April 20, 1999
Current and Growing Missile Threats to the U.S.
Lilley, Hon. James R., former U.S. Ambassador to China, the
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC.................. 34
Prepared statement of........................................ 39
Schlesinger, Hon. James R., former Secretary of Defense, former
Secretary of Energy, and former Director of the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency............................................ 15
Prepared statement of........................................ 18
Schneider, Hon. William, Jr., former Under Secretary of State for
Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, adjunct fellow,
Hudson Institute, Washington, DC............................... 26
Prepared statement of........................................ 31
Walpole, Robert D., National Intelligence Officer for Strategic
and Nuclear Programs, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, prepared statement.................................... 53
S. Hrg. 106-339
BALLISTIC MISSILES: THREAT AND RESPONSE
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 15 AND 20, MAY 4, 5, 13, 25, 26, AND SEPTEMBER 16, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
<snowflake>
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-777 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
CURRENT AND GROWING MISSILE THREATS TO THE U.S.
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Chuck Hagel
presiding.
Present: Senators Hagel and Frist.
Senator Hagel. Good morning.
Today's hearing is the second of a series of hearings
focused on the threat of ballistic missile attacks on the
United States, the urgent need for missile defenses and the
need for the United States to disassociate itself from an
obsolete arms control agreement, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty.
This morning we have three distinguished witnesses. The
first panel will consist of Dr. James Schlesinger. Dr.
Schlesinger has held many important senior national security
positions in the U.S. Government. He has served as Director of
Central Intelligence, Secretary of Defense and Secretary of
Energy. Presidents of both parties have repeatedly sought Dr.
Schlesinger's counsel and assistance.
Dr. Schlesinger, we are very proud and pleased to have you
with us this morning.
On the second panel is Dr. William Schneider, who was a
member of the Rumsfeld Commission and is an adjunct fellow at
the Hudson Institute. Dr. Schneider is also the president of
International Planning Services and is the former Under
Secretary of State for Security Assistance.
Mr. Secretary, when you come to the table, we will be
grateful for your presence and contribution as well.
Our third witness is the Honorable James Lilley, former
U.S. Ambassador to Korea and China. He has a long and
distinguished career in intelligence, national security, and
diplomacy.
Ambassador Lilley is currently a resident fellow and
director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.
I assume he will be along shortly. I do not see him yet, but I
know that he will be here.
America's national security lies in the interests of
preventing the proliferation of ballistic missile and warhead
technology. According to unclassified information from the
Defense Intelligence Agency, at least 10 countries have
operational ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 500
kilometers. Within the next decade, that number will grow again
by half, to 15.
Many of these nations--Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North
Korea--are clearly hostile to the United States. Two things are
certain. First, any of the countries I have just mentioned
could launch a ship-based ballistic missile strike against a
U.S. city today.
I wish to be clear on this point. Every U.S. coastal city,
from Seattle to Bangor, Maine, faces the present and growing
danger of ballistic missile attack.
Last year, the Rumsfeld Commission warned that the sea-
launch option is very real and very plausible.
Similarly, our intelligence community has warned that
forward basing from dedicated vessels or freighters could pose
a missile attack threat to the United States in the near-term.
The ranges and capabilities of ballistic missile programs
are growing rapidly, largely due to the assistance given these
programs by Russia and China. This will translate into the
achievement of ICBM capability for several countries.
One country, in particular, is in the final stages of
developing an ICBM. Last August, North Korea stunned everyone
by launching a version of the Taepo Dong-I missile, which had a
third stage. While we have known about the Taepo Dong-I missile
for several years, we did not expect North Korea to stack a
third stage on it to give the system intercontinental range.
The U.S. intelligence community has warned that with this
missile, North Korea has the ability to deliver small payloads
to ICBM ranges.
Moreover, North Korea has worked on the Taepo Dong-I with
implications for its other, even longer-range, missile, the
Taepo Dong-II. As we have learned more about this program, we
have become increasingly concerned that the missile could be
used to attack cities in Alaska and Hawaii.
Now the U.S. intelligence community judges that with the
staging technology demonstrated on the Taepo Dong-I, North
Korea's Taepo Dong-II could probably reach the rest of the
United States, depending on the size of its payload.
In other words, North Korea is on the verge of fielding a
ballistic missile capable not only of striking my home State of
Nebraska, in the exact middle of the United States, but
anywhere in the United States.
Just as troubling, the Rumsfeld Commission warns that Iran
could join North Korea in its ability to inflict major
destruction on the United States within about 5 years of a
decision to acquire such a capability.
All of this, of course, is in addition to the omnipresent
threat of deliberate or accidental attack against the United
States by Russia or China, both of whom have numerous ballistic
missile capabilities and both are capable of destroying U.S.
cities.
Obviously, with such a serious threat growing steadily
worse, one would assume that the United States would have
deployed long ago a missile defense system to protect the
American people. One would assume that the Federal Government
would have made certain by now that the United States is never
exposed to the threat of ballistic missile attack.
Well, such assumptions are wrong. The United States has no
defense against this threat.
This administration, in fact, aggressively blocked every
effort by the Congress to implement a national missile defense
system, to the point of vetoing an entire defense bill because
it mandated the immediate deployment of a missile shield.
The fact is the United States is vulnerable to nuclear and
biological tipped missiles.
This morning's two panels will focus on this issue and the
tangential issues that accompany missile defense. Again, on
behalf of my colleagues on the committee and Chairman Helms, we
are grateful that the three of you would take your time to come
up to share with us your thoughts and make a contribution to
this effort.
With that, let me now ask the former Secretary of Energy
and Defense, and former CIA Director--a complete public
servant--Jim Schlesinger, for his testimony.
Mr. Secretary, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, FORMER SECRETARY OF ENERGY, AND FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE
UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the invitation of the committee
to discuss the possibilities of ballistic missile attack
against the United States and the defenses that we might deploy
to protect against such an attack.
In the time limited, I can, of course, touch only on a few
major points. First, the prominent political role of the United
States in the world makes it a prime target for resentful
nations. Its military preponderance will spur other nations to
seek asymmetrical ways of threatening to inflict pain on this
country, thereby hoping to limit our response to actions on
their part.
There is a variety of ways to inflict such pain and, thus,
a variety of potential threats. Ballistic missile attack is one
prominent possibility. But there are others, including cyber
attack, chemical attack, and biological attack.
As you know, the Department of Defense is devoting
increasing attention to such possible attacks. It has recently
established the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Threat
Reduction Advisory Committee.
Among such possible threats, that of ballistic missile
attack is the most dramatic, if not necessarily the one of
highest probability. The potential is there already and will
likely grow in the near-term.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the recent test of the
Taepo Dong missile by North Korea is but an harbinger of what
will inevitably come. In both South Asia and Southwest Asia,
ballistic missile capabilities have already been demonstrated
and are undergoing rapid development.
While such capabilities are not of intercontinental range,
they could threaten American bases or American allies and could
be transported closer to the American mainland to make them
potential threats to the mainland.
Despite international efforts to restrict the spread of
technology, it is spreading and will do so increasingly. Unlike
some of the other potential threats referred to earlier, the
ballistic missile threat will remain a national threat rather
than a threat of terrorist subgroups.
Still, the number and variety of such potential threats
will grow and, thereby, foster a high degree of uncertainty,
contrasting to the cold war, when the source of the threat was
clearly known.
I stress both this potential and this variety since it
underscores the complexity and some difficulties in deploying
appropriate, even if limited, missile defenses.
Third, to achieve a suitable ballistic missile defense, one
that could cope with a limited attack, should, in my judgment,
be a major objective in U.S. defense policy. Both Houses of
Congress have now passed legislation endorsing a policy of
near-term deployment. Extended as the controversy over that
legislation may have been, now comes the truly difficult part--
determining the architecture of the ballistic missile defense
to be deployed. While we seek a thin area defense, we must
avoid just any defense, especially one designed against a
narrowly defined threat.
Any such defense could turn out to be simply a token. The
worst possible outcome would be a limited defense focused too
narrowly on a single threat and one that could readily be
circumvented.
It is crucial that we not confuse a ballistic missile
defense with a relatively simple weapon system, such as the F-
15. A ballistic missile defense would be a complex system of
systems, selected from a range of possible deployments,
combinations of sensors, and capabilities of interceptors. The
choice of systems architecture is crucial. One could all too
easily wind up with an unduly constrained system, lacking
capability against the range of emerging threats.
In this connection, I suggest that we should be wary of the
very limited system proposed for deployment in Alaska or by
some in North Dakota, which might deal with a rudimentary
threat, let us say, from North Korea, and with little else.
The architecture of any system chosen for deployment should
be subject in advance to rigorous technical analysis. Above
all, it should not be so constrained as to lack the capability
for growth to cope with the growing variety of threats.
In choosing among alternative architectures, systems
adaptability and flexibility should be prerequisites.
In choosing a system architecture, we must be assured in
advance that the system can be adapted to the broad range of
threats which may emerge. Consequently, we should avoid any
impulse leading to a rush to acquisition.
Fourth, in this connection, we must remain alert to the
possibility mentioned in the Rumsfeld Commission report, that,
before nations can develop ICBM's capable of reaching the
United States, they could deploy shorter-range ballistic
missiles on ships. You mentioned this in your opening
statement, Mr. Chairman.
A ballistic missile defense, let us say, to Alaska, could
not cope with such a threat. In selecting a system
architecture, we must remain mindful of such a possibility so
that some hostile country does not get the impression that it
could have a free ride.
