Blockades: Determining Effectiveness CSC 1995 Subject Area - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: Blockades: Determining Effectiveness AUTHOR: Lieutenant Commander C. Troedson, United States Navy THESIS: Since the decade of the l98O's, blockades have become an increasingly important weapon of diplomacy in coercing belligerent nations to accept U.S. or international policy. There are many considerations the blockading nation must address if success is to be achieved. The success of the blockade is not always obvious and is difficult to determine for several reasons. BACKGROUND: As the most powerful Navy in the world, the US Navy has been called upon on numerous occasions in the last two decades to conduct naval blockades. While the Navy is quite capable of performing the operation there are several key factors which planners must consider which will promote success. Is the effort supported both nationally and internationally? Is control of air, land, and sea routes possible? What are the desired results and are they achievable through blockade alone? Is the blockaded nation vulnerable to the blockade. Is the hardship that the blockade will inflict on non-combatants justified by the expected results? Blockades are not effective against all countries and a blanket policy of imposing one for every crisis is wrong. The blockades imposed upon Iraq and Haiti will be evaluated based upon these tenets. RECOMMENDATIONS: The same attention placed upon proper planning for the air, land and sea battle needs to be applied when considering imposition of a naval blockade. Determinations need to be made upfront concerning the goal and expected impact the blockade will have for the targeted country. To impose an economic blockade blindly without considering the economic and political situation of the blockaded nation may result in failure to achieve the desired endstate. THESIS A blockade cannot be classified as a surgical strike or even as a smart weapon. For these reasons the effectiveness and required precision of the naval blockade or embargo in achieving the desired endstate is questioned in both the planning phase and, with increased vigor, months after being placed in position. Answers to these questions are elusive and are yet to be decided for the naval blockades the United States participated in during the Reagan, Bush, and now Clinton administrations. There are many factors a blockading force must consider and which, when applied, contribute to the success of the blockade. Several of these key factors will be used in analyzing the apparently successful naval blockade placed against Iraq compared to the questionable success of the Haitian blockade. In conclusion several intrinsic factors contributing to the questionable effectiveness of blockades are addressed. TERMINOLOGY Economic pressure may be brought to bear on a belligerent in degrees, ranging from restricting specific commodities as with an embargo or sanctions to full fledged air and sea blockade of all trade. "An embargo is generally an order by a government to forbid ships to enter or leave its ports and is issued with the intent of imposing legal restriction, hindrance or restraint on commerce." 1 An embargo involves domestic prohibition of trade, total or specific, with a belligerent country. Most often an embargo is placed on arms, munitions, and materials of war. An embargo does not necessarily include naval or air power for enforcement, but a show of naval force may be required to ensure observance. An embargo may simply rely upon collective monitoring of shipping manifests to track prohibited cargoes. Detention in port, with confiscation of vessels and cargo found to be in violation of the embargo is legal under international law. A blockade can be considered an act of war or an act short of war and comes in different forms. It can be offensive or defensive, near (tactical) or distant (strategic) An offensive blockade is directed toward physically denying the movement of commodities to or from the belligerent nation. The offensive blockade provides strategic leverage for negotiation of disputes by inflicting hardship and inconvenience which weaken the belligerent resolve and works in partnership with a military offensive by cutting off the supply of materials and revenue necessary for continued conduct of war. The naval blockade imposed against Iraq by the United Nations following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 02 August l990 is an example of an offensive blockade. The defensive blockade is a protective measure established in order to prevent the movement of unwanted commodities, contraband, or enemy personnel into that nation's territory or to prevent enemy warships from going to sea where they would present a threat to friendly shipping. The introduction of air and naval forces in the "War on Drugs," though not sufficient in numbers to be totally effective, is an attempt