Copley News Service February 08, 2003
The Pentagon revises battle after fighting in Afghanistan
By James W. Crawley
One big military success story out of Afghanistan was the satellite-guided bombs that blasted targets with unprecedented pinpoint accuracy.
But at first, Marines had to go through a cumbersome and inaccurate process to communicate the coordinates to airborne bombers so the smart bombs could hit the mark. Then, they noticed commandos using commercially available German-made binoculars, fitted with a laser rangefinder, that did the job quickly and efficiently.
Thanks to some fast feedback to the Pentagon, the Marines now have the same binoculars, cutting the time for an airstrike or an artillery barrage from minutes to seconds.
Hundreds of lessons like that one were gleaned by the Pentagon as it examined how U.S. forces fought in Afghanistan. Some of that knowledge - along with lessons from the Persian Gulf War and conflicts in Somalia and Kosovo - is changing the way the U.S. military would fight a war against Saddam Hussein or handle other conflicts. "We collect lessons learned so we don't make the same mistakes twice," said Col. Phil Exner, who led the Marine Corps' assessment of Operation Enduring Freedom. "We pay for mistakes in blood."
But the wrong lessons can be learned, too, say military officers and analysts.
The unusual nature of the war in Afghanistan - fought largely by special operations forces and warlord proxies against a rag-tag army - doesn't translate well to a war against Iraq, which has a large, trained army with tanks, air defenses and, the Bush administration contends, weapons of mass destruction.
"It is important to understand that this was a unique war fought under unique circumstances," said defense analyst Tony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who wrote an analysis of the Afghanistan campaign.
Cordesman argues it is too soon to write a textbook based on the conflict in Afghanistan, citing the limited military power of the Taliban, Afghanistan's unusual political sensitivities and geographical location, and the vast technological differences between the United States and Afghanistan.
Improvements
What have the armed services learned from Afghanistan?
The Marine Corps:
- CH-53 Super Stallion choppers proved to be a key to the Marines' long-distance strike into Afghanistan from ships off Pakistan. As a result, more long-range helicopters are being assigned to deployed Marine expeditionary units.
- Rucksacks, a vital part of a Marine's gear, must be strengthened and modified to handle harsh combat conditions.
The Navy:
- Training for Persian Gulf-bound warships has been changed to better fit the need to stop and search vessels for terrorists.
- A classified Web site was developed to provide ships with the most current security data about foreign ports and anti-terrorism intelligence.
- The SEALs, the Navy's commando force, are taking on a greater role, both at sea and ashore. The Navy also has increased its reliance on smart bombs and missiles for its carrier-based aircraft.
The Army:
- When soldiers wearing body armor lay prone, they found the high collars were pushing their helmets over their eyes. Troops are being issued new helmets.
- Standard-issue desert boots were no match for the rocky ground of Afghanistan.
The Air Force:
- Air Force commandos and pilotless drones are the new "eyes" locating targets for bombers.
- Cold War nuclear bombers, such as the B-52 and B-1, have a new lease dropping smart bombs near ground troops.
Additionally, the military witnessed the success of precision-guided ordnance like Joint Direct Attack Munitions, known as JDAM. Such weaponry would surely figure in a war against Iraq, military planners say.
Even so, the war in Afghanistan may offer even better lessons for wars after 2010, said defense analyst John Pike, president of GlobalSecurity.org.
If the United States develops vital national interests in areas where the military can't be predeployed - as it is in the Persian Gulf - then some of those lessons from Afghanistan, such as forward-operating bases and aiding coalition forces, will be critical, Pike said.
Each of the four services sent teams to Afghanistan and around the region to study what worked and what didn't during the first year of the terrorism war.
Also, experiences are being shared through the unofficial channel of the Internet as troops describe battles, such as Operation Anaconda, picking apart tactics and gear. Analysts say it's important to be a quick study.
"Lessons learned are often a snapshot in time and (Afghanistan) today is different from six months ago," said Col. Mike Hiemstra, director of the Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
"It's always challenging to be relevant. You have to turn things more rapidly."
The center's 65 officers and civilians are the Army's repository for new ideas. It was created in 1985 as a clearinghouse for tactics developed at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. But it has been expanded Army-wide and includes analysis of operations conducted with other branches of the military.
Out of Afghanistan, the center has examined how well the Army deployed units, such as the 10th Mountain Division; the teaming of regular and Special Forces units; and the reliability of soldiers' equipment, such as helmets, goggles and boots.
Exner said the Marines sent assessment teams to ships and units as soon as fighting started in November 2001.
"We didn't want to wait until something terrible happened or the war was over," he said.
He said the decision to study operations while they were still going on was based on wisdom gained from Desert Storm, when the Marines waited until after the fighting to collect information and found combatants' memories were already fading.
