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2000
THREAT POSED BY THE CONVERGENCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME, DRUG TRAFFICKING,
AND TERRORISM
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
DECEMBER 13, 2000
Serial No. 148
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
JAMES E. ROGAN, California
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARY BONO, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
Page 3 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCDAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
JERROLD NADLER, New York
ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
ZOE LOFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
MAXINE WATERS, California
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., General Counsel-Chief of Staff
JULIAN EPSTEIN, Minority Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Subcommittee on Crime
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
Page 4 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCBOB BARR, Georgia
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
GLENN R. SCHMITT, Chief Counsel
DANIEL J. BRYANT, Chief Counsel
RICK FILKINS, Counsel
CARL THORSEN, Counsel
BOBBY VASSAR, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
HEARING DATE
December 13, 2000
OPENING STATEMENT
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McCollum, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress From the State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Crime
WITNESSES
Cilluffo, Frank, senior policy analyst and deputy director, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Marshall, Donnie R., Administrator, United States Drug Enforcement Administration
McCraw, Steven C., Inspector-Deputy Assistant Director, Information, Analysis, and Assessments Branch, Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mutschke, Ralf, assistant director, Sub-Directorate for Crimes Against Persons and Property, Interpol General Secretariat, Lyon, France
Perl, Raphael, Specialist in International Affairs, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress
Sheehan, Michael A., Ambassador-At-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism, United States Department of State
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
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Cilluffo, Frank, senior policy analyst and deputy director, Center for Strategic and International Studies: Prepared statement
Marshall, Donnie R., Administrator, United States Drug Enforcement Administration: Prepared statement
McCraw, Steven C., Inspector-Deputy Assistant Director, Information, Analysis, and Assessments Branch, Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation: Prepared statement
Mutschke, Ralf, assistant director, Sub-Directorate for Crimes Against Persons and Property, Interpol General Secretariat, Lyon, France: Prepared statement
Perl, Raphael, Specialist in International Affairs, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress: Prepared statement
Scott, Hon. Robert C., a Representative in Congress From the State of Virginia: Prepared statement
Sheehan, Michael A., Ambassador-At-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism, United States Department of State: Prepared statement
THREAT POSED BY THE CONVERGENCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME, DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND TERRORISM
Page 7 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCWEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2000
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill McCollum [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Bill McCollum, Steve Chabot, and George W. Gekas.
Staff Present: Daniel J. Bryant, chief counsel; Glenn R. Schmitt, chief counsel; Carl Thorsen, counsel; Veronica L. Eligan, staff assistant; and James Rybicki, staff assistant.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MCCOLLUM
Mr. MCCOLLUM. The Subcommittee on Crime will come to order.
This is a special day in a couple of ways. One, it is the last subcommittee hearing I get to chair as chairman, and I want to thank Mr. Gekas and Mr. Chabot for being here today.
Page 8 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCIt is a special day because of the subject matter, to talk about organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism, which all have been subjects individually, which has been a passion of mine as a Member of Congress and then to have a hearing where the nexus are in some way related is a very special occasion.
Today is also a sad day and I want to comment on that. I wear two hats. I am chairman of the Crime Subcommittee and Human Intelligence, and the three of us have had a closed briefing on some of the members in that community today, and I am reminded that today we are not joined by some of our other colleagues because there will be a funeral later today for the late Julian Dixon, our colleague, who served a good number of years on the Intelligence Committee, at the time of his death was the ranking member there, and I think we should pay a moment of silence to Julian Dixon's memory, a great Member of Congress.
Thank you.
Now, today's hearing, I want to welcome all of the witnesses who are going to be here. We have a couple of panels.
Organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism are three serious problems, each in their own right. Historically Americans have viewed these as separate problems, and that is still the case, but the common perception was that drugs were a danger only to a small percentage of individuals using or selling them, organized crime has been largely wiped out through the dismantling of Cosa Nostra over the last decade, and that dangers posed by terrorist groups is only present on foreign soil.
Page 9 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCUnfortunately, that is not the reality. The convergence in many ways of organized criminal activity, including drug trafficking and terrorism, is a growing concern to the United States and the world. Some experts in the field suggest that in a growing number of cases organized crime and terrorism are being jointly orchestrated, and that this trend can be developing into a global phenomenon. If true, we face a significant new challenge from both law enforcement and national security perspectives.
But even if they are not intertwined in an immediate and direct contractual way, the reality appears to be that drug trafficking and terrorism in an organized sense is very much present, and that organizational sense alone means that is in many cases organized criminal behavior by those involved in it, whether it is Cosa Nostra or the Russian mafia or anybody like that engaged in it or not.
Drug trafficking and terrorism are illegal, clandestine activities and they have a number of common needs: the acquisition of weapons, the maintaining of anonymity, hiding assets, keeping a steady flow of cash, and they both have found their hands strengthened through the ability to operate transnationally. It is important to bear in mind for a variety of reasons, including the collapse and diminished prosperity of certain governments, state funding for terrorism is drying up and terrorists are increasingly looking to crime for funding.
Criminal drug organizations can no longer be examined simply in the context of their drug trafficking activities. Drug cartels are more sophisticated than ever before and they engage simultaneously in other forms of criminal activities, including illicit arms trading, alien smuggling, technology theft and terrorism. Drug cartels have the ability to move vast amounts of money in and out of legitimate financial systems, and as a result of the increasingly globalized economy, the trend is toward deregulation, open borders and enhanced international movement of people, goods and services. This global capitalism and free trade facilitates the ability of terrorists and their support networks to operate internationally.
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While insurgency and guerrilla warfare were threats that characterized the Cold War environment, it may be that terrorism and its coordinated criminal activity and drug trafficking will become a high priority national security concern in post Cold War America.
There are a number of regions of the world today where the convergence of organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism is troubling. The obvious example is South America's oldest democracy, Colombia. Since the end of the Cold War, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as the FARC, has expanded its use of conventional criminal activities to finance terrorist operations aimed at overthrowing the Colombian government. Its growth is directly related to its association with drug production and trafficking. In Russia, organized crime groups have developed strategic alliances globally with drug traffickers, involving themselves in transshipment of cocaine and heroin in both Latin America and Central Asia. One notorious example of such an alliance was the 1997 Cali cartel attempt to purchase a Russian submarine complete with crew to circumvent interdiction efforts.
What is alarming is that these strategic alliances may not be limited to narcotics. One especially disturbing and not unrealistic scenario is the possibility of a strategic alliance between Russian criminals and the terrorist group related to supply and shipment of weapons to be used in an attack here in the United States. There is no evidence that has occurred, but no question the possibility of that in the future exists. It is alarming as the networks continue to grow and relationships too.
I am also deeply troubled that Afghanistan, a country controlled by Islamic fundamentalist Taliban may be the world's largest source country for heroin. Our best intelligence indicates that production is on its way up and that 96 percent of the heroin is cultivated in Taliban-controlled provinces. I am interested to learn to what extent the Taliban is known to finance its military operations with narcotics revenue as well as whether any known terrorists are involved in the narcotics trade in that region.
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This morning we have some knowledgeable witnesses that will help us understand this global trend and why it is such a significant development, as well as develop a national security response.
Do any other members wish to make opening statements? Mr. Gekas.
Mr. GEKAS. I thank the Chair. My opening comments will be to endorse the timeliness of the Chair's choosing these subject matters for reintroduction into the committee process, but more importantly I simply want to place on the record my personal commendation for the work of this chairman, the gentleman from Florida, not only in this subcommittee but throughout his tenure in Congress. He has been a driving force on many of the issues that have reached the floor of the House of Representatives over the last 20 years and which have in many cases become law.
I remember his concentration very early on the question of the death penalty, particularly in courts martial military code which no one seemed to adopt as an issue at that time, and for the gentleman of Florida that was important and he took it to its ultimate. But in more recent years his ideas and innovativeness with respect to revising and reforming the bankruptcy code of our Nation and whole system were the keystone in the bankruptcy reform bill that was ultimately passed by both the House and the Senate and now is waiting the signature of the President of the United States, but his ideas, his drive, his leadership, are primarily responsible for the impetus which was gained in bringing those issues to the floor.
So he has made his mark in the Congress and it is too bad that today is his last mark in the Congress with respect to actively developing and assessing legislation. So I wish him well and we will try to continue his work in various ways.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Gekas, I thank you for those kind words. I sat next to you on the full committee for a number of years and I know how much you put into the bankruptcy bill itself. It is your leadership, and I am honored to play a small role.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. I would like to reiterate Mr. Gekas' remarks and thank you for your leadership on this committee. It has been an honor to serve under you. We had very interesting hearings and your leadership has been exemplary. I look forward to serving under Mr. Gekas' chairmanship on this committee if that is where we are at. Thank you for your leadership.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. You have done yeoman's work in substituting for me and acting as the chairman. I appreciate your kind words.
Mr. Scott is not able to be with us today and he did want a statement introduced for the record. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scott follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. SCOTT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
I regret that I could not attend this hearing due to my attendance, along with Minority members of the Subcommittee, at the funeral this morning of our colleague, Congressman Julian Dixon, in Los Angeles, California. I also regret that this hearing could not be rescheduled to a time mutually convenient to the members of the Subcommittee and the witnesses.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. On the first panel is Donnie R. Marshall, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration. He was confirmed by the Senate in May of this year and sworn in by the President June 2. A native of Dallas, Texas, he began his law enforcement career in 1969 as a special agent with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, a predecessor agency of the DEA. He continued with DEA, serving in many different capacities before being the first Administrator ever chosen from within the ranks of the DEA. It is a pleasure to have you again testifying before us, Mr. Marshall.
