American Naval Preparation For Pacific War: 1931-1941

CSC 1995

SUBJECT AREA - Operations

AMERICAN NAVAL PREPARATIONS FOR PACIFIC WAR 1931-1941

A RETROSPECTIVE AND REAPPRAISAL

M. S. KOROMHAS

LTCOL J. JONES

MARCH 1995

Throughout the 1930's the United States Navy was guided by three interrelated

principles which largely served to define its warfighting strategy, force structure, and plans

for growth.

The first of these (Principles) was War Plan Orange, which provided the rationale

for a big Navy. The second was the concept of the "Balanced Fleet", which served as the

best available compromise of competing perspectives and interests within the Navy. The

third was the concept of the "Treaty Navy", which provided public justification for Naval

Growth.1

Several observations are relevant to these principles as they were initially outlined

and used in the 1930's. First, they were all interrelated. As described above the principles

addressed force employment, structure, and acquisition strategy for the Navy as a whole.

Second, all were to varying extents divorced from the realities of the American political,

economic, diplomatic, and military conditions of the 1930's. This in part meant that all

functioned with varying degrees of effectiveness in guiding naval strategy and doctrine

during the interwar period. The third observation is that these principles on the whole,

served the Navy poorly in preparing for the Pacific campaign waged between 1941 and

1945.

It is on this third observation that this paper will concentrate and expand its focus.

In doing so the paper will address several major themes. First, what was the genesis and

structure of each principle? Second, what factors either enhanced or diminished the

usefulness of each principle as it was applied in the 1930's. Third, how well did each

principle shape and prepare the Navy for Pacific War? Finally, do the lessons of the

1930's offer the contemporary military officer a model to emulate or avoid in pondering

and framing force strategy and doctrine?

Treat Navy 1920-1936

The first of these principles to be examined is that of Treaty Navy. As outlined

above this concept sought to provide the rationale for a world class, battleship based fleet

capable of exerting its influence globally in support of American interests overseas.2 Prior

to in depth analysis of this principle however, a brief historical overview is in order.

At the conclusion of the First World War only two of the allied (or associated)

powers, the United States and Japan, emerged in a position of enhanced financial,

economic or diplomatic strength.3 America in particular was well positioned to eclipse

the British empire as the worlds preeminent economic and most potent military power.4

However, concurrent with this rise in relative and absolute power there also arose

widespread fear and revulsion of a second conflict. Before the Treaty of Versailles was

concluded public opinion in the victorious powers clamored for demilitarization and

effective international arms control.5

It is against this background that American Secretary of State Charles Evans

Hughes organized and led the Washington Naval Conference of 1920-22. This conference

involved all of the worlds major naval powers and in part sought to diminish and stabilize

the size and number of the world's dreadnought fleets. To this end Hughes was largely

successful. Capital ships, defined as any vessel mounting a gun greater than 8" and

displacing more than 10,000 tons, were limited to 35,000 tons in displacement.6

Additionally, a ten year moratorium on capital ship construction was specified and a

capital ship ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 was established for the major powers, Britain, the

United States, Japan, France, and Italy respectively.7 Furthermore since the Japanese

were hesitant to accept the 5:5:3 ratio, the treaty also specified that the United States

could not fortify its bases in the Philippines or on Guam or Wake Island.8

The Washington Naval Conference set a de facto limit of 525,000 tons on the

American dreadnought force. To comply with the treaty, the Navy scrapped several

battleships under construction or laid down and canceled plans to fortify its Pacific bases

against possible Japanese invasion.

Designed to prevent a naval arms race, the Washington Naval Conference was

enormously popular with the American public.9 It appeared to prove the thesis that a

legalistic series of treaties could prevent the onset of militarization and an arms race, and

also that the United States could pursue security arrangements without having to bear the

burden of membership in a collective security arrangement such as the League of

Nations.10

Despite these apparent successes however, the Washington Naval Conference also

resulted in several liabilities and accentuated several artificiality's that became increasingly

troubling with the passage of time. The first problem was with the process of the

conference itself. Largely conducted by Secretary Hughes and the State Department,

naval officers were consulted only before the start of the talks and then on only the most

basic issues (such as the definition of the term "capital ship").11 This disconnect between

the agencies of government, in this case the Departments of State and War resulted in a

disjointed and passive foreign policy in the Pacific. The treaty also largely ignored the

dynamic nature of balance of power relationships between the major signatories. The

treaty drew no distinction between expanding powers such as the United States and Japan

and declining British power. By doing so it imposed a financial burden on the British that

they were ill advised to accept.

The most damaging outcome of this conference for the Navy however, was the

false sense of security it provided to the American government and people.12 Despite the

ceiling of 525,000 tons the Navy was never built to this limit during the duration of the

treaty (this failure to build was not emulated by the Japanese, who promptly built to the

edge of treaty limits). Instead, American public opinion remained steadfastly opposed to

an enlargement of the fleet until after the treaty system collapsed in January 1936. The

outcome of this opposition meant that the idea of Treaty Navy (that is the Navy's desire to

build up to treaty limits) worked poorly as a guiding principle of Navy policy because it

remained a clearly unattainable goal from 1922 to 1936.

