The Japanese Self-Defense Force: Its Role and Mission in The Post-Cold War Period CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE ITS ROLE AND MISSION IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Japanese Self-Defense Force: Its Role and Mission in The Post-Cold War Period Author: Captain Kaneepol Songjaroen, Royal Thai Marine Corps Thesis: Is the Japanese Self-Defense Force's buildup plan and increasing participation in United Nations peacekeeping activities in consonance with Japan's peace constitution, U.S.-Japan security agreements, and international expectations? Background: Through an investigation of historical background, political and economic considerations, and the influence of such things as the collapse of the former Soviet Union, this paper discusses the reasons for increased Japanese interest in UN peacekeeping operations and the concomitant increase in the size and scope of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF). Pacific Rim security issues are of vital concern as the region embarks upon an unprecedented rate of economic and demographic development. Thailand, as well as other Asian nations, foresee future problems if this issue is not presently addressed. As the economic power of Asia, Japan has rights and responsibilities that can no longer be ignored or placed totally on the shoulders of other nations. The hurdles for Japan to overcome are significant; their peace constitutional limitations, the internal political struggle over the issue, and the surviving generation whose vivid memories of Imperial Japan invoke fear and distrust. Recommendation: The regional stability surrounding Japan and the attendant military situation remains quite complicated. There remain diverse problems, including the divided Korean Peninsula, the disputed sovereignty of the Spratly Islands and Japan's Northern Territories. Therefore, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement remains an important element in maintaining security in East Asia. Currently, U.S.-Japan treaties and its constitution have limited Japan to a minimal operational capability; therefore, Japan must revise its constitution in order to substantially participate in the enforcement of global legal statutes. It is not only helping to maintain world peace but also stabilizing their own national defense that justifies strengthening the military and modernizing equipment. With the passage of time and the steady decline of victims and veterans of World War IT, Japan's military may be able to escape the specter of its past. In turn, Japan must proceed slowly, informing the world at every step of its peaceful intentions. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION l Chapter Page l. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 4 The Post-Cold War Era, lO 2. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS l3 Economic Considerations, 14 Political Considerations, l6 People, l6 Government Attitudes, l9 Treaties, 22 Political Philosophies, 26 Mainstream, 26 Nationalist, 27 Pacifist, 28 3. SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD 32 Threats, Risks and Influence on Japan's Defense Posture, 33 Changing Geo-Political Threats to Japan, 34 Japan's Basic Security Needs, 4O Defense Policy of Japan, 42 Current Force Structure and Buildup Program, 43 Future Forces, 46 4. UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 48 Past Involvement, 49 Constraints, 5O Future Involvement, 5l 5. CONCLUSIONS 54 Endnotes 57 Bibliography 6O Appendixes A. Japan's Public Opinion Regarding the SDF A-1 B. Changes in Japan's Buildup Programs B-1 C. Changes in Composition of Defense Expenditures C-1 D. Military Postures in and around Japan D-l Appendixes, continued E. Military Postures in Southeast Asia E-l F. Comparison of Defense Expenditure in Major Countries F-1 G. Major Systems and Equipment of Japan on which Development Completed G-l H. Major Systems and Equipment of Japan Currently under Development H-1 I. Contents of Assignments SDF Members Conduct for International Peace Cooperation Assignments I-1 J. Expenses for Major Equipment Items in FYl994 J-l K. Japan's Major Equipment to be Acquisitioned or Procured in FYl994 K-1 INTRODUCTION The memory of Imperial Japan's assault on its Asian neighbor during World War II is still painfully clear. The atrocities committed by those dedicated to establishing the "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" created a long standing and deep-seated distrust of Japan which encompasses a whole generation. Japan's relentless pursuit of resources from its neighbors during the war is one memory that stirs powerful emotions when coupled with the incredible economic development of Japan since World War II. Japan seems to be caught on the horns of a dilemma - that is, if it gets in- volved in world affairs even in such operations as peace keeping, they will have to contend with the negative image that a new Imperial Japan is rising. Conversely, as a world economic power, remaining uninvolved creates yet another unfavorable image of selfishness and isolation from the community of nations. Through an investigation of historical background, political and economic considerations, and the influence of such things as the collapse of the former Soviet Union, this paper will highlight the reasons for the increased Japanese interest in U.N. peacekeeping operations and the concomitant increase in the size and scope of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF). How Japan handles this increased military presence and development is critical to not only stability in Asia, but to the world economic community as well. A misstep creating the impression of a new imperialistic Japan could easily lead to economic sanctions due to Japan's closed domestic market, or worse yet, economic warfare. Some critics say that this economic warfare has already begun -- that Japan is now economically imperialistic vice militarily. To the student of military studies, this issue brings in many of the works of such notables as Clausewitz and Paul Kennedy. Likewise, the issue is not only of keen interest to the Asian reader, but also the American due to the meshing of the United States and Japan via security agreements. First of all, Japan must solve the dilemma internally first with regard to its Constitution, laws and public opinion. In order to understand whatever action they may take, it is important for us to understand what is behind it. This thesis will discuss the current build-up plan of the JSDF and its participation in U.N. peacekeeping activi- ties. Of primary concern is whether or not these actions are in consonance with the Japanese Constitution and the U.S./Japan Mutual Security Agreement. If the Japanese deploy in support of the U.N., what will be the internation- al reaction to the increased range and depth of their participation? Pacific Rim security issues are of vital concern as the region embarks upon an unprecedented rate of economic and demographic development. Thailand, as well as other Asian nations, foresee future problems if this issue is not ad dressed in the present. As the economic power of Asia, Japan has rights and responsibilities that can no longer be ignored or placed upon the shoulders of others. The road to defense self-reliance for Japan is a long and torturous one, but one which must be traveled -- even if it is one slow step at a time. CHAPTER l HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The past, it seemed, did not die ..... but lived on beside the present, and sometimes perhaps, become the future. John Galsworthy, A Modern Comedy While Japan has a long historical and societal evolution, this chapter will focus on some interesting developments from immediately following World War II to the current Japanese involvement in the United Nations Peace keeping Forces. This historical treatment will provide a contextual framework to analyze attitudes and actions that have brought Japan to its current world status. At noon, l5 August l945, activity all over Japan came to a halt. The national anthem was played and for the first time in its history, the Emperor spoke to the people of Japan: The enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. This is the reason why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers. Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation. Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction of the future. Culti- vate the ways of rectitude, foster nobility of spir- it, and work with resolution that you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep peace with the progress of the world."1 Many obvious facts about the episode lend credence to the bilateral rendition of Occupation history. Japan, no longer a sovereign nation after surrender, was not permitted representation in foreign capitals or membership in international organizations. All foreign relations -- governmental, business, and individual were conducted through the intermediary of Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP). Surveys of the Occupation generally emphasized the policy to seal off Japan from foreign contact and stress the minimal input of the Allied Powers in an almost exclusively American operation. Indeed the Occupation's positive achievements are commonly attributed to the audacity of a unitary command which neither sought nor tolerated international interference. The technical misnomer "American Occupation" raises few eyebrows and chronicles write blithely of Japan's "American interlude." Japan virtually became a surrogate colony of the United States, which gave it most of the advantages of colonial status, without the disadvantages. Just as the United States was once a colony of Great Britain, but is now the stronger of the two, Japan became a "colony" of the United States it may very well became the stronger of the two nations. Japan was given American defense protection, technology and markets, for which it paid little or nothing. Japanese leaders determined to rebuild from the ashes of defeat by concentrating exclusively on economic development, left Japan's defense to the American victor, to save money and to avoid rekindling fears among prospective customers about