A
New Era: From SAC To STRATCOM
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:
A New Era: From SAC to STRATCOM
Author: Major Jon M. Fontenot, United States Air
Force
Thesis: With the end of the cold war, is there a
need for the United States Strategic
Command?
Background: The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was created
on March 21, 1946
and
assigned the mission of deterring aggression through "long range offensive
operations
in any part of the world" and "maximum range reconnaissance over land
or
sea". During the first year, SAC's personnel loss was 63 percent and
aircraft loss
was
78 percent; the losses were due to the demobilization after World War II. But
during
the next two years, SAC's personnel and aircraft gains helped establish the
command.
When General Curtis E. LeMay became SAC's third commander, the
morale
in the command was low. But General LeMay would change the attitude in
the
command and make the command one of the elite places to work. During his
tenure
(almost nine years), General LeMay instituted a strenuous training program to
make
all units combat ready. SAC was very good at its job, but unexpectedly the
threat
was over--the Warsaw Pact was gone, the Berlin Wall fell, and the Soviet
Union
dissolved into independent states. General Butler was the chief architect with
dissolving
SAC and the start-up of the United States Strategic Command
(STRATCOM).
He worked very closely with General Colin Powell, Chairman of the
Joint
Chiefs of Staff, on the roles and missions and structure of STRATCOM. The
only
question was when would the change take place. STRATCOM took over the
same
mission of SAC, but with one twist. STRATCOM has authority over all
nuclear
weapons. The future for STRATCOM depends on two items: the Nuclear
Posture
Review and the restructure of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).
The
Nuclear Posture Review is a comprehensive look at the nations nuclear weapons
and
how the nation employs them. While SIOP is the means to employ the weapons,
the
planning takes 18 months. STRATCOM knew this was too long and developed a
plan
to reduce the time from 18 to 6 months (adaptive force planning).
Recommendation: STRATCOM is still needed to deter other
nations from using or
procuring
nuclear weapons, but DoD must continue reviewing our the nation's need
for
STRATCOM and nuclear weapons.
OUTLINE
Thesis: With the end of the cold war, is there a
need for the United States Strategic
Command?
I. History of the Strategic Air Command
A. Origin
B. Weapon Systems
C. Role in World Conflicts
II. SAC to United States Strategic Command
A. Changing World Climate
B. Origin
C. Mission
D. Centralized Command Structure
III. United States Strategic Command's Future
A. Nuclear Posture Review
B. Re-engineering the Nuclear War Plan
A NEW ERA: FROM SAC TO STRATCOM
Introduction
From 1946 to 1992, our Nation depended
on the Strategic Air Command
(SAC)
to conduct long-range nuclear attacks on the former Soviet Union, if ordered.
The
world had to live with the threat of a nuclear holocaust like a dark cloud,
threatening
the extinction of all mankind. SAC was the command held responsible
for
keeping that cloudburst from exploding. But with the end of the Cold War,
SAC's
nuclear deterrence mission was still needed, though less urgent. During this
time,
all the services were reviewing their role and missions and going through a
very
difficult
personnel drawdown. So a dramatic change took place June 1, 1992, with
the
restructuring of the Strategic Air Command to the United States Strategic
Command
(STRATCOM). Placing our nuclear forces under one commander makes
sense.
Not only do you have one voice on all strategic nuclear planning and
weapons,
but you improve efficiency and delete duplication.1 The improved
efficiency
is in planning and execution in case of a nuclear war and consolidating
requirements
for nuclear policy. In examining why STRATCOM is needed and its
future,
one must first look at SAC's history.
