A Military Space Control Doctrine -- A Necessity In The Post-Cold War World
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA C4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: A Military Space Control Doctrine -- A Necessity in
the Post-Cold War World
Author: LCDR Jack A. Greenspan, United States Navy
Thesis: With space systems playing an increasing role in
the U.S. national security posture and with the
proliferation of space technology in the post-Cold War
world, the U.S. needs to adopt military space doctrine based
on space control.
Background: The U.S. military has been operating in space
for the last 30 years, yet, surprisingly, no official
military doctrine for space exists. Space doctrine is in
its infancy as air power doctrine was during the I92Os and
193Os. Despite the lack of an official doctrine, the U.S.
has developed a complex military space capability that
proved successful in Desert Storm. Furthermore, the U.S.
military has become increasingly reliant on space systems to
support warfighting. The systems and force structure were
developed during the Cold War when the Soviet Union was the
major threat to U.S. national security. Today, the U.S. is
redefining its policies and strategies for the post-Cold War
world to deal with emerging powers and new global
relationships. The proliferation of technology is allowing
many nations, both allies and potential adversaries, to
build space programs with military capabilities. The Base
Force concept in the new National Security Strategy will
make U.S. forces more reliant on space for warfighting and
response to regional contingencies. Sound doctrine leads to
strategies and plans that would allow the U.S. to acquire
and employ space forces most effectively in support of
national objectives in the post-Cold War world.
Recommendation: The U.S. needs to adopt a military space
control doctrine that assures free access to space and the
capability to protect U.S. space resources.
A MILITARY SPACE CONTROL DOCTRINE ---
A NECESSITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD
OUTLINE
Thesis: With space systems playing an increasing role in
U.S. national security posture and with the proliferation of
space technology in the post-Cold War world, the U.S. needs
to adopt military space doctrine based on space control.
I. Space forces provide substantial capability
A. Reliance on space systems for support
B. Desert Storm examples
II. No real military space doctrine today
A. Current official doctrine
B. What doctrine is
C. The evolution of unofficial space doctrine - four
schools of thought
1. Sanctuary
2. Survivability
3. "High Ground"
4. Space Control
D. The Soviet threat and impact on doctrine
E. The ASAT debate
F. Space control -- the emerging doctrine
II. Emerging Space Powers and New Threats
A. Proliferation of space technology
B. Civil-Military applications of space -- new threat
IV. Implications of new National Security Strategy on space
V. Imperatives for a space control doctrine
A MILITARY SPACE CONTROL DOCTRINE ---
A NECESSITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD
The U.S. military has become increasingly reliant on
space systems to support warfighting. Seventy percent of
the U.S. military space effort is tactical in nature and the
vast majority of support is provided to conventional forces.
(1:24) Until the last 10 years, space systems merely
augmented terrestrial systems. Now the situation has
changed. Many terrestrial systems augment or serve as
backups for space systems, such as in communications,
weather, navigation and reconnaissance. (6:25-26)
During the 1980s, space systems played an important
role in all U.S. conventional military operations. They
were employed in operations Urgent Fury, (Grenada), El
Dorado Canyon (Libya) and Just Cause (Panama) for
communications, weather prediction, strike route planning
and battle damage assessment.
Operation Desert Storm, however, proved a watershed
event in military space application. Air Force Chief of
Staff Gen. Merril A. McPeak described it as "the first space
war." (3:18) "While we did not war in space," writes
Commander-in-chief, U.S. Space Command, Gen. Donald J.
Kutyna, "Desert Storm was the first campaign-level combat
operation in which space was solidly integrated in the
combat operations and was vital to the degree of success
achieved in the conflict." (1:25)
During the five-month buildup in Operation Desert
Shield, a mix of user sets, mobile terminals and portable
receivers were deployed to Saudi Arabia to create a space
infrastructure for receiving and disseminating space-based
data. (3:18) Once hostilities began, space systems were a
key component of combat operations.
