Military

Somalia: Humanitarian Success And Political/Military Failure

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues

 

 

                              EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Title: Somalia: Humanitarian Success and Political/Military Failure

 

Author:  Major L. M. Martin, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis: That although the commitment of U.S. forces in Somalia was ordered for

humanitarian reasons, the more ambitious goal of peacemaking failed due to the

absence of an achievable mission.

 

Background:    In ordering forces to Somalia in December 1992, President Bush

articulated the humanitarian mission, but did not ensure that the United States' and

United Nations' (UN) goals were in consonance. Additionally, he did not involve

incoming President Clinton in his decision. From the beginning, UN

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali intended the United Nations effort to include

disarmament of the Somali warring factions and nation building. In contrast to

former President Bush, President Clinton's views toward Somalia more closely

mirrored those of the UN Secretary-General. Although the UN assumed control of

the Somali operation in March 1993, the U.S. continued to play a major role in

military operations and UN negotiations. The humanitarian effort succeeded in

saving lives, but the political/military operation failed to achieve its mission. The

following factors contributed to that political/military failure: the lack of an

achievable military and political objective; the impact of the media on military

operations; the absence of an articulated foreign policy toward Somalia; and the lack

of American public support for continued operations.

 

Recommendation:    The U.S. should continue to support humanitarian operations to

the greatest extent possible. To avoid another failure such as Somalia, the United

States should not support nor participate in UN peacemaking or peace enforcement

actions involving civil wars unless all major warring factions actively seek a peaceful

solution to the crisis and there is an articulated and achievable end state.

 

                 SOMALIA: HUMANITARIAN SUCCESS

 

                 AND POLITICAL/MILITARY FAILURE

 

 

 

       On April 24, 1992, the United Nations Security Council established a UN

 

Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to "facilitate an immediate cessation of hostilities

 

and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country, and to promote the

 

process of reconciliation and political settlement."1 This initial resolution regarding

 

Somalia was modest in scope with only 50 UN observers and 500 security

 

personnel.2 UNOSOM's mission also included a 90-day Plan of Action for

 

Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia.

 

       With a fragile cease-fire in the capitol city of Mogadishu only (declared in

 

March 1992), and continued fighting in the north and south, warring factions greatly

 

outnumbered the UNOSOM forces. Tons of food began to flow into the country

 

and numerous nongovernment organization (NGO) personnel attempted to

 

distribute it to the starving masses. In a short period of time, it became evident that

 

armed bandits and looters were benefiting from the aid far more than those in true

 

need. Therefore, on December 3, 1992, the United Nations Security Council

 

approved a resolution authorizing member states to deploy combat troops "to

 

establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."3 Few

 

individuals following the story doubted that "member states" provided the UN cover

 

for a major deployment of U.S. troops and material to Somalia.

 

       President George Bush publicly declared that the United States was the only

 

nation capable of quickly mounting a military operation designed to facilitate the

 

humanitarian effort in Somalia. Journalistic speculation of the president's motives

 

varied from a belief that he wanted to end his term on a high note to the opinion that

 

he had caved in to public pressure generated by graphic news footage of starving

 

Somalis. As with most military operations that "fail," debate continues on whether

 

U.S. should have committed forces to such a mission. Certainly, the operation did

 

not meet the requirement of the Weinberger Doctrine since American vital interests

 

did not exist in Somalia; however, current national security strategy does not require

 

such "vital interest" and the issue of internal morality cannot be discounted.

 

       This analysis will discuss why the United States committed forces to Somalia,

 

whether the commitment of U.S. forces was in consonance with the National

 

Security Strategy, why we left Somalia, and how the Somalia experience may shape

 

future U.S. involvement in UN peace operations. This discussion begins with a short

 

background on Somalia, and is then broken down into the major phases of the

 

Somalia operation which directly involved American forces.

 

 

 

                                  BACKGROUND

 

       A general understanding of Somalia's geography, demographics, and culture

 

is essential to this analysis. Roughly the shape of a boomerang, and nearly equal in

 

square miles to the State of Texas, Somalia sits on the Horn of Africa at the entrance

 

to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Djibouti to the north, Ethiopia to the west,

 

and Kenya to the south provide its borders.

