Military

Placing The M1A1 Common Main Battle Tank Aboard Deploying Marine

Expeditionary Units, Special Operations Capable Forces

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Manpower

 

 

                               EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: Placing the M1A1 Common Main Battle Tank Aboard Deploying Marine

Expeditionary Units, Special Operations Capable Forces

 

Author: Major Richard V. Mancini, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis: To establish a requirement for re-employing the M1A1 Common Battle Tank

with the Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable(MEU(SOC)) in support

of current Marine Corps amphibious operations.

 

Background: The purpose of this monograph is to examine the United States Marine

Corps M1A1 Common Main Battle Tank's utility to the MEU(SOC) force. Specifically,

addressing a broad spectrum of rationale to validate the tank's requirement to redeploy

with amphibious forces. In conjunction, it is necessary to examine the subjective

rationale which precludes the M1A1's active integration in our current deploying task

organization. Additionally, illuminate the tank's employment and versatility in support of

Operation Restore Hope and exhibit its practical utility to sustain and complement

MEU(SOC) forces. MEU(SOC) is our nation's most relevant, capable, and responsive

enabling force. Yet our Corps' MEU(SOC) can not successfully meet the entire range of

conflicts it encounters as it is ineffeciently equipped with regards to combat power to

engage in today's geopolitical disturbances. As such, a continued need exists to educate

our forces as to the resident capabilities in our inventory and to question as to why they

are not employed.

 

Recommendation: The Marine Corps should embark the M1A1 tank in support of

amphibious operations. This application would enable MEU commander's to meet the

range of potential conflicts and leadership challenges, as well as protect our nation's

interests.

 

PLACING THE M1A1 COMMON MAIN BATTLE TANK ABOARD DEPLOYING

MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNITS, SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE FORCES

 

                             OUTLINE

 

Thesis: To establish a requirement for re-employing the M1A1 Common Battle Tank

 

with the Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable(MEU(SOC)) in support

 

of current Marine Corps amphibious operations.

 

I.  What is the threat facing today's military?

 

    a. Bipolar--now multipolar.

 

    b. Geopolitical characteristics present in the world.

 

 

II. MEU(SOC)--A viable military presence?

 

    a. MEU(SOC) tailored toward low intensity conflict scenarios.

 

    b. Examining armor's use during Operation Restore Hope.

 

 

III. Examining current Marine Corps misconceptions of the employment of the M1A1.

 

    a. Illuminating 24 MEU's M1A1 analysis.

 

    b. M1A1 characteristics pertaining to reliability, fuel and mobility considerations.

 

 

IV.  Reexamining the Navy's amphibious transport and ship-to-shore capabilities.

 

    a. Amphibious ship transport/placement capabilities.

 

    b. The sequencing of embarked assets ashore to generate combat power.

 

    c. Landing Craft Air Cushion consideration and capacity.

 

PLACING THE M1A1 COMMON BATTLE TANK ABOARD DEPLOYING

 

MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNITS, SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE

 

FORCES

 

      Due to the conditions existing within the world today it is necessary to have a

 

balanced, integrated, forward deployed force for the Marine Air Ground Task

 

Force(MAGTF). The current Marine Expeditionary Unit's, Special Operation

 

Capable(MEU(SOC)) inherent firepower and mobility equipment allowance is limited in

 

its capacity to face the potential conflicts that it may encounter. The addition of the

 

Marine Corps' M1A1 Common Main Battle Tank would significantly enhance the

 

MBU(SOC) commander's mission capabilities along with providing increased flexible

 

deterrent options to mitigate the challenges opposing him. This proposal, to re-employ

 

tanks in support of Marine Corps Amphibious Operations will explore several crucial

 

areas. I will address the various threats confronting our forward deployed military forces

 

today along with evaluating the MEU(SOC) mission. Establishing armor's use in a

 

support role to provide a truly credible military forward presence is not present in the

 

MEU(SOC) today. Additionally, a review of the tank's employment in Operations Other

 

Than War(OOTW), in particular during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, is revealing.

 

Further, analysis of some prevalent misconceptions regarding the embarkation of the

 

M1A1 aboard amphibious shipping will be made. Lastly, a reexamination of the United

 

States Navy's resident amphibious ship-to-shore transport capabilities--specifically, those

 

concerning ferrying tanks used during amphibious operations is made.

 

                    I. What is the Threat Facing Today's Military?

 

      In the Marine Corps today, the utility of the M1A1 Main Battle Tank is not

 

currently being utilized to its maximum capability. This statement in itself reflects the

 

continued misunderstanding of armor's use in the Corps' since the tank's inception on the

 

battlefield in 1917. Great consternation among senior leadership results when the

 

discussion involves the placement of tanks onboard today's amphibious shipping to

 

support MEU(SOC) forces. This is further compounded by the inability of many to fully

 

appreciate or understand the threat confronting the military today to attain the political

 

objectives of the government.

 

      Bipolar dynamics no longer exist in the world today. Reflecting on our past,

 

America's policies of containment were directed toward preventing the Soviet Union's

 

expansionist ideals among free world nation states. American military economic

 

expenditures during the Cold War were significant and readily supported by the

 

American taxpayer. Thus the Post Cold War Era is marked by the collapse of the Soviet

 

threat and propels the United States into a multipolar arena. Numerous questions and

 

issues remain that can only be resolved by political and diplomatic means, or as a last

 

resort, military intervention.