In this connection also, we must be alert to and exploit
the possibilities for intelligence. Some of the South Asian
nations, including those we term rogue states, have limited
shipbuilding capability or, for that matter, limited sea-faring
experience. We should be alert to the construction or the
modification of ships that could be used for this purpose and
to the possibility of collecting information from the
multinational crews that might be hired for such a purpose.
Gathering such intelligence would create the opportunity of
interdiction in a number of forms. But such possibilities drive
home the point that what we must avoid is a ballistic missile
defense deliberately constrained and focused on a narrowly
defined threat.
Fifth, this brings us, Mr. Chairman, to the controversial
issue of the restraints imposed by the ABM Treaty of 1972, as
modified.
An adequate defense cannot be attained within the present
framework of those constraints. Consequently, to deploy a
suitable defense would require either the modification or the
abrogation of the existing treaty.
I should observe that I agree with some of the critics who
believe that we are not legally bound by a treaty with a State
that has simply disappeared and has disintegrated into its
component parts.
Nevertheless, the treaty does exist. It is part of the
international environment and, irrespective of its legal force,
there are political advantages as well as disadvantages in its
continuation.
Unquestionably, we would pay a political price in simply
abrogating the treaty, as some urge. In particular, we should
not casually damage our political relationship with Russia in a
way that simultaneously would damage the Russian prestige and
make the Russians less cooperative with us. Particularly this
is so given the presently disturbed relationships arising from
differences reflecting Russia's long-term association with
Serbia.
Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, we must now allow ourselves to
be precluded from deploying suitable defenses by the treaty in
its present form. What I would suggest is that the United
States move firmly toward deployment of a suitable and adequate
thin area defense, preferably within the framework of the
treaty. This would require substantial modification to permit a
system architecture that could deal with the emerging range of
threats.
But we must bear in mind that the Russians have a much
greater stake in the preservation of the ABM Treaty than do we.
It is that treaty and other arms control agreements with the
United States that provide much of Russia's continuing
international prestige.
A modification of the ABM Treaty, as opposed to its
abrogation, which permitted the United States to deploy a thin
area defense in a manner that does not challenge a continuing
Russian retaliatory capability would seem to be in Russia's
interest, particularly so as Russia itself may come to be
threatened by spreading nuclear capabilities among rogue
nations and others.
Yet in moving toward modification of the treaty, we must
convey to the Russians that we are firm in our commitment to
deploy an efficient, if limited, defense and that we must have
treaty modification sufficient to allow a flexible and
adaptable architecture. To negotiate for something less, which,
regrettably, would be an easy temptation, might leave us in
that position of deploying a fixed, limited, and ultimately, a
virtually token defense. Sufficient modification must be our
clear objective--not minimal modification that would leave us
with little more than a token defense.
Sixth, and finally, in the period ahead, a limited nuclear
attack on the United States regrettably will become a growing
possibility. It could come from a variety of perpetrators. I
should have said a limited missile attack on the United States.
It could come from a variety of perpetrators. Because of the
range and the novelty of such possibilities, it will likely be
difficult to achieve an early assessment of missile buildup or
pending attacks among the candidate nations. We should,
therefore, move with all deliberate speed toward an effective
defense of the United States against such missile attacks.
But we must also remember that such an attack need not come
primarily from ballistic missiles. Most notably, we must
simultaneously be alert to the proliferation of cruise missiles
and move toward an effective defense against cruise missiles,
which will likely constitute the next turn in the road.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be delighted to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. James R. Schlesinger
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the invitation of the Committee to discuss the
possibilities of ballistic missile attack against the United States--
and the defenses that we might deploy to provide protection against a
limited attack. In the time allotted, I can, of course, touch only on a
few major points
1. The prominent political role of the United States in the world
makes it a prime target for resentful nations. Its military
preponderance will spur other nations to seek asymmetrical ways of
threatening to inflict pain on this country, thereby hoping to limit
our response to actions on their part. There are a variety of ways to
inflict such pain--and thus a variety of potential threats. Ballistic
missile attack is one prominent possibility. But there are others
including cyber attack, chemical attack, and biological attack. As you
know, the Department of Defense is devoting increasing attention to
such possible attacks. It has recently established the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency and the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee.
2. Among such possible threats, that of ballistic missile attack is
the most dramatic, if not necessarily the one of highest probability.
The potential is there already and will likely grow in the near term.
The recent test of the TAEPO-DONG missile by North Korea is but a
harbinger of what will inevitably come. In both South Asia and
Southwest Asia ballistic missile capabilities have already been
demonstrated--and are undergoing rapid development. While such
capabilities are not of intercontinental range, they could threaten
American bases or American allies and could be transported closer to
the American mainland--to make them potential threats. Despite
international efforts to restrict the spread of technology, it is
spreading and will do so increasingly. Unlike some of the other
potential threats, referred to earlier, the ballistic missile threat
will remain a national threat rather than that of terrorist subgroups.
Still the number and the variety of such potential threats will grow--
and thereby foster a high degree of uncertainty contrasting to the Cold
War, when the source of the threat was clearly known. I stress both
this potential and this variety, since it underscores the complexity
and some difficulties in deploying appropriate, even if limited,
missile defenses.
3. To achieve a suitable ballistic missile defense--one that could
cope with a limited attack--should in my judgment be a major objective
in U.S. defense policy. Both Houses of Congress have now passed
legislation endorsing a policy of near-term deployment. Extended as the
controversy over that legislation may have been, now comes the truly
difficult part: determining the architecture of the BMD to be deployed.
While we seek a thin area defense, we must avoid just any defense,
especially one designed against a narrowly-defined threat. Any such
defense could turn out to be simply a token. The worst possible outcome
would be a limited defense focused too narrowly on a single threat, and
one that could readily be circumvented.
It is crucial that we not confuse a BMD with a relatively simple
weapon-system, such as the F-15. A BMD would be a complex system-of-
systems, selected from a ranch of possible deployments, combinations of
sensors, and capabilities of interceptors. The choice of system
architecture is critical. One could all too easily wind up with an
unduly constrained system lacking capability against the range of
emerging potential threats. In this connection, I suggest we should be
wary of the very limited system proposed for deployment in Alaska,
which might deal with a rudimentary threat, let us say, from North
Korea--and with little else.
The architecture of any system chosen for deployment should be
subject in advance to rigorous technical analysis. Above all, it should
not be so constrained, as to lack the capacity of growth to cope with a
growing variety of threats. In choosing among alternative
architectures, system adaptability and flexibility should be
prerequisites. In choosing a system architecture, we must be assured in
advance that that system can be adapted to the broad range of threats
which may emerge. Consequently, we should avoid any impulse leading to
a ``rush to acquisition.''
4. In this connection, we must remain alert to the possibility
mentioned in the Rumsfeld Commission report that, before nations can
develop ICBM's capable of reaching the United States, they could deploy
shorter-range ballistic missiles on ships. A BMD with circumscribed
sensors and confined, let us say, to Alaska could not cope with such a
threat. In selecting a system architecture, we must remain mindful of
such a possibility--so that some hostile country does not get the
impression that it could have a free ride.
In this connection also, we must be alert to and exploit the
possibilities for intelligence. Some of the South Asian nations,
including those we term rogue states, have limited shipbuilding
capacity or for that matter seafaring experience. We should be alert to
the construction or the modification of ships that could be used for
this purpose--and to the possibility of collecting information from the
multi-national crews that might be hired for such a purpose. Gathering
such intelligence would create the opportunity of interdiction in a
variety of forms. But such possibilities drive home the point that what
we must avoid is a BMD deliberately constrained and focused on a
narrowly-defined threat.
5. This brings us to the controversial issue of the restraints
imposed by the ABM Treaty of 1972, as modified. An adequate defense
cannot be attained within the present framework of those restraints.
Consequently, to deploy a suitable defense would require either
modification or abrogation of the existing treaty. I should observe
that I agree with some of the critics who believe that we are not
legally bound by a treaty with a state that has simply disappeared and
has disintegrated into its component parts. Nonetheless, the treaty
does exist. It is part of the international environment and,
irrespective of its legal force, there are political advantages as well
as disadvantages in its continuation. Unquestionably we would pay a
political price in simply abrogating the treaty, as some urge. In
particular, we should not casually damage our political relationship
with Russia--in a way that simultaneously would damage their prestige
and make the Russians less cooperative with us. Particularly, this is
so given the presently disturbed relationship arising from differences
reflecting Russia's long-term association with Serbia.
Nevertheless, we must not allow ourselves to be precluded from
deploying suitable defenses by the treaty in its present form.
What I would suggest is that the United States move firmly toward
deployment of a suitable and adequate thin area defense preferably
within the framework of the treaty. This would require substantial
modification to permit a system architecture that could deal with the
emerging range of threat. But we must bear in mind that the Russians
have a much greater stake in the preservation of the ABM Treaty than do
we. It is that treaty--and other arms control agreements with the
United States--that provides much of Russia's continuing international
prestige. A modification of the ABM Treaty (as opposed to its
abrogation) which permitted the United States to deploy a thin area
defense in a manner that does not challenge a continuing Russian
retaliatory capability would seem to be in Russia's interest--
particularly so as Russia itself may come to be threatened by spreading
nuclear capabilities among rogue nations and others.
Yet in moving towards modification of the treaty, we must convey to
the Russians that we are firm in our commitment to deploy an efficient,
if limited, defense and that we must have treaty modification
sufficient to allow a flexible and adaptable architecture. To negotiate
for something less (which regrettably would be an easy temptation)
might leave us in that position of deploying a fixed, limited, and,
ultimately, a virtually token defense. Sufficient modification must be
our clear objective--not minimal modification that would leave us with
little more than a token defense.