 

       Of its approximately 8.5 million people, more than 98 percent are Somali,

 

giving it an unusual ethnic homogeneity. More than 45 percent of the population are

 

under 15 years of age. About 70 percent of Somali's are nomads who travel with

 

their livestock herds through Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. A lack of definitive

 

borders contributes to the unresolved land disputes between Somalia and its

 

neighbors.

 

       From the late 1800's until World War II, Somalia was split under British and

 

Italian colonial rule. During World War II, Britain occupied all of Somalia, and in

 

1948, gave the Ogaden region to Ethiopia even though Somalis primarily populated

 

it. In 1950, the United Nations voted to grant independence to Somalia; and in 1960.

 

Somalia became a republic with its current borders.4

 

       Following 9 years of civilian government, President Muhammad Siad Barre

 

assumed power in 1969 in a military coup. As a publicly declared "scientific socialist"

 

Barre received both military and financial aid from the former Soviet Union until

 

1977, when a dispute with Soviet-backed Ethiopia caused him to break off relations

 

with the Soviets and turn to the United States. To counter Soviet influence on the

 

Horn of Africa, the United States then provided Somalia with military and economic

 

aid. Somalia played the Cold War game very well, requesting hundreds of millions

 

of dollars in arms and financial aid to fight two U.S. foes, Libya's Muammar Qaddafi

 

and Ethiopia's pro-Soviet leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam. Additionally, Somalia

 

purchased tens of millions of dollars worth of U.S. arms under Foreign Military

 

Sales in the mid-1980's.5 Ironically, a mere decade later, American policymakers

 

tried to disarm a nation the U.S. had helped to arm. Aid to Somalia gradually

 

increased until it peaked in the mid-1980s at more than $ 100 million annually; but as

 

the Cold War wound down, aid began to decrease significantly.

 

       In 1988, the Somali National Movement (Isaq clan) rose in rebellion and

 

seized several towns in the north. Although President Barre responded with military

 

force, heavy bombing and shelling could not put down the rebels. Another group,

 

the Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogadeni clan), gradually took over the southern

 

region; and the United Somali Congress (Hawiye clan) dominated in the central

 

region and in Mogadishu, the capitol. In 1989, Barre's violent retaliation against

 

rival clans could no longer be ignored, and the United States cut off all aid.

 

       After nearly 3 years of civil war, Siad Barre finally fled Somalia in January

 

1991. Although the three dominant Somali groups declared their intent to form a

 

transitional government leading to a democracy, within a few months there were

 

challenges to the authority of the transitional president, Ali Mahdi Mohammed. The

 

primary challenge came from General Mohammed Farrah Aidid, chairman of the

 

ruling United Somali Congress and a fellow Hawiye clansman of Ali Mahdi.

 

       In addition to the carnage of a civil war with no end in sight, a drought-

 

caused famine was in full force and Somalis were dying of starvation by the

 

thousands. Although numerous humanitarian relief organizations were at work in

 

Somalia, they made little headway in stopping the devastation. In addition, Somali

 

refugees were becoming a problem in neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia.6

 

 

                          UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION

 

       On 23 January 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution

 

733 (1992) which called for an embargo on weapons and military equipment being

 

sent to Somalia. In the meantime, recently-elected UN Secretary-General Boutros

 

Boutros-Ghali continued his personal ongoing dialogue with all Somali "parties,

 

movements and factions" attempting to convene a conference on national

 

reconciliation and unity.7 Boutros-Ghali's previous relationship with former-

 

president Siad Barre, however, hampered his effectiveness in negotiating with the

 

warring Somali clans.

 

       On 24 April 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 751

 

(1992) to "facilitate an immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a

 

cease-fire throughout the country, and to promote the process of reconciliation and

 

political settlement."8 The resolution also supported Boutros-Ghali's 90-day Plan of

 

Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia.

