The U.S. Marine Corps And Domestic Peacekeeping

The U

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: THE U.S. MARINE CORPS AND DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING

Author: Major Timothy J. Reeves, USMC

Problem: The President may use Marine forces to quell insurrection and keep the

peace within the borders of the United States and her territories. The U.S. Constitution,

U.S. laws, and Department of Defense guidance limit the Marine Corps' role in providing

a domestic peace keeping capability to quell insurrection and domestic disturbances. This

thesis provides a framework defining the Marine Corps' limited role in domestic peace

keeping, and discusses the inability of the Marine Corps to provide a credible force due to

constitutional limitations and shortfalls in DoD doctrine and Marine Corps' capabilities.

Discussion: Throughout our nations history, the President as the commander and chief has used

the military as a peace keeping force to quell unrest and insurrection within the country's borders.

Although the original Articles of the U.S. Constitution initially excluded the military from this task;

follow-on legislation over the next 200 years defined the legal limitations in which civil authorities

could use the military in a domestic peace keeping role. The thesis examines the constitutionality

of using the Marine Corps in domestic peace keeping missions; and the policies established by the

DoD in order to develop a framework defining the Marine Corps' mission in domestic peace

keeping. The research examines this mission in terms of the Marine Corps' limited ability to

project a credible domestic peace keeping capability by presenting the various levels that unrest

threatens our national interests.

Conclusions: Comparing the tactics Marine forces may legally employ in domestic peace

keeping to the tactics necessary to meet domestic unrest, the research identifies several shortfalls

preventing the Marine Corps from providing a credible domestic peace keeping capability. These

shortfalls are evident in the legal constraints placed on Marines while supporting law enforcement

personnel; command, control, and communication problems inherent to this difficult mission;

proper force selection criteria; and domestic peace keeping training. Until law makers, the DoD,

and the Marine Corps address these shortfalls, it is doubtful that Marine forces will provide an

effective domestic peace keeping force capable of executing this difficult task in the 1990s and

beyond.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

A. BACKGROUND 1

B. METHODOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES 5

C. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 6

D. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 7

E. ORGANIZATIONS OF THESIS 8

II. U.S. LEGISLATION ON DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING 9

A. U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE EARLY YEARS 10

B. POSSE COMITATUS ACT OF 1878 18

C. 1981 MODIFICATION OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT 26

D. SUMMARY 28

III. DEFINING CRITERIA FOR USMC INVOLVEMENT

IN DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING 31

A. THE NATURE OF DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING 31

B. DOD GUIDANCE ON DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING 36

C. USMC FORCE SELECTION CRITERIA 41

D. SUMMARY 43

IV. DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING ISSUES 45

A. DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING CONTINUUM 46

B. LEGAL ISSUES AND FORCE SELECTION REQUIREMENTS 50

C. TRAINING ISSUES 56

D. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS 58

E. SUMMARY 66

V. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR FUTURE STUDY 69

A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 69

B. DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING DILEMMAS 73

C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE STUDY 75

BIBLIOGRAPHY 77

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CINC Commander in Chief

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

DoD Department of Defense

DoJ Department of Justice

DOMS Department of Military Support

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FMFLANT Fleet Marine Force Atlantic

FMFPAC Fleet Marine Force Pacific

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JTF Joint Task Force

JULLS Joint Universal Lessons Learned System

LAPD Los Angeles Police Department

LIC Low Intensity Conflict

MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force

MCPPA Marine Corps Principle Planning Agent

MCRPA Marine Corps Regional Planning Authority

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU/SOC Marine Expeditionary Unit/Special Operations Capable

MOS Military Occupational Specialty

MOUT Military Operations in Urban Terrain

OOTW Operations Other Than War

PME Professional Military Education

ROE Rules Of Engagement

SCRAG Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General

SO/LIC Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict

U.S. United States

USCINCLANT Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command

USCINCPAC Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

USCINCSOC Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command

USCINCTRANS Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command

THE U.S. MARINE CORPS AND DOMESTIC

PEACE KEEPING

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

1. Historical Perspective

Our nation's history thoroughly documents the active involvement of

United States (U.S.) military forces in quelling domestic disturbances. From the years

following the close of the American Revolution to the recent 1992 Los Angeles riots,

various U.S. Presidents have committed federal forces to assist law enforcement in

repressing insurrections and keeping the peace. Evolving legislation starting with the U.S.

Constitution continues to establish a framework for using the U.S. military in domestic

peace keeping missions. Although Congress possesses the right to declare war, the

President, as the Commander in Chief, can direct the military to repress insurrection

as past Presidents have done.1 This thesis provides a framework defining the Marine Corps'

limited role in domestic peace keeping, and discusses the inability of the Marine Corps to

provide a credible force due to constitutional limitations and shortfalls in Department of

Defense (DoD) doctrine and Marine Corps' capabilities.

____________________

1 Dorothy Schaffter and Dorothy M. Mathews, The Powers of the President as

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States (Washington, D. C.: U. S.

Government Printing Office, 1956), 48-49.

The public views using the military in domestic peace keeping missions as

detracting from the their ability to perform as guardian of the nation.2 However, both the rising

potential for civil disobedience within the inner cities and the shrinking budget guarantee the

military's continued active role in domestic peace keeping to bring civil unrest under control. This

rising potential for civil unrest requires that the Marine Corps provide a credible capability to

address domestic disturbances in the future.

2. Rising Potential for Civil Disorder

On 22 October 1993, the Mayor of Washington D.C. requested the mobilization

of National Guard military police units to aid Washington D.C. police in curbing the rising crime

rate.3 Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) statistics showing a tripling of crimes reported

to police between 1966 and 1990 document this rising crime rate. Additionally, the FBI reported a

quadrupling of violent crimes reported to police in the same period.4 Washington D.C. already has

the largest ratio of police to residents of any city in America, and this call for federal assistance

clearly demonstrates the deteriorating conditions in the inner cities. These deteriorating conditions

increase the potential for civil unrest and rioting. Many efforts, including spending on social

programs, prison expansions, mandatory sentencing, and new law enforcement techniques have

not helped in curbing this rising crime rate.5

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2 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait

(Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960), 419-420.

3 B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., "Washington Mayor Seeks Aid of Guard in Combating

Crime," New York Times, 23 October 1993, Sec. Al.

4 Earnest van den Haag, "How to Cut Crime," National Review, 30 May 1994, 30,

5 Ted Gest, et al, "Violence in America," U.S. News and World Report, 17 January

1994,24.

Studies have shown that the race riots of the 1960s achieved goals by focusing

attention on the rioters' causes. During the 1967 summer riots in Detroit, Michigan rioters

brought national attention to the impoverished conditions of the inner cities, which was one of

their objectives. The 1967 riots also demonstrated that civil unrest was instrumental in gaining

much needed federal funding which attempted to reduce the root causes of violence caused by

this poverty.6 These facts show that civil disturbances will continue in the inner cities, since

rioters believe their destructive action will achieve national attention and hopefully, their goals.

In addition to rising crime in the inner cities, recent articles explain that this

country is in the midst of a cultural war. Presently, segments of the U.S. population harboring

radical opinions on abortion, homosexuality, race relations, and other emotional issues are calling

for "militant action" against people intolerant to their opinions.7 Evidence of past cultural wars

suggest that they normally precede violence and civil disobedience.8 Based on rising cultural

conflicts, civil unrest is likely to continue throughout all segments of American society where

emotional issues exist. As a result, civil authorities will require force to keep the peace.

The summer riots of 1967 brought into question the ability of law enforcement and

the National Guard in combination to adequately control civil unrest. The police and National

Guard were unable to restore order in a number of cities including

______________________

6 Irwin Isenberg, The City in Crisis (New York, NY: H.W. Wilson Company,

1968),17.

7 Joe Loconte, "The Battle to Define America Turns Violent," Christianity Today,

25 October 1993, 75-76.

8 James D. Hunter, "Before the Shooting War Begins," Columbia Journalism

Review 32 (July/August 1993): 30.

Detroit, Newark, and Watts, until U.S. military forces were introduced.9 More recently in May

1992, the President sent an additional 4,000 active duty U.S. Marines and Army personnel into

Los Angeles to deal with the worst peace time riots in U.S. history. This occurred because law

enforcement personnel and National Guard troops were unable to restore order.10 The rapid

escalation of violence characterized by civil unrest will in most cases require the use of military

forces to aid police in restoring order.

Additionally, the festering crime and violence in the inner city has increased in

part due to the reduction of the federal budget in social service areas, and this has created an

environment conducive to civil unrest. The large scale criminal activity conducted by gangs,

including illegal drug activity, is causing a proliferation of sophisticated weapons, and making the

nature of civil disturbances more violent and volatile. These factors will in turn increase the

likelihood of using military force in future domestic peace keeping missions.

3. Federal Budget Reduction Efforts

With domestic spending cuts at hand, the public will clamor to expand the role of

the DoD into the domestic peace keeping realm. This will occur because the military is well

equipped for the mission, and corresponding cuts in the DoD budget will make domestic peace

keeping a means to justify a large defense budget to the public.11 The U.S. military possesses

equipment, and a large manpower pool easily accessible for domestic peace keeping missions.

Communications equipment, armored personnel

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9 Isenberg, 17.

10 Amos A. Jordon, William J. Taylor, and Lawrence J Korb, America National

Security Policy and Process (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press Ltd., 1993), 56.

11 Jordon, 174.

carriers, and weapons readily transported to potential unrest areas are a tremendous capability

available to civil authorities.12 Additionally, the training military forces receive in Operations

Other Than War (OOTW) in executing global peace keeping missions is portable to a domestic

setting.

From a city budget perspective, cities cannot afford an on-call manpower pool to

quell civil unrest. Police need manpower to make arrests and still maintain police lines, to close in

on troubled areas and quickly control unrest. Cases where police surrounded riot areas to let

unrest "burn-out" on its own accord resulted in additional destruction of property and suffering to

innocent victims caught in the area.13 The military represents a large manpower source which

could easily perform the domestic peace keeping mission in consonance with law enforcement. In

this regard, the past use of military forces by civil authorities to quell insurrection and rebellion, the

rising potential for civil disorder due to rising crime and cultural differences, and a shrinking

federal budget, all suggest the employment of U.S. Marine Corps forces in a domestic peace

keeping role in the 1990s and beyond, Consequently, these factors provide the impetus for the

research presented in this thesis.

B. METHODOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES

1. Purpose of Research

A number of questions arise pertaining to the constitutionality of the use of

Marine forces performing domestic peace keeping missions. This thesis will explore the

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12 Jordon, 175-176.

13 Isenberg, 74.

issue by first developing a constitutional framework which defines the domestic peace keeping

mission the military can legally perform. Once the framework is developed, the thesis will next

analyze the defining criteria for U.S. Marine Corps involvement in this mission, and discuss

pertinent problem areas arising from executing this mission.

2. Research Questions

In exploring domestic peace keeping, the research formulated the following

questions in fulfilling the goal of this thesis;

. Historically, how has the President used the military during periods of civil unrest and

domestic disturbance?

. What mission can the military perform in domestic peace keeping as defined

constitutionally?

. Is the law limiting the involvement of the military still compatible with the nature of civil

unrest?

. What is the DoD guidance on domestic peace keeping?

. What issues or dilemmas should the Marine Corps thoroughly examine prior to the

commitment of forces in fulfilling domestic peace keeping missions?

By thoroughly researching these questions and presenting the answers in a concise form, the

goals of this thesis will be satisfied and a usable product will be the end result.

3. Research Methodology

Initially, this thesis provides a historical overview of past domestic peace keeping

issues and the legislation defining the framework of this issue. Once defined, the thesis next

applies this legal perspective and examines the DoD guidance limiting the use of military forces

in domestic peace keeping missions. Identifying the military's overall mission is crucial in

understanding how the U.S. Marine Corps will execute these missions. This thesis will then draw

from the constitutional and DoD research in order to identify and discuss areas of

hindering the U.S. Marine Corps from successfully executing domestic peace keeping missions.

C. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH

The information presented will provide an understanding of the difficulties

involved in preparing and training for this mission as well as identifying dilemmas

involving the deployment of forces for domestic peace keeping. The research will also

discuss issues which should be resolved to aid the U.S. Marine Corps in effectively

executing domestic peace keeping missions.

D. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH

Although the military's use in domestic peace keeping missions is voluminous and

well documented, the research will focus on the milestone events in history shaping

legislation and clarifying the use of federal forces in a domestic peace keeping role. The

section of the thesis addressing this topic frames the constitutionality of this issue, and

does not provide a complete historic overview, as this effort would detract from the

overall goal of the research.