 

      The Marine Corps, along with its sister services, continues to struggle to define its

 

role and mission in this new world order. It is necessary to understand the foreign threats

 

that pose a danger to our vital national interests abroad. The threats incurred nationally

 

will inevitably be encountered by our forward deployed forces. These issues are further

 

clouded by the competition between senior military leaders to procure scant fiscal

 

resources for force structure modernization and sustainment.

 

      There is no doubt today that the world has but one super power--the United

 

States. It is the only power to possess the global reach and economic strength to

 

intervene and mediate many of the threats that compromise world stability. Many of our

 

allies, who are major regional actors within their sphere of influence, can only provide

 

limited assistance within their global realm. Their total commitment is forestalled and

 

they are unable to be ally engaged in world affairs due to their own underlying economic

 

and social problems. They as well as many third world nations' states are characterized

 

by "cultural, religious, and civilizations artificially grouped by colonization and the post

 

conflict treaty boundaries of this century and are striving for independence or

 

hegemony."1  These events are clearly underscored by the current and ongoing upheaval

 

in Haiti, Somalia, and North Korea. As proof, the people of these nation states are not

 

content with the status quo and rarely seek through peaceful and diplomatic resolution

 

answers to their economic and social plight through armed insurrection or conflict. The

 

clearly evident increase in mechanization and armor in third world countries from the

 

former Warsaw Pact, not only in quantity but more importantly quality, undoubtedly

 

causes significant alarms. Compounding these disturbances within the world disorder is

 

the immense proliferation of unconventional weapons that include nuclear, biological,

 

and chemical weapons production that further fracture what slim hope possible for world

 

equilibrium and economic resurgence.

 

      Yet to the promethean student of history these world tensions are ominous, with

 

no relief in sight. Upon close examination, history reveals that these competing

 

disturbances have always been present but were overshadowed by world events such as

 

"...the first, in the wake of collapsing Ottoman, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian

 

empires, came to a climax after World War I..."2 and the second, World War II with the

 

rise of the Cold War calamity between the two superpowers. "The third wave of

 

ethnic-based conflict may transform international politics and confront the United States

 

with new security challenges."3 John F.C. Fuller poignantly comments on past nation

 

state strife during the 1940's, "Where any forum of centralized government does not exist,

 

war-like impulses are always contagious. Economic instability, religious fervor and clan

 

customs are all irritants which rapidly generate strife."4

 

      The Marine Corps today is in the unique position to be able to rapidly deploy

 

forces to quell many of these minute disturbances as well to provide humanitarian

 

assistance as evidenced during Operations Sea Angle and Restore Hope. Thus it is

 

incumbent upon our Corps leadership not to squander this opportunity but to continue to

 

properly task and organize(man and equip) and to train our forces to support our nation's

 

foreign and domestic policies. The threat today facing our military is all encompassing.

 

The Corps must be prepared to participate from the high to low spectrum of conflict as

 

well as the most difficult peacekeeping and or peacemaking operations in support of

 

United Nations missions. As such, "The United States is entering an era of international

 

instability and uncertainty, one that will require a wide range of subtle and skillful

 

responses to coordinate elements of national power."5

 

                   II. MEU(SOC)--A Viable Military Presence?

 

      The Marine Corps has established itself as the premier naval expeditionary force

 

in the world. It alone provides the Combatant Commanders the most responsive military

 

means to mitigate the uncertainties presently before us. Through forward presence

 

"maintaining forward deployed or stationed forces overseas to demonstrate national

 

resolve..."6 the Corps' MEU(SOC) is the nations versatile force capable, flexible, and

 

relevant to respond to these crises.

 

      However,"...the MEU that we advertise... is a MAGTF capable of very

 

limited forcible entry and limited operations ashore. Special Operations Capable is an

 

added capability."7 Even though a combined arms organization whose reinforced

 

composition is an infantry battalion, air squadron, service support group along with its

 

command element embarked on a three to four ship Amphibious Ready Group(ARG)--

 

"the MEU is not capable of an assault."8 A review of Marine Corps Order 3120 lists the

 

conventional and special operations capabilities assigned to MEU(SOC) forces as:

 

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations                       Deception Operations

Humanitarian Assistance                                              Security Operations

Civic Actions                                                                    Specialized Demonstration

Clandestine Reconnaisance/Surveillance                               Show of Force Operations

In-Extremis Hostage Rescue                                           Electronic Warfare

Initial Terminal Guidance                                            Amphibious Raids

Mobile Training Teams                                                Operations in Urban Terrain

Maritime Interdiction                                                            Counter-Intelligence Operations

Seizure/Destruction of Offshore Oil Rigs                        Reinforcement Operations

Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel              Fire Support Control

Limited Objective Attacks

 

It is evident the MEU(SOC) is well tailored for a low intensity conflict(LIC) scenario.

