The United States Military and Domestic Peacekeeping CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA National - Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The United States Military and Domestic Peacekeeping Author: Major Lawrence P. Stawicki USMC Research Questions: What has been the military's role in domestic peacekpeeing and what should it be in the future? Discussion: There are some in the United States who argue that there is no authority under Title lO of the United States Code (U.S.C.) to use the military to quell civil disorder except under circumstances equivalent to war. Others argue that the military mission is to help civil authorities protect life and property, preserve social values, and maintain the tradition of individual liberty together with social order. Probably most citizens feel that when civil disorder occurs, "something must be done." It is generally accepted that National Guard units are the first line of defense, and if they are insufficient, that active duty forces reinforce them. It is the latter argument this paper supports. Using military units to enforce civil law is distasteful and dangerous, but it is preferable to lawlessness and anarchy. While abusive use of military forces in the domestic sphere can cause untold destruction to domestic values and political and social structure, judicious arrangements can nurture, support and bolster internal institutions and morale. Conclusions: The use of the military in domestic peacekeeping missions to preserve order and backup civilian police has a long history. This mission is both justified and constitutional. Indicators suggest that the use of the military to again perform a domestic peacekeeping mission is very likely. The need for the military to be trained and ready to execute this mission is essential. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION l II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 5 The Whiskey Rebellion 5 The Slavery Issue 7 Reconstruction 8 Labor Strife 9 The Great Depression ll The World War II Years l2 Civil Rights and Urban Race Riots l4 The Antiwar Movement l8 Surveillance Operations 2O Drug Enforcement 2l The l992 Los Angeles Riot 22 III MILITARY INTERVENTION AND DOMESTIC LAW 25 The Constitution 25 The Early Laws 27 The Posse Comitatus Act of l878 3O The l97O's 32 The l98l Amendments 34 The l988 Amendments 35 IV CURRENT LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 37 Title lO, United States Code 37 Department of Defense Directives 4l V ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 46 Command and Control 46 Training 48 Direct Intervention 5O Force Selection 5l The Media 52 VI A REASON FOR READINESS 55 Crime 56 A Widening Gap 57 The Family 58 Immigration 6O VII CONCLUSION 62 NOTES 65 BIBLIOGRAPHY 74 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION To the conscience of the nation that fancies itself the world's greatest democracy, the idea of military intrusion into the affairs of civil government is profoundly repugnant. In l972, for example, the United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren Burger, had occasion to recall the "traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into civilian affairs. That tradition has deep roots in our history.. ." (Laird v. Tatum, 4O8 U.S. l,l5). Again in l974 the same Chief Justice observed on behalf of the court that even where some form of government force is warranted "the decision to involk military power has traditionally been viewed with suspicion and skepticism since it often involves the temporary suspension of some of our most cherished rights..." (Scheuer v. Rhodes, 4l6 U.S. 232, 246).1 This aversion to domestic peacekeeping is found in the military as well. Beginning in l884, when officers in the military accepted their commissions they took an oath "to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic."2 Whether in the l9th or 2Oth century, officers have much preferred confronting foreign enemies than domestic ones. The professional soldier's preference for national defense over internal peacekeeping in part prevented the military from becoming a national gendarmerie, but, in the final analysis, the decision to intervene was a political act. Under the Constitution, that decision belonged to civilian leaders, and military men wanted it that way.3 The professional soldier dislikes domestic duty for a variety of reasons. Military men and women see themselves as the defenders of a nation from foreign enemies using organized armed forces. This is not only their reason for existence; it is the job they want to concentrate on! Diversionary tasks, such as fighting forest fires, assisting in flood relief programs, or performing police work, detract from their ability to meet foreign enemies. Finally, professional soldiers abhor a situation that pits them against their fellow citizens, who often may be veterans. Everything about the suppression of domestic disorder in fact, violates the professional soldiers' code and their view of themselves.4 It would be easier if defending the country involved only foreign enemies. It would be easier if all civil disorder could be controlled by our civil police forces. But that is not the case. At times our country needs help from its military and no one ever said those times would be easy or fair. When the United States is involved in very real wars in our cities and at our borders, the military cannot justify a reluctance to participate on the grounds that they must stand ready to fight a major conflict that fewer and fewer Americans believe will occur. Reluctance to take part because it is unglamorous, degrading, or too difficult may lead to reduced confidence and support for the military. The growing threat of international terrorism, its domestic imitators and civil disobedience on a major scale, and the need for a response beyond the capabilities of the civil authority raises serious questions that need to be faced with realism. The United States thus far has not experienced the type of terrorism and civil disobedience that has threatened the very existence of some Latin American countries or that has so radically altered the quality of life even in several quite stable European countries. Although it would be alarmist to suggest that such possibilities were imminent, it would be irresponsible to discount the eventuality entirely. Experience elsewhere has shown that when terrorism and civil disorder reach a certain level of intensity, the only appropriate response is a military one.5 The most fundamental right any government owes its citizens is personal safety - the right to live, work, and move about peaceably, secure in one's person and property. The fear of civil disorder dissolves the social fabric that binds Americans together into a community of common experience. It turns strangers into enemies, unfamiliar ground into dangerous turf, and random social contact into risky business. When civil disorder afflicts a neighborhood, those who can avoid it, stay away; those who cannot, suffer alone. The former becomes isolated, the latter abandoned.6 It is the intent of this paper to explore the subject of the military's role in domestic peacekeeping. I will build a foundation by first addressing some historical and legal background information on the subject. Next I will examine the current laws and directives that guide the military in the controversial issue of intervention into domestic law enforcement. Lastly, I will explore some issues for consideration and reasons for concern. Hopefully, this argument will demonstrate why the military needs to be ready to execute a domestic peacekeeping mission, what areas of this execution require more attention, and that a domestic peacekeeping mission will assuredly be a mission the military receives in the future. The military cannot stand idly by while U. S. cities are being destroyed and citizens are being murdered during a civil disorder. The American people will tolerate nothing less from its Armed Forces than a quick, decisive, and professional response. The military must be ready and willing to protect the nation against its domestic enemies. CHAPTER II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND It is important to review U. S. history to understand the issue of domestic peacekeeping. Just as we study battles and campaigns to be proficient at fighting major conventional wars, so too must we study domestic disorders to become proficient in executing our domestic peacekeeping missions. The mistakes made in the past can be avoided if we learn from history. Writing a complete history of the military's involvement in domestic disorders is well beyond the scope of this paper, therefore, I will focus on selected pivotal events in which the U. S. military was called upon to respond. The Whiskey Rebellion The first use of federal forces to suppress organized resistance to United States law was in the Whiskey Rebellion in l794. The farmers of western Pennsylvania displayed open and violent resistance to the collection of a federal tax on whiskey. President George Washington issued a proclamation in August l794 calling upon the tax resisters to obey the law. Resistance persisted, however, and the administration decided to enforce compliance. By employing federal troops Washington was aware that he was setting a precedent, thus he pursued with caution. In September l794 Washington issued another proclamation and sent three peace commissioners to Pittsburgh, the center of opposition, to negotiate with the rebels. When it became clear that negotiations would fail, Washington nationalized l2,95O militiamen, a force approximately the same size as the Continental Army of the Revolution. Washington, along with the governors of three states, personally led the military expedition into western Pennsylvania. Although the militia encountered evidence of western discontent, it met with no rebel force.1 Events after the militia's rendezvous were in fact anticlimactic. The rebellion burned itself out, in part because the rebels realized the administration intended to use force. By the time the Federal Force reached the Pittsburgh area, resistance had collapsed. Federal marshals arrested twenty men at random and sent them to Philadelphia for trial. Two were convicted of treason, but Washington pardoned both.2 Washington recognized that federal military intervention in a situation that normally called for civil law enforcement was a potentially explosive political act. He went beyond the letter of the law to obtain prior support from state authorities and the general public before calling for a military expedition. He was also careful to subordinate the military to civilian authority.3 The first threat of the use of federal force was not only a precedent setting event but it was also a genuine test of the federal government's ability to control disorder and enforce the law. The Slavery Issue For over eight years after the Whisky Rebellion, nearly all federal interventions dealt in some manner with the turbulence connected with slavery and its abolition.4 The intensification of the antislavery issue in the l85O's produced mounting challenges to civil authority, and government officials used state and national troops to enforce unpopular policies in an increasingly divided society. The difficulty was with the compromise of l850 and in particular with the Fugitive Slave Law. This law provided for the return of runaway slaves and denied the fugitives the right to testify or seek writs of habeas corpus against their removal. Federal judges or special commissioners were given power to call out a "posse comitatus composed of federal troops, militia or other citizens if necessary to return fugitive slaves. Posse comitatus is the body of men that a sheriff or other peace officer calls or may call to his assistance in the discharge of his official duty, as to quell a riot or make an arrest (Randon House Dictionary l984). In l85l in Christiana, Pennsylvania, the government used a Marine detachment to suppress an anti-slavery riot when armed Free Negroes drove off a posse of federal officers seeking to recapture four fugitive slaves. In l854, in Boston, fifty thousand demonstrators assembled to block the return of one slave to his southern owner. It took federal marshals, twenty-two militia companies, a battalion of regular soldiers, and a company of Marines, a total of sixteen hundred men to restore order. This has been the largest posse comitatus in the nation's history. This action was requested by U. S. Marshals, in conjunction with