Many critical support missions, including missile
warning, communications, navigation, mapping and weather
observation were performed primarily from space. (10:85)
-- Defense Satellite Program (DSP) strategic-warning
satellites provided early warning of Iraqi ballistic
missile attack to both Coalition forces and the
Israelis. (10:85)
-- Various defense communications satellite systems
carried more than 85 percent of all inter-theater and
intra-theater communications. (3:19)
-- The Global Positioning System (GPS) provided precise
navigation to air, sea and land forces. More than 4500
GPS terminals allowed aircraft to conduct all-weather
missions with extraordinary accuracy; tanks to maneuver
precisely in the featureless desert; minesweeping forces
to navigate safely and effectively in enemy minefields;
and even ration trucks to find and feed soldiers in the
desert. (10:86)
-- LANDSAT, the Department of Commerce's multispectral
imaging satellite system, provided wide-area imagery to
update maps, to aid in trafficability and terrain
analysis, and to prepare air-route and weapons-delivery
plans. (3:20)
-- The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)
provided images of cloud cover and other weather
conditions to aid in planning combat operations.
Accurate weather forecasting was critical in deciding
whether to employ precision-guided munitions for an air
sortie since target visibility is essential for laser
designation. In addition, DMSP imagery allowed analysts
to determine moisture content of the soil, and thus,
identify routes which would support the weight of the
armored forces that conducted Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf's
"left hook" into Iraq. (3:19)
The U.S. military has been operating in space for the
last 30 years, yet surprisingly no official military
doctrine for space exists. Despite the lack of an official
doctrine, the U.S. has developed a complex military space
capability that proved successful in Desert Storm. The
systems and force structure were developed during the Cold
War when the Soviet Union was the major threat to U.S.
national security.
Today, the U.S. is redefining its policies and
strategies for the post-Cold War world to deal with emerging
powers and new global relationships. The proliferation of
technology is allowing many nations, both allies and
potential adversaries, to build space programs with military
capabilities. Additionally, the U.S. military is reducing
force structure and overseas presence under the Base Force
concept, making it even more reliant on space systems.
Sound doctrine can lead to strategies and plans that
would allow the U.S. to acquire and employ space forces most
effectively in support of national objectives in the post-
Cold War world. A doctrine that assures free access to
space and the capability to protect U.S. space resources is
required. With space systems playing an increasing role in
the U.S. national security posture and with the growing
number of space powers, the U.S. needs to adopt a military
space doctrine based on space control.
“Just as air doctrine was in its formative years in the
interwar period, space war-fighting doctrine is in its
infancy today." (5:16)
Space was first acknowledged in military doctrine in
1959. Since then, there has been much debate as U.S.
military space doctrine has evolved both officially and
unofficially. Numerous articles have appeared in military
professional journals by both staff officers and commanders
of U.S. space forces arguing the merits of different
doctrinal approaches. Efforts to publish an accepted space
doctrine have been largely futile due to changes in
technology and major disagreements on basic tenets of
military operations in space. (11:29)
The U.S. Air Force has taken the lead in developing
military space doctrine. The current version of AFM 1-1,
Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, contains
general doctrine that the Air Force claims is applicable to
air and space forces. The first attempt at specific space
doctrine, AFM 1-6, Military Space Doctrine, was published in
1982, but later canceled. According to military space
operators, neither has been considered useful doctrine for
space. (11:29)
AFM 1-6 was flawed because instead of explaining how
U.S. space forces would be employed in future conflicts, it
simply restated public policy. (4:57) Furthermore, AFM 1-1
and AFM 1-6 misstated the impact of the physical properties
of space. They were not grounded in history, nor founded on
the principles of war as applied to space. (5:15)
AFM 1-1 views space as an extension of the atmosphere,
combining air and space forces into "aerospace" forces.
Space, however, is different than the air. The fundamental
characteristics of air forces -- speed, range and
flexibility -- do not apply to space forces in the same
ways. Speed, for example, is bounded by orbital mechanics.