 

       Resolution 751 called for the immediate deployment of 50 UN observers to

 

monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and approved "in principle" Boutros-Ghali's

 

plan to deploy a 500-member security force to assist with humanitarian supply

 

deliveries. Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council that the UN would

 

establish UNOSOM "in accordance with agreements signed on 27 and 28 March,

 

respectively, by Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid."9

 

       Although the 50 observers were in Somalia in short order, UNOSOM was in

 

trouble from the start. The UN had to place the 500-man Pakistani battalion,

 

designated as the UNOSOM security force, on standby for months as General Aidid

 

refused to agree to allow armed UN forces in Somalia.10 The UN observers made

 

little progress in reducing the conflict or securing supplies, and in July, the UN

 

asked for increased airlifting of food.

 

 

 

                      OPERATION PROVIDE RELIEF

 

       Ordered by President George Bush in response to UN requests. Operation

 

Provide Relief began on August 15, 1992, and was to: "[p]rovide military assistance

 

in support of emergency humanitarian relief to Kenya and Somalia."11 Although

 

United States military participation at this point was strictly logistical in nature, the

 

United States stationed a Marine Expeditionary Unit off the coast of Somalia to

 

support the airlift. At that time, Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen stated

 

that the United States had "no intention of landing a Marine expedition."12 Merely a

 

few months later, his words would prove untrue. Although Operation Provide Relief

 

successfully airlifted more than 28,000 metric tons of relief supplies into Somalia, the

 

situation on the ground worsened. The fighting continued, and media pictures

 

beamed back to the United States of dying children resulted in an ever-increasing

 

demand to "do something."

 

 

 

                       OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

 

       On December 4, 1992, President Bush announced that he would deploy

 

thousands of American troops to Somalia under the terms of UN resolution 794

 

(1992) passed the previous day. The United Task Force (UNITAF) would be a

 

multinational coalition led by the United States as a stop-gap measure to provide

 

security for distribution of relief supplies in Somalia until a more permanent UN

 

peacekeeping force could assume those responsibilities. Significantly, resolution 794

 

referenced Chapter VII of the UN Charter which concerns peace enforcement.

 

       At this point in the Somalia story, the disparities in expectations began to

 

impact American intervention in Somalia. Significant differences in goals existed

 

between President Bush and UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. President Bush

 

intended to send to Somalia "a broad force to accomplish a narrow mission in a short

 

time."13 Boutros-Ghali, on the other hand wanted the United States to stay until the

 

country was stabilized. The Secretary-General informed the UN Security Council

 

that he wanted the intervention force to disarm the Somalis and confiscate their

 

heavy weapons. Officials in Washington recognized the impossibility of that task,

 

refused to commit to it and left the matter to the discretion of the on-scene

 

commander.

 

       Throughout the remainder of his term of office, President Bush never

 

wavered from his position that the U.S. was in Somalia for humanitarian reasons

 

only and that he would bring the troops home soon. There were even public

 

assurances that the troops could be home by Inauguration Day, January 20, 1993,

 

but the more popular opinion was that they would for remain for 6 months to a

 

year.14

 

       To understand Boutros-Ghali's position, one need only review his Agenda for

 

Peace. The Secretary-General assumed his post with ambitious goals which included

 

establishing "peace-enforcement units" and permanently assigning armed forces from

 

member states to the Security Council to give the UN credibility as a "guarantor of

 

international security." He also advocated immediate establishment of a $50-million

 

revolving peace-keeping reserve fund and a pre-positioned stock of peacekeeping

 

equipment.15

 

       Additionally, expectations and frustrations on the ground in Somalia were

 

innumerable. For the most part, the Somali people were happy to see the troops, and

 

some Somali clan leaders were asking for an extended commitment. Even General

 

Aidid staged a pro-American demonstration, although most Western observers

 

doubted his sincerity. As might be anticipated in such a large and quickly conceived

 

operation, many contingencies arose amongst the coalition, the humanitarian relief

 

organizations, and the Somalis.

