"Driving
Where the Water Flows" and
Other
Lessons Learned from Our German Allies
by
CPT Louis B. Rago, IIOther Lessons Learned from Our German Allies
A recent CMTC rotation brought U.S. and German Observer/Controllers (O/Cs) together to assist training a Panzer Battalion (PzBtl). The exercise was a professionally rewarding experience. It was an excellent opportunity to exchange ideas, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Although our doctrine, organization and, to a lesser degree, equipment differ, O/Cs made several significant observations which transcend these differences.
Some of the strongest traits that the German units demonstrated align directly with current U.S. doctrine. Unfortunately, these strengths are often overlooked by many USAREUR battalions rotating through the CMTC. The rotation provided the opportunity for a contrasting view of the CMTC norm in both planning and execution. It is important to evaluate some of these TTPs in an effort to revalidate their use by American tank and mechanized infantry units.
The strength of the PzBtl was at the crew level. The German tankers and panzer grenadiers (mechanized infantrymen) demonstrated superior skill in both crew duties and the operation of their combat vehicles.
The two most significant lessons drawn from the Leopard 2 and Marder crews are the value of terrain driving and continuous scanning.
Terrain driving. German soldiers say, "Fahren wie das Wasser fliesst" to guide the training and execution of terrain driving. It means "Drive where the water flows." This descriptive and effective slogan serves as a rule of thumb for drivers and vehicle commanders when deciding routes of travel. A German crew almost always chooses the longer, concealed route over the most direct route. The average U.S. crew tends to use "speed as camouflage" or fails to adjust their position in the formation when the terrain changes. The PzBtl demonstrated throughout the rotation that a skilled driver significantly increases the crew's survivability by concealing them from enemy view and using cover as protection from direct fire.
Scanning. The German crews also increased their survivability through superior scanning and observation techniques. The old adage, "The tank that sees first, fires first and wins," is proven true rotation after rotation at CMTC. Unfortunately, the victor in most engagements during U.S. rotations tends to be the OPFOR. The tankers of the PzBtl use a few techniques that greatly assist them in gaining the advantage over their enemy.
Techniques:
1. Leopard gunners continuously maintain their scan pattern regardless of whether they are stationary or on the move. Effective scanning and maintaining gun tube orientation while on the move is a difficult task that must be vigorously trained. The Germans obviously make an effort to develop this skill. It pays great dividends. U.S. crews that break the "course road mentality" reap the benefit of "seeing first" in most cases.
2. Both the loader and tank commander (TC) actively participate in observation and acquisition of targets.
a. The loader assumes a sector of responsibility and remains up in the hatch until required to arm the gun or load. The TC rarely limits himself to the Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV), a device available on the Leopard 2A5 of the PzBtl . He remains up in the hatch and scans using binoculars. This technique provides the TC a wider view and quicker response while on the attack.
b. Since USAREUR tankers do not yet have the advantage of the CITV, this technique would seem to be the normal procedure for U.S. Tcs. On the contrary, most observations reveal that TCs tie themselves to the Gunner's Primary Sight Extension (GPSE). They rarely, if ever, use their binoculars on the offense. This is unnecessarily redundant. The gunner and TC scan the same sector and significantly decrease the crews' ability to see the enemy first. Improvement in this area increases crew survivability and the overall effectiveness of the platoon.
PLATOON
At the platoon level, the German tankers routinely used effective techniques normally overlooked by the majority of their American counterparts.
Techniques (Offense): Discipline is the watch word. The platoons of the PzBtl are very disciplined in both the use of terrain and appropriate movement techniques. U.S. tank platoons tend to disregard the use of movement techniques based on the terrain and enemy. Many U.S. platoons rarely bound by section when enemy contact is expected, as specified in our current doctrine.
1. German tank platoons specify movement techniques based on terrain and the templated enemy positions.
2. They execute bounding overwatch at the platoon level as a matter of routine.
RESULTS:
1. The disciplined and deliberate movement of platoons within observation of the enemy proved more effective than the traditional M1-series tanker's use of a fast-moving wedge or combat column formation.
2. The built-in security of bounding overwatch allowed the German platoons to move more safely and to transition into the assault with more tanks surviving the approach. More often than not, this is not the case with many USAREUR platoons that often are rendered combat ineffective during their approach march.
Techniques (Defense): Outstanding use of terrain. They rarely occupied the "normal" battle positions used during U.S. rotations. Since the Bundeswehr doesn't have the frequency of rotations to CMTC that U.S. battalions do, the German tankers were not able to rely on "institutional knowledge."
1. This forced the leaders to conduct thorough terrain analysis, and map and ground reconnaissance.
2. The platoon leaders of the PzBtl established engagement areas and hasty battle positions by the numbers.
RESULT: More effective use of terrain and an overall better defense. In this case, a lack of "institutional knowledge" benefited the German platoons since they were forced to execute based on doctrine rather than taking shortcuts based on past experience.
The experience of nearly every unit that has trained at the CMTC in recent months highlights the importance of security. USAREUR battalions fully understand the need to defeat the OPFOR reconnaissance effort so that they are postured for success. In most cases though, the only active measures to counter enemy reconnaissance are taken at the task force level. Normally a company/team augmented with scouts and other combat support assets is given the mission to screen the task force's main defenses. Unfortunately, company/team commanders tend to believe that this relieves them of responsibility for active security and counter-reconnaissance in their own sector.
In contrast, the German companies always took active measures in addition to those of the battalion. The most common technique was to establish a platoon-sized screen 2,000 meters forward of the company battle positions. This, coupled with dismounted patrolling of the flanks and woodlines, proved quite effective. On two of the three defensive missions executed by the PzBtl, no enemy scouts penetrated the battalion sector to the main defensive belt. Since the German battalion tended not to dig fighting positions to the degree found in American units, this technique was more easily executed than would be possible during a U.S. rotation. But that being said, the technique proved effective and should serve as food for thought.
The previously mentioned TTPs are discussed to encourage thought and to help focus the preparation of USAREUR units' training for combat at CMTC or elsewhere. The PzBtl, like its American sister units, demonstrated both strengths and weaknesses from the individual crew to the company level. But, the strengths of this unit and the lessons learned during this recent CMTC rotation are outstanding training points for any warfighting unit without regard to nationality, organization or doctrine.
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