Speed is fixed for a given orbit. At times, zero relative
speed is desirable in space as in geosynchronous orbit for a
communications satellite. The characteristic "flexibility"
generally does not apply to space forces -- once in orbit,
space hardware is not easily modified. (5:14)
The U.S. Air Force is currently working on a draft
space doctrine AFM 2-25, Space Operations, and a revision to
AFM 1-1, that will include updated thinking about the
military and space. However, both documents are almost a
year away from publication. (11:38-39)
Criticisms of existing official space doctrine reflect
the evolving nature of this new arena for military
operations. Part of the problem stems from the word
"doctrine." Doctrine has many different meanings and is
often confused with policy. (4:56) According to Professor
I.B. Holley, Maj. Gen., USAFR, "military doctrine is what is
officially believed and taught about the best way to conduct
military affairs." (2:3)
Lt.Col. Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow, authors
of Introduction to Strategy, a basic text on strategy used
at U.S. military war colleges, say that "doctrine, in
general, has three purposes. First it provides the working
medium for a thorough analysis of past experience -- the
ultimate distillation of lessons learned. Second, it
provides the means of passing on this experience by
educating and allowing successors to avoid repeating the
same old mistakes. Third, it provides guidance for future
actions and allows for a commonality of understanding
between superiors and subordinates that is essential during
conflict." (11:30)
According to Drew, doctrine is developed through
experience and the accurate analysis and interpretation of
history. (5:15)
New doctrines frequently emerge from unofficial sources
and become official later during a war or when demonstrated
in peacetime weapons systems tests or in military exercises.
One example is the writings of Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan on
sea power at the turn of the century. Despite their
influence on naval warfare and shipbuilding programs, they
were not officially embraced by the Navy until many years
after their release. (5:16) Similarly, the Air Corps
Tactical School played a key role in the 1930s developing
and teaching air doctrine used in the early stages of World
War II, yet the official doctrine was not published until
1943. (2:3)
Several unofficial space doctrines have been developed
in the last 30 years. In "On Space Warfare: A Space Power
Doctrine", Lt.Col. David E. Lupton, USAF, identifies four of
the major schools of thought on space doctrine and argues
himself for a "space control" doctrine. All of these
doctrinal schools are closely linked to strategic nuclear
strategies, since the first military use of space technology
was linked to arms control.
The first school of space doctrine, labeled the
sanctuary doctrine, holds that space is to be used for
peaceful purposes and, therefore, is a sanctuary from war.
It speaks of "open skies" to conduct nuclear treaty
verification and provide strategic attack warning. "It is a
doctrine born from the shootdown of Gary Powers and
Eisenhower's attempt to establish a sanctuary for space-
based national technical means." (9:118)
The second school of space doctrine, the survivability
school, says that space systems are inherently vulnerable
due to the predictability of orbital mechanics and the ASAT
technology. Proponents argue that a space denial strategy
is the best policy and that an ASAT capability is the best
deterrent. They further do not believe that space systems
can be depended upon in time of war.
The third school of space doctrine, the "high ground"
doctrine, argues for a space-based ballistic missile defense
"Star Wars" -- to assure survival in nuclear war The
"high ground" school advocates space-based weapons systems
to resolve all conflicts whether in space or on the ground.
The final school of doctrine, the control school,
argues that space forces need to assert space power just as
air forces and naval forces assert air power and sea power
respectively. Space lines of communication are comparable
to sea lines of communication and must be controlled if war
is to be won either in space or in a terrestrial theater.
Space control includes both ensuring free access and
use of space and the ability to deny use to a potential
enemy. It includes the concept of space superiority
analagous to air superiority whereby an enemy use of a
region of space is denied for a specific period. It does not
require absolute control of all space. (5:27)
Each doctrine was formulated when the Soviet Union was
the primary threat to U.S. national security. The Soviet
Union was the only other major space power, and it had a
defined military space doctrine that advocated space
control. Soviet doctrine dating from the 1960's declared
that space forces are to be integrated into combined arms
and that space forces were to do their part in accomplishing
the political goals of the state. The Soviets viewed space
as another theater of war. (5:85)
The Soviets built a military space program which
included a robust launch program to assure access to space.