The research focuses on using the military in a peace keeping role to restore order

during periods of civil unrest and disobedience. The research does not address the issue of

using military personnel in an active law enforcement role as this subject could be treated

as a completely separate issue. However, where appropriate, the research will present

issues and legislation that involve the military indirectly aiding law enforcement. This is

done to clarify and properly frame the domestic peace keeping mission. Consequently, the

scope limits the thesis to addressing the use of the military in domestic peace keeping to

provide a useful product.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

This chapter presented a brief introduction to the thesis background, methodology, and

research objectives. The chapter briefly introduced the historic use of the military in quelling civil

unrest, and their inevitable use in the future due to the rising potential for civil disorder. The

factors discussed earlier in this chapter indicate that federal military forces will assist law

enforcement and National Guard forces in keeping the peace.

Chapter II establishes a constitutional framework by reviewing the legislation initiated by

the articles of the U.S. Constitution, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, and the modification of the

Posse Comitatus Act in 1981. This chapter will familiarize the reader with significant historical

events which formed the basis for using the military in a domestic peace keeping role.

Chapters III and IV will address the defining criteria describing the mechanics of

employing U.S. Marines in areas of civil unrest. Chapter III will discuss the pertinent DoD

directives and orders, and the nature of civil unrest, which defines how the Marine Corps will

employ forces to conduct this mission. Chapter IV will explore the issues of using Marine forces

in domestic peace keeping in terms of force selection criteria; constitutional and training issues;

command, control, and communications problem; and other significant issues which have an

impact on Marine forces performing domestic peace keeping missions. Finally, Chapter V will

summarize the research, and provide suggestions for future research on the topic of U.S. Marine

forces in a domestic peace keeping role.

II. U.S. LEGISLATION ON DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING

In this chapter, the thesis presents a legislative overview pertaining to using federal

military forces in domestic peace keeping. The research discusses the American Revolution

experience and its impact on the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, the Posse Comitatus Act of

1878, and its amendment of 1981. Where appropriate, this chapter discusses specific

incidents directly affecting legislation of the Constitution and U.S. Law. The summary of this

chapter provides a definition of the legal use of military forces in domestic peace keeping.

A. U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE EARLY YEARS

Since the end of the American Revolution, the founding fathers began drafting the U. S.

Constitution to provide a legal framework for governing the newly formed country. The

experience gained from the American Revolution, specifically the first hand effects of an

oppressive standing army, gave the framers of the Constitution incentive to limit the use of the

federal military in domestic situations.14 With the American Revolutionary War experience and

Shays' Rebellion of 1786, Articles I and IV of the U.S. Constitution set the framework for

exempting the use of regular forces to quell civil disturbances. The U.S. Constitution excluded

federal military forces from domestic peace keeping missions until President Jefferson introduced

the 1807 Act in response to the threat that The Buff Conspiracy posed to the nation. As a

result of the large scale insurrectionist threat that

________________________

14 Ernest van den Haag, Political Violence and Civil Disobedience (New York, NY:

Harper and Row, 1972), 91.

the Burr Conspiracy posed to the nation, the 1807 Act allowed the President to use

federal military forces in domestic peace keeping.

1. Revolutionary Experience and the Shays' Rebellion

Shays' Rebellion of 1786 had a significant impact on the development of

constitutional authority preventing federal forces from intervening in domestic disturbances. Due

to an economic depression and currency shortage in Massachusetts, the court system forced

citizens to forfeit land for failing to pay taxes. As a result, Daniel Shays' organized New England

farmers revolted against the Massachusetts court system to prevent the issuing of arrest warrants

and forfeiture of properties. On several occasions, rebellion followers assembled under arms to

keep the Massachusetts court system from meeting, in order to frustrate these unfair tax practices

and property seizures.15

President Washington and Congressional leaders became concerned with the

danger this growing anarchy posed to the newly formed organization of states. As a result of this

movement's growing momentum, Congress voted to raise a militia of 2,000 men from the New

England states to add to the 5,000 man militia already raised in Massachusetts.16 With this force,

the federal government effectively quelled a rebellion of several thousand men under arms. This

action had a profound effect on how the founding fathers envisioned using the militia, and not the

military to keep the peace.

The President and Congress used federalized militia because the individual

states could not always quell rebellions, or protect themselves from insurrection.17 Even

____________________

15 Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders

1789-1878 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 5-7.

16 Coakley, 5.

17 Coakley, 20.

with the experience of requiring a federalized militia to quell this rebellion, the framers of the

U.S. Constitution tasked the militia rather than the federal army to deal with domestic disorder, Law

makers made this stipulation because to use federal military forces in domestic disturbances

would require a large standing army. Law makers felt that the President and Congress might

indiscriminately use a standing army to oppress the states in the same manner the King of

England did with the Colonies. The successful use of New Englanders to deal with New

Englanders during the Shays' Rebellion reinforced the concept that the militias could adequately

deal with domestic disturbances. As a Result, the founding fathers drafted Articles I and IV of

the U.S. Constitution to authorize using state militias and prohibit using the federal military in

domestic disturbances, thereby avoiding the necessity of a large standing army.

a. Article I, Section 8, U.S. Constitution

During the drafting of the Constitution, the authors carefully worded the

articles dealing with the power granted to Congress in using military force in a domestic setting.

Although they recognized the need for military force to suppress rebellion and insurrection, early

law makers did not wish to grant authority to Congress to indiscriminately create and use a large

standing army.18 Rather, they drafted laws to interpose in domestic disturbances by using state

militias and thereby reduce the requirement for a large standing army. Therefore, the drafters of

the U.S. Constitution prevented Congress from using the federal army by writing: "The Congress

shall have the power ... to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,

suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions."19 This article of the Constitution is written to

__________________

18 Coakley, 14.

specifically prevent Congress from using regular military forces in a domestic setting. Article I

limited Congress' power to calling upon a state's militia under three conditions: to execute the laws

of the union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasions.20 Regular forces were not considered for

domestic peace keeping by the framers of the U. S. Constitution because this mission would

require a large standing army, which they felt would threaten the security of the nation.21

Therefore, Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution implies that it is illegal to use the regular or

standing army in domestic peace keeping missions. Similarly, the framers of the U.S. Constitution

were consistent in defining the President's power in dealing with domestic disorder as written in

Article IV of the U.S. Constitution.

b. Article IV, Section 4, U.S. Constitution

This article gives the President power to call a state or many states'

militias into federal service to protect the individual states against domestic violence and civil

unrest. The framers of the Constitution gave the President these powers by drafting

into law that:

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of

Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the

Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against

domestic Violence.22

This section of law guaranteed that the federal government could intervene to quell domestic

disturbances at the request of a states governing body. As to how the President and Congress

could intervene with force was subject to a great deal of debate. Coakley

_____________________

19 U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 8.

20 Allen R. Millett, The Constitution and the Citizen-Soldier, Chapter 5 of Papers on

the Constitution (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 100.

21 Millett 95.

22 U.S. Constitution, art. IV, sec. 4.

discusses this debate between the "Federalists" who favored intervention with regular forces, and

the "Anti-Federalists" that envisioned the President intervening by using the militia of the

requesting state and surrounding states' militias. Alexander Hamilton, one of the most vociferous

"Federalists," felt that to prevent the "violent destruction of life and property incident to war"

which insurrection causes, a nation will have to resort to the security a standing army affords

even if the presence of a standing army risks reducing their freedom and liberty.23 The "Anti-

Federalists" did not share this same view and the result of the debate made it clear that regular

forces were exempted from use, and the President and Congress could only intervene with

federalized state militias.24

As in Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, this article contends that the

executive branch is prohibited from using regular military forces to protect against domestic

violence. These articles fulfilled the intent of the drafters of the Constitution to avoid the necessity

of a large standing army by empowering the President and Congress to task the state militias to

keep the peace. Shortly after the adoption of the U. S. Constitution, President Washington and the

Congress found it necessary to use the militia as outlined in these articles of the Constitution to

deal with the Whiskey Rebellion in the state of Pennsylvania.

2. The Whiskey Rebellion

In 1791, a growing dissatisfaction to the taxation system in Pennsylvania tested

the constitutional right of the federal government to intervene, at the request of a state, to put

down insurrection. Earlier in the year, the federal government had leveled a

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23 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, (New

York, NY: Viking Penguin Inc., 1987), 114-115.

24 Coakley, 13-15.

heavy excise tax on distilled spirits. Pennsylvania residents opposed this tax because distilling

spirits was considered the livelihood of the population and a major source of income.25 Within a

year, growing opposition to this tax escalated from tarring and feathering tax collectors to open

defiance of this new federal law. The high tide of the rebellion occurred when 7,000-15,000 men

supporting the now open rebellion gathered at Pittsburgh, and threatened to riot and destroy the

city if demands were not met.26 The federal government's growing concern for this situation

forced President Washington and Congress to call upon Articles I and IV of the U.S. Constitution,

which gave them power to intervene at the request of a state's government to quell insurrection

and enforce federal laws. As a result, Washington federalized the state militias of Pennsylvania,

New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, and personally took command of a total force of 15,000

men.27 This body of federalized militia marched on Pittsburgh into the rebellion stronghold,

essentially ending the civil disturbance without bloodshed.

The actions of the federal government during the 1791 Whiskey Rebellion

upheld the federal government's power to use military force to execute domestic peace keeping

missions; although these peace keeping missions were accomplished without regular military

forces. The first use of federal land and naval forces in domestic peace keeping did not occur

until fifteen years later, during the Burr Conspiracy. This incident gave rise to the

realization that the state militias were not capable of addressing wide

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25 John A. Carrol and Mary W. Ashworth, First in Peace, Vol. 7 of George

Washington (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), 183.

26 Coakley, 35.

27 Schaffter, 2.

spread insurrection, and that the President needed federal military assistance in addition to the

state militias.

3. 1807 modifying Act to the U.S. Constitution

Prior to 1807, it was illegal for the federal government to employ regular forces

in domestic peace keeping. In this year, President Jefferson and Congress signed into law the

1807 Act giving the federal government explicit power to use federal army and naval forces in

domestic cases involving insurrection and obstruction to federal law.

The foundation for the 1807 Act came as a result of Jefferson's inability to

effectively use state militias to deal with the Burr Conspiracy. In 1806, Aaron Buff was

attempting to raise a military force predominantly in the West and in some Eastern states in order

to gain power. His plan called for the overthrow of the existing government in Washington, D.C.,

seizure of the federal arsenal, and the seizure of the country's monetary funds. If this did not

succeed, Buff's plan was to travel by ship to New Orleans and proclaim Louisiana and the

Western states free from the Union.28 Because of the magnitude of the situation and that Buffs

followers were geographically dispersed, Jefferson found it difficult to call on any particular

state or states' militias to effectively deal with the insurrection. He therefore proposed to Congress the 1807 Act which stated,

That in all cases of insurrection or obstruction to the laws, either of the United

States or of any individual State or Territory, where it is lawful for the President of

the United States to call forth the militia for the purpose of suppressing such

insurrection or of causing the laws to be duly executed, it shall be lawful for him to

employ, for the same purposes, such part of the land and naval force of the United

States as shall be judged necessary, having first observed all the prerequisites of

the law in that respect.29

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28 Thomas P. Abernethy, The Burr Conspiracy (New York, NY: Oxford University

Press, 1954), 40.

29 Coakley, 80-83.

Congress signed the 1807 Act into law and legalized the use of federal military forces to deal

with domestic disorder. Regular land and naval forces could now be used as long as the basic

tenants of the Constitution contained in Articles I and IV were adhered to as pertaining to the

powers of the President and Congress to prevent rebellion, insurrection, and enforce federal

laws.

The years following the Buff Conspiracy and the 1807 Act provided few

occurrences for the use of regular forces in domestic peace keeping.30 The 1842 Doff Rebellion

served as the first major challenge to the 1807 Act. The Dorr Rebellion required the ruling of

the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the federal government to use federal military

forces in domestic peace keeping.

4. Legislation Tested and Upheld in the 1842 Dorr Rebellion

In Rhode Island, an organization rivaling the existing state government claimed

legitimacy by holding elections, and electing their representatives as Rhode Island's new

governing body. This "legislative body" under Thomas Wilson Dorr, placed Rhode Island in the

odd position of having two state governing bodies.31 In order to quell the growing support Doff

received, Samuel King the legal governor, called out the state militia and passed the Algerian Act.