 

Yet in today's environment, our nation asks much more of its military forces than to

 

"... provide an immediate response capability across a wide spectrum of crisis...."9

 

(As provided in the mission statement of the MEU(SOC).) Our smaller force structure

 

and "...fiscal realities demand that we reduce redundancies, history warns us of the

 

risks incurred when we allow gaps to exist in our capabilities."10 John F.C. Fuller

 

espouses two main recurring military themes for today's military leader's attention:

 

"...(1) the maintenance of law and order; and (2) the crushing revolt...."11 Haiti,

 

Somalia, and the current Russian revolution in Chechnya serve as classic warnings about

 

the type of conflict in which the MEU(SOC) will find itself embroiled. "The fact

 

remains that there are currently 43 ongoing shooting wars and a potential for 72 more

 

surfacing. The conflicts can be further categorized as in the 30 degree North latitude of

 

the Equator region where our forces are presently deployed."12

 

      The Corps' MEU(SOC) amphibious doctrine is time tested and is today built upon

 

a "...solid foundation in littoral warfare and low-intensity conflict, the Marine Corps

 

should know better than rest such a heavy burden on the skinny shoulders of the units we

 

deploy at present."13 Though the core element in our MEU(SOC) is the infantry battalion

 

that must be light, self-mobile, and supported by carefully task organized elements of the

 

MAGTF, the addition of the M1A1 Common Battle Tank is the element of credibility

 

that provides a truly balanced enabling force. Viewing the previous statement from an

 

objective perspective,

 

      "On the marco-approach, every major Western army moved towards a balanced

      tank-infantry force as it gained combat experience; postwar thinking informed by

      history has likewise tended towards balance. If a balanced force pays off best, at

      least part of the reason for this has to be that balanced teams are most often

      needed when the chips are down."14

 

The marriage of the M1A1 to the MEU(SOC) will enhance our nation's force projection

 

capability for the potential conflicts in the littoral regions where 70 percent of the world

 

now resides.

 

      Since 1923, and the introduction of the first tank in the Marine Corps,

 

considerable discussion ensues on the value and role of armor in our service. Examples

 

of armor's success are numerous in our history and have firmly ingrained our operational

 

need for its continued employment in our combined arms maneuver concept for the

 

MAGTF. However, "unlike high intensity warfare, armor's role at the lower end of the

 

operations of war has not been so well understood..."15 and poses a significant problem

 

today as in our past.

 

      A close examination of the armor's use during low intensity

 

operations(commonly referred to by military analysts as OOTW) is best revealed in

 

Mogadishu, Somalia with "Operation Restore Hope." Within the confines of this limited

 

campaign the immense versatility and complementary capability the M1A1 provides for

 

the MEU(SOC) is recognized. It is not commonly known that during this OOTW

 

scenario one platoon of M1A1 tanks was extensively utilized in direct support by

 

Marines and Coalition forces.

 

      Following the Maritime Prepositioned Squadron's arrival in theater, "The

 

Advance Arrival Off Load Element(AAOE) arrived in Mogadishu, Somalia on 11

 

December 1992, and within 36 hours had depreserved and prepared seven M1A1 tanks

 

and one M88 Vehicle Tracked Recovery Retriever for operations."16 By late December

 

the political climate and humanitarian relief effort began to change. On 3 January 1993,

 

in response to the deteriorating conditions, First Tank Battalion AAOE was redesignated

 

First Tank Battalion(Forward) and ordered to stand up for combat operations. It is

 

interesting to note that First Tank's AAOE comprised only ten qualified M1A1 crewmen

 

with the remaining AAOE party made up of service support occupational specialty

 

personnel. Initially, only two tanks could be properly manned and declared combat

 

ready, however, through Marine Corps determination the remaining six positions were

 

filled by Marines who took part in an extensive on-the-job training program.

 

      Due to these young Marines valiant efforts this ad hoc tank platoon saw

 

continuous operations in the streets of Mogadishu from January to April 1993, amassing

 

per tank an impressive 300 operating hours and more than 2,000 miles of patrolling.

 

Despite the austere environment the M1A1 accomplished a myriad of tactical operations

 

in support of Operation Restore Hope which included: surveillance and patrolling, show

 

of force, raids and limited objective attacks, military operations in urban terrain, convoy

 

escort, mobility enhancement(reduction of numerous road barriers to countermine

 

efforts), extraction of personnel and equipment to quick reaction force responsibilities, as

 

well as area denial. The practicality of armor role is evident when we

 

      "...take the lower intensity phases of the Vietnam War and Northern Ireland

      as examples of rural and urban counter-insurgency operations, the role played

      by armor vehicles is very striking indeed. Fact is a combination of sniper,

      ambushes with automatic weapons and mines makes it next to impossible to

      move men about on the ground without protection."17

 

The versatility and combat reliability of the M1A1 during Somalia's OOTW scenario

 

adds credence to support the rationale that tanks can contribute and complement the

 

many missions of a MEU(SOC) force.

 

      During the preparation phase for its scheduled deployment, the MEU(SOC)

 

commander along with his staff conducted an extensive mission area analysis of their

 

Combatant Commander's operational requirements. Simultaneously developing their

 

mission play book(Standing Operating Procedures) to accommodate both the rapid

 

planning cycle and subsequent introduction of combat forces when a crisis erupts in a

 

given theater. Obviously force tailoring is crucial to the success of the mission

 

when the"... operational environment can not be predicted with certainty to remain

 

benign...."18

 

      Operation Restore Hope distinguishes itself with the integration of heavy and

 

light forces throughout the campaign. The environment in Mogadishu was virtually void

 

of functional enemy armor and permitted tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to cross

 

attach at the section level as opposed to combining the assets at the company and platoon

 

level. This action facilitated the ability of the infantry to operate in simultaneous and

 

multiple missions throughout Mogadishu, and were assisted by the psychological

 

presence and firepower of the M1A1. The existence of the M1A1 tank while in Somalia

 

provided

 

      "... as much psychological as physical advantage for the infantry. It allowed the

      infantry to be much more accepting of the restricted ROE(Rules of Engagement)

      and dissuaded the hostile elements form attacking CTJF(Combined Joint Task

      Force).... The forces that were the most protected and best armed were most

      able to maintain control of the operational environment and maintain the

      initiative thereby imparting their will upon the populace."19

 

      The support role the M1A1 provided can not be understated and was in large

 

measure vital to the survival of many a Marine and Coalition force member. "If any part

 

of Task Force Mogadishu was engaged, a tank would move to draw fire away from the

 

less protected--be it an infantryman, a HUMMER, an AAV, a LAV, or even a helicopter.