to form a defensive blockade to prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. The near blockade, off the coast or outside the port of the enemy was popular when weapons were limited in range and the only threat was coastal artillery. In the near blockade enemy activity could be monitored full time. With the advent of mines, torpedoes, and missiles the use of the near blockade became too dangerous and costly to use. The distant blockade, established farther beyond the enemy's coast, became the method of choice by necessity. Today, new technologies such as radar and radio communications make distant blockades nearly as effective as near blockades once were. The term "sanction" covers , in a broad sense, those devices that are used to enforce or induce adherence to international law and the laws of war.2 As such the naval blockade and the embargo are both devices which fall under the category of sanction. Only because it is often misused one final term deserving of clarification is quarantine. This term is often wrongly used to identify a forceful means of trade warfare similar to blockade. The label quarantine is used with the intent of identifying a belligerent action with a non-belligerent label, for example President Kennedy's Cuban Quarantine. Used correctly, quarantine is the practice of restricting the movement of passengers and cargo into a country to prevent the introduction of animal and plant diseases. Quarantines are enforced in port by inspectors who review manifests and inspect cargo searching for banned or infected plant and animal products. Any items found in violation can be seized for destruction or turned away. Establishing and maintaining a naval blockade requires significant naval power and long term dedication. Public opinion, both nationally and internationally, is required if a blockading nation is to successfully implement and maintain a blockade. The burden of unilateral enforcement was removed from the United States early in the case of Iraq versus the international community. Internationally reaction to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 02, l990 was swift. The United Nations, on the day of the invasion, passed Resolution 660 by unanimous vote demanding Iraq withdraw immediately from Kuwait. Various nations took independent action freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, halting arms shipments, and imposing a boycott of oil imports from both Iraq and Kuwait. On August 06, l990 the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N.Charter, voted l3-0 (Cuba and Yemen abstaining) to require all member states to prevent the import of "all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution. "(Resolution 66l) The Resolution also prohibited any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait, and prohibited the sale or supply of any commodities or products (excluding medical supplies and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs) to Iraq or Kuwait.3 Actual enforcement of UN Resolution 661 with ships from l3 nations began on August l7, l990, with an interception in the Red Sea by the USS John L. Hall (FFG 32) of the Iraqi oil tanker Al Fao. Maritime Interception Operations continue to this day in support of UN Resolutions against Iraq with a weakening of determination appearing among various countries. France and Russia are pressuring to ease the blockade and allow trade to resume with Iraq while the United States, sympathetic toward a nation considered important to the Mideast peace process, has quietly ignored recent Jordanian violations of the blockade. In the case of Haiti neither national or international support came willingly. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by a military coup in August l99l. The United States promptly backed the Organization of American States call for an economic embargo by initiating weak bilateral trade sanctions against Haiti which were not strictly enforced. Contradictory signals from both the Bush and Clinton administrations contributed to the hesitancy of the international community in responding to the situation. With rare exception the economic blockade against Iraq has been effective in isolating Iraq from international trade, reaching nearly 100 percent effectiveness during the Gulf War. Continuation of this success is possible only through near total control of the land, sea and air routes which blockade runners must use. The main effort against Iraq takes place in the North Red Sea targetted against ships bound for Aqaba, Jordan, which shares a land border with Iraq. Leaks to the embargo occur primarily through smuggling across this border between Jordan and Iraq. Despite violations receiving high level attention, with pressure being applied on Jordan to support the blockade, the violations continue allowing Iraq to rebuild its defensive and offensive capabilities. The chokepoint between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, as