War Plan Orange 1920-1940

As stated above, throughout the decades preceding the Second World War the

Navy's basic scheme for war against Japan was Plan Orange. One of a number of color

coded plans developed by the Joint Board and its working group the Joint Planning

Committee in the decades preceding the Pacific campaign, Orange ceased to be an

executive plan shortly after 1922.13

When it was developed in 1920 however, Orange was both executable and also

addressed America's basic military strategy concerns in the Pacific. In the event of war

with Japan, Orange specified that the U.S. fleet would steam from its bases in the

continental United States, stopping at fortified island possessions (e.g., Hawaii, Guam, the

Philippines) for fuel and voyage repairs. As it neared the Japanese home islands the

numerically superior American fleet would engage the Imperial Navy in a daylight Jutland-

like engagement shattering it with superior numbers and gunnery.14 After the decisive

blue water engagement the American fleet would clamp a total naval blockade on the

Japanese, starving them into submission. The duration of this campaign was estimated to

be from one to three years. During much of this time the fleet would draw supply from its

Philippine base.

Several major assumptions grounded Orange. The plan explicitly assumed a

numerical superiority in dreadnoughts, the predominance of daylight gunnery tactics, and

the existence of a chain of fortified island bases across the Pacific.15 Orange also

implicitly assumed (in its original state) a passive Japanese defense and the support of the

American government and people for a protracted Pacific campaign. After the

Washington Naval Conference of 1920 and continuing well into the 1930's however, time

and events proved many of these assumptions to be false as Orange, despite changes and

adjustments, increasingly drifted towards the realm of fantasy.

In the wake of the 1920 Naval Conference the American assumption of numerical

superiority remained credible enough. A review of Jane's Fighting Ships editions of 1920,

1925, 1934, 1936, 1938 and 1941 confirms that the United States never lost its 5:3

dominance in dreadnoughts.16 Similarly, when war came in 1941 the circumstances

surrounding Americas entry into the war virtually assured the Navy of broad public and

government support for a Pacific campaign. There is also ample evidence to argue

however, that from 1920 to the autumn of 1941 the Navy did not have the public support

required to sustain a protracted naval campaign with the Japanese. Throughout most of

its existence. Orange remained fundamentally a Navy response to a national security

question. This issue, substantive at the plans inception, crippled Orange as a creditable

war plan throughout the 1920's and 1930's. At the broadest level the American public

remained either ignorant of Orange's existence or hostile to any plan which specified

participation in a large scale international conflict.17 Throughout the 1920's and to a

greater extent in the 1930's American isolationist and pacifist groups repeatedly brought

pressure to bear on the Roosevelt administration arguing that American naval and military

expansion would pave the way for entry into growing European and Asian conflicts.18

The actions of these groups had the effect of slowing military preparations in general and

decreasing broad support for even a "Treaty Navy".

The publics apathy or hostility to Orange and plans similar to it was mirrored in the

government. Instead of military preparedness, the Department of State preferred

contractual legalistic approaches to international conflict resolution.19 The Kellogg-

Briand Treaty of 1927 is a manifestation of this sentiment. Signed by more than one

hundred nations, the signatory nations explicitly renounced war as an instrument of state

policy.20 Exacerbating the philosophic differences between the War and State

Departments was the almost total lack of formal liaison between them to communicate or

formulate policy. In fact, it was not until 1936 that a State Department representative

(Stanley Hornbeck) was sent to the War Department. Even then, the views and opinions

Hornbeck expressed were his own vice the State Departments.21 Presidents Coolidge and

Hoover were also cool to plans endorsing any expansion of military or naval strength (it

was the Hoover administration that sought to abolish the Marine Corps and failed to

authorize the construction of even one naval combatant ship throughout its tenure).22

Even the War Department or more specifically the Joint Board or Joint Planning

Committee could not agree on Orange's feasibility after 1922. As historian Russell

Weigley wrote, "So great and difficult were the problems of the Orange Plans, especially

after the Washington Treaty of 1922, that the planners of the twenties and thirties never

had much confidence in their handiwork."23 Interservice problems with Orange were also

aggravated by the expansion of Japanese naval amphibious capability. The 1928 version

of Orange estimated that in the event of war with Japan, the enemy was capable of landing

60,000 men on Luzon within seven days, 100,000 within two weeks and 300,000 troops

within a month. At that time the U.S. Army garrison on the Philippines was 4,000 men

reinforced by a 7,000 strong Filipino constabulary.24 Hardly a credible deterrent or much

assurance that the United States could hold the Philippines long enough to await relief by

the battle fleet, this time supplemented by reinforcing troops.