 

... not one of them would have traded a supporting section or platoon of tanks for

 

anything in the world."20 Despite this enthusiastic endorsement of the tank's utility, it

 

often takes the praise of another service before a weapon system is given acceptance and

 

creditability. Lieutenant Colonel Malik, Commanding Officer of the First Punjab

 

Battalion, Pakistan succinctly captures the true essence and value of armor's utility in

 

OOTW operations in such a pointed phrase, "If the Marine tanks were not always with

 

their infantry to at least intimidate and provide psychological support, but usually to draw

 

away the hostile fire-the Marine casualties would have been much higher."21

 

      Another unfortunate and piercingly tragic incident highlights the value of utilizing

 

tanks in an OOTW environment. Had the M1A1 tank been employed in the quick

 

reaction extraction force role when the Army's Rangers assaulted what was Addid's

 

headquarters, it is certain that the number and degree of casualties would have been less.

 

The senseless loss of American lives was in direct correlation to then Secretary of

 

Defense Les Aspin's denial of the on-scene commander's request for armor support. Had

 

tanks been authorized and integrated into the mission, the flexibility options to the

 

commander would have been significantly increased. The protection of American lives

 

and mission accomplishments are vitally important to the American public. Both civilian

 

and military leaders who chose not to adhere to these two basic tenants will incite the

 

displeasure of their constituents as was in the case of the former Secretary of Defense.

 

III. Examining Current Marine Corps Misconceptions of the Employment of the

 

M1A1

 

      Understanding the subtle yet demanding characteristic of OOTW might preclude

 

the MEU(SOC) commander from equally well making the wrong decision regarding the

 

inclusion of tanks. Low intensity conflict is Operations Other Than War, and in defining

 

OOTW, it

 

      "does not describe a specific activity or operation per se. It is an umbrella term

      comprising four often related activities: insurgency-counterinsurgency, terrorism

      counteraction, peacekeeping, and peacetime contingency operations.... LIC is

      an environment in which political concerns dominate.... Marine ground combat

      forces are an inappropriate choice for many of these actions. However, since

      when forward deployed they may be the only available assets, Marine units

      should be prepared to execute any type of military action short of war"22

 

OOTW presents special leadership challenges to the Marine Corps and in particular to

 

the MEU(SOC) commander. A viable reason for the re-introduction for the deployment

 

of tanks within MEU's exists. Regrettably, the rationale and position of our senior

 

leadership preclude the tank's employment and is centered around four areas:

 

embarkation, maintenance, training, and contingency operations.

 

      A proposal by Second Tank Battalion to embark a platoon of M1A1s with the

 

24th MEU was presented during the latter half of calendar year 1994. A thorough

 

analysis by Major John Chandler, Logistics Officer, 24 MEU provided essential data that

 

contradicts the Marine Corps proverbial view that the tank is too big to fit on current

 

shipping assets. Foremost, a tank platoon with its requisite maintenance equipment(one

 

M88, one direct support electrical test set, one HUMMWV, and one five ton truck) can

 

be embarked on the Amphibious Ready Group(ARG)/MEU shipping assigned to Landing

 

Force Sixth Fleet 2-95 deployment without any compensatory equipment reduction. The

 

only caveat is "Embarkation of armor on ARG)MEU shipping will not have Corps wide

 

applicability.... armor is feasible only when a three ship configuration with a

 

LHD(Helicopter Deck Landing Ship) or LHA(Amphibious Assault Ship, General

 

Purpose) and LSD(Dock Landing Ship), LPD(Amphibious Transport Dock) configuration

 

is provided..."23 Additionally, consideration of embarking two tanks on a LSD and the

 

remaining two on the LPD with its associated M88 and maintenance support equipment

 

will facilitate split ARG operations which are common mission assignments.

 

      Secondly, fiscal maintenance and supply support were examined in detail. The

 

associated cost projections for preventive and corrective maintenance coupled with

 

planned mileage usage is programmed at $110,752.00 per platoon. "The cost of

 

embarking and operating the M1A1... is within the fiscal capability of... 24 MEU."24

 

As such, maintenance and supply support are feasible and well within Marine Service

 

Support Group-24's(MSSG-24's) requirements. The challenge will continue to be the

 

maintenance of all equipment aboard ship because of the limited confines. In the area of

 

supply funds for the M1A1 and M88 secondary repairable and class IX blocks will be

 

provided by Second FSSG at no cost to MSSG-24.

