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2002
INS'S MARCH 2002 NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL OF CHANGE OF STATUS FOR PILOT TRAINING FOR TERRORIST HIJACKERS MOHAMMED ATTA AND MARWAN AL-SHEHHI
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 19, 2002
Serial No. 63
Page 2 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCPrinted for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., WISCONSIN, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
LAMAR SMITH, Texas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
RIC KELLER, Florida
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
Page 3 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCMIKE PENCE, Indiana
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
JERROLD NADLER, New York
ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
MAXINE WATERS, California
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
PHILIP G. KIKO, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
PERRY H. APELBAUM, Minority Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania, Chairman
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
Page 4 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCMELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania
LAMAR SMITH, Texas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah, Vice Chair
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
ZOE LOFGREN, California
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
GEORGE FISHMAN, Chief Counsel
LORA RIES, Counsel
CINDY BLACKSTON, Professional Staff
LEON BUCK, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
MARCH 19, 2002
OPENING STATEMENT
The Honorable George W. Gekas, a Representative in Congress From the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
Page 5 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCThe Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
The Honorable Jeff Flake, a Representative in Congress From the State of Arizona
The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress From the State of California
The Honorable Chris Cannon, a Representative in Congress From the State of Utah
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa, a Representative in Congress From the State of California
WITNESSES
Mr. James W. Ziglar, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service
Oral Testimony
Prepared Statement
Mr. Tom Blodgett, managing director, Business Process Solutions, Affiliated Computer Services, Inc.
Page 6 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCOral Testimony
Prepared Statement
Mr. Rudi Dekkers, CEO, Huffman Aviation International, Inc.
Oral Testimony
Prepared Statement
Mr. Michael Cutler, special agent, New York District Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service
Oral Testimony
Prepared Statement
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Mohammed Atta's Entries and Exits
Marwan Al-Shehhi's Entries and Exits
Page 7 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCChronology of Mohammed Atta's Document Processing
Chronology of Marwan Al-Shehhi's Document Processing
Letter to Mr. Gekas from Mr. Ziglar regarding the issuance of the student visas, Mohammed Atta's INS inspection results, INS memo from Mr. Thomas Cook with attachments, and The Washington Post article by George Lardner Jr. dated October 28, 2001 (requested by Ms. Jackson Lee)
Letter to Mr. Gekas from Mr. Karpinski correcting Mr. Ziglar's testimony
INS'S MARCH 2002 NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL OF CHANGE OF STATUS FOR PILOT TRAINING FOR TERRORIST HIJACKERS MOHAMMED ATTA AND MARWAN AL-SHEHHI
TUESDAY, MARCH 19, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4 p.m., in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. George W. Gekas [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. GEKAS. The hour of 4 o'clock having arrived, this hearing and the Committee will come to order. Let the record indicate that the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Conyers of Michigan, is present; that the lady from Texas, Mrs. Jackson Lee, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee is present, as is the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake. The attendance of these Members constitutes a quorum for a hearing so that we may proceed immediately to the business of this hearing, which by the way, is apparent to the entire world.
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The events of September 11, known to every living human being on the face of the earth, constituted a devastating blow to the United States of America, and everyone knows it and everyone has felt the consequences of it in various ways.
Then to add insult to injury, on March 11, 6 months to the day, while the President is taking some time out to recollect the devastating events of September 11, at that precise time the ghost of Mohammed Atta and his conspirator, co-conspirator, strike the Nation again through the revelations made by the flight instruction company in Florida to the effect that the student visas for these two terrorists have now been approved.
That struck an extra chord of horror on the parts of all American citizens who paid attention to these series of events, and hence we have this hearing, which will go to the plan of determining what exactly happened and how did this situation occur.
We are aware of a chronology of events, but that will be fleshed out by the witnesses that we have brought to the witness table today, we are sure. It should be noted that the witnesses will be able to tell us a series of events and when they occurred in the context of where we found the failings of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Following these revelations, we have determined almost conclusively that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is broken, and that we must take giant steps together to try to reconstruct it. The thought that strikes everybody and everyone takes to heart is if the Immigration and Naturalization Service had difficulty and actually an impossibility of identifying the terrorists whose acts were complete, and in the part of the notorious history of the United States, how can we believe that future terrorists will be detected in time to prevent other similar tragedies? That's the burning question that faces the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of Justice, the Bush Administration and the Congress of the United States.
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As a matter of fact, because these events have occurred, we believe that the plan that the gentleman from Wisconsin, the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Sensenbrenner, and I, have offered by way of legislation to reorganize, restructure the Immigration and Naturalization Service is apropos and comes at a time when we should be helping us reconstruct the INS in a way that through such restructuring, full accountability will be accorded, full communication will be presented among the various bureaus and agencies that have our national security as part of their very existence, that we will be able to predict and be able to prevent terrorists from—and potential terrorists from reaching our borders, or if they do reach our borders, to bring them into custody swiftly. All of these things are inherent in the proposed legislation that we will consider fully when we return from the next recess for the purpose of making certain that the type of incidents which now have entered the history of our country should never happen again.
We're going to look forward to the testimony of the witnesses because I know they want the same goals, they want the same fixes to be placed in the system, they want the same accountability for which we yearn, and that they will in their own ways support and help us bring about a good solid system for the American people.
The Chair yields to the gentleman from Michigan, who may want to yield to the lady from Texas, but that's up to them.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman. I'm very pleased to be here with you and the Ranking Member, Congresswoman Jackson Lee of Texas, and to participate in this very important hearing, the purpose of which is to review the events that led the Immigration and Naturalization Service to notify the Huffman Aviation International, the flight school at which Atta and Al-Shehhi trained, that Atta and Al-Shehhi's student visa applications had been approved 6 months after those individuals participated in attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.
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We are here to examine Atta and Al-Shehhi's entries and departures from the United States in order to assess whether those individuals were properly admitted to the United States, and to determine whether their applications to change status should have been approved.
On March 11, 2002, precisely 6 months to the day after the September 11 attacks, the Huffman Aviation School received notification from the Immigration and Naturalization Service that student visa applications for both these persons had been approved. The incident raised almost immediate complains throughout the Government, including from the United States Congress, the President of the United States and the Attorney General. And so the questions that need to be examined is whether paperwork may be pending for other known terrorists in the Immigration and Naturalization system that the INS has failed to intercept. You see, the facts are that both Atta and Al-Shehhi completed their training 7 to 8 months before the INS adjudicated their applications to change status, and almost 15 months before Huffman Aviation was notified that their student visas had been approved.
In light of these facts, INS would be unable to stop another Atta or another Al-Shehhi from receiving flight training in the United States even if it had information indicating that the alien was engaged in terrorist activity. There are those on this Committee who are inquiring as to whether the INS should continue to allow aliens admitted in other non-immigrant statuses to take training in the United States while awaiting their visas. This incident also highlights the INS's computer problems and its inability to track students and others in the United States.
Page 11 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCAnd so I join the Subcommittee Chairman Gekas and the Ranking Member, Ms. Jackson Lee, in the discussions that have talked about how we should restructure the INS. But only yesterday the Administration has come forward with yet another plan that throws all of our work into some kind of peril. Now——
Mr. GEKAS. Would the gentleman yield for a moment?
Mr. CONYERS. I would yield with pleasure.
Mr. GEKAS. I don't believe that characterizing it as putting our work at some peril, but we will consider everything that the White House has proffered, along with the Department of Justice, as part of our continuing effort to bring about a restructuring. We will consider what they have offered.
Mr. CONYERS. Exactly. Of course we will, Chairman Gekas. The problem is though that we thought we were working with the White House when we were putting our plan together, and now we find out that there—maybe they're working with someone else, but they certainly aren't working with any of the Members that I'm aware of.
But the INS apparently remains fixated on detaining and rounding up countless thousands of Arab-Americans and permanent residents without any known justification, but yet has failed to take the most basic steps to ensure that visa approvals are not issued to known terrorists, and since we've had this Administration plan floated within the last 24 hours, I would like to hope that and suggest that we do not turn this hearing into an opportunity to blame other predecessors in the Immigration and Naturalization Services for mistakes that have occurred within this last period of months. Those who have approved the terrorist visas have and must be ultimately accountable to the INS, to the Congress, and to the Administration.
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Now, immigration law may be complicated, but I cannot believe that we are in the circumstance that forces us to come here today. The fact that we are operating in a way to determine whether or not we can deal with prominently identified terrorists or not tells me that this situation is—that this—INS is in badly in need of restructuring. But it may need more. It may need to have replacements of personnel there. I understand that four of the people responsible have been already moved in office, but whether that's enough or not, we'll wait to determine.
And I thank the Chairman for giving me additional time.
Mr. GEKAS. I thank the gentleman for his remarks. We now turn to the lady from Texas for an opening statement.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me acknowledge the Ranking Member and of course the Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to personally thank you for holding this hearing as soon as you did, within 7 days of the incident that occurred. I think that is a testament to what Congress can do.
Let me also acknowledge the witnesses, and thank you very much for the promptness of which you have responded in order to provide the people of the United States an open book to this particular set of incidences.
Obviously, September 11 sent a shock, a sheering shock, a piercing shock throughout this Nation, both in terms of a loss of life, the violation of our soil and the wondering of how we could have prevented it. But March 11 created a red alert day, and frankly said that what was broken has not been fixed, and that it is now time that the inertia of all who can be held accountable for this particular agency should stop immediately, cease and desist.
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I say that, Commissioner, as I look at you in particular, because I recognize the hard work that you have engaged in from the time that you have been sworn in to this present day. It's a tough job. And today's hearing I hope will be based more on fact finding and resolution.