a resurgent military threat. Meanwhile, the international community took prompt action after the end of World War II and the United Nations began to reconstruct a security framework because of the failure of the League of Nations. A period of demilitarization and democratization followed in Japan (l945-47). Under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Japan's Army and Navy Ministries were abolished, munitions and military equipment were destroyed, and war industries were converted to civilian uses. State Shinto was disestablished, and on l January l94E, Emperor Hirohito repudiated his divinity. MacArthur pushed the government to amend the l889 Meiji Constitution, and on 3 May l947, the New Japanese constitution (MacArthur Constitution) came into force. Constitution is the reintroduction of Western-style liberalism, the emergence of a stable parliamentary system under the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This Constitution includes the following distinctive features: the purely symbolic role of the emperor, the prominence of guarantees of civil and human rights, and the renunciation of war. The Article 9 of the Constitution, the "No War Clause", contains two paragraphs. The first states that the Japanese people "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes". The second is that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained".4 Article 9 has had broad implications for foreign policy, the institution of judicial review as exercised by the Supreme Court, the status of the Self- Defense forces, and the nature and tactics of opposition politics. This Article has remained an important brake on the growth of Japan's military capabilities. The Post-World War II period can be summarized as following: - Serious efforts were made between the United States and Japan to formulate a security framework. The postwar period has seen the United States and Japan sign three major defense treaties, in l95l, l954 and l96O. These have all tied Japan closer to the Western camp, committed the United States to the defense of Japan and allowed the Japanese to minimize defense spending. Additionally, it allowed for the basing of American troops on Japanese soil and for the rent to be paid to the Japanese government. The pact determined that American land, sea and air forces could be stationed "in and about Japan" to safeguard "international peace and security in the Far East", help protect Japan "against armed attack from without" and help, "at the express request of the Japanese Government", to put down "large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers". - Japan was hit by severe economic crises accompanied by relentless inflation. With militarization in the l93Os Japan had become a controlled economy. As the war progressed, disastrously, the regulatory system was tightened. By its end the Japanese government minutely controlled all economic activities through a comprehensive system of material and fuel allocation, product and food rationing, production quotas, supplies contracts, financial directives, price controls, wage controls, and labor conscription. At the end of war, the Japanese economy suffered virtually total breakdown: Industrial output dropped sharply, inflation accelerated, unemployment remained low, but only because the unemployed received no relief from their plight. Everyone eked out a living in whatever way they could, or lived off whatever real or financial assets they retained. The unemployed returned to the countryside, and others actively participated in the black market, trading in whatever they could. - National boundaries were redrawn, giving birth of a number of new and independent states such as India, declared independent from the Great Britain in l947, Indonesia declared independent from the Dutch on l7 August l945, Vietnam proclaimed its independence from France in l954, and East and West Germany divided into a communist eastern half and a capitalist western half in l95O, etc.. The seeds for the next era were sown, germinated, and took root in the immediate postwar period. The quality of the "seeds" depended in both cases on how the vanquished were treated, and how the newly rising powers were accommodated. The salient difference between post-World War I and post-World War II periods was the hostile relationship between China and the Soviet Union that developed soon after the war and the way they the principal alliances among the Western states stayed in force. The beginning of the Cold War is traced to the Truman Doctrine declared in March l947. In fact, the actual process by which the Cold War developed was punctuated by such events as the sealing of Berlin by the Soviets (l94B), the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and finally, the outbreak of the Korean War in June l95O, which decisively defined the structure of the Cold War. Both Germany and Japan became economic superpowers and reliable principal allies of the Western camp in this period. The l952 ratification of the Japan-United States Mutual Security Assistance Pact also ensured a strong defense for Japan and a large postwar role for the U.S. in Asia; however, the world community failed to find a way to accommodate the Soviet Union. In l954, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were estab- lished. Japan's biggest postwar political crisis took place in l96O. As the new treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was concluded, which renewed the United States role as military protector of Japan, massive street protests and political upheaval occurred, and the Cabinet resigned a month after the Diet's ratification of the treaty.5 After World War II, the people of the Japan devoted themselves to the reconstruction of the national economy. The role and view of the military changed from imperialistic to that of peacekeeper. These efforts, as well as the assistance from the international community, enabled Japan to become an economic power. In accordance with its economic growth, Japan has made substantial contributions to the international community, primarily in the field of financial cooperation efforts such as development assistance. The Post-Cold War Era The Persian Gulf Crisis, triggered by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August l99O, posed a challenge to the international community. It responded by adopting a United Nations Security Council Resolution, forming multinational forces, providing international support for the costs of operations and taking other unprecedented measures of cooperation under the authority of the United Nations. Although Japan contributed a total of $l3 billion to these collective operations by the international community, it was criticized because its cooperation did not include personnel contributions. This criticism is the embodiment of the Japanese Self- Defense Forces dilemma -- if they build up, they are fearful of the imperialistic perception, if they don't participate, they are fearful of being viewed as self-centered. Through these experiences, Japan became keenly aware of the need not merely to implement financial and material cooperation, but also to conduct effective manpower support in times of crisis. Against this background, Japan enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law in June l992, following a long domestic debate, with discussions centered in the Diet, over how to assume its international responsibility through personnel contributions. While Japan had a already participated in United Nations Peacekeeping activities through the dispatch of election supervisors to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law enabled Japan to establish a domestic framework to provide manpower contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping operations and humanitarian international relief operations on a full fledged scale. In summary, Japan's recent history is an important factor in not only its constitution, but the structure and missions of the SDF as well. This historical influence, coupled with political and economic aspects, will directly affect any decisions regarding U.N peacekeeping participation or SDF restructuring efforts. CHAPTER 2 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS The economy of a country is the foundation of its military power and the military is the foundation of economic power, a mutually supporting relationship. The classical theorists such as Adam Smith and the senior statesman of nineteenth-century mercantilism, Friedrich List, had believed that the economic foundation of military power, strong armies and national survival depended on national wealth: War or the very possibility of war makes the establishment of a manufacturing power an indispensable requirement for a nation of the first rank. Power is more important than wealth...because the reverse of power-namely feebleness-leads to the relinquishment of all that we possess, not of acquired wealth alone, but of our powers of production, of our civilization, of our freedom, nay, even of our national independence, into the hands of those who surpass us in might.6 War in the late twentieth century has become as much financial as technological. The military is expensive to maintain, and only rich and productive nations can defend themselves in modern times. Japanese practices make clear that collective benefits and national security can be derived from the economy as well as from the development of forces. This chapter will discuss the various political and economic considerations which influence the future use of the SDF in other than traditional UN support roles and the associated SDF structure with which to accomplish those missions. Economic Considerations Japan was the first Asian industrialized country since Tokugawa-Meiji transition, in the mid-nineteenth century. Since Japan first opened the country to Western commerce and influence until now, it has exposed the Japanese to Western ideas and influence, experienced revolutionary social, political, and economic changes, and become a world power with carefully developed spheres of influence. In the l99Os, Japan had the world's second largest gross national product. During the l98Os, Japan