 

      Reliability is the mainstay of the M1A1 Main Battle Tank which commander's

 

desire in a weapon system. From its initial design to its introduction into the Army and

 

Marine Corps inventories,"...more than 700,000 miles of demanding operational tests

 

in all types of environment.... have proven without question the ability of the

 

M1-series tanks to operate successfully..."25 The significant achievement by planners

 

in designing and continuing analysis of the world's best tank gives our armed forces an

 

incredible combat force multiplier. To its credit, "The M1A1 has achieved an

 

impressive operational readiness rate in the European environment of 95 percent coupled

 

with its most recent performance during the Gulf War accumulating in excess of 90

 

percent."26 Our Corps' Second Tank Battalion, M1A1 equipped, readiness rate for the

 

duration of the 100 hour Gulf War campaign was an impressive 100 percent operational.

 

During Second Tank's deployment in Southeast Asia the readiness rate was 95 to 97

 

percent within its theater of operations, which is equally impressive.

 

      Yet the truth remains that few of our senior leadership understand the combat

 

multiplier the M1A1 represents and the armor's employment considerations in low to

 

high intensity warfare scenarios. It is important to understand that the,

 

      "M1A1 represents the greatest technological advance in armor and tank

      development since tanks first appeared on the battlefield at Cambrai in 1917.

      Its technology should be examined, refined, and used in a manner that serves

      the interests of the MAGTF across the broad spectrum of conflict in which

      Marines may fight."27

 

Many critics point to the weight of 64.1 tons as being neither tactically nor operationally

 

compatible to the MEU(SOC) mission of remaining light and mobile. Additionally, both

 

fuel consumption and speed are presumed shortfalls. The fact is that the M1A1's cruising

 

range is 273 to 298 miles with a fuel consumption rate of 3 to 7 gallons per mile

 

"... depending on the idle to cruise ratio."28 One of the tank's many equipment upgrades

 

which is now in place is an operational external power unit(EPU). The EPU allows 24

 

continuous operation hours of both the tank's fire control and communication systems

 

without operating the main engine, thereby alleviating main engine fuel consumption in a

 

stationary position. This fuel enhancement program upgrade, along with the digital

 

control unit(designed to monitor and adjust fuel consumption for the main engine),

 

answers the critics concerns. The question of the M1A1's quickness is addressed with the

 

engine"...governed to 45 miles per hour, 0 to 32 kilometers per hour in 6.8 seconds was

 

designed to provide it with sufficient "dash" to move rapidly between fighting positions,

 

maneuver rapidly once contact is made, and to reposition...at a critical place or time."29

 

            The survivability that this weapon system offers is unparalleled on the battlefield

 

today. Additional enhancements such as the missile counter-measure device on the

 

M1A1 currently defeats all known anti-tank guided missiles used by an adversary. With

 

its standard issue 120mm smooth bore cannon and one .50 caliber and two 7.62mm

 

machine-guns and thermal sight night/day capability, the M1A1's inherent protection

 

enhances the commander's available deterrence options. Despite these advanced

 

armaments and improvements, critics continue to advise against transporting the M1A1

 

aboard amphibious ships and during the ship-to-shore phase of an operation.

 

IV. Reexamining the Navy's Amphibious Transport and Ship-to-Shore Capability.

 

      These arguments are at best a reflection of the planner's myopic view and

 

misconception of armor's role. There is little question that placing the M1A1 aboard

 

amphibious shipping is of concern due to its weight in relation to the structural design

 

inherent in amphibious ships. Again responding to the critics contentious point of view,

 

Naval Sea Systems Command(NAVSEA) conducted an extensive structural analysis of

 

resident amphibious ships(LHA, LHD, LPD, and LSD classes) to transport the M1A1.

 

Weight factors provided to NAVSEA by Marine Corps Research Development

 

Acquisition Command(64.69 short ton(ST) less combat load and 67.12(ST) full combat

 

load) coupled with NAVSEA's applied ship motion factors (assuming parking and

 

traversing the M1A1 will occur at worst case in sea state 3) were used to evaluate a ship's

 

load capability. Excerpts from the evaluation are provided in the appendix and

 

substantiate"...that the M1A1 parking and traversing operations can be

               

accomplished..."30 in support of the MEU(SOC) force.

 

      Another argument involves the 22 MEU Operation Officer's statement espousing

 

a commander's philosophy of; "The constrained ability to land one (1) tank vice four (4)

 

Light Armor Vehicles(LAV's) significantly slows the buildup of combat power ashore."31

 

Commanders continually stipulate that LAV's have more utility and versatility, and

 

subsequently assume that more can be accomplished with numerous LAVs than with a

 

platoon of tanks. The tradeoff of one M1A1 vice four LAVs ashore is neither the real

 

issue nor the prevailing supposition by some MEU(SOC) commanders but the

 

sequencing of assets ashore after a detailed mission analysis is conducted prior to the

 

ship-to-shore phase of an amphibious operation. The LAV has proven itself to be a very

 

capable weapons platform, however, it simply does not have the survivability, firepower,

 

nor psychological shock inherent in the M1A1. The sequencing of tanks or any force

 

ashore has not changed, "The methods for landing tanks are based on the initial scheme

 

of maneuver ashore, the mission....There is no hard fast rule for the

 

employment of tanks in the assault of a hostile beach."32 Additionally, critics continue to

 

address the Navy's limited ship-to-shore transport capability, in particular, the Landing

 

Craft Air Cushion(LCAC).

 

      The LCAC has tremendous capability and is now resident in the amphibious fleet.