But let me give you my very honest opinion. The dilemma and the debacle of March 11 has the hand prints of Democrats and Republicans. It is based upon partisan inertia, Democratic administrations, Republican administrations, Democratic congresses, if we've had one in the last couple of years, which we've not, and—except for the Senate—and Republican congresses. We have done a lot with hearings and delay and hearings and delay and comment and delay. This is something that we have to address now.
And one of the issues that I think is crucial is the ability to say to the INS to rapidly rehabilitate yourself. We gave dollars in 1996 to do the student tracking system. It is now 2002, and we're not holding you accountable until 2003. As my testimony or my statement will say, I am well aware that part of the delay had to do with our outstanding institutions of higher learning, who are concerned about the invasion of privacy, and I am sympathetic to that. Everyone is well aware of my commitment to civil liberties and civil rights, but it is clearly, the burden is upon our shoulders, that we're talking about a system that is not in place.
The facts are that on March 11, exactly 6 months after the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history, a Florida flight school was notified by mail that the INS had granted student visa status to two deceased terrorists, Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi. These men had already completed their flight training and obviously were dead. Even though the student visas were not necessary to carry out their plots since the men had entered the country on tourist visas, disclosures has raised new questions about the INS' ability.
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But let me give you the chronology. It was September 19, 2000 that Mr. Atta applied for a change from a visitor B–2 visa to a M1 student visa. It wasn't until July 17, 2001 that he was even notified, and the school did not get notified until the mailing by the particular company on March 2, 2002. Hand prints all over. And the inertia problem is absolutely outrageous.
Your statistics alone say that 600,000 foreign nationals held student visas in the United States, including more than 10,000 enrolled in flight training, trade schools and other nonacademic programs, and according to an early statement made by the INS after these visas were issued, they said that the system used by the INS to keep track of foreign students was antiquated, inaccurate, untimely, as we have indicated, and of little utility. I already mentioned to you that we assigned the INS the responsibility of changing this system in 1996. It won't be implemented, to my understanding, until 2003. A task force representing the INS, the FBI and CIA, and Defense Intelligence Agency was put together, and it recommended that information on students' I–20 visa applications be shared among Federal agencies. For example, an applicant who came from a country known to sponsor terrorists or has traveled to such a country might be referred for further scrutiny. That's what should have happened to Mr. Atta and his compatriot. The INS was required by law to collect the information on students' addresses, visa status and any academic disciplinary action, but of course, this apparently did not happen to its fullest. In some cases the INS reviews applications from foreign nationals in the United States when they apply to change business or tourist visas to student visas. A House Judiciary Committee investigation last fall determined that the tracking program was scaled back partly because of the pressure of major universities. What I can say is that it is extremely important that we begin to bring all the parties to the table, Mr. Chairman, to ensure that Congress is not in the midst of delay and deterring, delay be not doing the job, and deterring the right thing to be happening.
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Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying this. I'm gratified that you so willingly are open to the Administration's new offer. Speculative at best, I don't know if anyone has a proposal on their desk at this point, but as you're open to the Administration's proposal, let me say that Democrats have been offering a proposal, H.R. 1562, that clearly recognizes even some of the points that Commissioner Ziglar has made in his administrative changes, two freestanding—not freestanding—two institutions, services and enforcement, that are governed by an Assistant Attorney General for Immigration Affairs. In order for this to work, this must be a bipartisan effort where all are involved. And in order for us to be successful, Mr. Chairman, more hearings and more delay and more talk, will not be the solution that we need today.
I would say to us that we need to have a hearing and we need to pass legislation within the next 30 days. I yield back. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Mr. GEKAS. We thank the lady for the opening statement. Let the record indicate that the gentleman from Utah is in attendance, Mr. Cannon; the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa; the lady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Hart; the gentleman from California, Mr. Gallegly; and at this time we yield to the gentleman from Arizona for a brief opening statement.
Mr. FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It will be brief. I want to get to the testimony.
Now, let me just say we heard testimony from Commissioner Ziglar in October of last year, I believe, and at that time it was said that the INS was capable of reforming itself from within. I think that this incident last week simply demonstrates that the INS is in a freefall, and I think that this hearing, while about this incident, means something far broader. Is the INS capable of reforming itself, or is the Congress going to have to impose reform from without? And I can tell you, my expectations are pretty low coming into this hearing, and I'm anxious to hear the testimony and to hear why we're wrong if we believe that the Congress needs to move on this.
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And with that, I'll yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GEKAS. We thank the gentleman. Does anyone else with to be recognized for the purpose of an opening statement? The gentleman from California, Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important meeting.
As many know, I have advocated INS reform for my entire 16 years in this House. In that time I've been angry, I've been frustrated, outright flabbergasted by the bureaucratic incompetence of this agency.
When I heard last Wednesday that Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi's student visas had been approved and received by their flight school, I wasn't surprised. I considered it business as usual.
Let me share just a few of my own personal experiences with the INS to paint a clear picture for reform. In June 1995 I led a delegation to Chrome Detention Center in Miami to evaluate what Congress could do to assist overcrowded INS facilities. When we arrived everything seemed fine. However, we learned a little later—what we learned a little later, that the high-level INS employees had conspired to deceive our congressional delegation. Among other things, just prior to our visit, the INS release 59 detainees including 9 criminals and 35 individuals who had not been medically cleared into our streets. Dan Cadman, then the INS Miami District Director, had actively participated in efforts to mislead our delegation. INS Inspector General Michael Bromwich, after I might add a very lengthy investigation, recommended that Mr. Cadman be punished within a range of a 30-day suspension to termination. Most importantly, the IG stated that if Mr. Cadman were not fired, he should be reassigned to a position that did not have significant managerial responsibilities. Why then has Mr. Cadman been promoted to INS Counterterrorism Coordinator? It's troubling to know that INS trusts a person who deliberately deceives Congress, releases criminal aliens into our society as the leader of our counterterrorism efforts.
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A more recent example of problems I've had with the INS regards three very basic questions I posed about the immigration status of screeners at Dulles, Newark and Boston's Logan Airport on 9–11. Of course we all know too well now that these were the airports where the four hijackers boarded planes and departed on September the 11. I first posed my question to Commissioner Ziglar in person in late September. I followed up with three letters and several phone calls over the next 4 months. I received no response to any of them. It wasn't—it was not until the end of February, nearly 5 months later I received answers to half of my questions. I still have not received them in writing as I requested. Fortunately, the Subcommittee will soon be holding a hearing on this matter so we can further flush out the inability of the INS to respond to inquiries about national security.
Another example of ignoring national security threats, last August an illegal immigrant with fraudulent papers was caught trying to enter a sensitive military base in my congressional district. The military police called the border patrol. The INS response: ''It's not our policy to pick up illegal immigrants in such cases.'' A policy that was handed down from headquarters. I have asked the question, if we can't protect our military bases, Mr. Chairman, what can we protect?
The INS has received a 250 percent increase in their budget over the past 10 years. It has just approved student visas for two individuals who 6 months ago murdered 3,000 people and it has promoted an individual who knowingly deceived Congress.
Where we do—where do we dig in our heels and say enough is enough, Mr. Chairman? I'm a strong supporter and cosponsor of Chairman Sensenbrenner's proposal to restructure the INS. I believe this legislation will be a key in overhauling the INS and setting it back on the right track, and I yield back.
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Mr. GEKAS. We thank the gentleman for his remarks.
We now recognize the gentleman from Utah should he have an opening statement.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to thank Mr. Ziglar and others for being here with us today. By way of disclosure I should say that Mr. Ziglar's been a friend for about 20 years, and a person that I think highly of but who has a great responsibility right now.
I think it's fair to characterize what the gentleman from California, Mr. Gallegly, has just said, and this may be a little simplistic, but as referring to the agency as a failed organization, failed in some of its major missions. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, has talked about not blaming, and let me just second those remarks and associate myself with them, because the issue here is not blame. The issue here is how do we make this organization work because the problem is not a Democratic problem or a Republican problem. The problem is an America problem, and we want people to come to America. We don't want them to go through an acid bath when they get here to the INS system, but we want to protect America.
So I take this moment for an opening statement to point out that I think that you are going to need some help at the INS, and I am going to be aggressively active in doing that. In the first place I think you need more political appointees because you need to express your will and your organization through this bureaucratic and entrenched organization with force, and it's going to take some help to do that. And I think, by the way, these suggestions are agreeable to many people on both sides of the aisle, so they're not just one party to the other.
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In the second place you have some people in your organization who are recalcitrant and who are going to resist a change, and you need to have the ability to fire those people. We want to give you that ability, some of us do, and we're going to have a debate on that.
And finally, you need enough money to put systems in place. This is a retrograde agency. It is largely a service organization, and base don information and your information systems are grossly inadequate and so we need to give you the resources to do that.
Now, having said that, it is my greatest hope that we can change the nature of the organization and the way it operates and the way it reaches people and the way it protects us.
And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GEKAS. We thank the gentleman.
Does any other Member wish to be recognized? The gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, is recognized for a similarly brief opening statement.
Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll try to be even briefer.
Commissioner, I want to be brief in my opening statement, but I want to let you know that I not only support the Chairman's reorganization plan, but I'm here today to say that it is extremely important that we get this plan behind us so that we can actually get to the more—most important issue which is the whole question of the 3 to 6 million undocumented workers who live and work in America every day, who live outside the law, and who your agency, prior to your coming, totally has failed since 1986 to contain, control, document or do anything properly with. I consider your organization today worse than useless because it expends funds while accomplishing a net nothing. And I know you don't agree with that when you join an organization. My district is in a position today, where if you did your job today, you would put hundreds of businesses right out of business because so much of the workforce in agriculture and in construction and other areas in my district presently has either a large minority or even a majority of undocumented workers. That's a reality of Southern California today.
