Military





The Marine Component Headquarters and Wartime Functions

The Marine Component Headquarters and Wartime Functions

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Manpower

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: The Marine Component Headquarters and Wartime

Functions

 

Author: Major J.S. Mitchell, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis: The Marine service component headquarters need to

be lean, but fully capable of performing a variety of

functions in support of the CINC and the Marine warfighter

during a wartime scenario.

 

Background: The Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience led

the Marine Corps to consider establishing separate Marine

service component headquarters for each unified CINC. In

February 1992 the Commandant released a message proposing a

review of the functions and capabilities required of a

component headquarters as well as proposing that Fleet

Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific be designated as the

Marine service component headquarters. In a September 1992

the Commandant formally established these service component

commands. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command

requested that the Center for Naval Analyses conduct a study

on CINC service component concepts for the Marine Corps.

The study team made several recommendations on service

component structure and functions. The Marine Corps Force

Structure Planning Group developed an additional list of

functions and made structure recommendations. To these

lists were added unified command requirements for functions

required of a service component. Since then the Marine

component commands have wrestled with the issues of

structure and function. It has been an evolutionary

process and great strides have been made, but there are

milestones yet to be reached.The size and organization of

staffs has yet to be resolved. The division of labor within

the component headquarters and the prevention of bleed over

or duplication of functions with the warfighter require

continuous refinement.

 

Recommendations: The Marine component headquarters need to

be fully represented at each of the unified commands. The

staffs must be lean, but fully capable (with augmentation)

of performing their mission during wartime. A definite

division of labor needs to exist with the component

headquarters and with the warfighter during wartime.

 

The Marine Component Headquarters and Wartime Functions

 

 

 

In February 1992, the Commandant of the Marine Corps

 

(CMC) released a message proposing a "...thorough review of

 

the functions and capabilities required [of a service

 

component] headquarters.1 The message also proposed that

 

the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (CG,

 

FMFPAC) be the service component commander for USCINCPAC and

 

the designated service component commander for USCINCCENT.

 

The message further proposed that the Commanding General,

 

Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (CG, FMFLANT) be the service

 

component commander for USCINCLANT (now CINCUSACOM) and the

 

designated service component commander for USCINCEUR and

 

USCINCSOUTH. CMC formally established these service

 

component commands in September 1992.2 Since then the

 

Marine Corps has worked diligently at achieving full

 

componency. It has been an evolutionary process and there

 

are milestones yet to be reached. The Marine service

 

component headquarters need to be lean, but fully capable

 

of performing a variety of functions in support of the CINC

 

and the Marine warfighter from multiple locations during a

 

wartime scenario.

 

The Desert Shield/ Desert Storm experience led the

 

Marine Corps to consider establishing separate Marine

 

service component headquarters for each unified command.

 

In the Gulf, CG I MEF was dual-hatted as COMMARCENT, the

 

Marine component commander under USCINCCENT. CG, I MEF and

 

most of his staff were located at a forward headquarters.

 

Collocated with CINCCENT in Riyadh were a small staff and a

 

Marine two-star general officer. The fact that the other

 

services (except for the Navy) had larger staffs in Riyadh,

 

headed by three-star general officers, suggested that the

 

Marine Corps was not receiving equal representation and that

 

it should consider a similar structure.

 

Prior to this time separate service components did not

 

exist in the Marine Corps. Organizations that came close to

 

it, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (FMFLANT), Fleet Marine

 

Force Europe (FMFEUR) (DESIGNATE) and Fleet Marine Force

 

Pacific (FMFPAC) were type commands under the Navy Service

 

Components.

 

Why did the Marine corps establish Marine component

 

commands? The answer is threefold. First, as already

 

stated, the Gulf War experience demonstrated the requirement

 

for a service component headquarters, collocated with the

 

unified command in theater separate from the MAGTF

 

warfighting commander. Secondly, a Marine component command

 

allowed for direct access to the unified commander and his

 

staff. This served to provide ever present Marine Corps

 

visibility and influence on the use of Marine Forces and

 

brought the Corps in line with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of

 

1986. Lastly, the establishment of Marine service component

 

commands brought the Corps more in line with the arrangement

 

at the service chief level. CMC had been a member of the

 

Joint Chiefs of Staff for sometime and this same arrangement

 

at the theater CINC level was desirable.