became a financial center, the world's largest stock exchange and a world leader in technological research and production. Imports and exports totalled the equivalent of US$ 4S2 billion in l988. The Japanese government encouraged economic change by fostering a national revolution by planning and advising in every aspect of society such as: initiating new industries, cushioning the effects of economic depression, creating a sound economic infrastructure, and protecting the living standards of each citizen. The Japanese attitude towards government was that the nation, as a family, allowed government to influence business, and businesses worked hard not only for their own profits, but also for national well being. Thus, the relationship between government and business was as collaborators rather than as mutually suspicious adversaries. The national goal each time was to make Japan so powerful and wealthy that its independence would never again be threatened. Japan became the world's largest creditor, while the United States was becoming a debtor nation. Japan's financial institutions rapidly expanded their international activities since the l97Os, and they were major international players by the end of the l98Os. Japan's financial and banking industries grew at unprecedented rates. In l988, the nine largest banks in the world, measured by total assets, were Japanese banks. These banks became engaged in new activities, such as underwriting Euro-Yen bond issues. The investment houses also increased overseas activities, especially participating in the United States Treasury Bond market (25-3O percent of each new issue was purchased by Japanese investors in the late l98Os) Besides these private institutions, there were a number of government-owned financial institutions; the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), and the Japan Export Import Bank (Exim Bank). Of these, the Exim Bank was the only one with an international focus. The Exim Bank provides financing for trade between Japan and developing countries. These made Japan a more important international financial power. Japan is a member of the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As Japan became a greater international financial power, its roles in financing these trade and development institutions grew. Previously, the government had been a very quiet participant in those organizations, but as its financial role increased, pressure to expand voting rights and play a more active policy role mounted. Political Considerations People Japanese national character is reflected in that individual Japanese males often describe themselves with such terms as egotistic, emotional, introspective, illogical, hypochondriac, stoical, preserving, disciplined, conformist, diligent, respectful, loyal, honest, polite and unbelievably rigid about the requirements of various kinds of duties, but as less interested in the letter of written agreement than its emotional connotation and context, very anxious to avoid stark confrontations and uncertainty in almost all situations, and finally as having a realistic ability to learn, always being interested in self- or national-improvement.7 People are the most important resource. The Japanese government has foreseen this and inculcated nationalism in its people. By l99l, all eight approved Japanese elementary school social studies textbooks contained references to Admiral Togo, the first mention of him in post war texts.8 Among the troubling developments of recent years are the rebirth of popular veneration for the emperor, seen during the ascension of Emperor Akihito, and an increase in authoritarianism. For example, on l July l99l, the Japanese government officially reestablished the Hinomaru -- symbol of the red sun on the white background -- as its national flag and approved the imperial hymn Ga Yo' its national anthem, both had been banned since World War II. Additionally, there is the rise of State Shinto -- the erosion of the post war legal principle of the separation of state and religion -- in worship by Cabinet ministers at Yasukuni Shrine. The public funding of Shinto rituals in Akihito's accession ceremonies cannot be ignored, and now the Japanese politicians are trying to find a way to coordinate the defense policies and strategies with these civilian developments. These nationalistic movements and events have fueled the fears of those who remember Imperial Japan. The return of the nationalistic songs, flag and pride in their past military history are considerably unnerving to the many veterans, both Japanese and Allied, of World War II. While the world does not expect Japan to ignore its history or not foster national pride, a return to the image- and emotion- laden symbols of Imperial Japan does little to create a sense of confidence among those who remember the war. The national defense can only be carried out effectively with the understanding and cooperation of the nation's citizens. Japan has a constant interest in public's awareness of defense-related matters and is making efforts to ensure that Japan's national defense posture stands on a wide and firm base of public support. A public survey has been conducted every three years since l972. The results of the last survey can be summarized as following:9 Interest in the SDF and Defense Issues : Over half of the respondents indicated "some level of interest" in such issues for the past lO years, despite the fact that Japan shares no common land border with other countries and the Japanese have enjoyed steady peace and prosperity since the end of World War II. Impression of SDF : Most of respondents, 76 percent, are neutral or have a favorable impression. These results are likely due to the broad awareness and appreciation of the public regarding the SDF. Role of the SDF : Nearly one-half of all respondents indicated the opinion that the primary purpose for the existence of the SDF is "ensuring the national security". National Defense Structure : 7O percent of respondents acknowledged the current structure, and 60 percent indicated satisfaction with the current size of defense forces. This means that Japan's basic national defense policies, including the structure that combined the SDF and the Japan- U.S. security arrangements, along with the current defense efforts, are generally understood and supported by the public. In response to the International Contribution Question, most of respondents indicated that they "approve" of overseas dispatch of the SDF for disaster relief activities and United Nations peacekeeping operations. Government Attitudes Since l94Os, there has been a clear perception in the Japanese government that; - the building of a viable and then a competitive industrial economy and a stable, effective political system have been the primary objectives of national policy. - the achievement of these goals is very heavily contingent on foreign policy -- meaning avoiding war or relying on the U.S. "shield." - the security and economic dimensions of foreign policy are inextricably linked since Japan's economic power provides a large proportion of its security. It has been clear since early in the modernization process that the success of Japan's industrialization would depend on access to overseas raw materials and markets. The particular lesson of World War II is that Japan cannot achieve this necessary access to the world economy by the use of military force. The Japanese concluded that they must avoid as much as possible any military role in international politics, and they must rely on peaceful, non military means to build their economy and to make a decent life for themselves.10 By the late 1940s and early 1950s, Japan's conservative government concluded that the best foreign policy (the Yoshida policy) for Japan was to become an ally of the United States, and to base Japan's economic future on the relatively free, open international economic system that the United States was constructing. Cooperative economic relations with the United States itself would be a large source of raw materials and a major market for Japanese manufactured products. This policy had been rooted in the belief that the alliance with the United States would protect Japan against the Communist (Soviet) threat to its military security and political stability. In the l95Os, Japan was able to reconstruct its economy and become a highly efficient industrial country. Thus, this means of "economic foreign policy" was very successful. By the end of l98Os, the world environment changed, as Japan had become the world largest creditor and the second largest donor of foreign aid. The Yoshida policy was being called into question by, first, the diminishing of Soviet threat, and, second, Japan's success in building a competitive, industrial economy. Its economy was generating potentially dangerous levels of resentment, fear and antagonism toward Japan in the United States. The United States government began moving toward protectionist economic policies directed against Japan. Significantly, at the same time Japan took on a larger role in the international community to a level commensurate with its economic power. By l99O, Japan's foreign policy still supported close ties with the United States. However, Japanese leaders were well aware of strong American frustrations with Japanese economic practices and Japan's strong economic power relative to the United States in the world markets. Although the United States was working with the Japanese to find the new concept framework for Japan-United States relations, the view is far from clear. Some optimistically predicted that the United States and Japan would work together as truly equal partners in dealing with global problems. Some pessimists predicted that negative feeling generated by the realignment in United States and Japanese economic power and persistent trade frictions would prompt Japan to strike out more on its own, without guidance of the United States. Given the growing economic dominance of Japan in Asia, Japan was seen as most likely to strike out independently and translate its economic power into political and, perhaps, military influence. Treaties The security framework for the defense of