This act made it punishable by fine and imprisonment to participate with Dorr in his governing

body.32 During Governor King's attempt to quell the insurrection, military forces under L.M.

Borden broke into, and substantially damaged the home of Martin Luther, an ardent Dorr

partisan. In 1849 in a trespassing suit (Luther

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30 Coakley, 91.

31 Robert J. Morgan, A Whig Embattled: The Presidency Under John Tyler

(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1954), 97-98.

32 Coakley, 121.

v. Borden), the Supreme Court ruled that the President of the United States, under the U.S.

Constitution and the 1807 Act, had power to aid individual states by using state militias and federal

forces to preserve the peace.33 In the case of Luther v. Borden, the highest court upheld the rights

of the federal government as articulated by the Constitution and the 1807 Act to use federal

military forces in domestic peace keeping. During the Civil War Reconstruction, the country again

witnessed the authority of the federal government to intervene with federal forces to keep the

peace.

B. POSSE COMITATUS ACT OF 1878

An historical review of the events between the Dorr rebellion and the Posse Comitatus

Act of 1878 show a number of examples where civil authorities used regular military forces

without the express permission of the federal government. Earlier, the use of the Navy, Army,

and even U.S. Marines in domestic peace keeping, began shortly after the drafting of the

Constitution when federal marshals were given power to call the military to service as a posse

comitatus. Federal marshals could call as a member of a posse, any "able bodied" man to enforce

federal law. This included members of the state militia and federal troops within their jurisdiction.

When called, members of the posse would act under orders from the federal marshal, and not the

federal government. Later, the military's service during the Reconstruction period, and during the

Labor Strikes of 1877, gave way to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. This act redefined how

federal military forces could be used by civil authorities in keeping the peace or enforcing federal

law.

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33 Schaffter, 3.

1. Posse Comitatus and the Fugitive Slave Law

As early as 1850, federal marshals began to call upon the militia, regular army,

and Marine forces as part of a posse comitatus to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law. This law

made it possible for southern slave owners to have runaway slaves returned by federal

marshals.34 In the Northern states, because of strong abolitionist feelings, federal marshals found

it necessary to call out a posse to aid in enforcing the Fugitive Slave Law. Marshals soon began

to call upon regular forces with greater frequency, because they were well suited to enforce the

Fugitive Slave Law. The Burn's Incident of 1854 aptly illustrates the use of the militia and the

regular military as a posse by federal marshals.

Burns, a runaway slave from Virginia, had stowed away on a ship and sailed to

Boston, Massachusetts. His owner located him in Boston, and by invoking the Fugitive Slave

Law, requested his return to Virginia by federal marshals. Due to bitter opposition to slavery in

Massachusetts, federal marshals were compelled to organize a posse comitatus to keep the peace

while complying with the Fugitive Slave Law. As a result, marshals raised a posse consisting of

1,000 militia, and 180 Marines and soldiers to prevent abolitionists from freeing Burns.35

The Burns incident heightened a growing concern in Congress on the use of

federal military forces as a posse. At the request of the Senate, the U.S. Attorney General

reviewed U.S. law, and defined when federal marshals could use regular forces as

a posse comitatus. U.S. Attorney General Caleb Cushing issued this opinion:

A Marshal of the United States, when opposed in the execution of his duty, by

unlawful combinations, has authority, to summon the entire able bodied force of

his precinct, as a posse comitatus. The authority comprehends, not only

_________________

34 Coakley, 129.

35 Coakley, 135-137.

bystanders and other citizens generally, but any and all organized armed forces,

whether militia of the state, or officers, soldiers, sailors, and Marines of the United

States.36

This precedent set by the U.S. Attorney General initiated the convenient and often indiscriminate

use of military forces by federal marshals and state governing authorities. President Pierce

reiterated in 1856 that U.S. Attorney General Cushing's posse comitatus doctrine did not apply

"where state, and not federal law was involved." He also made it clear that the use of federal

military forces by state authorities must meet the criteria previously set forth by the Constitution

and the 1807 Act.37 Even with this understanding, state authorities used federal military forces

when they could not impel the President to commit federal forces under the articles of the U.S.

Constitution or the 1807 Act. This circumvention of the U.S. Constitution and the 1807 Act

created a dilemma for law makers which became apparent during the Reconstruction period and

the Labor Strikes of 1877.

2. Use of the Regular Military as a Posse Comitatus

The period of time between the 1866 Reconstruction and the violent Labor

Strikes of 1877, required the government to constantly use federal military forces to keep the

peace. During this period, the country experienced violent, widespread civil unrest never

witnessed before in our nations history and represents an escalation in the use of military force to

quell domestic unrest. The Reconstruction period required the federal military to act in place of

civil authorities until proper state governments could be established, and the 1877 labor strikes

required the military to keep the peace during

________________________

36 C.C. Andrews, ed., Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States

(Washington, D.C.: Robert Farnham, 1856), 272-274.

37 Coakley, 137.

violent labor disputes. The military's involvement in the 1877 labor strikes finally forced law

makers to draft legislation removing the authority local officials possessed over the military

provided by the posse comitatus doctrine.

a. Civil War Reconstruction

After the Civil War, the federal government divided the Southern states

into military districts to maintain order until residents elected new state governments. This

difficult transition period between military and civil rule required the direct involvement of

military forces because of violent unrest.38 Opposing political sentiments and racial strife caused

this civil unrest. Riots in many of the major cities occurred when political groups attempted to

disrupt the newly elected state governments with armed force. The resulting riots often spread

to surrounding rural areas as it did in Mobile, Alabama in 1869.

Two days after the Alabama state election, newly elected Republicans

held a meeting to adopt a state constitution. The meeting was forcefully interrupted by an armed

group from the opposing political party, and a riot lasting the night ensued until federal troops

intervened.39 This pattern of unrest repeated itself in almost every major city in the South during the

Reconstruction period, taxing the ability of federal forces to keep the peace.

The clashes between blacks and whites, and the violent opposition

between struggling political parties required the rapid intervention of federal forces. Often,

military commanders used their own judgment in determining under what

________________________

38 U. S. Congress, Senate, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances 1787-1903, 67th

Cong., 2d sess., 1922, Committee Print, 90-91.

39 U. S. Congress, Senate, Federal A id in Domestic Disturbances 1787-1903, 109.

circumstances and intensity to intervene. During this time, military commanders in the field often

acted without guidance from the federal government as the chain of command from the President

to federal military forces was not always clear.40 In certain instances, civilians sued individual

soldiers and the federal government because of their peace keeping actions.41 The Reconstruction

period initiated the concern of the federal government to more closely define who possessed the

authority to control military forces during domestic peace keeping missions. It was not until the

Labor Strikes of 1877, when the wholesale use of the federal military under the auspices of the

posse comitatus doctrine motivated the government to finally initiate legislation.

b. Labor Strikes of 1877

The Labor Strikes of 1877 resulted in the drafting of the Posse

Comitatus Act of 1878, eliminating the authority the posse comitatus doctrine held over military

forces. In Martinsburg, West Virginia in 1877, railroad firemen and brakemen commenced a

strike in protest of a ten percent wage reduction. The strike quickly spread along the Baltimore

and Ohio railroad network and shut down the major railroad hubs in six states.42 Railroad traffic

essentially halted east of the Mississippi. The response by state authorities to prevent further

damage to the railroad lines and hubs caused considerable domestic unrest.43 Riots occurred in

Baltimore and Pittsburgh when the governors called out the local militia to quell disturbances.

The state militia of Pennsylvania fired on an angry crowd in response to stone throwing. The

mob in turn

_________________________

40 Coakely, 344.

41 Jerry M. Cooper, The Army and Civil Disorders (Westport, CT: Greenwood

Press, 1980), 84.

42 U.S. Congress, Senate, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances 1787-1903, 162.

43 Cooper, 5.

caused eight to ten million dollars in damages to the railroad hub.44 The spreading unrest in six

states forced the President to commit one half of the U. S. Army to restore order.

Many of the requests for federal assistance came as result of the posse

comitatus doctrine and not in the manner that the drafters of the U.S. Constitution had envisioned.

In an attempt to quell unrest, federal marshals called in regular forces stationed within their

jurisdiction as a posse to enforce the law until the governor could properly request federal troops

from the President.45 The overall command and control of these forces became confused due to

the difference in command structure for a force called as a posse comitatus, or a force called by

the President as outlined by the U.S. Constitution.46 The Labor Strikes of 1877 served as the final

catalyst for federal legislation to eliminate the authority of anyone other than the President and

Congress to use federal forces in domestic peace keeping.

3. Posse Comitatus Act of 1878

The President and Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 to restore

the "old rules" which limited the circumstances for using federal forces in domestic peace

keeping. This legislation clarified the chain of command, forcing military commanders to exercise

discretion by waiting for orders from Washington, D.C. prior to committing forces.47 The posse

comitatus legislation did not limit the existing powers of the President or Congress. Their powers

to use federal forces in domestic peace keeping remained the same under the Constitution and the

1807 Act. The posse comitatus

__________________

44 U.S. Congress, Senate, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances 1787-1903, 167.

45 Bennett M. Rich, The Presidents and Civil Disorder (Menasha, WE George

Banta Publishing Company, 1941), 77.

46 Rich, 84.

47 Coakley, 341.

legislation forbid state governing bodies from using federal forces in dealing with domestic issues

without the express order of the President .48 The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878

stated that:

From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the

Army of the United States as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of

executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such

employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of

Congress.49

With the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, use of federal military

forces by civil authorities outside of the Constitution and the 1807 Act became illegal.

This legislation returned the use of federal forces to the President and Congress

exclusively, and eliminated the rights of federal marshals to use the military as a posse.

The Presidents in the years following the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (1879-1941)

found it necessary to continue employing regular military forces within the structure of the

Constitution and the 1807 Act to prevent rebellion and insurrection. Most civil disturbances

revolved around labor disputes in various industrial sectors. In most of these labor disputes,

violence invariably erupted between workers and corporation management, resulting in the

deployment of federal troops to keep the peace. This period is full of examples of federal troops

successfully restoring order, such as the Telluride and Goldfield Colorado mining strikes; the steel

strike at Gary, Indiana; the West Virginia coal field strikes; and the 1941 North American

Aviation strike. The unrest which resulted from these strikes was brought under control by federal

troops requested by the state governor in accordance with the U.S. Constitution and the 1807 Act.

_______________

48 Cooper, 83.

49 Coakley, 342.

The federal military continued to establish restrictions and regulations governing

the local commander's employment of units in domestic peace keeping, as called for by the Posse

Comitatus Act. In 1894, some officers were ignorant of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, and this

situation required General John M. Schofield to educate his officers through telegrams and Army

regulations. In so doing, General Schofield ensured that federal forces employed as a domestic

peace keeping force acted under the direction of the President, and not local officials.50

The use of regular forces during this period was not without instances of

unlawful actions by the military. In Idaho's Coeur d'Alene mining region in 1899, federal troops

inadvertently sided with mine owners and unfairly treated striking miners. They conducted illegal

search and seizures, unlawfully arrested and imprisoned strikers, and established and

administered a prison camp.51 However, this incident was the exception rather than the rule that

typified the use of federal troops in domestic peace keeping from 1879 to 1941.

The domestic peace keeping policy established by the Constitution, the 1807

Act, and the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, remained relatively unchanged from World War II

to present. Even during the tumultuous rioting in the 1960s and 1970s, state civil authorities

required the intervention of federal forces to restore order. When governors could not restore

order in their states using the National Guard and law

____________________

50 Cooper, 104-105.

51 In this particular instance, military forces were seen as an instrument of the state

officials and mine owners. Actions by the military forces unknowingly perpetuated the

situation and did not accomplish the peace keeping mission. An investigation after these

incidents reiterated that the military's responsibility was merely to restore and maintain

order to allow civil officials to make arrests and to enforce the law. For information see

Cooper, 190.

enforcement personnel, the President would authorize the deployment of federal troops which

were able to restore law and order in riot areas.52 Additional changes in the use of federal

military forces aiding law enforcement personnel did not occur until early 198 1, with the

passage of a modification to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.

C. 1981 MODIFICATION OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT

The discussion of the 1981 Amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 is germane

because it provides further legal definitions of how U.S. military personnel and equipment may be

used in the law enforcement arena. This discussion is helpful because it provides the foundation of

the DoD's current domestic peace keeping policy described in chapter III.