6. In the period ahead, a limited missile attack on the United
States regrettably will become a growing possibility. It could come
from a variety of perpetrators. Because of the range and the novelty of
such possibilities, it will likely be difficult to achieve an early
assessment of missile buildup and pending attacks among the candidate
nations. We should, therefore, move with all deliberate speed toward an
effective defense of the United States against nuclear attack. But we
must also remember that such an attack need not come primarily from
ballistic missiles. Most notably, we must simultaneously be alert to
the proliferation of cruise missiles, and move toward an effective
defense against cruise missiles--which will likely constitute the next
turn in the road.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
If I could call your attention to the last page of my copy
of your testimony, I will just quote a sentence back to you,
Mr. Secretary. You say, ``What I would suggest is that the
United States move firmly toward deployment of a suitable and
adequate thin area defense, preferably within the framework of
the treaty,'' the ABM 1972 treaty.
Would you explain that in your reference to ``within the
framework of the treaty?''
Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, as you will recall, the
original treaty of 1972 called for two sites. In 1974, the
treaty was modified by agreement between the Soviet Union and
the United States to reduce that to one potential site. We, of
course, ultimately decided to have no sites.
But the treaty was modified in the past; it can be modified
in the future with the collaboration of the other party, in
this case, Russia.
We must bear in mind that a one site defense probably will
be inadequate for the growing array of threats, and we need not
be constrained, we should not be constrained, with limitations
on space based sensors. For example, even the limited defense
that we are talking about will depend upon SBIRS-LOW, the Space
Based Infra-red Satellite System. Otherwise, we will not be
able to detect in sufficient time the warheads that might be
attacking the United States.
Therefore, I think we need to modify the treaty to permit a
minimum number of sites, but sufficient to protect the
continental United States as well as Alaska and Hawaii and to
adjust our research and development plans and potential
deployment plans with regard to sensors so that we have a full
understanding of any threats that might be directed against the
United States.
That will require a substantial modification of the treaty,
but it should not be so substantial that it would deny to
Russia what the Russians clearly value, and that is the
continued existence of a retaliatory capability against the
United States--indeed, probably the only retaliatory capability
in the world, including China.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, what if the Russians prefer
not to renegotiate the ABM Treaty?
Dr. Schlesinger. That is what I referred to, Mr. Chairman,
when I said we must be very clear that we are firm on
deployment as we develop the technology. As I have indicated,
it is very much in the Russian interest to permit an adjustment
of the treaty, as we had in 1974, to adjust to new
circumstances. If the Russians are unwilling to do that, then I
think we have no alternative but to move toward abrogation.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, you referred on a number of
occasions in your testimony to the urgency here. In your
opinion, how long would you give the Russians to get serious
about negotiating the necessary change in the ABM Treaty before
you would say to the President we must move forward with or
without the Russians?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, Mr. Chairman, ideally, I would start
now and I would put them on notice that we are developing
technology for a thin area defense and that it is not a threat
to their retaliatory capability; that we are determined to do
so and that the precise details will come later on as we know
more about the technologies that we develop. But we must put
them on notice now that that is the direction in which we are
going and we should not be equivocal about putting them on
notice.
I am fearful that we may go in with a kind of tenuous
``wouldn't you mind our adjusting the treaty somewhat,'' and
the Russians, under those circumstances, would be very much
inclined to say no. They must be clear in their minds that we
are determined to make that adjustment.
Within a period of I would hope 18 months we would have a
better feel for the technologies that we would exploit. Then we
could go to more precise definition of how that treaty should
be adjusted.
Alternatively, we could say we want to have three sites and
we want to have freedom to explore any kind of sensors, whether
they are space based or ground based, and we could do that now.
That would provide greater latitude for any set of technologies
that we would choose to deploy.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, you have been involved over a
good many years in defense issues. You mention in your
statement that we must not limit ourselves to a technologically
limited base of options here.
Would you care to explain and enlarge upon that, because it
very much cuts through the issue with the Russians and all the
other dynamics here? How would we do that?
Dr. Schlesinger. That is quite correct, Mr. Chairman. The
danger in negotiating with the Russians is that we make a
limited adjustment, one time, that permits us to have a limited
defense that turns out to be a token defense that we deploy in
Alaska or in North Dakota at one site with a stringent
limitation on the sensors that we could employ.
If that were the case, we might be able to stop a missile
attack from North Korea, which will remain limited for some
time.
I doubt that we would be able to stop even a limited
attack, let us say, from China, or an accidental launch from
Russia because they will be moving toward penetration aids. We
need to have a system sufficiently sophisticated that it can
deal with at least simple penetration aids by another country.
As you mentioned in your opening statement, there is the
whole problem of protecting against launch vehicles, launched
from ships offshore.
Obviously, if we have a system in Alaska and a ship is
moved off the coast of Mexico, that system will have very
limited capability to protect the United States. We need to
have a capability that looks in all azimuths.
Senator Hagel. With your current knowledge of the
technology available, do you believe that it is feasible that
we can, in fact, achieve some of the more limited dynamics of
what you are talking about here within a relatively short
period of time?
Dr. Schlesinger. We can achieve--I trust that we can
achieve a limited defense within a reasonably short period of
time if we are talking about 7 or 8 years to deployment.
Senator Hagel. Seven or 8 years to deployment?
Dr. Schlesinger. Seven or 8 years to deployment.
The problem that we face, I think, is that there must be
the capability for growth in that initially deployed system so
that we are not constrained to dealing with whatever the
limited threat that that initial system could deal with. That
is part of the problem of negotiating effectively with the
Russians or, if they won't play the game, ultimately moving
toward abrogation of the treaty.
Further, we don't have the technology at this time. The 6
most recent tests of the THAAD missile have been, to say the
least, disappointing. Before we begin to deploy, we should have
a firm grasp on the technology. Nothing would be worse, it
seems to me, than to spend a great deal of money on a
deployment of a system that turns out to fizzle, thus
disgracing the concept as well as wasting the money.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, what should we be doing with
the Chinese in this area of missile defense? Should we be
negotiating a treaty, bringing them into talks? How should we
be working with the Chinese?
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that, once again, we have to make
clear to the Chinese, and they are very reluctant to accept
this--far more reluctant, I believe than Russia, even though
China is not a signatory to the ABM Treaty and, therefore, does
not have the legal rights that Russia has--they are far more
reluctant to see this development because it would deny to them
the capability to use their missile forces against Japan,
Taiwan, Korea, and the like.
I think that we must recognize that in our deployments in
the Western Pacific we have much of our forces tied up in very
limited real estate, small bases that are highly vulnerable to
attack; and that, therefore, we need to protect those limited
bits of real estate against a missile attack; and that we are
not prepared, we should inform the Chinese, merely to
propitiate them and allow Okinawa, let us say, to remain
vulnerable to attack; that we believe that it is necessary, not
only from the standpoint of our own interests but from that of
the overall security and stability in Asia, for us, when we
have the technology, to deploy defenses; and that we would be
deploying defenses that would protect our bases in the Pacific
and would include in that protection of Japan, whether or not
they are pleased to hear that; and that it would protect South
Korea as well.
The delicate problem is the subject of Taiwan. I think that
this is a subject on which the least said, the better; that we
ought to continue to reiterate that, indeed, the United States
policy, as it has been since 1972, is a one-China policy; that
we continue to believe that the People's Republic of China and
the Republic of China will work out their differences
peacefully; and that we ought not to develop an articulated
defense.
Now in the circumstances, the Chinese will understand that
we, particularly if we deploy the Aegis system, have the
capability of providing a missile defense for Taiwan. But I do
not think we should ever say that. The Chinese would regard it
not only as a threat but as interference, as they say, in their
domestic affairs.
Senator Hagel. I suspect Ambassador Lilley will have
something to say about this as well.
If I could move a little way from China to the
subcontinent, where India and Pakistan reside and where we now
have new members of the club, Mr. Secretary, what kind of
policy should we be pursuing in regard to Pakistan and India on
their nuclear efforts?
Dr. Schlesinger. The policy should be to encourage them to
have safe retaliatory capabilities, protected retaliatory
capabilities, so that neither side might be tempted to strike
first to exploit the vulnerability on the other side.
I think that we should recognize the developments in South
Asia between India and Pakistan are, to a greater extent than
elsewhere, contained in South Asia. It is obvious, I think,
that the development of missiles and nuclear weapons by Iran
and/or Iraq would have much broader implications and could not
be contained within a limited geographic area.
Pakistan and India, to a large extent, are focused on each
other and, even though that development has disappointed us in
terms of the partial failure of our nonproliferation policies,
it is not as menacing as the nuclear and missile developments,
say, in North Korea. As North Korea acquires a nuclear
capability, I cannot see that the Japanese will disregard such
a development. They would then be tempted to move in that
direction.
In the mid-1970's, we headed off South Korea from
developing nuclear weapons. If North Korea has a nuclear
capability or missile capability, South Korea, too, would be
tempted. It would have the capacity for infectiousness.
Happily, in South Asia there is less capacity for
infectiousness of the region. Therefore, we ought not to be too
desperate or to pay too high a price to either of the parties
merely to get them to collaborate on, let us say, the
Nonproliferation Treaty or the CTB.
Senator Hagel. In your opinion, are we pursuing the correct
policy with North Korea in regard to oil, fuel, food, and
things that we are putting on the table in order to get entry
to their facilities?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, it has its ironical aspects, Mr.
