Boston Globe October 14, 2002
US sees tactics, technology keys to Baghdad fight
By Robert Schlesinger
WASHINGTON - The Marines took heavy casualties in the early hours of the battle of al George, fighting street by street in what once was the military housing sector of George Air Force Base in the Mojave Desert. The four-day ''siege'' was full of hard lessons for the troops, who could be among the first US soldiers into Baghdad if the United States declares war on Iraq.
''In the beginning, we were taking a lot of casualties,'' said Lieutenant Buster O'Brien, an Acton native, recalling the intense training exercise. ''But it was great that we could take them here, because they were casualties born of sweat, not of blood.''
Iraqi leaders have vowed to draw any US attackers into the streets of Baghdad, raising what many analysts have described as a nightmare scenario of close-quarters fighting for the Iraqi capital. But 21st-century technology and tactics that focus on specific objectives rather than block-by-block conquest make urban combat a far less daunting prospect for US forces than it once may have been, according to more than a dozen officers, retired officers, and other military specialists.
The battle of al George, staged last August at the base 90 miles northeast of Los Angeles, was not an isolated exercise. As military strategists shift focus away from such Cold War scenarios as tank battles on the plains of Germany to more modern battlefields, military training has increasingly emphasized preparing for the dangers of urban combat.
The classic conception of urban fighting - taking Stalingrad or Berlin house by house - has been overtaken by the lessons of the United States' two most recent forays into cities: the relatively successful 1989 invasion of Panama and the debacle in Mogadishu, Somalia, that was chronicled in ''Black Hawk Down.''
''We can no longer do urban warfare the way we used to do it, and treat the city as an objective,'' said Jim Lasswell, a retired Marine colonel now with Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in Quantico, Va. ''You have to look at an urban area as just terrain, as an environment rather than as an entity, as jungle or a mountain range.''
The Gulf War taught Saddam Hussein the cost of leaving troops arrayed across the desert floor, where they were easy targets for allied warplanes. It is a mistake he cannot be expected to make twice. ''If they want to change the political system in Iraq, they have to come to Baghdad,'' Mohammed Mehdi Saleh, a senior member of Hussein's Cabinet, told the Washington Post last month. ''We will be waiting for them there.''
Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee last month, retired general Joseph Hoar, a former chief of US Central Command, painted a dark picture of the risks of urban warfare. ''You could run through battalions a day at a time,'' he said. ''It looks like the last 15 minutes of `Saving Private Ryan.'''
US military planners are acutely aware of the risks. A new ''Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations'' published last month warned that urban combat is ''mentally, physically, and emotionally exhausting,'' and said that units can last only a few hours before needing relief. ''When that is coupled with the high casualty rates normally associated with urban combat, the problem of reconstitution becomes a serious one,'' the report said.
But specialists in and out of the military question the assumptions underlying the ''Siege of Baghdad'' scenario, the first being that US war planners would let Hussein dictate the terms of the battle.
''To talk about urban operations presupposes that that's your only choice,'' said Army Colonel Jimmy Rabon, an aviator who now teaches at the National Defense University. ''You surround it and isolate it. You cut it off. There's other options to going door to door.''
Even if US war planners determine to take Baghdad, the assault would not focus on bulk conquest. When military planners examine cities, they look for key nodes and centers, objectives to be taken or destroyed. Those might include telephone exchanges, power supply, government buildings, or Hussein himself. ''You might not have to take and hold a whole city, which is what a lot of people are envisioning,'' said Army Colonel James Harris, an instructor at the National Defense University.
Still, there are good reasons to avoid urban combat. Soldiers must be aware of not only what is in front of them, but also what is behind, above, below, and around the next corner. Cities level the battlefield for US forces, compressing combat space and decision-making timelines and fracturing attacking forces. ''Urban combat is close combat, which nullifies some of the advantages the US typically has: See first, see farther, shoot first, shoot farther,'' said Dan Goure, a military specialist with the Arlington, V a.-based Lexington Institute.
One of the biggest US advantages that cities can neutralize is technology. For example, during the four-day training exercise in August, Marines found that the lasers they use to determine ranges or target precision munitions bounce off windows. The tall buildings of a city can also disrupt communications. The turning radius of the Humvees that are a military mainstay is too wide to operate effectively on city streets. A city can also play havoc with US close air support, particularly helicopters. ''Every weapon becomes a potential [antiaircraft] weapon,'' said Rabon, who flew in Mogadishu. ''An automatic weapon stuck out of a window becomes lethal.''
It would be a major problem in Baghdad: Iraq has one of the densest, most advanced antiaircraft networks in the world, with much of it placed in and around the capital city. ''The Iraqis are going to be able to enforce a no-fly zone over Baghdad,'' said John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a Virginia-based defense think tank.
Many specialists believe superior training could be the biggest advantage for US fighters. The United States has been training hard for urban combat for 10 years, while ''the training of the [Iraqi] Republican Guard for urban warfare is pretty perfunctory,'' said Anthony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
In addition to the lessons of Panama and Mogadishu, military planners also have learned from watching the Israelis operate in the occupied territories. Rabon recalled how in Mogadishu they learned the importance of using Kevlar blankets on the floors as protection in helicopters. Flying tactics are also important. ''If you fly high everybody sees you, you're a target for everybody in the city,'' he said. ''If you fly low, fly fast, you actually reduce your signature.''
More broadly, the 1993 Mogadishu battle, where 18 US soldiers lost their lives, drove home for the military the importance of being able to quickly communicate and direct soldiers in cities. ''We've been exploring tactics of using infantry on rooftops to keep the rooftops clear and protect the aviation when they come in,'' Lasswell, the retired Marine colonel, said. ''Instead of leading with your aviation, you lead with your ground forces.''
While tanks and infantry have typically fought as discrete units, the Marines have started combining them, putting a single tank with a squad, relearning a tactic used during World War II. They've also sharpened tactics in dealing with casualties: Urban environments often preclude calling in a helicopter to fly out wounded. In exercises, Marines use modified John Deere Gator four-wheel vehicles, which offer less of a target, to take out casualties. And they've changed patrol strategy, employing a ''satellite'' pattern of spreading out and doubling back to catch any trailing enemies.
And while cities lessen the US technological advantage, they do not eliminate it. In their August exercise, the Marines used the Dragon Eye, a drone plane that could fly overhead and beam pictures back down, giving them a view of the area. It is not deployed yet, but could be in time for a conflict with Iraq. While bright city lights can somewhat diminish US soldiers' ability to ''own the night,'' they remain far better able to operate in the dark than any opposition.
Laser- or GPS-guided bombs and rockets can also be used to great effect in an urban environment. They can be crucial in terms of destroying a single site while leaving much of the surrounding infrastructure intact.
Baghdad itself lacks some of the traditional urban obstacles: There are virtually no tall buildings to block communications, for example. And many important government buildings are in the kind of open spaces that make inviting targets for bombardment.
© Copyright 2002 Globe Newspaper Company.