1. Purpose of the Legislation

The sharp increase in illegal drug use in the 1960s and 1970s became a growing

concern in this country. With the overwhelming task of combating illegal drug use, the federal

government searched for methods to curtail drug distribution and smuggling. The amendment to

the Posse Comitatus Act clarified the cooperation between the military and law enforcement

agencies.53 This modification defines the use of military personnel and equipment in a law

enforcement role and discusses how the military may legally proceed while working with law

enforcement.

____________________

52 The military provided a very credible force due to fire discipline and combat

experience that many of the units received during recent tours in Viet Nam. For more

insight on this discussion, see Isenberg, 72.

53 Paul Jackson Rice, "New Laws and Insights Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act,

unpublished research paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1983), 2.

2. Act of 1981

The Amendment of 1981 to the Posse Comitatus Act states that the military

can provide equipment and facilities only in situations where military personnel are not used in an

active law enforcement role. Further, the military may provide training and expert military advisors

to law enforcement personnel, but military personnel cannot be placed in charge of any law

enforcement operation.54 It is clear that this modifying amendment reinforces the indirect role of

the federal military in supporting law enforcement personnel while performing domestic peace

keeping missions. Military personnel have no authority to arrest, or conduct search and seizure of

property while in the execution of domestic peace keeping operations. The military's role in a

domestic peace keeping mission is relegated to one of support. The military cannot perform police

or judicial functions unless martial law is declared.55 Their mission is to overcome organized

resistance to the enforcement of laws by aiding federal authorities and local law enforcement

personnel. The military may provide assistance while law enforcement personnel make arrests,

but the military cannot make arrests.56 The relegation of the U.S. Marine Corps to a support role

was articulated by the Director of the FBI in a recent lecture. Director Freeh stated that in

domestic peace keeping missions, the military would be used strictly to support law enforcement,

and would not have the powers of arrest, or conduct search and seizure.57 The 1981

Amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878

_____________________

54 Rice, 3-5.

55 Schaffter, 140.

56 Coakley, 348.

57 Director Freeh's comments were made during the Erskine Lecture Series,

sponsored by the Marine Corps University on 16 November, 1994. Director Freews

comment was in response to a question regarding how the FBI perceived the use of

military forces in aiding law enforcement during periods of civil unrest.

is important, because it establishes a limitation on the powers the military possesses when called

to duty as a domestic peace keeping force,

D. SUMMARY

In the years following the American Revolution, the founding fathers debated the role of

military force in enforcing federal law and keeping the peace. Early domestic disturbances such

as the Shays' Rebellion, resulted in the drafting of Articles I and IV of the U.S. Constitution

discussed in this chapter. These civil disturbances impressed upon the drafters of the Constitution

that a military force would be necessary to quell civil unrest and to keep the peace. The

Constitution stipulated that state militias were the only military forces that could be used in

domestic peace keeping missions. The adverse experience with the occupying British Army

during Colonial America provided this impetus.

It was not until 1807, during the Burr Conspiracy, that President Jefferson suggested

using federal troops in addition to state militias during domestic peace keeping. The use of federal

forces came as a direct result of the wide spread threat of insurrection that former Vice

President Burr posed to the country. During the Burr Conspiracy, state militias were unable to

cope with the domestic threat of this rebellion. As a result, the 1807 Act made it lawful for the

President to use any necessary land or naval forces to suppress insurrection and to keep the

peace within the country's boundaries. The ease at which Congress and the President passed this

law clearly demonstrates that the military's role in domestic peace keeping can easily expand to

extreme threats to our domestic security in the future.

The 1807 Act was not the first use of federal forces in domestic peace keeping. The

posse comitatus doctrine made it possible for federal marshals to call troops individually or as a

unit to serve as a posse to enforce federal law. Marshals routinely used the military as a posse to

enforce the Fugitive Slave Law prior to the Civil War. Unfortunately, this made it convenient for

civil authorities to call into service any federal military troops located in their jurisdiction without

the prior advice or consent of the President. This dilemma prompted the passing of the Posse

Comitatus Act of 1878 which made it illegal to use federal military forces as a posse comitatus

except under the provisions already authorized by the U.S. Constitution and the 1807 Act. Finally,

the 1981 Amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act clarified the military's limited role in supporting

law enforcement. These limitations will be discussed further in the following chapters showing

the impact on the military's ability to effectively meet the challenging demands of domestic peace

keeping.

This chapter showed that the President can use any and all federal military forces in

domestic peace keeping missions to enforce federal laws, quell insurrection, and keep the peace,

Under the auspices of the U.S. Constitution, the 1807 Act, and the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878,

the President retains command of these forces during their use. These laws formalize the chain of

command from the local military commander to the President functioning as the Commander in

Chief Chapter I discussed the inevitable use of Marine forces in executing domestic peace

keeping missions for a variety of reasons. This chapter provided the constitutional framework

which authorizes the President and Congress to commit U.S. Marines in a domestic peace

keeping environment under the U.S. Constitution and subsequent legislation. This is

important because in the past, the President used the regular military to keep the

peace in many violent unrests, even during the Reconstruction Period and 1877 Labor

Riots where there was no peace to keep. This historic use of the military as a

domestic peace keeping force, is an indicator that the U.S. Marine Corps will

be called upon to react to violent domestic disturbances in the 1990s and beyond. This historic

precedent should also serve as an impetus to prepare, train, and equip for this mission to ensure

success against the threat of widespread domestic disturbance. Next, chapter III will discuss the

limitations placed on the Marine Corps as they prepare and execute this difficult peace time

mission.

III. DEFINING CRITERIA FOR USMC INVOLVEMENT

IN DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING

With the mission constitutionally defined, it is logical to next address the defining and

limiting criteria articulated by the DoD and the U.S. Marine Corps. Chapter III presents the

peculiar nature of domestic peace keeping which must be taken into account while preparing for

this difficult mission. The research next examines the DoD position in pertinent DoD documents

and directives, and finally this chapter provides a perspective on the U.S. Marine Corps' selection

of forces in executing this mission. The purpose of Chapter III is to analyze the methods used by

the DoD and U.S. Marine Corps to provide a domestic peace keeping capability as

constitutionally defined in Chapter II. This chapter lays the foundation in order to identify and

discuss significant issues the U.S. Marine Corps must resolve to provide a domestic peace

keeping capability.

A. THE NATURE OF DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING

Domestic peace keeping is arguably one of the most difficult peace time missions the

military performs. The difficulties arise from the requirements that must be met prior to deploying

military forces. Not only must military units prepare for this mission because of the characteristics

of domestic peace keeping, but training must be compatible with law enforcement methods.

Formal relations between the military and civilian authorities must also be established prior to civil

unrest incidents.

1. Mission Characteristics

Civilian authorities must realize that when a certain threshold of violence is

reached, the military should be called upon to aid in restoring order.58 This suggests that the military

will rapidly deploy to civil disturbance areas with little warning, and little understanding of the

mission and overall situation. Before a governor's request for help, the level of violence achieved

by the riot will be substantial, because calling for federal military aid is a sensitive issue. It clearly

displays a lack of control by elected officials. In most cases, civil authorities will request U.S.

Marine forces as a last resort, and well after violence is out of control. During the 1960s riots,

state governors were reluctant to call in military forces. When they finally did, the military was

tasked with an already deteriorated situation. This required the almost immediate deployment of

forces without carefully working out the command and control structure, rules of engagement

(ROE), or mission tasking issues.59 This rapid tasking characteristic affords little time, if any, for

commanders anticipating these missions to conduct unit training in preparation for the mission.

Marine units identified as capable of performing domestic peace keeping missions should be

prepared and trained prior to their employment to civil unrest areas.

Military forces experienced this during the recent Los Angeles riots. In

anticipation of the riots, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) drafted a letter for the

mayor's signature declaring Los Angeles a formal emergency. This allowed a rapid request for

the National Guard and military immediately after civil unrest broke out.60

______________________

58 National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, "Report of

the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, " (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1976), 56.

59 Jorden, 174.

60 Robert Vernon, L.A. Justice (Colorado Springs, CO: Focus on the Family

Understandably, military commanders must make preparations with civil authorities well

before the requirement for military intervention in order to successfully execute their

domestic peace keeping mission.

Similarly, the type of mission the military is being asked to perform must be

defined prior to committing forces. Peace keepers should not be sent into areas lightly

armed where there is no peace. The former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Caspar

Weinberger, stated that the U.S. should not confuse the mission to quell civil unrest with

any other missions such as humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.61 Although these

comments were intended for peace keeping missions abroad, they are pertinent in the

domestic arena. Military commanders must understand the rapid response requirement of

civil unrest, and have a clear conception of the mission prior to deployment. By

accomplishing these two requirements, the peace keeping force will successfully

coordinate their efforts with the law enforcement tactics used to restore order during civil

disturbances.

2. Law Enforcement Requirements

Law enforcement personnel are trained to act in a specific manner when

performing a crowd dispersal function. The same riot control tactics must be used by the

military to complement law enforcement.62 By understanding and training with the same

peace keeping techniques as that of law enforcement, the military can prevent an

escalation of violence by avoiding improper actions that could further incite rioting. The

____________________

Publishing, 1993), 163.

61 Caspar W. Weinberger, "How to Lose a Peace Keeping Force," Forbes, 29 August

1994,33.

62 Gary T. Marx, "Civil Disorder and the Agents of Social Control," Journal of

Social Issues 26, no. I (1970): 175.

only method in which Marine units can hope to act in the same manner as law enforcement is to

train using the same techniques that law enforcement utilize.

The 1960's riots provide two examples of the lack of preparation by

National Guard units in training to law enforcement standards. During the 1967 riots in Watts

and Newark, tanks indiscriminately strafed buildings in response to sporadic sniper fire.63 During

the same summer in Detroit, National Guard units used deadly force to enforce Michigan state

laws. As a result, looters and arsonists were fired upon.64 In both of these instances, the National

Guard's actions provoked a greater violent response from rioters. Had the National Guard

training been more coordinated with law enforcement methods, the difficulties encountered could

have been avoided. By tailoring training methods to law enforcement standards, the military will

be more capable of supporting civil authorities in achieving their desired end state.

3. Civilian Control of Military Forces

Civilian control over military forces used in domestic peace keeping is essential

in restoring order with minimum further disturbance. The military is trained and equipped with

such substantial fire power that if unleashed without constraints, could inadvertently create

severe damage. If the military is in control, the situation would take on the appearance of a

military state or martial law, which would be looked on unfavorably by the general public.65

However, as the level of domestic violence escalates into a more serious threat to our domestic

security, the general public may not only

________________________

63 Isenberg, 17.

64 Steven E. Ambrose, and James A. Barber, Jr., The Military and American Society

(New York, NY: The Free Press, 1972), 252.

65 Coakley, 348.

tolerate, but encourage a form of martial law to restore law and order. For example, in the Shays'

Rebellion, New Englanders were able to put down a threat to the country's domestic security by

other New Englanders. If this were not possible, then the public would certainly authorize the use

of additional force to ensure our domestic security. This level of violence that determines the level

of military involvement is not defined. Such as when does law enforcement ask for National

Guard assistance, when does the governor request federal military forces, and when does the

military take on the responsibilities defined under martial law. The next chapter provides a

discussion on this important issue.

At the request of civil authority, the military is called in to restore order, or to aid

law enforcement in enforcing federal law. It is then logical that the military receive guidance from

the civil authority which initially requested their assistance. In this respect, civil authority must

exercise some form of control over employed military forces in much the same manner as our

political leaders exercise control over the military during time of war. Since civilian authorities

ultimately assume responsibility for the consequences of using troops in quelling unrest, they

should provide that guidance for the military.

Although the President is designated the Commander in Chief of the military, he

must provide decentralized control of military units engaged in domestic peace keeping. Civilian

control is exercised over the military through written guidance drafted by both the DoD and the

U.S. Marine Corps.66 This guidance aids military commanders

____________________________

66 This guidance is found in several instructions and directives drafted by the JCS,

DoD, and the Marine Corps. Further information may be found in DoD Directives

3025.12 and 5525.5, Chairman of the JCS Instruction 3216.01, and Marine Corps Order

3440.7.

involved in peace keeping missions to provide a capability without violating the Articles of the U.S.

Constitution or the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.

B. DOD GUIDANCE ON DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING

Due to the complex and political nature of using military forces in domestic peace

keeping, the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commandant,

U.S. Marine Corps, provide advice on the use of Marine forces in assisting civil authorities. This

section presents the specific written guidance by members in, and out of the chain of command

in order to familiarize the reader with the requirements placed on units executing domestic peace

keeping missions.