well as deep navigable water, are factors which benefit the interception ships. Interception ships are able to closely monitor and block the chokepoint and the deep water allows pursuit of shallow draft blockade runners. Any vessel stating her destination as Aqaba is boarded and searched to ensure that no cargo is manifested for delivery to Iraq. Enforcement of the U.N. embargo against Haiti was not as vigorously pursued as the embargo against Iraq. The primary reason for this being lack of national support in the U.S. which was the predominant naval force available for enforcement. In dramatic contrast to the strict enforcement of sanctions against Iraq, in which U.S. naval vessels aggressively intercepted and boarded ships, three oil tankers reportedly managed to slip into Haiti, providing fuel to keep the military machine going. Haitian parliamentarians also complained to the U.S. Congress that a steady flow of supply planes were landing at Port-au- Prince airport each night. . .The United States quickly abandoned the pretense, announcing on February 4 that the embargo would be relaxed for U.S. companies running assembly plants that employ cheap labor in Haiti.4 Added to the apparent policy weakness which hampered warships in stopping these large blockade running ships the jagged coast line with its restricted waters in which the large warships were unable to maneuver benefitted the blockade runners with smaller, shallow draft vessels. That leaves the jagged shoreline to "coast- huggers," wildcat fuel runners who use the cover of darkness to spirit drums of gas and diesel into Haiti's biggest harbors. Together with small tankers operating out of Venezuela and Panama, which do not observe the embargo, the armada of smugglers have managed to deliver so much contraband fuel that hustlers have set up a bustling business along "gasoline alley" in Port au-Prince. 5 Not only did the air and naval enforcement of the embargo prove ineffective but strong trade across the border with the Dominican Republic continued with an estimated 10,000 Haitians daily crossing to buy fuel to be sold on the black market. The ineffectiveness of the blockade was significant in that the Haitian leadership continued to function despite the sanctions and was further emboldened in its defiance of the international community. As seen in Haiti, a naval blockade by itself is usually ineffective in obtaining the desired results. The successful naval blockade relies heavily upon operations being simultaneously conducted ashore. These operations may include actual invasion by ground forces, an aerial bombing campaign, or simply the believable threat of such invasion or attack. The show of force demonstrated by the introduction of U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia on l4 August l990 and the blockade which began on l7 August l990 failed to impress Saddam Hussein. He obviously felt time was on his side and expected a weakening of wills with gradual acquiescence from the world community over the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait. Through economic sanctions the international body hoped to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. In order to maintain the non violent posturing, President Bush, though prepared to use the U.S. Navy to enforce these sanctions, avoided describing the sanctions as a blockade. Saddam Hussein rejected United Nations ultimatums to withdraw from Kuwait and the offensive to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait began on January l7, l99l. Military leaders in Haiti were confident that the U.S. would not resort to military force for several reasons. First, the U.S., U.N., O.A.S. and even President Aristide were initially outspoken against the introduction of military forces. Secondly, repeated American threats and associated deadlines passed without enforcement. Finally, emboldened by their success in turning away the USS Harlan County, carrying American and Canadian military trainers as part of the Governors Island Accord, the Haitian military felt they could prolong the political conflict without any real threat from the United States. It was not until notification that U.S. Forces were enroute to forcefully remove them from power and reinstall the legitimate government in Haiti that agreement for a peaceful settlement was reached. The greater a nations dependency upon sea trade the greater its vulnerability to coercion by naval blockade. Iraq depends upon sealift for export of its primary source of revenue, oil (30 million dollars per day), and for the import of the majority of its supplies, both military and domestic. The blockade resulted in ". . .Iraq los[ing] 90 percent of its imports, 100 percent of its exports, and had its gross national product cut in half."6 reduction of spare parts and equipment as well as beans, oil, and bullets brought Saddam's once mighty war machine to the