Inside The Pentagon December 4, 2003
Small, Experimental Satellite May Offer More Than Meets The Eye
Elaine M. Grossman and Keith J. Costa
One year from now, when the Air Force Research Laboratory launches its Experimental Small Satellite No. 11, some eyes will gaze at the heavens in wonder at a feat of robotic technology that may lower the cost of maintaining and repairing satellites on orbit. It is just as certain that others will scrutinize this new arrival in space, suspicious that the so-called XSS-11 has a clandestine, dual capability -- as a ready-on-demand, orbiting anti-satellite weapon.
Air Force leaders describe XSS-11 as a small, maneuverable satellite -- a featherweight in the 100-kilogram class of space vehicles -- with a one-year mission to demonstrate "rendezvous and proximity operations" with other satellites. That's military jargon for meeting up with other space vehicles on orbit, and maneuvering close by to inspect or perform other tasks.
After XSS-11's November 2004 launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, "the vehicle will be capable of controlled relative position and approach, close-in co-orbiting [or] circumnavigation of other space objects, and automatic operations," says Lt. Gen. Dan Leaf, vice commander of Air Force Space Command at Peterson Air Force Base, CO. The new microsatellite -- built by defense contracting giant Lockheed Martin -- also will be "fail-safe," sporting built-in mechanisms that prevent it from harming nearby objects should its systems falter on approach, Leaf tells Inside the Pentagon.
The experimental satellite will be able to capture 200 pictures a day of objects in space, aimed at assisting operators back on Earth in diagnosing problems with other satellites on orbit and in undertaking maintenance and repair tasks, Leaf says.
Space Command "expects to learn lessons about on-orbit servicing and refueling concepts" during XSS-11's time in space, which might be prolonged for up to three years, he says. "We are very interested in improving our ability to maintain systems already on orbit."
The system is a follow-on to XSS-10, a $40 million experimental microsatellite the research lab launched from Cape Canaveral, FL, last January. During a 24-hour mission, the 28-kilogram XSS-10 successfully maneuvered back and forth within 100 meters of its booster rocket's spent stage. From its low-earth orbit, XSS-10 beamed television pictures of its activities back to Earth.
Leaf calls XSS-11 "a more sophisticated version of the same technology." Like XSS-10, the new experimental satellite will be controlled by a team at Kirtland Air Force Base, NM.
Experts outside the Air Force acknowledge the XSS series holds great potential for cheaper and more readily usable alternatives to manned platforms, like the Space Shuttle, for satellite maintenance and repair tasks.
XSS-11 also should assist space officials in simply identifying unknown objects in space -- a job the military calls "space situational awareness." Leaf calls the requirement to better understand what is in space -- and why it is there -- his command's "top priority."
But the same capacity built into XSS-11 that enables it to maneuver around another satellite it is servicing can also allow the spacecraft to disable or destroy adversary satellites, if desired, some experts say.
"XSS-10 and -11 [were] both designed for the same mission," one defense official said this week, speaking on condition of not being named. "XSS-11 can be used as an ASAT weapon."
"Such a satellite could house a small kinetic-kill vehicle designed to smash into a nearby enemy satellite," Theresa Hitchens and Jeffrey Lewis of the Center for Defense Information in Washington wrote in a September opinion piece published in Space News.
In the Air Force's 1999 Microsatellite Technology and Requirements Study, the service raised the possibility of borrowing technology from the Army's Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite, or KE-ASAT, program for its own microsatellites, according to Hitchens and Lewis.
The study's "single strongest recommendation" was "the deployment, as rapidly as possible, of XSS-10-based satellites to intercept, image and, if needed, take action against a target satellite," the two analysts quoted from a 2000 unclassified summary.
Operators on the ground could use XSS-11 to transmit detailed images of a foreign spy satellite back to a U.S. command center, for example. If the spy satellite were deemed a threat to U.S. forces or assets -- particularly during a period of hostilities -- the new microsatellite would have the capability to eliminate it, experts in and outside the government say.
"If you don't like what you see, you can ram into it," says John Pike, a longtime space policy critic and director of GlobalSecurity.org, a clearinghouse for military information based in Virginia. In building XSS-11 to be relatively cheap and easy to launch, it also may be expendable and replaceable in an anti-satellite role, he says.