a recently disarmed Japan was developed over the post-war period of l945-l95l, culminating with the signing of a formal security treaty with the United States on 8 September l95l in San Francisco.11 On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan did not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it had been disarmed. There was danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore, Japan desired that a security treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Japan. This treaty attached weight to the U.S. military's right to be stationed in Japan. Japan was now essentially a dependent ally of the United States, which continued to maintain bases and military on Japanese soil. Second came the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, signed at Washington, D.C. on l9 January l96O. This treaty was to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship existing between the two nations. It also upheld the principles of democracy of the government, individual liberty and the rule of law. Japan needed to reaffirm its faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and Japan's desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. Furthermore, the Treaty underlined the U.S. and Japanese common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far-East, having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security. Twenty five years after the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Government of Japan became convinced that the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons treaty would serve as a first step toward nuclear disarmament and hopes that as many states as possible will adhere to this treaty to make it effective. Therefore, on 3 February l97O, the Government of Japan signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.l2 While Japan's policy of against the acquisition of nuclear weapons enjoyed the support of most political parties, there seems to be some action to the contrary. For example, Japan's Foreign Ministry seems to now favor nuclear weapons. Last June, the ministry prepared a document for the then-coalition government to send to the World Court stating that the use of nuclear weapons in war was not necessarily illegal.13 It seems as if the tragic events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are no longer enough. Other evidence indicating a possible attitude shift in the Japanese regarding nuclear weapons is the abnormally high quantity of stockpiled plutonium, which they extract from spent civilian power fuel. The approximately ll million metric tons accumulated by the end of l993 greatly exceeded Japan's capacity to use them as reactor fuel in the near future. Some consider these attitude shifts and suspicious actions as justification for requiring Japan to restate its policy towards nuclear weapons. In international society today, Japan needs to make an effort in many ways to pursue the establishment of a more stable world order. It is also very important to establish foundations for national security by stabilizing domestic affairs, implementing appropriate domestic policies, encouraging people to defend their own country, and preventing the development of a domestic situation that allows the country to be subjected to aggression. In accordance with the MacArthur Japanese Constitution and Mutual Cooperation and Security Agreement, the JSDF has limited operational capabilities. Opinions regarding the security treaty with the United States fall into "pro-continuity" or "pro-change" camps. The pro-continuity group argues that the treaty is still important in the post-Cold War era, precisely because nobody is sure of the threats posed in the near- to mid-term future. The latter group argues that the treaty served its purpose of protecting Japan, while at the same time making it unnecessary for Japan to acquire a large military arsenal. In their view, it is unnecessary for Japan to acquire a large military arsenal or develop nuclear weapons; the treaty is no longer needed because Russia is not the threat that the former Soviet Union was. However, the common concern shared by both camps is that Japan lacks a comprehensive new national security strategy to deal with the post-Cold War environment, and that, US security alliance or not, Japan must build such a strategy. Fifty years later, the Japanese government still heavily relies on the United States government to defend their country. Currently, the Japanese are ranked number two in the world for their economy and they are ready to share greater responsibility of world peace and national security but are unable to assume the roles and missions because of the US Treaties and Japanese Constitution. The United States is not wealthy enough, nor has the desire, to act as global ring master and policeman. Regional institutions as we have seen in Europe, the America, Africa, are weak and not sufficiently well developed to assume major responsibility.14 The only way to regulate the new policy, is that the Japanese government must convince all political parties, business communities, and government bureaucracy (Mainstreamers, Nationalists and Pacifists) to have the same approach and that the Japanese can defend their nation while supporting the United Nation's mission to make our world a better place. Political Philosophies The difference of Japanese politics can be viewed from several angles: as debates among the government bureaucracy, political parties, the big-business community, and the relatively voiceless masses, and as debates among those whose political philosophies could be called "mainstream," "nationalist," and "pacifist".l5 Mainstream - Within the government, mainstream thought characterizes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Defense Agency (DA), the SDF, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. It supports the maintenance of the U.S.- Japan Security Agreement, and, to keep U.S. forces in Japan, this group is willing for Japan to carry more of the financial burden of the alliances. The other side of the coin is that it does not favor expanding Japan's defense forces in the near term. The mainstreamers value the alliance with the U.S. not necessarily out of admiration or respect for the United States, but out of political calculation of what is best for Japan. They see that Japan must need the U.S. security "umbrella" for the indefinite future for at least two reasons; first, because other nations' historic perception of Japan as a potential aggressor in Asia restricts Japan's rearmament options and, second, because without American support the nationalists might seize the opportunity to remilitarize Japan. A Liberal Democratic Party study group, chaired after the Gulf War in February l992, suggested that Japan's peace constitution be reinterpreted as advocating and "active" form of pacifism that would be consistent with Japan's use of force in international peacekeeping operations. However, the report also concludes that Japan should only assume this active role in the international community because other countries have asked it do so. Nationalist - Although the nationalists are not affiliated with any significant institutional foundations or political parties, they are scattered as influential individuals throughout Japanese society. Nationalists see the post-Cold War era as a non-polar world in which Japan must be ready to defend itself without relying on the United States, and the first task for doing so should be to revise the Constitution, which prohibits Japan from using force against other nations. Their reaction to the Gulf War differ from those of the mainstreamers: they objected to Japan's effort to gain international respect through financial contributions to the war. They felt the monetary option was foolish and, instead, military troops should have gone into combat with UN forces. The blind submission to pay $l3 billion for the Gulf War only served to demonstrate that Japan is an uncritical follower of misguided "American justice." The nationalists' autonomous defense and foreign policy orientation implies that Japan either withdraw from the U.S.-Japan security alliance or insist on equal partnership. However, they do not clearly spell out what Japan's defense posture should be, especially in regard to nuclear weapons. Pacifist - The views of Japan's pacifists on rearmament have prevailed since the end of World War II; they have been groomed largely within the academic community and the Socialist Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). Japanese academics, especially economists, are predominantly socialists, the Marxist tradition having taken root in the early part of this century. Although Japanese government and business leaders claim that university professors do not have a strong popular influence, Japan's academics -- far more than their American counterparts -- enjoy the respect of the public in accordance with the Confucian tradition of "revering the literati and despising the military." Pacifists have traditionally asserted that Japan make its contribution to world peace in an age of collective UN leadership by terminating its security agreement with the United States, supporting the United Nations as a global, nonmilitary force for peace, maintaining the Japanese peace constitution, and reducing Japan's military capabilities. Of particular note is that many of the less radical pacifist views are widely held by the electorate, especially by women.15 Instead of sending troops into combat, the pacifists believe that Japan has to remain a peaceful power and convince its neighbors that it is not a future military threat. Since the l96O's, when the pacifists were most active, public sympathy for their more extreme views was dwindling. The SDPJ was been unsuccessful in rejuvenating the l96O's anti-security treaty sentiment, and in a February l993 interview with Mainichi Shimbun, SDPJ Chairman Sadao Yamahana admitted that in order to get more votes, the SDPJ must get more realistic and less idealistic.16 This would happen very soon. Developments in l993-94, have seen a dramatic change in political Japan. Former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) "mover-and-shaker" Ichiro Ozawa, catalyzed change by engineering events that brought Morihiro Hosokawa to power, ending the LDP's 38-year-old iron grip on government. However, last June, when Hosokawa's successor Tsutomu Hatta was forced to resign after only 59 days in office, the LDP regained power by forming a coalition with their traditional opponents, the SDPJ, led by Tomiichi Murayama.17 The dramatic changes continued even within the SDPJ, as it attempted to make itself more relevant. For example, as Prime Minister, Murayama jettisoned pacifist policies by accepting the constitutionality of the SDF, the legitimacy of the l96O U.S.