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04 May 2000

Text: Neumann's Senate Testimony on U.S. Policy Toward Libya

(Asst. Secy says U.S. policy toward Libya remains consistent) (2400)
"U.S. policy and policy goals vis-a-vis Libya have remained consistent
through three Administrations," Ronald E. Neumann, deputy assistant
secretary of state
for Near Eastern Affairs, told Congress May 4.
"Our goals have been to end Libyan support for terrorism, prevent
Tripoli's ability to obtain weapons of mass destruction and contain
Qadhafi's regional ambitions," Neumann said in testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs.
He added that an additional aim of the U.S. is to bring to justice the
persons responsible for the bombing more than 11 years ago of Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The trial of two Libyans accused
of the terrorist act that killed 270 people opened May 3 in the
Netherlands. Neumann pointed out that Libya's surrender of the
suspects came as a result of intensive efforts by the U.S. to bring
them to trial.
Since Muammar Qadhafi's 1969 coup, the U.S. policy agenda towards
Libya has been focused on Libya's sponsorship of terrorism, support
for groups violently opposed to Israel and the Peace Process,
preventing Tripoli's efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction and
unhelpful activities in neighboring African states, Neumann said.
Neumann testified that Libya no longer poses the threat it once did on
terrorism, opposition to Middle East peace, and regional intervention
and U.S. efforts to impede Libya's WMD and missile programs have had
substantial success.
However, he said, "we must continue to watch Libya closely and will
maintain pressure until all of these concerns are fully addressed."
The U.S. will continue to oppose lifting UN sanctions against Libya
"until we are satisfied that Libya has met all the relevant UN
Security Council requirements."
Neumann also said the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
regarding investment in Libya's petroleum sector will continue to be
considered until, as the statute prescribes, the President has
determined and certified to Congress that the UNSCR requirements have
been met. "Also until that time, we expect to maintain core unilateral
economic sanctions prohibiting U.S.-Libyan business."
Following is the text of Neumann's testimony:
(begin text)
Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs
Ronald E. Neumann
May 4, 2000
I appreciate the invitation to speak to you on current U.S. policy
towards Libya and welcome the opportunity to address a topic of
interest to many members. We have achieved significant success in
meeting long established goals, but this is a continuing story whose
ending is as yet unclear.
U.S. policy and policy goals vis-a-vis Libya have remained consistent
through three Administrations. Our goals have been to end Libyan
support for terrorism, prevent Tripoli's ability to obtain weapons of
mass destruction and contain Qadhafi's regional ambitions. Since
Lockerbie, we have added additional aims, including bringing the
persons responsible to justice. I would like to discuss current
developments in the context of U.S. policy goals and unilateral and
multilateral efforts on behalf of these goals, and consider what
remains to be done.
Prior to the Qadhafi regime, we enjoyed a generally warm relationship
with the Libyans and pursued policies centered on our interests in
operations at Wheelus air force base with its 4,600 Americans the
considerable U.S. oil interests, and other key issues.
After Qadhafi's 1969 coup, the relationship quickly soured. Concerns
about Libya's foreign policies came to dominate our policymaking.
Chief among these concerns are state sponsorship of terrorism, support
for groups violently opposed to Israel and the Peace Process,
preventing of Tripoli's efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction
and unhelpful activities in neighboring African states. Since that
time, the U.S. policy agenda towards Libya has been focused on these
concerns.
Although our commercial relationship with Libya flourished throughout
the 1970s, the political relationship deteriorated, marked by
confrontation and by intermittent reconciliation attempts on both
sides. In the 1980s, we ended the long-standing commercial
relationship and rejected any possibility of reconciliation so long as
Libya pursued its policies of concern. We imposed sanctions
piece-by-piece in response to Libyan support for terrorism, beginning
with the disapproval of all further military sales to Libya and the
designation of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979. We
ultimately imposed comprehensive sanctions on all commercial and
financial transactions with Libya under an executive order in 1986.
The unilateral sanctions regime against Libya has remained one of the
most comprehensive.
