Navy News Week November 18, 2002
Navies Overseas: China Buys Russian Vessels To Mount Naval Challenge To U.S.
BY DAVID ISENBERG
In the latest move of a seeming tit-for-tat arms buying cycle, China is said to be planning to buy top-of-line Russia warships to block U.S. attempts to confine the fast-growing expansion of Chinese forces.
Such a move is sparking fears of an intensifying cross-strait arms race between Taiwan and China.
The Taipei-based United Daily News said the People's Liberation Army plans to order Russian Akula nuclear submarines, as China's own efforts to develop new nuclear submarines is stalled by technical difficulties.
It said the Chinese navy (PLAN) also plans to buy two Slava-class cruisers armed with 16 P-500 anti-ship missiles, which, with a range of 550 kilometers (330 miles), could threaten U.S. battle carrier groups.
This year alone, China has ordered two new Project 956EM Sovremenny destroyers for $1.4 billion, eight Kilo submarines for $1.5 billion and two S-300F naval air defense systems for $200 million, according to media reports. The basis for this modernization dates back to the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, which raised military tension to a high level during a series of missile tests by the People's Republic of China.
The responsive deployment of a U.S. carrier battle group further concerned the Chinese military, which formed the impression that, if conflict breaks out in this region, U.S. involvement would be inevitable. At that time Chinese military forces were outclassed, with options ranging from few to none.
Since then, special attention has been given to naval development in China. According to a past report in Jane's International Defense Review, China currently is working hard to develop larger surface ships and SSBN, SSN and conventional submarines, aiming at acquiring the capability to blockade Taiwan and deter the involvement of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the Taiwan Strait in the next 10 years. According to GlobalSecurity.org, based in Alexandria, Va., the Chinese navy currently numbers approximately 260,000 personnel, with over 50 destroyers and frigates, about 60 diesel and six Han- and Xia-class submarines, and nearly 50 landing ships. This force is complemented by several hundred auxiliary and smaller patrol vessels, as well as a naval air arm of over 500, mostly obsolescent, fixed-winged aircraft and some 30 helicopters.
Over the last decade, the Chinese navy has streamlined and modernized its forces by eliminating large numbers of older ships and replacing them with fewer, more modern units. Force modernization has emphasized the addition of new, indigenously built destroyers, frigates, supply ships, landing ships, and other smaller vessels.
The size of the major surface combatant fleet has been relatively stable, with older ships slowly being replaced by newer Chinese-built destroyers and frigates. To increase the survivability of its surface combatants, the Navy seeks to acquire modern antisubmarine and antiaircraft systems. It has had little success in developing these systems and now seeks technical assistance from Russia.
In many respects, the Chinese navy is significantly inferior to U.S. navalforces. GlobalSecurity.org notes that it continues to have longstanding concerns about its capability to engage enemy aircraft, cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions.
This problem is becoming more significant as the navy strives to operate away from the protection of land-based air defenses. Chinese surface combatants have a limited, and primarily self-defense, anti-air warfare (AAW) capability. Only about twelve of its destroyers and frigates are outfitted with surface-to-air systems; the others are armed only with anti-aircraft artillery and possibly man-portable air defense systems.
In addition, Chinese warships lack the modern air surveillance systems and data links required for area air defense missions. The combination of short-range weapons and lack of modern surveillance systems limits the Chinese navy to self-defense and point-defense anti-air warfare only.
Consequently, except in unusual circumstances, no Chinese ship is capable of conducting air defense of another ship. Additionally, the Chinese could not reliably defend against either current or projected anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM).
Earlier this year, China ordered eight Kilo 636 submarines armed with Club-K surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) from Russia. It is planned that the submarines will be delivered to China within five years. Because of this, Russia is planning to produce these submarines simultaneously in different shipyards.
And in order to meet the needs in the transitional period, China purchased from Russia a further two Type 956ME destroyers, armed with longer range upgraded 3M80E supersonic missiles. By 2006, China will have seven 6,000-ton class large destroyers, and will have established a substantial naval force.
Yet, these acquisitions may be less worrisome than many think.
Russia does not think its sales significantly change the military balance. In August, in an interview with Moscow Vremya Novostey, military analyst Chzhan Ikhun said, "But it's all relative: Russia sells weapons that are second-rate, by Western standards, to China, but by the standards of Taiwan, Japan, and Eastern Asia, they're first-rate. For example, Russia agreed to equip the new lot of Kilo submarines with up-to-date Klub-S anti-ship missiles with a range of 220 kilometers. In the sustainer phase, these missiles are subsonic, but shift to supersonic at approach to target. Japan and Taiwan are alarmed, but the U.S. is indifferent. Their Air Force and Navy simply wouldn't allow the Chinese submarines to approach their main naval forces within launch range of the Klub-S."
Nor are the Russians the only ones who think this sale is much ado about nothing.
Piers Wood, for example, is a Washington-based defense analyst, and co-author of an article in the Autumn 2001 Naval War College Review on how China might invade Taiwan. Reached by e-mail he wrote:
"Our analysis indicated that the [Chinese navy, or PLAN] surface fleet's capabilities were not as crucial to the success of a cross-straits invasion as air superiority and sea denial operations by PLAN submarines.
The PLAN's submarines operating with the inherent advantage of diesel/battery silence [operationally advantageous only in close-in "home waters"] present U.S. CVBG's [as currently configured] with a worrisome set of problems, full of nasty little decisions between unsatisfactory alternatives. If a U.S. fleet had to go up against a PRC force that had rapidly achieved air superiority over the Straits before the U.S. intervened, it would be even worse for them.
"It's hard to imagine [U.S. aircraft carriers] sailing into the [Taiwan] Straits under such conditions, and there are substantial disadvantages to operating at long stand-off ranges. Both of these contingencies are plausible, and even a great increase in quality/quantity of PLAN destroyers/frigates/ etc. would not seem to alter that basic equation very much.
PLAN surface fleet ships would be sitting ducks-even in port-for U.S. naval air wings [that] had any kind of air superiority or parity. Moreover, the capabilities and size of the U.S. attack-submarine fleet would dramatically shorten the life expectancy of any PLAN surface vessels [that] left the shallows of the Chinese coast-regardless of the balance in an air war. Actually, I have no idea what the PLAN hopes to gain by upgrading their surface fleet-at such great cost. It seems they are shooting themselves in the foot by forgoing wiser expenditures on much, much more useful weapons platforms like diesel/battery submarines and high performance ground attack aircraft. Perhaps the R.O.C. and their U.S. allies ought to encourage this foolhardy PLA investments in Chinese weapons that might look impressive, but have marginal utility in a cross-straits offensive operation."
Indeed, even U.S. governmental analysts are not overly alarmed by China's buildup. The Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, released this past summer, noted that despite major strides in improving its armed forces, China would still have trouble invading Taiwan.
In discussing the success of an invasion scenario, it stated, "Beijing would have to possess the capability to conduct a multi-faceted campaign, maritime area denial operations, air superiority operations and conventional missile strikes. The PLA [People's Liberation Army] likely would encounter great difficulty conducting such a sophisticated campaign throughout the remainder of the decade."
China, of course, is not the only state in the area modernizing its forces. Over the years since Aug. 2, 1992, when the United States decided to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan, the United States has sold several billion dollars' worth of weaponry to Taiwan.
In terms of naval systems that includes 18 S-70 anti-submarine helicopters, 10 S-70CM anti-submarine helicopters, four MSOs (minesweepers, ocean); six Knox-class escorts and two Newport-class landing ships, which Taiwan leased from the United States, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and MK-46 anti-submarine torpedoes.
© Copyright 2002 King Communications Group
