Transforming the Navy's Surface Combatant Force
March 2003 Section 3 of 6 |
Like the rest of the military, the Navy is pursuing a variety of initiatives to transform itself into a more effective and lethal force. Those initiatives include improving sensors and information networks, developing a new and more capable aircraft carrier as well as new strike and reconnaissance aircraft, and changing the way that the Navy and Marine Corps are organized and fight. One of the Navy's highest priorities is transforming the surface combatant force. That force, which represents more than one-third of the fleet, comprises the Navy's cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. Over the next 10 to 15 years, the Navy intends to retire one class of destroyers, modernize its cruisers and frigates, introduce three new types of surface combatants (in particular, a new small warship), and experiment with different operating concepts. If those plans were fully implemented, they would result in a force of around 160 surface combatants in 25 years, compared with 115 ships today. That transformation effort has serious budgetary implications for the Navy's shipbuilding programs. The resources needed to make those changes would be much greater than what the Navy spends on surface combatants now. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that in the absence of large increases in the Navy's shipbuilding budget through 2020, transforming the surface combatant force could crowd out funding for other ship construction programs, particularly for attack submarines. In addition to their budgetary implications, the Navy's plans for surface combatants are important because the new ships represent the primary means by which Navy officials expect to defeat the threat of relatively inexpensive weapon systems that potential opponents might use to inhibit the Navy's freedom of action. According to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), overcoming that threat should be a key objective of transformation. That objective echoes the Navy's effort in the 1980s to build new surface combatants capable of defeating large-scale attacks by antiship missiles launched from Soviet ships and aircraft. This CBO study examines the composition, missions, and modernization
programs of the Navy's surface combatant force. It also analyzes three
alternative approaches to the Navy's transformation plan that highlight
key issues and trade-offs associated with transformation. Those approaches
were designed to improve the surface combatant force while maintaining
roughly the current funding level: an average budget of $6.6 billion a
year (in 2003 dollars) for both procurement and operation and support between
2003 and 2025.(1)
Transformation and What It Means for the NavyNo universal agreement exists about what military "transformation" means or why it is necessary. In the past few years, President Bush has outlined a vision of military transformation in which the number of major combat platforms is much less important than mobility, speed, and the ease of sustaining forces. In his words, the transformed military would rely "heavily on stealth, precision weaponry and information technologies."(2) The President argues that technology is changing the nature of warfare and that if the U.S. armed forces do not embrace those changes, the United States will lose its military superiority and ability to protect its interests, if not its security. Thus, he seeks dramatic improvements in military capability.(3) The Navy has recently begun to describe what transformation might mean for its forces.(4) But critics complain that the service has been slow to recognize the importance the Bush Administration places on transformation and that its efforts to date have been disorganized and lacking a clear direction or set of priorities.(5) Other observers take a very different view, arguing that the Navy has transformed itself in terms of capabilities and the ability to perform new missions, compared with what it could do 20 years ago. They also argue that the Navy's investment in communications and sensor technology, as well as the way it has operated over the past 30 years, represents a transformation that the Army and Air Force are only now discovering and trying to achieve. The implication is that either the Navy has done a poor job of explaining how it has already transformed itself or it does not recognize itself as already being transformed.(6) Countering Antiaccess Threats
If a country had enough of those weapons, it could implement what defense analysts call an asymmetric naval antiaccess or area-denial strategy. Such a strategy would not attempt to challenge and defeat U.S. naval forces directly. Instead, it would seek to inhibit the Navy's operations by strewing coastal areas with mines, putting hundreds of antiship cruise missiles along the shore or on small, fast boats, and having several quiet diesel-electric submarines hide in noisy coastal waters. One official Navy report states: "In future crises and conflicts . . . access-denial weapons could make the projection of U.S. power so costly that the United States might be deterred from acting."(7) Or, if the nation had to act anyway, such weapons could either prevent U.S. forces from prevailing or result in a Pyrrhic victory. The 2001 QDR was explicit in saying that naval transformation must occur to defeat area-denial threats: "Anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced diesel submarines, and advanced mines could threaten the ability of U.S. naval and amphibious forces to operate in littoral waters. New approaches for projecting power must be developed to meet these threats."(8) Using Forward Presence for Deterrence
Transforming Technology
Some advocates of naval transformation want to use developing technologies to better link sensors, computers, communications, and precision weapons into coherent networks so the Navy can engage enemies faster and more efficiently--thus projecting power more effectively, especially on land. Indeed, although the Navy characterizes many of its programs as being part of military "transformation," it emphasizes what it calls FORCEnet (also known as network-centric warfare) as one of the service's most important initiatives. FORCEnet is a technological effort that includes improvements in hardware and software to link all of the communication, sensor, and warfare systems of the Navy's ships so that every ship in a battle force has the same tactical data available. Thus, one ship's sensors might detect a threat, and even if that ship did not have the means to counter it, the threat could still be dealt with quickly because every other Navy ship operating in the area would know about it at the same time. If the FORCEnet effort succeeds, surface combatants, along with other Navy ships, may become more capable and effective than they are today. Employing New Operating Concepts