 

       Although the U.S. special envoy, Robert Oakley, brokered a temporary

 

cease-fire between Aidid and Ali Mahdi, the warlords did not agreed to lay down

 

their arms. In fact, their orders for their fighters to leave Mogadishu created havoc

 

in the countryside and caused an outcry from relief workers in outlying towns as

 

armed gangs attacked them.

 

       The issue of complete disarmament was a catch-22 that the UN never fully

 

resolved. Few disagree with UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's position that

 

peace building could not begin until the coalition disarmed the warring factions.

 

However, military officials and experienced U.S. politicians (those who remember

 

Beirut) believed that wholesale disarmament would turn the coalition troops into the

 

enemy of all Somali factions. Although armed with modern warfighting equipment,

 

the coalition troops (predominantly U.S.) could not disarm so many Somalis without

 

an exceedingly high toll in lives: American, coalition, and Somali. It is reasonable to

 

assume that the American public would be unwilling to accept the deaths of so many

 

sons in a "humanitarian" operation.

 

 

 

          THE UNITED NATIONS/UNITED STATES GAP WIDENS

 

       As his presidential term came to a close, President Bush reiterated his

 

position that prolonged operations would not be necessary and that American

 

servicemen would be in Somalia "only as long as necessary to establish a secure

 

environment."16 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali now demanded that "before going

 

home, American troops not only seize the Somali clans' arsenals but also remove the

 

mines that have been laid in the north of the country and set up a military police

 

force to preserve order."17 Only under those conditions would Boutros-Ghali provide

 

UN peacekeepers to take over. U.S. officials maintained that they made the offer of

 

troops to the UN with very specific guidelines, and the pertinent Security Council

 

resolution did not require such actions by UNITAF. United States officials accused

 

the Secretary-General of "moving the goalposts" while UN officials maintained that

 

the U.S. knew the ground rules from the beginning.

 

       It is not surprising, therefore, that the quick hand-off from UNITAF to the

 

more permanent UN force did not go "quickly." On the eve of Bill Clinton's

 

inauguration as president, the U.S. pulled more than 1,000 Marines out of Somalia to

 

return home. Most observed the move as a token effort of keeping President Bush's

 

word, but also as a means to prod the United Nations into creating the regular

 

peacekeeping force.

 

       For several weeks, the U.S. media reported little news from Somalia News

 

of sporadic fighting with few coalition casualties competed with news of President

 

Clinton's first months in office. After much delay, however, on March 26, 1993, the

 

UN Security Council passed resolution 814 (1992) establishing UNOSOM II.

 

       Resolution 814 contained several significant (and ambitious) provisions: (1) it

 

mandated a peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and

 

included the requirement to disarm all Somali clans; (2) it specifically addressed the

 

political objective of rebuilding a member state's political and economic structure;

 

and (3) it directed the creation of a secure environment throughout Somalia to

 

include the northern region which had declared independence.18

 

       To carry out the resolution, the United Nations established a full

 

peacekeeping structure in Somalia with Admiral Jonathan Howe, U.S. Navy,

 

retired, as head and special representative of the Secretary-General, and Turkish

 

Lieutenant General Cevik Bir as commander of the UN forces.

 

 

 

         THE UNITED STATES TAKES A SUBORDINATE ROLE

 

       Under UNOSOM II, the U.S. role was primarily that of logistical support,

 

with one significant exception. The U.S. also agreed to provide a Quick Reaction

 

Force of more than 1,000 Army soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division. Those

 

troops were to remain under the tactical control of the Commander, U.S. Forces,

 

Somalia.19 On May 4, 1993, the UN official took control and responsibility for

 

operations in Somalia.

 

       Approximately one month later, the UN operation shifted dramatically. On

 

June 6, 1993, Aidid supporters ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. The

 

assault was particularly vicious. The Somali gunmen used women and children as

 

shields and mutilated the Pakistani corpses. Two days later, and with the strong

 

support of the Clinton administration, the UN Security Council passed resolution

 

837 which called for the immediate apprehension of those responsible for the

 

ambush. The hunt for Aidid was on, and the UN coalition started to weaken.

 

       In the following weeks, the UN command accused the Italian and Saudi