The Honorable Michael A. Sheehan is the Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the United States Department of State. Prior to his present position, he served on both the National Security Council staff and as Director of Political Military Affairs and a Special Counselor to former Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and received Master's Degrees from Georgetown University and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Ambassador Sheehan retired as a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army in June 1997 to join the State Department.
Your complete statements will be admitted to the record. Without objection, so ordered. I will recognize each of you to give us such summary of your statements as you choose, starting first with you, Mr. Marshall.
STATEMENT OF DONNIE R. MARSHALL, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chabot, Mr. Gekas, it is always a pleasure for me to appear before this subcommittee, and before I start my statement I just want to tell the entire subcommittee, and particularly you, Mr. Chairman, how much the 9,000 courageous and talented men and women of DEA appreciate how much this subcommittee has done in support of DEA and particularly under your leadership. We will miss your leadership, and we look forward to continuing our relationship with this subcommittee in the next Congress.
I am here today, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, to talk about the threat posed by the convergence of organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. Now certainly as a law enforcement agency, DEA has a mission of gathering evidence sufficient to arrest, indict and convict drug criminals. We work within the legal systems of host nations as well as our own legal system. We work in cooperation with our host country police agency counterparts. With that in mind, my testimony has been presented and I will present my comments from a perspective of law enforcement; that is, the DEA perspective.
First, I want to discuss a little bit about Colombia. Attacking the Colombian organizations has to be the centerpiece of any coordinated strategy which is aimed at organized crime, drugs and terrorism. The Colombian traffickers control the manufacture of the vast majority of cocaine in South America, and what we see in the U.S. in this day and age is that the Colombian traffickers' fingerprints are on virtually every kilogram of cocaine that is sold in the U.S..
Much of the cocaine processing occurs in the eastern lowlands, the southern rain forests of Colombia, where the national government exerts very limited authority. This geographic fact poses a real challenge for the American and Colombian counterdrug policy. It makes it difficult for the Colombian government to assert sufficient authority in those areas.
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DEA of course does not have a counterterrorism or a counterinsurgency mission, but when we do acquire information of that sort in our intelligence collection programs, we share that with the appropriate U.S. and foreign agencies.
From my perspective the major two insurgent groups that are active in Colombia are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or the FARC, and the National Liberation Army, or the ELN. The presence of the FARC in these eastern lowlands and the southern rain forest hinders the Colombian government's ability to conduct counterdrug operations, and the presence of ELN in the northeast and central and northwestern parts of Colombia impacts on the security of oil pipelines and, more importantly to my mission, it hinders eradication operations against opium poppy and marijuana growing areas.
Now, beyond the involvement and the presence of those two organizations in the drug crop cultivation and processing areas, there do appear to be some links between traffickers and terrorists. Some of these units practice extortion or provide protection in return for weapons or cash payments. Others allegedly are engaged in cocaine laboratory operations, in transportation of drugs, storing of cocaine and marijuana, and protecting basically clandestine air strips and transportation in southern Colombia.
But these terrorists in my view and in the judgment of DEA are not the glue that holds the drug trafficking together in Colombia. We don't believe that the FARC should be viewed as equal to the traditional drug trafficking cartels. It is true that the profits represented by the drug trade have taken on a very big role and probably an ever-growing role in financing those organizations.
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Russian organized crime groups are also involved in drug trafficking. They use criminals from Russia, East Europe, and they are certainly involved here in the United States in trafficking several drugs but particularly MDMA, or Ecstasy. Internationally those Russian organized crime groups are involved in the cocaine and heroin trade to Russia, to the Soviet Union and to Europe as well. Their involvement has increased recently because of the shifting of the major trafficking routes to Europe through the Balkans and through Russia and through some of the former Soviet Union countries.
The biggest threat are the criminal organizations based in Mexico. These organizations truly pose the greatest challenge that U.S. law enforcement and drug enforcement agencies have ever faced in the history of our country. Because of the ever increasing cross border traffic and commerce between the U.S. and Mexico, a number of these international organized crime groups have established very elaborate and efficient smuggling methods across that border.
It has also been established, in addition to drug trafficking, these international organizations spawn an immense amount of violence, corruption and intimidation, and that threatens the safety of cities and towns across America.
While these Mexican organized crime groups are not terrorists in the traditional sense, in the sense that they are seeking necessarily to put some political plan in effect by violent means, they nonetheless are very efficient at using terroristic type tactics to advance their drug operations. The primary reason that those groups have been able to avoid arrest and continue their criminal enterprises is their ability to intimidate witnesses, assassinate and corrupt public officials.
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There are many clear examples of this. We have seen some recently in our efforts to apprehend members of the Arellano Felix cartel and the Cardenas Guillen cartel based in Tijuana. In November 1999 some members of the Gulf Cartel Group actually detained and assaulted two U.S. agents, a DEA agent and an FBI agent in Matamoros, Mexico, right across the international border from Brownsville, Texas. There have been literally countless kidnappings, tortures and murders of police and judicial officials in Mexico. This type of terrorism, while not traditional terrorism, is a brand of terrorism that impacts on our ability and the government of Mexico's ability to deal with these Mexico-based drug traffickers.
In conclusion, I want to say that we will continue to build judicial cases against the leaders of these criminals groups and we will do that despite the escalating threat of violence. We remain committed to our most significant goal, which is to target and arrest the most significant drug traffickers in the world. We will work with the domestic law enforcement and our host nation governments to improve our efforts against international drug smuggling and to improve exchanges of intelligence and actual enforcement results.
Again, Mr. Chairman, committee members, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and at the appropriate time I will be happy to respond to any questions you might have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Marshall follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONNIE R. MARSHALL, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
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Chairman McCollum, it is a pleasure for me to appear before you one last time. It is, as always, a pleasure to appear before you and the other members of the Subcommittee. We in DEA deeply appreciate your support for our fight against international drug trafficking over the years. Indeed we look forward to continuing our work with the Subcommittee on Crime in the next Congress. I appear before you today to testify on the threat posed by the convergence of organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism. The international drug trafficking organizations that smuggle their poison into our country, and that use terrorist violence to further their criminal activities are, indeed, a threat to the national security of the United States.
DEA's mission is to target the powerful international drug organizations that operate around the world, supplying drugs to American communities, employing thousands of individuals to transport and distribute drugs. Historically as well as today, some of these groups do not hesitate to use violence and terror to advance their interests at the expense of law-abiding citizens. We see in these groups today a merger of international organized crime, drugs, and terror. While DEA does not specifically target terrorists, per se, we can and will target drug traffickers involved in terrorist acts, wherever in the world we can find them and track them down.
As a law enforcement agency, DEA aims to gather evidence sufficient to arrest, indict, and convict criminals. When DEA operates in foreign posts, we work within the legal systems of our host nations, and of course within the structures of the U.S. legal system and in cooperation with our host nation police agency counterparts. Our evidence must be usable in a court of law, and must withstand severe scrutiny at every level of the criminal justice process. With that in mind, my testimony will be limited to presenting DEA's view from a law enforcement perspective of the evil union of drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. I will also briefly describe some of the steps we are taking to counter this threat.
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUGS:
Members of international drug trafficking organizations headquartered in Colombia, Mexico, and other countries today have at their disposal sophisticated communications equipment. These technologies are being utilized by drug trafficking organizations to oversee the drug business from its raw beginnings in South American jungles to the urban areas within the United States. Modern technology and vast resources enable the leaders of international criminal groups to build organizations that reach into the heartland of America, while they themselves try to remain beyond the reach of American justice.
The traffickers also have the financial resources necessary to corrupt enough law enforcement, military, and political officials to create a relatively safe haven for themselves in the countries in which they make their headquarters. The cell or compartmentalized structure of the organizations necessitates a complex system of communications to enable the organizations' leaders to know where their stores of illegal drugs are located, how much profit is being made, and where and when deliveries will take place. These organizations have the resources to take whatever measures they feel necessary to protect their investments through bribery, corruption, intimidation, violence, and terrorism.
As complex as these communications arrangements of organized crime groups are, U.S. law enforcement agencies have been able to pierce their communications by using court-approved interceptions. With some of the top leadership of these organizations in hiding beyond the immediate reach of U.S. law enforcement, we have directed our resources at their organizational structure, and their transportation and distribution elements in the United States. By targeting these traffickers' communications, we can disrupt their operations and minimize the violence they are able to perpetrate on innocent citizens.
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THE COUNTERDRUG SITUATION IN COLOMBIA AND THE REGION
Attacking Colombian organizations must be the centerpiece of any coordinated strategy aimed at the union of organized crime, drugs and terrorism. Colombian traffickers control the manufacture of the vast majority of cocaine in South America and their fingerprints are on virtually every kilogram of cocaine sold in U.S. cities and towns.
Colombia continues, as it has for a number of years, as the key South American coca source country. Colombia has always been—and remains—the world's number one producer of finished cocaine HCl, producing more than 70 percent of the world's cocaine HCl. The U.S. government estimates the Colombian potential cocaine production from that country's 1999 domestic coca crop at 520 metric tons. This is an increase of 85 metric tons over the 1998 crop.