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And so while I support the President's initiative to try to come up with a comprehensive guest worker program, to try to come up with some way to put into control that which is out of control, I have to say here today that this need for reform is standing in the way of what we really need to get to which is a way of controlling our—not just our borders, but our workforce and our workers. And so I will hope that you will take today's hearings in the spirit that it's given, which is to get this behind us and get on to the business of really reforming, as Mr. Gallegly said, the ongoing errors that have been made by this organization to the tune of 3 to 5 million people operating every day as employees outside the law in America.
And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GEKAS. We thank the gentleman for his opening statement.
I would ask the witnesses to please rise so that we may administer an oath prior to their testimony.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. GEKAS. We thank the witnesses. Now we defer to the gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner, a Member of the Judiciary Committee, to do a preliminary introduction of one of the witnesses, who happens to be his constituent. Mr. Weiner is recognized.
Mr. WEINER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As a Member, it's my pleasure to welcome Michael Cutler, my neighbor from Sheepshead Bay, who served in the Immigration and Naturalization Service since 1971, is an inspector, is a special agent of the INS and is a member of the INS Task Force on Organized Crime. I think his insights from within the belly of the beast will prove interesting.
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Let me also take this opportunity to say to the panel and to Members, as we know, during the deliberation on the PATRIOT Act, we in this Committee passed language in our version of the bill that not only would have increased the funding to crack down on the abuses of the student visa program, but we also moved up the deadline and said the time for delay of bringing on board the computer system for this purpose has long since passed.
You know, there are many people who say it takes a great deal of creativity to game the system and to get into this country illegally to commit acts of terrorism. It's actually very simple. Just have to go on to the Internet, contact a university, apply for a student visa. You can even come here while the application's in play. You don't need to show up for class. You can apply to study English literature. You can actually take lessons in flying planes without having to learn how to land them. You can overstay your student visa as long as you want, and frankly, no one will catch you. And Lord knows, the educational institutions that we would hope would be supportive of this did quite the opposite. They fought us tooth and nail on even putting in a tracking system.
So this doesn't take a great, creative, sinister mind to beat the system. It's very easy to do, and I hope, Mr. Ziglar, that you can finally get to the bottom of it, but if you're anything like your predecessor, and your predecessor's predecessor, and your predecessor's predecessor, and your predecessor's predecessor, who were all aware of this problem and did nothing, frankly, I'm skeptical that you'll be able to either.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Page 22 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCMr. GEKAS. We thank the gentleman. We are prepared now to introduce the witnesses formally and proceed with their testimony.
The first and foremost witness is James W. Ziglar, Commissioner of the INS, a graduate of the George Washington University and the George Washington University Law School. After clerking for Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmon, Mr. Ziglar spent 7 years in the private practice of law in New York and Phoenix. He then went into investment banking, where he worked in management positions at three prestigious firms, Dillon Reed & Company, Paine Webber and Drexel Burnham Lambert. From 1987 through 1988 he served as Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Water and Science. He served as Sergeant at Arms of the Senate from 1998 to 2001, and has been in his current position since August 2001.
Mr. Blodgett joins him at the witness table, the Managing Director of Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., the Business Process Solutions Division.
And he will be joined, and is joined at the witness table by Rudi Dekkers, who is President and CEO of Huffman Aviation. He's a graduate of the Vocational Technical School, the Royal Dutch Military Academy and University for Business Law, all in the Netherlands. He's also President of Aerojet Service Center, Inc., and Dekkers Aviation Group, Inc.
The final witness, introduced by Mr. Weiner, is as he indicated, a special agent with the INS. He started his immigration career as an Immigration Inspector at John F. Kennedy International Airport, became a special agent in August 1975. In 1991 he was promoted to senior special agent and assigned to the INS's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force.
Page 23 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCWe will proceed now with the testimony of Mr. Ziglar. Pursuant to the customary allotment of time, which is normally 5 minutes, with an assertion to each of the witnesses that their written statement will become a part of the record, which we now do, we will consider allowing elongation of that 5 minutes as it may appear necessary, but we ask you to keep that in mind as you proceed. After all, it will be the full and complete written statement that will constitute the fullest exposition of what you want to present to the Committee.
We now begin with Mr. Ziglar.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES W. ZIGLAR, COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
Commissioner ZIGLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I've endeavored to get it down. It's down to about 7 minutes if that's all right.
I appreciate your calling this hearing today. In fact, I'm glad you called this hearing, so that we can have a discussion of about the latest example of why the INS needs reform. While we may differ on some details of that reform, I know we both share a desire that INS quickly and effectively respond to the security needs of the Nation as well as—oh sorry—as well as quickly and effectively processing naturalization applications, adjustments of status, change in status, and other kinds of adjudications. The reorganization of the INS is necessary to provide clearer lines of decision making and specific accountability, but the recent mailings of the return I–20's to Huffman Aviation International were a direct result of obsolete technology and overly bureaucratic and illogical processes that we have there.
Page 24 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCWhen I started this job about 7 months ago, I found that I had inherited an information technology system, or more correctly, systems that were big on information and small on technology. I found too much reliance on manual data entry, much of which had to be boxed and shipped to outside contractors. Literally, we would have a box that would sit there in some of these places, and as forms came in, they'd wait till the box was full and then they would ship it off to the data entry contractors to put it in. I also found a lack of real-time data and a lack of readily-accessible electronic information for accurate and timely reporting. I found that INS lacked interconnectivity among its own systems as well as those of other law enforcement agencies, and I found that the enterprise architecture was still on the drawing board.
The incident of the return of the I–20's to Huffman Aviation International is a perfect example of the system that existed when I arrived at INS. While distressing, I want to use this incident that just occurred as a catalyst to accelerate the reforms at INS that I've tried to lay out and that I've talked to many Members of the Congress about.
First, before discussing some of these reforms that we already have undertaken or are undertaking, I think it's useful to clear up some of the facts of the case from last week. Contrary to some reports, the INS did not just recently approve the applications for Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi to change their non-immigrant status in order to take flying lessons. What we had here—I'm trying to find an analogy—what we had here is similar to buying an item with a check, go into a store, you buy an item with a check, get the item, and then you don't receive the canceled check for 6 months, the receipt for the check. Simply put, Huffman Aviation International was receiving its file copy of paperwork that they originally prepared on behalf of Atta and Al-Shehhi, and that's it. No new visas were issued, and no new decisions were reflected in the documents sent to them.
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However, we should have intercepted these I–20's at the contractor, and we did not. We should have thought that—although this was just a paperwork process, that we should have thought, gee, you know, we've got to go to this contractor and pull back those I–20's because of who these guys are. The contractor's not at fault in this at all. I might add that I have stopped any more sending out of I–20's when this happened, and we are reviewing all of them now to see if there's any other of these kinds of things in there. I don't think there are, but we certainly are going to make sure there are not.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to present to the Committee today a series of measures that INS is considering to rectify gaps in current processes and policies related to student and visitor visas. The changes fall into two areas, regulatory and administrative. And I might add that some of these changes have already been in the process and are in fact in the approval process before March 11. For example, we are considering a proposed regulatory change that would result in most visitors being admitted for a period of 30 days unless they can make a case for a longer stay in the country. And let me expand on that just a second.
As it is now the default date for someone coming in on a visa to the United States is 6 months. So you come in, you get a 6-month admission unless there is some other factor in there. We want to change that default date to 30 days, so that when somebody comes in they have to make a case as to why they need to stay longer or the inspector will have the discretion to make the visa time—make the admission time shorter. We think that will be an important initiative.
We also are considering changing our regulations to prevent a person, who has entered under some other status to begin a course of study before their request for a change of status to student is approved, as happened in the cases of Atta and Al-Shehhi. Now let me also mention that in this process what we have are two kinds of things that happen. Students either apply for a visa which is issued by the State Department overseas to come into the United States as a—as a student, an M visa, or they can come into the United States under a visitor's visa and then apply for a change of status to a student visa, and we are looking at how we can correct that system and keep people from gaming the system by coming in as visitors and then changing to a different status.
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To prevent the possibility of a long gap in sending a return copy of the I–20, INS has revised the process through which the I–20's are sent to the schools, so that the I–20's—I–20 is returned promptly when the individual is authorized to enter into student status. Once our foreign student tracking system is fully implemented, schools will be electronically notified when a decision is made.
I might add that back in September, before September 11, we were renegotiating the contractor status, and what was then a provision in the contract that said that the contractor would hold the I–20 notice and mail it after 6 months of holding it, that was changed to 30 days or not more than 30 days, but because of a bid protest in the contract, the contract was awarded in October, sometime in October, and I'm sure Mr. Blodgett can talk to you more about the contract terms. We allowed the contractor to continue with the 6 months until we got to the backlog that built up as a result of the bid protest. However, under the contract now, there is 30 days to return the I–20, and this is something that the process started before September 11, trying to clean up this situation that we have here.
And I might add one other thing. I'm parting from my text here, and I'm going to go more than 7 minutes, but I think it's important to say this. Is that the contractor here, ACS, did nothing wrong. They did absolutely nothing wrong, although they had the I–20 in their possession for data entry—data enter it into our systems. The fact is that those I–20's, we should have known to go and pull them out of the system. Today all applications processed at our service centers, including student visa and student status applications, are also checked against law enforcement databases, and that's not always been the case.
