The Guardian (London) December 8, 2001
Strategy switch
Winter was coming, civilian casualties were on the rise, and TV pictures of the bombing were threatening the broad coalition which the US and Britain - and notably Tony Blair and the US secretary of state, Colin Powell - had built. Washington was impatient.
This wobble brought a switch in strategy. Rather than hold the Northern Alliance back from Kabul for political reasons, the US threw its full weight behind the opposition fighters attacking Taliban forces north of the capital, and then further north, including at Mazar-i-Sharif. Special forces were sent to alliance front lines to help direct withering B-52 bombing raids on Taliban front lines, backed up by low-flying C-130 gunships, and transport planes dropping 14,000lb "daisy-cut ter" bombs the size of lorries. By November 2, air strikes against front line targets accounted for 80% of missions flown.
The US "prepared for a long campaign but, because they were very frustrated, they escalated militarily", Nigel Vinson of the Royal United Services Institute, said.
And the Northern Alliance, for all its internal divisions, did "a very good job of taking advantage of the air campaign", said Theresa Hitchens, at Washington's Centre for Defence Information. "Politically, we didn't want to go there, but militarily we had no choice."
John Pike, a military analyst at GlobalSecurity.org, an online intelligence newsletter, said: "The first preference would have been for Pashtun groups to be in Kabul rather than the Northern Alliance but the cookie didn't crumble that way."
The politicians have been left to sort out the legacy of this strategic choice, but militarily the success of the "northern strategy" was stunning; as the bombing increased, so did Taliban defections.
"Defections were a critical factor," said Michael Clarke, director of the centre for defence studies at King's College, London. as was the psychological effect of bombs.
Allies on the ground - proxy fighters, - were also vital: Afghans were the foot soldiers. The conflict was also suited in the end to special forces. They are sure to have a role elsewhere in the war on terror.
This was a war the US prosecuted with support from Britain and others, and help from Pakistan, but without any Nato involvement. The Kosovo conflict two years ago made Washington wary of fighting wars "by committee".
The lessons of the Afghan campaign could profoundly influence the conduct of warfare for years to come. The role of bombing seems secure. And the US may be emboldened to take on new military challenges in the believe that substantial casualties on its side can be avoided.There is no doubt, that the US public, administration and military establishment are, barring an endgame disaster in Afghanistan, considerably emboldened to look for a new adversary.
Americans will start to "believe there is an instant formula for regime change", Mr Pike said, "you add air power and microwave for three minutes and hey, presto, you've got a new regime."
Copyright 2001 Guardian Newspapers Limited