In addition to its central role in coca production, Colombia is now also the world's largest producer of cocaine base (the intermediate coca product that must be further refined into finished cocaine HCl). As recently as 1995, however, Colombia only produced about one-quarter of the world's cocaine base. Each year, hundreds of tons of cocaine base were imported via aircraft into Colombia from Peru or Bolivia. Since 1995, net coca cultivation in Colombia has more than doubled (from 50,000 hectares in 1995 to 122,900 hectares in 1999). In 1999, Colombia produced approximately 68 percent of the world's cocaine base. Accordingly, Colombian traffickers are far less dependent on Peruvian or Bolivian cocaine base sources of supply.
Most of Colombia's new coca cultivation, and much of its cocaine processing, occurs in the eastern lowlands and southern rain forest—areas where the national government exerts limited authority. This geographic fact poses a significant challenge to U.S. and Colombian counterdrug policy. It is difficult for the Colombian government to assert any kind of authority in the area, making it possible for Colombian cocaine trafficking organizations with bases of operations in these areas to continue to dominate the international cocaine trade.
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Notwithstanding the recent dramatic increase in Colombia's potential cocaine production, total Andean Region cocaine production has actually declined in recent years, due to unprecedented reductions in Peruvian and Bolivian cocaine production. Potential cocaine production in Bolivia decreased from 150 metric tons in 1998 to 70 metric tons in 1999, largely due to the Bolivian Government's unprecedented coca eradication program. In 1999, the Bolivian Government eradicated 16,999 hectares of coca. Potential cocaine production in Peru has decreased from 240 metric tons in 1998 to 175 metric tons in 1999. As a result of coca field abandonment and eradication, net coca cultivation in Peru has decreased from 51,000 hectares in 1998 to 38,700 hectares in 1999.
DRUGS AND TERRORISM: INSIDE COLOMBIA
There is deep concern in DEA, as in the rest of the Administration and in the Congress, about the connection between the FARC and other terrorist groups involved in the drug trade in Colombia. The Colombian government is now engaged in responding to this armed challenge with assistance from the United States. DEA will continue to pay close attention to FARC involvement in the drug trade. We will, together with our Colombian partners, take whatever steps are necessary to attack the international organized crime groups that are the driving force behind the drug trade and the armed groups that may be protecting them.
DEA has in the past demonstrated its ability and willingness to fight drug trafficking even in the face of terrorist activity. For example, we participated in the struggle with Pablo Escobar in Colombia, a trafficker who turned to terrorism when the net was closing around him.
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The same facts of geography that make it difficult for the Colombia government to exert authority over the traffickers operating in remote areas of the country also make it difficult for the Colombians to confront various terrorist or insurgent groups operating in the same region. There is, naturally, considerable interest in the extent to which the two problems—drug trafficking and terrorism—are intertwined in the region. As I have already stated, DEA does not have a counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency mission. When DEA does, however, acquire relevant information from its active drug investigations and drug intelligence collection programs, we share that information with the appropriate U.S. agencies—ones that do have counter-terrorism responsibilities. DEA passes specific threat information on to the FBI in domestic cases and to the foreign intelligence community in overseas cases.
It is well known that two major insurgent groups are active in Colombia. They are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with some 7,000 to 11,000 active combatants, and the National Liberation Army (ELN), with some 3,000 to 6,000 active combatants. It is also known that the presence of the FARC in Colombias eastern lowlands and southern rainforest—the country's primary coca cultivation and cocaine processing regions—hinders the Colombian Government's ability to conduct counterdrug operations. The presence of the ELN in the northeast, central, and northwestern parts of Colombia impacts on the security of oil pipelines, and hinders eradication operations against opium poppy and marijuana growing areas.
Beyond the FARC's and ELN's well-established presence in the drug crop cultivation and processing areas, there do appear to be some links between the traffickers and the terrorists. To be sure, there are differences of view in the United States on just how involved the FARC and ELN are in drug trafficking. DEA reporting and analysis demonstrated several areas of just such involvement. Some insurgent units raise funds through extortion or by protecting laboratory operations. In return for cash payments, or possibly in exchange for weapons, the insurgents protect cocaine laboratories in southern Colombia. Some FARC and ELN units are probably independently involved in limited cocaine laboratory operations. Some insurgent units apparently have assisted drug trafficking groups in transporting and storing cocaine and marijuana within Colombia. In particular, some insurgent units protect clandestine airstrips in southern Colombia.
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An alliance of convenience between guerillas and traffickers is nothing new. Since the 1970s, drug traffickers based in Colombia have made temporary alliances of convenience with leftist guerillas, or with right wing groups. In each case, this has been done to secure protection for the drug interests. At other times, the drug traffickers have financed their own private armies to provide security services. If the traffickers did not buy security from the FARC or ELN, they would buy it from elsewhere—as they have done in the past.
The frequent ground fire sustained by CNP aircraft when engaged in eradication missions over FARC or ELN controlled areas is indicative of the extent to which the terrorists will go to protect the drug interests. Some of these shootings may well have been angry peasants lashing out at a government target. In either case, these shooting incidents pose a threat to personnel conducting counter-lab or eradication operations.
The revenues provided by the drug trade have apparently become increasingly important to many insurgent fronts. In fact, some insurgent fronts have become little more than bands of well-armed thugs that sell their services to drug traffickers. Moreover, DEA has no way to assess the total amount or even the gross proportion of the terrorists' revenues represented by drug proceeds.
On the other side of the political spectrum from the FARC and ELN, other right-wing paramilitary groups (with some 5,000 active combatants) conduct combat operations and terrorist attacks throughout Colombia against the insurgents and their alleged civilian sympathizers. Northern and central Colombia continue to be the primary base of operations for paramilitary groups. Paramilitary groups have become more active in southern Colombia.
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Colombia's paramilitary groups do not appear to be directly involved in any significant coca, opium poppy, or marijuana cultivation. However, according to press reporting, certain of the paramilitary leaders have admitted to receiving payments from coca growers in southern Colombia to protect them from guerrillas. Several paramilitary groups may also raise funds through extortion, or by protecting laboratory operations in northern and central Colombia.
The terrorists are not the glue that holds the drug trade together. DEA does not believe that the FARC should be considered another drug trafficking cartel. It is, however, certainly true that the ''cash cow'' represented by the drug trade has taken on a big, and probably growing role in financing the terrorists.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which terrorism will play a role as the U.S. expands its presence in Colombia in support of Plan Colombia. FARC leaders have stated in the past that the FARC would conduct attacks against unspecified U.S. targets.
DRUGS AND TERRORISM: INCREASED ROLE OF RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME
Another possible tie between drug trafficking and terrorism involves Russian Organized Crime. This phenomenon actually involves activities of individuals or groups from Russia, East Europe, or Eurasia in criminal enterprises. Russian Organized Crime groups are involved in a wide variety of crimes, including drug trafficking to and within the United States. They are relative newcomers to the scene in the United States, and that forms the basis for the role they play, since other more well established groups already dominate drug distribution and sales in the United States.
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Internationally, Russian Organized Crime groups are involved in the heroin trade to Russia, the States of the former Soviet Union, and to Europe. Their involvement has increased as the major trafficking routes to Europe have shifted to the Balkans and through Russia and/or the former Soviet Union. Russian Organized Crime is involved in the trafficking of cocaine to Europe, and trafficking of cocaine to the United States on a generally smaller scale. Russian criminal groups have long-established ties with organized crime groups from other countries, most notably Italian Organized Crime in Italy, and Colombian Organized Crime in the cocaine trade.
While Russian Organized Crime is clearly involved in drug trafficking, especially as transportation specialists, links between their drug operations and terrorist activities are less than well established. On September 7, 2000, the Colombian National Police (CNP) seized a partially constructed, steel-hulled submarine from a warehouse outside Bogota, Colombia. All available information suggests the submarine—if completed—could have been used to transport up to ten metric tons of illicit drugs from Colombia to remote off-load sites in Latin America and the Caribbean. It could well be that Russian International Organized crime was involved in this submarine project.
Russian nationals were involved in the engineering project, seeming to be organizing the project while Colombian nationals assisted in the construction work. The full extent of Russian involvement in the submarine is unclear. The Russian instruction manuals, with Spanish translations, found in the warehouse suggest that Russians might have been helping to build the submarine. Colombian authorities and DEA are actively investigating leads to determine the identities of the suspects involved in the construction of the submarine. There is, as yet, no established or suggested link between this submarine and terrorist activity. Colombian cocaine trafficking groups do generate billions of dollars in revenues each year, resources that increasingly have been used to purchase the best talent and technology available on the world market.
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DRUGS AND TERRORISM: SOUTHEAST ASIA
In years past, the Muslim separatist groups in southern Thailand and the Communist Party of Thailand dabbled in drug trafficking to raise funds to support their political and operational objectives. Today, there is little if any data linking indigenous terrorists to drug trafficking in Southeast Asia. The Communist Party has not been a viable organization in Thailand for years, and the Muslim separatist movement has fractured into a number of organizations known more for their banditry than their political activities. Drug trafficking does not, therefore, contribute to any significant terrorism on the part of these organizations.
In fact, there are no credible reports of any terrorist groups either being based in or conducting terrorist activity within the Kingdom of Thailand. Even the United Wa State Army (UWSA), across the border in Burma, is not a regional organization capable of reaching into Thailand with terrorist activities. The UWSA exists primarily as a separatist organization, seeking autonomy from the central government in Burma. It funds its separatist activities by being the major international drug trafficking organization in the region.