Page 27 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCINS also will send a cover letter to the school with the school's copy of the I–20. This letter will remind the school of its—of its already-existing obligation to notify INS if a student fails to attend classes, and it will give the school a process to follow in providing such notice. That is, in the interim, until the student tracking system comes online. And by the way, the student tracking system is beginning implementation in July and will be fully implemented by the end of this year.
Finally, since September 11, we've taken numerous initiatives to enhance security, and I—I guess we haven't probably talked enough about some of the things that we have done at the INS, and that's my fault. I should have—I should have been out telling people more about the actions we were taking.
Shortly after the terrorist attacks, INS began Operation Tarmac to ensure that employees who have access to secure areas of airports and other critical security infrastructures are legally in this country, authorized to work and pose no threat to the American people. More than 100 individuals have been arrested on various charges as a result of that operation. INS inspectors now have access to visa information from the State Department's Consolidated Consular Database and can call up photos and visa records of individuals at ports of entry. Under the direction of the Department of Justice, the INS, FBI and the Marshal Service are integrating their fingerprint databases, and by the end of 2001 this effort had already resulted in a number of fugitives being apprehended.
With an appropriation of 36.8 million, INS is moving from a paper system to an Internet based system for the administration and tracking of foreign students, and will meet the PATRIOT Act deadline for implementing the system by January 1, 2003. In fact, we will begin enrolling universities in the new foreign student tracking system, in July, as I mentioned.
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The INS has established a multi-agency project management office to develop and implement an entry-exit system, something that the President talked about in his State of the union. We intend to have that entry-exit system in place and operating a year ahead of the congressionally-mandated deadline.
And to increase our presence on both the Northern and Southern borders, approximately 800 National Guard personnel have been added temporarily until we can bring on other people to replace them, to assist INS inspectors at the port of entry.
In November, the Attorney General and I announced a major restructuring of the INS. The INS restructuring plan is a fundamental reform that's put service and enforcement into two distinct bureaus. It will clarify and improve the chain of command at INS, and we believe increase accountability.
Mr. Chairman, all of us at INS want to improve operations and performance. I've seen hard work undertaken by our people. The INS and the Department of Justice have moved forward on numerous important initiatives to enhance our Nation's security, and we will continue to make improvements to enhance both our law enforcement and our service operations. I want to work closely with the Congress, particularly on improving our information technologies and on restructuring. I look forward to moving ahead together in a positive way to improve systems for protecting our borders and our citizens—both native-born and naturalized.
And I look forward to answering any of your questions.
Page 29 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC[The prepared statement of Mr. Ziglar follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES W. ZIGLAR
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your calling this hearing today so that we might have the chance to discuss the latest example of why INS needs reform. While we may differ on the details of that reform, I know we both share a desire for INS to quickly and effectively respond to the security needs of the United States as well as quickly and effectively respond to the processing of naturalization petitions, changes in status, and other adjudications functions. Reorganization of INS is necessary to provide clearer lines of decision-making and specific accountability. We need to update antiquated technology systems and overly bureaucratic processes that exist at INS that directly caused the recent mailings of the return I-20s to Huffman Aviation International.
When I started this job about 7 months ago—one month before September 11—I found that I inherited an information technology system, or more correctly, systems, that were big on information and small on technology. I found too much reliance on manual data entry, much of which had to be boxed and shipped to outside contractors. I found a lack of real-time data and a lack of readily accessible electronic information for accurate and timely reporting. I found that INS lacked interconnectivity among its own systems as well as with those of other law enforcement agencies, and found that enterprise architecture was still on the drawing board. I also found that the INS lacked a full-time Chief Information Officer who could be responsible for and analyze the best solutions to the agency's IT shortcomings. While some improvements have taken place in recent years, you and I both know that the pace of improvement has been well behind any reasonable definition of the Service's needs.
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It has become all too clear that, over time, the processes and procedures involved in approving naturalization petitions, changes in status, and in other adjudications functions have become far too bureaucratic, involving too many steps—many of which add no real value to the final outcome.
The incident of the return of the I-20s to Huffman Aviation International is a perfect example of the system that existed when I arrived at INS. First, before I begin a recitation of the events and of the processes of that system, I think it is useful to clear up some confusion. Contrary to some reports, the INS did not just recently approve the applications for Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi to change their nonimmigrant status in order to engage in flight training. Simply put, Huffman Aviation International was receiving their file copies of paperwork they originally prepared on behalf of Atta and Al-Shehhi. No new visas were issued and no new decisions were reflected in the documents sent to them.
The process for foreign student applications begins with the I-20 form: a document that schools, certified to accept foreign students, give to prospective students to enable the students to apply to the U.S. government for a student visa or student status.
If the student is outside the United States, he submits the I-20 to a U.S. consulate abroad as part of an application package to obtain a student visa. If the student is already lawfully in the United States in another nonimmigrant status, he applies to the INS for a change of status to that of student, and submits the I-20 as part of a package of documents. If this application is approved, the student is sent a Notice of Action (Form I-797), which he uses to show the school that he has been approved for student status. There are two copies of the I-20—one for the student and one for the school. The student's copy of the I-20 form is returned to the student with the Form I-797. The INS Service Center sends the school's copy of the I-20 to an outside contractor to perform data entry to update our automated Student Schools System. When that is completed, the school's copy of the I-20 is returned to the school for its records. This is the return that took place last week with respect to Mohammed Atta's and Marwan Al-Shehhi's earlier approved requests to change status.
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The papers sent to this flight school were documents that acknowledged the approval dates of July 17, 2001, and August 9, 2001, for Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi, respectively, to attend Huffman Aviation International. It is worth repeating that at the time the student status for Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi were approved, neither the INS nor the State Department had any adverse information indicating that the applications should be denied. It is also worth noting that the Aviation Security Act now requires that foreign nationals who seek to receive training on aircraft of substantial size must undergo a background records check before they can begin training. Sound intelligence information is necessary to ensure the accuracy of that background records check.
The I-20s in question were sent to an outside contractor in late September for data entry. The contract in effect at that time, which was negotiated in 1996, required that the I-20s be entered into a database system and microfiched within 5 days, and returned to the school for its records after holding them 180 days. The data from these particular I-20 forms was entered into the database on October 5, 2001, and then later mailed, arriving at Huffman Aviation International in March 2002. As the result of September 11, a new contract, with a different contractor, was signed on October 23, 2001, requiring that the I-20s be returned to the school within 30 days after processing. I have been told that, because of a backlog transferred from the previous contractor after a bid protest, the I-20s in question were processed under the terms of the previous contract, which allowed the contractor to extend the time period for mailing to 180 days. I would like to note that it does not appear that either contractor did anything in error. However, I would say that the INS procedures and the terms of this contract were clearly not the most effective or desirable.
Page 32 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCAs you know, this current system for foreign student applications is being replaced with the new automated Student Exchange and Visitor Information System, known as SEVIS. INS will begin deploying this system in July. SEVIS is an internet-based system and once the system is fully deployed schools will receive quick electronic notification of student approvals, eliminating most of the paper elements in the current foreign student process.
This Committee has also asked questions about the process that allowed Mohammed Atta to come to this country as a visitor and then to attend flight school. The following facts have been determined and may prove helpful:
Mohammed Atta entered this country on June 3, 2000, as a visitor and on September 19, 2000, requested to change his status from a visitor to that of a student. While that change of status was pending before the INS, he started taking classes, which was allowed under INS regulations at that time.
Atta then departed the U.S. in early January 2001, and returned on January 10. Given the sheer volume of inspections and the amount of time that has passed, the Inspectors who spoke to Mohammed Atta on January 10, 2001, do not remember the specific inspection. However, a limited record, based on the Inspectors' notes, does exist of that inspection.
According to that record, Mohammed Atta arrived at Miami International Airport via American Airlines flight 69 from Madrid. Upon inspection, Atta presented Egyptian passport number 1617066. The notes from the primary inspector indicate that Atta had in his possession a Form I-20, which, as noted earlier, is the form issued to foreign students by schools authorized to accept such students. They also reflect that Atta had indicated to the inspector that he had been attending flight school for five or six months. As I mentioned before, current rules permit nonimmigrants with change of status applications pending to attend school while awaiting adjudication of the application. INS is considering changing these regulations so that student status must be approved before an individual can begin a course of study. Also, our backlog reduction plan is being accelerated so that no more than 30 days average processing time will be needed for these applications.
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In light of the information given to the primary Inspector, and the fact that Atta was carrying an unexpired B-1/B-2 visa, Atta was referred to secondary inspection to determine admissibility. The notes from the secondary inspection indicate that a query to the CLAIMS system (INS'' benefits processing database) was made, which confirmed that Atta had previously submitted an application to change status to M-1 student. The notes also indicate that no grounds for removal were found.
As noted, the record indicates that at the time of the January 10 admission, the Inspector was aware that Atta had applied for a change of status to M-1 student. He also was aware that Atta was not at that time the subject of any lookout or watch list. If Atta's inspection presented issues that needed additional information or further scrutiny, that should have caused the inspector to defer the inspection or deny admission. But, we cannot know today all of the information that was then before the inspector. Therefore, a fair judgment would be that one cannot determine in hindsight, positively or negatively, that the Inspector's decision was not the correct one based on the information available to him at that time. But we do know that the Inspector conducted a thorough check and had no information that Atta was a potential terrorist. Certainly a different decision would have been reached had such intelligence information been available to the Inspector.
