Military

Naval Surface Fire Support, Is It A Viable Option?

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues

 

 

 

                       EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT, Is It A Viable Option?

 

Author: Major B. T. Kowalski, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis:  In this volatile world, does the United States still possess the naval surface fire

support assets necessary to continue to project power from the sea?

 

Background:  The present force structure of the United States naval services is stretched

alarmingly thin. In the fall of 1994, these limited military assets were being deployed

throughout the far corners of the world. As the United States Navy continued to respond

to various regional crises, the number of its surface combatant ships continued

throughout 1994 to decline. As downsizing occurred, the Navy had, for the second time

this century, found itself with the five inch gun as its largest naval gun in the active fleet.

Is the five inch naval gun even a viable option for consideration in support of an

amphibious operation? If it is not, what is the Navy doing to correct this shortfall? Does

the nation still need naval surface fires, or can ground forces merely rely upon sea and

land based air assets to provide all of its early fire support needs?

 

Recommendation:   Current weaponry, in the form of the five inch naval gun, continues

to be a valuable asset. The future of naval surface fire support holds great potential. The

key to the United States possessing the requisite naval surface fire support assets to allow

it to continue to project national power from the sea, will rest upon the abilities of

military men to justify the need to develop and maintain those proposed future weapons

systems.

 

                                PREFACE

 

      The issues and ideas presented in this paper are based upon information

 

extracted from unclassified interviews and publications. Readers, especially those

 

that have access to classified material, should be aware that some facets of future

 

weapons systems addressed in this paper are thus unclassified. Even though the

 

author had access to classified material, he chose not to utilize it. The purpose of

 

this paper is to present ideas in an unclassified form so that its analysis and concepts

 

can be freely disseminated and discussed. The differences between information

 

available in some of the classified publications that the author had examined and the

 

unclassified sources that he opted to use are not of any great significance in regard

 

to the basic concept of the issues that will be discussed.

 

      Throughout this paper the reader will encounter the terms naval surface fire

 

support and naval gunfire support. Though related, they do not share the same

 

meaning. Naval surface fire support is that fire support that could be provided by either

 

naval guns, rockets, or missiles. Naval gunfire support is that portion of naval surface

 

fire support provided by naval guns, currently limited in size to that of the five inch naval

 

gun.

 

      This paper was initiated while the four Iowa class battleships were still in the

 

inactive, 'mothball', fleet. This inactive status would have enabled the battleships to

 

return to the active fleet in a time of national crisis within a reasonable period of time.

 

The original paper focused on a concept of recommending one of the battleships be

 

brought back on duty as a reserve training ship. This recommendation, if acted upon,

 

would have maintained a trained, ready, proficient crew able to take a fully functional

 

battleship to war with only a short period of preparation. Considering the speed in which

 

current conditions in the world change, this concept of having one of the Iowa class ships

 

in this reserve training ship status would have facilitated the rapid introduction of the

 

battleship's superior firepower in a major regional conflict. This naval reserve fleet

 

battleship concept would have ensured that the Navy would be capable of providing at

 

least one fully capable naval surface fire support platform to a theater commander.

 

A fire support platform that could deliver conventional short range five inch naval

 

gunfire, long range sixteen inch naval gunfire to 20+ nautical miles, and strategic long

 

range fires with its thirty two Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) to a range of

 

approximately 1,000 nautical miles.

 

      Currently, the Navy does not possess naval gunfire systems larger then the Mk-45,

 

5"/54 caliber gun. The only other surface to surface weapon system currently available in

 

the fleet that is capable of providing fire against land targets is the TLAM. However,

 

this weapon has one major disadvantage; it is a very expensive, though accurate weapon

 

that would generally best be employed against strategic targets deep in enemy territory.

 

      Future surface to surface missiles systems and an improved naval gun are not

 

projected to enter the fleet until after the year 2000. The limitation of having only one

 

type of naval gun, though fully capable of engaging close range tactical targets, and a

 

missile such as the TLAM that is currently best employed against stationary strategic

 

targets, leaves the theater commander to contend with a naval surface fires gap. This gap

 

forces the commander to rely more upon air to surface fires in order to attack operational

 

targets, such as the enemy's theater reserves or corps artillery assets, that in the past

 

would have been engaged by the battleships sixteen inch guns.