-Japan Treaty of Cooperation and Security, and even endorsed "Kimi Ga Yo" as the national anthem! Basically, the SDPJ still clings to some of its pacifist ideology such as Article 9 of the constitution, but has given its support to fullest possible involvement in non- combat peacekeeping roles under U.N. auspices.18 In summary of the economic and political considerations regarding Japan's increased involvement in international peacekeeping missions and the concomitant structural changes in the SDF, it can be safely said that the economic might of Japan will continue to invite pressure from the world community to "do more" in support of stability for many years to come. The three dominant political philosophies -- mainstream, nationalist and pacifist -- will be engaged in a three-way tug-of-war for control over the size and composition of the SDF. While the "mainstreamers" have been in control for some time, the nationalist movement is gaining some momentum. The pacifist movement, as mentioned above, has essentially adapted its philosophy to be more relevant. Perhaps all three will adapt to the point of becoming a homogeneous political philosophy. In the meantime, what will keep all three political camps in check is the presence of the World War II generation of Japanese that vividly remember the pain and international castigation from the war. Over the course of the next twenty years, as this generation dies off, the well-spring of nationalism may spring forth unchecked by those who remember. A number of factors can lead to a resurgence in nationalism within Japan: the fading of memories both inside and external to Japan regarding World War II; the children of today continue to be influenced by their history and recent nationalistic initiatives like the Hinomaru; and if the Japanese continue to view the United States commitment to their security with skepticism. These factors will contribute to a swaying of the peace constitution revision pendulum towards a greater Japanese role and a restructured SDF to support it; however, because of the continued presence of the World War II generation, this expansion in the SDF role will most likely not be achieved until 2OlO or longer. CHAPTER 3 SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD We must consult our means rather than our wishes, and not endeavor to better our affairs by attempting things which, for want of success, may make them worse. - George Washington to Lafayette, l78O, The end of the Cold War has raised questions over the future of the security relationship between the United States and Japan and the direction of Japan's defense buildup. With the second-largest economy in the world and steady technological advances, Japan possesses the financial and technological ability to transform itself into a military power. This chapter will discuss some of the threats which compel Japan to maintain a strong defense program, its current status, and plans for the future. Various local confrontations due to religious or ethnic discord in many parts of the world, which had been contained under the East-West confrontation, have come to the surface or intensified, heightening the likelihood that regional conflicts (for example the Spratly Islands, Korea, etc.) may occur or expand. In addition, transfer or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear arms, are feared in the international community as they can aggravate regional conflicts. The military situation thus remains unstable and uncertain and under such circumstances, the United Nations is expected to perform its function more than before in keeping peace and security in the world.19 Threats, Risks and Influence on Japan's Defense Posture The Japanese military establishment, as well as Japan's public-opinion leaders and policy makers, have accepted that the Cold War is over. While many of the implications of this change are still emerging, the chief priority of the new peacetime environment is for Japan to re-evaluate its security requirements in the absence of an apparent threat from the former Soviet Union. International security threats comprise a combination of aggressive intentions and military capabilities. Viewed from a long-term perspective, as most security policies are, the additional factor of predictability, especially predictability of intentions, becomes a third important variable to enter into the threat equation. The Japanese are perhaps more concerned about the unpredictability of their security environment than about the present intentions or military capabilities of their neighbors. Japan's l992 Defense White Paper identified the following problem areas in East Asia: the confrontation between North and South Korea, the multinational dispute over the Spratly Islands, and the unresolved conflict in Cambodia. On the other hand, the White Paper noted positive signs in the region; a continuing dialogue between North and South Korea, both of whom joined the United Nations; South Korea's announcement that it is free of nuclear weapons; North Korea's signing (but lack of fidelity to) of the Non Proliferation Treaty, and acceptance of nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Additionally, China established relations with South Korea and Vietnam, and strengthened relations with Russia. North Korea was talking about opening up to the outside world, Vietnam had opened up, and a Cambodian peace agreement was reached. It is not clear how the former Soviet Union's massive military forces in the Far East will develop in the process of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Significant movements toward arms proliferation have been seen in the Far East, constituting an unstable factor for the security of this region. Changing Geo-Political Threats to Japan The Russian Threat- Like most other Western nations, Japan is experiencing difficulty in adjusting to the changed security environment vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. Russian analysts argue that Japan has "belittled the changes that Perestroika and the new thinking have brought to Soviet foreign policy". Japanese defense analysts point to the lack of force reductions in Russia's Far East Forces. The Japanese are also concerned about the sale by former Soviet republics of modern weapons to other nations, especially China, as well as the possibility of weapons-technology (especially nuclear technology) transfer, all in the new Russian spirit of free-wheeling capitalism. Ironically, it is not criticism of Russia's vast military establishment that has preoccupied the Japanese, but rather a relatively insignificant dispute involving the ownership of four small islands, the Kuriles, (which Japan designates as the Northern Territories), the closest of which is located only a few miles north of Hokkaido. The archipelago provides an eastern barrier to the entrance of the Sea of Okhotsk, from which Russian ships and submarines operate. The islands also have economic value in terms of fishing rights and mineral deposits. Russia is believed to have a brigade of troops supported by helicopters and MiG-23 fighters stationed on the larger two islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu. The Soviet Union took the entire chain at the end of World War II. Japan has never recognized the legality of Russia's possession of the four southern islands, claiming they are not part of the Kurile group that Japan officially ceded to the Soviet Union in the l952 San Francisco Peace Treaty. In the past (l956, l988, and l99O) the Soviet Union has offered to give Japan the islands (Shikotan and the Habomai group) in return for a peace treaty, but Japan has continued to insist on the return of all four islands. Various deals have been floated from both Tokyo and Moscow, involving the Japanese "purchase" of the islands for a large sum of money, or even some agreement whereby the islands might be occupied by Russia but owned by Japan. Russia is sensitive about setting a precedent of ceding territory to Japan, China, or another CIS republic. The island issue has thus stalemated Japanese-Russian relations. The Chinese Threat- With the exception of Russia, China is the strongest military capability in Asia. While China has kept military expenditures at a constant percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) since l99O, the robust growth of the Chinese economy has produced three consecutive years of higher military expenditures. For example, Japan estimates that the spending in l992 was l3 percent over l99l. Among the recent additions to China's arsenal are Russian SU-27 fighters. The Chinese were even reported to be considering the purchase of a Ukrainian aircraft carrier, although the deal does not seem to be going through. In July l994, the Shidian magazine reported that a number of Naval-Air force pilots with tens of thousands of hours flying experience were being trained in the Guangzhon Naval Vessel Institute. But without an aircraft carrier battle group, Chinese cannot effectively protect the so-called "Spratly National Marine Territory". Japan's relations with China have been relatively smooth. The Japanese continue to advocate the importance of opening up China economically, and this advocacy has most certainly been appreciated by Beijing. Except for the passage in l992 of China's Territorial Waters Act, by which China has laid claim not only to the Spratly Islands but also to Japan's Senkaku Island, China's present intentions toward Japan seem positive. In the future, it is plausible that China could come into conflict with other regional