Looking back at the XSS-10 experiment, the defense official said the XSS-series spacecraft's potential for destroying other satellites was demonstrated.
"It is harder to rendezvous with an object in space than hit it," the defense official said. "XSS-10 went around the object a few times."
The experimental craft "doesn't need any modifications to kill a satellite," this source added. "It's capable of doing all the missions that KE-ASAT is intended to do -- and then some. That's been proven in the flight test."
Interviewed by telephone Nov. 17, Leaf declined to comment on anti-satellite capabilities, saying any such discussion about the XSS program would "all be speculation."
But he did say rendezvous and proximity operations are absolutely essential for XSS-11's experimental satellite maintenance tasks, regardless of what others may make of the capability.
"You can't closely inspect a vehicle -- say, one with an on-orbit malfunction -- without getting 'close' and approaching from the right angle," Leaf tells ITP. "To refuel, obviously you'd have to get more than close, and 'dock' with the vehicle. While we can do that with the [Space] Shuttle currently, an ability to perform such operations autonomously and with a much smaller vehicle offers great advantages in cost and availability."
Air Force officials do acknowledge selected offensive and defensive space capabilities the United States is developing for use against future enemies. But they will discuss offensive space capabilities only in broad terms, emphasizing those systems with "temporary and reversible" effects. Service officials stop short of disavowing satellite destruction in space warfare.
Leaf cited two "offensive counter-space" programs the Air Force first acknowledged earlier this year, both of which are ground-based.
A Counter-Communications System, to be fielded in fiscal year 2005, is aimed at temporarily blocking an adversary's command and control. And in 2008, the service intends to field a Counter-Surveillance and Reconnaissance System, focused on denying an enemy's access to space-based imagery.
Leaf would not acknowledge the technologies these "space control" programs will use to disrupt their targets, but experts believe they are jamming systems.
The general also declined to say if the military has now or plans any future offensive space capabilities beyond these two.
Asked why he could not be more forthcoming in explaining whether the United States currently has the capability to achieve space control, Leaf said, "We don't want to reveal any vulnerabilities, if we have any. We don't want to reveal classified information."
Air Force leaders say that in wartime, they would like to achieve "space superiority" much as the United States has achieved "air superiority" over enemy skies in past conflicts. But they are far less willing to open space systems and operating strategy to the kind of public scrutiny the procurement and use of fighter aircraft and bombers and tankers receive on Capitol Hill and in the news media.
"You don't have to understand where we're at with [space plans] to understand" the concept of space superiority, Leaf said in the Nov. 17 interview. He said the quest for space superiority is much like the objective the Air Force has sought and achieved in the air.
"We ensure the capability to use the atmospheric medium, and we deny that to the enemy. We want to do the same from space. There's absolutely nothing different about that just because it's space," Leaf said. "Now the specifics, some of the sensitivities and technical discussions and everything else are quite different, but it is as simple as wanting to do something we don't let the enemy do."
To some outside observers, it seems ironic at best -- and perhaps foolhardy at worst -- that the United States has developed the greatest reliance on space-based assets of any nation around the globe, yet is preparing to go on the offensive against relatively undeveloped foreign space capabilities. The U.S. military increasingly uses spy satellites, the Global Positioning System, Iridium satellite phones and other space-based communication networks to wage war on the ground, in the air and at sea.
It is an understatement to say the United States "relies" on space because assets on orbit are "much more than a crutch," Leaf acknowledged in an Oct. 24 interview with ITP. He said space capabilities are "woven inextricably through our overall military capabilities."
At the same time, the United States is most capable of disrupting foreign satellites in some of the very same ways the Air Force is concerned future adversaries will harm U.S. operations, notes Pike of GlobalSecurity.org.
Leaf says future enemies could deny U.S. space-based capabilities without necessarily destroying U.S. spacecraft themselves.
A threat against U.S. space capabilities, he says, "could be something brute force, like a nuclear explosion in space, a massive electromagnetic pulse -- or EMP -- burst that could hamper satellites. It could be a jamming approach to . . . the transmission of data to and from the satellite for data-gathering or communications purposes. Or, [it could be] interference with the command and control of satellites."
He continued: "Then, if you take the specific capabilities of an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform, it could be trying to deny that through standard camouflage, concealment and deception kind of means, or something else that would deny or damage the sensor.