brink of collapse. An island nation the size of Maryland, Haiti is primarily an agrarian society, with 75 percent of the population relying upon small scale subsistence farming. Approximately 75 percent of the population live in abject poverty with little to export and no money for significant imports. Haitians relied mostly upon sea transport to deliver humanitarian supplies and these were exempted from the embargo. Aside from demonstrating U.N. disapproval for the Haitian regime the economic blockade against impoverished Haiti had little merit. CONCLUSION What do the blockades against Iraq and Haiti have in common? There are several intrinsic features of a blockade which must be evaluated by the blockading nation. These features contribute to targetting inaccuracies and complicate measurement of blockade effectiveness. There is little question that the blockade imposed against Iraq was successful in weakening the Iraqi military both materially and psychologically, contributing greatly to the shaping of the battlefield. Four years after the Gulf War and without the threat of military intervention to support it, the blockade has failed to achieve all the intended goals. On the other hand, no evidence can be found to indicate the blockade imposed against Haiti contributed in any measurable way to restoring the democratically elected president to power. The length of time required for the blockades to pressure both Iraq and Haiti to comply with the dictates of the international community has not been determined. Iraq continues to defy the world despite continuance of the blockade, and Saddam Hussein remains firmly in power. Iraq has proven capable of rebuilding its military and repairing most wartime damage even with a blockade in place. The question that needs addressing is how long should the blockade remain in place even when its usefulness in achieving the desired endstate becomes questionable. This pressure on Iraq, this barbarian policy of starving a whole population to force them into rebellion against the regime, has the contrary effect because it increases the dependence of the people on this government. Political change is too luxurious a thought to indulge in if you are busy just surviving.7 The military leadership in Haiti would probably never have ceded control of the government because of hardships brought about by the naval blockade alone. How long could the United States expect the international community to support an unpopular blockade? Repressive regimes must have something personal to loose (or gain as in the case of Haiti) before they willingly surrender control of a nation. It was not until the introduction of military forces to physically remove them was initiated did the regime in Haiti finally capitulate. Western nations tend to evaluate blockades based upon economic damage and hardship. Iraq and Haiti, being Third World nations, do not provide their citizens with a standard of living equivalent to even the poorest of Western nations. The general population is familiar with subsistence living and is unfamiliar with luxuries Westerners depend upon in their daily lives. The impact of a blockade is slow in developing even in industrial countries. The impact on Third World, under-developed nations is significantly less and may be of little consequence. Neither Saddam Hussein of Iraq nor the military leadership in Haiti were particularly concerned with the welfare of the populace. The hardships endured by the general population were not shared equally by the leadership or the military, the designated targets of the blockade. Both the leadership and the military received priority in food, fuel, medicine in order to maintain their control of the countries. In the case of Iraq, ". . . the United States provided evidence that President Saddam Hussein was spending lavishly on his own comforts while millions of Iraqis lacked food and medicine. ... the Iraqi leader has spent more than $500 million on dozens of opulent new palaces for the exclusive use of his family." 8 The target of the blockade, those in power, control who has money and food. The Iraqi government lives virtually unaffected by the blockade while the common Iraqi citizen lives in poverty, forced to sell family possessions to purchase basic necessities. In Haiti the leadership and elite actually benefitted from the blockade. The handful of wealthy families who directly or indirectly support the junta maintain their near monopolies on items exempted from the blockade, such as cooking oil, rice, and sugar-- and are profiting handsomely. . .black marketeers slapped an $11 charge on every case of supplies. Canned milk, a substitute for nonexistent fresh milk, has doubled in price. The poor people can't afford it. . .Everything is for the rich first. 