The Navy is pursuing some of those new operating concepts. It plans to base three attack submarines in Guam by early 2004. The Navy is also considering basing a cruiser/destroyer squadron there and possibly additional submarines.(12) Another option would be to use multiple, rotating crews on surface combatants to keep them deployed overseas for much longer periods than are now the case. As Chapter 2 discusses in more detail, the Navy began an experiment in the fall of 2002 that will rotate three crews from Spruance and Arleigh Burke class destroyers to one ship, with the objective of keeping the ship overseas for about 18 months, substantially increasing the time it spends on-station. The Budgetary Implications of Transformation
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the idea
of spending less money on the military has fallen out of favor. Moreover,
the development of and transition to "transformational" technologies is
proving expensive. Thus, although the long-term cost implications of military
transformation are uncertain, a smaller defense budget may not result.(15)
The Current Surface Combatant ForceAs noted above, the Navy's definition of surface combatants includes cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. (It used to include battleships, but they have been retired.) The service's proposed littoral combat ship, which would be smaller than a frigate, would also be defined as a surface combatant. That definition excludes aircraft carriers and amphibious ships as well as smaller vessels such as mine-warfare ships and patrol craft. The four classes of surface combatant in active service represent the
ultimate development of Cold War-generation ships. Designed for combat
against the Soviet Navy in the open ocean, they comprise 17 Spruance class
(DD-963) general-purpose destroyers, 33 Oliver Hazard Perry class (FFG-7)
guided-missile frigates, 27 Ticonderoga class (CG-47) guided-missile cruisers,
and 38 Arleigh Burke class (DDG-51) guided-missile destroyers (see
Figure 1).
Seventeen Spruance class destroyers remain from an original Cold War production run of 31 ships. Each one carries two 5-inch naval guns, a formidable open-ocean antisubmarine-warfare suite, two helicopters, short-range antiship missiles, and a short-range antimissile system (see Table 1).(16) As the first of the final Cold War generation of surface combatants, Spruance destroyers introduced many technologies and systems that have been used on subsequent combatants, including a gas-turbine propulsion system and a digital antisubmarine-warfare combat system. The Spruances were later modernized with an antiship missile capability, and 24 of them received the vertical launch system (VLS)--composed of easy-to-maintain groups of launcher "cells" inside a ship's hull--to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles at targets on land. All of the ships still in service are equipped with 61 VLS cells. The oldest Spruance in the active-duty fleet is 27, and the average age of the active ships is 22. Their notional expected service life is 35 years. The second class of the Cold War family of surface combatants was the Oliver Hazard Perry guided-missile frigate. Thirty-three of those ships remain in commission (out of 51 built for the Navy), including eight assigned to the Naval Reserve.(17) Those ships were designed to help defend sea lines of communication--essentially to serve as convoy escorts--during the Cold War. They carry 40 local air-defense and antiship cruise missiles, fired by two single, above-deck launchers; a rapid-fire cannon; two helicopters and a towed-array sonar system; and a terminal missile-defense gun--all of which provide useful combat capabilities for less stressful naval missions. The age of the oldest Perrys still in commission is 23, and the average age of the class is 19. Their notional expected service life is 35 years. As one reference work puts it, "The soundness of the design has permitted the expansion [of capabilities], and the ships have proven remarkably sturdy."(18) Ticonderoga class cruisers use the same hull design as Spruance class destroyers, but they carry a much more formidable combat system. They are multimission ships capable of conducting antisubmarine warfare, antiship operations, land attack, and especially long-range air defense for a group of ships. They were the first U.S. surface combatant to be equipped with the Aegis combat system, which was and is the most advanced antiaircraft/ antimissile warfare system in the world. The first five Ticonderogas do not have VLS cells. Instead, they carry two above-deck twin-missile launchers fed by below-deck rotary missile magazines, which hold a total of 88 antiair and antisubmarine missiles. The remaining 22 Ticonderoga class ships, sometimes referred to as Improved Ticonderogas, have 122 VLS cells capable of firing a variety of weapons, including Tomahawk land-attack missiles. The first ship of this class was commissioned in 1983, making the oldest Ticonderoga 20 years old. The average age of the class is 14. Its notional expected service life is 35 years. Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyers are the second warship designed to carry the Aegis combat system. They are the newest surface combatants in the fleet. Their hull form differs from that of the Spruances and Ticonderogas, and they have a faceted superstructure that reduces their radar cross section to one-tenth that of a Ticonderoga class cruiser. The 38 Arleigh Burkes now in commission are divided among three groups, or "flights":
As of this writing, another 24 Arleigh Burkes are being built, have
been authorized, or may be authorized between now and 2005, for a total
planned production run of 62 ships. However, if the Navy experiences problems
in developing its proposed DD(X) destroyer, it will almost certainly lengthen
production of Arleigh Burkes to support the two shipyards that build surface
combatants. The first Arleigh Burke was commissioned in 1991, and the average
age of the class is only 5. The ships have a notional expected service
life of 35 years.