 

Within this context, the Marine Corps Combat

 

Development Command (MCCDC) requested that the Center for

 

Naval Analyses (CNA) perform a study on CINC service

 

component concepts for the Marine Corps.3 These concepts

 

were to include roles, missions and functions as well as

 

organizational structures for the headquarters.

 

The CNA study team first delineated roles, missions and

 

function of component headquarters in peacetime, wartime

 

and during transition to war. Secondly, the team identified

 

capabilities and deficiencies of the Marine Corps to perform

 

these roles. Lastly, the team developed and analyzed

 

courses of action to increase the ability of the Marine

 

Corps to take on these responsibilities. The results of the

 

study were published in June 1994 in a series of classified

 

and unclassified reports. The results of the have received

 

mixed reviews. For the record, it is worth reviewing in

 

broad terms the approach that the team used in their

 

analysis, to include issues that were beyond their scope and

 

needed to be resolved by the Marine Corps and some final

 

cautions that they put forward.

 

The team began their research by reviewing JCS Pub. 2,

 

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Joint doctrine defines

 

service component commands as consisting of the Service

 

component commander and all those individuals, units,

 

detachments, organizations and installations under his

 

command that have been assigned to the unified command.

 

Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations or

 

installations may operate directly under the service

 

component commander and should contribute to the mission of

 

the CINC.4 Additionally, UNAAF addresses service component

 

commanders having responsibilities that derive from their

 

positions in both the operational and Service chains of

 

command.5 These functions are listed at Appendix A.

 

It is appropriate to mention at this time that the

 

Marine Corps Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) under

 

then, Brigadier General Krulak, also published a list of

 

functions for the service component headquarters. This list

 

briefly described the role of the service component

 

headquarters above and beyond those listed in UNAAF.6 It

 

stated that the component headquarters would be the primary

 

source for administrative and logistics support functions

 

combined with coordination and liaison functions. This

 

would serve to assist the warfighter by relieving him of

 

those functions not directly associated with warfighting.

 

Additionally, an even more expansive list emerged when joint

 

doctrine, coupled with the FSPG, was added to service

 

component functions and requirements derived from recent

 

exercises, contingencies and requirements from theater

 

CINCS. This last source is critical in that OPLANS,

 

CONPLANS, strategic plans and CINC policies hold the real

 

key to the requirements of service components.

 

Returning to the CNA study, there were several issues

 

that the team revealed requiring Marine Corps action. Among

 

them were: 1) the functions of the service component versus

 

other headquarters, 2) the size of the headquarters and 3)

 

the service component functions in support of a Joint Task

 

Force.7 The team also cautioned the Marine Corps that there

 

were certain steps that needed to be taken in order to

 

implement an effective headquarters. Along them were: 1)

 

the development of meaningful doctrine, 2) the pursuit of a

 

rigorous training program to teach this doctrine and 3) the

 

absolute requirement to overcome the warfighter bias on the

 

part of the component commander and staff.8

 

After conscientiously addressing the factors above, the

 

team used a requirements-based approach in the study to

 

develop concepts for a service component headquarters.

 

Functions were determined using a top-down approach, i.e.

 

that the theater CINC would establish the requirements for

 

their components. Consequently each theater CINC was

 

visited to collect data and, as stated earlier joint

 

doctrine, Marine Corps publications, exercise and

 

operational after-action reports were consulted.

 

Next, the team identified potential courses of action

 

for a service component headquarters. This was done using a

 

zero based approach meaning that all possible structures

 

were examined. Eight organizational structures were

 

identified for a headquarters. These structures covered the

 

spectrum of distance, both conceptual as well as physical

 

from the CINC. Each course of action contained a peacetime

 

and wartime component as well as a reference to a "cell" if

 

the service component had representation at the CINC. The

 

courses of action varied from those that were combined Navy

 

and Marine Corps in both peacetime and wartime to those that

 

were a full component staff (Marine only) that were

 

collocated with a CINC in peacetime and responsible to him

 

alone and also deployed with that CINC in time of crisis.

 

Once the courses of action were finalized each was assessed

 

with respect to their ability to perform the required

 

component functions. Then a theater by theater analysis was

 

performed and the results tallied.

 

As a final step, the study looked at the various costs

 

of implementing each of the courses of action by theater for

 

the Marine Corps overall. This yielded a list of options

 

with pros and cons for each. The study team also proposed a

 

method of selecting the best possible option for performing

 

the required service component functions.