Chairman. In order to head off a 60-megawatt reactor, which is
capable of producing plutonium for several nuclear weapons, we
are providing 3,000 thermal megawatts over time, which will
have the capability of producing many, many nuclear weapons.
The premise of our policy has been that time is on our
side; that the North Korean regime might implode, collapse; and
that, therefore, they would never be in a threatening position,
let's say, in 2010.
It is an interesting premise, but there is no guarantee
that that premise is correct. In the last 5 years since we
signed the agreement with North Korea, it seems to me that the
premise has become increasingly questionable.
It was a trade. It was a trade that was pushed by the
Department of Defense on the premise that it was better to
freeze temporarily their move toward nuclear capabilities. And
in the process, we failed to sustain the IAEA, which we had
induced to make challenge, to demand challenge inspections of
North Korea.
That was a trade. I think it was pushed by Secretary Perry
at the time. It may have been a good trade at the time. It has
become more questionable, and I think that Secretary Perry's
new report, as a special envoy, will point to some of the
difficulties in that limited agreement because of the movement
of North Korea toward additional facilities that we do not
fully understand.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a moment ago,
when we were talking about India and Pakistan, the CTBT. Do you
know if that is a useful treaty for dealing with the India-
Pakistan situation?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, no, in a word.
The CTBT has been based on a premise that is widespread in
the scientific community that other nations will develop their
nuclear capabilities or refrain from developing such
capabilities based on what the United States does; and that if
we limit ourselves in testing, then other nations will refrain
from testing and, therefore, presumably, developing nuclear
capabilities.
That is a wholly invalid premise. The motivation for other
countries to develop nuclear weapons has nothing to do with
whether or not we test. It has to do with their relations with
their neighbors. In the case of India, the Indians talk about
China as well as Pakistan. Pakistan clearly is concerned about
India, being in a conventionally much weaker position than
their opponent.
Whether or not the United States tests is totally
irrelevant. The notion that Saddam Hussein, Kim Il-sung or Kim
Jong-il will refrain from nuclear tests because the United
States has given them up is just, it seems to me, a misleading
premise.
Therefore, we ought not to believe that CTBT is an
effective anti-proliferation device. It is something that
developed in the 1960's, after the disappointments of the
Soviet return to nuclear testing, the 50- and 60-megaton
weapons that were tested in 1961. It led to the partial test
ban treaty. The desire to have a complete test ban treaty
acquired a momentum at that time that had some relationship to
the bipolar world of the 1960's and 1970's, but has very little
relationship to the set of motivations in this proliferating
world that we see today.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Helms asked that I ask this question.
Would you recommend that the Senate adopt the
administration's proposed changes to the ABM Treaty relating to
multilateralization and demarcation?
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that that would be very
frustrating. I fear that it would be very frustrating.
Why is that? It's because I think that we have some
political advantage in continuing our relation with the
Russians; and that that would require, if we go ahead with a
missile defense, a Russian capability to say yes to
modification of the treaty.
It seems to me that when you throw in Kazakhstan, Belarus,
and Ukraine as parties to such a modification, there is the
possibility of manipulation. To prevent such modification, the
Russians can urge Belarus--whose relationship with Russia
reflects the fear in Belarus that the Russians are too damn
moderate--to thwart any such change in the treaty. It would
make it unduly complicated to change the treaty.
We have taken the position that Russia is the true legatee
of the Soviet Union with regard to strategic forces. And this
to spread out a negotiation by making all of these parties part
of the ABM Treaty would, in my judgment, be a mistake.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you one additional
question? You can frame this any way you like.
Would you give this committee the benefit of your thoughts
on the situation in Kosovo? Anywhere you want to start or end,
we would be grateful for your words.
I am a little off from the intent and objective of this
hearing, but, actually, it did come up and, as you know, it is
very much a part of our relationship with Russia. What we are
doing there and what we may yet do has significant
consequences.
Dr. Schlesinger. Foreign policy, by and large, is concerned
with the relationships amongst great powers.
Senator Hagel. Excuse me. Mr. Secretary, would you pull the
microphone a little closer, please?
Dr. Schlesinger. Yes. Foreign policy, by and large, is
concerned with the relationship amongst great powers. Russia is
down on its luck, but it may well come back as a great power
and it certainly is the most significant potential power in
Europe and potentially in Eurasia, as well, along with China.
It seems to me that the administration was quite correct
when it said that getting along with the Russians during its
first 6 years was a correct policy.
When Mr. Primakov was half way across to the United States,
at Shannon Airport he was informed that we were going to start
bombing the Serbs for whom the Russians have had a protective
attitude for at least a century and a half, as the Serbs
attempted to separate themselves from the Ottoman Empire. That
was a serious blunder on our part, to allow our relations with
a major power to deteriorate in this way.
Serbia has subsequently asked to join the Association of
Belarus and Russia, and we don't know where that will go. But
it is not a healthy sign from the overall standpoint of our
foreign policy.
To the extent that we decided to move into the quarrel in
Kosovo, we should have thought through in advance what the
response was going to be on the other side and whether or not
we could achieve our objectives with the means that we had put
up.
We did not. The result is that, when we started bombing,
this triggered the very outcome that we wanted to avoid--to
wit, the massive expulsion of Kosovars from Kosovo and the
spilling over of that conflict beyond the borders of
Yugoslavia. In the process, we also, at least temporarily,
immensely strengthened Milosevic within the country--not one of
our objectives.
It seems to me that we must decide what we wish to be the
outcome in Kosovo and to put together the means to achieve that
end. If we want to achieve the results that we started with,
that we started out asserting were our goals, then we must be
prepared to create a credible ground threat.
In the absence of a credible ground threat, Milosevic and
the Serbs will hunker down, I believe. They will absorb the
punishment. It will have a damaging effect ultimately within
NATO.
There are those countries that sympathize with the Serbs,
including some of the new members of NATO. And it will
ultimately be divisive, I fear, unless we are prepared either
to move quickly to terminate it or to achieve ways of enforcing
our will.
At the moment, we seem to be hung up on neither, and we are
proceeding with a bombing response which will do immense damage
to the infrastructure of Serbia but which will not necessarily
cause Milosevic or the Serbs to yield.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. We are grateful for your contribution and,
as always, your insights. I am sure we will have occasion to
revisit not only this subject but many others.
Mr. Secretary, thank you.
Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. Now we will ask Ambassador Lilley and
Secretary Schneider to come forward and when they do, we will
get started.
Gentlemen, welcome once again. We have been joined, as you
can see, by our friend and colleague, the distinguished Senator
from Tennessee, Bill Frist. He will be poised to ask very
insightful, direct questions as we go along.
If we could, we will now ask Secretary Schneider for his
testimony. Then we will ask Ambassador Lilley and will then get
into some questions.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR., FORMER UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, SCIENCE, AND
TECHNOLOGY, ADJUNCT FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Schneider. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the privilege of testifying before this committee.
As you know, I previously served as Under Secretary of
State and, subsequently, as chairman of the General Advisory
Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament in the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency and more recently served as a member of
the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States, the Rumsfeld Commission.
This commission, as you know, delivered its report in July,
1998. The question of proliferation can no longer be thought of
as an isolated and far-off threat to the United States. The
burden of evidence available to the U.S. Government was
reviewed by the Rumsfeld Commission and presented to the
Congress last July.
Among the major conclusions of this congressionally
mandated study are these.
First, the threat to the United States posed by these
emerging capabilities of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction is more mature and evolving more rapidly than has
been reported in estimates and reports by the intelligence
community.
Moreover, the warning times the United States can expect of
new, threatening ballistic missile deployments are being
reduced. Under some possible scenarios, including rebasing or
the transfer of operational missiles, sea or air-launch
options, shortened development programs that might include
testing in a third country, or some combination of these, the
United States might have little or no warning before an
operational deployment of ballistic missiles able to reach the
United States.
The surge in the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction during the 1990's has created an
environmental fact for the United States' national security
policy for the next quarter century or more. Moreover, the
nature of contemporary ballistic missile proliferation and
weapons of mass destruction proliferation challenges many of
the underlying assumptions of policy, including the abstention
from the defense of U.S. territory from long-range ballistic
missile attack.
This posture is currently required under the provisions of
the ABM Treaty of 1972.
My testimony today will focus on proliferation related
developments in Iran and assess the implications of these
developments for U.S. security.
In starting out, I think it is helpful to try to get an
understanding of the nature of the contemporary proliferation
process because the process since the end of the cold war is
qualitatively different from that prior to the end of the cold
war.
Before the end of the cold war, Russia was an effective
party to the nonproliferation regimes in place. Its interest
resided in containing rather than facilitating the spread of
the technology of weapons of mass destruction.
Multilateral export controls limited the access of
potential proliferators to scientific and industrial technology
and equipment pertinent to the development of ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the United
States and most other governments, apart from China, restricted
access to technology relating to weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missile technology.
The end of the cold war brought about stark changes in
Russia and its incentives relating to nonproliferation
compliance. Export controls, especially multilateral controls,
largely disappeared as an effective counter proliferation
instrument.
Regional rivalries created an interest in regional powers
deterring outside intervention in regional disputes. This
subject was referred to by Secretary Schlesinger during his
testimony.
The existing nonproliferation regime has proven to be ill-
suited to the manner in which post-cold war proliferation has
taken place. Proliferators have not focused on obtaining the
most advanced technology. Instead, they have focused on
obtaining obsolescent but functional WMD and ballistic missile
technology.
