Subject: Team B on ASATs (the view from 1976)
From: thomsona@netcom.com (Allen Thomson)
Date: 1995/10/19
Message-Id: <thomsonaDGoADL.Dv8@netcom.com>
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,alt.war,alt.politics.org.cia
I was recently rereading the famous "Team B" alternative
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 1976 while preparing a
posting for a.p.o.cia and came across the following section on
Soviet ASAT. It's interesting from several points of view, so
I've reproduced the entire available text here (there are many
redactions, unfortunately). I've made some comments in places
where there is information relevant to present-day problems of
satellite vulnerability and other things which interest me.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Estimating History [i.e., previous NIE assessments]
[One or two paragraphs redacted]
In 1968, the Soviets initiated actual non-nuclear ASAT
testing, a fact which was reflected in the 1969 NIE. By 1971
(Feb), NIE 11-3 noted that a non-nuclear ASAT capability had
been demonstrated, but that "a fully operational system would
require greater flexibility than was displayed in the Soviet
tests." [NIE 11-3-71, p.79, paragraph 207] It was believed hat
the same constraints on ASAT use discussed in earlier years
would continue to prevail, and would, in fact, be reinforced by
the increasing dependence of the Soviets upon their own
satellite systems as well as the effects of the SAL [Strategic
Arms Limitations] negotiations.
It will be very interesting to obtain those 1960s - early 1970s
NIEs to see what the "constraints on ASAT use" were believed to
be, as those probably influenced the way future U.S. systems
like the KH-11 (IOC Jan 1976) were designed.
As far as increasing Soviet dependence on satellites goes, it's
my impression that, at least in a qualitative sense, they never
got to the degree of dependency the U.S. did.
In an August 1971 supplement, the NIE noted that the Soviets
were in a period of frequent ASAT testing, and questioned why
they did not employ a non-nuclear ASAT variant of the Galosh
ABM, which would be capable of direct ascent intercepts and
therefore highly effective against US reconnaissance satellites.
Quite a relevant comment in the present-day context: non-nuclear
direct ascent ASATs, the kind easiest to build, were recognized
as "highly effective against US reconnaissance satellites."
This reasoning let to the view that the ASAT system was a long
range program ultimately directed against the full range of US
space systems which could have originated in response to
hypothetical systems (e.g., orbital bombardment) widely
discussed in the early 1960's, but not introduced.
An interesting notion, but I'd want to see the evidence before
accepting it.
The hiatus in ASAT testing from 1971 to 1976 has led to the
publication of essentially unchanged estimates concerning the
Soviet ASAT system, although Soviet laser capabilities have been
given increasing emphasis as they have advanced. In addition,
in 1974 the NIE noted that the Soviets demonstrated a capability
to place satellites in geostationary orbit, thus potentially
extending their ASAT capabilities to that altitude.
The second sentence contains a point worth bearing in mind as we
sail off into the future: GEO (or even GTO, for crossing shots)
launch capability implies some degree of GEO ASAT capability.
The Evidence
[entire text, approximately two to four paragraphs, redacted]
Darn.
Analysis/Estimate [by Team "B"]
As it currently exists, the Soviet ASAT system has several
operational limitations which must be considered in assessing
its potential utility to the USSR.
(1) Altitude Limitation. This was noted above, and is primarily
a function of the launch vehicle [SL-11]. It could be
alleviated by use of a larger launch vehicle such as the SL-12,
although Soviet views regarding the necessity of testing at
higher altitudes prior to operational use remain unknown.
[ section 2 redacted ]
(3.) Target Capacity. As noted, each target satellite requires a
separate ASAT launch. Although US reconnaissance systems
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
maintain only a small number of satellites, which cannot be
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
rapidly replaced, on orbit
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Aigh! This is *still true today, and is getting worse* as the
"recapitalization/reinvestment" program rolls along. Lots of
people know it now, lots of people knew it then. So what the
hell has been going on in the NRO these past twenty years?
a militarily effective attack upon planned systems (such as
GPS) would seem to require development of an ASAT vehicle
with a multiple engagement capability. [One or two paragraphs
redacted]
While Soviet intentions for the current system cannot be
determined, consideration of its characteristics and limitations
does permit attribution of several potential applications:
(1) Political Use. Demonstration of intent, political "shock"
effects, etc.
True today as well.
(2) Crisis Management. One time denial of information during a
high intensity crisis situation.
Hm. I'd tend to think that the availability of UAVs makes this
less valid in today's world.
(3) Extended Conventional War. Denial of tactical information
over an extended period of time, possibly preceded by or
coupled with lower level antisatellite operations, such as laser
blinding, ECM, etc.
Well, given the small numbers of spysats and long replacement
times, this is probably still important. UAVs might take up
much of the slack locally, but loss of global reconnaissance
would be a serious indirect consequence of satellite destruction
in a regional conflict. It would be interesting to find out
what kinds of industrial lasers could be used for blinding
satellites these days.
Physical satellite destruction may be more
likely as the nuclear threshold is approached. [about four lines
redacted] This would be fully in consonance with Soviet
employment of other space systems, such as their radar ocean
surveillance satellite, in tactical operations.
IMO, "the nuclear threshold" is totally irrelevant today in
talking about ASAT. We'll nuke'm if they use nukes (or just
maybe biological weapons -- not chemicals) on U.S. territory or
troops and not otherwise.
(4) Strategic Research and Development. Provide test and
operational data for use in development of more capable ASAT
systems.
It is worth noting that the second series of Soviet ASAT
tests began about a year after the ABM treaty, which had
significantly constrained the number of ABM launchers that the
Soviets could possess. Since the ASAT system is totally
ineffective in an ABM role, its development may reflect a Soviet
desire to avoid diverting any of their ABM system to an anti-
satellite role, while at the same time acquiring an ASAT system
that could in no way be construed as a violation of the ABM
treaty.
Another interesting dissertation topic: to what extent were
early ABM (and perhaps high-performance SAM??) systems on either
side designed to be usable as LEO ASATs?
Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View
Report of Team "B"
Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis
December 1976
Note:
This document is one part of an experiment in competitive
analysis undertaken by the DCI [Director of Central
Intelligence] on behalf of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. The views expressed are those of the authors
and do not represent either coordinated National Intelligence or
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Introductory Remarks:
The mandate of Team "B" was to take an independent look at the
data that go into the preparation of NIE 11-3/8 [on Soviet
strategic forces], and on that basis determine whether a good
case could be made that Soviet strategic objectives are, in
fact, more ambitious and therefore more threatening to U.S.
security than they appear to the authors of the NIEs...
Team Leader : Professor Richard Pipes
Associates : Professor William Van Cleave
: Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA (Ret.)
: Dr. Thomas Wolfe, RAND Corporation
: General John Vogt, USAF, (Ret.)
Advisory Panel : Ambassador Foy Kohler
: The Honorable Paul Nitze
: Ambassador Seymour Weiss
: Maj. General Jasper Welch, USAF
: Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
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