 

In taking this approach the study traded depth for

 

scope. This was purposeful in that many different component

 

initiatives came up during the study and it was important to

 

consider every alternative. Another consequence was that

 

the study did not develop tables of organization and

 

equipment for the headquarters , nor did the team suggest

 

sources of augmentation for the headquarters in wartime.

 

During the course of the CNA study and even since its

 

release the two component headquarters have continued to

 

evolve into what they are today. Figure 1 depicts the

 

current Unified Combatant Commanders (CINCS) and the Marine

 

Service component headquarters relationship to each CINC.

 

Figure 1.

 

CINC Marine service component headquarters

(location) (location)

CINCPAC MARFORPAC

(Hawaii0 (Hawaii)

CINCUNC/CFC MARFORPAC as MARFORK (designate)

(Korea) (Hawaii)

CINCENT MARFORPAC as MARCENT (designate)

(Tampa) (Hawaii)

CINCUSACOM MARFORLANT as MARFORUSACOM

(Norfolk) (Camp Lejeune)

CINCSOUTH MARFORLANT as MARFORSOUTH (designate)

(Panama) (Camp Lejeune)

CINCEUR MARFORLANT as MARFOREUR (designate)

(Germany) (Camp Lejeune)

 

Under the current setup MARFORLANT is under the

 

Combatant Command (COCOM) of CINCUSACOM as a provider of

 

CONUS-based forces to other Combatant Commanders and

 

MARFORLANT is under the COCOM of CINCPAC. This is not to

 

say that the National Command Authority (NCA) will not

 

transfer COCOM of deploying forces to another CINC during

 

contingency or crisis operations.

 

The Marine Corps is still wrestling with service

 

componency and all that it entails. One indication of this

 

is that the Commanding General, MCCDC, chartered yet another

 

working group during the fall 1994 to develop a concept for

 

command and control of a Marine service component

 

headquarters. The group met in Quantico during October and

 

in January published FMFRP 14-32 (Coordinating Draft). This

 

document has yet to be staffed and approved as a concept.

 

The issue of command and control (C2) as it relates to

 

service components has amplified dramatically the increased

 

requirements for C2 capabilities at the headquarters that

 

are state of the art.

 

The component headquarters are also closing the gap on

 

those functions performed by the headquarters in peacetime,

 

wartime, during the transition to war and in relation to the

 

warfighter. I have included the CMA study functions at

 

Appendix B. These functions are currently being reevaluated

 

and it is my belief that this process will continue

 

indefinitely as the Marine Corps grows into full componency.

 

The most important group of functions listed are those

 

required of a service component command in wartime. After

 

all, these are the functions most often exercised in CINC

 

directed exercises, crisis, and contingencies. Ironically

 

these are the functions that still cause the greatest degree

 

of teeth gnashing at the service component/ warfighter

 

level. It is absolutely essential that the Marine Corps

 

come to terms with the division of labor and duplication of

 

effort between the service component/ warfighter in a

 

wartime setting. The Marine Corps must convince its

 

personnel that the roles of a service component- advising,

 

supplying, training etc.- are critical to accomplishing the

 

mission. Careful articulation of the functions of each

 

headquarters and more particularly, the division of labor

 

within the service component (remain behind staff vs.

 

forward deployed command element) will help prevent the

 

"bleeding over" of functions to the warfighter.

 

Having said this, both component commanders and their

 

staffs play a pivotal role in optimizing preparation and

 

employment of the combat power of committed Marine Forces.

 

It is imperative that each headquarters be structured,

 

staffed, equipped, augmented, and trained to provide the

 

required functions in an effective, efficient and timely

 

manner.

 

Before addressing functions and recommending who should

 

perform them in a wartime scenario certain considerations

 

need to be put on the table. There are three assumptions

 

relating to CINC's USMC Service Component Headquarters and

 

they are:9 1) One Major Regional Contingency (MRC)

 

deployment will involve at least partial mobilization of the

 

Reserves, 2) Two nearly simultaneous MRC's (involving two

 

deployed USMC Service Component Headquarters) will include

 

full mobilization of the Reserves and 3) the CINC's USMC

 

Service Component and the MAGTF will frequently perform

 

complimentary actions in certain functional areas, although

 

to differing degrees and with different perspectives (i.e.