Complicating the problem of countering Japanese amphibious capability and

repelling an invasion of the Philippines were the provisions of the Washington Naval

Treaty which forbade fortification of American island bases in the western Pacific.25 If

these bases were taken by the Japanese the U.S. Navy was essentially left with two

options: to steam the 3,400 mile "through ticket" from Hawaii to Japan and engage the

Imperial Navy while low on fuel and in need of repairs, or seize island bases as the fleet

progressed slowly across the Pacific. The estimated duration of a campaign which

embraced the second option was three to ten years. Curiously, it did not specify how

bases were to be seized or mention a role for the Marine Corps. The estimated outcome

of steaming the "through ticket" as specified in option one was the annihilation of the U.S.

battle fleet in a probable replay of the 1905 Battle of Tsushima Straits during the Russo-

Japanese War.

An interesting conclusion of the preceding discussion is that Orange was not

clearly linked to any corner of the Clauswitzian paradoxical trinity - the state, the military

or the people. Thus its acceptance as well as its practical feasibility was weak at

interception and grew increasingly improbable over time. Additionally, due in part to the

Washington Naval Conference of 1920 as well as the tiny size of the U.S. Army during the

interwar years the Navy lacked the basic force structure to execute Orange and the Army

lacked the troops to support it. After 1929 American domestic preoccupation with the

Great Depression kept the public focused on economic vice international matters until

almost the end of the 1930's.26 In short, involvement in a long, potentially costly war

against the Japanese was an anathema to most Americans during the Depression years.

After 1937, several international factors also impinged on Orange. The first and

most important of these factors was the rise of Hitler's Germany, particularly after

rearmament commenced in 1936.27 By 1940, the expansion of German power in all

directions gave the Roosevelt administration cause for grave concern. As a result of

several planning meetings held between British and American leaders in 1941, Germany

was determined to be the primary threat to Anglo-American security interests.28

The second of these factors was the expansion of Japanese power in China and the

concurrent diminution of Occidental influence in Asia after the outbreak of full scale Sino-

Japanese war in July 1937. Advancing quickly into the Chinese interior, Japanese forces

captured the Nationalist capital at Nanking after a bloody three week struggle which

culminated in a orgy of violence and terror. Western powers, preoccupied with economic

domestic concerns or Hitler's growing power, protested but felt incapable of providing

direct military assistance to China.29 By the autumn of 1940 the French and Dutch

collapse and British involvement in Europe virtually assured Japan a free hand in East Asia

with two exceptions: further resistance from the battered Nationalist Chinese and the

potential challenge of the United States.

In One Hundred Years of Sea Power historian George Baer wrote, "The

experience of World War II proved the fundamental features of War Plan Orange to be

correct."30 While this observation may be true, it is equally almost certainly irrelevant.

While continually updated in the 1920's and 1930's and wargamed extensively, Orange

was never executed. Instead, Orange was superseded by five Rainbow options developed

in 1940, then by Adm Harold Stark's Plan Dog in November 1940. Essentially a policy

outline that concluded with four options (Alpha through Dog) Stark wrote "In my opinion

Alternatives (A), (B), and (C) will most probably not provide the necessary degree of

assistance, and, therefore, it we undertake war, that Alternative (D) [a policy of defeating

Germany before Japan with a strategic offense in the Atlantic and a strategic defense in the

Pacific] is likely to be the most fruitful for the United States, particularly if we enter the

war at an early date."31 Following deliberations with several domestic agencies and the

British, Roosevelt adopted Alternative D. The elements of this alternative were

incorporated into Plan ABC-1 and eventually into Rainbow Five which remained the

primary strategic vision for the United States during the Second World War.32

Rather than following Orange, the American campaign in the Pacific War was

based on a clear assessment of military reality, the availability of material assets made

possible by America's colossal industrial capacity and was fought with tactics (e.g.,

USMC amphibious assault) and weapons (e.g., aircraft carriers) almost completely

unforeseen or unappreciated by the planners of Orange.

Balanced Fleet: 1933-1941

The principle of Balanced Fleet, although executed with uneven results, best

prepared the Navy for the Pacific War. This principle succeeded where the preceding two

largely failed for several reasons. First, Balanced Fleet explicitly recognized the

importance of new weapons and tactics in the force structure. Unfortunately some of the

most innovative tactics contained in Marine Amphibious Doctrine were not incorporated

prior to 1942.

Second, the ruling factions within the Navy began to recognize the importance of

new technology at almost the same time that a pro-Navy President took office in

Washington. The importance of Roosevelt's pro-Navy predelicitions, frequently

overlooked by many readers until obvious in 1938, are difficult to overstate. Within a year

of taking office Roosevelt made fleet expansion a key part of his New Deal economic

stimulus growth package.33 Considering the time required and labor and capital intensity

necessary for naval ship construction, this fleet expansion was well timed.

This convergence of innovation, political opportunity, and the intensification of

threats to American security affected the three major branches of the Navy to varying

degrees but unquestionably aided the Navy as a whole in its war predurations. Balanced

Fleet's major challenge, as the title implies, was to balance both external multimission

capability and maintain an intragency balance of power and influence among surface,

aviation and subsurface advocates within the Navy. In short, Balanced Fleet was a power

sharing protocol as well as a rational vision for force structure.

The development of naval aviation capability proceeded by both chance and

Military