1. DoD Guidance

DoD Directive 3025.12 discusses the relationship between the President, the

Department of Justice (DoJ), and the DoD, in dealing with requests for military support; and

military interaction with the DoJ in providing this support. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Instruction (CJCSl) 3216.01 describes the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the

Secretary of the Army as the executive agent for military assistance for civil disturbances; and

more importantly, the manner in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provides

forces for domestic peace keeping missions. Finally, DoD Directive 5525.5 clarifies issues

regarding military assistance to law enforcement agencies and describes the limiting factors built

into the U.S. Constitution and the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.

a. DoD Directive 3 025.12 and CJCSI 3216. 01

Although the primary responsibility for quelling civil unrest falls under the

authority of the state and local governments, the President issued an Executive Order designating

the Attorney General of the United States, and the Secretary of Defense as the primary officials

tasked with planning and executing military assistance for civil disturbances.' The President must

grant authorization to use military force in all cases with the exception of extreme emergency

situations where military commanders can use their initiative and employ forces

. To prevent loss of life, or wanton destruction of property, or to restore governmental

functioning and public order.

. When state or local authorities are unable or decline to provide protection to federal

property or federal government functions.

Although these two instances provide the only emergency exceptions, commanders must

request authorization from the President while they provide military assistance for civil

disturbances.68

The DoD responds to requests from civil authorities, and the DoJ serves

the President as the coordinating authority in recommending when to use military aid and when to

release the military to return to normal duty. The Attorney General receives and coordinates

preliminary requests for military assistance and provides a formal request to the President for

adjudication. The President then determines if federal action in the form of committing military

forces is necessary, and tasks the Secretary of Defense to provide domestic peace keeping

forces.69 The Secretary of the Army is the executive

___________________

67 Department of Defense Directive 3025.12, "Military Assistance for Civil

Disturbances (MACDIS)," 4 February, 1994, 3.

68 DoD Directive 3025.12, 4.

69 DoD Directive 3025.12, 6.

agent of the Secretary of Defense tasked with military assistance for civil disturbances. The

Secretary of the Army in turn provides the liaison between the DoD and the DoJ to ensure the

military coordinates the President's wishes and guidance.

In response to requests for military assistance, the Secretary of the

Army tasks the Department of Military Support (DOMS) under the U.S. Army to act as the

principle agent in developing guidance, plans, and procedures for domestic peace keeping. The

DOMS has the Secretary of Defense's authority to commit DoD resources in domestic peace

keeping missions, in response to civilian requests received by the DoJ and approved by the

President. The DOMS however, must closely coordinate with the Chairman, JCS through the

Directorate of Operations prior to committing military forces assigned to combatant commands.

Depending on the geographical location of the civil disturbance, the

DONIS, in coordination with the Joint Staff, will assign the mission to the appropriate Commander

in Chief (CINC) of that region. The U.S. and its possessions are divided into

the following geographical boundaries under the designated CINC:

. Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT); the Common Wealth of

Puerto Rico, the territory of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the 48 contiguous states, and the District

of Columbia.

. Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC); Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S.

possessions and territories in the Pacific area.

The CINC placed in charge of executing the domestic peace keeping

mission is designated as the supported CINC, and those CINCs tasked with providing units to

the supported CINC are designated as supporting CINCs. In addition, the Commander in Chief,

U.S. Special Operations Command (CINCSOC), provides the DoD response to domestic terrorist

incidents upon request. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS),

provides transportation to and from the civil disturbance areas as necessary. Due to

the rapid nature of response to requests for military assistance, the Chairman JCS has

authorized the direct liaison from the DOMS to the appropriate CINCs. The Chairman tasks

the CINCs to respond and provide forces to the DOMS, but not to interfere with the primary

mission of the CINCs to provide a war fighting capability.70 In turn, the appropriate service

components falling under the CINCs provide forces as necessary to meet domestic peace keeping

missions.

b. DoD Directive 5525.5

As discussed under the 1981 Modification of the Posse Comitatus Act

in Chapter II, the military cannot provide direct assistance to law enforcement personnel when

called upon to execute domestic peace keeping missions. DoD Directive 5S25.5 states that the

military cannot:

. Interdict a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity.

. Conduct search or seizure.

. Arrest, apprehend, stop and frisk, or similar activity.

. Use military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as under cover

agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.71

The use of military force in domestic peace keeping is therefore limited to giving

assistance to law enforcement personnel by providing manpower. There are exceptions to

the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, but these exceptions are emergency circumstances,

________________________

70 Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3216.01, "Military Assistance to

Civil Disturbances," 28 October, 1994, 2.

71 Department of Defense Directive 5525.5, "DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law

Enforcement Officials," 15 January, 1986, encl. (4), 3.

when law enforcement personnel cannot perform their functions. This request is granted only

after lengthy debate between the President, DoD, and the DoJ, and represents extreme situations

requiring temporary empowerment of the military to perform law enforcement activities.72 This

extreme situation deals with wide spread criminal activity and is defined as a grave threat to U.S.

domestic security. Military assistance to provide support during times of civil unrest usually does

not fall into this category. Therefore, the military is legally limited to what they can provide to law

enforcement personnel, and this problem area creates a dilemma. If the military could conceivably

execute this mission at the high end of the spectrum defined by extreme situations, then the

military should anticipate this expanded mission in terms of training and equipping. This issue is

discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

2. U.S. Marine Corps Guidance, MCO 3440.7

To assist the CINCs in planning and executing domestic peace keeping missions,

MCO 3440.7 designates the Director of Operations, Plans, Policies and Operations Department,

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps as the overall coordinator for administrative support to civil

authorities. MCO 3440.7 also provides the U.S. Marine Corps liaison representatives to the

DOMS as required.73 Additionally, the Director of Operations also coordinates with the Marine

forces under the respective CINCs to aid in planning and coordinating domestic peace keeping

missions. The order designates the Commanding Generals, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic

(FMFLANT) and Pacific (FMFPAC)

_______________________

72 DoD Directive 5525.5, encl. (4) 6.

73 Marine Corps Order 3440.7, "Marine Corps Assistance to Civil Authorities," I

January, 1992, 3.

as the Marine Corps Principle Planning Agents (MCPPA) on U.S. Marine Corps

assistance to civil authorities.

MCO 3440.7 stipulates that MCPPAs will not utilize reserve units in domestic

peace keeping missions while active U.S. Marine units are available. In keeping with the guidance

of DoD Directive 3025.12, commanding officers will comply with the spirit and intent of this

directive and involve Marine forces in domestic peace keeping when tasked by the CINC.

Lacking this direction, commanding officers will use Marine forces when their involvement will

prevent loss of life and wanton destruction of property.74 Marine Corps Order 3440.7 clearly

indicates that when tasked, Marine forces will rapidly deploy to support law enforcement

authorities to quell insurrection and restore order as necessary. Thus, the mission characteristics,

law enforcement requirements, and DoD guidance as previously discussed, all have a distinct

impact on the type of U.S. Marine forces selected to execute domestic peace keeping missions.

C. USMC FORCE SELECTION CRITERIA

One of the lessons learned from the Los Angeles riots of 1992 is that the nature of civil

disturbance has changed since the 1960s. In the 1960s, reactions to civil disturbances focused

more on crowd control rather than law enforcement activities, and required federal forces trained

in crowd control and dispersal tactics. However, during the Los Angeles riots, the focus turned

away from crowd control to anti-sniper and counter-terrorist tactics.75 Additionally, the threat of

drive by shootings and bombings

_____________________________

74 Marine Corps Order 3440.7, 4.

75 "Joint Task Force Los Angeles After Action Report," 7/12/92, under the key word

"Garden Plot," down loaded from the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS)

posed a threat to those Marines conducting foot patrols and standing guard at stationary

outposts.76 This evolution away from crowd control to anti-sniper, vital area security, and reaction

force missions requires a different capability than that normally required in the 1960s and 1970s.

However, providing Marine forces to domestic peace keeping missions is secondary to providing

combat forces to the CINCs, and our operational tempo does not guarantee the designation of a

qualified unit to peace keeping missions.

These factors are apparent to high level decision makers because MCO 3440.7

addresses the need for Marine Corps commanders to provide any available forces for employment

to disturbance areas.77 Consequently, the possibility of employing any Marine unit to a domestic

peace keeping mission is possible, The type of unit and their level of peace keeping training will

vary in each situation. This casts doubt on the Marine Corps' ability to employ their most qualified

peace keeping forces to execute this complex mission. Although the Marine Corps prides itself on

the ability to accomplish any and all missions, using any and all Marine forces indicates that units

not specifically trained in a peace keeping mission could be used. The DoD directives and MCO

3440.7 previously discussed do not specify the type of unit to employ during military assistance to

civil authorities. Rather, the CINC or the Joint Task Force JTF) Commander select the units in a

response to an assigned mission.

Hopefully, when tasked by the CINCs, the component commanders would provide

credible units to the JTF Commander. If peace keeping trained ground combat units or military

police units were not available, the Marine Corps Regional Planning Agents

_______________________

database, on 6 February 1995, II-3.

76 "Joint Task Force Los Angeles After Action Report, JULLS database, I-6.

77 Marine Corps Order 3440.7, 3.

(MCRPA) assigned as Commanding Generals, Marine Corps Bases Camp Lejeune/Camp

Pendleton would then arbitrarily select units from within the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)

ground combat element to execute domestic peace keeping missions.78 Because of this, ground

unit commanders should consider their units eligible to conduct domestic peace keeping missions

when tasked. This situation represents one of the dilemmas discussed in the next chapter dealing

with unit selection issues.

D. SUMMARY

This chapter provided the logical follow-on discussion developed from Chapter II. The

chapter moved from the constitutional definition of domestic peace keeping to defining the criteria

of how the DoD and DoJ use military forces to assist civil authorities during periods of civil

unrest. The chapter identified the necessity of rapidly employing federal military forces into

deteriorating situations. This rapid response characteristic demonstrated the need to use U.S.

Marine units adequately trained to conduct these missions. However, due to the evolving nature

of civil unrest away from demonstrations and riots to wide spread violence and unlawful activity,

the forces now eligible by DoD and U. S. Marine Corps definitions may not be those best suited

for the mission. The increasing threat of violence also questions the limited support that Marine

units may provide as defined by U.S. Law and DoD guidance.

This chapter illustrated the chain of command from the President to the Secretary of

Defense, with consultation from the U.S. Attorney General from the DoJ. The DOMS

___________________

78 Major John Sullivan, USMC Action Officer at Head Quarters, U.S. Marine Corps,

Plans, Policies, and Operations, Future Operations Branch, interviewed by author, 8

February 1995.

under the Secretary of the Army serves as the primary planning agent tasking the CINCs to

provide units at the request of civilian authorities. Although this chapter provided a discussion of

the manner in which U.S. Marine forces should be employed, and which forces are best suited

according to Marine Corps planners; there exist several problem areas which require resolution

to ensure success in executing domestic peace keeping missions. Chapter IV provides an in

depth discussion on these issues and suggests possible solutions to the problems facing Marine

commanders called to execute future domestic peace keeping missions.

IV. DOMESTIC PEACEKEEPING ISSUES

The research to this point provided an overview of the constitutionality and historic use of

military forces in domestic disturbances and civil unrest. It introduced the evolving nature of civil

unrest in our inner cities, and the guidance provided by DoD and U.S. Marine Corps directives to

peace keeping forces. This effort defined the limitations placed on Marine forces in domestic

peace keeping missions and provided guidance to Marine commanders. However, when U.S.

Law and DoD guidance is compared with the tactics needed to oppose the various levels of civil

unrest, several problem areas emerge in the study of domestic peace keeping. A discussion of

these problem areas is extremely important because it will aid U.S. Marine forces to provide a

credible domestic peace keeping capability in the 1990s and beyond.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the data presented in the previous chapters, and

discuss several problem areas affecting U.S. Marine forces carrying out domestic peace keeping

missions. This chapter discusses force composition, legal and training issues, and provides a

discussion on command, control, and communication problems inherent to domestic peace keeping

missions. Many of these issues selected for discussion depend on the many variables of domestic

unrest. For example, choosing the correct Marine force, and training them to meet the threat

clearly depends on the level of threat. Only by establishing a criteria that defines the level of

threat can the Marine Corps adequately prepare their peace keeping forces to successfully

accomplish these missions. The next section of this chapter is devoted to defining the various

levels of peace keeping across the level of domestic violence spectrum, in order to logically

discuss the dilemmas and problems previously noted.

A. DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING CONTINUUM

The various levels of domestic unrest in future disturbances will undoubtedly

dictate the level of force, and types of forces the government will use to restore order.