Evolving Roles and Missions of Surface CombatantsIn the past quarter century, surface combatants have already undergone a transformation in their capabilities. Early Cold War cruisers and destroyers generally carried mostly defensive weapons--surface-to-air missiles and antisubmarine rockets--to screen higher-value ships (such as aircraft carriers) and merchant vessels from attack. They also supported amphibious forces with naval gunfire. Today, surface combatants can and still do carry out those missions, but they have also taken on new roles and perform some of their old ones in fundamentally different ways. Probably the three biggest improvements in the design of surface combatants in recent decades were the Aegis combat system, the vertical launch system, and long-range Tomahawk missiles. The Aegis system--which includes a powerful multifunction, phased-array (fixed-antenna) radar, fire-control directors, computers, displays, and power sources--gives a cruiser or destroyer the capability to defend an entire battle group against aircraft and missiles. The system can track hundreds of air targets up to 200 nautical miles, and because it can update the target data sent to its missiles in flight, it does not have to guide them continuously after launch. As a result, Aegis-capable ships can attack as many as 20 targets simultaneously--a vast improvement over previous antiair-warfare systems. The Aegis system is also less prone than its predecessors to jamming or to electronic countermeasures, and it is effective against sea-skimming antiship missiles. In short, the Aegis system enhances the capabilities not only of the ships that carry it but also of their entire battle group, because it provides for long-range detection, is capable of longer-range interception, and is less susceptible to saturation raids than previous combat systems. The vertical launch system also created a revolution of sorts in the combat capabilities of surface combatants, for several reasons. First, the system uses space efficiently. The five Ticonderoga class cruisers without VLS cells can carry 88 missiles apiece in their magazines for use by their two twin-missile launchers. Ticonderogas with the VLS can carry 122 missiles in their 122 cells, a nearly 40 percent improvement. Second, the system can be easily converted from an offensive system to a defensive one depending on what type of missile is loaded into the cell. Third, the VLS itself is a relatively low-maintenance weapon system that requires little training to operate. Finally, the VLS cells nestled in the center of a ship below the deck line are less susceptible to battle damage than above-deck launchers are. (Even small hits on those launchers will essentially eliminate a ship's combat effectiveness.) The third major improvement, Tomahawk missiles, have provided surface combatants with the capability to conduct long-range strike (or land-attack) operations. In the past, a surface combatant's ability to hit targets on land was limited to the range of its guns (27 nautical miles for the 16-inch guns of Iowa class battleships and 13 nautical miles for the 5-inch guns on modern warships). The development of Tomahawk missiles and VLS cells has given surface combatants the ability to strike targets 700 miles inland--farther than the range of carrier-based aircraft (unless they are refueled in flight). The VLS/Tomahawk combination also allows ships to launch missiles quickly. A surface combatant armed only with Tomahawks could fire its entire complement within minutes if an operation demanded it. A new version of the Tomahawk missile just beginning production is expected to double the weapon's range and provide additional improvements. (Other land-attack missiles, which would be compatible with the VLS, are also being developed.) In short, the combination of the VLS and Tomahawk has vastly improved the land-attack capabilities of surface combatants. Into the 1980s, not one of the Navy's cruisers, destroyers, or frigates could strike targets more than 13 miles inland. Today, 82 surface combatants have long-range strike capabilities. The missions of the surface combatant force may evolve further in the
future. With improvements to their radars and missiles, cruisers and destroyers
may be able to provide ballistic missile defense within a theater and,
possibly, play a role in national missile defense. Such changes could require
the development of larger ships to accommodate more-sophisticated radars
and larger, faster intercept missiles. Other types of ships, smaller than
any in the current force, might also be necessary to fulfill missions that
surface combatants already perform and will still be required to carry
out 30 years from now.
Stated Requirements for Surface CombatantsAn essential question in this analysis is, How many surface combatants does the Navy need? The service has not answered that question definitively or consistently. Furthermore, the answer depends on responses to other, related questions. What does the Navy want to do with its surface combatants? Does it need larger numbers of smaller, less-capable platforms, or should it buy fewer but more-capable platforms? Finally, will the Navy continue to operate its surface combatants as it has in the recent past--that is, by basing them in the United States and deploying them only about once every two years? Studies by the Department of Defense and the Navy over the past 10 years
have produced various estimates of the required number of surface combatants
(see Figure 2). One analysis of that issue,
the Surface Combatant Force Level Study, published in August 1995, stated
that the Navy needed 135 to 165 surface combatants to meet wartime requirements.(19)
That conclusion was based on an extensive war game in which U.S. forces
fought two major theater wars (in Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf)
at the same time. The figure of 165 represents "peak demand" for surface
combatants 30 to 80 days into a conflict, assuming no assistance from allies.
If nations friendly to the United States are assumed to contribute 30 ships
to the fight, the total wartime requirement falls to 135 surface combatants.