The only hint of a link between drug trafficking and terrorist organizations is associated with the Tamil Tigers. There are some Tamil Tigers in the Phuket area of southern Thailand reportedly involved in heroin smuggling. In addition, they are believed to have purchased weapons for transport to Sri Lanka to support their separatist activities there. The drug proceeds may have been used to purchase any weapons actually acquired, but there is no direct evidence of this link between the two activities available to DEA.
Page 27 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCIn Laos, insofar as DEA's reporting suggests, the recent spate of terrorist bombing activity is based in anti-Communist sentiment and is being financially supported not from drug proceeds but from organizations based in the U.S. with ideological ties to the terrorists in Laos. In sum, DEA has no credible information of the Tamil Tigers, or any terrorist group, using drug trafficking as a source of income for destabilizing the local government or any neighboring country's government.
CONCLUSION: HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
By way of conclusion, we can and should continue to identify and build cases against the leaders of the criminal groups involved in drug trafficking wherever they may be found. These criminals have already moved to make our task more difficult by withdrawing from positions of vulnerability and maintaining a much lower profile than their predecessors. They have not refrained from using violence to protect their interests when they are threatened.
As we concentrate our efforts on Colombia, a number of initiatives hold particular promise for success against significant traffickers, even as we face an era of political uncertainty there and possibly even greater levels of violence than we see now:
The U.S. Embassy's Information Analysis/Operations Center (IAOC) is being increasingly utilized to coordinate and analyze tactical information regarding the activities of drug trafficking groups active in the Colombian territories south and east of the Andes Mountains. The IAOC is comprised of Embassy personnel from the DEA Bogota Country Office and U.S. Military's Tactical Analysis Team. The Defense Attaché Office and the State Department also provide support and staffing. This organization serves as a central clearinghouse for counterdrug law enforcement cooperation in Colombia.
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The special unit program, funded under the Andean Initiative, makes it possible to convert existing partially vetted units of the Colombian National Police (CNP) into fully vetted teams. These teams of investigators will work closely with DEA and will conduct high-level drug investigations.
There have been several cutting-edge, sophisticated investigations, such as OPERATION MILLENIUM last year, which benefit from the closest possible cooperation between the DEA and CNP. MILLENIUM resulted in the demolition of the ''Juvenal'' organization, one of the most significant groupings of drug traffickers in Colombia. This type of investigation will lead to the dismantling of even more of the most significant drug trafficking organizations operating in Colombia today.
There is funding under ''Plan Colombia'' for a Bilateral Case Initiative and for creation of new vetted units. These new resources will improve the U.S. government's capability to target trafficking organizations in Colombia.
The CNP, with support from DEA, conducted several successful long-term investigations against major drug trafficking organizations in 2000 including: the Carlos Castro Arias cocaine trafficking group, the Ivan de la Vega cocaine trafficking group, and the Nicolas Urquijo Gaviria heroin trafficking group.
The DEA remains committed to our primary goal of targeting and arresting the most significant drug traffickers in the world today. In particular, we will continue to work with our partners in Colombia to improve our cooperative efforts against international drug smuggling. The ultimate test of success will come when we bring to justice the drug lords who control their vast empires of crime which bring misery to the nations in which they operate. They must be arrested, tried and convicted, and sentenced in their own countries to prison terms commensurate with their crimes, or, as appropriate, extradited to the United States to face American justice.
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Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Sheehan.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE AND COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. SHEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before your subcommittee today. I would first like to pay tribute to the work done in this subcommittee regarding U.S. Government major counterterrorism laws in recent years. The Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 is very important for my office. You and your staff and Chairman Hyde of the full committee played an important role in enacting this legislation which contains major provisions aimed at terrorism fund-raising and the designation of foreign terrorist organizations, which is an extremely important diplomatic and political tool of my office in pursuing our counterterrorism objectives internationally.
Interesting, when I first arrived in my office, Mr. Chairman, I must tell you that there were many that said what good is this legislation, what role does it play. I can assure you from the 2 years in my tenure in this job, this legislation is one of the most important instruments I have in enforcing counterterrorism and achieving our goals internationally. It is an extraordinarily important instrument. I can get into that in the question and answer.
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Thank you for that legislation, Mr. Chairman.
I have a long statement which I will submit for the record, and I would like to summarize it if I could.
Looking at the broad picture, you have clearly identified there is a nexus there. When I look at two of my primary areas where I work around the world, Afghanistan and Colombia, the nexus of international terrorism and narcotics trafficking is clear.
Any terrorist act is a crime, hijacking aircraft, kidnapping innocent people, bombing buses and buildings or ships are all a crime which must be viewed separately from the so-called causes of the terrorist groups that use this instrument.
Terrorists seek to find sanctuary or bases in lawless corners of the world, including the jungles of Colombia, the mountains of Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Lebanon and other places. It is not surprising there is often overlap between terrorists and those engaged in other forms of criminal activity such as narcotics trafficking or other acts. In the old days of the seventies and eighties, many of the terrorist groups such as the Red Army and the traditional groups raised money the old fashioned way, robbing banks, extorting people and raising money through nation states as well. And this still exists in the Middle East, particularly with the example of Hizbullah—Hizbullah still receives much of its financing from Iran. However, increasingly what we see is terrorist groups around the world today as they have moved away from dependence on funding from state sponsors and moved to independent means of raising money. Some of that is siphoned off of legitimate nongovernmental organizations and other fund-raising methods, but often they move toward crime and particularly narcotics trafficking to get money to fund their terrorist objectives.
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I would like to talk about two particular examples where these come together, which I mentioned previously; that is, Colombia and Afghanistan.
In Colombia there is clearly a convergence of terrorism and narcotrafficking. Colombia is the primary example of narcoterrorism in the world where the drug trade is a major factor in terrorism activities. It is a mutually dependent relationship. The terrorists and paramilitaries gain funding from drug traffickers who look to these illegal arms groups for protection. The FARC recently began to try to establish a monopoly position over the cocaine base primarily in the southeast, referred to by administrator Marshall, and we have seen evidence that the FARC is involved in the export of cocaine. Mexican and Colombian officials have exposed a major link between the Mexican drug cartels and the FARC. FARC guerrillas supply cocaine to the cartel in exchange for cash and weapons.
Kidnapping is also a major problem in Colombia and it is associated with this same lawlessness and violence. During a recent trip to Colombia, I was taken aback by the kidnapping industry that has developed over the past years. The FARC and the National Liberation Army, the ELN, generate income from kidnapping and extortion and other types of activities. Much of it directed against foreigners. Kidnapping has increased every year since 1990, to its current level of more than 3,000 persons a year, half of the world total, out of Colombia. Since the early 1980's, the FARC, also a very violent organization, has been responsible for kidnapping 30 Americans. 13 have either been killed or remain unaccounted for.
Let me turn now to Afghanistan. The Taliban control most of Afghan territory and it has resulted in an area of lawlessness in which terrorists, drug traffickers and other criminals live with impunity. The Taliban benefits from the funds brought in by these activities.
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Therefore, they have little incentive to change their behavior regarding providing sanctuary for these types of individuals. Afghanistan is a little different from Colombia in that it harbors terrorists that have an international reach, and plan and conduct operations outside their immediate area of operations. This includes Osama bin Laden and his organization, which have been indicted for attacking our embassies in East Africa in 1998. The terrorists that have lived in Afghanistan or are headquartered there is a long one indeed, and I have included that in my testimony for the record.
At the same time in recent years Afghanistan, under Taliban control, has become the world's largest producer of opium, which is refined into heroin. Their narcotics production and trafficking victimize the population of Afghanistan and attack the political stability of Afghanistan and the entire region.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to talk a little bit about what we are trying to do about that right now in the U.N. Security Council in New York. We are seeking to put another resolution into effect that will put more pressure on the Taliban, following up on a resolution passed last year, Resolution 1267, which demanded that Taliban turn over Osama bin Laden to justice. We are seeking further international legislation in the U.N. that will impose an arms embargo against the Taliban. We are trying to increase the pressure on them to abide by international laws regarding terrorism and narcotics trafficking. The resolution also includes a measure to ban the export of a precursor chemical for heroin processing, acetic anhydride. We are trying to bring the international community together to put more pressure on the Taliban in order to get them to change their policies.
Page 33 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCLet me summarize, Mr. Chairman, by saying you are absolutely right to bring together this discussion on the nexus of international crime, terrorism and narcotics and I applaud you for that effort. There is no easy silver bullet solution. These individuals are ruthless, well financed and fiercely determined. It will take long term effort and diplomatic pressure on behalf of the United States Government to defeat these threats to our interests.
I thank you very much for the opportunity to speak today, and I look forward to any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheehan follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE AND COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the threat posed by the convergence of drugs, terrorism and organized crime.
Let me start by paying tribute to your work on one of the U.S. Government's major counterterrorism laws in recent years, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 1 You and your staff, and Chairman Hyde of the full Committee, have played such an important role in enacting the 1996 legislation. That bill, for those in the audience who are not familiar with it, contains major provisions making it illegal to provide funding and other forms of material support for specific terrorist acts and to groups formally designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This has become a key aspect of our CcounterterrorismT tools. Let me express my thanks for your strong effort. It is great to have such an advocate on the Hill.
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TERRORISM IS A CRIME
Mr. Chairman, in looking at the broad picture of narcotics, terrorism and international crime, we should start with the basic fact that terrorism itself is a crime, not a political statement. Hijacking aircraft, kidnapping innocent people, and bombing busses, buildings or ships are all forms of a crime, which must be viewed separately from the so-called ''cause'' that prompts some people to commit this crime. This is a long-standing U.S. policy, one that is shared by the international community and demonstrated in a dozen international conventions and treaties.