9 Stories of hardship and death were used as political weapons by the leaders in both Iraq and Haiti. "In fact, the military is counting on headlines about rising malnutrition and disease to weaken the international community's resolve."10 A naval blockade is a two edged-sword, injurious to combatants and non-combatants alike. The simple act of declaring an economic blockade has significant impact on shippers to that area of the world and to other countries. In the Red Sea boardings did not take place after sunset as a safety issue. Any merchant that could not be boarded and inspected prior to sunset was not allowed to proceed and was required to lay to until the next morning. The cost of the delay runs into the tens of thousands of dollars a shipper loses in operational costs while sitting at anchor unable to deliver the cargo. Further, there is an increased danger of sailing into what may be considered a war zone and the possibility of increased insurance premiums. The incentive to conduct shipping within the blockade area is greatly reduced and many shippers are financially forced to avoid the area of enforcement. Again using the North Red Sea interdiction effort as an example, trade to Jordan and Israel were significantly reduced by the naval blockade against Iraq. Indeed, "...financial losses [were] incurred by Jordan as a result of delays caused by a US--led Naval force...Jordanian losses are estimated at more than 1.4 billion since the sanctions were applied against Iraq in August 1990."11 Other nations, Russia, France, China, and Turkey were also big trading partners with Iraq and would like to see an end to the blockade and resumption of trade with Iraq. This reduction in shipping also has an impact on the non- combatants within belligerent country. Even though food and medicine may be exempted from the embargo, the reduced shipping in general reduces available foodstuffs and medicine into the blockaded country. In both Haiti and Iraq, the blockades impacted the lives of the non-combatants more than the intended targets. This is an unavoidable occurence with the economic blockade. The question that must be answered in the planning stages must be whether set goals are achievable and whether the suffering inflicted upon unintended victims is justified by the results. In the case of Iraq the initial results, cutting off war materials to Hussein, appear to support the blockade. Continuation of the blockade alone to pressure Iraq to abide by remaining United Nations Resolutions is questionable. In the case of Haiti, the poorest country in the Americas with a small and ill equipped military, the naval blockade succeeded only in demonstrating the international communities opposition to the Haitian regime. The aim of pressuring the regime to surrender power was not achievable through economic pressure alone. For an economic blockade to be effective each case must be viewed individually, taking into consideration the aim to be achieved and the situation both politically and economically for that specific nation. The questions that bear answering are will the blockade impact its target and is the collateral damage to the civilian population acceptable? NOTES 1. Naval Warfare Publication 10, Warfare Naval Warfare College, Newport, RI. 03 March l972, p 2-9. 2. Naval Warfare Publication 10. 3. CDR Jane Gilliland Dalton, JAGC, "The Influence of Law on Seapower in Desert Shield/Desert Storm," Naval Law Review Vol 41, l993, p 30. 4. John Canham-Clyne, "Haiti After the Coup," World Policy Journal Fall l994, p 350. 5. Kevin Fedarko, "To Have and To Have Not," 06 June l994, p 32. 6. General Norman Schwarzkopf, "A Tribute to the Navy- Marine Corps Team", August l99l, p 44. 7. Youssef M Ibrahim, "Baghdad's Burden", The New York Times 25 October l994, p Al. 8. Richard D. Lyons, "U.N Council Decides to Keep Economic Sanctions on Iraq", New York Times 15 November l994, p A6. 9. Fedarko, p 32. 10. Fedarko, p 33. 11. Lamis Andoni, "US Lifts Red Sea Blockade In Peace Gesture to Jordan", Christian Science Monitor 27 April l994, p 3. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Andoni, Lamis. "US Lifts Red Sea Blockade In Peace Gesture to Jordan". Christian Science Monitor, 27 April l994 ,p 3. 2. Canham-Clyne, John. "Haiti After the Coup". World Policy Journal FALL l994, pgs 348-364. An interview with Haitian ambassador to the United States, Jean Casimir. 3. Gilliland Dalton, CDR, JAGC. "The Influence of Law on Seapower in Desert Shield/Desert Storm". Naval Law Review Vol 4l, l993, pgs 27-82. 4. Fedarko, Kevin. "To Have and To Have Not." Time 06 June l994, pgs 32-33. 5. Ibrahim, Youssef. "Baghdad's Burden." The New York Times, 25 October l994, pgs A1 - A12. 6. Lyons, Richard. "U.N. Council Decides to Keep Economic Sanctions on Iraq." The New York Times, l5 November l994, p A6. 7. Naval Warfare Publication 10, Naval Warfare. Naval War College, Newport, RI, 03 March l972, pg 2-9 8. Schwarzkopf, Norman, GEN. "A Tribute to the Navy-Marine Corps Team." Proceedings, August l99l, 44. Speech presented to the Naval Academy Class of l99l.