Two years later, however, the 1997 QDR concluded that the Navy should operate only 116 surface combatants. The report did not provide much information about how that figure was determined, but 116 was the number of surface combatants in the fleet at the time. The subsequent QDR, in 2001, did not discuss specific requirements for forces but stated that the current force levels, set by the 1997 QDR, would be the base from which transformation would occur. In 1999, the Navy completed the Surface Combatant Force Level Study II. It was intended to update the 1995 analysis and provide an authoritative statement of the Navy's requirements for surface combatants. That study was never released (because of the start of the 2001 QDR), but press reports indicate that it concluded that 95 surface combatants would be necessary to meet peacetime requirements in 2015, whereas 145 would be needed to fight simultaneous major theater wars in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Pacific.(20) In June 2000, the Secretary of Defense released the Report on Naval Vessel Force Structure Requirements (also known as the 30-Year Shipbuilding Report), whose completion the Congress had mandated in the 2000 defense authorization act.(21) That report argued that naval forces were in high demand and that the 1997 QDR force was being heavily tasked. To reduce the risks posed by growing operational demands, the report advocated a 10 percent to 15 percent increase in the number of surface combatants, apparently to support a proposed increase in the number of aircraft carriers from 12 to 15. Today, the Navy is again reevaluating its requirements for surface combatants,
primarily because of the war on terrorism, pressure from the Bush Administration
to transform the current fleet, and the new forward-presence posture outlined
in the most recent Defense Planning Guidance. In the judgment of the Chief
of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, the Navy would need a fleet
of at least 375 ships, including 30 to 60 littoral combat ships, to meet
all of its requirements.(22)
Under the Navy's evolving future concept of operations, the surface combatant
part of that 375-ship Navy would amount to 160 ships. (For a more detailed
explanation of what a 375-ship Navy might look like, see Box 1.)
The Navy's Plan for Transforming the Surface Combatant ForceThe uncertainty about how many surface combatants the Navy needs reflects uncertainty about the proper size and scope of transformation from older to newer generations of ships. How quickly will anticipated antiaccess or area-denial threats evolve? Does the Navy need to transform only a few of its platforms or its entire force structure to counter those threats? More important, to what extent should the focus of transformation be on capabilities or numbers of ships? Prominent members of the Bush Administration have stated that the emphasis in any modernization program needs to be on capabilities.(23) They appear to be saying that what is required is a set of capabilities to achieve certain tasks. If those capabilities can be provided by a smaller number of platforms, so be it. Others, including Navy officials and Members of Congress, have argued that numbers matter and that the Navy needs to buy more ships and have a larger fleet. The Navy's plan for transforming the surface combatant force reflects that tension between capabilities and numbers. Over the next five years, the Navy intends to retire some older surface combatants before the end of their notional service life, cutting the fleet in the short term, even though stated requirements and Navy officials have called for more, not fewer, ships. After that, however, it would develop and deploy large numbers of a family of next-generation ships: the big multimission DD(X) class destroyer, a small "focused-mission" ship called the littoral combat ship (LCS), and a large multimission cruiser known as the CG(X). By 2025, the Navy's plan would result in a surface combatant force that was not only 40 percent larger than today's force but much more capable than the current Cold War generation of ships. Retiring Spruance Class Destroyers Early
Some Navy officials also regard Spruance class destroyers as unreliable and more prone to unexpected breakdowns than any other surface combatant. Various engineering systems are said to be particularly unreliable. The Navy argues that retaining Spruances for their full service life would require upgrading those systems as well as some of the ships' combat systems, at a cost of $50 million to $100 million per ship. That approach would be similar to the upgrades that the Navy performed on Leahy and Belknap class cruisers in the 1980s, which it retained in the fleet until the early to mid-1990s. Keeping Spruances running for a total of 35 years would cost an average of $45 million a year per ship for needed upgrades and operations. As a matter of relative cost, that would make keeping Spruances in service cheaper than building new destroyers, and somewhat more expensive than building the as-yet-undesigned littoral combat ship. The equivalent costs are about $60 million a year for a new Arleigh Burke class destroyer and about $30 million a year for the littoral combat ship, CBO estimates.(24) Clearly, Spruances are much less capable than newly built guided-missile destroyers. They lack the Aegis air-defense system and carry one-third fewer VLS cells. But a better comparison of their capabilities would be with the new littoral combat ship. A modernized Spruance would have two naval guns, 61 cells for land-attack missiles, and two helicopters; as a result, its self-defense and antisubmarine-warfare capabilities could prove equal to those of the smaller LCS. However, Spruances would be larger and much less stealthy than the LCS, so the latter could prove to be more survivable against modern threats in coastal regions, although that is by no means certain. Improving Ticonderoga Class Cruisers and Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates
According to the 2003 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), the Navy was planning to upgrade all 27 Ticonderoga class cruisers. Fourteen, including the five oldest ships, would be outfitted with improved fire-control systems, radars, and self-defense systems, and their guns would be converted to the 5-inch, 62-caliber design capable of firing extended-range guided munitions. In addition, the first five ships of the class, which have above-deck launchers, would have the VLS installed (the first two would receive 64 cells, and the other three would get 128). The remaining 13 Ticonderogas would receive many of the same improvements in radars, computers, and self-protection systems, as well as better missiles and even more advanced radars in order to perform theater ballistic missile defense. In the 2004 FYDP, however, the Navy has altered its conversion plan for Ticonderogas: it proposes canceling the upgrades to the first five ships and retiring them early.(25) The Navy argues that by updating the combat systems of Ticonderogas, it will extend their useful service life to as much as 40 years. Doing so, however, implies a substantial overlap between that cruiser conversion effort and the program to build a new cruiser, the CG(X) (discussed later). If the Navy upgraded all 27 Ticonderogas, the first one would not retire until 2023, four years after the Navy wants to commission the first CG(X). If the Navy reduced its requirement for cruisers to 22 by retiring the first five Ticonderogas early, all 22 would remain in the fleet until 2026, when the first of them would retire. For this analysis, CBO assumed that under the Navy's 160-ship plan, the upgraded Ticonderogas would serve for 35 years. (CBO's options, however, take advantage of the Navy's estimate of a 40-year service life for upgraded Ticonderogas.) The Navy also plans to upgrade its Oliver Hazard Perry class guided-missile frigates. To maintain the operational effectiveness of those ships until the last ones retire (in 2018), the Navy wants to improve their engineering, habitability, and combat systems. According to the 2003 FYDP, the Navy plans to spend about $200 million over five years to, among many other things, replace engines, install osmosis units, upgrade the Close-In Weapons System, and incorporate the Nulka decoy system on about half of those ships. (Those last two upgrades would improve the frigate's self-defense capabilities.) The Navy plans to increase spending in later years to upgrade all of the Perrys. CBO estimates that the costs to upgrade all of the frigates would total about $360 million, or slightly more than $10 million per ship. Developing Future Surface Combatants
The DD(X) Destroyer. At the direction of the Bush Administration, the Navy canceled the DD-21 Land Attack Destroyer program on November 1, 2001. In its place, the DD(X) program was established, which outlined the Navy's vision for a new generation of surface combatants, to include the DD(X) destroyer, the littoral combat ship, and eventually the CG(X) cruiser. Although the DD-21 program consisted of 32 ships, it is not yet clear how many DD(X)s would be bought. As of this writing, the Navy appears to have settled on 16--one each for the 12 planned expeditionary strike groups in the Navy's Global Concept of Operations (see Box 1) and four more for wartime surge capability. Furthermore, how much the new destroyers might cost is uncertain. The Navy had hoped that by the fifth DD-21 in the production run, that ship would have cost less to procure than an Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer, which costs about $1.2 billion per ship when buying them at a rate of two per year. But if the Navy bought only half as many DD(X)s at a rate of two per year, it would be unlikely to achieve that goal. On the basis of information from the Navy about how much it expects the first DD(X) to cost (excluding nonrecurring design elements), CBO estimates that the new destroyer would have a price tag of about $1.9 billion per ship, on average, for a 16-ship run. In contrast, the Administration estimates that the eight DD(X)s included in the 2004 FYDP would cost an average of $1.3 billion apiece. (For a detailed explanation of CBO's cost estimates for future surface combatants, see the appendix.) Because the DD(X) destroyer would borrow much from the DD-21 program, more is known about it than about the other two ships in the new generation. Like the DD-21, the DD(X) is intended to be a multimission ship, emphasizing land attack. It would carry one or two new 155-millimeter (mm) advanced gun systems developed for the DD-21, each of which can hurl rocket-assisted precision-guided projectiles to ranges of 100 miles. It would also have a VLS battery of up to 128 cells capable of firing various land-attack and self-defense missiles, a large helicopter hangar, and a new integrated undersea-warfare suite. The DD(X) would also be able to operate boats or unmanned vehicles from a special boat ramp. The DD(X)'s final combat capability would be determined primarily by its size. The DD-21 was supposed to be an extremely large combatant--upward of 16,000 tons--primarily because of two big advanced gun systems and large 600- to 750-round magazines and because of the need to increase its stealthiness. If the Navy decided to reduce the size of the DD(X), it would lose one of the gun systems and decrease the number of VLS cells. However, it is unclear how a smaller number of reduced-capability DD(X)s could meet the operational requirements set forth in the DD-21 program. Producing more DD(X)s would be one option, but that clearly would not be as cost-effective as the current plan. Much like the role that the Spruance class destroyer played in the current generation of surface combatants, the DD(X) is intended to be the "pathfinder" for technologies that would be used in all subsequent ships of the next generation. Three of those technologies are especially significant. First, the Navy wants to equip the DD(X) with an all-electric power-distribution and propulsion system instead of the gas-turbine systems on the current generation of surface combatants. That new system would allow a ship to use power far more efficiently. Gas-turbine-powered surface combatants devote most of the power they generate to propulsion, and they cannot easily redirect that power to other purposes. If the technical challenges can be overcome, an all-electric system will be able to divert power effortlessly from propulsion to weapons and back again, paving the way for the development of shipboard, electrically powered weapons, such as lasers or long-range electromagnetic guns. Second, the DD(X) is intended to incorporate new hull forms, materials, conformal antennas (antennas embedded directly in the skin of a ship), and other design features to give the ship a very small radar cross section, as well as low magnetic, acoustic, and infrared signatures. Those "stealth" features are designed to decrease the ship's detectability and increase its survivability. Third, the DD(X) is supposed to introduce a host of automatic advances, especially in the area of damage control. The Navy hopes that