SAC's
History
The Strategic Air Command traces its
origins back to World War II. The
bombers
and fighters of the Eight Air Force and Fifteenth Air Force in Europe and
the
Twentieth Air Force in the Pacific were part of the overall strategic air arm
helping
defeat Germany and Japan, but the most important bomber missions were the
atomic
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. H. H. (Hap) Arnold, the Air Force's
first
Chief of Staff, declared: "The influence of atomic energy on air power can
be
stated
very simply. It has made air power all-important." After the war in an
effort
to
keep strategic bomber superiority, USAAF created SAC.2
SAC was created along with two other
major air commands: the Air Defense
Command
and the Tactical Air Command on March 21, 1946. SAC's original
mission
statement was given by General Carl Spaatz:
The Strategic Air Command will be
prepared to conduct long range offensive
operations in any part of the world either independently or in
cooperations
with land and naval forces: ...to
provide combat units capable of intense and
sustained combat operations employing
the latest and most advanced
weapons...[and] to train units and
personnel for the maintenance of the
strategic forces in all parts of the
world.3
Primarily, SAC was the nation's long
range strike force, deterring nuclear war
through
strict readiness and supporting other operations by maintaining heavy
bombers
for conventional bombing.4 General George C. Kenney was the first
commander
and given the order to assemble SAC with 100,000 personnel and 1,300
aircraft,
which included B-29 bombers, nine heavy bomb groups, two fighter groups,
one
reconnaissance wing and one air transport unit. There were 18 active bases in
the
continental U.S.5 SAC's headquarters at this time was at Andrews Air Force
Base
(AFB), Maryland.
1948 was a significant year for the new
command. Their headquarters moved
to
Offutt AFB, Nebraska and the new commander was General Curtis E. LeMay who
served
the longest of any U.S. military force commander (19 October 1948 to 30 June
1957).
During his SAC tenure, personnel grew from over 49,000 to over 224,000;
SAC
bases went from 21 CONUS to 38 CONUS and 30 overseas; and SAC started to
receive
an increasingly larger portion of the defense budget. With the introduction of
KC-135
tankers, who provided in-flight refueling, bombers could strike anywhere in
the
world. Gen. LeMay was instrumental in procuring the B-47 and B-52 force
which
were sustained by KC-97 and KC-135 tankers.6
SAC's third commander was General
Thomas S. Power and was responsible
for
initiating bomber ground alert. The ground alert concept was to maintain
approximately
one-third of its aircraft on the ground, weapons loaded, and crews
prepared
for immediate takeoff.7 The alert concept was a result of world conditions
at
the time. The Soviet Union's move towards advanced technology and tense
relations
with Stalin made immediate retaliatory strike force a necessity.
Under Power's command, SAC adopted the
slogan "Peace Is Our
Profession".8
This slogan can be viewed as a result of SAC's underlying position:
nuclear
war was considered a final act. By maintaining alert crews and planes loaded
with
weapons, the U.S. was dispatching a message to the Soviet Union and other
hostile
countries.
SAC wanted their presence felt all over
the world. SAC reached its personnel
zenith
of over 282,000 and operations and maintenance budget of over $750 million.9
During
the 1950s, SAC received 47 percent of the U.S. military budget. Jerry
Miller,
Vice Admiral (retired), stated, "Back in those days, it was SAC against
the
Navy
and the Tactical Air Command. SAC had all the money. The best thing you
could
do was get assigned to a SAC base. They had everything."10 The reasons
were
simple: (1) SAC was the nations deterrent against the Soviet aggression, (2)
SAC
had two-thirds of the nuclear triad (B-52 bombers and ICBMs), and (3) SAC had
the
only strategic war planning system to build the Single Integrated Operational
Plan
(SIOP).
From 1964 to 1973, SAC's B-52s,
KC-135s, and reconnaissance aircraft flew
thousands
of bombing, air refueling, and reconnaissance missions in Southeast Asia.
SAC
forces helped defeat the 1968 North Vietnamese siege of Khe Sanh and blunted
the
enemy's 1972 spring offensive. With the Linebacker II campaign in December
1972,
SAC played a key role in forcing North Vietnam back to the peace tables.
Although
the bomber's mission was tactical at first, by June 1966, B-52s were
dropping
8,000 tons monthly and becoming a strong strategic force in the war against
the
Viet Cong.11
SAC's B-52s conventional capability was
used instead of their primary mission
of
nuclear bombing during the Gulf War. During Desert Storm, one B-52 could
deliver
fifty 750-pound bombs of high explosives that shattered buildings and strategic
targets.
Ensuring the bombers could reach their targets, the KC-10 and KC-135
provided
the aerial refueling support while stationed throughout Saudi Arabia and
bordering
countries, as the "gas station in the air" for coalition aircraft.12
The
KC-135
also was used to move high priority cargo from CONUS to the Kuwaiti
Theater
of Operations. Also, SAC's U-2, TR-1 and RC-135 aircraft helped Gen.