Atta's final entry was on July 19, 2001. In the meantime, his application for change of status to student had been approved two days before, on July 17. However, he was not admitted in that status, but instead had been admitted as a visitor. We do not know today what he told the Inspector at the time of that entry.
Page 34 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCMr. Chairman, I would like to present to the Committee today a series of measures that INS is considering to rectify gaps in current processes and policies related to student and visitor visas. The changes fall into two areas: regulatory and administrative.
First, we are considering regulatory changes to tighten up the Student Visa Program. For example, we are considering a regulatory change that would result in most holders of visitors' visas [as distinguished from Visa Waiver Program entrants] being admitted for a period of 30 days. Currently, visitors are generally admitted for a period of six months.
We are also considering changing our regulations to prevent a person who has entered under some other status from beginning a course of study before their request for a change of status to student is approved, as happened in the cases of Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi. Both of them had entered as visitors. In addition, we are looking at the overall process by which visitors can change from tourist to student visa status to consider if there are additional changes that can or should be made.
INS has reduced the processing time for student change of status applications to 30 days at two Service Centers and will reduce the processing time to 30 days or less at the remaining two.
To prevent the possibility of a long gap in sending a return copy of the I-20, INS will immediately revise the process through which the I-20s are sent to the schools, so that the I-20 is returned promptly when the individual is authorized to enter into student status. Once SEVIS is fully implemented, schools will be electronically notified when a decision is made.
Page 35 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCAll applications filed at Service Centers, including student status applications, are now checked against the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS).
INS now will send a cover letter to the school with the school's copy of the I-20, which will remind the school of its obligation to notify INS if a student fails to attend classes, and it will give the school a process to follow in providing such notice.
One thing we need to remember—the student process had become so lax and lengthy because the focus of immigration policies prior to September 11 was not on security but on facilitating the students and the schools that they attended. The focus has changed and our process has changed as well.
I would also like to state that this episode should not reflect negatively on the tremendous job and hard work that the employees of INS have done in response to the tragic events of September 11. Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson recently underscored something I have stated numerous times: ''Since September 11th, INS special agents, intelligence analysts, detention officers, and others have worked closely with FBI-led counterterrorism task forces to track down and apprehend those responsible for the attacks. They have generated, and pursued, thousands of leads, resulting in the arrest of more than 700 aliens for a variety of administrative and criminal charges. They have worked with officials from the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control to identify and freeze the assets of terrorist organizations and their front groups. INS detention and deportation officers and attorneys have played a critical role in supporting the nationwide enforcement effort. Border Patrol agents and immigration inspectors have been working just as diligently to strengthen security at our ports and along our borders.''
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Mr. Chairman, within 36 hours of the September 11 attacks, 317 Border Patrol agents were deployed to nine international airports, where they played a vital role in strengthening security and restoring travelers' confidence in the safety of flying. In addition, our Forensic Document Laboratory examined passports recovered from the crash sites, and it continues to receive requests from the FBI, the Joint Terrorism Task Force and others to analyze documents linked to known and suspected terrorists. It was the Forensic Document Laboratory's Fingerprint Unit that confirmed the true identity of Richard Reid, the ''Shoe Bomber,'' who attempted to blow up a jetliner as it was in flight from Paris to Miami in December.
In addition, since September 11, the INS has undertaken numerous initiatives to enhance security.
I have directed every component of INS to review their processes and systems with an eye to strict enforcement of our immigration laws, particularly as they relate to the security of our borders. In this war on terrorism, the INS is a front line agency, whether those battles are fought on our enforcement side or our benefits side. Since September 11, ports of entry have been on a Threat Level One alert—the highest state of alert; Border Patrol agents have been assigned to major airports and land ports; and our adjudications process has been changed to ensure that applications are checked against terrorist watch lists.
Shortly after the terrorist attacks, INS began Operation Tarmac, an initiative designed to ensure that employees who have access to secure areas of airports and other critical security infrastructures are legally in this country, authorized to work, and pose no threat to the American people. This is a huge undertaking; as an example, the Los Angeles and San Francisco Airports alone account for 65,000 employees. To date, INS has conducted investigations at Dulles, Baltimore-Washington International, Atlanta, Boston, Newark, Detroit, Denver, Salt Lake City, San Francisco and Dallas-Fort Worth. More than 100 individuals have been arrested on various charges, including immigration violations and criminal fraud or misrepresentation charges.
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After September 11, INS began conducting the Absconder Apprehension Initiative, designed to ensure that aliens against whom Final Orders of Removal have been entered do indeed leave the country. The initiative consists of entering the names of all aliens who have violated federal criminal law by failing to depart as ordered into the NCIC system. State and local law enforcement officers will be able to detain offenders under their own authority because of the federal crime. To date, 1,751 leads have been sent to INS field offices, which have resulted in 149 arrests. Of those 149 arrests, 77 were priority cases involving aliens with criminal convictions or other law enforcement interest. INS has also been careful to ensure that only aliens who have violated criminal law are entered into NCIC under this initiative. Rigorous review is in place at our Law Enforcement Support Center where each individual file is checked and verified before entry into the system.
INS also has worked with the State Department to establish new initiatives to increase security. Today, INS Inspectors have access to visa data from the Consolidated Consular Database system and, as a result, can call up visa records for immigrants and nonimmigrants and photos of nonimmigrants as they arrive at ports of entry. This system helps to identify security and fraud risks.
Under the direction of the Department of Justice, the INS and the FBI are integrating the ''IDENT'' and ''IAFIS'' fingerprint databases. As part of this process, the United States Marshals Service Federal Fugitive fingerprints were added to IDENT on August 15, 2001. By the end of 2001, this had resulted in the apprehension of 55 fugitives.
Building on this success, in December 2001, INS worked with the FBI to include FBI fingerprints of foreign nationals wanted by law enforcement. This effort has resulted in the identification of over 700 individuals wanted for offenses that include homicide, rape, drug crimes, and weapons violations.
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As previously discussed, with an appropriation of $36.8 million, INS is moving from a paper system to an Internet-based system for the administration and tracking of foreign students, and will meet the Patriot Act deadline for implementing the system by January 1, 2003. In fact, we will plan to begin enrolling universities in the new SEVIS system this summer. Also related to enhancing security in the Student Visa process, INS is participating in an interagency working group on Student Visa issues.
The INS has established a multi-agency Project Management Office to develop and implement an entry-exit system. For passengers entering the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, INS will deploy the entry-exit system at air and sea ports on October 1, 2002, and will deploy the system for all other air and sea passengers by December 31, 2003. INS is committed to meeting a timetable to implement the entry-exit system at all 300 air, sea, and land ports of entry in the United States by the end of 2004. Initial funding for this effort is provided in the President's FY 2003 budget. INS is working closely with other components of the Department of Justice, and with the U.S. Customs Service, the Department of State, the Department of Transportation, and the Office of Homeland Security on this important initiative.
Since September 11, INS has been working with the State Department, the FBI and others to enhance refugee screening procedures, including additional fingerprint and database checks.
As you know, to increase our presence on both the Northern and Southern borders we have entered into an agreement with the Department of Defense to obtain the help of approximately 800 National Guard personnel. Their role is to assist INS officers with such duties as cargo inspection, traffic management, and pedestrian control.
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In December, INS played a major role in the ''Smart Border'' Declaration signed by Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge and Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley. Also, I have recently returned from a trip to Mexico with Governor Ridge, where we discussed INS participation in bi-national cooperative security arrangements.
The reduction of backlogs and the improvement of services by INS has long been a subject to which the Attorney General, the President, and I are strongly committed. I want to share some statistics that reflect significant improvements made in the delivery of services:
In 1999, the average wait for adjustment of status applications was 30 months. Today, it is down to 13 months.
We are now completing 75,000 adjustment of status applications a month, triple the number three years ago.
The average waiting time for the processing of naturalization applications, which was two years or longer in 1999, has been cut by more than half. I want to emphasize that our efforts to reduce backlogs will not compromise the national security. Our plans for reducing the backlog include quality control procedures to ensure that only deserving applicants receive immigration benefits.
Although I only began this job in August, I hoped to be further along by now with management changes at INS, particularly the restructuring of the agency. A few days ago, I made a number of important personnel changes in upper levels of management at INS. I will be making additional personnel and structural changes in the very near future that are critical to improving our performance. I have a fiduciary duty to the American people to fix this agency and I am determined to move ahead.
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Following up on the President's commitment to reform INS, in November 2001, the Attorney General and I announced a major restructuring of the INS. The INS restructuring plan is a fundamental reform that splits service and enforcement into two distinct bureaus. It will clarify and improve the chain of command at INS and increase accountability.
The plan was presented in November, and includes numerous positive changes. Just recently, I moved forward on three management reforms: establishing the positions of Chief Financial Officer and Chief Information Officer, and creating an Office of Juvenile Affairs. I am pleased to announce that yesterday we received a letter from the House Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations Subcommittee concurring in INS moving forward with the restructuring plan.
In the meantime, I have undertaken a number of information technology initiatives, many of which I previously discussed. In addition to expediting the development of SEVIS, and expanding deployment of ENFORCE and IDENT, I have moved forward on key elements of the agency's Enterprise Architecture plan and established an inter-agency project office to develop and implement an entry-exit system. The emergency supplement provided $39 million for information technology infrastructure. The FY 2003 budget requests an additional $83 million for this effort and $300 million for the entry-exit system. We look forward to Congress' support for these requests.