Also, in 1986, we identified Libya as responsible for the La Belle
Disco bombing and in retaliation bombed select military and
terrorist-related targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. Our judgment on
Libyan responsibility for the bombing was recently given additional
credibility by new testimony in the Berlin trial of the La Belle
bombing suspects.
In the wake of the La Belle bombing, our European allies finally began
to coordinate efforts against Libya. The EU resolved to reduce Libyan
diplomatic presence abroad, embargo arms sales to Libya and encourage
policy and security cooperation against Libyan support for terrorism.
We obtained UN Security Council support against Libya for its
sponsorship of terrorism following evidence of Libyan involvement in
the tragic 1988 Pan Am 103 and 1989 UTA 772 bombings. In 1992 and
1993, the Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling on
Libya to surrender the suspects, accept responsibility for the actions
of its officials, pay appropriate compensation, disclose all it knew
of the crime and cooperate with the criminal investigation, cease all
forms of terrorist action and assistance to terrorist groups, and
prove its renunciation of terrorism by concrete actions. The Security
Council imposed civil aviation, financial, and diplomatic sanctions
against Libya.
Carefully targeted, UN sanctions against Libya were for many years one
of the most successful multilateral sanctions regimes. Rigorously
observed sanctions succeeded in isolating Libya and limiting its
access to dollars and other hard currencies for almost a decade.
However, two years ago, support for the international sanctions began
to fade. Deliberate violations by some states were increasing. We
found little support to upgrade or even maintain the international
sanctions.
For ten years, the United States made every effort to bring the
perpetrators of the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103 to justice.
Libya's surrender of the Pan Am 103 suspects came as a result of our
intensive efforts to bring them to trial. Beginning in the fall of
1997, along with the British and the Dutch, we developed a detailed
plan for a trial before a Scottish court seated in the Netherlands.
After we unveiled the plan in August 1998, the UN Security Council
unanimously endorsed the initiative and again urged Libya to surrender
the suspects. International opinion welcomed this proposal, Libya
finally turned over the suspects, under the terms we had laid out. The
U.S. engaged in no negotiations and placed no restrictions on the
prosecutors' freedom to follow the evidence. The Scottish trial in the
Netherlands will be a genuine criminal proceeding, conforming with the
rules and traditions of Scottish jurisprudence, and the prosecution
will follow the evidence wherever it leads. Since the Libyan suspects'
surrender, they have awaited trial in a Scottish jail in the
Netherlands. The trial began yesterday and is expected to take some
time.
Over time, faced with UN and U.S. sanctions, as well as the attendant
political isolation, Libya has reduced its support for terrorism and
sought to distance itself from terrorist groups. As reported in
Patterns of Global Terrorism for the last two years, Libya has not
been implicated in any international terrorist act for several years
and has taken important steps.
Libya has expelled the Abu Nidal Organization, uprooting its
infrastructure and seeking to eliminate any ANO presence in Libya. It
has cooperated with other intelligence services in the region to
deport remaining ANO members from Libya. Ironically, the ANO has
publicly threatened terrorist retaliation against Libya.
In addition to withdrawing its support from Palestinian groups that
oppose the Peace Process, Libya has thrown its support to Chairman
Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. The Libyan Government has told
all Palestinians that the Palestinian Authority is the only address
for their concerns. Given Libya's status as one of the original Arab
radical states, this support for the Palestinian Authority represents
an historic policy shift toward peace that we should all welcome.
In the last year, Libya has imposed visa restrictions to limit the
ability of terrorists to enter its territory as a haven.
Libya has also cooperated with Egypt, Jordan and Yemen against
terrorist groups. In the context of the Arab League Interior
Ministers' agreement to cooperate on counter-terrorism, we have seen
the extradition of a number of suspected terrorists between Libya and
Jordan and Libya and Yemen.