powers such as India or Japan. Both India and China consider themselves "great powers" and have expanded their ballistic missile arsenals and nuclear capabilities. The Chinese naval capability is beginning to protrude into the Bay of Bengal, and both countries are suspicious of the other. Essentially, China and India are too big, too close and too ambitious not to conflict with each other in the future.20 The future intentions of China in regard to Hong Kong and Taiwan are unclear to Japan. Whether Hong Kong will be allowed to keep its democratic-capitalist system after l997 has been questioned by Beijing. Like China, Taiwan's strong economy enables it to improve its defense capabilities. For example, it has purchased advanced fighter planes from the United States (l5O F-l6s) and France.21 The minority Democratic Progressive Party, which received a third of the votes in the December l992 election, has called for Taiwan's independence from mainland China, that is, a renunciation of its claim to be the legitimate government of China. Such a break is unlikely to come in the near future. If it did, it could conceivably trigger an armed conflict with the mainland. Such conflict at Japan's doorstep could easily have repercussions for Japan's security, especially if the United States should extend assistance to Taiwan, perhaps even from American bases in Japan. In fact, a number of Chinese strategists and security analysts identify the United States as the primary enemy in the post-Cold War era. For the United States, China today is an important actor in both international and regional environments. While it is in no sense a superpower, it has significant global capabilities with which it can influence the success of U.S. policies, and it has the potential to wield even greater influence in the future. It is a member of the UN Security Council with a veto, and can therefore frustrate or, at least strongly influence, any U.S. policy which requires a Security Council decision. As a self-proclaimed "Third World" state, increasingly successful in an economic and military sense, it has the ability to influence other Third World governments, either in support of, or in opposition to, U.S. global interests. Because it is one of the five acknowledged nuclear powers, China is central to restraining the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology.22 The verdict on China's performance in this area is not in - - especially regarding North Korea's mysterious "nuclear program". Lastly, China is an important exporter of arms which sells relatively sophisticated missiles to customers that the United States considers dangerous, including Iran, Syria, and Libya.23 The Korean Peninsula Threat- Although both North and South Koreans have bitter memories of Japan's colonial aggression, the South Koreans have developed strong economic ties with the Japanese and have learned to work with them. Curiously, North Korea also has strong ties with Japan; an estimated 2OO,OOO North Koreans have lived in Japan since World War II. The Kim IL Sung regime had been courting Tokyo in pursuit of diplomatic recognition and a large wartime compensation package. Although the Japanese government is also eager to normalize relations in order to provide greater stability to the region, the normalization talks have made little progress over the failure of the North Koreans to agree to permit mutual North-South Korean nuclear inspections. Most worrisome to the Japanese is the possibility that North Korea could develop a nuclear weapon capable of being delivered to western Japan by its new Scud-C missile (NODONG). What purpose such an attack would serve is not obvious; however, given the somewhat reckless nature of North Korean military policy in the past-from launching the Korean War to attempting to assassinate the South Korean President-the possibility of such an attack is one reason why Japan is eager both for mutual North-South Korean inspections and for the establishment of normalization with the North Koreans. Southeast Asian "Threat" - Japan's relations with the Southeast Asian nations have improved greatly in the recent years, and Japanese investment has been pouring into the region. None of the nations in this region pose a security threat to Japan in the foreseeable future. In summary, while not all of the aforementioned geo- political threats pose imminent danger to Japan, they do present an enormous potential threat to regional stability and to Japan. The Japanese feel, rightfully so, that with two major nuclear powers in close proximity, total reliance on the U.S. security umbrella may be too little or too late. Japan's Basic Security Needs In view of the threats mentioned above, the grand strategy of Japan should aim at developing and effectively utilizing political, military, economic, and psychological forces for the purpose of attaining Japan's long term national goal of achieving regional stability. Japan's basic security strategy, rooted in mainstream philosophy, can be summarized into ten points:24 l. Maintenance of the US-Japan Security Alliance and establishment of a regional multilateral collective security framework. In essence, including other friendly nations in the region into the U.S.-Japan security cooperative. Japan has to protect and stabilize its raw material sources and export markets. The important regions are the connecting Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC); the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. By nature, this implies a large SDF. 2. Contribution to strengthened international economic cooperation and economic policy coordination because Japan cannot survive if the international economy collapses. 3. Implementation of assistance programs targeted at Russia and China. Russia still remains a mighty military power, while China is the newly rising power from the Cold War. The idea is to prevent problems and by encouraging stability. 4. Participation in international activities aimed at the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons and preparedness for nuclear accidents. 5. Participation in international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. 6. Positive participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the strengthening of UN functions. Especially, participation in UN-sponsored Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) in all areas for resolving regional conflicts. 7. Participation in other international activities aimed at resolving non-military problems of global concern. 8. Focusing on the need to resolve the Korean North- South problem. 9. Institutional preparation to become a major information power. Japan's economic and national security can be firmly built upon the foundation of a stable international interdependence. Japan can use its technology and economic power to carve a niche in the information market and create an "informational interdependence." lO. Preparation of a self-defense capability with well-defined limits on equipment systems, operational ranges, and force structure. For example, by not acquiring offensive weapons. Defense Policy of Japan The Defense Policy Japan has pursued under the constitution is based on the "Basic Policy for National Defense", adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet in l957.25 Its main basic policy is as follows: making a contribution to world peace through the United Nations, consolidating of the foundations for national security through comprehensive policies, and gradually acquiring a moderate but effective capacity to defend Japan. In the same year, Japan's 1st Defense Buildup Plan (l958-l96l) was also introduced. The "National Defense Program Outline", adopted in l976, included Mid-term Defense Programs and was based on the following assumptions: l) major military clashes between East and West could be deterred by a balance of powers, including the nuclear powers, 2) there could be limited armed conflict in vicinity of Japan, and 3) any major military attack on Japan is unlikely so long as the Japan-U.S. security arrangement remains functional. In the first part of the Defense Buildup plan, emphasis was laid on the defense of Japan in conjunction with U.S. force against external threats, particularly from the Soviet Union. That orientation explained the priority given to the defense of the main island and the Kuriles. However, because of their strong anti-nuclear policy at the time, Japan was insisted that U.S. forces on Japan or Okinawa be non-nuclear. The internal security mission was played down until the massive demonstration and riots instigated by the Left to overthrow the government in its opposition to the l96O Security Treaty with U.S.. Since that time, internal security has been a high priority of the armed forces, especially the JSDFI and has been tackled with great thoroughness.26 The recent Mid-term Defense Program (l99l-l995) was adopted in l99O and has achieved the force structure level specified in the original Outline Program; however, there are still on-going efforts to rationalize and modernize the JSDF. 27 Current Force Structure and Buildup Program Japan's armed forces, as in "Article 9" of their constitution, preclude existence of offensive military forces. Japan's armed forces, totalling some 234,OOO personnel, are composed of:28 - Five Armies - Five Maritime Districts - Three Air Defense Forces Main bases are in Hokkaido, eastern Honshu, central and western Honshu and Shikoku, and Kyushu. A revision of the Japanese Force structure which has been listed in the outline program is shown in Appendix A.29 The new force structure will probably mean a reduction in the numbers of personnel and equipment. This is the strong political requirement. Japan has no option but to reduce the size of its forces; to maintain quality, the JSDF must undergo restructuring to become efficient and highly capable. The restructured forces will have increased access to military technology, including the latest high-tech weapons and equipment. The restructured JSDF will also have improved intelligence, transport, and deployment capabilities. Although there is a lot of political pressure in the West and Japan to realize a peace dividend from the