Russia has economic incentives as well as policy incentives
to assist Iran and several other countries in acquiring weapons
of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology.
The absence of export control barriers to scientific and
industrial equipment relevant to weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missile development has made this equipment
widely available.
North Korea's successful development of long-range missiles
and weapons of mass destruction has made its program one of the
engines of proliferation. Its dispersion of manufacturing
technology to other countries has contributed to making
proliferation largely self sustaining.
The creation of large-scale weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missile manufacturing facilities in North Korea,
Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, has several profound effects for the
long-term outlook for proliferation.
First, this infrastructure will soon make these nations
largely independent of access to technologies from nations such
as China and Russia, who are now the primary suppliers. The
major proliferators have insisted on a substantial measure of
autarchy in WMD and missile production. They are not simply
buying missiles off the shelf. They will be producers.
Proliferation is now on the verge of being self-sustaining.
Second, the size of the infrastructure in place creates
incentives for producers to also become exporters. National
requirements will be met by a few years of production from the
local industrial base. To sustain production, these nations
will be obliged to seek export markets. Acquiring ballistic
missiles is the least cost approach to regional power status,
an opportunity many nations may seize with very negative
consequences for regional stability and peace.
Third, the impact of large manufacturing infrastructures
for WMD and ballistic missiles changes the scale of the problem
from a few ballistic missiles to hundreds in the next decade,
and perhaps thousands after 2010. Several proliferators are
profoundly hostile to the United States and its allies.
Bearing the nature of this proliferation problem in mind,
there are a few observations I would like to make specifically
with respect to Iran.
Iran is well suited to acquire a very substantial WMD and
ballistic missile force. Its acquisition of SCUD series missile
from North Korea during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq conflict helped
finance North Korea's development of longer range systems,
including what is now known as the SCUD-C, which has a 700
kilometer range, No Dong, which has a 1,300 kilometer range,
and the Taepo Dong-I and Taepo Dong-II, with an
intercontinental range with characteristics that depend on the
weight of the payload.
North Korea sold its No Dong missile to Iran, where it has
been upgraded with Russian assistance. The missile was launched
in July 1998 and will be deployed later this year.
At a September 25, 1998 military parade in Tehran,
President Khatami praised Russia for the assistance it provided
to Iran's missile program. The weapon can deliver a nuclear,
chemical, or biological or conventional payload to targets
throughout the Middle East and can reach targets throughout
Europe with a biological weapons payload.
Moreover, because the missile is mounted on a mobile
transporter-erector-launcher, it can be readily launched
covertly from a merchant ship. This technology is hardly new.
The United States launched a Polaris missile from a merchant
ship in 1962. The former Soviet Union also launched SCUD short-
range missiles from surface ships. The technique is well
understood.
Surface ship launch appears to be a likely alternative
option for several emerging WMD and ballistic missile States.
More recently, the Financial Times reported on April 16 on
the Pakistani Shaheen-1 missile, which was launched the
previous day, that the missile may be intended for sea launch.
The missile, with a 1 metric ton--that is, 2,200 pound--
payload, may be developed so that Pakistan can have a similar
capability to that which is deployed by India or that will soon
be deployed by India, which is a surface ship launched
ballistic missile.
The modern commercial technology, such as the INMARSAT
telecommunications satellite and the global positioning system
satellites diminishes the significance of the primary
operational limitations of sea-based ballistic missile systems
in the past--that is, communications with the ship and
positional accuracy.
The use of surface ship launched missiles may be especially
attractive to Iran. Iran tends to employ non-Iranian nationals
for some of its international terrorist operations. Iran has
used personnel from several States in the Middle East region to
diminish the risk of accountability for its support of
international terrorist operations.
The recent terrorist activities, including the Khobar
Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia and the East African embassy
bombings last year, were done without any country claiming
responsibility for these.
The option of a covert launch provides another alternative
for Iran to extend the geographic reach of its ballistic
missile force while diminishing the risk of retaliation against
its own territory.
Iran is developing longer-range ballistic missiles as well.
Iran has acquired rocket engines and advisory support from
Russia that will permit it to develop intercontinental range
missiles able to reach the United States from Iranian
territory. The technology is mature since it is based on the
German World War II V-2 liquid fuel technology. So little
testing is required.
This phenomenon of little testing was reflected in North
Korea's development of the No Dong missile. The missile was
successfully flown in May 1993 and has been in series
production since then.
Large numbers have been produced and, based on observed
evidence, it is quite reliable. The No Dong is used as the
first stage in North Korea's Taepo Dong-I missile, which was
successfully launched in a trajectory over Japan in 1998. The
Taepo Dong-I is capable of reaching U.S. territory with a
biological weapons payload. The Taepo Dong-II will be able to
reach the United States with a nuclear payload.
Iran has the components for the Taepo Dong system already
in its inventory in that the second stage of the Taepo Dong
missile is a SCUD missile. The first stage would be the No
Dong.
Iran will begin its deployment of its variant of the No
Dong missile later this year, the Shahab 3. This will augment
its inventory of SCUD missiles. The missile is not accurate
enough to be usefully employed effectively with conventional
warheads. Thus, it is likely that it will use an unconventional
warhead--biological, chemical, or nuclear.
The details of the weapons program are not known. But as
the deployment of the Shahab 3 is imminent, it is likely that
Iranian authorities have already identified the missile's
warhead.
Iran has previously employed missile delivered lethal
chemical agents in 1980 to 1998 in its conflict with Iraq. Even
without foreign assistance, Iran is capable of a missile
delivery of anthrax or smallpox derived biological weapons in
bulk form.
A more effective mode of biological agent delivery using
submunitions may also be available to Iran. This submunition
technology for biological agents is at least four decades old.
Submunition systems for biological agents were developed in the
1950's.
Missile delivered submunitions filled with biological
agents were extensively developed and produced by the former
Soviet Union and continue to be available in Russia today.
Access to nuclear weapons is dependent on Iran's ability to
acquire special nuclear material. Foreign acquisition of such
material is unlikely to be observed by the United States.
We learned from experience in the 1980's that Pakistan
obtained a tested nuclear weapon design and a significant
quantity of special nuclear materials, in this case highly
enriched uranium from China.
This development permitted Pakistan to acquire a nuclear
capability without the necessity to conduct a nuclear test,
although it did so for apparently political reasons in response
to India's nuclear testing.
The Shahab 3 poses a threat to U.S. forces and allies
deployed in the Middle East region and to Europe, as well, if a
biological weapons payload is employed.
If the Shahab 3 is covertly deployed on a merchant ship, it
can then be employed against U.S. territory. Provisions of the
ABM Treaty prevent the United States from deploying missile
defenses against this threat. The proposed national missile
defense system is designed to have no capability to intercept
ballistic missiles with a range of less than 2,000 miles. This
is so to comply with provisions of the treaty.
The treaty prevents the use of theater missile defenses in
a national missile defense mode. Hence, it precludes deploying
our own theater missile defenses against a sea based threat.
Such defenses as the Patriot system would not be permitted
under the existing terms of the ABM Treaty.
Iran's missile force is poised for rapid growth. Russian
assistance to Iran has intensified since 1998. Iran's
production of the No Dong completes the building blocks for
multi-stage missiles.
It is likely that Iran will continue development of multi-
staged missiles, although some of these may be disguised as
space launch vehicles. The option is attractive for Iran and
may help preserve the ambiguity of its ballistic missile
programs.
In the case of space launched vehicles, only software and
payload changes are required to shift from a civil space launch
to a military missile. Moreover, any missile with sufficient
energy to deploy a payload into orbit around the earth also has
the capability to deliver payload to a target on the surface of
the earth at intercontinental range.
Finally, in this regard, a new channel of proliferation may
soon emerge if Russia obtains relief from existing arms control
limitations on the number of space launch sites it can create
outside of its own territory. Most of the ICBM's it developed,
manufactured, and deployed are used in modified form for space
launch application. The proliferation of such activities could
create yet another path for the proliferation of long-range
missiles.
The ABM Treaty in its present form poses an obstacle to an
important policy objective of the United States, deterring Iran
from making further investments in long-range missiles.
Further, the provisions of the treaty prevent the United
States from deploying missiles against the two most plausible
forms of ballistic missile threats now available or that will
soon be available to Iran--covert, sea launch missiles and
land-based ICBM's.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Schneider follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. William Schneider, Jr.
iran's activities relating to ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee:
It is a privilege to have an opportunity to appear before this
committee. I previously served as Under Secretary of State (1982-86),
and as Chairman of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and
Disarmament. More recently, I served as a Member of the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (the Rumsfeld
Commission) that delivered its report to the Congress in July, 1998.
The question of proliferation can no longer be thought of as an
isolated and far-off potential threat to the United States. The burden
of evidence available to the United States government was reviewed by
the Rumsfeld Commission and presented to the Congress in July 1998.
Among the major conclusions of this Congressionally mandated study are
these.
The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities
is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been
reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence
community.
The warning times the U.S. can expect of new, threatening
ballistic missile deployments are being reduced. Under some
plausible scenarios--including re-basing or transfer of
operational missiles, sea or air-launch options, shortened
development programs that might include testing in a third
country, or some combination of these--the U.S. might well have
little or no warning before operational deployment.
Proliferation-related developments can no longer be thought of as
an isolated or far-off threat that is of no immediate consequence to
U.S. security interests. The surge in the proliferation of ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the 1990's has created
proliferation as an environmental fact for U.S. national security
policy for the next quarter century or more. Moreover, the nature of
contemporary WMD and ballistic missile proliferation challenges many of
the underlying assumptions of policy including abstention from the
defense of U.S. territory from long-range ballistic missile attack.