"Any of those are potential threats that we have to consider, whether we've seen them demonstrated or not," Leaf added.
"People who live in glass houses should not be organizing rock-throwing contests," Pike told ITP Nov. 25. "The whole preoccupation with space control misses the point. [The Air Force] does not think about space creatively and how it's different from air."
Apart from the obvious physical distinctions that require different vehicles and military strategies -- as do land, air and sea -- space demands new thinking simply because U.S. vulnerability is greater than any other nation's, Pike says.
The notion of space warfare to protect U.S. assets is problematic "because it would just be us that's getting shot up," he told ITP. As the predominant power around the world, the United States would do better to protect its satellite capabilities by pressing other nations to accept the "sanctity of space," rather than making space a battleground, he said.
Leaf says the battle for space control has already been joined. He recalled that during last spring's war, then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein attempted to jam U.S. munitions that rely, in part, on Global Positioning System guidance to hit their targets.
With Saddam out of power, where's the future threat? Leaf would not provide specifics.
"We are somewhat vulnerable to electronic jamming and sensor disruption," Leaf told ITP. "There is a certain level of vulnerability to our worldwide ground facilities as well. Many low-technology incidents have occurred over the years that hint that if we ignore the future, we would be missing the point that as these technologies continue to grow and mature -- for us as well -- it is possible to extrapolate that there could ultimately be some impact to our space services."
The general cited a number of news articles, dating back to 1986, on the feasibility of disrupting satellite communications for commercial or political purposes.
Three of the articles noted Chinese potential for attacking U.S. space-based assets, and China's plans to protect its own space-based broadcast capability by adding anti-jamming devices to its French-made APSTAR VI satellite.
Pike says China launched its first spy satellite in October 1999, in collaboration with Brazil. A single China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite, or CBERS, remained on orbit for three years until this past August, transmitting back to Earth 310,000 still images with 19.5-meter resolution. The two nations recently completed a feasibility study on constructing two more satellites, CBERS-3 and CBERS-4, which would offer 5-meter resolution, according to GlobalSecurity.org.
"The Chinese don't have much worth shooting at," said Pike. "If the Red Chinese were to shoot down our satellites, we'd be in a world of hurt."
Bush administration officials believe if they can demonstrate overwhelming capability in space control, they can discourage China from even attempting to take on near-peer status in space, according to Pike.
"Their ambition is to go ahead and pre-emptively win any arms race the Chinese might embark on into the century," Pike said. One precedent is the small Soviet investment in strategic bombers in the face of U.S. bomber superiority during the Cold War, he said.
Rather than spark an arms race, the United States is now seeking to channel Chinese behavior into commercial, non-military competition, Pike said.
Will the policy work? Might the Chinese military react in asymmetric fashion, much as the Soviets invested in a robust land-based nuclear missile force?
"We're going to find out," Pike said. "One benefit of policy is that it can be tested."
From a military perspective, "we want to ensure that we are able to continue accessing our capabilities in a time of conflict," Leaf said. "We would like to deny that to an enemy."
Extending U.S. military supremacy around the globe is little different than extending such reach into space, Leaf said.
In land-based operations, "we don't want the enemy to be able to drive their tanks through our territory," he said. "We want to be able to drive our tanks through their territory."
Pike attributes the Air Force propensity for equating space with terrestrial and air operations to a concern that the Pentagon or Congress may create a breakaway Space Force, apart from the air service.
But wherever responsibility for military space may lie in the future, differentiating between peaceful and hostile purposes in a system like XSS-11 will remain complex and problematic, he says.
"To me it exemplifies the intractability of trying to negotiate some type of treaty prohibiting these things," says Pike.
From a practical standpoint, it is absolutely necessary to develop and field systems like XSS-11 to simply recognize and understand what is going on overhead, Leaf says.
"It doesn't take nefarious intent to cause problems in space. It could just be debris," he says.
"We have to have a much better understanding -- [a] more responsive space picture -- than simply knowing what is up there, in an object sense," Leaf says. "We've got to recognize change as it occurs, not after it occurs. We have to know not just what's up there, but try to appreciate what it's up there for, what an adversary might be doing with it, and what it means to not just the space part of our armed forces but the overall military and nation. That's a proactive -- a pretty significant -- mindset change that we're making."
© Copyright 2003 Inside The Pentagon