BAD NEIGHBORHOODS ATTRACT BAD PEOPLE
Terrorists tend to live, operate, and derive support from the lawless corners of the world, including the jungles of Colombia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, and the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, to name a few. Narcotraffickers and drug producers, like international criminals, also seek out those corners of the world where their behavior will not be subject to government control or punishment. So it is not surprising that there is often an overlap between those that engage in terrorism and those engaged in other internationally unacceptable behavior.
FUNDING—DIVERSIFIED FUNDING SOURCES
Many terrorist organizations have engaged in low-level local crime to finance their activities. Some groups, such as the IRA and now defunct German Red Army Faction raised money ''the old fashioned way,'' such as robbing banks. The Kurdish terrorist group (PKK) engaged in extortion against Turkish Kurdish workers and businessmen. And groups throughout the world—from Latin America to the Philippines—have taken hostages to obtain ransom money from the victims' families or employers.
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Historically, many terrorist groups, especially in the Middle East, looked to state sponsors of terrorism for funding. This source of funding has decreased significantly in the last couple of decades. With the exception of Iran—which continues to actively support groups that seek to undermine the Middle East peace process—terrorist states provide very limited funding to terrorist groups or individuals. Hizballah, the major international terrorist group operating in Lebanon, receives most of its financing from Iran. CIA Director George Tenant has testified before Congress that Iran remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism.
Given the overall decrease of state financial support, and in some cases because of the nature of their organization, terrorists have looked to alternative sources of funding, which have included narcotics production and trafficking. Some terrorists have developed loose mutually beneficial relationships with drug traffickers to support both the terrorists and drug traffickers' interests.
That said, I would caution against thinking that international terrorism generally is dependent upon funds from drug trafficking or international crime. There have been reports that some individuals involved in Middle East terrorism have profited from the drug trade through Lebanon. But most terrorist groups or their supporters are not dependent on drug revenues—. Tthey usually have a ''diversified portfolios'' of fundraising. Sources include their ideological supporters, money siphoned off of legitimate and illegitimate charities, legitimate companies that are used to generate profits and transfer funds for terrorist groups, and ordinary crime, such as extortion and robbery.
Let me turn now to two cases in which drug trafficking does significantly impact terrorism, Colombia and Afghanistan. In both cases, there is a convergence of terrorists, drug producers and traffickers, and other criminal activity. Most importantly, there also is a lack of governmental control. This lack of control and rule of law is what allows these criminals to converge, and sometimes cooperate, in certain corners of the world.
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COLOMBIA—CONVERGENCE OF TERRORISM AND NARCO-TRAFFICKING
Colombia is the strongest example of what is meant by the phrase ''narco terrorism,'' and where the drug trade is a major factor. In the guerrilla and paramilitary controlled areas of Colombia, a cycle of terrorism and narco-trafficking has spiraled into a mutually dependent relationship. The terrorists and paramilitaries gain funding from the drug-traffickers who, in turn, look to these illegal armed groups for ''protection.''
Major actors include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), one of the world's deadliest terrorist organizations and the Colombia self defense forces, or AUC.
The FARC recently sought to establish a monopoly over the commercialization of cocaine base across Colombia. We have seen evidence that the FARC is now involved in the export of cocaine. In a November 29 statement, the Department's press spokesman, Richard Boucher, noted that since late 1999, Mexican and Colombian officials have exposed a major link between the Mexican drug cartel and the FARC. Evidence shows FARC guerrillas supplied cocaine to the cartel in exchange for cash and possibly weapons.
Meanwhile, the Colombian paramilitary groups are not only funding themselves, but trying to hit the FARC where it hurts by aggressively attempting to establish control over the prime coca and heroin-growing areas currently controlled by guerrillas. Paramilitary leader, Carlos Castano, frankly acknowledges that the narcotics trade provides the bulk of the paramilitaries' financing.
Page 37 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCMr. Chairman, estimates of profits by the FARC and paramilitaries run into hundred of millions of dollars. But as I stated earlier, narco-trafficking is not the only source of income for terrorist groups. The FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) also generate income by kidnapping Colombians and foreigners.
During a recent trip to Colombia, I was taken aback by the ''kidnapping industry'' that has developed. Kidnapping has increased every year since 1990 to its current level of more than 3,000 persons a year—half the world total. Since the early 1980's, the FARC has been responsible for kidnapping 30 Americans. Thirteen were either killed or remain unaccounted for, representing a 43% mortality rate. The FARC was responsible for taking three New Mission missionaries hostage in 1993, but has failed to account for their whereabouts. One American was kidnapped by the FARC in November. FARC spokesmen have consistently vowed to continue the practice of kidnapping, referring to it as a war tax on Colombia's elite.
The kidnapping problem has become so severe that local criminals are even now kidnapping people and transferring them to the FARC, which in turn extorts money—and a profit for themselves—from families and businesses.
These criminal activities help finance their attacks against the country's electric grid and oil pipeline, affecting local as well as American commercial interests. The paramilitaries have not only targeted Americans or American businesses; they also routinely kill scores of civilian non-combatants suspected of being guerrilla sympathizers.
AFGHANISTAN
Page 38 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCLet me now turn to Afghanistan, a country that has been at the heart of our counterterrorism efforts throughout my tenure as Coordinator for Counterterrorism.
The Taliban's control over most of Afghanistan has resulted in a haven of lawlessness, in which terrorists, drug traffickers and other criminals live with impunity. The Taliban naturally benefits from the resources brought in by these sources, and thus has little incentive to change their own or their ''guests'' behavior.
Afghanistan is different from Colombia in that it harbors terrorists with an international reach, including Usama bin Ladin, indicted for masterminding the attack our embassies in East Africa in 1998. While we do not have full information on who planned and carried out the attack on the USS Cole, we do know that numerous people immediately left Yemen for Afghanistan, the safehaven where they could hide out with little fear of Taliban intervention.
The list of terrorists that live in or have lived in, have trained in, are headquartered in, or financed from Afghanistan gets longer all the time. To name a few:
Usama bin Ladin—indicted for terrorist attacks, including 1999 attack on US embassies in East Africa
Mir Aimal Kansi—1993 attack on US CIA workers
Ramsi Youssef—1996 Bombing of the World Trade Center
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Muhammed Atef, Mohammad Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, and Fazul Abdullah Mohammad—all—indicted for the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa
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Ahmed Ressam—1999 planned attack launched from Canada
Raiz Basra—1999 would-be assassin of former Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif
Abu Hawshar, cell leader of 1999 thwarted attack in Jordan; Raid Hijazi, deputy cell leader; and Khalil Deek and Abu Qatadah also wanted for the thwarted attack in Jordan
Taha Musa—of the Egyptian Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya organization
Ibn al Khattab—field commander in Chechnya
Shami Basayav—field commander in Chechnya
Tohir Yuldashev—IMU commander
These and others with an Afghan connection are wanted in many counties. It is quite a notorious list of current or former ''guests.''
At the same time, in recent years, Afghanistan under the Taliban has become the world's largest producer of illicit opium, which is refined into heroin. The narcotics production and trafficking victimize the population of Afghanistan and attack the political stability of the entire region.
To give an idea of the dimensions of the problem:
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Afghanistan's opium crop of 3,656 metric tons accounted for 72% of the world's illicit opium in 2000.
Since 1997 over 96 percent of the opium-poppy crop has been cultivated in Taliban-controlled areas.
For the last three years, opium-poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has continued to increase, in spite of a devastating drought and decrees from the Taliban leadership banning poppy cultivation.
Poppy is cultivated at the expense of wheat and other food crops desperately needed by the people of Afghanistan, and is planted on the best available land with productive soils, irrigation, and fertilizer, not on previously uncultivated or marginal lands.
Drug abuse is increasing steadily in the region, in Eastern Europe and Russia, and probably Afghanistan itself, with huge social costs.
Regional criminal syndicates with a global reach are linking up with the Afghan drug trade.
These conditions favor the development of parallel drug-based economies and new centers of drug production and trafficking, compounding exponentially our drug containment efforts.
Governments in Central and South Asia are ill equipped to battle the well-financed Afghan drug trade.
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Narcotics-linked income strengthens the Taliban's capacity to provide support for international terrorism. The Taliban admit to imposing the same ''ushr'', a 10 per cent tax, on poppy as they impose on other agricultural crops. There is clear evidence that Taliban officials have to handle opium; from the viewpoint of the farmers, this is a green light to cultivate an illicit crop.
The Taliban use the considerable profits from illegal narcotics activity to buy weapons, which are used to fight the opposition groups and maintain control over the territory where training camps are located. These camps train both domestic fighters and terrorists that are launched to any number of corners throughout the world.
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
The Taliban so far has refused to withdraw its support for Usama bin Ladin and hand him over to a place where he can be brought to justice. As a result, the United Nations Security Council a year ago imposed sanctions against the Taliban, including freezing assets and imposing an embargo on the Ariana Afghan Airlines, the Taliban-controlled air line.
Because the Taliban still have not complied with the Security Council Resolution 1267, a new Security Council resolution is being considered this week. I was in New York last week for consultations with our U.N. Mission and other Security Council members.