This consideration is necessary to deploy the most qualified and trained force to meet the

threat criteria. The thesis has developed a quantifiable method to determine the level of

force necessary, and link this force level to the threat the unrest poses to our national

interests. Figure 4-1 was developed to graphically depict the varying levels of civil unrest,

and the threat that this unrest poses to our national interests.

Click here to view image

Along the vertical axis of figure 4- 1, the level of violence is measured to reflect the

overall threat to the country's national interests. As the level of unrest increases, it becomes an

increasing threat to our national interest and requires a measured response by civil authorities.

Along the horizontal access, in coordination with the level of unrest, response by civil authorities is

measured in phases in order to use the appropriate amount of force to adequately address the

level of unrest corresponding to the threat to our national interests. It is important to note that the

level of unrest graphically portrayed in figure 4-1 depicts the escalation of civil unrest that

threatens our survival national interests. Obviously, not all civil unrests can be portrayed in this

manner. Less violent unrests can be depicted by a flattening curve to show that the unrest never

exceeded a threat to our peripheral national interests. The rapidity that the civil unrest reaches a

threat to our vital and survival national interests will vary, and the slope and curve depicted in

figure 4-1 will change accordingly depending on the nature and extent of the unrest.

Referring to figure 4-1, civil unrest below the peripheral level of our national interests is

relatively non-existent in the phase level I category and is classified as an daily occurrence by

law enforcement authorities to enforce local and federal law. A phase level I requirement does

not require any action by the government above normal police functions because civil unrest does

not threaten our national interests. Likewise, civil unrest escalating past our peripheral national

interests requires a limited response by civil authorities as well. For example, an unrest falling

within our peripheral national interests is "one that does not seriously affect the well-being of the

United States as a whole."79 A

___________________

79 Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: United States National

phase level II requirement suggests that unrest activity has reached a notable level of concern to

our national interests, but civil authorities are able to address the situation using local and federal

law enforcement personnel to curb unrest. The use of law enforcement personnel in addressing

phase level II unrest is appropriate because the civil unrest is caused primarily by those intent on

pursuing criminal activity. Many people would argue that in the major cities of our nation, the

level of unrest has reached a peripheral threat to our national interests, and is rapidly escalating to

a major threat to our national interests as seen in phase level III.

In phase level III in figure 4-1, an escalation in civil unrest can rapidly move to a major

threat to our national interests. A threat to our major national interests is one that the country

defines as important, but not crucial to the well-being of the country overall.80 If the situation is

tolerable, although distressing, it falls within a major threat to national interests and requires a

limited increase in force to deal with the unrest. To address this major threat, civil authorities

would use both federal and local law enforcement personnel in order to address the problem.

Domestic disturbances reaching phase level III are an escalation in criminal activity and civil

disobedience. The level of unrest is threatening to the public and requires both local and federal

authorities using special task forces and police units in order to control the unrest.

To this point, civil unrest falling in phase levels I, II, and III have been limited to using

law enforcement personnel in dealing with the threats to our peripheral and major national

interests. The threat of civil unrest to our vital and survival national interests will

__________________________

Interests in the 1980s, (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1985), 13.

80 Nuechterlein, 12.

require the addition of the military and the National Guard to quell this unrest due to the increased

threat this unrest poses to the well-being of the nation. The July 1994 national security strategy

stated that the use of the military against threats to our national interests will be decisive to the

vitality and survival of our national entity.81 Figure 4-1 shows two distinct phases that require

military assistance because of the different required responses to civil unrest falling within our

vital and survival national interests. With a civil unrest threatening our vital national interests, the

addition of the military and National Guard would be made to aid law enforcement to quickly

bring unrest under control. Threats to our vital national interests are those that will cause serious

harm to the security of the nation if strong measures, including the use of the military are not

quickly taken by the government.82 Civil unrest in phase level IV can be characterized as

widespread criminal activity and rioting exceeding local and federal law enforcement's ability to

keep the peace and protect civilians and property. At this low intensity level of military

involvement, law enforcement needs the National Guard and the military to conduct law

enforcement functions to aid civil authorities in restoring order. This involvement falls under the

lower end of the spectrum in terms of the use of limited force to quell domestic disturbances and

to keep the peace. This would include those powers described in chapter III that are prohibited by

U.S. Law and DoD guidance. The current capability authorized by U.S. Law and DoD guidance

that the Marine Corps brings to the domestic peace keeping realm, are more appropriate for

phase level V responses to threats to our survival national interests rather than our vital interests.

The peace keeping continuum developed in this

__________________________

81 National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC: U. S.

Government Printing Office, 1994), 10.

82 Nuechterlein, 9.

chapter would classify the Los Angeles riots as falling under a phase level IV response by civil

authorities to restore order. The difference in the capability that the Marine Corps will provide

between phase levels IV and V is important to note because it requires two very different

capabilities in response to different situations.

A level of civil unrest that threatens the very survival of our nation, would require a phase

level V involvement of the military to restore order. This particular phase represents the extreme

emergency circumstances in which the military is used during the imposition of martial law, and is

the exception to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 discussed in the previous chapter. An example

of a phase level V response would be the use of the military to prevent a civil war or to address a

domestic threat so serious it challenges the very survival of our nation. Activities in phase level V

cross over the peace keeping boundary into the peace making realm and require an entirely

different response by the military in terms of Rules of Engagement (ROE) and basic duties in

addressing a domestic disturbance of this magnitude. The domestic peace keeping continuum

developed in this chapter can also be used to delineate a transition point for the enactment of

martial law and the changing of ROEs. Now that the domestic peace keeping continuum has

linked domestic unrest to the threat to our national interests, and provided an appropriate force

response to the unrest, it is appropriate to discuss the legal restrictions and force selection criteria

in providing a credible force.

B. LEGAL ISSUES AND FORCE SELECTION REQUIREMENTS

In the previous chapter, DoD guidance discussed the necessity of the Marine Corps to

respond with any and all military force in order to aid civil authorities in keeping

the peace. In reviewing past domestic disturbances in the nation, the majority of the large scale

unrests fall into the phase level IV response characteristics as a threat to our vital national

interests. These disturbances require the use of additional manpower to aid law enforcement

personnel in performing their duties. Not only must the military provide manpower in phase level

IV responses, but they should provide manpower in the form of personnel trained in law

enforcement methods. This creates a legal dilemma between what actions U.S. Law allows, and

what actions need to be taken by Marine forces deployed in a phase IV environment.

1. Legal Issues

The use of the Marine forces to aid law enforcement personnel in quelling civil

unrest and domestic disturbances is a logical extension of our warfighting capability. The Marine

Corps has successfully operated at the war end of the spectrum, so the deployment of military

forces at the peace keeping end is credible.83 What is not logical is restricting the military from

directly assisting law enforcement personnel as required by phase IV threats. As discussed in

Chapter III, the direct assistance of interdicting vehicles, conducting search and seizure, and

arresting, apprehending, stopping or frisking civilians is prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act and

DoD directives. These restrictive policies are in direct conflict with the overall tactics of peace

keeping in a phase level IV response, which require forces to detain suspected enemy, and search

and confiscate weapons. These methods provide the basic protection for peace keepers and non

combatants alike. Marine forces engaged in foreign assistance peace keeping missions routinely

conduct

___________________________

83 Colonel Burke, U.S. Army, "The Army Corps, III Corps Perspective," lecture

presented at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 6

February 1994.

these activities because they are not restricted by U.S. Law. Employing the same Marine force to

quell civil unrest falling in phase level IV and restricting their activities, will surely invite disaster.

This is because phase level IV requires Marine units to use law enforcement techniques in aiding

civil authorities to restore order to unrest areas.

The entire nature of civil unrest and riot activities has changed dramatically in this

country. The sophistication of gang warfare includes the proliferation of small arms and automatic

weapons, increased mobility, communications, and even rudimentary intelligence functions.

Referring to figure 4-1, this increase in capabilities by the threat quickly elevates the response to

deal with a threat to our vital national interests with this sophisticated threat. In supporting law

enforcement, the role of the military in domestic peace keeping during phase level IV has

dramatically changed. The military is moving to peace keeping actions which are coming into

conflict with current U.S. Law and DoD guidance. This conflict was never more clear than in the

Los Angeles riots which serves to demonstrate this "gray area" between adhering to U.S. Law

and performing domestic peace keeping functions as required by phase level IV response

characteristics.

The "gray area" between U.S. Law and domestic peace keeping tasks during the

Los Angeles riots became apparent with the detention of criminal suspects. U.S. Marines

detained civilians suspected of looting and other crimes, although this activity violated the 1981

modification to the Posse Comitatus Act. The reasoning behind this action, according to a Marine

officer participating in JTF Los Angeles, was that "we were in such close proximity and contact

with law enforcement personnel, that Marines felt comfortable law enforcement personnel would

arrive within a few minutes to actually make the arrest."84 Small unit leaders made these

judgment calls in order to effectively assist law enforcement personnel in restoring law

and order to the city of Los Angeles. In order to accomplish the mission of credibly

supporting law enforcement, U.S. Marines did what was required, even though it meant

violating DoD directives and U.S. Law.

This example illustrates that these Marine forces were sent to perform phase

level IV tasks and were successful in their mission because they conducted law enforcement

functions. U.S. Marines manning check points and protecting key areas, should be authorized to

search and seize weapons from civilians which in their judgment pose a threat to their safety. In

Los Angeles, Marines assigned to a military police company protecting a strip mall, stopped,

searched, and questioned suspicious individuals penetrating into their sector. The military police

conducted cursory body searches or frisks in order to determine the level of threat the suspect

presented.85 Although realizing these actions fell into a "gray area," Marines took the necessary

steps to safeguard themselves from potential danger. Law makers and military leaders must

closely examine this "gray area" because current legislation and DoD policy requires modification

if the Marine Corps is to provide a credible phase IV response capability. Modifications to the

law will enable military forces to effectively meet threat levels found in phase level IV. Ignoring

the widening gap or "gray area" between U.S. Law and the necessary actions of level IV forces

guarantees the failure of these missions in the future. The "gray area" will require military

participants in domestic peace keeping missions to make judgment calls in

___________________________

84 Major Scott Street interview of 8 February 1995.

85 Major John Forquer, USMC, Student, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff

College, formerly a Military Police Company Executive Officer, interviewed by author, 16

February 1995.

order to do what it takes to accomplish the mission. The more risk that Marines take by making

judgment calls, the more likely these risks may call into question the legal employment of

Marine forces assigned to meet phase level IV threats.

2. Force Selection Issues

Chapter III addressed the necessity of local commanders to consider any ground

force employable to conduct domestic peace keeping missions. The "gray area" within the Posse

Comitatus Act provides a further limitation to U. S. Marine Corps force selection parameters.

Due to the sensitive nature and high profile of domestic peace keeping, the Marine forces

assigned to phase level IV responses should be those units that conduct daily training and

operations in parallel with law enforcement tactics. Those units are military police units trained in

law enforcement missions and experienced in working with the public.

Military police are already familiar with the more restrictive ROEs which

authorities will invariably establish in domestic peace keeping missions falling under phase level

IV response. Military police are trained to detain civilians and conduct personnel searches to find

and confiscate concealed weapons.86 Additionally, military police are accustomed to the constant

interaction with the public and law enforcement agencies near their bases. The very nature of

dealing with civil unrest with the most appropriately trained military force suggests the logical

choice of military police units over other Marine units.

By working with military police units rather than other Marine units, law

enforcement personnel will greatly reduce the potential for incidents resulting in

______________________

86 Major John Forquer interview of 16 February 1995.

misunderstanding basic orders. To use the Los Angeles riots as an example, a law enforcement

team issued orders to a ground Marine unit to provide cover while confronting an armed suspect

barricaded in his residence. The Marines that were issued the covering order commenced to lay

down covering fire on the face of the apartment building. Marines fired approximately 30 rounds

into the building before law enforcement personnel stopped them.87 Clearly, the definition of the

word "cover" had a different definition to what the law enforcement team wanted, and what the

Marine unit delivered. This example illustrates the requirement to use military units trained in law

enforcement techniques to meet the requirements of phase level IV threats. The forces most

suited are military police units trained similarly to law enforcement personnel, and not necessarily

any available ground unit as called for by current DoD guidance.