Schwarzkopf
see and shape the battlefield. This shift from nuclear to conventional
use
of bombers is not new. With the emergence of third-world countries and their
fight
for independence, our defense policy makers and military leaders see world
powers
shifting from a less likely global nuclear war to a regional, conventional
conflict.13
Our forces and warfighting capabilities must reflect current conditions.
Again
the role of SAC's aircraft during any conflict proved critical: Their aircraft
provided
the strategic bombing, while the tankers provided the aerial refueling support
for
strategic and tactical aircraft. If SAC was so successful at its missions, why
was
the
Strategic Air Command disestablished and a new command called United States
Strategic
Command created? The answer lies in the changing world climates and the
role
of the super powers.
SAC
to STRATCOM
The world political environment during
the Cold War was fairly stable.
SAC's
operational planning capability was tailored for the Cold War. But, with the
U.S.S.R.
dissolving into independent states and nuclear arms reduction pacts signed,
SAC's
purpose was no longer essential. Even General Butler, Commander-in-Chief
of
SAC, had questions how long SAC could endure.14 When the Conventional
Forces
in Europe agreement was signed, this was a signal to the end of the Cold War
and
SAC; however, when President Bush ordered bombers, tankers, and missiles off
alert
in September 1991--SAC was history.15 No longer would B-52s and KC-135s
sit
on alert year in and year out; no longer would the EC-135 "Looking
Glass"
continue
24 hour airborne alert; no longer would the intercontinental ballistic missiles
be
targeted at the U.S.S.R. After 46 years of protecting the nation from U.S.S.R.
aggression,
SAC was out and a new strategic command was needed. Deterrence is
not
an Air Force mission, General McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff stated.
"For the
nation,
deterrence is a joint mission, requiring a joint command."16
Placing the nation's nuclear war
planning under one command, as
STRATCOM,
was not new. General Curtis LeMay proposed the same idea in 1959,
but
Gen. LeMay ran into opposition from the United States Navy. The Navy could
not
envision a USAF command controlling their nuclear missile carrying submarines.
The
dispute goes back to the USAF B-36 versus the USN super carrier
agreements.17
Instead of having our nuclear weapons under one authority, the
Department
of Defense (DoD) settled for a compromise--the Joint Strategic Targeting
Planning
Staff (JSTPS). JSTPS was formed in 1960 and directed by the Joint Chiefs
of
Staff. The Commander-in-Chief of SAC was designated the JSTPS director with a
Navy
Vice Admiral for vice-director. The JSTPS was a very large planning team of
Air
Force, Navy and Army personnel. SAC and the Navy got along well and there
were
enough of the triad of nuclear weapons to go around.18 This was going to
change
due to the end of the Cold War and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
(START).
START I was a success story having been
initially proposed in 1982 and
signed
in 1991, but the more significant START II almost did not occur. After
signing
START I in late 1991, the Soviet Union separated into the Commonwealth of
Independent
States (CIS). Four of the CIS (Russia, Belarus, Kazkhstan, and Ukraine)
controlled
the former U.S.S.R.'s nuclear weapons. START I calls for the United
States
and the four CIS to reduce strategic missile warheads by 25 percent and
ballistic
missile warheads by 40 percent and 48 percent respectively.19 With both
sides
making progress under START I, START II is the more significant treaty to
complete
the nuclear arms reductions.
START II was signed by President Bush
and President Yeltsin in Moscow on
January
3, 1993 and made dramatic changes in both nation's ballistic missile
program.
Multiple warheads are banned and strict limits on the number of warheads
at
sea were placed. Once the treaty is ratified by each nation, by 2003 the U.S.
will
have
cut its nuclear warheads to 3,500 and the CIS to 3,000. A significant change
from
the Cold War period where over 75,000 tactical and strategic warheads were
aimed
at each other.20
It is no overstatement to say General
Butler, the last CINCSAC and the first
CINCSTRAT,
started the process to disestablish SAC and create USSTRATCOM.
While
General Butler was Vice-Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, of the
Joint
staff (later director), he undertook secret negotiations with the Soviets
directed
by
Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in August 1988.