 

However, competing demands for its use make it an operational linchpin for the phasing

 

of forces and equipment ashore. "Traditional approaches to combat loading and craft

 

assignment procedures will have to be reconsidered when working with LCAC."33

 

Combining the landing craft mix aboard amphibious shipping and phasing assets ashore

 

are the essential ingredients for the rapid buildup of combat forces ashore.

 

      "For example, the LHA-1 can carry one LCAC, two LCUs, and one LCM-8

      simultaneously. The same LHA could carry ten LCM-8 or four LCU's. The

      impact of landing craft mix is significant because in the combined

      LCAC/LCU/LCM-8 equation,...."34

 

For the military operation's planner who is not accustomed to embarkation "The M1A1

 

can be transported ship-to-shore in the same manner as the... M60A1: one per LCAC,

 

rated up to 70 tons;... ; three per LCU, etc....."35 The MAGTF, and in particular the

 

MEU(SOC), is designed to be a combined arms balanced tasked force that is

 

self-sustainable and expandable. "Due to its responsiveness, the MEU is frequently the

 

first to arrive on scene during a potential crisis....It has the people and equipment for

 

sustained operations while at the same time it retains a capacity to absorb battle and

 

maintenance casualties."36 These facts contradict the opinion of the Operations Officer,

 

22 MEU(SOC) as stated earlier and again reflect the prejudices surrounding the M1A1's

 

capabilities and its relationship to the MEU(SOC).

 

                                  Conclusion

 

      The Marine Corps MEU(SOC) is tailored to be America's quick reaction force to

 

"face a broad range of operational scenarios."37 The MEU(SOC) must possess

 

operational depth and flexibility and in its current configuration it does not. The addition

 

of one M1A1 tank platoon would enhance the spectrum of MEU(SOC) missions, not

 

detract from its utilization. The Navy's amphibious shipping has the capacity to embark

 

and transport the M1A1. Our failure to employ all organic assets resident in the Marine

 

Corps inventory for use by the MEU(SOC) force does not adhere to our basic doctrinal

 

belief of a balanced projection force. "The strength of the MAGTF is derived from its

 

coactive qualities, not from weighing individual parts. We should acquire systems whose

 

interaction with other systems ensures the total effect is greater than the sum of its

 

parts."38

 

      The realization of today's uncertain political and economic world order presents

 

leadership and military challenges that have not changed radically over time. However,

 

due to the climatic geographical factions and the fact that the religious ferver is more

 

intense and imbued in pure hatred creates a more complicated situation. In turn, with the

 

advent of the capability of the media to expeditiously report world events, our military's

 

deliberate planning time is compressed and crisis planning is now the accepted norm.

 

With the termination of the Cold War, the United States is in the unique position of being

 

the supreme global super power which encompasses immense responsibilities. America

 

relies on the Marine Corps to be its first responsive enabling force to stabilize regional

 

conflicts by foes who would otherwise seek to undermine the balanced scales of world

 

order.

 

      Certainly the numerous missions tasked of MEU(SOC) are not limited to function

 

within the OOTW spectrum. The array of geopolitical threats facing today's military

 

commander are extremely complex and compounded by the proliferation and lethality of

 

weapons now in use. The Marine Corps' overriding concern should be to properly

 

balance MEU(SOC) forces, and to re-introduce the M1A1 Common Main Battle Tank to

 

its deploying units. There is adequate embark space available for the M1A1 (even with

 

the retirement of the Landing Ship Tank). Programmed and funded increases for

 

amphibious shipping are already underway with the resulting benefit for the Marine

 

Corps. With the realization that our Navy's amphibious force by the year 2000 will be

 

much smaller yet more capable the embarkation of M1A1s on MEU(S0C) fits this

 

reduction concept. Putting aside parochial beliefs of the tank's non-utility to the

 

MEU(SOC) mission requires an invitation to think apart from the paradoxical view

 

shared by many of our senior leaders. No weapon system can perform all assigned 21

 

missions of the MEU(SOC), but by integrating this very capable and reliable platform,

 

the MEU(SOC) commander is given a greater degree of flexibility and deterrent options

 

not otherwise achievable.

 

         Amphibious Ships Capability to Transport the M1A1 Main Battle Tank

 

                                                            Embarked Weight            Ship-To-Shore

Ship Class            Location                      Park/Traversing            Park/Traversing

LHA 1             WELL                          Y/Y                              Y/Y

                        3D, FR 45-62               Y/Y                              N/Y

                        3D, FR 55-89               Y/Y                              Y/Y

LHD 1             WELL                          Y/Y                              Y/Y

                        3D                               Y/Y                              Y/Y

LPD 1-2            WELL                          Y/Y                              N/Y

                        3D                               N/R1                            N/N

LPD 4-6            WELL                          Y/Y                              N/Y

                        3D                               N/R1                            N/N

LPD 7-15            WELL                          Y/Y                              Y/Y

3D                                 N/R1                            Y/Y

LSD 36            WELL, FR 52-105            Y/Y                              Y/Y

                        WELL, FR 105-184            N/R1                            N/N

                        WELL, FR 184-270            Y/Y                              Y/Y

LSD 41-43            WELL, FR 35-42            Y/Y                              Y/Y

                        WELL, FE 42-67            R2/Y                            R2/Y

                        WELL, FR 67-74            Y/Y                              Y/Y

                        WELL, FR 74-98            R2/Y                            R2/Y

                        WELL, FR 96-145            Y/Y                              Y/Y

LSD 44-49            WELL                          Y/Y                              Y/Y

Notes:

Y-Deck is certified structurally without restrictions.