the Mayor and authorized by President Franklin Pierce.6 Attorney General Caleb Cushing explained later that a marshal's call for a posse obligated not only civilians but any and all organized forces whether militia of the state or officers, soldiers, sailors, and Marines of the United States. Except for a few instances in northern cities in the late l85O's, this broad assertion, the so-called Cushing Doctrine, was little used until the Reconstruction era following the Civil War.7 On l6 October, l859 President James Buchanan dispatched three companies of artillery, and a detachment of Marines in response to John Brown's raid on the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry. The commander of the force, Colonel Robert E. Lee, arrived on the scene on l9 October. After a brief negotiation the Marines stormed the building, killing two of the abolitionists and losing one of their own men. Brown and six other survivors were tried and executed for conspiracy to incite a slave insurrection and treason against the state of Virginia.8 Reconstruction Following the Civil War, the U. S. Army, for the first and only time in it's history, executed the mission as an army of occupation within the United States. President Andrew Johnson divided the Southern States into five military districts and the Army assisted law enforcement officers in enforcing reconstruction policies. In addition, the Army was used to control the illegal production of liquor, to suppress labor disputes, and even to collect taxes.9 The enforcement of civil law by federal forces caused intense controversy and opposition in the Southern States and in the Democratically controlled Congress. By l878, most congressmen decided that using the military to enforce the law was counter-productive.10 The result was that Congress passed the so-called Posse Comitatus Act of lB78, prohibiting the use of the military in law enforcement.11 This act will be analyzed in greater detail in Chapter III. Labor Strife Industrial disorders dominated federal intervention from l877 to the early l920'S. In most cases, regular Army units, occasionally augmented by Marine Corps detachments, were committed at the request of state officials who were unable to restore order with state and local law enforcement agencies.12 In l877 railroad strikes began when the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad cut wages for a second time that year during an economic depression. With over l00,000 workers idle, violence erupted in many cities and property was destroyed in Baltimore and Pittsburgh. President Rutherford B. Hayes deployed two thousand regular troops who rushed from city to city to put down rebellious strikers.13 was the first time the Army was used to break a strike since the l830's. The display of federal force helped end the strike as well as the violence.14 As a result of the violence of l877 the states began to rebuild the National Guard and train them in riot control. Many Governors, however, were reluctant to use the military in labor disputes due to voters sympathy for workers. Also, a number of industrial states, led by Pennsylvania, created a new paramilitary instrument, the State Police. This new paramilitary concept quickly spread to other states including New York and New Jersey.15 After the l89O's Congress generally followed a policy of maintaining federal troops under the direct control of the President and using them to preserve order rather than assisting management in crushing organized labor. President Theodore Roosevelt spurned persistent calls from Colorado in l903 and l9O4 to provide federal troops to police strike disorders in the Cripple Creek mining region. The President sent an Army officer to investigate the situation. The officer reported that the state had the resources to control the disorder and that federal troops were not needed. In l9O7 President Roosevelt granted a request from Nevada too hastily; once the federal force reached the disturbed area little disorder was found. An infuriated Roosevelt then ordered the commander of the force not to assist Nevada officials. Following Roosevelt's example in l9O3 many presidents sent Army officers or a civilian representative to survey the disorder before deciding to commit troops.16 In l9l4, as a result of the Ludlow Massacre, in which two women and eleven children were killed when company guards and Colorado militiamen destroyed a tent city of striking coal miners and their families, and following open warfare in which at least fifty persons were killed, President Woodrow Wilson agreed to the governor s request for federal troops. The President, however, made it clear publicly that the soldiers were to restore order, not to assist the mine owners in breaking the strike. Consequently, he requested that the Colorado National Guard be withdrawn, that everyone in the region including company guards and local police be disarmed, and that strikebreakers not be brought in by the mining companies. Strikers welcomed the seventeen hundred troops with cheers and a brass band. In contrast to previous similar disturbances, the troops acted under federal orders only, with no pretense of cooperation with state and local officials and were withdrawn some six months later.' The Great Depression In the l92O's in addition to the courses at the Army Command and General Staff College on more effective use of troops during civil disorder the intelligence officers put together a domestic contingency plan to fight civil disorders. Among the so-called Rainbow Plans (color-coded for different world adversaries) was Emergency Plan White, a detailed outline for Army intervention to suppress radical, Communist-led civil disorders and armed insurrection if they occurred, within the United States.18 In l932 the Army used a modified form of Emergency Plan White against the so-called Bonus Army, an assemblage of unemployed veterans and their families who had come to the nation's capital at the depth of the Great Depression to petition Congress for an immediate cash payment of their "bonus" for service in World War I. When Congress rejected them many left, but many did not. The Washington Police Force tried to remove the remaining two thousand of the Bonus Army but in the confrontation two policemen and two veterans were killed. President Hoover called on the U.S. Army Troops to evict the veterans from their encampment. The troops were led by the Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur. With his young aide, Major Dwight D. Eisenhower at his side, MacArthur employed infantry, cavalry, tanks, and tear gas to clear the veterans out of their shanties, which were then set on fire. President Hoover, MacArthur, and the Army were subsequently criticized for excessive use of force. The actions, however, were successful and the Bonus Army left the capital.19 The World War II Years Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December l94l, President Roosevelt assigned protection of defense plants to the Army. Military Intelligence (G-2) established a network of thousands of informants in its defense-plant protection system. Military forces were used many times during the war to maintain defense production. In the summer of l94l Roosevelt used twenty- five hundred troops to enable strikebreakers to continue production at the North American Aviation plant in Los Angeles which was under a wildcat strike. The strike ended a month later. Once the United States entered the war, Congress specifically empowered the President to seize industrial facilities where war production was threatened by labor disturbances.2O Additionally, President Roosevelt, under pressure from the Army and Navy and from western economic and political groups, authorized the War Department in February l942 to remove the approximately 7,OOO Japanese aliens and some l00,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast and intern them in prison- like camps in remote areas of California, the Midwest, and the Rocky Mountain states. Run by a civilian agency, the War Relocation Authority, the camps were guarded by soldiers of the U. S. Army. The Army was responsible for the movement of these people and management of the camps until the emergency regulation was lifted on 2 January l945. Similar actions took place in Hawaii as well as the imposition of martial law.21 The Army was used to restore order in the summer of l943 in Detroit when in June, race riots turned into a full-scale war. The governor of Michigan requested federal assistance. By the time the Army arrived twenty-five blacks and nine whites had been killed and more than 7OO people had been injured. In August l944, when a protest strike in Philadelphia against upgrading black transportation workers led to interracial clashes, Roosevelt sent federal troops, who quickly restored order. Civil Rights and Urban Race Riots The primary domestic use of the U. S. Army in the late l95O's and l96O's was in response to the civil rights revolution that established equal legal rights for African-Americans. President Eisenhower found himself in such a position in l957. Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas defied a federal court order directing the racial integration of Central High School in Little Rock. Faubus not only denounced the court but ordered out the Arkansas National Guard to halt integration.23 Eisenhower's Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, had cautioned the President that if Faubus persisted, Federal action was unavoidable. Eisenhower was already on record against using the military to enforce Supreme Court rulings on civil rights, having told a press conference in July l957 that "I can't imagine any set of circumstances that would ever induce me to send federal troops to enforce a court order. continued defiance, and his calling out and then removing the Arkansas National Guard, led to rioting in Little Rock on 23 and 24 September. Though still loathe to use troops Eisenhower had to act, especially after the mayor of Little Rock pleaded for federal assistance. Eisenhower began by federalizing the Arkansas National Guard, the first time that had been done since Reconstruction. In addition, the President dispatched twelve hundred paratroopers from the lOlst Airborne Division and these uniformed soldiers kept Central High School open until May lg58.25 In the fall of l962 at the University of Mississippi at Oxford, James H. Meredith, a black transfer student, was admitted under a federal court order. In addition to ten thousand National Guardsmen President Kennedy dispatched twelve thousand regular soldiers under Major General Creighton V. Abrams, Jr. to surround "Ole Miss." More than two thousand persons engaged in pitched battles with federal marshals escorting Meredith into the school, resulting in the deaths of two rioters and injuries sustained by l66 federal marshals, 4B soldiers, and 3l civilians. A small detachment of marshals continued to protect Meredith until he was graduated in August l963.26 In the summer of l963, on petition from black Alabamians, a federal court ordered the desegregation of that state's university. Governor George C. Wallace called out seven hundred members of the National Guard to preserve order and block desegregation. President Kennedy twice federalized the Alabama National Guard, forcing Wallace to back down from his refusal to allow integration of the university or public schools in Birmingham, Mobile and Tuskegee.27 One of the most acrimonious confrontations between a governor and a President occurred during the l967 Detroit riots. In the heart of the black ghetto in Detroit, an early morning police raid on an after-hours drinking establishment on July 23, l967, triggered the appearance of a group of several hundred blacks. One person threw a bottle at a police cruiser, others shouted obscenities, and a mob surged down l2th Street breaking windows. The small band of demonstrators quickly multiplied, looting increased, fires broke out, and disorder and destruction escalated. The disorder spread over almost eleven square miles.28 A delay in obtaining federal troops occurred because Governor George Romney, a potential Republican presidential nominee, proved reluctant to declare that the state government could not control the situation by formally requesting federal assistance. President Lyndon Johnson was also reluctant to commit federal troops because he did not want to be branded with the burden of using military force against civilians at the height of the war in Vietnam and with an election pending in l968. Finally, after