Agence France Presse September 29, 2002
Saddam's army could turn to city conflict to avoid desert storm
BY FRANCIS TEMMAN
Amidst the heavy mix of veiled and blunt warnings of a new Gulf War, intense attention is focusing on what kind of war the US military might fight in Iraq.
Some reports talk of 100,000 soldiers being sent to handle the campaign to bring down Saddam Hussein, five times fewer than the force that lay waste to the Iraqi army in 1991 after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
But there is also intense speculation about the military tricks Saddam may have up his sleeve. And having learned the hard way from Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Iraq's army may this time try to lure US soldiers into urban fighting, where casualties could multiply. The prospect of elite Iraqi army units turning Baghdad into a fortress is the "nightmare scenario," said Joseph Hoar, a retired general and former head of the US Central Command.
The Washington Post on Friday quoted senior government officials and diplomats in Baghdad expressing similar fears about Iraqi tactics.
"They believe they have a tactical advantage in the cities because they can mix with the civilian population," the newspaper quoted one unnamed diplomat as saying.
"If soldiers start sniping from apartment buildings filled with people, what can the Americans do? They can't very well blow them up."
During the 1991 war, Iraq lost thousands of soldiers in its vast southern desert. The United States was able to inflict heavy casualties on an army entrenched mid-desert and exposed to air strikes and artillery fire.
"If they want to change the political system in Iraq, they have to come to Baghdad. We will be waiting for them here," the daily quoted Mohammed Mehdi Saleh, a senior member of Saddam's cabinet, as saying.
There has been no visible military buildup in Baghdad in recent weeks.
And John Pike, director of globalsecurity.org in Washington, said there were no regular army divisions in Baghdad but there are two Republican Guards divisions on the outskirts of the capital and a third in Karbalah, close to Baghdad.
Pike also expressed concern about concentrations of Iraqi fighters with sniper weapons and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).
"There might be sufficient provocation for US forces to open fire and kill a lot of civilians in the process," he said.
"Saddam's strategy is to do what he can to provoke the Americans into killing a lot of civilians and to prolong that process. He's basically hoping that he can turn Bagdad into a big Jenin," a West Bank refugee camp where Palestinians accused the Israelis of a massacre.
"I am worried about a battle of Baghdad that would look a little bit like Panama City in 1989 where the US winds up killing a lot of civilians," he added, refering to the US campaign to bring down Panama dictator Manuel Noriega.
Former general Hoar told US lawmakers last week that there would be a US victory "but at what price?" as he expressed fears of US shells landing on densely-populated Baghdad neighbourhoods.
Experts and veterans like Hoar said Iraq would surely not repeat its 1991 error by fighting in the desert, where Iraqi forces could not match US technological superiority.
Iraq may have more soldiers but control of the skies, better technology and more informed intelligence is the key to victory now, experts said.
But in urban areas, such superiority is less important as there is greater scope for ambushes, greater problems identifying the enemy and a higher risk of casualties.
"We have to be prepared to fight block by block in Baghdad," said Hoar. "All our advantages in command and control technology and mobility are in part given up and you are working with corporals and sergeants and young men fighting street to street."
Wesley Clark, who led US forces in Europe from 1997 to 2000, said the United States had to "try to attack the forces that are in the urban areas first. You want to try to prevent other forces to reinforce them, and second, you want to get your own forces in there to prevent the emergence of a fortressed Baghdad as rapidly as possible."
Brian Jenkins, an analyst at the Rand Corporation, said the US army was aware of the risks and had been working on avoiding prolonged fighting in cities.
Jenkins, a former Special Forces captain, highlighted the "awful" experience of the Russian army as it battled to take the Chechen capital, Grozny, from rebel forces.
"Baghdad can be taken but as casualties mount on the American side, Bagdad ends up looking like Berlin in 1945," he said.
"We may have to be extremely pragmatic as well and make sure that there are opportunities for people to defect, save themselves. We don't want to create a situation where anyone thinks they have to fight to the death, so we can avoid creating a new Alamo."
Copyright 2002 Agence France Presse