such advances will eventually allow it to operate the new destroyers with a 70 percent smaller crew than those of today's destroyers. In addition to expressing skepticism about the Navy's ambitious cost and crewing goals for the DD(X), critics raise other questions about the program. First, it is not apparent why the DD(X) needs to be as stealthy as the Navy wants. Under the new Global Concept of Operations (or Global CONOPs), the smaller littoral combat ship would be the first to penetrate an opposing country's antiaccess network and defeat diesel submarines, mines, and swarms of small missile attack boats that would threaten successive U.S. forces. If that was true, the majority of threats facing the DD(X) would already be dealt with before it moved closer to shore, perhaps eliminating the need to greatly reduce its acoustic and magnetic signatures. Decreasing the DD(X)'s radar cross section would still seem to make sense since an enemy could engage ships close to shore with long-range antiship cruise missiles launched from far inland. But would the DD(X) need to be substantially stealthier than the Arleigh Burke destroyer, which is itself much stealthier than the Ticonderoga cruiser? A second criticism of the DD(X) program involves its emphasis on land attack. Any surface combatant equipped with the vertical launch system is capable of land attack, and the Navy already has more VLS cells than it can afford to fill with missiles (which is one reason that it feels it can part with Spruance class destroyers). The DD(X)'s new advanced gun system would differ from current guns and have a much greater range and payload, offering the Marines better naval gunfire support. But CBO is unaware of any analysis that explains why the 63-mile extended-range guided munition--which can be fired from upgraded 5-inch, 62-caliber guns and provides five times the range of older 5-inch guns--is not sufficient for naval gunfire requirements, especially since the last large amphibious assault conducted by the United States occurred during the Korean War. Using a stealthy ship to provide naval gunfire would not seem to make sense because, to get the most out of its range capabilities, the ship would have to operate close to shore, where it would be detectable. (Stealth is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.) If the threats that limited the DD(X)'s close-in operations had been eliminated, a less stealthy ship equipped with 155-mm guns, perhaps one based on a commercial design, would serve equally well. (Such a ship would essentially be a gun barge--an off-shore floating platform to provide gunfire support so that Marine Corps units would not have to carry as much artillery with them.) The Littoral Combat Ship. As noted above, the DD-21 program was intended to consist of 32 ships, for a steady-state surface combatant force of 116 ships. In effect, the DD(X) program and the Global CONOPs modified that plan to include 16 DD(X) destroyers and 56 littoral combat ships, for a steady-state force of 160 surface combatants. Under the 2004 FYDP, the Navy plans to order the first LCS in 2005 and eight more by 2009. The Navy has yet to answer many questions about the LCS, primarily because the ship is still in the very early stages of design and development. However, Navy officials have stated that the LCS would be much smaller and faster than the DD(X) and would be a focused-mission ship rather than a multimission or single-mission ship. In other words, the LCS would be designed modularly so that it could be reconfigured fairly quickly to perform one of three distinct missions: finding and sinking quiet diesel submarines operating in crowded, noisy, and shallow coastal waters; finding and neutralizing mines; and countering swarm attacks by small, high-speed boats armed with missiles. Navy officials have begun to characterize the LCS as a kind of "truck" capable of carrying various cargoes. The truck--consisting of the ship's hull, propulsion plant, crew quarters, and basic defensive combat systems--would be developed and acquired separately from its three associated mission packages, or modules. The operators of the truck and the modules would train separately, probably on shore or on designated training vessels. When an LCS was slated to deploy, whichever mission package was called for would be pulled, put on the truck, and sent to sea. Vice Admiral Phillip Balisle, head of Naval Sea Systems Command and the former head of surface warfare for the Chief of Naval Operations, used the analogy of an aircraft carrier and its air wing to describe that LCS concept, calling the carrier a "hollow" platform until the air wing comes aboard.(28) That analogy seems a bit misplaced, however. Throughout an aircraft carrier's training cycle (which lasts between 12 and 18 months prior to a six-month deployment), the air wing is assigned to the carrier and trains with it. Perhaps a better analogy, which some Navy officials have used in discussions with CBO, is the helicopter detachment routinely assigned to a surface combatant before deployment. Although a helicopter detachment trains with the surface combatant to which it has been assigned, it is more flexible in that it can be assigned to a different ship at the last minute, if necessary. The detachment can even be transferred to another ship during deployment if a mission requires it. Neither of those options is possible with a carrier air wing. Even that analogy, however, does not quite capture what Navy planners are suggesting for the littoral combat ship. Traditionally, the captain of a surface combatant "fights" the ship, employing all of the weapons and systems at hand. The commander of a helicopter detachment is just another department head on a surface combatant, answering to the ship's captain. But who would "fight" the LCS--the truck driver or the mission-module commander? Which of them would be ultimately responsible for the safety of the ship? The mission commander could be expected to take the lead because only he or she would have the expertise to "fight" the ship. But how that would work in actual combat situations is not clear--especially if the truck driver remained responsible for the safety of the ship and its crew. Another key unknown about the LCS is its ultimate size and configuration.
Reports suggest that the Navy is exploring designs that range in size from
as little as 300 tons of displacement to as much as 5,000 tons. (By comparison,
an Oliver Hazard Perry frigate displaces about 4,000 tons.) Most reports
suggest a ship the size of a large corvette, on the order of 3,000 tons.