a formal request from Romney, President Johnson at ll:3O pm on 24 July l967 agreed to deploy regular troops.29 After several days of a massive, yet controlled commitment of troops, together with police, in the streets, the riot died down and came to an end on July 27th. The withdrawal of regulars began on the following day and ended on August 2nd. The Guard remained on the scene for four more days. To some observers, the riot resembled a war. It bordered on mass insurrection, more closely resembling guerrilla warfare than the riots and disorders with which the nation is more familiar. By the time it ended, 43 people were dead, 2,OOO injured, and 5,OOO were homeless as a result of 4,000 fires. A large part of the nation's fifth-largest city lay in ruins. On April 4, l968, Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee. Memphis, closest to the tragedy, blew up first; but as news of the assassination quickly spread, a wave of riots in l25 cities in 29 states erupted. Most explosively of all was in Washington D.C. where heavily armed units of the 82nd Airborne Division were flown in from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to help restore order. In Washington D.C., 8 people were killed and 705 were injured.31 On the day following King's death, massive rioting erupted in Chicago, where 6,000 guardsmen and 5,000 army troops joined the police. In Chicago ll demonstrators were killed and 35O were arrested.32 On April 6 futher rioting occurred in Cincinnati, Ohio, Newark and Trenton, New Jersey and particularly in Baltimore, Maryland, where 6000 guardsmen and 2,000 federal troops were brought in. In Baltimore, 5 people were killed and 258 were injured. The week's upheavals left 46 people dead across the nation.33 Under intense pressure from the White House, Department of Defense leaders moved quickly to establish a full set of oversight committees and a command agency that would be able, in the words of the Undersecretary of the Army, "to expand as rapidly as is feasible the Federal military capability to respond with large forces and with speed to directives from the President to control multiple disorders."34 The increase of civil disorder caused the formation of the Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Steering Committee which included representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Justice, the White House, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Committee set overall policy, but gave responsibility, for planning and directing civil disturbance operations to the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff. In turn, the Army established the Directorate of Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations, a joint-service command headed by an Army lieutenant general. The Directorate was to plan and oversee the training of Army and National Guard units, develop nonlethal civil disorder weapons, and monitor civil disturbances across the nation.35 The Antiwar Movement Opposition to the U.S. role in the Vietnam War led to widespread demonstrations and protests. Most of these activities were relatively peaceful, among them the university "sit-ins" that began in l965; the massive antiwar parades in the spring of l967 in New York, San Francisco, and other cities and the massive march on Washington, D.C.36 On May 4, l970, at Kent State University in Ohio, a ragged line of poorly trained, improperly equipped, inadequately led National Guard troops confronted an unorganized group of milling students and other radicals, many of whom were changing classes or going to lunch. Operating in a climate of intense anti-war sentiment and unfamiliar with such duty the Guardsmen, taunted by the mob, felt angry and scared. When either an officer or a noncommissioned officer gave an order, the troops fired into the crowd. They wounded nine individuals and killed four. Nine of the thirteen victims were shot in the back or side.37 Although polls showed that most Americans supported the National Guard, it was recognized that their training, equipment, discipline, and leadership was inadequate for containing civil disturbances. Suggested solutions included: more use of regular troops, better training and equipment, and greater integration of blacks into the guard.38 The government also realized the effectiveness of a new tactic, the prepositioning of troops. From l968 to l973, the government repositioned troops six different times, covering such events as an antiwar demonstration at Yale University in l970, both the Republican and Democratic presidential nominating conventions in Miami, Florida in l972, and Richard Nixon's second inauguration in January l973. Troops were not needed but it showed a federal propensity to intervene quickly which had never been seen in the past.39 Surveillance Operations The most controversial expansion of the domestic role of the armed forces was the growth of military surveillance of U.S. citizens in the l960's and l97O's. Military intelligence groups gathered information from a variety of sources including the FBI and police reports. All data on persons was forwarded to the Army's Counterintelligence Analysis Branch in Washington for analysis, then permanently deposited in personal dossiers, often computerized, at the U.S. Army Intelligence Command at Fort Holabird, Maryland. The army's extensive surveillance of American civilians, and its accumulation of thousands of dossiers, meant that in the late l96O's and early l97O's, army intelligence had crossed the dividing line into illegal, unconstitutional activity.40 Public exposure of this intelligence gathering in l97O brought this activity to an end, and the dossiers were ordered destroyed. In testimony to a Senate Investing Committee, President Richard Nixon's Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, Robert Froelke, explained the civil disorder intelligence program as the Army's "aggressive" response to demands for more information, and added lamely, "we maintain that there was no illegal activity. We maintain there was inappropriate activity."4l Congress held a series of hearings in l975 into the abuses of various civilian and military intelligence agencies. The Senate Committee called for stricter supervision and the House Committee recommended that the military be prohibited from any domestic intelligence operations. Several military officers also believed that those types of missions should be avoided.42 Drug Enforcement The most dramatic new development in the use of the military to enforce civil authority was the employment of the Armed Forces in the l98O's in support of drug-enforcement laws. The Reagan Administration enlisted the Armed Forces in its "War Against Drugs" Campaign as a result of budgetary constraints against major increases in civilian law-enforcement agencies. The military leadership resisted this new role. On December l3, l989, a small contingent of Marines, patrolling the Arizona border came across a group of smugglers on horseback. The Marines sent an illumination flare into the sky, and in the blaze of light that followed, shots were exchanged. The smugglers dropped their load, some 57O pounds of marijuana, and fled back to Mexico.44 The military's role also includes carrier task forces off the coast of Columbia, mobile ground radar stations in Bolivia and Peru, and AWACS flights over suspected drug routes. The military unit charged with coordinating this effort is the Joint Task Force - Six (JTF-6) at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas. Since its creation in l989 JTF-6 has responded to hundreds of requests for support. These requests came from a wide array of federal, state, and local task forces set up to stem the flow of drugs.45 Traditional military reluctance to engage in operations which they considered police work was overcome by the fact that the war on drugs had become one of the few areas of increased appropriations for the Pentagon. Although the overall defense budget shrank dramatically, the Defense Department's antinarcotics spending tripled from $44O million in l989 to $l.2 billion in l992.46 The l992 Los Angeles Riot At the end of April and early May l992, the ghetto in the predominantly black south-central district of Los Angeles exploded in one of the deadliest riots in American history. The violence followed the acquittal of four of the city's white police officers' charged with savagely beating a black motorist, Rodney G. King, who had initially resisted arrest. On 29 April l992, when the acquittal by an all-white jury was announced, social order in the nation's second-largest city broke down. Violence, looting, vandalism, and arson spread from south-central Los Angeles to Koreatown, immediately north, and as far as Santa Monica, West Los Angeles, Long Beach, Hollywood, and Beverly Hills. Confronted with warring youth gangs, especially the notorious "Crips" and "Bloods," who were armed with an arsenal of weapons and munitions ranging from sub machine guns to grenades, the Los Angeles police initially withdrew from the south-central district. California Governor Peter Wilson sent in ten thousand members of the National Guard. In response to the governor's request, President Bush ordered in eighteen hundred soldiers, members of the 7th U.S. Infantry Division, a "light-infantry" unit trained in low intensity conflict, which had fought in Panama in l989, and was stationed in Fort Ord, California. Bush also sent in fifteen hundred Marines from Camp Pendleton, California, most veterans of the l99l Gulf War. They joined several hundred FBI, state, and local police officers.47 Once the military was deployed, its response was coordinated and effective compared with many of the military actions in the l960s riots. Unlike the l96O's, all state and federal troops were immediately placed under a single temporary command, Joint Task Force - L.A. (JTF-L.A.), headed by Army Major General Marvin L. Covault, commander of the 7th U.S. Infantry Division. This time the National Guard included large numbers of black soldiers, as did the Army and Marine units. The units worked in harmony to bring peace to the area. Four days of violence, including two nights of uncontrolled rioting and gang warfare, left 53 dead, more than 2,3OO wounded, l7,OOO arrested, and an estimated $785 million in property damage from looting and 5,600 fires.48 The problem of civil disorder in the United States is not new. By its very persistence it is a more serious problem for our society than it would be were it new, for its roots run very deep. The use of the military to quell civil disorder has a varied history. The effectiveness of military intervention has largely been attributed to the disciplinary superiority of federal forces as compared to police, militia, or National Guard. From past events many valuable lessons have been learned. Lessons the military needs to study and act upon. If history teaches anything it warns that the military will be called upon again to execute a domestic peacekeeping mission. 24 CHAPTER III MILITARY INTERVENTION AND DOMESTIC LAW The national government's commitment of military forces in civil disorders paralleled many of the most important social and economic conflicts in history. As with any controversies of this magnitude, our legal and judicial system dictated what actions should or should not be taken. And as could be expected, the use of military forces in civil disorders was not always a smoothly executed evolution. In this chapter I will highlight the legal involvement and key laws enacted that affected the military's intervention into domestic disorders. In so doing, I hope to demonstrate how the military arrived at the point it is at today. I hope this information will also shed some light on what actions may and may not be taken in the future. The Constitution The framers of the United States Constitution were much concerned with domestic disorder in the aggressive new republic. The nationalists at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in l787 wanted to ensure that the new central government would not find itself powerless in the future. States' rights advocates, however, feared giving the national government the power to intervene militarily in the states. Sentiment remained strong in the post revolutionary period that maintaining a standing army in peacetime would be dangerous to the liberties of the people.1 The new Constitution proposed in l787 met with opposition on several grounds, but no feature was more controversial than its provision for a National Army. States' rights advocates feared giving the national government the power to intervene militarily in the states. Sentiment remained strong that maintaining a standing army in peacetime would be dangerous to the liberties of the people. To appease the localists, many writers of the Constitution published articles explaining that the Army was merely to be used to suppress rebellions and dangerous insurrections. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison used their Federalist Papers to express their views. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 28, That there may happen cases in which the national government may be necessitated to resort to force cannot be denied...Seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body...Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national government, there could be no remedy but force.2 Despite Antifederalist opposition, the Constitution gave the national government final authority. Article I Section 8 granted Congress the power "To provide for the calling forth the militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion." Article II, Section 2 gave the President authority over the armed forces by making him their Commander-in- Chief. Article II, Section 3 directed of the President that "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Finally, Article IV, Section 4 assured that "The United States shall guarantee to every State a Republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion and on application of the Legislature or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence."3 American federalism under the Constitution thus provided a means for the use of state or national military forces for supporting civil authority against serious internal disturbances. The state governments had been given that power from the state constitutions. The national government obtained similar, if somewhat circumscribed, authority from the Constitution.4 During ratification many states still had problems with the military's role in government. It was the Bill of Rights that provided the protection they wanted which was not found in the Constitution. The language which James Madison chose, which the Congress eventually approved and the states ratified, to calm the fears of military law enforcement was that "No person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."5 As was true for the Constitution as a whole, the real meaning of the civil disorder provisions would become evident only when implemented by law and experienced in practice. The Early Laws The first law granting the President powers to intervene with military force in domestic disorders was passed by the Second Congress and became law on 2 May l792. The clauses dealing with the use of force in internal affairs were part of a broader scheme to carry into effect Congress' power to "provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions."6 The law, in language similar to that of the Constitution, allowed the President to call militia from other states "as he may judge sufficient" to put down "an insurrection in any state against the government thereof," when so requested by a state legislature, or its governor if the legislature could not be convened.7 The act also allowed the President to call militia from within a state experiencing disorder, or from neighboring states if necessary, when the United States laws were opposed or obstructed "by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in marshals by this act." An associate justice of the Supreme Court or a United States district judge had to notify the President that such conditions existed before he could call out the militia. The President was required to issue a proclamation to "command such insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably...within a limited time" in advance of military intervention.8 This law was reenacted on 28 February l795 becaue the l792 Act expired in three years. An Act of 3 March l8O7 which resulted from the "Burr Conspiracy," expanded the power of the President. Shortly after slaying Alexander Hamilton, Aaron Burr, his political career now at an end, asked money of Anthony Mercy, British minister to the United States, supposedly for the purpose of organzing a movement for separating the Western States from the U. S. President Thomas Jefferson was informed of Burr's plan in Nov. l8O6. Whether Burr's aim was treasonable, or whether he was planning to lead an expedition against the Spanish dominions, is still a matter of dispute. Burr was indicted for treason but acquitted on l Sept l8O7. Jefferson was troubled by his lack of authority to use regulars in a domestic insurrection, which he really deemed the Burr conspiracy to be. In mid-December l8O6 the President sent the draft of a law permitting the use of regulars, to a friendly congresman from Virginia, John Dawson. The bill passed by Congress in March l807 was phrased in language almost the same as Jefferson's draft.9 The act provided explicitly for the use of the regular land or naval forces of the United States by the President in cases of insurrection or obstruction of the laws, whereas the l792 and l795 statues had authorized only his use of the militia. As the regular army came to displace the militia as the primary military arm of the nation, Federal Marshals, with Presidential authority, came to use national troops rather than militia as their "posse comitatus" when major force was required to enforce the exucution of the laws of the Republic.10 After the fall of Fort Sumter in April l86l, President Lincoln, using the powers of the law of l795, declared a state of insurrection and called out the militia as well as U.S. Volunteers. Congress subsequently approved this action, and on 29 July l96l, Congress revised the basic laws of l795 and l8O7 and greatly increased the President's authority to use both militias and regulars to suppress insurrections and execute the laws of the Union. The l86l act entrusted the decision to use military force against obstructions of the law or against rebellion to the "judgement of the President" whenever he deemed it "impracticable's to enforce the law by ordinary means. The l86l law authorized the President to use naval as well as land forces and also federalized militia forces. This l86l statute permitting the use of military force to deal with actions which cannot be overcome by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has remained the basic authority for presidential use of troops to enforce federal law. This statute, as part of the U.S. Code, was used by President Eisenhower and Kennedy to enforce federally mandated desegregation of school facilities in the l95O's and l96O's.12 The Posse Comitatus Act of l878 One of the most important laws regarding the use of the military in domestic affairs is the Posse Comitatus Act of l878. The Act came into being in the aftermath of the Civil War and Reconstruction periods, owing to southern opposition to the growing military involvement in law enforcement with virtually no control by the federal government. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibited use of the Army "as a posse comitatus, or otherwise for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress."13 What the legislation in effect actually did was repel the Cushing Doctrine of l854, which allowed Army forces to be summoned by marshals or sheriffs without specific approval by the President. The statues of l795, l8O7, and 186l remained in force. The President's authority was required to use troops for domestic intervention. Orders to support civil authorities came from the President, then through the Secretary of War, the Commanding General, and finally Field Commanders. Local civil officials had no authority to direct the deployment of federal troops.14 Although not mentioned in the Act, the Navy and Marine Corps adhere to the statue by Navy regulation, and several courts have opined that only the U.S. Coast Guard is excluded from the intent of the statue.15 While ending uncontrolled military involvement in law enforcement, such as that which occurred during and after the Civil War, the Posse Comitatus Act did not completely end law enforcement by the Armed Forces. The Act had limited application for two principal reasons. First, the President can employ the military to enforce the law in times of national crisis or emergency.16 Second, courts have ruled that while Posse Comitatus applies to "direct" military participation in law enforcement, it nevertheless, allows "indirect" participation.13 The l97O's Despite Posse Comitatus restrictions, the President has employed the military to enforce the law on many occasions when civil law enforcement agencies either could not or would not do so. Yet, seldom has military enforcement of the law been challenged in the courts by invoking the restrictions specified under the Posse Comitatus Act. Posse Comitatus received little attention until after l96O. There were only three cases prior to that year when the Act was invoked in the courts.18 All three cases dealt with military arrests of individuals charged with treason in occupied foreign territory. The courts ruled that the Act did not apply to an occupying force, since civil law enforcement was usurped by the military authority.19 After 1960, the issue of domestic civil- military relations and Posse Comitatus restrictions became more prominent in the legal arena. In l972 the Nixon administration promulgated a set of new regulations, "Employment of Military Resources in the Event of Civil Disturbances" (now codified as 32 C.F.R. sec 2l5), giving legality for very substantial military intrusions into the realm of domestic government. The l972 Regulations took the place of others first devised in l968 during the Johnson Administration and discontinued in l97l. The l968 regulations themselves had been objectionable on some points of law; but novel provisions in the l972 regulations dramatically increased the potential for domestic use of the national military while at the same time substantially reducing prior safeguards against abuse.2O The most significant challenge to military involvement in the enforcement of civil law came out of the l973 American Indian uprising at the hamlet of Wounded Knee, South Dakota. Over l00 members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) occupied the village on February 27, and remained until May 8. The FBI, charged with restoring order, received assistance from the U.S. Army, which sent a Colonel to determine whether troops would be required in the crisis. Colonel Volney Warner made several recommendations during the incident. The Army provided armored personnel carriers, and maintenance personnel and the Nebraska Air National Guard assisted with reconnaissance flights. Following this episode, the AIM leaders were charged with obstruction of justice. The defendants countered that the Federal Government did not carry out law enforcement properly, since military involvement constituted a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.21 Several criminal court cases resulted from Wounded Knee, which dealt with civil-military relations and provided interpretation of the Posse Comitatus Act.22 The judgements, however, were vague and inconsistent. In l98O, a special Attorney General's Task Force looked into the decisions regarding Posse Comitatus and concluded, "the parameters of the Act are...substantially untested and remain unclear."23 The l98l Amendments As early as l98l Congress became acutely aware that the country was concerned with a drug problem. They knew that drastic action was needed against the illegal drug industry. What resulted was a sanction for more limited military assistance. The action came from amending the Posse Comitatus Act by allowing and directing the military to provide assistance to law enforcement agencies.24 The l98l Amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act authorized the military to provide assistance to law enforcement agencies, but precluded servicepersons from becoming directly involved in "search and seizure, and arrest, or other similar activities."25 The new law ensured that military material, information, and human resources would be employed in the war against illegal drugs. The Department of Defense had been loaning equipment, providing information, and providing training to law enforcement agencies for quite some time.26 What Congress did in l98l was to ratify and codify an ever growing military activity, and to open the door for greater military involvement in the future. In l986 Congress again expanded the military's role in drug interdiction. Since the Navy's standard operating procedures did not allow Navy personnel to search, seize, and arrest on the high seas, Congress authorized the Legal Detachment (LEDET) program whereby Cost Guard personnel were assigned to Navy ships for the purpose of enforcing drug laws in international waters.27 The next big change occurred in l988. The l988 Amendments The drug problem worsened and by l988 more Americans were calling for stronger action. Under pressure, Congress decided to take even greater steps to allow military participation in the war on drugs. Many senior leaders in the Department of Defense expressed concern. In June l988, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci told Congress, "The Armed Forces should not become a police force, nor can we afford to degrade readiness by diverting badly needed resources from their assigned mission."28 Nevertheless, Congress decided to enhance the nation's drug fighting capability by marshaling more DoD resources into the struggle. Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of l988, Congress, in addition to establishing a "drug czar", Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, directed the DoD to devise a plan to use federal research and development facilities to develop drug law enforcement technology.29 Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act of l989 directed the DoD to become the "lead agency for detection and monitoring of air and sea drug trafficking across our borders."30 It also charged the military to "integrate the command, control, communication, and technical intelligence (C3I) assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network; and enhance state governors' use of the National Guard in support of drug interdiction."3l As described in Chapter II, the military unit responsible with coordinating this effort was Joint Task Force - Six (JTF-6) at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas. In summary, the intervention of the military into domestic affairs is a sometimes vague and still developing area of constitutional law. The issue of military involvement in law enforcement is an issue political in nature. Posse Comitatus is a statute that was created by Congress and already significantly amended by that same body. There is even precedent for annulling Posse Comitatus restrictions. Owing to chaos resulting from the Alaskan "gold rush," in l890, Congress passed legislation that exempted Alaska from the Posse Comitatus Act. The exemption was not repealed until l959.32 Therefore, when it becomes necessary, Congress can revoke the restrictions on military law enforcement provided by the Posse Comitatus Act. If this should happen the courts would be hard pressed to limit military involvement in law enforcement. CHAPTER IV CURRENT LAWS AND DIRECTIVES The purpose of this chapter is to examine the current laws and directives that deal with the military's domestic peacekeeping mission. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section looks at laws found in Title lO of the United States Code (U.S.C.). The second section deals with Department of Defense (DoD) directives. Laws are the regulations that establishes what the military is allowed to do or not allowed to do. The directives are more of a guide to describe how something should be done. In the preceding chapters, some material covered relating to the military's role in drug interdiction has been addressed. Since I am primarily concerned with the military's role in domestic disorders I will not discuss the laws and directives related to drug interdiction. Lastly, the directives that will be examined will be Department of Defense level directives and not those of individual services, which are based on the DoD directives. Title lO United States Code The United States Code (U.S.C.) is a consolidation and codification of all the general and permanent laws of the United States. Their are fifty titles that make up the Code. Each title addresses a different subject, i.e., agriculture, bankruptcy, commerce and trade, education, patents, transportation, etc. The last edition that was published was in l988. The title that concerns itself with the Armed Forces is Title l0. Title l0, Chapter l5 deals with insurrection. It is here that the laws are found relating to military intervention.1 There are three key sections in Chapter l5, Title l0, that provide the legal ground for the military's intervention into domestic disorders. They are: 33l. Federal aid for State governments. Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.2 332. Use of militia and armed forces to enforce Federal authority. Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. 333. Interference with State and Federal law. The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considered necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination or conspiracy, if it - (l) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that state are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any situation covered by clause (l), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.4 Additionally, a l972 Civil Disturbance Regulation authorized the use of military force to prevent loss of life or...property and to restore governmental functioning and public order when sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disasters, or calamities seriously endanger life and property and disrupt normal governmental functions to such an extent that duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation.5 The regulation draws its authority from lO U.S.C. 33l-333 (l988). Therefore, under these laws, the President has the authority to use emergency powers in times of crisis. Because the Chief Executive must "take care that the laws be faithfully executed,"6 Congress gave the President the power to use the military in times of emergencies, such as "insurrection," "rebellion," "obstruction" of the law, "domestic violence," or "conspiracy."7 The President also has the responsibility when enacting the authority in Title lO to issue a proclamation asking for dispersal, so that the perpetrators of the civil disturbance will have the opportunity to desist.8 In addition to Chapter l5 of Title lO, Chapter l8 entitled "Military Support For Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies" is an area important to this discussion. This Chapter deals with the use of military equipment, the maintenance of that equipment, military facilities, military training and information collected by the military and the relationship between this military support and civilian law enforcement agencies. Additionally there are two sections that are of special interest because they have the potential of causing controversy. They are: 375. Restriction on direct participation by military personnel. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that the provision of any support (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) to any civilian law enforcement official under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search and seizure, an arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law. 376. Support not to affect adversely military preparedness. Support (including the provision of any equipment of facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) may not be provided to any civilian law enforcement official under this chapter if the provision of such support will adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that the provision of any such support does not adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States.10 Both G375 and #376 generate areas of concern that will be addressed in the next chapter. It is the above mentioned laws that legally allows the military to intervene in domestic disturbances. One can infer that it is entirely up to the leadership of this country to decide when the military "trump card" is to be played. It certainly seems that the laws place that decision firmly with the President, entirely dependent upon his interpretation of the laws and the situation. How the military prepares itself and organizes itself to carry out this type of mission is largely placed in the hands of the Department of Defense. Department of Defense Directives The term used by the Department of Defnese for "domestic peacekeeping" is Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS). The focus of this paper is strictly with civil disturbances and not fighting forest fires or providing humanitarian assistance after floods or earthquakes. The key directives in this area are: DoD Directive 3025.l2, "Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances;" DoD Directive 3O25.l, "Military Support to Civil Authorities;" Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 32l6.Ol, "Military Assistance to Civil Disturbances;" and the DoD Civil Disturbance Plan, "Garden Plot." "Garden Plot" is the codename given to that plan. If an operation's command relationships are undefined or vague then the operation is destined to fail. DoD Directive 3O25.l2 defines policy, responsibilities, and command relationships in the event the military is called to intervene in a civil disturbance. A civil disturbance is defined as: Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and disorder within the 5O states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, u.s. possessions and territories, or any political subdivision thereof; includes all domestic conditions requiring the use of federal armed forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter l5 of title lO, United States Code.11 The process of getting the military involved to quell a civil disturbance is exact and should be followed to the letter. It is this process and the command relationships that will now be discussed. When a civil disturbance occurs that goes beyond the capability of what a state, territory, or possession can control with its own assets then the governor, or equivalent, requests federal military support through the Attorney General to the President. The President shall determine the federal action to be taken. "The employment of federal military forces to control civil disturbances will normally be authorized by a Presidential Directive or Executive Order in a specified state or locality."12 The President may also use a representative to communicate his guidance to the military commander for MACDIS operations. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is the Chief civilian agency in charge of coordinating all federal government activities relating to civil disturbances.13 Attorney General will designate his representative to be located in each city where federal forces are committed. This representative is called the Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General or SCRAG.14 At the Department of Defense level the process involves an Executive Agent, an Action Agent, and an Operating Agent. The Executive Agent is the Secretary of the Army and is responsible for developing planning guidance, plans, and procedures for MACDIS. He/She will also coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any commitment of military forces assigned to the Combatant Commands. The Executive Agent also has the authority of the Secretary of Defense when tasking DoD components. The Director of Military Support (DOMS), normally an Army major general, is the Action Agent for the Executive Agent. "The DOMS plans for, coordinates, and directs the employment of all designated federal resources for the Executive Agent in civil disturbance operations and serves as the DoD point of contact in all such matters."15 The Operating Agent is the Supported CINC assigned to direct civil disturbance operations in his area of responsibility.16 During this process the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a coordinating agent who helps to work out any problems that may arise. It is the Supported CINC who appoints a JTF commander to take control of the operation. This command relationship just described is seen in figure l. It is important to understand that representatives of civilian agencies may augment but shall not replace the military's chain of command. Additionally, the Executive Agent or his designated representatives will coordinate activities, planning, and support with other civilian agencies.17 When the JTF commander is selected and his units are assigned it then becomes a military operation is support of civilian law enforcement. Appropriate plans and orders are developed and written based on the situation. The current laws and