end of the Cold War, there remains much uncertainty over security in Northeast Asia. It is unlikely that there will be a large-scale reduction in Japan's defense force because it has not yet reached a level comparable to that of the defense forces of other advanced industrial nations in the West. Japan's defense expenditures, in term of dollars, are very high (l.O percent of GNP), but more than 4O percent of this is attributable to personnel and provision expenses.30 According to the latest edition of "Military Balance", issued by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the U.K., Japan, as of FY l994, ranked 7th in the world in annual defense expenditures after the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom and Germany. Defense budget requests for l994 total 4,683.5 billion Yen, up O.9 percent from the previous fiscal year. The Defense budget for l993 is 4,64O.6 billion Yen, up l.95 percent.31 In the future, defense budgets will be frozen at approximately this present level, although the budgets will be allocated so that some equipment can be modernized. The "Mid-Term Defense Program (FY l99l-l995)", MTDP, was adopted in December l99O and was revised in order to reflect changes in the domestic and international situation in l992. Under the revised MTDP, the Fiscal l994 defense expenditure has been restrained in consideration of the extremely serious fiscal situation and some other factors. The Japanese government reached the conclusion that there was a need to reflect such changes in defense buildup as soon as possible, and it revised the MTDP as follows:32 (l) put off the implementation of some projects envisaged in the Program, and (2) strive to replace and modernize old equipment and to improve deficient capability. The results are that the growth rate in defense expenditure in l994 has been held around l percent. The FY l994 Defense Budget is basically designed to replace or modernize old equipment and improve deficient capabilities. Regarding logistic support, the budget focuses on various measures, including the upgrading of living-related facilities, such as barracks, and the promotion of the SDF base countermeasures. Future Forces Japan's future modernization of its defense capability covers a broad range of matters, including the organization, function and deployment of the SDF, by paying due heed to the aforementioned changes in the international situation, diverse domestic factors, increased restrictions on availability of personnel resources in future, and the latest technological trends, among others. In February l994, Japan's Prime Minister Hosokawa decided to hold the "Advisory Group on Defense Issues", a private advisory group to the Prime Minister, to hear from knowledgeable people about a new frame of reference as a substitute for the present Outline. In June l993, a private advisory group to the Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy , the "Panel on Japan's Defense in the New Era", was set up. The perspectives which would be the basis for the study of Japan's defense modernization included: l. the international situation surrounding Japan 2. Japan's national security 3. Japan's international contribution 4. the SDF's relations with the people and society While the formation of these study groups is a step toward a rational, measured approach to force modernization, the path to a restructured SDF remains obstructed by the limits of the constitution, political and economic considerations, and the strong influence of Japan's Imperial history. In summary, Japan must make significant changes to the national security framework before it can embark on a meaningful revision of its force structure. CHAPTER 4 UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS As of April l994, U.N. peacekeeping operations being conducted throughout the world encompassed about 7O,OOO people from 66 countries.33 Traditionally, U.N. peacekeeping operations are roughly divided into three categories: l) peacekeeping forces 2) crease-fire observer missions 3) election monitoring and others After the Cold-War, there is a tendency toward making arms control and disarmament agreements such as those regarding U.S. and Russian nuclear arms or conventional weapons of which development was premised on confrontation in Europe. On the other hand, diverse rivalries resulting from religious or racial problems in various parts of the world, which were contained under the East-West confrontation in the past, have surfaced, increasing the danger of developing into disputes. The military balance at the regional level would undergo change in a short period of time due to the transfer or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or high-performance weapons. Compared with the Cold War era in which the East-West confrontation was wholly reflected in the Security Council, members of the United Nations have become more cooperative, and expectations are growing upon the function of the United Nations in the arena of security. However, the U.N. function is not of such a nature as to provide deterrence to conflicts in advance, while the reality is that U.N. peacekeeping activities cannot be expected to produce sufficient results unless certain conditions are ensured. Past Involvement During the Persian Gulf War, April l99l, the SDF, for the first time, participated in the minesweeping activities. This was the SDF's first international contribution in terms of human resources. More significant than the actual number of mines cleared -- only 34 in a six-month period -- is the further expansion in constitutional interpretation, and the precedent set for Japanese vessels, reportedly under U.S. naval command, that far away from the Japanese archipelago. The government's next attempt to widen the scope of SDF activities was made in June l992, when the " Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations" and the "Law to Amend Part of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams" were enacted, thereby providing a statutory framework for Japan to positively address the task of pursuing activities for national contribution in terms of human resources.34 Based on these laws, the SDF has prepared for the International disaster relief activities, while dispatching contingents and personnel to engage in U.N. peacekeeping operations in Cambodia from September l992 through October l993. Currently, the SDF continues to dispatch forces to Mozambique, where their involvement began in May l993. Constraints As previously mentioned, Japan's international peace operation assignments have been conducted on the basis of the "Law Concerning Cooperation for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations". The International Peace Cooperation Law was legislated in line with the basic guidelines for Japan's Participation in Peacekeeping Forces on the five principles shown below:35 l) Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to the conflicts. 2) The parties to the conflicts, including the territorial state(s), shall have given their consent to deployment of peacekeeping forces and Japan's participation in the force. 3) The peacekeeping force shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any party to the conflict. 4) Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw its contingent. 5) Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the personnel's lives, etc. The SDF's participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations is conducted under the Law, therefore, will never entail the possibility of the "use of force" or the "dispatch of armed forces to foreign countries for purpose of using force" as prohibited under Article 9 of the Constitution. Future Involvement Peacekeeping has changed dramatically and has also expanded very rapidly in recent years. Seventeen peace operations are now in place throughout the world, and most of these have been set up during the past four years. We have moved away from the old-style peacekeeping which for the most part involved military observers, or an interposition of United Nations forces to oversee a cease- fire. Such forces were lightly armed and could count on the full cooperation and consent of the parties involved. Some have recently described these functions as no more than "cooking and looking," since military action in such cases is practically non-existent. New style missions, however, require peacekeepers to do much.36 The Japanese now realize that they have to take a more active position in the United Nations, whose role in the post-Cold War era is likely to increase in importance. They have begun to lobby quietly for a Security Council Seat. Yet it is difficult for them to play a more prominent role because they do not have a permanent seat on the Security Council and because Japan's peace constitution has been interpreted as forbidding the dispatch of Japanese soldiers abroad.37 When it comes to the creation of a separate organization, there are views to the effect that it is considered appropriate to make the best use of the SDF's capabilities in order to make Japan's cooperation feasible and that there is no need to institute a new organization separate from the SDF due to a host of problems that include: l. for peacekeeping forces or cease-fire observation teams, dispatches of members who belong to each participating country's military organization are asked for; 2. for U.N. peacekeeping operations that are conducted in harsh environments immediately after the end of an armed conflict, participation of an organization with self- sufficient capabilities is asked for; 3. in order for dispatched units to fully display their capabilities, organizational logistics support, such as supplies and transportation, is needed, and only establishment of a separate dispatch unit is insufficient; and 4. given the capabilities and achievements the SDF demonstrated in Cambodia and Mozambique, any moves to neglect such would affect the pride and morale of the SDF considerably.38 Regarding the creation of an expert organization within the SDF, it is believed to be a matter that should be discussed deliberately by studying the most appropriate form of the SDF's participation in such assignments, including