Gen.
Butler made several trips to the Soviet Union and saw the decay in the cities,
current
living conditions, and deteriorating military infrastructure. From his
prospective,
the Soviet Union was in a state of collapse. After long negotiations the
U.S.
and Soviets agreed in June 1989 to end the Cold War.21
General Powell was now the new CJCS and Gen. Butler recognized that the
Chairmen
and his Joint Planners needed to be on the same course. Gen. Butler laid it
out
straight:
General [Powell], I think the Cold War
is over. We are about to see a
sweeping transformation of the
international security environment. That
is...for you to take the United States
Armed Forces down an entirely new
path,.. [involving] sharp reductions, a
revision of roles and missions...22
General
Powell's reply was, "I wholeheartedly agree and let me lay out for
you
some of the details."23 General Butler went through a four step process:
(1)
paradigm
changes on plug and programming against the former Soviet Union, (2)
new
"base force" concept, (3) total rewrite of NATO strategy and force
structure, and
(4)
revision of the National Military Strategy.24 General Butler was responsible
for
Minuteman
II force deactivation, B-52G retirement to the bone yard, taking 75
percent
of tankers out of inventory and the accompanying draw down of SAC
personnel.
Gen. Butler took command of SAC on
January 25, 1991 and probably knew he
was
the last CINCSAC, but was unsure of the timetable for forming STRATCOM.
The
transformation did develop sooner than most anticipated. During this time
period
with
the Cold War over, budget constraints, the CJCS setting the stage for
STRATCOM
as early as the summer of 1992, and the survival of SAC's aerial assets
to
the budget, General Butler came to the same conclusion--time to deactivate
SAC.25
When I added one, two, three and four I
got zero; time to deactivate SAC.
Step aside, let the Air Force
reorganize and create the conditions for a
transition to STRATCOM without having
to worry about where SAC might
fit.26
On June 1, 1992, three ceremonies
occurred: the stand up of Air Combat
Command
(ACC), Air Mobility Command (AMC), and the United States Strategic
Command
and the stand down of Tactical Air Command, Military Airlift Command,
and
Strategic Air Command. ACC and AMC are USAF major commands while
STRATCOM
is a unified command.27 STRATCOM, located at Offutt AFB in
Nebraska,
is the only unified command having a unique combatant command
authority.
It has sole authority over nuclear forces: missiles and submarines,
bombers,
tankers, and airborne command posts.28
STRATCOM's
Mission
STRATCOM's mission is to deter a major
military attack on the United States
and
its allies, and should deterrence fall, employ strategic forces. Their command
goals
are to: (a) establish USSTRATCOM as the leading authority on strategic
matters,
(b)develop capabilities and posture forces to meet strategic objectives, (c)
develop
force employment plans and STRATCOM's role in defense planning and
system,
(d) effectively employ assigned forces in strategic operations, and
maintain
strong, cooperative relationships with other CINC's services and
agencies.29
As directed by the National Command
Authority, STRATCOM performs a
wide
variety of missions from posturing bombers, missiles and submarines to deter
attack,
to preparing the nation's nuclear war plan (the Single Integrated Operational
Plan).
STRATCOM conducts world-wide strategic reconnaissance, and maintains
state-of-the-art
command, control, and communications and intelligence support
networks
linking forces, which are ready to respond 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
STRATCOM is the key link between
national strategy and nuclear forces.
Creating
this command improved the
Defense
Department's ability to deal
with
complex strategic nuclear
weapon
issues of the future. Placing
all
strategic forces under one
command
has improved efficiency
and
eliminated duplication.
CINCSTRAT
is responsible for
integrating
strategic nuclear policy, requirements planning, and operations across
service
lines. Whether in peace, war, or crisis, STRATCOM and its component
commanders
share a close working relationship (see figure above).30
Click
here to view image
STRATCOM's
Future
William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense
agrees the U.S. must maintain our
nuclear
forces in sufficient size and capability.31 But as the defense budget declines,
personnel
are reduced, and more bases are closed, what is the future of STRATCOM?
For
STRATCOM to survive in the 199Os and beyond, they must concentrate on the
following:
(1) nuclear posture review and (2) re-engineering the single integrated
operational
plan.