the MACDIS process proved to work extremely well for the l992 Los Angeles Riot. However, problems and issues arose that need further attention. CHAPTER V ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION There are a multitude of issues that need to be examined when speaking about domestic peacekeeping. This is an area that is scrutinized by both the government and the American people. Mistakes that happen on the streets of Somalia may receive much less attention than a same type mistake made on the streets of Los Angeles. Topics such as rules of engagement, excessive use of force, logistics support, legal issues, and budgetary problems are only some of the items that need to be addressed. In this chapter I will discuss five issues of importance. They are: command and control, training, direct intervention, force selection, and media. I selected these five issues because they are vital to achieving success in future domestic peacekeeping missions. Command and Control Effective command and control is essential to achieving success in any military operation. "Command is a uniquely human dimension that principally involves decisionmaking while control involves a complex array of resources to ensure proper mission execution. The linking of decisionmaking and execution forms the concept of command and control."1 Effective command and control means not only linking together the civilian and military relationship but also synchronizing the language and communications assets so that all units concerned can coordinate effectively with each other. In domestic peacekeeping the civil authority should maintain close liaison with commanders of the military forces employed. There should also be an agreement on the policy to be adopted in relation to the restoration of order and the reinstatement of the ordinary civil process of authority. Finally the civil authority should avoid interference with tactical and operational decisions that might need to be taken by the military forces in implementation of their mandate to restore order.2 During operations, the need to interface civilian agencies and military units is essential. The use of liaison officers will help alleviate misunderstandings and increase the flow of information. There may be a need for several liaison officers depending on the circumstances. During the Los Angeles Riots of l992, the initial boundaries that delineated operations zones were highways because they were prominent terrain features. Unfortunately these did not always match police jurisdictions. Operating in some areas required coordination with as many as four police departments as well as the Los Angeles Sheriff's office.3 This problem was solved with the help of liaison officers and points of contact.4 Also, there may be a distinct problem with terminology used by police and military. The words "cover me" mean one thing to the police and another thing to an infantry squad. Again, the use of liaison officers would aid in eliminating those problems. Unity of command is critical to successful civil disturbance operations. Establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander, who has command over all military units, active, reserve or national guard worked extremely well in Los Angeles. This procedure should always be followed. Lastly, the type of communications assets should be seriously considered. In urban areas some military communications equipment is ineffective. The use of proper communications equipment and radios such as the ones utilized by police should be examined. During all types of recent operations the use of cellular phones has become the rule instead of the exception. The use and funding of cellular phones in the Garden Plot plan should be implemented. Training In the l960's and l970's civil disturbance operations were oriented on crowd control. Tactics such as fixed bayonets with riot control formations were practiced at many units. Today, operations involving domestic civil disorder are similar to peacekeeping operations or military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). Some observers who were part of JTF Los Angeles compared that operation as similar to the experience on the streets of Beirut during the l980's.5 The number of handguns and automatic weapons in hands of private citizens is drastically increasing. Training in civil disturbances by military units must change based on the tactics and weapons of the future enemy. The on-line riot formations of the 60's and 70's would place our military personnel in unnecessary danger. The military should place greater emphasis on peacekeeping operations, antisniper operations, positive control by leaders, and understanding the rules of engagement. There are many military personnel who feel that training in civil disturbance operations would degrade the readiness of our forces to fight a war. This would be true if the military trained solely for civil disturbance operatons. The military should and does train to fight all levels of war; high, medium, and low intensity. Even though the basics can be employed in all three levels, training in any one level does not assure success in all three. Many senior military leaders believe that if you train to the high intensity end of the spectrum you can easily shift to the low intensity level. They also argue, however, that the converse is not true. A difinitive answer to this training issue has not yet been determined. I hold that the military must specifically train to each level of conflict. Common denominators such as: weapons proficiency, exact command and control, skillful maneuvering, and competent small unit leadership are fundamental areas essential to success in all three conflict levels. When these skills have been achieved the specifics of each level of war much be taught and practiced. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Section 376, Chapter l8 of the title l0 U.S.C. states that the Secretary of Defense is responsible that the preparedness of the military is not degraded due to support to law enforcement agencies. It is my opinion that this refers more to drug enforcement operations than to civil disorders. I believe this section was written to prevent military units from being taken away from their normal duties to take part in drug interdiction operations. I can see how some individuals could use this section to keep the military out of domestic peacekeeping. Direct Intervention The issue of direct intervention of military personnel in law enforcement is covered in Section 375 of Chapter l8 of Title lO, U.S.C. As was discussed in Chapter IV of this paper, military personnel are not allowed direct participation in a search, seizure, or arrest. In practice, however, military units will take whatever steps are necessary, to included search and seizure to guarantee the safety of their members.6 The police and any reasonable person can see the need for this. In the l992 Los Angeles riots military units would stop, search and detain individuals and wait for police to arrive, if the situation called for such action.7 A situation such as this, if litigation should arise, could cause a similar controversy as seen in the l973 cases from Wounded Knee. Because this is such a controversial issue legal teams should be readily accessible to military units during civil disturbance operations. These legal teams should coordinate closely with the Department of Justice and should be fully versed on the Posse Comitatus Act and the relevant chapters of Title lO, U.S.C. Force Selection There is no question that in the Armed Forces there are some units better suited to handle civil disturbance operations. The use of these better trained units should be a priority when the military is needed to assist in a civil disturbance. During an interview with Major John Forquer, a Military Police officer who was member of JTF Los Angeles, he related how the operation in Los Angeles was more in line with the training received by military police units than the training received by infantry units. He saw a great need to be able to work with the local police, understand their methods, and work closely with the local population. Putting vast amounts of firepower on targets was not the major objective.8 Therefore, the use of military police units and peacekeeping-trained units should be seriously considered when putting a JTF organization together. Another aspect of force selection is political in nature. Clausewitz's assertion that "war is simply a continuation of political intercourse" applies also to domestic peacekeeping operations, for they also must be viewed as political instruments.9 Close attention must be given to the political suitability of forces selected for a given situation. When the leadership selects forces for a civil disturbance operation, they must be sensitive to the perceptions of the local population and the American public. Sending in the 82nd Airborne Division to a U.S. city carries with it a certain message that a U. S. Army military police battalion doesn't have. The correct force selection can go a long way to contributing to a successful operation. Forces that do not project massive offensive power, that have extensive training, and that have tight discipline will also be more likely to avoid sacrificing the lives of innocent people. The Media No matter how much the military dislikes working with the media during military operations, its importance should make it another one of the battlefield activities. During civil disturbances since the l95O's, television's search for dramatic images created the impression that entire cities were about to fall into anarchy. Sometimes I think the media does not realize how the reporting of one incident of extraordinary violence may influence the occurrence of others. The media can set the tone of an operation and have a direct impact upon its success. Throughtout American history, the fortunes of both the military and the news media have varied with the climate of opinion prevalent in the country at any one moment. The military and the news media have competed, but the military has always held the advantage because it has controlled the battlefield. If history teaches anything, however, it advises commanders to remain above the temptation to manipulate the press for the sake of short-term gain. Public opinion can change with the moment, and the news media is the only credible means military leaders have for communicating with the American people. As General Ulysses S. Grant warned, that in the United States "the people governed and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies."lO The news media needs to respect the seriousness of the mission the military is involved in and appreciate the influence they have in its success. They also must realize that a certain level of operational security is needed to protect the lives of the men and women in the armed forces who are executing that mission. Before completing this chapter I would like to make a comment on a new development in the military closely related to this subject. That is the use of non-lethal or less lethal means when involved with peacekeeping missions. On l4 February l995 ABC Nightly News aired a story on non-lethal means available for use in the February/March l995 military mission in Somalia, Operation United Shield. The mission was to assist in retrograding U.N. forces safely out of that country. The story related that items such as: plastic sticky foam, styrofoam bullets, nets, and other non-lethal projectiles could be used to control civilian crowds so that deadly force was not the only option left to soldiers and marines on the street. This brings two questions immediately to mind: first, is the introduction of these weapons making the Rules of Engagement too complicated? And second, are we going to become known as the military that will not use deadly force thereby placing marines and soldiers at greater risk? Especially in domestic peacekeeping, killing United States citizens is a dreadful outcome but it may be the only resort. The use of non-lethal weapons may in fact cause the exact opposite reaction that is intended. These are additional issues that our country's leadership will now have to face. CHAPTER VI A REASON FOR READINESS The issues discussed in this chapter are the reasons that the military must be prepared to employ forces to take part in domestic peacekeeping operations. There are growing problems in this country that contribute to building an environment that is ripe for civil disorder. From l96O to l99O there has been more than