They had the capability to surge operations in times of
crisis as demonstrated by launches of extra reconnaissance
and surveillance satellites during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War
and the Falklands War. By 1989, the Soviets had roughly 50
different satellite systems, with missions including
reconnaissance, surveillance, strategic and tactical
targeting, launch detection and attack warning,
communications, navigation and weather. (5:38)
In addition, the Soviets were first to develop an
operational ASAT in the early 1970s, an interceptor placed
in orbit that would maneuver close to its target and
detonate. The Soviets pursued several ASAT technologies
including a ground-based laser program and an electronic
warfare program judged to have an ASAT capability. (1:23)
The Soviet ASAT capability meant the sanctuary doctrine
was no longer viable. The debate over military space
doctrine concentrated on the survivability, "high ground,"
and space control schools.
Concern with the Soviet ASAT capability fueled a public
policy debate on U.S. ASAT development during the early
1980s. This issue clouded the doctrinal debate on space.
By the early 1980s, the U.S. military had become
increasingly reliant on space systems, and a doctrine based
on space control was necessary if the U.S. was to ensure the
uninterrupted use of these systems during conflict with the
Soviets. Space would not remain a sanctuary in war if the
Soviets fought according to their doctrine.
The Reagan administration supported the need to build
offensive and defensive space weapons to protect U.S.
national security interests in space. (5:46) Development
began on an ASAT system that included a missile interceptor
launched from an F-15 aircraft. Also in 1983, President
Reagan announced the Stategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a
vision for a program using new technologies and space-based
weapons to counter the strategic nuclear threat.
Space weapons and the advocacy of military space
control was a controversial topic in Congress, however.
Congressional concerns centered on whether current treaties
permitted the development and deployment of space control
technology, or whether peace could be better attained and
maintained through arms control. (5:43) The President got
funding for SDI research, but Congress banned testing of a
U.S. ASAT throughout the mid 1980s. By 1989, the anti-ASAT
fervor subsided, and the Bush administration was allowed to
continue development of an ASAT. (5:46-47)
Also in 1989, the Bush administration published "The
National Space Policy" which addressed military operations in
space. Objectives included "(1) deterring, or if necessary,
defending against enemy attack; (2) assuring that forces of
hostile nations cannot prevent our own use of space; (3)
negating, if necessary, hostile space systems; and (4)
enhancing operations of United States and Allied forces."
(5:52). This policy required a doctrine of space control.
The space control school prevailed, or so it seemed:;
Current doctrinal debate has centered on refining a
military space control doctrine. Discussions in
professional literature have analyzed the relative aspects
of space control. Given the high cost of space systems and
shrinking federal budgets, should the U.S. concentrate on
active defensive measures, such as ASATs? Or, should more
passive defensive measures be used, such as improving access
to space with a more robust launch architecture? (4 and 6)
The end of the Cold War and the recent collapse of the
Soviet Union, however, brings a new twist to evolving
military space doctrine. With no other space power a
threat, why bother with a doctrine of space control?
The most pressing concern is that space programs are
proliferating throughout the world, and new space powers are
emerging. Many nations have the desire, technological
capability and economic resources to obtain space systems
for both commercial and military use. Relationships with
these nations that are or have the ability to become space
powers are changing in the vacuum of superpower politics.
Their attitudes toward the free use of space are unknown.
Current allies and potential adversaries learned the
lesson of the effectiveness of military space systems during
Desert Storm. Many have significantly increased their
research and development activity and many are pursuing
launch technology and satellite programs. (10:90) Table 1
extracted from the 1992 annual "Report of the Secretary of
Defense to the President and the Congress" lists 31 nations
that have existing space systems or emerging space
technology.
TABLE 1 - SPACE SYSTEMS (WORLDWIDE) EXISTING AND EMERGING
SPACE TECHNOLOGY/SATELLITE COUNTRIES (10:91)
Argentina Iran Russia
Australia Iraq South Africa
Brazil Israel South Korea
Belarus Italy Spain
Canada Japan Taiwan
China Kazakhstan Thailand
Czechoslovakia Luxembourg Turkey
France Mexico UAE
Germany Netherlands Ukraine
India Pakistan United Kingdom
Indonesia United States
During the last 10 years, China, India and Japan have
launched communications satellites. (9:9) China, India and
Israel are believed to have launched reconnaissance
satellites. (9:9) Japan, France and Russia are offering
commercial launch services to countries capable of building
or buying space systems and who can also afford the price of
access to space.