Mr. Chairman, all of us at INS want to improve operations and performance. I have seen significant actions and hard work undertaken by our people. The INS and the Department of Justice have moved forward on numerous important initiatives to enhance our Nation's security and we will continue to make improvements to enhance both our law enforcement and service operations. I want to work closely with the Congress, particularly on improving our information technology capabilities. I look forward to moving forward together in a positive way to improve systems for protecting our borders and our citizens, native born and naturalized. I look forward to answering your questions.
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Mr. GEKAS. We thank the gentleman.
And we turn to the next witness, Tom Blodgett.
TESTIMONY OF TOM BLODGETT, MANAGING DIRECTOR, BUSINESS PROCESS SOLUTIONS, AFFILIATED COMPUTER SERVICES, INC.
Mr. BLODGETT. Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Tom Blodgett, and I'm an officer of Affiliated Computer Services and Managing Director of ACS's Business Process Solutions Division.
ACS is pleased to assist the Subcommittee in its review of the facts surrounding the March 2002 INS notifications mailed to Huffman Aviation. Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a more details statement for the record, and will offer the highlights in my opening statement.
We want to note at the very beginning of our testimony, that while ACS is confident we performed all services timely and correctly under our contract with the INS, we are concerned American citizens who have shared in the grief of the September 11 tragedy, and we fully appreciate the sensitivity of this matter. We are committed to assisting our public officials in any way possible to improve our Government's information processing capabilities for the protection of all American citizens.
Page 42 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCAffiliated Computer Services, headquartered in Dallas, Texas, provides business process outsourcing and information technology solutions to commercial and Government accounts. ACS has revenues of $3 billion, employs 35,000 people, operates in 35 countries, and has 500 offices. ACS' Federal Government clients include the Office of the President, the U.S. House and Senate, the Pentagon, all branches of the military, the Department of Education, the Department of Labor, as well as the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
In support of the INS contract INS—or ACS operates a high volume back office facility in London, Kentucky for the processing, including microfilming, data entry, and storage of multiple INS forms including I–94 forms and I–20 formed. Specific to I–20 forms, which also could be called applications for student status change, we receive completed forms from INS service centers, schools and ports of entry. Our process is as follows. First of all the forms are scanned, microfilmed and certain data is keyed off the forms. Secondly, the data is returned to INS in microfilm and electronic form. Thirdly, the original form is stored by ACS for a period specified in the INS contract. Fourth and finally, after expiration of the contractual storage period, ACS mails the original form to the originating school. ACS has no involvement in the review, evaluation or determination of INS visa approvals.
In 2001 we processed approximately 575,000 I–20 forms and nearly 30 million I–94 forms. Our contract provided that ACS, ''shall store all original source documents for a period of 180 days.'' After expiration of this mandatory storage period ACS was required to mail the original form to the originating school. This mandatory storage period has been changed to 30 days under our new contract for forms received after December 18, 2001.
Mr. Chairman, Members of this Committee, in conclusion, we are confident that ACS performed in accordance with the INS contract, and I would be happy to answer and respond to any questions.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Blodgett follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS BLODGETT
Mr. Chairman and Members of this Subcommittee, my name is Thomas Blodgett. I am an officer of Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. (''ACS'') and Managing Director of ACS' Business Process Solutions division.
INTRODUCTION
ACS is pleased to assist the Subcommittee in its review of the facts surrounding the March 2002 INS notifications mailed to Huffman Aviation. We want to note at the very beginning of our testimony that while ACS is confident we performed all services timely and correctly under our contract with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (''INS''), we do regret that the original I–20 INS forms submitted by Huffman Aviation on behalf of the subject terrorists were not removed from the normal mailings of original I–20 forms in March 2002. We are concerned American citizens who have shared in the grief of the September 11 tragedy and we fully appreciate the sensitivity of this matter. We are committed to assisting our public officials in any way possible to improve our Government's information processing capabilities for the protection of all American citizens.
ABOUT ACS
ACS is headquartered in Dallas, Texas and provides business process outsourcing, information technology solutions and systems integration services to commercial and government clients. ACS has revenues of $3 billion, we employ over 35,000 people, operate from 35 countries and have over 500 office locations. We are a publicly traded company on the NYSE, traded under the symbol ''ACS.''
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Our services to Federal, state and local governments support government programs for health and human services, public safety, information systems, municipal services, and defense-related work. ACS' federal clients include the Department of Education, the Department of Labor, the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, the Department of Defense, all branches of the military, as well as the INS. Our state and local government services span nearly all 50 states.
ACS SERVICES PROVIDED TO INS
ACS operates a back-office microfilm, data entry, and storage facility in London, Kentucky that performs high-volume transaction processing for the microfilming, data entry, and storage of multiple INS forms, including I–94 and I–20 forms. Specific to I–20 forms (applications for student status), we receive completed forms from INS service centers, schools and ports of entry. Our process is (1) the forms are scanned, microfilmed and certain data is keyed off of the forms; (2) the data is returned to INS in microfilm and electronic form; (3) the original form is stored by ACS for a period specified by our INS contract; and (4) after expiration of the contractual storage period, ACS mails the original form to the originating school. ACS has no involvement in the review, evaluation or determination of INS visa approvals. In 2001 we processed approximately 575,000 I–20 forms and 30 million I–94 forms.
ACS has provided these microfilming, data entry and storage services to INS directly and through predecessor companies acquired by ACS since 1994. Prior to winning a new prime contract with the INS for these services effective December 18, 2001, ACS provided these services as a subcontractor. The prior subcontract provided that ACS ''shall store all original source documents for a period of 180 days.'' See Exhibit A attached. After expiration of this mandatory storage period, ACS was required to mail the original form to the originating school.
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ACS is currently providing these processing services pursuant to a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA), dated October 22, 2001, between INS and ACS Government Services, Inc., a subsidiary of ACS. The BPA became effective on December 18, 2001, and covers the Non-Immigrant Information System (NIIS) and Student/School (STSC) System Support Services. Like the prior subcontract described above, the BPA requires ACS to store original forms, including the I–20 forms. The following requirement is set forth on page 6 of the BPA: ''The Contractor shall also be required to safeguard the original paper forms for a specified period, then destroy them appropriately. While they are safeguarded, the Contractor may be required to locate specific forms on request, and to return them to the INS for forensic purposes.'' See Exhibit B attached. Page C–5 of Attachment C to the BPA changes the mandatory storage period from 180 days to 30 days for I–20 forms and requires ACS to ''[r]eturn page 1 of the I–20 to the school thirty (30) days after processing.'' See Exhibit C attached. Therefore, for forms received on and after December 18, 2001 ACS is required to store the original forms for 30 days rather than 180 days. At the end of the mandatory storage period ACS mails page 1 of the form to the originating school and destroys the rest of the original document.
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE MARCH 2002 MAILING
In August 2000 Huffman Aviation filed I–20 applications with INS to change Atta's and Al-Shehhi's visas from tourist to student status. INS approved the requested changes in July and August 2001. On September 24, 2001 ACS received the completed I–20 forms for microfilm, data entry and storage for the mandatory 180-day period. ACS processed the I–20 forms and returned the microfilm and electronic data back to INS and stored the forms as required by contract. The BPA changing the 180-day storage period to a 30-day storage period went into effect December 18, 2001 for I–20 forms processed on and after that date. The I–20 forms then in 180-day storage continued in that status until February 27, 2002 when INS requested that ACS begin mailing all of the I–20 forms then held in 180-day storage status to the form originators. On March 5, 2002 ACS did an automated bulk mailing of approximately 4,000 I–20 forms. The Huffman Aviation forms for Atta and Al-Shehhi were part of the 180-day storage and were mailed to Huffman Aviation as part of the March 5, 2002 mailing.
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ACS generally receives around one request per month from INS to pull documents. These requests usually are for I–94 forms. We received no requests from INS to pull any documents related to Atta or Al-Shehhi. As INS' processor, ACS is required to treat all documents as confidential to INS and is not authorized to review or pull documents unless requested by INS.
Again, Mr. Chairman, while I am certain that ACS performed as our contract required us to do, I want to emphasize again that we share all Americans' grief at the tragedy suffered by our Nation, and we fully appreciate the sensitivity of this issue. We continue to stand ready to assist our public officials in any way possible to improve the Government's information processing capabilities for the protection of all citizens. Thank you.
Mr. GEKAS. Before we proceed with the next witness, let the record indicate that the lady from California, a Member of the Subcommittee, Ms. Lofgren, is present.
Mr. Dekkers.
TESTIMONY OF RUDI DEKKERS, CEO, HUFFMAN AVIATION INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Mr. DEKKERS. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members. Thank you for asking me here. I feel like I don't belong on this table because I'm just having a small flight school. But anyway, I will give you my testimony. I will concern my 5 minutes or a couple minutes talk to you in the INS matter.
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When Atta and Al-Shehhi came to my facility on July 1 they inquired information about how much they have to pay, et cetera, about flying. That is a different situation than normal. Normally foreign students are calling, inquiring over the Internet from their home base, countries overseas. When they inquire for that information, we sent them that. After a while they get back to us and state they want to fly with us. We send them an I–20 form. We fill out the form according to course they're going to follow. We send that form to the students. They go to their United States Consulate in their country. The United States Consulate checks out the information. If there's enough funds, if the person is really the person, and then the consulate stamps it and the student takes it with him to the border. The border will see the I–20 form and the student can continue.
That's a different situation. Atta and Al-Shehhi came through my front door. When I have foreigners coming in—and I'm a foreigner myself; I'm a guest in this country—I am watching a little bit the rules sharper than if I would be maybe an American. Why? Because I want to do it by the book.