The selection of a Marine force to combat a level of unrest falling into phase

level V is another subject. In this particular phase, ROEs will certainly change and so will the

mission. In that regard, Marine ground combat units who have been training in the war end of the

spectrum are qualified to conduct this mission. Phase level V represents the level of combat that

Marine forces train to every day. However, the likelihood of deploying to conduct this type of

mission is remote and does not require any additional training on our part. Addressing a threat

with a phase level IV force is the most likely requirement the Marine Corps will face in future

domestic peace keeping missions. Unfortunately, phase level IV is the phase the Marine Corps is

least prepared for in terms of training.

_______________________

87 Major John Forquer interview of 16 February 1995,

C. TRAINING ISSUES

As previously discussed, the Marine Corps will be required to provide a phase level IV

force capability to quell civil unrest. Therefore, we should devote training to conduct these

missions, or send only those units trained in these functions such as military police units. This may

not be possible as the number of Marine Corps military police companies is not unlimited. As a

result, the Marine Corps should provide integrated training with law enforcement personnel to

those units considered for phase level IV missions. There are two reasons for this requirement;

because of our commitment to the nation, and the emergency circumstances that can be rapidly

enacted by law makers.

Marines are committed "to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign

and domestic," as sworn to by our military oath. This commitment to defend our country and the

Constitution against domestic violence cannot be taken lightly and when called, the Marine Corps

must provide a credible force capable of fulfilling this obligation. The second reason the Marine

Corps must train to provide a phase level IV response capability is because of the emergency

response circumstances in the Posse Comitatus Act. Recalling chapter II, this act under extreme

circumstances allows law makers to intervene with military force that is temporarily granted police

powers. This emergency contingency could rapidly place Marine forces in an arena where they

have limited training and experience such as in phase level IV requirements. Because of these

factors, the Marine Corps needs to be ahead in providing a credible level IV force projection

capability.

Marines designated for these missions should undergo rigorous training in military

operations in urban terrain (MOUT). The training regimes should include techniques to

prevent drive-by shootings, suspect detention, and search and seizure techniques. These skills are

vital in ensuring that civilians and peace keepers are safeguarded from the threat we will face in

the involvement of forces in phase level IV operations. Ideally, this training will also establish the

vital liaison links between Marine units and law enforcement authorities which they will be

assisting in future domestic peace keeping operations.

Our Professional Military Education (PME) should stress the use of Marine forces in

conducting law enforcement type operations in support of civil authorities. Our resident schools

should teach proper law enforcement techniques and procedures at all levels. Officer and enlisted

alike should undergo training to effectively deploy Marine forces in response to civil authorities.

The Marine Corps University could easily integrate FBI lectures into the curriculum at Quantico

dealing with this subject to provide training across the spectrum. In addition to PME, units should

conduct realistic training with law enforcement personnel by going on command sanctioned "ride

alongs" with police in order to become familiar with their ROE when operating in the law

enforcement realm.

The next logical step in the training cycle is to develop the doctrine for operating in the

phase level IV spectrum of domestic peace keeping. In order to provide a credible domestic

peace keeping force, the Marine Corps should be leading the way in developing operating

procedures, tactics, and techniques in conducting these missions. Not only in this phase, but

preparing to move rapidly into the phase level V which necessitates a rapid change in ROEs and

procedures to deal with a gravely deteriorating situation. This training will aid Marine forces

immensely in identifying the transition point between phase levels IV and V to less restrictive

ROEs and a more permissive environment in addressing a level V threat to our national interests.

D. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

The exercise of command authority during domestic peace keeping missions is difficult,

requiring close coordination between military and civil authorities. The key to conducting a

successful domestic peace keeping operation is ensuring that command rests with the appropriate

authority. The appropriate authority must coordinate the use of the military with the use of

National Guard, and law enforcement personnel. The political complexity of dealing with

domestic disorder indicates the need for civil authorities to exercise control over the military

during these periods. In a report to the President in 1976, a task force recommended that the

appropriate command relationship between the military and civil authority is to legally place the

military subordinate to civil authorities in times of unrest.88 The President, as discussed in Chapter

II, is legally empowered by the Constitution to exercise this command. However, the President is

not able to exercise effective control due to other pressing domestic and international

commitments. The President must therefore exercise his control through a senior civilian official

at the scene of the civil unrest.

Although the state governor in the affected region seems a logical choice, as early as the

1870s, Congress and senior military leaders realized that state governors were not qualified to

serve in this capacity. General Hancock in 1877, implored the President not to place elements of

Hancock's division under the command of the Pennsylvania Governor.89

_______________________

88 National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 114.

DoD Directive 3025.12 provides guidance on the President's command authority which presents

the military commander with a dilemma. The chain of command from the President through the

CINC and down to the JTF commander is clearly defined.90 However, this command and control

structure can be confused when the President and the Attorney General appoint civilian

representatives to influence the military commander. The President can appoint a personal

representative to communicate his guidance to the military commander, and the DoJ may also

designate a Senior Civilian Representative of the U.S. Attorney General (SCRAG).91

Accordingly, the civilian representatives appointed by the President and the Attorney

General may augment, but not replace the chain of command. This situation can place the JTF

commander in an awkward situation. Not only is the JTF commander receiving guidance from the

CINC, but he will receive informal guidance from the state governor, the SCRAG, and the

President's personal representative. Figure 4-2 graphically depicts the chain of command as

delineated by DoD directives, This depiction shows the doctrinal relationship of the SCRAG

augmenting the military forces as shown by the dashed line, and the CINC maintaining overall

control of the JTF and reporting to the President.

_______________________

89 Cooper, 63-64.

90 DoD Directive 3025.12, 4.

91 DoD Directive 3025.12, 7.

Click here to view image

In reality, the JTF commander does not exercise complete command authority as delineated from

the CINC. The Los Angeles riots demonstrated this departure from established directives by

defining the SCRAG as having authority over military forces. In a message from the Secretary

of the Army to Commander in Chief, Forces Command (CINCFORCOM), the message stated under

the mission paragraph:

Direct Joint Task Force Los Angeles to commence and conduct civil disturbance

operations in the city and county of Los Angeles and other districts of California as

tasked by Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG), Mr.

Bob Muller.

Further in the message, the tasking requested that the supported CINC report the operational

chain of command to the DOMS.92 DoD guidance provides a stated chain of command with the

SCRAG having an augmenting role as seen in figure 4-2. However,

_______________________

92 Secretary of the Army message to U.S. Forces Command, subject: "Execute

Order, Oplan Garden Plot," 020359Z May 1992.

this message in reality interposes the SCRAG above the JTF commander in the chain of

command as portrayed in figure 4-3.

Click here to view image

The possibility for confusion under this situation in figure 4-3 is apparent. A military officer

assigned as the JTF commander must exercise coordination between the different civilian and

military agencies in order to successfully employ military forces. On one side of the chain of

command, the JTF commander reports through the SCRAG to the DoJ and finally to the

President. On the other side, the JTF commander reports to the CINC who in turn reports to the

President. A situation where a commander will take orders from two different authorities will

surely lead to confusion. This situation will allow the proliferation of conflicting ROEs and mission

tasking to occur, and will become even more confusing with the CINC removed from the area and

the SCRAG located in the disturbance area. To alleviate potential confusion and streamline

the command and control task, military units should use liaison officers and effective

communications to exercise control over their units

1. Liaison Officers

The forming of a JTF in a domestic setting is very similar to forming a JTF in an

international environment. There are many different organizations with various capabilities and

limitations working together for the first time. In this regard, using liaison officers will greatly

reduce the coordination burden placed on the JTF commander by the nature of the situation. The

JTF commander will require senior officers to serve within the JTF command element and

coordinate activities with the National Guard (if they are not federalized), the city police

department, county and state police units, FBI task forces, the state governor, mayor's office, and

other organizations as necessary. These liaison officers represent a vital link, providing direct

interaction between the task force command element, deployed units, and civil authorities.

The complexity of the coordination role that the liaison officers perform show the

necessity to use talented officers in these billets. The JTF commander must evaluate liaison

requirements early in the operation, and use officers familiar with these tasks. The JTF

commander can also use liaison officers to educate civil authorities in the capabilities of military

forces. Not all law enforcement personnel understand the legal limitations of the military in civil

disturbances. Liaison officers will provide this information to prevent the possible illegal use of

military forces. Similarly, liaison officers must be familiar with the methods of police agencies,

FBI units, and other task organizations in order to accurately communicate these capabilities to

the JTF commander. Using liaison officers will require the JTF commander to use a timely and

robust communication network to maintain contact with liaison officers and tactical units,

in order to accomplish effective command and control throughout the disturbance area.

2. Communications

The means by which a commander will execute his command authority is

through the use of adequate communication equipment. Lack of appropriate communications

systems is not a new problem with domestic peace keeping; it occurred during the 1967 riots as

well as the recent Los Angeles riots. During the 1967 riots, the U.S. Army used communication

equipment operating on frequencies not used by police units. As a result, the military and the

police could not communicate and coordinate efforts. U.S. Army units could not identify

boundary areas or riot perimeters; and this caused a great deal of confusion between law

enforcement units, the U.S. Army, and National Guard units in coordinating riot control efforts.

Lack of communication created friendly fire incidents when one of two adjoining units became

engaged in anti-sniper operations and could not communicate their actions to the adjoining unit.

The adjoining unit mistook this fire as sniping against their unit and indiscriminately responded in

kind. These type of unfortunate incidents increased casualties and damage.93

During the Los Angeles riots, JTF Los Angeles units possessed adequate radios;

however, these radios did not operate efficiently in the heavily built-up area of a

modern city.94 As a result, Marine units established other procedures which enabled them

___________________

93 Marx, 175.

94 Major Scott Street, USMC Action Officer at Head Quarters, U.S. Marine Corps,

Plans, Policies, and Operations, Security and Law Enforcement Branch, interviewed by

to communicate with higher and subordinate units. Military units located with law

enforcement officers used their communication nets to relay messages when military

radios did not work. This action quickly overloaded normal police frequencies by

introducing additional radio traffic on an already strained communication network.

To overcome the communication problem, the JTF commander eventually

authorized the use of cellular telephones. Since these phones did not exist in the JTF's table of

equipment, units purchased cellular telephones and distributed them to restore communications.95

Cellular telephones also enhanced the communications between law enforcement personnel and

military units in the field. The JTF Los Angeles after action report recommends purchasing

cellular telephones and issuing them to units prior to deploying into urban areas. Although this

recommendation is probably not feasible with the current budget reduction efforts, it provides an

important learning point. Units deploying to modern built-up areas either in a domestic or

international arena may find their organic communications equipment not suited for the operation.

Consequently, commanders must address this issue prior to deployment and take action to correct

this potential shortfall. Another important issue falling within the command, control, and

communications realm is the National Guard's placement in the operation and their overall

relationship with the JTF commander.

3. National Guard Relationship

Depending on the circumstances and the degree of disorder during civil

disturbances, the National Guard may remain under the control of the state governor, or it

______________________

author, 8 February 1995.

95 Joint Task Force Los Angeles After Action Report, JULLS database, I-6.

may be federalized by the President to serve with regular military units. From a command and

control standpoint, whenever the President introduces military forces into a civil disturbance area

as he would do in phase levels IV and V, the National Guard should be federalized. This provides

a convenient hand-off point and federalizing the National Guard makes it easier to place them

under the command of the JTF commander and thereby preserves a unity of command among all

military forces. Although the President reserves the right to federalize the National Guard, it is

not done without some coordination problems which may hinder the JTF mission.96

Federalizing the National Guard places them under the operational control of the

JTF commander, but relieves the state from providing administrative control over the now

federalized units. This situation requires the JTF commander to provide administrative control

over the federalized National Guard units already deployed and on the way. The JTF

commander is already tasked with a great deal of responsibility and to add another large unit

under the JTF commander's administrative control further complicates the task. The JTF Los

Angeles mission provided a good method of solving this problem. The CINC tasked another U.S.

Army command to perform all administrative control functions necessary for the federalized

National Guard, and simultaneously placed them under the operational control of the JTF

commander.97 This procedure worked in this case because of the mission's short duration.

However, the administrative processing of the National Guard into and out of federal service

was time consuming and administratively manpower intensive. The CINC had to call in additional

______________________

96 Ambrose, 247.

97 Joint Task Force Los Angeles After Action Report, JULLS database, II-6.

combat service support units to provide administrative, medical, and financial support to the

National Guard. The computer information systems designed by the U.S. Army to maintain pay

and medical records are not compatible with National Guard systems and this resulted in

accountability problems. This problem would be exceedingly more difficult had the CINC tasked

the Marine Corps with administrative support of National Guard units.