N-Deck is not certified structurally.

R1-Tank may traverse over the area at pierside or close to shore under clam seas only.

R2-Tanks may be positioned two abreast symmetrically about ships centerline.  Tanks

must be centered on frames 50, 60, 80, 90.

 

LHA and LHD Classes, LPD 1-15(with shipalt LPD 916K), LSD 36 Class, and LSD 41

Class are structurally capable of transporting "parked" LCAC's which have been

preloaded with an M1A1 tank.  In all seas through sea state 8.  However, preloaded

LCAC transported aboard LPD 1-15 and LSD 36 Class can not be carried on docking

blocks in the aftmost position.  Preloading LCAC's must be lashed in accordance with

current SEAOPS Manuals.

 

LCU, although there are three M1A1 parking spots on the LCU deck, the after two spots

require strengthening of the deck stiffeners, only LCU's with BoatAlt 258 completed can

carry three M1A1 tanks.

 

1     Maj Alan Hendrickson, USMC, An analysis of National Security Strategy, Ends,

Ways and Means, 1997 and Beyond, Oct 1994,2.

 

2     William A. Stroff and Gary L. Guertner, "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military

Intervention," Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Spring 1995, 31.

 

3     Ibid. Stroff and Guertner, 31.

 

4     John F.C. Fuller, Armored Warfare, (Conn: Greenwood Press, 1983), 164.

 

5     BGen Anthony C. Zinni, "Forward Presence and Stability Missions: The Marine

Corps Perspective," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1993, 57.

 

6     Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare

(Washington, DC DON, 1994), 73.

 

7     Maj T. Brant Bailey III, "A New MEU for the Indian Ocean-MEU(SHOC)"

Marine Corps Gazette, June 1993, 25.

 

8     Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Reference

Publication(FMFRP 2-12), Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability,

(Washington, DC DON, 1991), 33.

 

9     Col Larry D. Outlaw, USMC, "Introduction to the Marine Expeditionary Unit

(Special Operations Capable) Program. Lecture presented at the U.S. Marine Corps

Command and Staff College for Defensive Operations, Quantico, VA, 31 January 1995.

 

10    Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr., "Complementary Capabilities from the Sea," Joint Forces

Quarterly, Summer 1993, 17.

 

11    John F.C. Fuller, Armored Warfare (Conn: Greenwood Press, 1983), 164.

 

12    Col Charles E. Burke, USA, "The Arms Corps-III Corps Perspective " Lecture

presented at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College for Defensive

Operations, Quantico, VA, 6 February 1995.

 

13    Capt Neil C. Carns and Capt Stanton S. Coerr, "A True Force in Readiness" U.S.

Naval Proceedings, August 1994, 35.

 

14    Richard E. Simpkin, "Mechanized Infantry," (NY: Pergamm Press Inn, 1980), 59.

 

15    Maj Jeffery L. Wilkinson, USMC, An analysis of "Armor In Low Intensity

Conflict: What Is The Best Tactical Doctrine For Armor In Counterinsurgency." AY

91-92, 1.

 

16    Capt Mike Campbell, USMC, Armor Officer at U.S. Armor School, Ft Knox, Ky,

telephone interview of Said Named Officer's personal notes of Operation Restore Hope.

Interview by author, 4 December 1994.

 

17    Ibid. Simpkin, 102.

 

18    Capt Mike Campbell, USMC, "Somalia Lessons Learned," Lecture presented at

the U.S. Armor School for the American and German Symposium, Ft Knox, KY, 29

August 1994.

 

19    Ibid. Capt Mike Campbell, Lecture, 29 August 1994.

 

20    Ibid. Capt Mike Campbell. Interview by author, 4 December 1994.

 

21    Ibid. Capt Mike Campbell. Interview by author, 4 December 1994.

 

22    Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development

Command, Operational Handbook(OH) 6-1, Ground Combat Operations. (Quantico,

VA, 1988), 2-7,16-1.

 

23    Logistics Department, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Letter to Commanding

Officer, 24th MEU and others. Subject:: "Use of M1A1 Tank Platoon by 24 Marine

Expeditionary Unit." 081600 September 1994.

 

24    Ibid. 081600 September 1994.

 

25    Philip W. Lett, "M1 Story," Marine Corps Gazette, August 1991, 99.

 

26    Capt John F. Lynn, "Silent Knight: Fact and Fiction and the M1A1," Marine Corps

Gazette , June 1990, 99.

 

27    Ibid. Lynn,71.

 

28    Ibid. Lynn, 67.

 

29    Ibid. Lynn, 67.

 

30    Commander Amphibious Group TWO to Amphibious Group TWO Afloat

Commands, Subject: "Amphibious Ships Capability to Transport the M1A1 Main Battle

Tank," 222310 October 1993.

 

31    Two Two MEU(SOC) message to Commander Marine Forces Atlantic, subject:

"Request for Addition of Tank Platoon to 24 MEU for LF6F 2-95," 031755Z October

1994.

 

32    Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 9-1, Tank Employment (Washington, DC:

Headquarters United States Marine Corps, September 1970), 90,92.