We know, as a flight school, when a student walks in and they want to fly a professional flight course, and they're continuing studying, so they're not part time, they need to have a change of status. By the way, a change of status needs to be filled out by the student, individual themself, not by the school. The school has the obligation to send in an I–20 form in case if it's an M1 student visa. We determined that Atta, who had a B–1/B–2 visa and Al-Shehhi, who had a tourist visa, that we wanted to go for the M1 because they were not part time, they were full time. There are a lot of rules in FAA—INS, that you could train these people even without an M1. My only reason, by being happy what I stated, to receive these forms was that I could show the world we asked for an M1 visa.
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So I want to specifically tell you here, this case, when different than normal, they came in the front door. We sent to I–20 form to Texas INS, and we had the approval receipts from ACS. So it's a little bit a different scenario than a normal scenario.
I think this is what I have to say. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dekkers follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RUDI DEKKERS
On July 1st, 2000, Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi arrived at Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida to inquire about taking flying lessons. After a description was given about our flying school, they said they would let us know what they would decide about the flying lessons.
On July 3rd, 2000, Atta and Alshehhi came back to Huffman Aviation to sign up for lessons. Atta already held a Private Pilot License but wanted to advance and get his Commercial License and Alshehhi was there to obtain both a Private and Commercial License. They had stated they were unhappy with a flying school they attended up North.
We told them the cost for the licenses they wanted was about $18,000 per person with $1,000 down payment and $1,000 weekly thereafter paid by Atta with a check drawn from a First Union account.
Page 49 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCThey inquired about a place to stay. It is normal procedure for a flying school to offer proper accommodations for students whom are learning to fly. However, at the time Huffman Aviation had no such accommodations. Due to the fact they came through the front door without advanced notice for Huffman Aviation to take care of a room. Rudi Dekkers, owner of Huffman Aviation, knew that Charles Voss, CFO of Huffman Aviation, rented out rooms in his home. Atta and Alshehhi rented a room from Voss, but after one week were asked to leave due to excessive rudeness from Atta to Mrs. Voss. After their eviction there was no mention of where they were staying.
Atta and Alshehhi started their flying lessons on July 6th, 2000 in a Cessna 172, N734EE with flight instructor Thierry Leklou. Then in August Leklou went to the Chief Flight Instructor, Dan Purcell, to complain that Atta and Alshehhi had behavioral problems and that they were not following instructions, they also had bad attitudes. Purcell asked Dekkers if it would be okay to expel them from the program. Dekkers said that if necessary it would be acceptable to expel them from the program. Purcell had a meeting with both Atta and Alshehhi to let them know there had been complaints about their behavior and that if they would not conform they would have to leave the program. Their behavior changed and they were able to continue their lessons without any further problems throughout the course. On August 29th, 2000, Nicky Antini, Student Coordinator of Huffman Aviation, sent in I-20M's to the INS along with a copy of their passports.
Dekkers, on many occasions tried to communicate with Atta, but Atta was very unfriendly with everyone. Dekkers knew that Atta had lived in Hamburg, Germany and one day spoke to him in German as a way of friendly communication. Atta was stunned and quickly walked away. Alshehhi on the other hand was very friendly and willing to communicate with everyone. He always seemed to walk behind Atta, we had the impression that Atta and Alshehhi where family.
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In December 2000, Atta and Alshehhi took their last flight tests. Atta had approximately 270 hours of total flight time and received his Instrument, Single/Multi-Commercial Certification. Alshehhi was granted the same certification along with a Private Pilot License. Dave Whitman, the local FAA designated examiner, gave them their exams which they passed with average grades and they were given temporary FAA licenses for 120 days.
On December 24th, 2000, Atta and Alshehhi rented a Warrior (N555HA) from Huffman Aviation for a flight. They landed in Miami when the engine from the aircraft stalled (shutoff) on the taxiway where they abandoned it. They called Huffman Aviation for taxi fare back to Venice but were denied by Huffman Aviation. One to two days later, Huffman received a phone call from the Miami FAA regarding the Warrior that had been unattended for a half-hour on the runway. Dekkers got in contact with Bob Martin, the Operations Manager of Huffman Aviation, who then contacted the FAA. Martin had several phone conversations with the FAA and upon their request sent all maintenance records on the Warrior to the FAA. Nothing else was reported back from the FAA to Huffman regarding the Warrior.
Atta and Alshehhi returned to Huffman Aviation to make final payments on their outstanding bills. Atta paid a total of $18,703.50 and Alshehhi paid a total of $20,917.63. Because they were not taking any more flying lessons, they were asked to leave the facility due to their bad attitudes and not being liked by staff and clients alike. Huffman never heard about or from them again until September 11th, 2001.
On September 12th, 2001 at 3:00AM, the FBI Chief Investigator Kelly J. Thomas called Huffman's General Manager Dale Krauss to help them with files on Atta and Alshehhi. Krauss was no longer working for Huffman Aviation so Krauss gave the FBI Susan Desantis' phone number who was Dekkers' assistant. Desantis arrived at Huffman at 4:00AM to give the FBI the files on Atta and Alshehhi. Desantis asked if she should call Dekkers, the FBI told her this was not necessary. At 7:00AM, while the FBI was still looking over the files and computers, Desantis called Dekkers who was shocked and annoyed he had not been contacted earlier. The FBI waited for Dekkers upon Dekkers' request. Dekkers immediately left for Huffman from Bonita Springs, Florida. Dekkers let the FBI know there were more Muslim student files. Therefore the FBI ended up taking over 100 files and 2 computers. Dekkers informed the FBI he also owned a flight school in Naples, Florida named Ambassador Airways. This furthered no reaction.
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Several days after September 11th, 2001, the Naples FBI contacted Dekkers and asked for files from students. The FBI asked if Dekkers could recognize the other terrorists. Dekkers did not recognize any other terrorist. The FBI took several files and returned them about 3 months later.
On Friday, March 8th, 2002, a meeting had been set up with CNN Miami to do an interview regarding the six-month anniversary of September 11th, 2001 for Monday, March 11th, 2002. Dekkers opened the mail that Monday morning to eerily discover the original I-20M's (student visa application) for Atta and Alshehhi. It is over a year since Atta and Alshehhi left Huffman Aviation and six months since their deaths. Dekkers was relieved to see the paperwork, but not surprised. It usually takes a long time for visas to be returned from the INS. Dekkers was relieved because now he could prove that his company had carried out the proper procedures regarding Atta and Alshehhi's I-20M's. Huffman had previously been castigated for not following proper procedures. This new information was brought to the attention of CNN.
On Thursday, March 14th, 2002, President Bush gave a press conference and answered a question regarding the I-20M's that had arrived at Huffman Aviation. He replied there would be a full investigation. At 4:30PM of that day, an INS officer from Tampa arrived at Huffman requesting that all original documents be returned. Dekkers was more than willing to cooperate with the government but was reluctant to surrender the documents until a subpoena was produced by the INS officer from his briefcase. Dekkers immediately surrendered the documents.
On the way back home to Bonita Springs, Florida on Thursday, March 14th, 2002, Dekkers received a phone call from the office of the Assistant General Attorney in Florida named Mr. Marino. Marino wanted to discuss the entire incident and asked if Dekkers would bring along the original I-20M's on Friday, March 15th, 2002. Marino was surprised to discover that Dekkers was no longer in possession of the original documents that were taken by the INS. A meeting has been set up for Dekkers and Marino to meet on Monday, March 18th, 2002 at 12:00PM in Naples, Florida.
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Mr. GEKAS. We thank the gentleman, and now turn to the final witness, Mr. Cutler.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL CUTLER, SPECIAL AGENT, NEW YORK DISTRICT OFFICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
Mr. CUTLER. Chairman Gekas, Ranking Member Ms. Jackson Lee, Members of the Congress, distinguished members of the panel, ladies and gentlemen.
I want to start out by commending Ms. Jackson Lee for her bill on restructuring the INS, and I especially commend her for her efforts as a leader of this Subcommittee in Congress.
I greatly appreciate this opportunity that she has provided to me to share my views and perspectives which I have acquired during my roughly 30 years as an Immigration officer. I began my career with the INS in 1971 as an Immigration inspector, and at that time I was assigned to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City. During the course of that assignment, I was detailed for approximately 1 year to an examinations unit known as the I–130 Unit.
In August 1975 I became a Special Agent. I rotated through virtually every squad within the Investigations Branch of the INS at NYC during my tenure as a Special Agent.
Page 53 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCIn 1991 I was promoted to my ultimate position of Senior Special Agent and assigned to the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, and this assignment required that I worked closely with other agencies to investigate, apprehend and prosecute aliens who were involved in narcotics trafficking and other crimes.
The INS is responsible for enforcing laws that govern the entry of aliens into the United States as well as those laws that are involved in granting a variety of immigration benefits to aliens who are in the United States. It was in this latter mission that the INS apparently sent notifications to two terrorists that they were granted permission to attend flight school in the United States, 6 months after they carried out their suicide missions in our country.
The fact that the system failed in such an embarrassing and public way should serve as an alarm that the INS has many serious problems which can no longer be ignored. We are in a state of war, and if we are to safeguard our Nation, we first need to secure our borders, and we also need to make certain that our ability exists to enforce those laws which govern the entry of aliens into the United States, as well as their continued presence in our country. These problems cannot be solved easily, but they must be solved effectively, for our Nation's very survival is at stake.