That size ship provides a good balance between payload and endurance. It
can deploy reliably overseas while having enough room for acceptable crew
facilities, and it is the smallest ship deemed capable of supporting a
single medium-sized helicopter. Should the LCS be required to embark (that
is, carry, operate, and sustain) a medium-sized helicopter, it would need
a displacement of at least 4,000 tons. Smaller vessels can carry helicopters,
but the Navy's Helicopter Master Plan calls for only two types of helicopters
in the fleet--both variations of the large, multimission SH-60 Blackhawk.
Introducing an entirely new class of smaller helicopters to support the
littoral combat ship would entail considerable costs for training and operation
and support.(29) (For
more information about the role of helicopters in helping surface combatants
counter area-denial threats, see Box 2.)
Yet another uncertainty surrounding the littoral combat ship is how
it would be used. The Global CONOPs suggests that the LCS would be employed
in forward-deployed squadrons. However, the size of those squadrons and
whether they would be single mission (all carrying the same type of mission
module) or multimission (having a mix of mission modules) are unknown.
Also unclear is how the LCS would be supported logistically. Some Navy
officials have suggested that littoral combat ships could be refueled by
the cruisers and destroyer with which they would be operating. But what
about food, munitions, and spare parts? Would the squadrons require mother
ships? (The Navy does not appear to think so if the ships are in the 3,000-ton
range.) If so, how would the mother ships be protected? Under any circumstances,
the large numbers of LCSs that the Navy envisions buying would require
the service to expand its supporting combat logistics force (for more details,
see Box 3).
Of the many uncertainties surrounding the LCS, the biggest question is whether the tactical concept of operations for that ship makes sense. The Navy describes the LCS as the "transformational" leg of the DD(X) program because it is designed to provide "assured access" in the face of future naval antiaccess networks. The theory is that the smaller, speedier, and more stealthy LCS would enter an enemy's littoral waters and eliminate mine, submarine, and boat threats, allowing larger and less stealthy ships to move closer to shore at acceptable levels of risk. Yet if an enemy had over-the-horizon targeting capability and antiship cruise missiles effective enough to compel larger combatants to remain far out at sea, could it not engage smaller ships closer to its own shore and overwhelm their small loads of short-range self-defense missiles and guns? Conversely, if the larger combatants had to move closer to shore to provide longer-range air and missile defense for the LCSs, why could they not perform the antisubmarine warfare, antiboat, and countermine missions themselves? Indeed, the three missions now assigned to the LCS appear heavily dependent on helicopters (and, in the future, unmanned systems); it is not clear why larger combatants could not use those systems to similar effect. Finally, there is the question of what the LCS will cost. The Navy has provided some information to CBO about the possible price tag of the LCS and its mission modules. But it has not specified whether it plans to buy one mission module of each type for every LCS it buys or a total of 56 mission modules (one for each ship), divided equally among the three missions. CBO estimates the average cost of the LCS, with 1.25 mission modules per ship, at about $350 million apiece (see the appendix for more details). In comparison, the Navy estimates that the first nine ships would cost an average of $200 million and that the mission sets assigned to each ship would cost about $180 million. The CG(X) Cruiser. In the Navy's plans, the third ship of the DD(X) program will be a large multimission surface combatant, which is expected (although not yet certain) to use the same hull, propulsion plant, and basic combat systems as the DD(X). The key difference is that the CG(X) cruiser would be designed to provide long-range fleet air defense, long-range defense against overland cruise missiles, and theater ballistic missile defense. The CG(X) might be equipped with an upgraded Aegis combat system, but more likely it would introduce an entirely new, advanced-generation combat system, including new radars and more-advanced missiles. Because of its mission, the CG(X) would probably trade the DD(X)'s advanced gun systems for additional VLS cells. CBO assumes that the minimum VLS load for the CG(X) would be 200 cells. In light of the Navy's plans to modernize Ticonderoga class cruisers, the need to begin building the CG(X) is not pressing. Currently, the Navy thinks it may order the first CG(X) in 2014, with that ship entering the fleet in 2019 or 2020. Such a timetable would cause a large overlap between the first CG(X) and the retirement of the modernized Ticonderogas, which would have an expected service life of 40 years. In fact, the first of the 22 VLS-equipped Improved Ticonderogas, the Bunker Hill, would not retire until 2026, and the last, the Port Royal, would remain in service until 2034. According to press reports, the CG(X) warships "will first complement and eventually replace the 27 Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruisers" [emphasis added], suggesting that the CG(X) production run might be greater than 27 ships.(30) A larger production run for the new cruiser would be consistent with
the Global CONOPs. That operating plan calls for 24 ships--a single cruiser
to be assigned to each of 12 carrier strike groups and 12 expeditionary
strike groups. However, it also calls for nine surface action groups to
provide theater ballistic missile defense, with two dedicated antiballistic-missile
shooters and a single antiair "shotgun" for protection. That goal suggests that the Navy would need another 18 CG(X)s, for a total production run
of 42. In this analysis, CBO assumed that the additional cruisers would
be used to replace the early-flight Arleigh Burke destroyers on a one-for-one
basis. (The first of those ships is scheduled to retire in 2026, if it
serves its full 35-year expected service life. If midlife upgrades extend
that service life to 40 years, the first destroyer will not retire until
2031.) The average price for the CG(X) would be $2.2 billion, CBO estimates
(see the appendix for details).