The new resolution would impose an arms embargo against the Taliban, hitting the regime—not the people—where it hurts. The resolution reiterates the demand that the Taliban turn over Usama bin Ladin so he can be brought to justice, and freezes bin Ladin's financial assets. The resolution also includes a measure to ban the export to Afghanistan of a precursor chemical, acetic anhydride, which is used to manufacture heroin. The international community agrees that this measure is essential because of the Taliban's refusal to put into deeds their empty promise to end opium production, which goes to support the regime and terrorists.
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The Taliban's acquiescence to or support for poppy cultivation and narcotics manufacture and trade has further exacerbated the humanitarian crisis of the Afghan people. The explosion of poppy cultivation under the Taliban has reduced agricultural land available for food crops at the very time that Afghanistan is suffering the worst drought in a generation.
All of this underscores why the UN Security Council resolution is very important to counter this support for terrorists stemming from Afghanistan and why the resolution deserves to be passed.
THE WIDER IMPACT
Terrorists and drug traffickers rely heavily on a wide international network to keep them in business. This is why the impact of the threat of terrorism—like the scourge of drugs—is impacting a wider area, including the neighboring Central Asian Republics.
Terrorist groups in Central Asia have been profiting from the drug smuggling and using it to finance their purchase of weapons and other activities. Informed observers also suggest that one tactic employed is the staging of terrorist activities to divert security forces while drug shipments are being made elsewhere. In September, the Secretary of State formally designated a major group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. This is one of the many steps that we are taking to counter this widening terrorist threat.
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OUR EFFORTS
We are pursuing a number of initiatives to counter the international terrorist threats I discussed.
In Afghanistan, we will continue to put political, diplomatic, and economic pressure on the Taliban to make them realize that they will not be an accepted member of the international community until they comply with internationally accepted norms on terrorism.
The U.S. is encouraging the international community to help Afghanistan's neighbors build their national capacities to fight terrorism and the drug trade and its corrosive effects.
In dealing with the Colombia problem, the Department supports Plan Colombia, a balanced strategy the Administration designed to deal with the country's multiple problems. This large scale program includes economic assistance and the aerial eradication of drugs. On the counterterrorism side, my office and our antiterrorism assistance (ATA) program are looking specifically at breaking the kidnapping industry through increased training and logistical support to Colombian police and judiciary. We will also renew other ATA training to Colombia.
Implementing the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act provisions against terrorist fund raising, the State Department, after a careful review of the records, has currently designated or redesignated 29 Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Designations require extensive Administrative records and my office has been looking at additional groups for possible designation.
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We worked with other nations in drafting the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, which The President recently submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent. We hope the new Senate will act on this Convention early in the next session. This Convention is a companion piece to our efforts to encourage other countries to strengthen their laws and procedures against terrorist fund raising and money transfers.
In a related initiative, the Department's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program is working with the Justice Department, FBI and Treasury, to develop training courses for foreign officials in detecting and curbing terrorist fund raising activities and money flows. The first course offerings are being scheduled for early in the new year.
We are working with individual countries and through the UN to improve regional cooperation against drugs, organized crime and terrorism.
My office, working with the Department's ATA program has held two regional conferences since June 1999 focused on South Asia and Central Asia terrorism. We also helped conduct an OAS conference to encourage regional cooperation and also helped support security efforts for the Sydney Olympics. We hope to expand the ATA program in the future and develop and expand policy-related and training programs to foster cooperation on a regional basis to counter conventional threats and weapons of mass destruction.
The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) oversees an extensive worldwide program to counter narcotics trafficking and transnational crime. INL led the Department's contribution to developing the President's International Crime Strategy, which includes expanding the membership of the Financial Action Task Force and taking other steps to strengthen international efforts against money laundering. INL also helps train foreign officials in the latest law enforcement techniques as well as respect for human rights.
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NO MAGIC SOLUTIONS
Mr. Chairman, in these efforts to counter terrorist fund raising, whether from narcotics, criminal activities or contributions, there are no magic solutions, easy legislative remedies, or other quick fixes.
We have to keep up the diplomatic and political pressure, bolster our allies' will and capability to help, and maintain strong diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement and training components. The key to this is strong political will and commitment of resources. We appreciate Congress' continued support for these counterterrorism efforts.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much Ambassador Sheehan, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
I would like to make some clarifications. It is my understanding, Mr. Sheehan, that there are some 20 or 30 recognized terrorist organizations in the world. Do you have a precise number that we currently have? I know that the law specifies your doing some assessment of that.
Mr. SHEEHAN. We have designated 29 by our foreign terrorist designation, which is a very legal and technical process. There are others that fall into groups that we keep an eye on but haven't reached the rigorous standard applied by the law, which is a good one and well respected around the world.
Page 46 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCMr. MCCOLLUM. Of these 29 organizations is it a very high percentage or all of them that are engaged in some kind of criminal behavior that results in either—or should I say what percentage of them are engaged in drug trafficking or make profits from drug trafficking in order to operate? Do you have a feel for that?
Mr. SHEEHAN. Virtually every one of these organizations is involved in some type of criminal activity. I know from my close association with the FBI, that often they are able to make cases against suspected terrorists by their other criminal activity. Internationally, that trend also is the same. I was talking domestically for those here in the United States.
In terms of narcotrafficking, the primary nexus of narcotrafficking and terrorism is in Colombia. The links between groups like the FARC are very clear.
Internationally it is not as clear. They benefit from the financing of narcotics trafficking and smuggling in these areas that are outside of control, but the direct link is not always as clear. For instance, some of the bin Laden organization is probably not directly involved dramatically in narcotics trafficking.
However, the narcotics industry in Afghanistan and the enormous revenue generated from that provide a certain shield for that area of sanctuary. It hamstrings our ability to put pressure on those that provide sanctuary to terrorists because they have independent illegal means of financing and that understanding is important.
Mr. Chairman, I am glad to have an opportunity to explain that. Even though an organization may not be directly involved in smuggling of narcotics, the narcotics industry helps provide the sanctuary for them and the ability to operate and thereby attack us.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Marshall, you have alluded, as did Ambassador Sheehan, to the bigger picture question in Latin America with the FARC, with Colombian narcotics trafficking and Mexico. Is this one continuum of organized criminal activity between the United States and there? Or do you look at this as a montage of many independent organized criminal activities? Is there a coordinating council? Do they talk to each other? How do you describe that and how does that fit into the terrorist part of this which is principally the FARC?
Mr. MARSHALL. Right now the way that I see the organizations that are controlling drug trafficking, there are certainly a number of organizations in Colombia that control drugs coming out of Colombia. They utilize the services of some tightly controlled Mexican organized crime and from other countries as well. Frankly the picture of these drug cartels is evolving. Right now we have had quite a bit of success from law enforcement both domestically and in Colombia, particularly against the Colombian organized crime groups. They are undergoing some sort of a fundamental change in the way that they do business right now. We don't know where that is ultimately going to lead, but some of the indicators that we are seeing is that the Colombian organized crime groups are turning more and more of their U.S. operations over to Mexican based organized crime groups.
We see that in Colombia itself it is no longer the two or three huge cartels, but it is a larger number of perhaps more loosely associated groups that are controlling the traffic coming out of Colombia now.
It is, I think, when you look at the movement of drugs from Colombia and through these various other countries, including Mexico and into the United States, I think it is a continuum. I think it is a seamless continuum. I think you see the Colombian organizations that really have pretty tight control over all of the decisions that are made when the product moves up and in turn when the money moves back into Mexico.
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Mr. MCCOLLUM. They talk to each other?
Mr. MARSHALL. Absolutely. While they may be competitors today, tomorrow they may be allies. It is alliances of convenience.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. How does the FARC fit into this? Is it making money off the process? Are they one of the organized crime people that you categorize as an entity or are they associated with these cartels in some means for profit or mutual benefit?
Mr. MARSHALL. I would characterize—the best way I could describe the FARC from my point of view is that they are not a traditional drug trafficking cartel. They are not a full service drug trafficking cartel, as it were. By that I mean up until recently they haven't had any international distribution networks. We have some indication that they may be moving into that. They don't have their own retail networks. They don't have their own money laundering networks. So I wouldn't describe them as a traditional drug trafficking cartel.
Rather, I think they have alliances with all of these other Colombian cartels and they profit from the drug trade. They provide protection, logistical support. They perhaps move drugs themselves. They provide protection to the cultivation and in these areas so that essentially the Colombian authorities can't effectively deal with some of these, like in the deep demilitarized zone. They profit from the drug trade in a significant and substantial way. So they are a legitimate, I think, target of our country's anti-drug efforts, even though I wouldn't characterize them as a traditional drug trafficking cartel.
Page 49 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCMr. MCCOLLUM. To what extent and what percent of the FARC income comes from the drug trafficking, if you will, either protection or otherwise? I assume that they have other sources of income besides drugs?
Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I apologize. I don't know enough about the FARC to really say beyond a substantial portion of their income comes from drug trafficking. I couldn't give you a percentage, I'm sorry.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Ambassador Sheehan, do you have any idea?
Mr. SHEEHAN. I am not exactly sure what the percentage is. I have been dealing with the FARC since 1980 and I can assure you what has changed the FARC so dramatically over the 20 years I have been watching them is the enormous amount of narcotics revenue that has changed the nature of that organization. It made them a much more difficult threat for the Colombian Army, that I know so well, and difficult to confront an organization which has such deep pockets. I think a great, great number of that amount of resources comes from the narcotics industry, as well as just plain old extortion and kidnapping.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. You categorize the FARC and the ELN amongst the 29 that you gave us?