This posture is currently required under the provisions of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. My testimony today will focus
on proliferation-related developments in Iran and assess the
implications of these developments for U.S. security.
The Post-Cold War Proliferation Process
The process of proliferation since the end of the Cold War is
qualitatively different from the process of proliferation prior to the
end of the Cold War in 1991. Before the end of the Cold War, Russia was
an effective party to the non-proliferation regimes in place. Its
interests resided in containing rather than facilitating the spread of
the technology of weapons of mass destruction. Multilateral export
controls limited the access of potential proliferators to scientific
and industrial technology and equipment pertinent to the development
and manufacture of ballistic missiles and WMD. The United States and
most other governments (apart from China) restricted access to
information relating to WMD and ballistic missile technology.
The end of the Cold War brought about stark changes in Russia and
its incentives relating to nonproliferation compliance. Export
controls--especially multilateral controls largely disappeared as an
effective counter-proliferation instrument. Regional rivalries and an
interest by regional powers in deterring outside intervention in
regional disputes have stimulated an effort to acquire WMD and
ballistic missiles.
The existing non-proliferation regime has proven to be ill-suited
to the manner in which post-Cold War proliferation has taken place.
Proliferators have focused on obsolescent, but functional WMD and
ballistic missile technology. Russia has economic and policy incentives
to assist Iran and several other countries in acquiring WMD and
ballistic missile technology. The absence of export control barriers to
scientific and industrial equipment relevant to WMD and ballistic
missile development has made such equipment widely available. North
Korea's successful development of long-range missiles and WMD has made
its program one of the engines of proliferation. Its dispersion of
manufacturing knowledge to other nations contributed to making
proliferation largely self-sustaining.
The creation of large scale WMD and ballistic missile manufacturing
facilities in North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan has had several
profound effects on the long-term outlook for proliferation.
First, this infrastructure will soon make these nations largely
independent of access to technologies from nations such as China and
Russia who are now primary suppliers. The major proliferators have
insisted on a substantial measure of autarky in WMD and missile
production. They are not simply buying WMD and missiles ``off the
shelf''--they are or will be producers. Proliferation is now on the
verge of being a self-sustaining phenomenon.
Second, the size of the infrastructure in place creates an
incentive for producers to become exporters. National requirements will
be met by a few years of production from the local industrial base. To
sustain production, these nations will be obliged to seek export
markets. Acquiring ballistic missiles is the least-cost approach to
regional power status--an opportunity many nations may seize with very
negative confidence for regional peace and stability.
Third, the impact of large manufacturing infrastructures for WMD
and ballistic missiles change the scale of the problem from a ``few''
ballistic missile to hundreds in the next decade, and perhaps thousands
after 2010. Several proliferators are profoundly hostile to the United
States and its allies.
Proliferation Developments in Iran
Iran is well situated to acquire a very substantial WMD and
ballistic missile force. Iran's acquisition of SCUD-series ballistic
missiles from North Korea during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq conflict helped
finance North Korea's development of longer range systems including
what is now known as the SCUD-C (700 km. range), the No Dong (1,300-km.
range), and the Taepo-dong 1 and 2 (intercontinental range).
North Korea sold its No Dong missile to Iran where it has been
upgraded with Russian assistance. The missile was launched in July 1998
and will be deployed later this year. At a 25 September 1998 military
parade in Tehran, President Khatami praised Russia for the assistance
it provided to Iran's ballistic missile program. The weapon can deliver
a nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional payload to targets
throughout the Middle East, and can reach targets throughout Europe
with a biological weapons payload. Moreover, because the missile is
mounted on a mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), it can also be
readily launched covertly from a merchant ship. The U.S. launched a
Polaris missile from a merchant ship in 1962. The former Soviet Union
also launched short-range SCUD missiles from surface ships. The
Financial Times (April l6, 1999) reported on the first launch of
Pakistan's Shaheen-1 (600-km range) ballistic missile on April 15th.
The technique is well understood. Surface ship launch appears likely to
be an alternative launch option for several emerging WMD and ballistic
missile states.
The Financial Times noted that the Shaheen-1, with a one metric ton
(2,200 lbs.) payload ``could be launched from a naval vessel.'' Such a
development may reflect Pakistan's effort to develop a counterpart
capability to India's surface ship-launched ballistic missile program.
Modem commercial technology (e.g. INMARSAT telecommunications and
Global Positioning System navigation satellites) diminishes the
significance of the primary operational limitations of sea based
ballistic missile systems in the past--communications with the ship and
positional accuracy.
The use of surface ship launched ballistic missiles may be
especially attractive to Iran. Iran tends to employ non-Iranian
nationals for some of its international terrorist operations. For
example, Iran has often used personnel from several states in the
Middle East region to diminish the risk of accountability for
supporting international terrorist operations. The option of a covert
launch provides another alternative for Iran to both extend the
geographic reach of its ballistic missile force while diminishing the
risk of retaliation against its own territory.
Iran continues to develop long-range ballistic missiles as well.
Iran has acquired rocket engines and advisory support from Russia that
will permit it to develop intercontinental range missiles able to reach
the United States from Iran. As the technology for these systems is
mature (the liquid fuel propulsion system is derived from the Germany's
World War II V-2 program), little testing is required. This phenomenon
was reflected in North Korea's development of the No Dong missile. The
missile was successfully flown in May 1993, and has been in series
production since then. Large numbers have been produced, and based on
observed evidence, is quite reliable. The No Dong is used as the first
stage in North Korea's Taepo-dong 1 missile--successfully launched in a
trajectory over Japan in August 1998. The Taepo-dong 1 missile is
capable of reaching U.S. territory with a biological weapons payload;
the Taepo-dong 2 will be able to reach the United States with a nuclear
payload. North Korea has stated publicly that it intends to export its
ballistic missile systems. Iran, as a buyer of its SCUD-series missiles
as well as the No Dong missile is a plausible candidate for the Taepo-
dong missile system as well.
Implications of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program for the U.S.
Iran will begin deployment of its variant of the No Dong medium
range ballistic missile, the Shahab 3 later this year, and will augment
its inventory of SCUD missiles. As the missile is not accurate enough
to be usefully employed with a conventional warhead, it is likely that
it will be used with an unconventional warhead--biological, chemical,
and nuclear.
The details of its weapons program are not known, but as deployment
of the Shahab 3 is imminent, it is likely that Iranian authorities have
already identified the missile's warhead(s). Iran employed missile
delivered lethal chemical agents in its 1980-88 conflict with Iraq.
Even without foreign assistance, Iran is capable of missile delivery of
anthrax or smallpox-derived biological weapon payloads in bulk form. A
more effective mode of biological agent delivery using sub-munitions
may also be available to Iran. The technology for sub-munition delivery
of biological agents is at least four decades old. A sub-munition
system for biological agents was developed by the United States in the
late 1950's. Missile-delivered sub-munitions filled with biological
agents were extensively developed and produced by the former Soviet
Union, and continue to be available today in Russia. Access to nuclear
weapons is dependent on Iran's ability to acquire special nuclear
material. Foreign acquisition of such material is unlikely to be
observed by the United States. We learned from experience in the 1980's
that Pakistan obtained a tested nuclear weapon design and a significant
quantity of special nuclear material (highly enriched uranium) from
China. This development permitted Pakistan to acquire a nuclear
capability without a necessity to conduct a nuclear test (though
Pakistan did so in 1998 in response to India's nuclear testing).
The Shahab 3 poses a threat to U.S. forces and allies deployed in
the Middle East region and to Europe if a biological weapons payload is
used. If the Shahab 3 is covertly deployed on a merchant ship, it can
then be employed against U.S. territory. Provisions of the ABM Treaty
prevent the United States from deploying missile defenses against this
threat. The proposed National Missile Defense system is designed to
have no capability to intercept ballistic missiles with a range of less
than 2,000 miles to comply with the Treaty. Treaty provisions
preventing the use of theater missile defenses in a national missile
defense mode preclude theater missile defenses (such as Patriot).
Iran's ballistic missile force is poised for rapid growth. Russian
assistance to Iran has intensified since mid-1998. Iran's production of
the No Dong completes the building blocks for multi-stage long-range
missiles. Iran possesses the SCUD missile--the second stage of the
Taepo-dong 1 ballistic missile. The Taepo-dong 1 ballistic missile has
intercontinental capabilities with a biological weapons payload. North
Korea has successfully demonstrated that it is able to implement
missile stage separation--the enabling capability for intercontinental-
range missile development. If it shares this technology with Iran--
perhaps North Korea's largest and most loyal customer--the range of
targets Iran could hold at risk will grow significantly.
It is likely that Iran will continue long-range multi-stage
ballistic missile development, although some missile flights will be
disguised as ``space launches.'' This option is attractive for Iran in
creating ambiguity about its military missile development program. Only
software and payload changes are required to shift from a civil
``space'' launch to a military missile. Moreover, any missile with
sufficient energy to deploy a payload into an orbit around the earth
has a capability to deliver a payload to a target on the surface of the
earth at intercontinental range.
In this regard, a new channel for proliferation may soon emerge if
Russia obtains relief from existing arms control limitations on the
number of space launch sites it can create outside of its own
territory. Most of the ICBM's developed, manufactured, and deployed by
the former Soviet Union are used in modified form for space launch
applications. The proliferation of such activities could create yet
another path for the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles.