Budgetary Implications of the Navy's PlanAnalyzing the resources necessary to implement the Navy's plan for modernizing its surface combatant force is particularly difficult because the Navy has not specified exactly how many surface combatants it wants or needs, nor has it laid out its long-term modernization program in any detail. The 2004 FYDP provides details only through 2009. As a consequence, CBO developed two long-term procurement plans, based on official information, to determine the level of funding that the Navy thinks it needs to modernize the surface combatant force. Comparing those plans with past and projected funding levels suggests that the Navy could face trade-offs among different parts of its fleet in coming years. Determining the Navy's Procurement Plans for Surface Combatants Through 2025
CBO's second shipbuilding plan--which more closely reflects current
Navy thinking--is drawn from public statements by Navy officials, the 2004
FYDP, unofficial sources, and the new Global Concept of Operations. CBO
assumed that to achieve the force structure goals implied by the Global
CONOPs, the Navy would modernize its 22 Improved (VLS-capable) Ticonderoga
cruisers and would buy 16 DD(X) destroyers, 32 CG(X) cruisers (with an
eventual goal of 42), and 56 littoral combat ships.(31) The Navy would also modernize its frigates and purchase 62 Arleigh Burke destroyers as specified in the 2004 FYDP.(32) Under that approach (referred to here as the Navy's 160-ship plan), the inventory of surface combatants would grow over the next 25 years until it reached a steady-state level of 160 ships (see Figure 3).
The Navy's 160-ship plan defines the upper limit of the service's goals
for surface combatants, and it conforms most closely to Navy briefings
about the Global CONOPs. That concept of operations calls for 88 Aegis
ships, 16 DD(X) destroyers, and 56 littoral combat ships. The briefings
do not provide a date when such a force would exist, only its general outlines.
To derive a procurement plan for surface combatants, CBO used the information
in the 30-Year Shipbuilding Report and updated it for recent developments--particularly
the intention to buy 16 DD(X)s instead of 32 DD-21s, as well as 56 littoral
combat ships. (That procurement plan is shown in Figure
4.) CBO then calculated the cost of the two shipbuilding plans using
its cost estimates for the various types of surface combatants. (For more
details of those estimates, see the appendix.)
The Resource Implications of the Navy's Modernization Program for Surface Combatants
Thus, the current level of funding for surface combatants cannot continue much longer if the Navy wishes to achieve its new, higher force goals. CBO estimates that the Navy's 160-ship plan would entail spending an average of about $5 billion annually on surface combatants between 2003 and 2010, for a construction rate of 4.0 ships a year--more than the amount necessary to sustain a force of 116 ships but still less than the amount needed to achieve the 160-ship force goals by 2025. Consequently, after 2010, the surface combatant force would have to consume a far larger share of the Navy's shipbuilding budget. The Navy's 160-ship plan would spend an average of $6.2 billion a year between 2011 and 2020 on surface combatants--or about three-quarters of today's shipbuilding budget. Without a significant rise in the Navy's construction funding, that level of spending would require trade-offs with other shipbuilding programs. The numbers for surface combatants portray only part of the overall budgetary challenge that the Navy is facing. Other elements of the Navy will also need greater resources if the service is to achieve a total force goal of 375 ships. Although most of the planned increase in the fleet involves surface combatants, reaching a 375-ship Navy would require maintaining at least the current force levels for other types of ships. Between 2011 and 2020, the average ship construction budget needed to build all of the aircraft carriers, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, and support ships now planned would be almost $17 billion a year, CBO estimates (see Table 3). That level is roughly double the Navy's average construction spending of $8.5 billion a year over the 1990-2002 period. (The 2003 shipbuilding budget is only slightly more than $8 billion.)(33) |
A Trade-Off Between Surface Combatants and Attack Submarines?
In comparison, the surface combatant force is far healthier, at least with respect to past requirements. Based on the force goal of 116 surface combatants--the requirement that the Navy has operated under for the past six years and that is still official--spending for surface combatants between 1990 and 2002 showed a cumulative surplus of $2 billion and about two ships relative to steady-state needs. Based on the greatly expanded force requirements called for in the Navy's 160-ship plan, however, funding and construction over the 1990-2002 period fell short by $19 billion and 15 ships. Other major components of the Navy are being funded at levels closer
to their steady-state requirements. Support ships have actually received
a surplus of funding over the past 13 years and will make only modest demands
on the Navy's budget relative to what they have been getting. Aircraft
carriers and amphibious ships have been underfunded but not dramatically so. Although ballistic missile submarines
experienced a large cumulative shortfall between 1990 and 2002, it reflects
the relatively young age of those subs (13 years, on average) and their
long service life (42 to 44 years). The Navy need not order another ballistic
missile submarine until at least 2020.
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