Mr. SHEEHAN. Absolutely.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chabot.
Page 50 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCMr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Starting with Colombia and the portions of the country that are underneath the control of FARC and insurgency groups, can you give us some idea about the trends? Is that area growing? Is it stable? What U.S. efforts might be helpful to the government to either retake that land or to fight the insurgencies, and I know that we have had this issue about the helicopters and could they be used, they could be used for drug fighting and not putting down insurgencies. Is anything on the horizon where we might be more helpful?
Mr. MARSHALL. From a law enforcement standpoint, the FARC's control of those southern areas where you have traditional coca growing areas and a lot of laboratory activity, their control of those areas has impeded the ability of the Colombian Army and, in our case, the Colombian police to go in there and conduct criminal investigations, to follow up on seizures that are made or even to make seizures there.
So yes, the FARC control of those areas does in fact have a negative effect on the overall effort in Colombia. Now, I think that from where I stand, I think that in order to deal adequately in those areas, we have to in some way, or the Colombian government has to in some way go back in and exert control over those areas, and it is my understanding that is the overall objective of the aid that we are giving to Colombia. I endorse the concept of that and I think we have to deal with the FARC if we are to get a handle on the overall drug trafficking situation in Colombia.
Now, having said that, I don't think that necessarily just regaining control of those areas is the total answer. We have to then support the Colombian police, we have to support the judicial systems, and we basically have to continue the law enforcement approach, which is taking out the command and control structure, the leadership of the criminal drug organizations.
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Mr. CHABOT. I have a question relative to the kidnappings. Did you say that there are 3,000 a year and 30 have been Americans? Was that over a year's time or was that over a longer period of time?
Mr. SHEEHAN. 3,000 a year is the number. 30 over a longer period.
Mr. CHABOT. And 13 were either killed or missing?
Mr. SHEEHAN. Since 1980, 13 dead or unaccounted for. It is actually 10 and 3 is how that breaks down. 10 dead and 3 unaccounted for.
Mr. CHABOT. What advice do we give to family members, relatives for getting their loved ones back, and I imagine that is a very sensitive area because obviously these are people that they love and care about, at the same time you don't want to reward bad behavior, so to speak. What do we advise these families that go through this terrible trauma?
Mr. SHEEHAN. This is a very sensitive issue, Congressman. Pure kidnapping is not in my purview because it is not terrorism unless it is done by a terrorist group or for political gain.
Clearly our policy regarding terrorism, although we negotiate with terrorists for food and the well-being of the hostages—there is negotiation in a hijacking of an airplane, for example—our policy is not to make concessions to terrorist organizations so they benefit from it.
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I think it is similar in kidnapping. There is negotiation that is in play led by the law enforcement community, but you try not to give concessions so that those organizations become bigger and bigger and more of a problem.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.
Mr. Gekas.
Mr. GEKAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On the question of organized Russian crime, it is largely heroin because they are in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, et cetera, where heroin has its origins, but, Mr. Marshall, you also included them in the cocaine trafficking in your testimony and involvement in Colombia. That is a little strange for me to swallow because they would seem like real strangers in Colombia, unlike the Americano which would be a familiar sight there, but they are involved in the cocaine trafficking directly from Colombia?
Mr. MARSHALL. Yes. I have to share your perception. It was strange to us when we first ran across it. But they are involved in the cocaine trafficking. They do have ties into Colombia. We know that from a number of investigations. We know that they have connections with the Colombian drug traffickers. We know that they were involved. We don't know the full extent, but we know that they were involved in the building of this submarine that was seized in Colombia.
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They are involved not only in cocaine trafficking going from Colombia and Europe to the former Soviet Union, but they are, as you pointed out, involved in heroin trafficking from the ''stan'' countries and into Europe through the Balkan route. There is some consumption problem in Russia.
But I think that the most immediate impact on the United States is their involvement with the MDMA trade, or Ecstasy, in Europe and the United States. They are very, very deeply involved in that. And it is a recent thing, just in the last couple of years, they have become involved with European organized crime, Israeli organized crime and those groups are really bringing a lot of this MDMA, Ecstasy, from its sources in Europe into the United States. I would say that they are the predominant trafficking and smuggling groups of that drug into the United States. So they are involved on a lot of fronts, and it concerns us very much because we see them branching out into new drugs. We fear that they are going to become more and more involved, not just in the United States but globally as time passes.
Mr. GEKAS. But for most of that activity, it is a business activity rather than a terrorism based or terrorism inciting type of enterprise, is that correct, with the Russians?
Mr. MARSHALL. As far as the Russian organized crime goes, yes, that is correct. I think they have the potential perhaps to assist some of the terrorist groups. We have heard reports, for instance, that they have provided small arms to drug traffickers and perhaps the insurgent groups in Colombia. We have not confirmed that. We know that they were involved in the building of the submarine. We think that the potential is there probably through the provision of arms to some of these groups. But that is uncorroborated.
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Mr. GEKAS. Ambassador Sheehan, you do not list Russia as a state that sponsors terrorism or at least not officially; is that correct?
Mr. SHEEHAN. That is correct, Congressman.
Mr. GEKAS. But is there any connection among governmental officials in Russia and the activities which we now relegate to Soviet Union mafiya type or organized crime? Are there corruption elements in the Russian government that can be attached to this by our intelligence?
Mr. MARSHALL. From the DEA standpoint only. I don't see any direct established, corroborated connection. We work in fact very well with the Russian authorities and we have provided training to them. We do cooperative investigations and share intelligence information. You know, they are—they do have some problems in the transition that they are going through right now and they have a lot of problems dealing with this organized crime, but we don't see the endemic corruption there, at least with regard to the drug enforcement business.
Mr. GEKAS. I have no further questions. I thank the Chair.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Gekas.
I just want to follow up very briefly because I want to thank both of you to be here today. I won't take much more of your time but I am interested in following up a little bit about the Ecstasy trafficking question since this is my last chance to do that, at least on the record. If I am not mistaken, much of this comes from the Netherlands and Belgium, and I had occasion to meet with a group of those parliamentarians that were here, and I know it is sensitive with them, but are we making any progress in getting those countries to work on precursor chemical restrictions so maybe the making and production of Ecstasy will be more difficult or is that still a faint hope?
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Mr. MARSHALL. I think we have a long way to go, Mr. Chairman. I think there is perhaps some progress in that area in that we are working with a lot of the law enforcement and the chemical regulatory agencies over there and we have very good cooperation from them.
I fear, however, that you need some more of those—those countries need some more comprehensive controls on a lot of those chemicals, and I don't see that coming about in the near future. But as far as law enforcement cooperation, we work very well with them. In the law enforcement arena, we have made a lot of progress in taking out some of the criminal organizations, and we continue to target those.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. The Russian criminal element that Mr. Gekas was referring to, is there numerous organizations or is there one monolithic organization?
Mr. MARSHALL. We are just learning right now and are in the process of figuring out how they are pieced together. It is my impression that there are a lot of different organizations involved in different types of crime in different parts of the world. I hope that I can give you a better answer to that or your successors a better answer to that in a year or so. We are still piecing that picture together.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. I want to clarify one thing, Mr. Sheehan. In the region of Osama bin Laden's world we have quite a network relative to his support of different groups. It isn't just something that he is doing here or there, it is a rather wide-ranging effort on his part. Could you put on the record a description of that network for us? What is he about beyond the fact that we suspect his involvement in the bombing of the USS Cole and doing the African bombings as opposed to the Hizbullah or other terrorist organizations? What distinguishes his activity and therefore gives us the greater importance with respect to the funding coming from the drug trafficking?
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Mr. SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, his organization has been described, I think correctly, as a network of networks. It is a series of small organizations that come together informally based on their contacts. Most often we see contacts based on serving together in Afghanistan. That is why they are often referred to as Afghan Arabs or Afghan alumni by some. The organization is not as tightly wired as you might think of a corporate structure, but it is one that reaches around the world through this network of networks.
Often their operations are generated from the bottom up, a small local cell looking to attack one of our interests and looking for help from outside. Sometimes they are directed from the headquarters downwards to look for alliances to make to conduct operations.
So it is a very loosely knit organization, but one that has proven to be very effective as they demonstrated by hitting two of our embassies virtually simultaneously in August 1998 in Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The organization is different than Hizbullah which has somewhat focused its effort recently in the Middle East. These organizations, Usama bin Laden's and others associated with it, have more of a strategic threat to the United States, have broader objectives.
Usama bin Laden's organizations in some of their political statements have specifically talked about forcing U.S. forces out of the Gulf. They consider us as desecrating certain holy lands, and also use anti-U.S. rhetoric regarding our policies with Israel in the Middle East, and generally a rhetoric that is anti-West in terms of its social implications on some of the Islamic parts of the world where they have influence.
Page 57 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOCSo they have a broad agenda, and it has manifested itself in attacks against the United States to try to achieve those aims. And that is why we have focused so clearly on the threat of these groups and, particularly, those emanating from their headquarters, which are most often in Afghanistan.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. What you have told us is that Usama bin Laden's groups don't necessarily cultivate the crops to produce the opium or the heroin, but they do benefit by the culture that is there. And do they get money from these sources? I mean, he gets money from somewhere.
Mr. SHEEHAN. I think his organization has a variety of means of funding itself, all of which are very problematic for us to get after. First, he has his own personal resources, enormous wealth.