the aspect of organization. In summary, Japan has shown a willingness to participate in UN peacekeeping operations and has performed admirably. Once again, as one of the world economic powers, Japan is expected by the community of nations to "do her part". In fact, the Japanese desire to participate rather than be a spectator on the sidelines. With most members of the Diet supporting a push for permanent membership on the UN Security Council, they want Japan to be more involved in the UN affairs. This should be considered only natural for a nation that has such intense pride. Conversely, the Japanese continue to worry about how their participation will be viewed by Western powers as a breach of their "peace constitution." The dilemma of this defense-dependent economic power continues. CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION The regional stability surrounding Japan and the attendant military situation remains quite complicated. There remain diverse problems, including the divided Korean Peninsula, the disputed sovereignty of the Spratly Islands and Japan's Northern Territories. Therefore, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement remains an important element in maintaining security in East Asia. The fact that Japan and the United States, which share the common value of freedom and democracy and are playing an important role -- political and economic -- in the international community, are closely linked which each other is deemed conducive to the stability and prosperity not only in East Asia but also in the world as a whole. A new era has begun and the world must maintain peace in a highly unstable environment. The United Nations has taken responsibility for world peace and Japan desires to increase its role and mission in order to help maintain world order. Currently, U.S.-Japan treaties and its constitution have limited Japan to a minimal operational capability; therefore, Japan must revise its constitution in order to substantially participate in the enforcement of global legal statutes. These issues must also be conveyed to the public so that the government can gain popular support. It is not only helping to maintain world peace but also stabilizing their own national defense that justifies strengthening the military and modernizing equipment. We can expect Japan to participate increasingly in UN peacekeeping operations. This can be regarded as essential in Japan's quest to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Therefore, it is seeking to gain a permanent seat to become more fully engaged in the world around them. At the same time, this involvement in UN operations can be seen as a means to counterbalance Japan's security dependence on the United States. Japan ranks number two in the world economically and with its financial strength can broaden its assistance in supporting the mission of United Nations, if it gets some voice in the matters (i.e. Security Council seat). If Japan is accepted as a permanent member, it will no doubt play an even greater role, with a concomitant need for new weapon procurement, especially transport aircraft and ships. This increased involvement not only gives a new lease on life for weapons procurement, but also gives the politicians a tool to enhance Japan's international status. However, this may be difficult since many countries are still afraid of a reemergence of the power of Japan and fears of starting another war. The Japanese do not aspire to become a military power, but to change the world opinion with the new generation. They feel that the only way to be respected in the world is to participate fully along with other nations. Japan can be expected to expand gradually its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. In the context of a decreasing U.S. presence, as seen in the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines, and an increasing acceptance of regional governments of a larger military role for Japan, the Maritime SDF will probably expand to an area of sea line defense beyond lOOO nautical miles. In a visit to South Korea, Prime Minister Hosokawa not only apologized for the war, but also called for Japan and South Korea to play a role in the building of a new, peaceful order in the post- Cold War world. In this we can perhaps see the seeds for a new military relationship developing in the nation. With the passage of time and the steady decline of victims and veterans of World War II, Japan's military may be able to escape the specter of its past. In turn, Japan must proceed slowly, informing the world at every step of its peaceful intentions. In summary, Japan must make the constitutional/treaty changes needed to increase UN participation, be patient with the generation that remembers World War II, and carefully proceed down the path towards greater defense self-reliance with an active role in shaping a new world order, especially in the Pacific Rim. ENDNOTES l. Brian Reading, Japan: The Comming Collapse, (New York : Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., l992), 45-45. 2. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (New York Random House Inc., l9B7), 45l-452. 3. Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden, Japan: A Country Study, 5th ed., Federal Research Division, Liberty of Congress, DA Pam. No. 55O-3O (Washington D.C.: Goverment Printing office, l992), 6O. 4. Dolan and Worden, 3l2. 5. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and U.S. (Excerpts): 23 June l96O Treaty No.6 and Agreement under Article 6 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, regarding facilities and areas and the status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (Excerpts): Treaty No. 7 effective on 23 June l96O. 6. Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation Strong Army, National Security and The Technological Transformation of Japan, (U.S.A.: Cornell University Press, l994), l-32. 7. Hermann Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response, (New Jersey: Prentice, Inc., l97l), 25. 8. Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education". International Security, Vol.l8, no.3 (Winter l993/l994), l29. 9. Government of Japan White Paper, Defense of Japan l994, (Japan: The Defense Agency, l994), l9O-l94. lO. Martin E. Weinstein, " Japan's Foreign Policy Options: Implications for the United States," Japan's Foreign Policy, ed. Gerald L. Curtis (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., l993), 2l8-2l9. ll. Donald C. Hellmann, Japan and East Asia: The New International Order, (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., l972), l95-l96. l2. Hellmann, l97-2OO. l3. Arjun Makhijani, "What Non-Nuclear Japan Is Not Telling The World and How Tokyo Keeps Its Options Open", The Washington Post, 2 April l995, Sec. Al. l4. Alexander Borg Olivier, "The United Nations in a Changing World Order: Expectations and Realities," Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Coalition Warfare: The Future Role of the United Nations, ed. Fariborz L. Mokhtari (Washington D.C.: NDU Press, l994), 22. l5. Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold-War, National Research Institute (CA: RAND l993), 24. 15. In a poll taken by Nihon Keizai Shimbun in late January l99l, 57 percent of Japanese men but only 25 percent of Japanese women supported the use of force by the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf. Similarly, the Asahi Shixnbun poll on attitudes toward PKO participation in Cambodia showed 63 percent of Japanese men in favor and 3O percent opposed; but only 42 percent of women in favor and the same percentage opposed. See Asahi Shiznbun, September 2B, l992, Morning Edition, page l. l6. Mainichi Shimbun, February 4, l993, Morning Edition, Page 2. l7. Peter Polomka, "Out of the Shadows Towards Greater Self- Reliance," Asia-Pacific Defense Review (A-PDR) l995 Annual Reference Edition, page 35. l8. Polomka, page 35. l9. Joseph P. Keddell, Jr., The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures, (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., l993), 3. 2O. Philip L. Ritcheson, "China's Impact on Southeast Asian Security", Military Review, May l99l, 44-57. 2l. Thomas L. Wilborn, Security Cooperation with China: Analysis and A Proposal, (Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, November, l994), l6. 22. Wilborn, l2-l6. 23. Compared to the United States, Russia, and Western European countries, the volume of China's arms trade is modest, however, see R. Bates Gill, The Challenge of Chinese Arms Proliferation: U.S. Policy for the l99Os, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 3l, l993), l-l2. 24. Toshiyuki Shikata, Japan's Grand Strategy in the Succeeding Era," Asia in the 2lst Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities, ed. Michael D. Bellows, (Washington, DC; National Defense University Press,l994), 63-67. 25. Government of Japan White Paper, G3. 26. Peter G. Tsouras, Changing Orders: The Evolution of the World's Armies l945 to the Present, (New York: Facts On File, Inc., l994), l4O. 27. Defense Agency, Japan, The Defense of Japan, (Tokyo, Japan: The Japan Times, Ltd., l994), 96. 28. Dolan and Worden, xxiii. 29. Government of Japan White Paper 63. 3O. Satoshi Morimoto, "The Japanese Self-Defense Force: Its Role and Missions in the Post-Cold War Period," Asia in the 2lst Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities, ed. Michael D.Bellows, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, l994), l82-l83. 3l. Government of Japan White Paper, 9l. 32. Government of Japan White Paper, 9O. 33. Government of Japan White Paper, ll7-ll8. 34. This law aimed at the consolidating a domestic setup so that Japan can contribute to U.N. peacekeeping operations and humanitarian international relief operations appropriately and swiftly, and thereby contribute more positively than before to the international community, particularly in terms of human resources. Moreover, it is stipulated that the law is to be reviewed three years after coming into force. 35. Government of Japan White Paper, ll8. 36. Olivier, 22. 37. Fukuyama, 18. 38. Government of Japan White Paper, l35. 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