In Afghanistan and aboard ships, the 28-member Marine team watched, interviewed and took notes. The information was e-mailed to Quantico, Va., the headquarters of the Marines' training command, where another team cataloged and analyzed it.
Representatives from each of the Marine Corps' divisions - infantry, air and armor - scrutinized the data.
"In the past, lessons learned would sit and become lessons forgotten and later to become lessons relearned," Exner said.
Not the case, though, with the laser binoculars.
One of the Marines' biggest achievements was quickly obtaining the new laser binoculars to help forward air controllers, said Lt. Col. Andy Pfiester, the team's operations officer.
He said the previous target-sighting system was heavy, inaccurate, didn't provide range and distance information and took too much time to operate.
The German-built Viper binoculars, available on the open market, solved the problem and a shipment was rushed to the war zone.
"We got it into the hands of Marines within months instead of three to five years," Pfiester said.
Another lesson learned was the problems with the Corps' newly designed rucksack. Troops in Afghanistan discovered the backpacks, which utilize a plastic frame, did not hold up under 100-pound-plus loads or rough treatment.
At the assessment team's urging, the Marines are looking for a new design.
The Navy's Lesson Learned Program at the Navy Warfare Development Center in Newport, R.I., is trying to speed up the time it takes for new tactics and strategies to reach the service's classrooms and training centers.
To help, the center created a Web page that allows sailors to submit ideas, said Lt. Cmdr. Tom Rancich.
The program also has civilian staffers assigned to gather data at the fleet level.
"We're mining the operational forces for lessons learned," Rancich added.
Ideas are then researched and validated by Rancich's staff before being distributed to Navy commanders and training centers.
"We don't want to give them data; we want to give them knowledge," said Mark Warner, deputy director of doctrine at the center.
The center saw a spike in ideas for improving maritime interdiction operations - the use of warships to stop and search vessels for contraband or terrorists. The staff decided training needed to be improved. Within three months, according to Rancich, the new training was in place.
The center also helped create a one-stop Web site on the Navy's top-secret intranet. Ships, units and bases can check the site for information about terrorist threats around the world.
Less visibly, an eclectic group of naval officers and civilians, called Deep Blue, has been working for more than a year at the Pentagon for Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark.
The group has no budget and doesn't officially exist. The Navy would allow a top officer in the group, a captain, to be interviewed only if his name would not be published.
With only 16 people on staff, the captain said, "you won't find an odder group of ducks than in Deep Blue. We look for people who are a bit odd" rather than "follow-the-regs" desk jockeys.
Deep Blue serves as a conduit between the Navy's operations staff, fleet commanders and think tanks. Staffers have made several trips to Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf to find out how commanders and sailors are dealing with problems and new situations, and to identify ways to apply that knowledge.
The Air Force program, called Enduring Look, has developed a Web site listing some lessons learned by its personnel.
Having Air Force commandos on hand as "eyes on the ground" to direct airstrikes has proved useful, officials said. The process has improved bombing accuracy and helped reduce unintended damage and the need for follow-up airstrikes, Air Force analysts discovered.
GlobalSecurity's Pike thinks that's a mistake.
"Special Ops plus JDAM equals victory is not the right lesson," the think tank director argued.
While much attention has been showered on satellite bombs and Predator unmanned aerial vehicles, Pike said the military has largely ignored the plight of infantry soldiers, who might play the pivotal role if a war on Iraq devolves into urban street fighting.
"The infantry doesn't get the attention they need," he said.
Infantry veterans of Operation Anaconda have been voicing their opinions of good and bad tactics and gear on the Internet.
An Army first sergeant sent an e-mail that has been copied and re-copied on the Net, urging fellow soldiers to:
- "Go with what you know, stick with how you train."
- "I would also recommend wearing the body armor during all training. I doubt we'll ever fight without it again."
- Be ready for the cold and wind. "ChapStick, ChapStick, ChapStick. Sunscreen, sunscreen, sunscreen."
The e-mail, one of several found on the Internet, also discusses problems with close-air support, supplying troops in the field and uniforms.
Army officials acknowledge that there are many things to be learned and that not all the lessons come through official channels.
Many of the issues offered by soldiers are being taken to heart, the Army's Hiemstra said. Boots and helmets, both found lacking during Anaconda, are being replaced with improved versions as quickly as feasible, he said. Close-air support procedures are being corrected, he added.
The Pentagon must make sure good tactics are instilled in troops and sailors and that failings are not repeated, said Navy Capt. Jim Harrington at the Naval Warfare Development Center.
"If a lesson learned is recorded again and again, then it's not a lesson learned," he said.
Copyright © 2003, Copley News Service