Second of all, they raise money in different parts of the world for their causes. Often that money is funneled through NGOs or other so-called charities, and some of that money is siphoned off to support his operations. Clearly, some is also generated from the narcotics business, but I would say Mr. Chairman, that is not a primary source of his funding.
The more complicated problem of narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan is because the Afghan economy and the Taliban, who provide the sanctuary for these groups, have become more and more dependent on narcotics trafficking as their principal source of revenue. It makes it that much more difficult for us to put pressure on them through sanctions or other means because they are outside of the international community. They are extralegal in their economy. It makes it more difficult for us to go after them in our traditional means of putting pressure against them.
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That is the complicating factor that makes it so much more difficult for us to bring pressure to bear on terrorist groups that find sanctuary in Afghanistan and immediately threaten American interests.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. In other words, because they don't engage or are not dependent upon normal trade and normal economic intercourse, therefore we don't have the levers against them, is what you are saying?
Mr. SHEEHAN. Exactly.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. In addition, they obviously continue to be very sympathetic to the cause of Usama bin Laden in addition to all of that.
Well, I think I have probably overstayed your time. I greatly appreciate you both being here today, and thank you again for going out of your way to be here.
I see both my colleagues have slipped out to the back room for a moment. So I know there is not a second round of questions from them. I will excuse you and call the next panel. Thank you both, Mr. Marshall and Mr. Sheehan.
The next panel consists of four witnesses. Mr. Frank Cilluffo is the senior policy analyst and deputy director of the Global Organized Crime Program at the Center for Strategic International Studies in Washington, DC. Mr. Cilluffo directs the Global Organized Crime Program, seven multiagency and multidiscipline task forces on information warfare and information assurance terrorism, Russian organized crime, Asian organized crime, the narcotics industry, financial crimes and the nuclear black market. He is currently a World Economic Forum fellow and a member of the office of the Secretary of Defense's Highlands Forum.
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The next panelist in this group is Mr. Steven McCraw, the Deputy Assistant Director of Information Analysis and Assessments Branch of the Investigative Services Division at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After serving as a State trooper for the Texas Department of Public Safety, Mr. McCraw received his appointment as an FBI Special Agent in February 1983. He received both his bachelor of science and his master of arts degrees from West Texas State University.
Mr. Ralph Mutschke is the assistant director for Crimes Against People and Property of the Interpol General Secretariat. Mr. Mutschke is a career police officer with BKA, the Federal police agency for the Republic of Germany who has graduated from the DEA course on clandestine labs as well as the BKA specialized officers school for drugs and organized crime.
Our fourth witness is Mr. Raphael Perl, a specialist with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress in the area of international terrorism, drug trafficking and crime. A graduate of Georgetown University's foreign service and law schools, Mr. Perl is also a retired Army Reserve lieutenant colonel and Desert Storm veteran.
We want to welcome the entire panel. Thank you very much for coming. Your entire statements will be submitted for the record; you may proceed to summarize them.
We will start in the order I introduced you, with Mr. Cilluffo.
STATEMENT OF FRANK CILLUFFO, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
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Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to address the committee today on this most important national security issue. I am especially thankful to appear before you on your last hearing as chairman of this subcommittee. I think I speak for everyone when I say we are all indebted to you for your tireless efforts to advance our national interests, not just in this area, but also in terrorism and a whole host of other issues. We have had a good working relationship with you at CSIS as well.
As we begin the 21st century, America is faced with a new national security challenge that is both vexing and complex. The once clear lines between the international drug trade, terrorism, and organized crime are blurring, crossing and mutating as never before.
Unfortunately, Washington is only beginning to come to grips with this deepening phenomenon. The continued use of an inflexible 20th century bureaucratic entanglement of government agencies will not answer this call. We must see this threat clearly. We must understand its roots. We must understand what it means to our future.
The challenge of terrorism of course is nothing new. It has been and always will remain a weapon of the weak to target the strong. It is a low-cost, high leverage tactic that enables small nations, subnational groups and even individuals to circumvent conventional projections of power such as military might, economic might and political might. And yet I think we all have come to the conclusion that this is especially true since the end of our swift and decisive victory in Desert Storm.
Few, if any, nations would attempt to confront the United States in—tank-for-tank, plane-for-plane in a traditional war on a conventional battlefield. Rather, they recognize that terrorism and asymmetric warfare, which we will throw in here is more effective and perhaps in some cases even unaccountable means of offsetting our strengths and exploiting our weaknesses.
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The overlapping of terrorism and the narcotics trade is not entirely new either. But many terrorist organizations—many have always been involved in the drug trade, but we have seen a shift where many ideologically bankrupt terrorist groups shed their moral righteousness almost overnight and turned to the drug trade to further their tainted causes. Whether the terrorists actively cultivated and trafficked the drugs or taxed those who did, the financial windfall that the narcotics industry guarantees has filled the void left by state sponsors.
Organized crime and terrorism in general have two differing goals. Organized crime's business is business. The less attention brought to their lucrative enterprises, the better. The goal of terrorism is often quite the opposite. They seek a very public and profiled desired effect. Despite this, the links between organized crime and terrorism are becoming stronger, especially in regards to the drug trade.
Organized crime groups in some cases manage the trafficking organizations while the terrorists or insurgent groups, depending upon where we are looking, often control the territory where the drugs are cultivated and in some cases transported. The relationship is mutually beneficial and reinforcing. Both use funds garnered from the drug trade to finance their organizations and operations.
Funds from states that support terrorism, as Ambassador Sheehan brought up earlier, are dwindling but by no means depleted entirely. The fall of the Soviet Union, which I think it is fair to say was the ''sugar daddy'' of a lot of the terrorism, Marxist-Leninist especially, terrorism aimed against the United States and Latin America, has forced a number of groups to search for new sources of funding.
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Some groups, though, and you can't generalize because if you look at the Shining Path, they always look to indigenous forms of funding and have always been involved in the drug trade. The FARC, on the other hand, are cooperating with overseas criminal enterprises and looked to Cuba to fund their Marxist-Leninist agenda in the past. Nevertheless, I think it is evident that the distinction between terrorist groups fighting an ideological enemy and criminal organizations' pragmatic pursuit of profit is quickly becoming blurred.
In some cases, these terrorist organizations are becoming outright criminal cartels. Increasingly, involvement in the drug business guarantees financial independence from a state sponsor. Groups are no longer beholden to outsiders. That brings the realization that whatever restraint those state sponsors could impose has now more or less vanished. Likewise, any diplomatic or military pressure the United States could subject state sponsors to, to curb terrorist actions, has also diminished, except of course in the case of state-sponsored crime a la Afghanistan.
The blurring of these lines pose new challenges to the United States. The traditional organization of the U.S. national security apparatus that used to come at the troika of what was pretty clear terrorism, organized crime and narcotics trafficking is no longer applicable. In order to work toward a solution of the problem of narcoterrorism it is important to identify its implications to U.S. policy-making, and we are all fortunate that you are looking at this issue, but also its implementation.
While the unholy alliances of narcotics trafficking and terrorism span the globe from Kosovo to Kazakhstan and from Nepal to the North Korean Government, nowhere does this convergence directly impact U.S. national security more than in Afghanistan and Colombia, as was discussed earlier this morning.
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Although similar in some ways, Afghanistan and Colombia pose diverse threats to the United States, and of course the one-size-fits-all approach will not work. While drug production in Afghanistan is of interest to the U.S., the main concern is that Afghanistan is a hot bed and haven for radical Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. In this case, I think it is fair to say that counterterrorism trumps counternarcotics.
In Colombia, the stabilization of a democracy in our very backyard is ultimately the primary concern. We have to come to grips with the reality that we have a nation within a nation with respect to what we can call FARC-landia. While Mr. Marshall, I think, is correct to say that the FARC may not be the glue holding the drug industry together, they are certainly the shield, preventing authorities from making a dent in the problem. They are the ultimate shield, impacting or impeding the good guys from making headway.
Yet the underlying fact remains that Colombia accounts for a majority of the world's coca production and Afghanistan accounts for a majority of the world's opiates. As I mentioned in my prepared remarks, the trend lines are both going up. I think you can refer to them as the true Blue Chips of the narcotics industry in both these areas.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. has devoted, as you well know, billions to the so-called ''drug war,'' which may not be the best way to think of the problem arguably, though with marginal success. At present, more than 50 Federal Government agencies, organizations, have a role in this war. Yet without clear lines of authority the absence of a lead agency and a drug czar lacking a clear mandate, the counternarcotics struggle is in jeopardy of falling between the same regional bureaucratic gaps as have other unconventional threats in the past. These problems lead to the absence, in my eyes, of effective interagency coordination, but things are improving.
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Only an integrated strategy that synchronizes the various organization efforts under a unifying concept can address these problems. Moreover, until we determine how we are going to combat the issue as a Nation, it will prove difficult for us to gain international cooperation on the scale necessary to be effective. And this is critical, as ultimately the threat is transnational and so too must portions of the response be.
As if orchestrating and marshaling the Nation's counternarcotics efforts were not daunting enough, the convergence of organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism demands a new paradigm of strategic thinking. It cannot be seen through a diplomacy, military, law enforcement, financial or intelligence lens alone. Rather, it demands a prism of all of these to offer a comprehensive and coordinated approach. The United States cannot afford to view the world according to our agencies and their org charts.
In closing, we need an entire set of golf clubs in our Nation's golf bag. Please forgive the analogy. But we should never have to be in the position to drive with a putter or putt with a driver.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time. I look forward to answering any questions you m