 

different levels of deployment planning and support). When

 

hostilities begin the MAGTF will focus on employment of

 

operating forces on the battlefield and the component

 

headquarters will assume the responsibility for the support

 

and sustainment of the MAGTF.

 

Under existing plans MARFORLANT is a service component

 

without a MRC to plan for.10 In each of MARFORLANT's three

 

theaters there exists or soon will exist a MARFOR

 

(designate) at a minimum. MARFORLANT does not currently

 

envision a requirement to deploy a forward headquarters to

 

any locations other than where they have elements in place,

 

i.e. Stuttgart, Panama City, or Norfolk. In the event of a

 

near simultaneous MRC scenario however, this equation will

 

change and depending on the time/space line, the component

 

headquarters may have to deploy. To date MARFORLANT has

 

deployed several Joint Task Force Headquarters, but has not

 

exercised the capability of deploying the MARFOR

 

Headquarters. In actuality, if a requirement arose, a

 

portion of the MARFOR Headquarters would augment the

 

existing designate in theater in order to accomplish the

 

component mission while a remain behind staff would stay at

 

Camp Lejuene.

 

Conversely, MARFORPAC is intimately involved in

 

planning for multiple MRC's under the direction of two

 

CINC's (USCINCCENT and CINCCFC). To amplify, in the event

 

of general war on the Korean Peninsula, COMMARFORPAC would

 

be designated as Commander, Combined Marine Forces Command

 

(COMCMFC) and Commander, USMC Forces (COMUSMARFORK) when

 

designated. In this capacity MARFORPAC has actively

 

participated in Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens and has deployed a

 

headquarters under canvas in Hawaii with great success.

 

To date, both MARFOR's have made great strides toward

 

assuming their full roles as component headquarters, but

 

definite milestones have yet to be met.

 

The component headquarters must be lean, yet effective

 

organizations. Its functions are critical to the Marine

 

Corps capability in a joint warfighting environment.11

 

However, assets assigned to the component headquarters are

 

deducted from those available to the rest of the Marine

 

Corps. I believe there is a trade-off here. If the Marine

 

Corps fails to staff the designate headquarters for our

 

components with less than the requisite numbers of personnel

 

by grade, MOB, and experience level, the Corps ability to

 

gain an advantage and remain engaged at all levels of

 

planning will never be achieved. This may serve to alienate

 

the CINC and nullify the component commanders relationship

 

with that CINC during an actual crisis. Therefore, the

 

component staff must be lean, containing only those assets

 

and personnel needed on a full time or frequent basis. Less

 

frequent requirements should be met only when required for

 

execution and then, sourced from allocated assets; either

 

preplanned active duty augmentation and/or Reserve unit

 

support.

 

The likelihood of either MARFOR deploying their entire

 

headquarters as a USMC Component is remote. In fact, both

 

CINCUSACOM and USCINCPAC would have to deploy before this

 

would happen. The reality does exist for a level II

 

headquarters (something less than the entire staff, but

 

fully functional and capable of providing the full spectrum

 

of component functions) to deploy out of either or both

 

headquarters in a MRC x 2 scenario. This will create a

 

situation as described earlier wherein there is a deployed

 

headquarters supporting one CINC and a garrison remain

 

behind staff supporting that deployed headquarters as well

 

as retaining its responsibility to other assigned CINC's.

 

In that regard, what functions can be performed by the

 

remain behind staff? What functions are absolutely

 

required to be carried forward by the deployed command

 

element? Are their functions that should be shared between

 

the two staffs? Are there functions that the warfighter

 

(MEF) requires that could be performed by either the

 

deployed component command element or the remain behind

 

component staff?

 

Let's examine the functions/responsibilities of the

 

component headquarters. I will not address any of these

 

functions by individual staff section as that is beyond the

 

scope of this paper.

 

The deployed headquarters needs to advise the CINC on

 

the proper employment of Marine forces and represent the

 

interests of those forces with the CINC on a daily basis.

 

By this I mean proper mission assignment and maintenance of

 

the integrity of the MAGTF, whatever its size. The deployed

 

headquarters needs to be prepared to accomplish assigned

 

operational missions. I say this realizing the service

 

component at large is a provider of forces and sustainment,

 

focusing on support for the MAGTF (MEF) and providing an

 

interface with the CINC. However, on rare occasions the

 

deployed element may be directed to "employ forces".

