Scripps Howard News Service September 19, 2002
Options for a military strike against Iraq
By LISA HOFFMAN
- The endgame is clear - rid Iraq of the "evil" regime of Saddam Hussein. How to do so is all that remains to be decided.
That is the unstated message President Bush and his national security team are sending to the United Nations and beyond this week, serving notice that the mighty weight of American power will be wielded, once and for all, to accomplish that end.
That conviction remained unwavering, even after the Iraqi President's offer Tuesday to allow U.N. weapons inspectors in to hunt for chemical and biological toxins complicated the situation.
Bush and his military leaders are weighing a range of diplomatic, economic and military methods to finally force Saddam and his police state from power.
According to military experts at the Center for Defense Information, Jane's Intelligence Review and GlobalSecurity.org, war planners are likely to mix and match the options, each with its own sets of risks and repercussions. Options include:
- Foment a coup. With this strategy the CIA and U.S. commandos would curry favor with disaffected members of Saddam's regime, supply them with covert intelligence and other aid, and then back up a coup attempt with U.S. bombs and missiles against Saddam's elite Republican Guard and armored divisions.
While this approach would avoid a large-scale commitment of U.S. forces and give at least the veneer that the change in government sprang from within, it also could be a years-long endeavor with too-high odds of failure. This option is rated a long shot by defense analysts.
- The Afghan model. The game plan here would be to mobilize the Iraqi Kurds in the north and the Shiia Muslims in the south to battle Saddam's army, much as the Northern Alliance and southern warlords took on the Taliban in Afghanistan. U.S. special forces would train and coordinate the proxy fighters, who could number as many as 25,000, and organize punishing air strikes by U.S. combat planes against Iraqi military targets.
Unlike Afghanistan, however, combat-ready military militias do not currently exist among the Kurds, Shiia or any of the exile opposition groups. Arming and training them could take several months, and for this option to succeed, significant numbers of Iraq's army would have to flip sides and join the revolt. Defense experts expect any U.S. military operation to include these indigenous fighters, though most likely in a supporting role.
- Operation Desert Storm II. Like the ponderous 1990-91 operation - which took six months to stage and involved 500,000 U.S. forces - this plan would require a massive buildup of U.S. troops, though only about half the number who fought the Persian Gulf War.
After weeks of hundreds of U.S. warplanes bombing thousands of Iraqi military and infrastructure sites, a U.S. invasion force with tanks and artillery would swarm into Iraq from Kuwait, Qatar, the Persian Gulf and, perhaps, other directions. Simultaneously, special forces commandos or covert CIA operatives would hunt down Saddam's suspected weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to lob them, as well as the Iraqi dictator himself.
Major drawbacks of this approach include at least three months required to mass so many American soldiers and armament, and the vulnerable target that large concentrations of U.S. troops would make for Saddam's alleged chemical and biological weapons.
Plus Kuwait, at least for now, has signaled opposition to being a staging area, and other Gulf states are equally leery. And, given the deterioration of Saddam's military capability from its generally sorry shape a decade ago, and the vast improvement in U.S. weapons, this could amount to a costly oversupply of forces needed for victory.
- Inside-Out Plan. For now, this evolving strategy appears to be finding the most favor, although the Bush administration is keeping its cards uncommonly close to its collective vest.
Cobbling together some of the elements of the other options, war planners envision this as a quick, deep strike towards Baghdad with the goal of decapitating Saddam's command structure, collapsing his government and sowing chaos among his army, spurring a widespread revolt.
Air strikes would radiate outwards from Baghdad, while a U.S. ground force of 50,000 to 90,000 troops would seize other cities in a rapid advance from Kuwait, and possibly Turkey, to Baghdad, where they would destroy Saddam's elite Republican Guard troops. This, in theory, would lead to a domino-effect army mutiny or mass surrender.
One advantage of this plan is that it could be launched as quickly as two weeks after Bush gives his okay. Another is that, if executed well, the plan could keep Saddam from being able to order pre-emptive deadly weapons strikes against Israel or U.S. troops.
Copyright 2002 Scripps Howard News Service