a 5OO percent increase in violent crime; more than a 4OO percent increase in illegitimate births; a tripling of the percentage of children living in single-parent homes; a tripling in the teenage suicide rate; a doubling in the divorce rate; and a drop of almost 75 points in students SAT scores.1 Over the years teachers have been asked to identify what their greatest problems were with students in public schools. In l94O, teachers identified talking out of turn; chewing gum; making noise; running in the halls; cutting in line; dress code infractions; and littering. When answering that same question in l99O, teachers identified drug abuse; alcohol abuse; pregnancy; suicide; rape; robbery; and assault.2 It is this degradation of society and a quickness to violence that are key indicators for civil disorder. It is the crime and violence, the widening gap between the "haves" and "have nots," the collapse of the family, and the waves of illegal immigrants that makes this country more prone to experience civil disorder in the future. Crime The rate of violent crime in the United States is worse than in any other industrialized country. The United States' homicide rate is more than five times that of Europe, and four times that of Canada, Australia, or New Zealand. In addition, the rate at which rapes occur in the United States in nearly seven times higher than it is in Europe.3 Gangs have taken over the inner cities across America. Instead of the bludgeon, billy, or knife used by past gangs, today's gang members carry assault weaponry, and often have more firepower than police. From l960 to l980, the population of the United States increased by 26 percent while the homicide rate due to guns increased by l6O percent.4 In l99l, in Los Angeles, there was a greater chance that a citizen would die from a bullet wound than from a traffic accident.5 Drugs like guns, are a tide against which no single city or state can erect a dike. There is an undeniable relationship between crime and drugs. Drug addiction can both lower inhibitions among offenders and spur them on to other crimes to finance their dependency. Over 5Q percent of all convicted jail inmates are under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of their current offense. No subject generates more concern than violent crime, and none touches people more deeply and personally; none triggers more emotion. The growing problem of violence leads people to think that something fundamental has been broken in America. Crime and violence influence where one goes, where one lives, where one attends school, how one looks at another person, how one parks, especially at night and even how one dresses. Crime and its consequences sharpen every racial and economic division of our nation, and blunt every popular impulse toward faith in government and willingness to sacrifice to achieve ones dreams. A Widening Gap America has lost the initiative in the war on poverty. Despite rising social spending and moderate growth, the U.S. has made negligible progress against poverty since l973. Our poverty rates are twice those of other advanced countries. And poverty in America increasingly wears a child's face: one out of every five of our children is poor. Most alarming of all is the emergence of an angry and demoralized "underclass" that is at once dependent on government yet isolated from society at large. The U.S. is in danger of creating a caste system in which scattered pockets of impoverished and mainly minority citizens are permanently barred from taking part in the nation's productive and civic life.7 Poverty itself does not cause civil disorder, but there is a rift developing between the Haves and the Have Nots.8 This rift was seen both in Oakland in l99l and in Los Angeles in l992. In both cases widespread looting occurred that did not start out of racial hatred. Quite simply, the uprisings were directly related to class. The Have Nots were taking from those who have.9 In the book The Dream and the Nightmare: The Sixties' Legacy to the Underclass, the author relates how the liberal programs the "sixties generation" fought so hard to implement have been ruinous to society's most marginal members. Society, which should be a crucible for forming character, is saturated with programs that give incentives to fail. The Have Nots have been incapacitated for upward mobility by the sixties's culture of the Haves.10 When a society creates a class of people that see no way for upward mobility an environment for crime and civil disorder is created. When other factors such as fear are added to the environment the situation becomes even more grave. The Family In l965 President Lyndon Johnson said: The family is the cornerstone of our society. More than any other force it shapes the attitude, the hopes, the ambitions, and the values of the child. And when the family collapses, it is the children that are usually damaged. When it happens on a massive scale the community itself is crippled.11 By l992, non-marital childbearing had reached near parity with divorce as a social generator of female-headed homes. If current trends continue, sometime by the late l99O's the total number of fatherless homes created by unwed childbearing women will surpass the number created by divorce12 Even more alarming are the projections that only 6 percent of black children and 3O percent of white children born in l98O will live with both parents through age l8. In comparison to l95O where the figures were 52 percent and 8l percent respectively.13 This trend has had a devastating affect on our children. Statistics about young Americans are alarming. Every thirty minutes in America, fifty young people drop out of school, eighty-five commit a violent crime, and twenty-seven teenage girls give birth, sixteen of them out of wedlock. That process continues until by the end of a year a million students have dropped out of school, l.3 million youths have committed a violent crime, and 478,000 teenagers have given birth.14 In addition, many of these youths turn to gangs to replace their families. They become a generation that lives and grows up in the streets. An accurate description of the situation on families was given by the then Assistant Secretary of Labor, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, when he wrote From the wild Irish slums of the l9th century Eastern seaboard to the riot-torn suburbs of Los Angeles, there is one unmistakable lesson in American history: A community that allows a large number of young men to grow up in broken families, dominated by women, never acquiring any stable relationship to male authority, any stable relationship to male authority, never acquiring any rational expectations about the future - that community asks for and gets chaos...(In such a society) crime, violence, unrest, unrestrained lashing out at the whole social structure - these are not only to be expected, they are very nearly inevitable.15 Immigration Never has America experienced such an explosion of legal and illegal immigration as that which now reshapes the nation's population and racial/ethnic composition. The decade of the Eighties saw the single largest flow of immigration in U.S. history - some nine million who entered legally and at least two million illegally. The number of illegal aliens in the United States is impossible to determine, but some demographic studies estimate it to be as high as eight million, and rising. The lowest estimate is two million.16 In addition to the stress from shear numbers there is also a racial problem associated with immigration. As black and Latino gangs have begun to compete for turf and drug profits, a power struggle has developed that, if it explodes won't compare to anything we've seen before.17 Blacks who have battled longest and hardest for racial and economic equality find themselves facing new competition from those of other races and ethnicities. This competition lies at the root to some of the problems raised earlier in this chapter about class, crime, poverty and increasing cultural tensions. These problems will not go away but will be of great concern well into the 2lst century. When a society is boiling with the problems previously described it may only take one incident to cause it to erupt like a volcano into civil disorder. In l968 it was the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. In l992 it was the Rodney King beating and the acquittal of the white police officers. It would be wise for the senior civilian and military leadership of the United States to make sure that the military is ready and capable to execute its domestic peacekeeping mission. CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION An accepted political principle in the United States is that intervention by the military at home should be kept as limited as possible even in times of crisis. This is part of an accepted if unwritten constitutional principle that goes beyond civilian supremacy of the military to include the belief that the military should be kept out of civilian politics and the political process. Using military units to enforce civil law is distasteful and dangerous, but it is preferable to lawlessness and anarchy. The employment of military forces to quell civil disorders resembles the activities performed by the Army on the western frontier. Throughout the nineteenth century, along the moving edge of civilization, soldiers functioned to suppress lawlessness and to promote law and order. Their purpose was to establish conditions that would permit the civil forces to provide social order consistent with and required for the peaceful life of law- abiding citizens. Although the scene has changed to an urban one, the military's domestic peacekeeping mission is still much the same. That is, to help the civil authorities protect life and property, preserve social values, and maintain the tradition of individual liberty together with social order.1 The most striking aspect of federal intervention in domestic disorders has been that regardless of the sources of violence or the extent of disorder, the appearance of federal forces has invariably restored order with a minimum of bloodshed. Their arrival has never provoked violent retaliation from those in disorder; neither have federal forces used their military power to wreak havoc on disturbers of the peace. Since so much American violence "has taken the form of action by one group of citizens against another, rather than by citizens against the state," national authority almost always has been accepted as legitimate.2 While the military's organizational strength served it well in domestic peacekeeping, and its capacity to impose a high level of violence on rioters was more than incidental to its success, in many instances regulars prevailed not merely from their potential military power but because they symbolized national power.3 When the subject of domestic peacekeeping comes up many military leaders respond that "we can't do it" or "it won't work" or "it's not our job." These types of responses are not only incorrect based on facts but they erode the trust and support the people of the United States have given its military. If the military drags its feet on taking part, it could encourage the formation of a national police such as the type that existed in the former Soviet Union. Are greatly increased federal and state law enforcement forces, which are difficult to remove or downsize, preferable to the use of military forces which normally are returned to bases arid other missions when order is restored? While abusive use of military forces in the domestic sphere can cause untold destruction to domestic values and political and social structure, judicious arrangements can nurture, support and bolster internal institutions and morale. As this paper demonstrates the military has had a long and successful history of domestic peacekeeping. It has had some rough times but has benefited from its mistakes. The military should only be used as a last resort when civil law enforcement agencies and states' National Guard forces can no longer contain the situation. The mission is a lawful one and one that can be expected in the future. The military should be willing and has an obligation to be ready to successfully execute this mission when the time comes. NOTES CHAPTER I l. David E. Engdahl, "Foundations For Military Intervention In The United States," in Military Intervention in Democratic Societies, ed. Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan (London: Croom Helm, l985), l. 2. Edward M. Coffman, "The Army Officer and the Constitution, "Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly, l7 (Sept l987), 5. 3. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in Domestic Disorders," in The U.S. Military Under the Constitution of the United States, l789-l989, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York: New York University Press, l99l), l43. 4. Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Armed Forces and Civil Disorder," in The Military and American Society, ed. Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber Jr., (New York: The Free Press, l972), 242. 5. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, l976), 57. 6. Ed Kilgore, "Safer Streets and Neighborhoods," in Mandate for Change, ed. Will Marshall and Martin Schram (New York: Berkley Books, l993), l79-l85. CHAPTER II l. Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, l986), passim. 2. Ibid. 3. John Whiteclay Chambers II, "The Military and Civil Authority," in Encyclopedia of the American Military, eds. John E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, l994), l8O9-l8lO. 4. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in Domestic Disorders," in The U. S. Military Under the Constitution of the United States, l789-l989, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York: New York University Press, l99l), l23. 5. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority", l8l3. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., l8l4. 9. E. Sherman, "Contemporary Challenges to Traditional Limits on the Role of the Military in American Society," in Military Intervention in Democratic Societies, ed. Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan (London: Croom Helm, l985), 2l9. lO. Ibid. ll. Ibid. l2. Bennet M. Rich, The Presidents and Civil Disorders (Washington, l94l), 52. l3. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," 1818 l4. Ibid. l5. Ibid., l8l9. l6. Ibid., l82O. l7. ibid. i8. Ibid., 1821. Since the early l9OOs colors had been used in war planning and war gaming to identify the various powers involved. Blue for instance meant the United States; red identified Great Britain; black was Germany; and orange meant Japan. During the l92Os and 1930s, the Army-Navy Joint Board prepared a series of contingency war plans against specific countries, each plan identified by a different color. Where the color plans considered only one country per plan, the rainbow series postulated operations pitting the United States, sometimes with allies, against a variety of coalitions. (See Simon & Schuster Encyclopedia of WWII, l978). l9. Ibid., 1822. 2O. Ibid., 1823. 2i. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, l984), 4l0. 24. Ibid., 4l7. 25. Ibid. 26. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l825 27. Ibid. 28. Martin Blumenson, "On the Function of the Military in Civil Disorders," in The Military and American Society, ed Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber Jr. (New York: The Free Press, l972), 249-254. 29. Ibid. 3O. Ibid. 3l. W. Augustus Low. ed. Encyclopedia of Black America, (New York: McGraw-Hill, l98l), 239. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., 24O. 34. Memo, David E. Giffert, Undersecretary of the Army, to Chief of Staff, Army, l3 April l968, in U.S. Senate, Subcommittees on Constitutional Rights, Federal Data Banks, Computers, and the Bill of Rights, part 2, l283. 36. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l826. 37. Ambrose, "The Armed Forces and Civil Disorder," 24l. 38. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l827. 39. Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: It's Impact on American Society (New York, l97l), l83-l84. 4O. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l829. In l967 two Supreme Court decisions, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (l967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 4l (l967), held that electronic surveillance was a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that in criminal proceedings the fruits of domestic electronic surveillance activities would be inadmissible if the probable cause and warrant requirement of the Constitution had not been satisfied. 4l. From Annex B, reprinted in U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Federal Data Banks, Computers, and The Bill of Rights, part I, 43l. 42. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l83O. 43. Ibid., l832. 44. Miriam Davidson, "Militarizing the Mexican Border," The Nation, l April l99l, 4O6. 45. Ed Magnuson, "More and More, a Real War," Time, 22 January l99O, 22. 46. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l832. 47. Ibid., l827-l828. 48. Ibid. CHAPTER III l. John Whiteclay Chambers II, "The Military and Civil Authority," in Encyclopedia of the American Military, eds. John E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, l994), l8O7. 2. Hamilton addressed the question of military suppression of domestic disorders in Numbers 25 and 29 also, as did James Madison in Number 43. See The Federalist Papers, Isaac Kramnic, ed. (New York, l987), l95, 2O4-2O6, 2l0-2ll, 28l-284. 3. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in Domestic Disorders," in The U.S. Military Under the Constitution of the United States, l789-l989 ed. Richard. Kohn (New York: New York University Press, l99l), l20. 4. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l807. 5. David E. Engdahl, "Foundations for Military Intervention in the United States," in Military Intervention in Democratic Societies, ed. Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan (London: Croom Helm, l985), 5. 6. l Statues at Large 264. 7. Cooper, "Foundations For Military Intervention," l2l. 8. Ibid. 9. Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, l789-l878 (Washington D. C.: Center of Military History, l988) 83. lO. Chambers, "The Military and Civil Authority," l8O8. ll. Ibid., l8l4. l2. Ibid. l3. Ibid., l8l7. l4. Ibid., l8l8. l5. SECNAVINST 54OO.l2 (l7 January l969); U.S. v Walden, 49O F. 2d 372 (4th Cir. l974); U.S. v. Chaparo-Almeida, 679 F. 2d 423 (5th Cir. l982); U.S. v. Yunis, 68l F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. l988) l6. U.S. l, 63.64 (l89O). l7. United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 9l6 (D.S.D. l975). l8. D'Aguino v. United States, l92 F. 2d 338 (9th Cir. l952); Gillars v. United States, l82 F. 2d 962 (D.C.Cir. l95O); and Chandler v. United States, l7l F. 2d 92l (lst Cir.l949). l9. Peter M. Sanchez, "Drug War: The U.S. Military and National Security," Air Force Law Review, l99l, l2O. 20. Engdahl, "Foundations For Military Intervention," 2-3. 2l. Sanchez, 'The U.S. Military and National Security," l2l. 22. United States v. Caspar, 54l F. 2d l275 (8th Cir. l976); United States v. McArthur, 4l9 F. Supp. l86, l92, n.2 (D.N.D. l976); United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 9l6 (D.S.D.l975); United States v. Means, 383 F. Supp. 368 (D.S.D. l974); and United States v. Jaramillo, 38O F. Supp. l375 (D. Neb. l974) 23. Posse Comitatus Act: Hearing on H.R. 35l9 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., lst Sess. 42 (l9Sl) l0. 24.Sanchez, "The U. S. Military and National Security," l22. 25. lO U.S.C. 37l.7S (Pub. L. No 97.86, 95 Stat. llO4). 26. Posse Comitatus Act: Hearing (l98l), l5. 27. U.S.C. 379 (l988); Pub. L. No 99-57O Title III, 3053 (b) (l). 28. Report of the Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to a Joint Hearing of Congress, June l988. 29. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of l988, Pub. L. No. lOO-68O, 2l U.S.C. 1501 3O. Pub. L. No. l00-456, l02 Stat. l933, lO U.S.C. 37l- 8O (l988). 3l. Ibid. 32. Siemer P. Effron, "Military Participation in United States Law Enforcement Activities Overseas: The Extraterritorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act," 54 St. John's Law Rev 44-45 (l978). CHAPTER IV l. United States Code, l988 Edition, Volume Three Title 10-Armed Forces. (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, l989), VII. 2. Ibid., 96. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., 97. 5. 32 C.F.R. #2l5.4. (c). (l). (i) 6. U. S. Constitution Article II, 3. 7. lO U.S.C. 331-33 (l988). 8. lO U.S.C. 334 (l988). 9. lO U.S.C. 375 (l988), lO2. lO. Ibid. ll. Department of Defense "Civil Disturbance Plan," Department of the Army, (Washington D.C. l99l) L-2. l2. Ibid., l. l3. Department of Defense Directive 3O25.l2, "Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MASDIS)," (Washington D.C. 1994) 7. l4. Ibid. l5. "Civil Disturbance Plan," l. l6. "Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances," l2. l7. Ibid., 7. CHAPTER V l. FMFM 3, Command and Control (Washington: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, l6 June l993), l. 2. National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, l976), 56. 3. Major David R. Heinz and Major David C. Damm, "SPMAGTF in Los Angeles: Overview," Marine Corps Gazette, October l992, 55. 4. Ibid. 5. CINCFOR After Action Report on Operation Garden Plot, JTF-L.A. (Washington: Department of Defense, l2 July l992), II- 3. 6. Major John Forguer, USMC, interviewed by author, Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA. l6 February l995. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, l976), 6O5. lO. William M. Hammond. "The News Media and the Military", in Encyclopedia of the American Military, eds. John E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz (New York: Charles Scrilner's Sons, l994), 2lll. ll. Non Lethal Weapons In Somalia, ABC Nightly News, l4 February l995. Chapter VI 1. William J. Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators; Facts and Figures on the State of American Society (New York: Simond & Schuster, l994), 8. 2. Ibid., 9. 3. U. S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, "International Crime Rates," (Wash D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, l988) 4. Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators, 24. 5. Ibid., 25. 6. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, l99l), Table 6.63, 629. 7. Will Marshall and Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, " Replacing Welfare with Work," in Mandate for Change, eds. Will Marshall and Martin Schran (New York: Berkley Books, l993), 2l7. 8. The terms "Haves" and "Have Nots" are widely used today by writers and social scientists. In most cases "Haves refer to the rich while the "Have Nots" refer to the poor. However, the author Myron Magnet argues that poverty is more of a cultural than economic phenomenon produced by a poverty of "inner resources." The "Have Nots" not only suffer from a lack of material needs but also suffer from a lack of cultural values which prevents their upward mobility. Magnet blames this deficiency on the attitudes and programs created by the "Haves of the l96O's. (Myron Magnet, The Dream and the Nightmare: The Sixties' Legacy to the Underclass. New York, l992). 9. Haynes Johnson, Divided We Fall (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., l994), 23l, 232. lO. Myron Magnet, The Dream and the Nightmare: The Sixties' Legacy to the Underclass (New York: William Morrow & Co., l992). ll. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Howard University Commencement, June l965, in Families First, National Commission on America's Urban Families, l993. l2. Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators, 5l. l3. Ibid. l4. Johnson, Divided We Fall, 2O3. l5. Cited in Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators, 53. l6. Johnson, Divided We Fall, 277. l7. Andrew Peyton Thomas, Crime and the Sacking of America, The Roots of Chaos (Washington: Brassey's, l994), 239. CHAPTER VII l. Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Armed Forces and Civil Disorder," in the Military and American Society, eds. Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber Jr. (New York: The Free Press, l972), 256. 2. Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace eds., "Reflections on Violence in the United States," in American Violence: A Documentary History (New York: Vintage Books, l97l), 10. 3. Jerry M. Cooper, "Federal Military Intervention in Domestic Disorders," in The U. S. Military Under the Constitution of the United States, l789-l989, eds. Richard H. Kohn (New York: New York University Press, l99l), l3l. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ambrose, Stephen E. "The Armed Forces and Civil Disorder." in The Military and American Society, eds. Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. 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