 

Neither the headquarters itself nor its command and control

 

support elements are designed for this possibility.

 

Augmentation would be required. The deployed headquarters

 

needs to inform the CINC of plans for changes in logistics

 

support that affect his (the CINC) and the MAGTF'S

 

operational capability and sustainability. This will

 

include planning, directing, and monitoring common item

 

support as well as making appropriate arrangements for host

 

nation support requirements of USMC forces. Intimate

 

knowledge of sourcing, availability, transportability,

 

throughput and the ability to deliver replacement personnel

 

and logistics will be a critical function of the deployed

 

headquarters. This relates directly to the ability of the

 

deployed headquarters to consolidate, review, and validate

 

said requirements for replacement personnel and equipment as

 

well as planning, directing and monitoring force

 

reconstitution if required. This can be accomplished by

 

maintaining a constant dialogue with the MAGTF in theater

 

and remaining engaged as a staff in the CINC's future plans.

 

Development, recommendation, and review of rules of

 

engagement is another function levied on the deployed

 

headquarters. Knowledge of current and future operations in

 

theater can best be monitored by being on scene.

 

The forward deployed headquarters sole purpose is to operate

 

in support of the CINC, at the joint/ combined level, and in

 

support of the MAGTF commander conducting maneuver in

 

theater.12

 

As such it will be incumbent on the remain behind staff

 

to take the lead on specific responsibilities in support of

 

that CINC (allowing the deployed headquarters to focus its

 

efforts in theater) as well as all functions/

 

responsibilities to other CINCs to which the headquarters is

 

assigned. These specific functions in support of the CINCs

 

should include, conducting joint training, because any

 

crisis short of one or more MRC's will necessitate

 

continuance of JCS and CINC directed exercises throughout

 

the world. This staff needs to remain dedicated to

 

developing program and budget requests that comply with CINC

 

guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities as well

 

as informing the CINC of such decisions that could affect

 

future operational and contingency planning. There are a

 

multitude of service peculiar functions that the remain

 

behind staff should take responsibility for such as,

 

networking and coordinating with HQMC, the other USMC

 

component commander, the supporting establishment and the

 

Reserves. They must continue training in USMC service

 

doctrine, tactics and techniques as well as performing

 

service peculiar intelligence functions.

 

There are a multitude of functions/ responsibilities that

 

will be inescapably shared between the forward deployed

 

headquarters and the remain behind staff. The performance

 

of these functions/responsibilities will commence well in

 

advance of any deployment, but must continue to be

 

accomplished in a transparent/seamless fashion during and

 

after the deployable headquarters is in theater. These

 

functions include identifying and validating shortfalls in

 

USMC forces and support to be sourced by other

 

services/agencies. Both headquarters must possess the

 

capability to source, coordinate and direct via global

 

sourcing the deployment of Marine forces into a designated

 

theater(s). They must be able to consolidate and validate

 

deployment priorities consistent with the CINC's guidance,

 

then develop and monitor both deployment and redeployment

 

requirements and plans. Lastly, they must direct force

 

deployment and then commensurate with the cessation of

 

hostilities redeploy those forces.

 

My recommendations on those functions performed by the

 

warfighter that should be performed by the either the

 

deployed headquarters or the remain behind staff does not

 

fit nicely into an either/or category. The warfighter knows

 

best what functions he needs to perform on the battlefield

 

in order to best accomplish the mission. Therefore, there

 

are functions which the warfighter should retain, but the

 

deployed component headquarters and the remain behind staff

 

should take a proactive role in assisting the warfigter in

 

the performance of these functions above all others.

 

The first is that of enemy prisoner of war (EPW)

 

processing. The Gulf War experience taught everyone some

 

sobering lessons on the burden placed on combat units

 

responsible for handling EPWs. The deployed staff needs to

 

assist the warfighter in establishing and implementing

 

custody, handling, accountability and transfer procedures.

 

They need to establish and make manning arrangements for

 

collection and holding facilities far removed from the front

 

lines as EPWs are evacuated rearward. This will involve but

 

not be limited to ensuring coordination of transportation,

 

further interrogation, health care and administrative

 

processing.