 

33    Operational Handbook (OH) 7-15, Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion

(LCAC) in Amphibious Operations (New York, New York: Amphibious Group Two,

November 1985), 5-1.

 

34    Ibid. 5-1.

 

35    Capt John F. Lynn, "Silent Knight: Fact and Fiction and the M1A1 "Marine

Corps Gazette, June 1990, 65,66.

 

36    Zinni, "Forward Presence and Stability Missions: The Marine Corps

Perspective," 60-61.

 

37    Col Robert L. Larkin, "Task Organizing for the Armor Threat" Marine Corps

Gazette, July 1988, 39.

 

38    Lynn, "Silent Knight: Fact and Fiction and the M1A1" 67.

 

                                 BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

                                    BOOKS

 

Fuller, J.F.C. Armored Warfare. Westport, CT:

      Greenwood Press, 1983.

 

Simpkin, R.E. Mechanized Infantry. Elmsford, NY:

      Pergamon Press, 1980.

 

                              ARTICLES AND PAPERS

 

Bailey, Maj B.T. III. "A New MEU for the Indian Ocean--MEU(SHOC)." Marine Corps

      Gazette June 1993.

 

Barley, LCdr T.A. "LCAC and the Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Assault." Command

      and Staff College AY 1984-1985.

 

Broderick, Col M.E. "MEU(SOC)--Once a Threat, Now Threatened." Marine Corps

      Gazette March 1994.

 

Carns, Capt N.C. and Capt Coerr, S.S. "A True Force in Readiness." U.S. Naval

      Proceedings August 1994.

 

Finlayson, LtCol A.R. "Marine Armor in Mid-Intensity Conflict." Marine Corps Gazette

      July 1988.

 

Grider, Maj R.R. "Over-The Horizon Amphibious Operations: Will They Work?"

      Command and Staff College AY 1987-1988.

 

Gudmundsson, Capt B.J. "New Tanks for Old: How Marines Should Think About

      Armored Vehicles." Marine Corps Gazette December 1988.

 

Gunzelman, Maj K.J. "White Knight or White Elephant: The M1A1 "ABRAMS" in the

      Marine Corps." Command and Staff College AY1988-1989.

 

Joner, Maj W.C. "Amphibious Assault or Amphibious Raid: You Decide!" Command

      and Staff College AY1992-1993.

 

Jordan, Capt L.R. "The Type of Armored Vehicles to Support Marine Corps

      Requirements in the Mid-Range Period" Command and Staff College

      AY1971-1972.

 

Larkin, Col R.L. "Task Organizing for the Armor Threat." Marine Corps Gazette

      July 1988.

 

Lett, P.W. "The M1 Tank Story." Marine Corps Gazette

      August 1991.

 

Lynn, Capt J.F. "Silent Knight: Fact and Fiction and the M1A1." Marine Corps Gazette

      June 1990.

 

Mente, Capt A.L. III "The Optimum Available Tank for the Marine Corps." Amphibious

      Warfare School AY1972-1973.

 

Mundy, Gen C.E. Jr. "Complementary Capabilities from the Sea." Joint Forces

      Quarterly September 1993.

 

Neller, Maj R.B. "Another Assessment of the M1A1." Marine Corps Gazette

      November 1987.

 

Pinion, Capt R.F. "Adoption of a Light Armored Vehicle to Fulfill the Marine Corps

      Tank Requirements in the Future." Amphibious Warfare School AY1968-69.

 

Poeck, Cdr, (BMC) J.A. and Maj Kelly, T.T. "Concept of Employment of the Light

      Armored Assault Battalion(LAAB) in the Marine Air Ground Task

      Force(MAGTF)." Command and Staff College AY1991-1992.

 

Stofft, W.A. and Guertner, G.L. "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention"

      Parameter US Army War College Quarterly Spring 1995.

 

Sykes, Maj J.R. "The Marine Corps Must Have Tanks" Command and Staff College

      AY1988-1989.

 

Wilkinson, Maj J.L. "Armor in Low Intensity Conflict: What is the Best Tactical

      Doctrine for Armor in Counterinsurgency?" Command and Staff College

      AY1991-1992.

 

Zinni, BGen A.C. "Forward Presence and Stability Missions: The Marine Corps

      Perspective." Marine Corps Gazette March 1993.

 

                         GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

 

Combat Studies Institute. Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Study of Tactics,

      Doctrine, and Organization in the 20th Century. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command

      and General Staff College, 1985.

 

Concept & Issues, United States Marine Corps 1994. Taking the Corps Into The 21st

      Century. Washington DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1994.

 

Field Circular 71-100, Armored and Mechanized Division and Brigade Operations.

      Ft Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1984.

 

Field Circular 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and

      General Staff College, 1986.

 

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense.

      Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1991.

 

Fleet Marine Force Manual 9-1, Tank Employment. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps

      Development and Education Command, 1970.

 

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 1-18, Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft

      Data Book. Quantico, Va: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1991.

 

Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare. Norfolk, VA: Naval Doctrine

      Command, 1994.

 

Operational Handbook 2, The Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Quantico, VA: Marine

      Corps Development and Education Command, 1987.

 

Operational Handbook 6-1, Ground Combat Operations. Quantico,VA: Marine Corps

      Development and Education Command, 1988.

 

Operational Handbook 7-15, Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion(LCAC) in

      Amphibious Operations. Norfolk, VA: Surface Warfare Development Group,

      1985.