Although I did at one time act as an examiner, by experience with the process of adjudicating applications is not current. However, I can tell you that from what I have been hearing and reading, the INS appears to have created an unwieldy system to carry out this important aspect of the service side of the operation. Besides displaying ineptitude, this failures by the INS calls into question the procedures that the adjudicators follow. We need to determine if they are required, for example, to check the name on each and every application against a database similar to the one that's utilized by Immigration inspectors at ports of entry to determine if the alien named in the application is wanted by other law enforcement agencies or is otherwise ineligible to receive the benefit that they are applying for. We also need to know if there is any meaningful quality control built into the system to make certain that the examiners are in total compliance with the established procedures.
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Finally, we need to determine what if anything is being done by the INS in seeking to uncover instances of fraud in the filing of applications for immigration benefits. The obvious goal of criminal aliens, once they enter the United States, is to be able to remain in the United States without fear of being deported. The easiest way for them to accomplish this goal is through fraud, whether it's by engaging in a marriage of convenience, obtaining a fraudulent labor certification, or submitting a claim for an immigration benefit that the alien in question would not be entitled to if all the facts concerning their case were known.
It is often said that you only get one opportunity to make a first impression. Generally speaking, the first laws that aliens entering the United States encounters are those laws that the INS is supposed to enforce. When the INS fails to effectively, consistently and fairly enforce these laws, we are sending a very dangerous message to aliens seeking to enter the United States. In effect, we're telling them that not only can they expect to get away with violating our laws, but they can anticipate to rewarded for violating our laws.
The apprehension of aliens who are illegally in the United States is the responsibility of the special agents. These dedicated employees are also tasked with many additional responsibilities including uncovering fraud, uncovering alien smuggling rings, working cooperatively with other agencies and various task forces, and enforcing employer sanctions provisions of the Immigration Act. We have recently heard that the INS is also going to need to develop and effective departure control system to track foreign students and visitors in the United States. Presumably the goal will be to arrest those people who are found to be out of status within the United States. Currently, according to published statistics, there are fewer than 2,000 special agents in the United States, and at present there's roughly 100 special agents to cover the southern half of the State of New York, including the City of New York. Who's to carry out these vital missions?
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I've come to think of the INS law enforcement program as a tripod. The Border Patrol is responsible for enforcing the laws between ports of entry. The Immigration inspectors are charged with the responsibility of enforcing immigration laws at ports of entry. And the special agents are supposed to back up both of these other two divisions. Each of these components of the enforcement program needs to be emphasized equally. Just as a camera's tripod needs to have 3 legs of equal length, the enforcement tripod needs to rest equally on each of its three legs. If you shorten one of the legs on your camera's tripod, it falls over. This is the reality of the INS enforcement program. If we do not boost resources allocated to the interior enforcement mission, as typified by the special agents, then the entire enforcement program becomes ineffective.
We need to have many more special agents. We need to have an agency that functions effectively. At present each district office operates more as a franchise than as a component of a paramilitary organization. While I agree that each office needs to have some autonomy to take regional variations into account, the overall functioning of the agency should stress a direct chain of command from headquarters to each and every field agent throughout the United States.
And finally, the INS needs to take into account the fact that it now suffers from a terrible attrition problem. We spend between 50 to $100,000 for special agents, to recruit and train them. It takes approximately 5 years for each person hired off the street to become truly effective and proficient as a special agent. If we are unable to hold on to these qualified people, to prevent them from going on to other agencies, then we find that we keep spending an awful lot of money to keep on this revolving door process of recruiting and training, only to watch them leave. Attrition and morale desperately need to be addressed if the INS is to be effective in carrying out its many serious missions.
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I thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cutler follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CUTLER
Chairman Gekas, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, members of the Congress, distinguished members of the Panel, ladies and gentlemen, I greatly appreciate this opportunity to share my views and perspectives which I have acquired during my roughly 30 years as an immigration officer. I began my career as an Immigration Inspector assigned to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City. During the course of that assignment I was detailed for approximately one year to an examinations unit known as the I-130 Unit.
In August of 1975 I became a Special Agent. I rotated through virtually every squad within the Investigations Branch of the INS at NYC during my tenure as a Special Agent.
In 1991 I was promoted to my ultimate position of Senior Special Agent and assigned to the OCDETF Unit (Organized Crime, Drug Enforcement Task Force). This assignment required that I worked closely with other agencies to investigate, apprehend and prosecute aliens who were involved in narcotics trafficking and related crimes.
The INS is responsible for enforcing laws that govern the entry of aliens into the United States as well as those laws that are involved in the granting of a variety of immigration benefits to aliens who are in the United States. It was in the latter mission, that the INS apparently sent notifications to two terrorists that they were granted permission to attend flight school in the United States, 6 months after they carried out their suicide missions in our country.
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The fact that the system failed in such an embarrassing and public way should serve as alarm that the INS has many serious problems which can no longer be ignored. We are in a state of war and if we are to safeguard our nation, we first need to secure our borders and our ability to enforce those laws which govern the entry of aliens into the United States, as well as their continued presence in our country. These problems cannot be solved easily, but they must be solved effectively, our nation's very survival is at stake!
Although I did, at one time, act as an examiner, my experience with the process of adjudicating applications is not current. However, I can tell you that from what I have been hearing and reading, the INS appears to have created an unwieldy system to carry out this important aspect of the service side of the operation. Besides displaying ineptitude, this failure by the INS calls into question the procedures that the adjudicators follow. We need to determine if they are required to check the name on each and every application against a data base similar to the one that the Immigration Inspectors at ports of entry utilize, to determine if the alien named in the application is wanted by other law enforcement agencies or is otherwise ineligible to receive the benefit they are applying for. We also need to know if there is any meaningful quality control built into the system to make certain that the examiners are in total compliance with established procedures.
We also need to determine what, if anything, is done by the INS in seeking to uncover instances of fraud in the filing of applications for immigration benefits. The obvious goal of criminal aliens, once they enter the United States, is to be able to remain in the United States without fear of being deported. The easiest way to accomplish this goal is through fraud, whether it is by engaging in a marriage of convenience, obtaining a fraudulent labor certification, or submitting a claim for an immigration benefit that the alien in question would not be entitled to if all of the material facts in his or her case were known.
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It is often said that you only get one opportunity to make a first impression. Generally speaking, the first laws that aliens entering the United States encounter are those laws that the INS is supposed to enforce. When the INS fails to effectively, consistently and fairly enforce these laws, we are sending a very dangerous message to aliens seeking to enter the United States. In effect we are telling them that not only can they expect to get away with violating our laws, they can anticipate being rewarded for violating our laws!
The apprehension of aliens who are illegally in the United States is the sole responsibility of the Special Agents. These dedicated employees are also tasked with the many additional responsibilities including uncovering fraud, uncovering alien smuggling rings, working cooperatively with other agencies in various task forces. We have recently heard that the INS is going to need to develop an effective departure control system and track foreign students in the United States and presumably arrest those who violate their status. Currently, according to published statistics, there are fewer that 2000 Special Agents of the INS nation-wide. At the present time, there are approximately 100 Special Agents to cover the southern half of the state of New York, including New York City. Who is to carry out these vital missions?
I have come to think of the INS law enforcement program as a tripod. The Border Patrol is responsible for enforcing the laws between ports of entry, the Immigration Inspectors are charged with the responsibility of enforcing the laws at ports of entry and the Special Agents are supposed to back up both of the other two divisions. Each of these components of the enforcement program needs to be emphasized equally. Just as a camera's tripod needs to have three legs of equal length, the enforcement tripod needs to rest equally on each of its three legs. If you shorten one of the legs on your camera's tripod, it falls over. This is the reality of the INS enforcement program. If we do not also boost resources allocated to the interior enforcement mission, the entire enforcement program becomes ineffective.
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We need to have many more Special Agents. We also need to have an agency that functions effectively. At present, each district office operates more as a franchise than as a component of a paramilitary organization. While I agree that each office needs to have some autonomy to take regional variations into account, the over-all functioning of the agency should stress a direct chain of command from Headquarters to each and every field agent through out the United States.
I welcome your questions.
Mr. GEKAS. We thank the gentleman, and we will proceed now with a round of questioning beginning with the prerogative of the Chair to do exactly that.
I must say that I'm a little bit disappointed, Mr. Ziglar and Mr. Blodgett, that you did not lay before us a chronology of events having to do with Atta and his coconspirator, up to and including March 11 when the aviation school reported the receipt of that status report. I have to—I want to dredge from you, if I can, how this happened and when Atta did what in order to give us a full picture of what went wrong here. And I must ask you that if we do not receive the answers today on this chronology which I am portraying to you, that you would—you would fill in with written answers to those questions.
For instance, we know now, do we not, that Atta initially entered the United States on June 3, 2000, on a visitor's visa? Is that correct? That's the first appearance of this individual in the United States.
Page 60 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCCommissioner ZIGLAR. That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GEKAS. What visitor's visa was—what kind of was it?
Commissioner ZIGLAR. He had a B–2. Mr. Chairman, I believe a lot of that is in my full testimony.
Mr. GEKAS. Pardon me?
Commissioner ZIGLAR. I believe a lot of the information you're looking for is in my full testimony. It's——
Mr. GEKAS. Well, I hope it is.
Commissioner ZIGLAR. Yes, sir. And I think we've also sent you a letter about that.
Mr. GEKAS. Well, we'll review it.
Commissioner ZIGLAR. Sure, absolutely. Glad to.
Mr. GEKAS. A business visitor's visa?
Commissioner ZIGLAR. A B–2 visitor's——
Page 61 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCMr. GEKAS. And that would have entitled him to be a visitor for how long and fo