 

A second area wherein the deployed headquarters can

 

provide tremendous assistance to the warfighter is in the

 

area of intelligence, particularly national/theater

 

collection assets. Through detailed coordination with the

 

warfighter the component headquarters can request and

 

coordinate via the CINC all requirements for assets. With

 

the warfighter's concurrence the component headquarters can

 

recommend allocation of intelligence resources, collection

 

and production tasking. Additionally, in coordination with

 

the warfighter the headquarters can formulate, prioritize

 

and validate requirements for assets thus freeing up the

 

warfighter's intelligence personnel for more pressing

 

duties.

 

The last area is that of target analysis, validation

 

and bomb damage assessment(BDA). Here again, the Gulf War

 

produced some painful lessons for the warfighting staff and

 

their ability to conduct proper target analysis, then

 

validate those targets prior to conducting air strikes and

 

subsequently receive timely BDA in order to reassess the

 

requirement to restrike targets if necessary. The component

 

headquarters can provide an invaluable service to the

 

warfighter by way of personnel and resources to assist in

 

this area.

 

The Marine Corps will eventually achieve it's goal of

 

full componency. As the Marine Corps works toward this end

 

it must continue to build component headquarters that are

 

lean, yet capable. These headquarters must be adequately

 

trained and equipped to support a multitude of CINCs, as

 

well as a Marine warfighter from a number of potential

 

locations during wartime. This means that each staff will

 

be required to perform a multitude of functions individually

 

and collectively in order to accomplish the mission. This

 

will not be an easy task, but the time to organize and train

 

is now, not when the balloon goes up and rounds are going

 

down range.

 

 

Appendix A

*Advising the CINC on proper employment of forces of

the service component

*Accomplishing assigned operational missions

*Selecting and nominating units of the parent service

for assignment to another subordinate force

*Conducting joint training

*Informing the CINC of plans for changes in logistics

support that affect the CINC's operational capability

or sustainability

*Developing programs and budget requests that comply

with CINC guidance on warfighting requirements and

priorities

*Informing the CINC of program and budget decisions

that could possibly affect operational and contingency

planning

The doctrine also indicates that CINC service

components have responsibilities to their own services

which include:

*Providing internal administration and discipline

*Training in service's doctrine, tactics, and

techniques

*Performing logistics functions that are standard to

the command (except when otherwise directed by the

CINC)

*Performing service intelligence functions

 

 

Appendix B

Peacetime Functions

*Represent USMC interests- Represent, or be an advocate

for Marine Corps interests in the theater- Make

recommendation to the CINC on proper employment of

Marine Forces.

*Coordinate USMC plans and policies with CINC, other

components and warfighters- For example, policies on

reserve augmentation support would need to be

articulated to the CINC.

*Provide administrative support-Ensure administrative

support exists and/or provide support to all assigned

and apportioned Marines in theater. Peacetime support

includes maintaining service records, payment of

personnel, receiving, controlling and storing

classified material etc.

*Provide logistic support-Ensure logistics support

exists and/or provide logistics support to all Marines

in theater. Monitor and assess logistics posture of

Marines in theater, identify requirements for

storage of supplies and war reserves, and coordinate

MPF activities of required.

*Participate in deliberate planning process:

-OPLANS/CONPLANS

-JOPES/TPFDD

-supporting plans and annexes

*Participate in Planning, Programming and Budgeting

System- assess impact of OSD budget decisions on Marine

Corps capabilities. Inform and advise CINC when

decisions affect operational and contingency

planning and readiness. Prepare and submit budget

proposals in support of Marine activities in theater.

*Coordinate training in area of responsibility

*Implement CINC's guidance for administration logistics

and training

*Develop memorandums of agreement (MOA) and memorandums

of understanding (MOU)

*Participate in negotiations for wartime host nations

support or interservice agreements

*Participate in working groups and committees

Wartime Functions

*Represent Marine Corps interests-Make recommendations

to the CINC or proper employment of Marine Forces in

support of future plans

*Coordinate with other components-coordinate with other

service components on joint/ combined boards/ agencies.

*Coordinate with warfighter- To include, as required,

operational(e.g. planning) matters

*Coordinate logistics support- coordinate release of

war reserve materials. Arrange for inter theater

transfer of equipment from supporting CINC theaters and

locating lost shipments

*Perform RSO duties- Provide for receipt, staging and

onward movement of assigned or apportioned forces

*Provide administrative support to Marines in theater-

To include, all the peacetime support functions and

ensuring hostile pay, arranging emergency leave, and

supporting hospitalized Marines

*Implement CINC's guidance in administration,

logistics, and training

*Participate in CINC future planning- Actively

participate in CINC future planning cell. Advocate

USMC warfighters interests. Coordinate planning with

warfighters.