The ABM Treaty in its present form poses an obstacle to an
important policy objective of the United States--deterring Iran from
making further investments in long-range ballistic missiles. Further,
the provisions of the Treaty prevent the United States from deploying
missile defenses against the two most plausible forms of ballistic
missile threats available now or will soon be available to Iran--covert
sea-launched missiles, and land-based ICBM's.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
Ambassador Lilley.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LILLEY, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
CHINA, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Lilley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have four caveats as I proceed. First, others have well
defined the strategy of missiles and the missile defense, so I
am not going to get into that. I have been asked to have a
narrow focus on a very large and complex subject, Chinese
intentions and the role of missiles in this.
I have gone back in time because this is the only way we
can begin to understand what the Chinese might be up to. Bear
with me as I deal with the rhetoric because there are millions
of words spoken. So I must be selective.
Having said that, I think, first of all, as for Chinese
intentions, what have they actually said? I chose their
February 1992 law passed by the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress, which stands today, I think, as a
singular statement of what the Chinese are up to. The scope of
this is defined as the first island chain around China. It goes
from the Senkaku Islands off Japan, it goes down to Taiwan, and
it takes over the South China Sea, claiming exclusive
jurisdiction over the Spratlys.
What this law means, of course, is that it puts China into
potential confrontation with Japan over the Senkakus because
Japan claims them, too, and we have a security treaty with
Japan which the Japanese say includes the Senkaku Islands.
Second, as for Taiwan, we have the guarantees in the Taiwan
Relations Act. China has said this is their own territory. They
claim it is theirs and that we are interfering in their
internal affairs when we sell weapons or support Taiwan.
Finally, in the Spratly Islands, they contest Vietnam,
Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan, all of whom claim
them. The Chinese say these are simply ours. They have also
reserved in this piece of law the right to use hot pursuit and
military means to deal with foreign powers that challenge them.
I will make one caveat on this, actually, the U.S. has said
that the sea lanes through the Spratlys were of critical
interest to the United States. In a statement in 1995, ASEAN,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, politically
complained to China about its predatory moves down there, and
the Chinese have backed off to a degree because the power of
the Seventh Fleet, along with ASEAN's political power, were
sufficient to deter them. I think this is an important
precedent to keep in mind as you go through this analysis.
Second, this is not words. Statements in their law and
other statements the Chinese have since made to support their
law are important but we must also look at their acquisitions.
Their acquisitions back this up, whether it is the Sukhoi-27
from Russia, a state-of-the-art fighter/bomber--they will
probably have 200 of them in the next 5 years--their kilo class
submarine and their 100 SRBM's, short-range ballistic missiles,
which are alleged now to be deployed along the Fujien coast
opposite Taiwan.
They have conducted in July 1995 and March 1996 live fire
exercises, which have demonstrated their DF-15 or M-9 nuclear
capable missile off the north and south coasts of Taiwan.
Certainly what emerged from this particular exercise, by the
exercises, I should say, was that China's amphibious force, its
use of aircraft, its use of naval forces, its tri-service
coordination were weak. The one powerful instrument they had
were missiles. They recognize that the missiles not only caused
economic dislocations in Taiwan, but also they claim
intimidated the Seventh Fleet carrier battle groups that came
off the east coast from going through the Taiwan Strait.
This is a claim the Chinese made.
I then deal with the Chinese sizing up of the American war-
fighting psychology. They have come to the conclusion--and this
is amply demonstrated in Michael Pillsbury's book--which is
based on Chinese documents and Chinese view of future warfare--
they make the proposition quite clear that the United States
will not take losses. They look at Somalia, they look at
Kosovo, and they look at other countries where we have engaged
our forces. We go for hi-tech and no losses. Therefore, this
gives them a distinct advantage in dealing with the United
States.
Hence, they give you the veiled warning that the United
States would not sacrifice Los Angeles for Taiwan. And now that
we know they have the capability to reach Los Angeles, we have
to take this seriously.
Then I indulge briefly in a sketchy walk-through history,
because I think we have to look at the way they fought their
wars since 1949, to try to get a look into their mentality--
what checks them, what works, what does and does not work for
them. I think you start off with Korea in 1950 as instructive.
Certainly, in the first stages of that war there was
surprise, overwhelming force, favorable terrain and they scored
great victories. They drove the 8th Army and the 1st Marine
Division out.
The second lesson of the war was when they got into
positional warfare against an enemy with better weapons, they
lost. Matthew Ridgeway gave them a very punishing lesson, that
they could not stand up to. Then they compromised in a major
way in the Korean War. I think that is a lesson.
Again, I think in the Taiwan Strait they have consistently
tried to use bluff and bluster first to achieve their ends.
They were able to do this in 1954. They failed in 1958 and they
failed in 1995 and 1996. It did not work. It was a particularly
egregious failure in 1958, when they had to back off from a
threat to Taiwan, mainly because the Seventh Fleet moved in and
the Taiwan Air Force shot them out of the air. It was something
like 35 planes to 1. They were no match for the Sabre Jet with
the air-to-air Sidewinder missile.
So they backed off. They undertook on-day/off-day artillery
firing to save face. But people know that it did not work.
Again, I say in 1995-96, when the Nimitz went through in
December 1995 and when the two carriers came in 1996, the
Chinese got the message. They were no match for the Seventh
Fleet.
So they backed off from this and they planned the next
steps.
If you look at 1969 and the way they faced the Soviet
Union, they were driven by the passionate nationalism of the
Cultural Revolution. They conducted military operations against
the Soviet Union which were, in many ways, almost bizarre. But
the point is they got their clock cleaned. The Russians had
superior force, they beat up on them, they drove the Chinese
back. What did the Chinese do? They turned to us for a
strategic partnership with us against the Soviet Union. And we
took it up immediately for the opening to China.
I think 1974 is interesting, January 1974, because it was
the kind of operation you have to look out for these days. They
seized the Paracels in a lightening attack. They moved in
amphibious forces, Hainan class gunboats. They took the
Paracels and their timing was perfect.
The United States was pulling out of a collapsing Vietnam,
the Soviet Union had not moved in yet, and they had a window of
opportunity. They struck quickly, decisively, and won. They
took over the Paracels. Now they are building airstrips there.
They again punished the Vietnamese in 1988 in the Spratlys
and they started to buildup, as you know, a People's Liberation
Army facility on Mischief Reef down in the Spratlys.
So we see them moving from a surprising success, pushing
forward for the next step. However, in 1979, it was
instructive. They took on the Vietnamese in a clumsily executed
land war. The battle tested, hardened Vietnamese military
inflicted heavy casualties. The Chinese retreated. They said
they gave the Vietnamese a bloody nose, delivered a message,
and then pulled back. And they found their army was lazy, fat,
poorly trained, and their use of command and control was poor.
What emerges from all this is that China tries to know its
own strength and its opponent's weaknesses. It can adjust very
quickly when it faces superior forces and the enemy has a
strong will. But it also moves quickly and decisively when the
opportunities arise.
I think we have to keep this in mind in Taiwan.
Then I get briefly to the role of missiles. First, the
Chinese see definitely an ally in the anti-missile defense
people in the United States. They try to link up with them.
I think since 1995, they have been trying to shape the
debate on missiles. They have said the problem is not our
missiles, it is our missile defense system. They have been able
to divert the Americans into focusing on that. Look at the
argument we are having today on ABM.
It is not so much for Chinese missile deployments as it is
our reaction to it. The Chinese have been rather successful
because we have heard a chorus of voices sounding off against
missile defense directed against the Chinese. The Chinese
quickly follow this with a very effective device. They say if
you deploy theater missile defense, this is a make or break
issue in the Chinese-American relationship. That's it--you have
gone back on the commitments you made in 1971-72, Nixon-
Kissinger, that you would not work with Japan and Taiwan to
form a defense system against us, and that is precisely what
you are doing. This is intolerable to us. You said you would
not do this. We affirmed this in the three communiques. This is
intolerable American intervention which will only increase the
chances for Taiwan independence and will cause China to perfect
and expand its own missile forces. That is their argument.
Third, the Chinese have taken direct aim at national
missile defense and theater missile defense by insisting that
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which they have not signed,
be maintained and strengthened. This is a means to curtail our
ability to deploy weapons against them.
I notice that the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace distributed Sha Zukang's statement on this in February of
this year. It is a clear, tough, hard statement which says
don't deploy antimissile defense.
It is instructive, when you look back briefly in history,
you see that one of the successful efforts that the Chinese
made with their collaborators in the United States was to block
the FX for Taiwan in 1981. They marshalled forces. They said at
that time that the sale of an F-16 or an F-5G to Taiwan would,
in fact, break the relationship.
Hysterical memos came out of our bureaucratic establishment
and we backed off. We did not get new fighter planes sold to
Taiwan for another 10 years. And they did not really complain
then.
It is interesting that it was at a time in 1992, when the
Chinese needed us. They had seen the results of Desert Storm.
They wanted to make contact with our military. They were
willing to accept the F-16 sale because it was more important,
as Deng said, to have the American relationship than to fight
over a single issue.
So it is a question of how we handle this. There is also
another aspect of the way they manage the U.S. relationship. It
is the old adage--when capable, feign incapacity. Put the word
out--China's defense budget is only $9 billion, it is much
smaller than Japan's, Taiwan's, Korea's, ours. Ours is at $250
billion and China only at $9 billion.
But, of course, they are dissembling. We know their budget
is at least four times as large. At the same time, the argument
is used--and President Clinton used this on April 7 in his
press conference in the Mayflower--we have 7,000 nuclear
weapons, they have 24, what is the problem?