The number of countries possessing short- and medium-
ranged ballistic missiles is growing. Former CIA Director
William Webster recently informed Congress that by the year
2000, at least six Third World countries probably will have
ballistic missiles with ranges up to 3,300 miles. Four of
these countries developing missile capabilities have nuclear
weapons or advanced programs. (1:22) Space-launch vehicle
technology and hardware are interchangeable with these of
ballistic missiles. (10:90)
Today some nations, such as China, rely heavily ;o-n
foreign military sales to shore up their economies, to help
client states, or to broaden their influence. As former
Space Command deputy Maj. Gen. Robert A. Rosenberg, USAF
(Ret.), writes, "No one has told these states they can't
sell access to space and space systems the same way. Is it
reasonable to think that states who want to exercise their
sovereignty to the reaches of outer space can't buy their
way into space weaponry? What about terrorist states? What
about the next generation of Iranian leadership or the next
Qadhafi?" (9:122)
Of additional concern is the problem of unemployed
Soviet scientists selling their space expertise to potential
adversaries pursing a military space program.
U.S. military space policy and doctrine must address
the proliferation of dual-use (military and commercial)
space systems and technologies that could significantly
jeopardize U.S. national security interests. The
acquisition of critical space-based information by
adversaries engaged in regional conflicts could have a
dramatic impact on the course of the battle. (10:90)
France has launched SPOT, a commercial observation
satellite system capable of 10-meter ground resolution.
Although the system has modest military utility, an improved
SPOT is planned for the mid-1990's with improved resolution.
The French as well as the Russians sell imagery obtained
from these multispectral satellites on the open market, thus
making it available to countries unable to field their own
systems. (5:8, 9:117)
Gen. Kutyna writes, "Just as we would not tolerate
enemy reconnaissance aircraft flying over our forces, we
must not allow any enemy satellites to provide militarily
useful data from space in wartime. Our forces obviously
need a capability to counter this threat." (1:23)
The growing number of space powers and the increased
access of military space technology in a multipolar world
increases the overall threat to U.S. space systems and the
forces they support. If the U.S. military is to continue to
operate in space, a doctrine of space control is necessary
to protect U.S. space assets and deny the use of space to
adversaries.
The importance of military space forces to warfighting
that was demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm will
increase as the new National Security Strategy is
implemented. The new strategy with its pillars of nuclear
deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and
reconstitution will be more reliant on space systems. Under
the Base Force concept within the strategy, the U.S. will
have a smaller force structure and fewer forward operating
bases from which to respond to regional crises.
As the U.S. presence in Europe and the Far East is
reduced, forward-deployed ground support systems such as
communications sites, navigational aids, weather stations
and collection activities will be eliminated. Space systems
will replace these terrestrial systems to provide essential
support functions. (3:17-18)
Because of their global nature, high readiness and
rapid response, space forces may be the only "on the scene"
capabilities in the early stages of future regional
conflicts. (10:85) Furthermore, space forces can provide
real-time or near-real-time support to deployed or enroute
forces and national command authorities during a crisis.
As Gen. Kutnya states, ". . the ability of the U.S. to
use any of its force packages depends heavily on its ability
to operate in the high ground of space. If we are to
maintain peak efficiency of our combat forces in an era of
reduced force levels and fewer forward operating locations,
our space systems must be available to our land, sea and air
forces when they are needed in both peacetime and wartime."
(1:24)
In summary, space forces have become an integral part
of the U.S. warfighting capability. Maturing space doctrine
must meet the challenges of the future. In the evolving
post-Cold War world, new space powers are emerging that may
bring new threats to U.S. national security. A space
control doctrine will assure the U.S. access to space and
the survivability of systems during conflict. A space
control doctrine will allow the U.S. to maintain the space
lines of communication to support terrestrial forces' around
the world. A space control doctrine can meet the challenges
of future.
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