The Daily Telegraph January 6, 2003
British officer calls for system to prevent friendly fire deaths in Iraq
BY Michael Smith, with files from Doug Fischer
LONDON -- British ground troops should not be sent to fight in Iraq unless a system is in place to prevent accidental attacks by American aircraft, says a senior officer whose unit was bombed by friendly fire during the 1991 Gulf War.
In a potentially explosive letter published today in The Daily Telegraph, Lt.-Col. Andrew Larpent accuses the British defence ministry of "serious negligence" for failing to introduce a system that would prevent such accidents.
Lt.-Col. Larpent commanded the 3rd Battalion Royal Regiment of Fusiliers during the Gulf War. Nine of his men were killed and 12 seriously wounded when an American A-10 Tankbuster aircraft mistook them for Iraqi troops. The colonel's letter does not specifically mention the four Canadian soldiers killed in Afghanistan when an American F16 fighter pilot mistakenly dropped a 227-kilogram laser-guided bomb on them during training exercises in April.
It does say, however, that other NATO countries have done more to protect their troops from friendly fire since the Gulf War and that Britain's foot dragging is "difficult to excuse."
But an American defence analyst who has studied friendly fire extensively says the British situation is no different than that in the U.S., Canada or any other NATO country.
John Pike said that after the friendly fire deaths of more than 50 American and British soldiers during the Gulf War, the U.S. military has spent about $200 million to find ways to prevent fatal mistakes.
But the research has yet to come up with a system that will adequately allow ground and air forces to identify each other. In fact, Mr. Pike said last night, the various troops in Afghanistan are equipped with only minor improvements of the systems used in the Gulf War.
"They have come up with a series of protections against some specific kinds of errors, but there is still no universal system that might provide broad protection," he said.
In his letter, Lt.-Col. Larpent argues that British defence chiefs should make the fitting of an effective Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system to frontline army vehicles "a pre-condition of the commitment of British troops to close combat operations involving the U.S. air force."
But Mr. Pike said an effective IFF, one that would outfit all troops with a lightweight, wireless computer system to differentiate friend from foe, is still at least a decade away. Last year, NATO brought the U.S., Canada, Britain, Germany and France together to work on the IFF. NATO hopes to have the system in place by 2015 at the latest.
Mr. Pike argues that in most cases, an IFF system is probably needed less than changes to some of the command structures now in place and, in other cases, strict adherence to rules that have proved to be effective.
Indeed, U.S. and Canadian investigations into the incidents that killed the four Canadians concluded the American pilots failed to follow procedure and showed "reckless disregard" for the consequences. Investigators also discovered systematic shortcomings in the co-ordination between commanders on the ground and units in the air.
Lawyers for two U.S. National Guard pilots being court martialled over the killing of the Canadians have blamed the error on drugs that were given to the pilots. The courts martial will hear that, as a matter of routine since the Second World War, American combat pilots have been given amphetamine "go" pills to extend their ability to continue flying missions.
Lt.-Col. Larpent's letter doesn't specify what kind of technical protection system he wants the British defence ministry to implement, but he argues there has "been plenty of time over the past 12 years for a solution to this problem to be found."
The colonel argues that some of the men who served under him during the Gulf War are still in the regiment and are due to be deployed as part of 1 (U.K.) Armoured Division to fight alongside U.S. forces. One of those due to be sent to the Gulf is the brother of a soldier killed in 1991.
"That the same soldiers are now preparing to undertake operations in the same theatre with nothing more to protect them from their allies than the same fluorescent marker panels we carried on top of our vehicles smacks of serious negligence on the part of the ministry," Lt.-Col. Larpent says.
"Our chiefs of staff and politicians should consider very carefully the risk that they could be imposing on our troops and how they will answer to the nation if yet more British soldiers become casualties in similar circumstances."
Lt.-Col. Larpent's letter follows criticism of the Ministry of Defence by the National Audit Office and the House of Commons public accounts and defence committees of its failure to introduce an effective IFF system for Army vehicles.
Despite highly critical reports in 1992 and 1994 by the public affairs and defence committees, it was not until the 1998 strategic defence review that the ministry finally admitted that it could not produce an effective combat identification capability because the three services each had different equipment procurement procedures.
Although the procurement system has since been reorganized and work is going on to incorporate combat identification into the tactics and procedures of the three services, there is still no firm date for its completion.
Copyright © 2003 The Daily Telegraph