While we recognize positive steps Libya has taken, a number of issues
remain on which Libya must act. One key question is what else remains
for Libya to do on terrorism to show that the break is permanent and
not just opportunistic. Libya should comply with the U.N. Security
Council Resolutions, including payment of appropriate compensation,
acceptance of responsibility for the actions of its officials,
renunciation of and an end to support for terrorism, and cooperation
with the Pan Am 103 investigation and trial. In October 1999, Libya
allowed the Scottish investigators to travel to Libya and obtain
access to requested witnesses and documents. We will insist that any
similar, future requests be granted and that Libyan witnesses be able
to testify in The Netherlands unimpeded. Such Libyan cooperation is an
explicit UN Security Council requirement, before UN sanctions are
lifted. It is also a concrete way for Libya to demonstrate that it has
changed its policy, not just its rhetoric, on terrorism.
We want to see Libya sever all remaining ties with and support for
terrorist groups. That would include terminating all contacts, travel
on Libyan soil, and financial assistance. We also seek clear and
concrete Libyan support for the Peace Process, including the
underlying principles of the Madrid process. Such steps would be a
concrete, definitive way for Libya to demonstrate its abandonment of
violent opposition to the Peace Process and cessation of its support
for opponents of peace. In this regard, we are closely watching
Libya's talks with the EU and possible participation, with Israel and
the Palestinian Authority, in the Barcelona Process. Looking to the
future, we would like Libya to join and comply with certain
international anti-terrorism conventions, which it has indicated a
willingness to do.
We remain concerned about Libyan programs to develop weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems. British authorities at
London's Gatwick Airport recently intercepted Scud missile parts
interdicted at Gatwick bound for Libya. We seek to prevent Libya's
efforts to acquire WMD and delivery systems and encourage other
countries to do the same. Multilateral efforts to contain these Libyan
programs have, thus far, achieved substantial success. We would like
to see Libya join the Chemical Weapons Convention and comply with the
CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention. These actions would signal
its seriousness of purpose and be an important, concrete step toward
more responsible behavior.
Libya's recent record on intervention outside its borders is less
clear and requires close attention. Libya continues to be deeply
engaged in Africa, including Sierra Leone, Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea,
and Sudan. We want to see it play a constructive role. For example,
Libya has joined with Egypt to push for a negotiated resolution of the
longstanding conflict in Sudan. We support the mediation efforts led
by East African states under the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development, because its Declaration of Principles spells out the key
issues which must be resolved for achievement of a just, lasting
settlement. At same time, we have stepped up effort to cooperate with
Egypt in the search for peace, as a single, unified process stands the
best chance of achieving a settlement in Sudan. However, given the
long history of dangerous intervention by Libya outside its borders as
well as more recent reports of providing arms throughout the region,
we will continue to take steps to ensure that Libya seeks to resolve,
rather than aggravate, regional conflicts.
There has been intense press speculation and some Congressional
interest about possible changes to travel-related restrictions for
Libya. In March, the Secretary authorized a consular trip to Libya for
the specific, limited purpose of assessing whether there continues to
be an "imminent danger" to U.S. travelers. An "imminent danger" was
the factual, legal basis for imposing a restriction on the use of an
U.S. passport for travel to, in, or through Libya in 1981. Based on
all reports, we believed it was appropriate to assess the situation on
the ground for ourselves. The Department is still reviewing the trip
findings as well as other relevant information, including reports from
European diplomats, our Protecting Power, and travelers to Libya.
Speculation about the outcome of this review would be premature;
however, knowing of your interest in the matter, we will continue to
stay in close contact with you on this issue.
On our key concerns -- terrorism, opposition to Middle East peace, and
regional intervention -- Libya no longer poses the threat it once did.
On WMD and missiles, our efforts to impede Libya's programs have had
substantial success. That said, we must continue to watch Libya
closely and will maintain pressure until all of these concerns are
fully addressed. Our goal continues to be to deter Libyan policies of
concern. An improved bilateral relationship is not, in itself, an end.
We will oppose lifting UN sanctions against Libya until we are
satisfied that Libya has met all the relevant UN Security Council
requirements. The provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
regarding investment in Libya's petroleum sector will continue to be
considered until, as the statute prescribes, the President has
determined and certified to Congress that the UNSCR requirements have
been met. Also until that time, we expect to maintain core unilateral
economic sanctions prohibiting U.S.-Libyan business.
Again I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to
appear in front of the Subcommittee on these important issues, and
would welcome the opportunity to address any specific questions you
might have.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)