There is no problem. We overwhelm them. Why are we arguing
about our threat? There is no threat.
So we dismiss the threat as minimal. What it does not take
into consideration is the way they look at weapons. They don't
look at them the way we do. They are not trying to match us
missile for missile. They have a concept of asymmetrical
warfare.
They hit our vulnerabilities. They know that our cities are
vulnerable. They have used this against the Russians--force de
frappe in the 1970's. The U.S. has many more than China does,
but the USSR would never lose Irkutsk or Vladivostok.
This is a psychological ploy that puts one on the defensive
quite effectively.
The Chinese also have documented that they are willing to
take huge population losses in any kind of war.
They have said, as Mao is alleged to have said, we can lose
300,000 million people in a war with Russia; or, we know, for
instance, that in the Great Leap Forward, 30 million Chinese
died of starvation because of Mao's social engineering.
We have to take this seriously.
I just might add on Kosovo, Kosovo is instructive in one
way for us on this. If we let Milosevic know that we are not
going to use ground forces in Kosovo in advance, he is going to
take much more decisive action. If we let the Chinese know that
there is no missile defense out there, their missiles will be
built up because it will give them leverage to force Taiwan to
the negotiating table on their terms.
Again, I say in my epilogue that China is a great
civilization of culture and art. It should be a country that
goes by international rules of trade, the rule of law across
the board, that expands its electoral base, that opens up its
system and that deals with its problems on its periphery in a
peaceful way. I think this is what we should aim for.
There is the clear emphasis on economic priorities now in
China. This is being challenged because of the economic turn-
down. Some Chinese propose turning to military means. But there
is a very powerful force in China that wants to be in the World
Trade Organization. In Premier Zhu Rong-ji's visit here the
whole strategic-military arrangement was downplayed in favor of
economics.
Even our own President neglected to use the words
constructive strategic partnership in both his press conference
in the Mayflower and his joint press conference with Zhu.
Anybody knows that a strategic partnership does not exist. It
is just a word game.
The Chinese are against NATO expansion, they are against
our position in Kosovo, they are against the Japanese-American
Security Treaty, which is the cornerstone of our strategy in
Asia, they are against our position on Taiwan, and they
sometimes have not been helpful in our position on North Korea.
So, I end up with the old Sunzi adage that the real
strategy is to win every battle without fighting. Those who
simply win every battle are not really skillful. Those who
render other armies helpless without fighting are the best of
all. The best victory is when the opponent surrenders of his
own accord, before there are any actual hostilities.
It seems to me, when I read your S. 693 on enhanced
security cooperation with Taiwan, there was one element in
there that I think was particularly important. I think, as
Secretary Schlesinger said, to get into a real contest with the
Chinese right now on TMD is not worth our attention.
But it seems to me that it is clearly spelled out in that
piece of draft legislation that the software concerning
communications, planning, education, and training, are very
important to establish now.
These are not make or break issues.
When we sent our carriers in there in March 1996, we had
really no contact with Taiwan. This could have led to a
disaster. It seems to me it is essential to establish an
understanding with Taiwan about future contingencies and
planning to deal with those contingencies. This is the sort of
thing which you can carry out, I think, without really
challenging the PRC relationship.
What we do about Aegis class destroyers built into a THAAD
system to defend Taiwan, whether we sell Taiwanese the
destroyers to do it themselves it seems to me is a decision
that is way down the road and only after there is actually an
antimissile system that works.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lilley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. James R. Lilley
the chinese challenge and the role of missiles
First, what is the Chinese challenge? Does the United States have a
genuine ``constructive strategic relationship'' with China? How modern
are Chinese strategic rocket forces and how does China intend to use
them? Is to consider China any kind of a threat a self-fulfilling
prophecy? Are American strategic forces so overwhelming that we do not
have to worry about China? Is Taiwan a flash point or a model for
positive change?
1. Chinese intentions: Let us look at what the Chinese themselves
say authoritatively and publicly:
The Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the Territorial
Sea and Its Contiguous Zone adopted at the 24th Meeting of the Standing
Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on February 25,
1992 explicitly states.
Article 2
The territorial sea of the People's Republic of China is the
sea belt adjacent to the land territory and the internal waters
of the People's Republic of China. The land territory of the
People's Republic of China includes the mainland of the
People's Republic of China and its coastal islands; Taiwan and
all islands appertaining thereto including the Diaoyu Islands
the Penghu Islands; the Dongsha Islands; the Xisha Islands; the
Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha Islands; as well as all the
other islands belonging to the People's Republic of China. The
waters on the landward side of the baselines of the territorial
sea of the People's Republic of China constitute the internal
waters of the People's Republic of China.
Article 5
The sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over its
territorial sea extends to the air space over the territorial
sea as well as to the bed and subsoil of the territorial sea.
Article 6
Foreign ships for non-military purposes shall enjoy the right
of innocent passage through the territorial sea of the People's
Republic of China in accordance with the law. Foreign ships for
military purposes shall be subject to approval by the
Government of the People's Republic of China for entering the
territorial sea of the People's Republic of China.
What this law means is the Spratly Islands (also claimed by
Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei) belong to the PRC. Taiwan, which
has security guarantees in the Taiwan Relations Act, belongs to the
PRC. The Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands which are also claimed by Japan
belong to the PRC. China has thus staked out claims on the first island
chain surrounding its most valuable east coastal area from Tianjin to
Guangzhou which puts it into potential confrontations with ASEAN, the
U.S., and Japan.
Article 3 establishes PRC sovereignty over the territorial sea and
air space, and establishes procedures for foreign navy ships to pass
through its territorial waters.
Article 8 says the PRC ``has the right to take all necessary
measures to prevent and stop non-innocent passage,'' and in Article 14
this includes the ``right of hot pursuit against foreign ships.'' It
specifically states this includes ``for military purposes.''
Prior to 1985, Chinese strategy was defensive, against a single
superior force to its north, the Soviet Union, and this required a
temporary partnership with the U.S. In 1985 the Chinese switched its
strategy to hi-tech warfare against states on its periphery. It has
since given first priority to its strategic rocket forces, its navy,
its air force, and its Rapid Reaction Units. This was to support its
objective of extending its sovereignty over contiguous areas to its
east and was done for both offensive and defensive reasons.
Offensively, the PRC seeks to undermine the American bilateral alliance
system stretching from Korea in the north to Australia in the south by
labeling it an anachronism left over from the Cold War. The Chinese
characterize these alliances as a series of arrows aimed at China which
will spur on the arms race and destabilize the area. China also seeks
to neutralize the military bases of this U.S. alliance system by
tactics of naval warfare. As Captain Shen Zhong Chang in his article on
21st Century Naval Warfare puts it, ``long-range precision strikes by
warships, carrier based aircraft and missiles are needed. Submarines
will make missile attacks on air targets. Long-range combat, missile
combat, and air force cover will be crucial.'' In 1996 PLA General Ding
Henggao stated that precision guided missiles (conventional and nuclear
armed) were the most important single system in China's future defense
posture.
Chinese procurement and production reflects its priorities. Sukhoi-
27, long-range strike aircraft procured from Russia are state of the
art--200 will become available in the next five years. Kilo class
submarines, Sovremennyy class destroyers with the deadly Sunbeam
torpedoes, air refueling, and of course ICBM, MRBM, SRBM, and cruise
missiles. Over 100 SRMBs (DF-15 or M-9s) are deployed opposite Taiwan,
according to the latest media reports. The number could reach over 650
missiles by 2005 according to what some newspapers say is a classified
DOD study on TMD. The July 1995 and March 1996 Chinese live fire
exercises in the Taiwan Strait area proved that Chinese aircraft
performance, tri-service exercise, amphibious attempts were primitive
and non-competitive. The Chinese trump card emerged as its missiles.
They were accurate, threatening, and were the main cause of economic
dislocations in Taiwan. If the threat could be increased 50 fold, the
potential for intimidation would also be increased. The presence of a
large number of missiles opposite Taiwan--especially if some were fired
into the sea-lanes off Taiwan--would represent leverage to get Taiwan
to the bargaining table on PRC terms. The missiles would not even have
to impact on Taiwan itself.
The Chinese also had to raise the stakes for the United States.
This would be done in two ways. A launch of Chinese missiles could have
the potential to destroy a U.S. carrier battle group--the capability to
do this would oblige the Americans to re-calculate the costs of close-
in intervention. In March 1996, the PRC claimed its threat of missile
attack kept our carriers out of the Taiwan Strait. Second, a long-range
``force de frappe'' would have the potential of taking out an American
city. This strategy was used on the Soviet Union by the PRC in the
1970s. Although the USSR had many times the number of missiles China
had, the Soviets would have to think hard before sacrificing the city
of Irkutsk to Chinese nuclear attack. So much more for the Americans
who have demonstrated their fear of casualties (for instance, in Iraq
in Desert Fox, in Somalia with our pullout, and now in Kosovo). The
Chinese raised this question in 1996: Would the Americans sacrifice Los
Angeles over a long distance turmoil off Taiwan?
The Chinese have also systematically improved their monitoring of
U.S. naval movements in the Pacific by setting up a major PLA space
tracking station in Kiribati Islands (Tarawa, to World War II buffs).
PRC historical war fighting--many battles on the periphery: A quick
review of Chinese combat history bears out the strategy spelled out in
1985 of wars on the periphery. China has fought often, sometimes
clinically sometimes passionately, with mixed results of both success
and failure.
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