E. SUMMARY

This chapter examined the research presented in chapters II and III and provided an

analysis of the Marine Corps' capability to respond to future domestic peace keeping missions. In

this chapter, the research developed a domestic peace keeping continuum which links civil unrest

to its threat to our national interests in order to provide a phased level of force to meet the threat.

Figure 4-1 graphically depicts the various phase levels I through V in which civil unrest may be

categorized. Phase levels I and II require the continued effort of law enforcement to deal with

civil unrest. Phase level III introduces the National Guard to a deteriorating situation in order to

assist law enforcement. It is not until phase levels IV and V that the Marine Corps should

introduce forces to assist law enforcement. However, the difference between phase levels IV and

V require a different force capability.

Phase level IV requires forces trained in search, seizure, arrest, and apprehension in

order to provide a credible force under this phase level. Although these actions are against U.S.

Law as dictated in the Posse Comitatus Act and DoD policy, these activities are required to

safeguard peace keepers and civilians, while aiding civil authorities in restoring law and order.

Because the majority of civil unrest where the military becomes involved falls within the

phase level IV criteria, Marine forces will be tasked with performing these missions. Therefore,

the Marine Corps should get involved in developing and maintaining a credible law enforcement

training program concentrating on law enforcement skills. On the other hand, the Marine Corps

has operated in the spectrum of phase level V for so long that we do not need to train our

forces in the more permissive ROEs and less restrictions of the use of force.

The research showed that the command structure of a domestic peace keeping JTF is

complex and difficult to control. This chapter demonstrated that the President and the U.S.

Attorney General possess the capability to interject civilian representatives above the JTF

commander. Figure 4-2 provided a graphical depiction of the chain of command as defined by

DoD directives, and figure 4-3 showed the actual chain of command for JTF Los Angeles. This

point illustrates that even with definitive guidance, it is possible to have a chain of command

situation where the JTF commander reports to both the CINC and the SCRAG. This will have an

effect on the overall command relationship between the CINC and the JTF commander. This

situation in combination with the JTF commander's requirement to communicate with law

enforcement agencies, requires the extensive use of liaison officers. Liaison officers serve the JTF

commander by communicating the capabilities and limitations of Marine units tasked with domestic

peace keeping missions to reduce confusion between Marines and civil authorities.

This chapter identified the shortfalls of U.S. Marine Corps' communications equipment

in meeting domestic peace keeping missions. Marines should use police communication

networks and cellular telephones to overcome communication problems while operating in

the built-up areas of modern U.S. cities such as Los Angeles. Effective communications

are essential in the high profile mission of domestic peace keeping. Lack of communication

between Marine commanders and their units will require small unit leaders to make judgment calls.

The changing nature of civil unrest evolving from riot control to defending property and

combating gangs armed with sophisticated weaponry, has created a "gray area" in the law. This is

seen in phase level IV employment where U.S. Law as articulated by the U.S. Constitution, the

Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, and the 1981 amendment of the Posse Comitatus Act prohibit law

enforcement activities by Marine forces. Experience from the Los Angeles riots demonstrated the

need to grant U.S. Marine forces the legal right to detain vehicles and suspects, conduct arrests,

searches, and seizures in order to accomplish the peace keeping mission. With these powers, the

U.S. Marine Corps will be able to project a credible force to provide a domestic peace keeping

force to deal with future phase level IV threats.

V. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR FUTURE STUDY

The research presented in this thesis identified the criteria from U.S. Law and DoD

guidance which currently limits the U.S. Marine Corps' mission in domestic peace keeping to

assisting law enforcement personnel. After defining the Marine Corps' mission, the capability that

the Marine Corps may legally employ in the domestic peace keeping arena was compared to the

capability that is needed when dealing with various levels of civil unrest. This comparison yielded

several dilemmas in terms of what the Marine Corps needs to deliver to deal effectively with civil

unrest, and what the Marine Corps may legally deliver to meet the civil unrest threat. Additionally,

the research also identified several shortfalls in the Marine Corps' capability to adequately

perform this difficult mission.

A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

The data was collected by performing an in-depth literary review of books, research

papers, and magazine articles dealing with the discussion of the federal military assisting civil

authorities during domestic unrest. Additionally, a review of DoD and U.S. Marine Corps

directives established criteria in which U.S. Marine forces will limit their support to civil

authorities during domestic peace keeping missions. The author also collected data through

personal interviews with Marine officers participating in Joint Task Force Los Angeles, and

action officers at Head Quarters, U.S. Marine Corps. These interviews were crucial in identifying

the differences in the required actions of Marine peace keepers to quell civil unrest, and the

actions legally authorized by U.S. Law.

1. Legal Constraints

Articles I and IV of the U.S. Constitution empowered the President to use the

states' militias to keep the peace during times of domestic disturbances. The drafters of the

Constitution exempted the President and Congress from using the federal military forces due to a

strong opposition to maintaining a standing army to accomplish this task. The 1807 Act later

granted the President the authority to use federal military forces in domestic peace keeping

missions. This action occurred because law makers realized that certain wide spread threats to the

country's national interests could not be handled solely by law enforcement and the states' militias.

The President may use these forces to enforce federal laws, quell insurrection, and in general

keep the peace within the states and territories of the United States of America. The President

maintains command of these forces during their employment under the Posse Comitatus Act of

1878 which formalizes the chain of command from the President to the military commander.

Congress passed the 1981 Amendment of the Posse Comitatus Act in response to requests to use

the military in combating illegal criminal activity focusing on drug smuggling and distribution. This

amendment clarified the cooperation between the military and law enforcement. It limited the use

of the military to indirectly aiding law enforcement agencies. Based on this established

constitutional framework, the DoD provided further guidance on the military's use in domestic

peace keeping missions.

2. DoD Criteria

The many documents and directives presented in Chapter III discussed the

formal chain of command from the President to the CINC. The President tasks the Secretary of

Defense with consultation from the U.S. Attorney General to plan and execute domestic peace

keeping missions. The Secretary of Defense in turn tasks the DOMS under the Secretary of the

Army as the principle agent for these missions. The DOMS possesses the Secretary of

Defense's authority to plan and commit DoD forces in response to approved civilian requests for

military assistance. The DOMS is able to directly task the appropriate CINC depending on the

geographic location of the civil unrest, and direct the supporting CINCs to provide forces as

necessary.

Under DoD guidance, specifically DoD Directive 5525.5, the military cannot

provide direct assistance to law enforcement personnel when called upon to execute domestic

peace keeping missions. According to this directive, the military cannot:

. Interdict a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or similar activity.

. Conduct search or seizure.

. Arrest, apprehend, stop and frisk, or similar activity.

. Use military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as under cover

agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.

The use of military force is therefore limited to providing assistance to law enforcement

personnel in the form of manpower for domestic peace keeping. This limitation in the

Marine Corps' peace keeping powers by U.S. Law and DoD guidance is not compatible

with the powers necessary to deal with the threats to our national interests that the military

will be tasked to deal with in the 1990s and beyond.

3. U.S. Marine Corps Mission in Domestic Peace Keeping

In Chapter IV, figure 4-1 graphically depicts two circumstances when the

President will employ Marine forces in domestic peace keeping missions. These two areas are in

response to domestic threats to the nations vital and survival national interests. The difference

between vital and survival national interests defines the spectrum of force that will be used by the

Marine Corps to deal with these different types of domestic disturbances. A threat to our vital

national interests is a threat to the well-being of the nation if the government does not respond

with military force, whereas a threat to our survival interest requires the military to immediately

respond to a perilous threat.98 The Marine Corps' capability to respond to both of these threats is

questionable in terms of threats to our vital national interests.

The Marine Corps provides an extremely credible force in terms of providing

combat power to deal with a phase level V threat or a threat that a domestic disturbance poses

to our survival national interests such as civil war. The Marine Corps has been operating at the

war end of the spectrum for so long that there is no question as to their capability to defeat such

a threat. However, in addressing a domestic disturbance that threatens our vital national

interests, the Marine Corps is limited by the law and DoD guidance to provide a credible

capability.

As presented earlier, the escalation of civil unrest into phase level IV will

require the addition of Marine forces to quell insurrection and unrest. However, these forces

are necessary to aid law enforcement in performing law enforcement activities to bring unrest

under control. Although military police units possess the training and

____________________

98 Nuechterlein, 9-10.

experience to perform these functions, they are limited by U.S. law in providing these capabilities

to law enforcement personnel. Likewise, Marine ground units are neither empowered nor

extensively trained in these capabilities as well. As a result, U.S. Law and DoD guidance have

left a gap in the Marine Corps' capability to provide a credible domestic peace keeping force to

combat the most common types of disturbances the Marine Corps will be tasked to address,

phase level IV threats to our vital national interests.

B. DOMESTIC PEACE KEEPING DILEMMAS

In interviews with Marine officers involved in domestic peace keeping missions and

officers responsible for articulating the Marine Corps' policy on domestic peace keeping, it

became apparent to the author that Marines took whatever action was necessary. At times,

these actions required Marines to violate U.S. Law and DoD directives in order to safeguard

their units and accomplish the mission. The previous chapter identified the need to examine U.S.

Law and DoD) guidance in order to eliminate the "gray area" existing between the necessary

actions of peace keepers to accomplish the phase level IV mission, and the actions authorized by

the law and DoD guidance.

The power of the President and the U.S. Attorney General to interject civilian

representatives into the chain of command, complicates the JTF command and control structure.

The civilian representation by the President and the SCRAG allow a dual reporting situation to

exist which will invariably lead to confusion. Marine commanders must understand this inherent

problem area and work hard to reduce conflict and eliminate the confusion this problem presents.

This factor adds to the complexities of cooperating with the numerous law enforcement agencies

and governmental task forces converging on a small riot torn urban area. Two effective methods

to simplify the command and control process and clarify relationships between the military and law enforcement agencies, is through liaison

officers and effective communications.

Due to the random nature of civil unrest, many different organizations with a variety of

capabilities will be working together for the first time. In this respect, the JTF commander will

require senior officers to serve with the JTF command element and other agencies to coordinate

the activities of the National Guard, JTF components, city, count and state police departments, FBI

task forces, and civil authorities. The coordination role these liaison officers perform, demonstrates

the necessity of talented and experienced officers in these billets. To effectively function in

response to civil authorities and CINC tasking, the JTF commander must evaluate liaison

requirements early in the operation and use officers familiar with these tasks. Liaison officers will

serve as a vital link between the JTF commander and external agencies in order to communicate

capabilities and limitations of the military and civilian agencies.

Marine commanders deploying into built-up cities must understand that the

communication assets organic to their units may not be sufficient. The radios carried by Marine

units cannot effectively transmit in heavily built-up areas. During the Los Angeles riots, unit

commanders were forced to use cellular telephones or relay transmissions through police radio

networks. This was done because organic radios were not effective in cross-town

communications. Cellular telephones served as the method to tie-in the many law enforcement

agencies deployed in close proximity to Marine units. Reliable and robust communications are a

definite requirement in dealing with any civil unrest. There is a significant shortfall in the

communication assets allotted to Marine commanders participating in domestic peace keeping

missions, and this shortfall must be corrected prior to deploying into modem cities.

C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE STUDY

The research presented in this thesis identified possible areas of future research that will

undoubtedly aid U.S. Marine Corps units tasked with executing domestic peace keeping missions.

These areas of research include legal issues, and the U.S. Marine Corps' ability to meet the

changing characteristic of civil unrest.

The Marine Corps would benefit from research into initiating legislation to empower

military forces with the right to conduct search and seizure, interdiction of vehicles, and the

detention of suspects. This research would identify the limiting factors under U.S. law that

prevents the military from effectively accomplishing the mission, and recommend legislation

which would empower the military to more aggressively combat the changing threat to Marine

forces performing domestic peace keeping missions. Eliminating or reducing the "gray area"

between what action is necessary and what action is authorized will relieve a judgmental burden

from small unit leaders faced with difficult decisions during domestic peace keeping missions.

The other topic for potential thesis research is to address the readiness of U.S. Marine

Corps units to accomplish domestic peace keeping missions. The research could concentrate on

training and equipping issues in order to determine the readiness levels of those qualified units

identified by the U. S. Marine Corps to accomplish the mission. The research in this thesis

already identified some of these issues, but more detailed research would provided valuable

data to Marine commanders tasked with executing future domestic peace keeping missions. The result

of this research may very well reinforce the need of the Marine Corps to closely evaluate their

policy in using any available Marine unit to participate in domestic peace keeping missions. These

research areas will contribute to this thesis in aiding the Marine Corps in providing a credible

domestic peace keeping capability to the nation.

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