Boston Globe July 31, 2002
US planners see a weaker Iraqi leader
By Robert Schlesinger
WASHINGTON - President Saddam Hussein of Iraq this month marked the 34th anniversary of the revolution that brought his Baath Party to power by issuing bluff proclamations of his invulnerability.
''You will never defeat me this time, never,'' Hussein said in a speech broadcast to his nation. ''Even if you come together from all over the world and invite all the devils, as well, to stand by you.''
Hussein has never lacked for bluster. But what he does lack - according to current and former US officials, Iraqi defectors, and military specialists - is a functional war machine. Eleven years after the Gulf War, Iraq's armed forces are worse off than they were at the end of that conflict.
While an oddly public debate unfolds in Washington about precisely which military strategy would best achieve President Bush's oft-stated goal of a regime change in Baghdad, there is little doubt that US troops could handily defeat the Iraqi armed forces.
''They're much weaker than they were at the time of the Gulf War,'' said Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon's influential Defense Policy Board. ''They've had 10 years, during which time their capabilities have deteriorated. They've got one-third today what they did in 1991, and it's the same third, 11 years older.''
US military planners are considering three options for an attack on Iraq: deploying special forces to support opposition groups, sending an overwhelming force as large as 250,000 soldiers, or using a combination of special forces, opposition groups, and about 50,000 US soldiers.
The biggest military problems facing administration strategists in a war against Iraq are the possibility that Hussein will deploy weapons of mass destruction and the challenge of organizing a new government after Hussein's fall. Those questions are expected to be debated tomorrow when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings on Iraq. Administration officials have repeatedly said that President Bush has not made a decision on military action to oust Hussein.
At the time of the Gulf War, the Iraqi dictator's armies were 1 million men strong, including 5,500 tanks among roughly 67-70 divisions. Currently, they consist of roughly 424,000 troops, including 2,200 tanks among roughly 23 divisions. But the raw numbers do not properly illustrate the state of the Iraqi armed forces.
''Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional war technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War or to produce any major new equipment,'' Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies wrote in a draft assessment of Iraqi capabilities being prepared for the Naval War College. ''Much of its large order of battle is now obsolescent or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat.''
The main Iraqi armed forces are divided into three groups: the army, the Republican Guard, and the Special Republican Guard.
The five corps of the army would present the least resistance to US troops. ''They're poorly outfitted, poorly supplied, poorly paid,'' said Danielle Pletka, a former staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who is now at the American Enterprise Institute.
Most estimates are that about 40 percent of the Iraqi Army's units are combat ready, though other estimates put the level as low as 30 percent.
The Northern and Southern Corps of the Republican Guard are better fed and trained and are viewed as likely to put up a fight. They also have better equipment. For example, the Republican Guard has several hundred of the more modern Soviet T-72 tanks. Some units have Iraqi-assembled T-80s, according to the Iraqi National Congress, an anti-Hussein organization, but those tanks are said to be less reliable because they were assembled in Iraq.
The Special Republican Guard is virtually the only armed force allowed in Baghdad. The commanders, all drawn from Hussein's home city of Takrit, are the most loyal and trusted in the armed forces. Trained in urban warfare, those soldiers would form Hussein's last line of defense.
While Iraq remains the largest military in the region, its mission has changed, several specialists said. ''He ... went to regime security and internal security,'' one US official said. ''Power-projecting went by the wayside.''
Rebuilding efforts have focused on trying to punch up an air defense that was shredded by US sorties 11 years ago.
''With air defense in Iraq, there is an open budget,'' said a former Iraqi officer now working with the Iraqi National Congress, who spoke on condition of anonymity. The Iraqi National Congress estimates that Iraqi air defense has 180 antiaircraft missile launchers, 800 more shoulder-launched antiaircraft missiles, 1,500 antiaircraft artillery batteries, and 1,500 antiaircraft machine guns.
The biggest unknown and the biggest risk facing US military planners is the extent to which Hussein has been able to rebuild his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. United Nations inspectors were kicked out of Iraq in 1998, and Iraqi scientists have been able to toil unmonitored since then.
Hussein would have no reason to hold back those weapons if the United States attacked with the explicit goal of driving him from power. Specialists fear that he might target US troops or Israel, trying to rally Arab support to his cause. But some specialists believe that the United States could deter Hussein's troops, if not Hussein.
''You are not talking about Saddam Hussein standing up and dumping chemical weapons or nuclear weapons on US troops; you are talking about people doing it for him,'' said Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute. ''We say to whoever does this ... We're going to find you, and you'll be brought to account. Do you really want to do this?''
The loyalty or at least the passivity of Iraqi troops and the Iraqi populace is another uncertainty. Though some specialists worry about the possible loss of many lives in house-to-house fighting in Baghdad, some military analysts say that once it becomes clear that Hussein will be removed, his regime will crumble.
''What keeps Saddam Hussein in power today is the idea that he will be in power tomorrow,'' said John Pike of GlobalSecurity.org. ''When the 18th Airborne Corps shows up in Baghdad, that will [wipe out] that presumption.''
The extent to which the Iraqi opposition can contribute forces could have a great effect on US plans. Fawzi al-Shamari, a former Iraqi general who defected in late 1986 said that if he is given six months, he could rally an effective fighting force from the various disaffected groups.
''As soon as they hear the US is serious, they will revolt,'' Shamari said recently. ''We already have the seeds there. If we feed that, we will control all Iraq.''
But other specialists question the extent to which the groups would be able to muster forces.
''There's a lot of in-fighting between the various opposition groups, so it's going to be difficult getting a synergistic combination of capabilities,'' said one US defense official. ''They're all light infantry-type groups, so at best you're going to get a tactical victory.''
According to published reports, there are three main plans being considered by US military officials.
The first model, favored by Wayne Downing, a retired general who recently resigned from the National Security Council staff, apparently over differences in Iraq strategy, would use air power and special forces to support Iraqi opposition. Critics of this approach argue that the Iraqi opposition is not as effective a fighting force as the Northern Alliance was in Afghanistan.
''The problem with the Downing plan is that it uses a small amount of force precisely and therefore could easily go wrong,'' said Loren Thompson, director of the national security program at the Lexington Institute, a research group. ''The smallest defect in intelligence could screw up the whole operation.''
The second model, a traditional plan to deploy overwhelming force, would use as many as 250,000 soldiers to wipe out Hussein and his supporters. Critics of that approach argue that such a large force smacks too much of an army of occupation. The critics say that having internal opposition as part of the liberating forces will be important for whatever government is put in place to replace Hussein.
Some military specialists say that overwhelming force does not make good use of the lessons of Afghanistan and the technological advances made since the Gulf War. They also say that Hussein is unlikely to sit back idly and wait for the United States to put all its pieces in position.
The third option is one that uses US air supremacy, Iraqi opposition groups with US special forces troops, and deployment of a 50,000-strong US force that would conduct rapid operations aimed at toppling Hussein.
© Copyright 2002 Globe Newspaper Company.