*Serve as a nucleus of a JTF headquarters- Provide the

nucleus of a JTF headquarters when required. Prepare

for augmentation, as required. In coordination with

augmentees, perform functions of a JTF headquarters to

include: planning deployment, employment,

sustainment, and redeployment; assisting JFC in

directing, controlling, and coordinating planning

activities of the subordinate component commands;

developing courses of actions and staff

estimates, etc.

*Coordinate MOAs and MOUs

*Perform remain behind functions- Perform peacetime

component functions as required. These functions would

be in support of a service component headquarters in

wartime and would encompass ongoing service component

responsibilities in theater. These functions include

providing inputs to the CINCs integrated priority list

and participating in the deliberate planning cycle.

These functions also include supporting other

combatants CINCs that the component headquarters have

obligations too. Remain behind functions also

include providing support to the warfighter.

Transition to War Functions

*Participate in Crisis Action Team (CAT) -Develop/

modify plans for Marine Forces based upon situation and

liaison with CAT

*Participate in planning and working groups

*Monitor/ provide Marine JOPES/TPFDD input- Monitor

flow of Marine forces into theater. Continue

coordination with warfighter

*Transition from the peacetime to wartime headquarters.

Arrange for the personnel and equipment necessary to

perform wartime functions. Deploy to theater as

required

 

 

Bibliography

 

 

Center for Naval Analyses. Developing a Concept for Maine

Service Component Headquarters. Study. CRM 93-132,

June 1994.

 

Center for Naval Analyses. Joint Doctrine on Service

Component Headquarters. Study. CIM 310, February

1994.

 

Commandant, United States Marine Corps. Message to Major

Subordinate Commands. Subject: "Organization and

Functions of Marine Component Command Headquarters."

041950Z February 1992.

 

Commandant, United States Marine Corps. Message to Major

Subordinate Commands. Subject: "Marine Service

Component Commands." 011952Z September 1992.

 

Componency Command and Control (C2) Working Group Meeting.

Developing a Concept for Command and Control of a

Marine Service Component Headquarters, 11-13 October

1994. C393. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat

Development Command, 1994.

 

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 14-32

(Coordinating Draft). A Concept for Command and

Control Capabilities of the CINC USMC Service Component

Headquarters. Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps.

January 1995.

 

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Forces, Atlantic. Separation of

U.S. Marine Forces, Atlantic and II Marine

Expeditionary Force Staff Functions, 1995: Policy

Memorandum 1-95. Camp Lejuene, NC: Commander, U.S.

Marine Forces, Atlantic, 1995.

 

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific. Observations

from Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens 1993 (UFL 93). Study.

October 1993.

 

JCS Publication (JCS) Pub. 2. Unified Action Armed Forces

(UNAAF). Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

December 1986.

 

 

1. Commandant, United States Marine Corps, Message 041950Z Feb 1992, Organization and Functions

of Marine Component Command Headquarters(U), Unclassified.

 

2. Commandant, United States Marine Corps, Message 011952Z Sep 1992, Marine Corps service

Component Commands (U), Unclassified. This message also appoints COMMARFORPAC as the designated

service component commander to Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSFORKOREA).

 

3. Developing a Concept for the Marine Corps Service Component Headquarters (Alexandria, Va:

Center for Naval Analyses) p. 1.

 

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication, JCS Pub. 2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAFF) (Washington,

D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff) p. 3-24.

 

5. Ibid., pp. 3-25-26.

 

6. "Developing a Concept for the Marine Corps Service Headquarters" (Alexandria, Va: Center for

Naval Analyses) p. 16.

 

7. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

 

8. Ibid., p. 8.

 

9. FMFRP 14-32 (Coordinating Draft) A concept for Command and Control Capabilities of a CINC

USMC Service Component Headquarters, 12 January 1995 p. 1-2.

 

10. E-mail from Colonel Robert P. Mauskapf, Executive Assistant, COMMARFORLANT, 14 March

1995.

 

11. FMFRP 14-32, p. 3.

 

12. Ibid., p. 1.

 



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