 

      Regrettably, a decision was made to remove the four Iowa class battleships from

 

the 'mothball' fleet. Thus, on 12 January 1995, the last of the world's battleships were

 

struck from the Naval Vessel Register. The battleships now are gone with virtually no

 

chance of ever returning. This decision to strike these ships from the record prompted a

 

major shift in both the direction of this paper and its focus. It changed again in mid-

 

March 1995, after the successful test firing of a ship launched Tactical Missile System

 

(TACMS) against a land target. Finally, it altered direction once again, the first week of

 

April 1995, when the author learned of a decision that had been made in late-March

 

initiating an Operational Requirement Document (ORD) for the development of a 5"/62

 

caliber gun as the next gun system to be tested, refined, then fielded in the fleet after the

 

turn of the century.

 

 

                                  INTRODUCTION

 

      In this volatile world, the United States could discover that its naval surface

 

combatants capable of providing naval surface fire support are over stretched.

 

Thus, the United States might become incapable of neither projecting power abroad

 

nor protecting those forces it deploys in support of national policy. The country

 

could find itself extended beyond its ability to quickly respond to even one major

 

regional conflict, much less the two major regional conflict requirement of the

 

current National Security Strategy. Does the United States still possess the naval

 

surface fire support assets necessary to continue to project power from the sea?

 

If not, what is the Navy doing to correct this shortfall? Does the nation still need

 

naval surface fires, or can ground forces rely upon sea and land based air assets to

 

provide all of its early fire support needs during amphibious operations?

 

      The present force structure of the United States naval services is stretched

 

alarmingly thin. In the fall of 1994, these limited military assets were being deployed

 

throughout the far corners of the world. Where were these commitments? The following

 

illustrates the dilemma: to Southwest Asia, to counter the provocative movement of Iraqi

 

forces near the Kuwaiti boarder; to Haiti to restore democracy; to Guantanamo Bay,

 

Cuba and Panama to support Cuban refugee operations; to Italy and Turkey, where air

 

assets control the airspace over Bosnia and northern Iraq; and to the Far East, where

 

forces remain alert in order to respond to the periodically tense situations on the Korean

 

peninsula.

 

      As the United States Navy continued to respond to these numerous regional

 

crises, the number of its surface combatant ships continued to decline throughout 1994.

 

This reduction in available naval assets, combined with an increase in taskings resulted

 

in a higher tempo of operations. Additionally, as downsizing occurred, the Navy had, for

 

the second time this century, found itself with the five inch gun as its largest naval gun in

 

the active fleet. So far, the nation's naval assets have been able to meet the demanding

 

deployment requirements. Can this high operational tempo be sustained indefinitely?

 

      Recently, the United States Navy made the decision to strike from the inactive

 

fleet the last four of the world's functional battleships, those of the Iowa class. The

 

nation has stripped itself of its only viable over the horizon (OTH) surface fire support

 

assets. In this unstable world, can a maritime nation such as ours afford to lose the long

 

range punch of the big gunned battleships prior to the fielding of the next generation of

 

naval weapons? In the initial stages of an amphibious operation, the landing force may

 

need to rely upon air and sea based fires in order to provide cover during the movement

 

of the landing force from ship to shore. After the landing, air and naval surface fire

 

support may be needed to interdict the movement of an enemy counter-attacking force.

 

Does the United States currently possess the ability to blunt an enemy mechanized

 

counterattack during the initial phases of an amphibious operation with a fire support

 

asset other then air?

 

      During this period of ever shrinking budgets, should the concept of naval surface

 

fire support be retired? Within today's budget minded, and operationally active military,

 

only a limited number of military personnel have had benefit of having substantial

 

classroom training and live fire experience. In today's military, only a limited number of

 

individuals have actually fired naval gunfire in any actual hostilities. Why? Because, in

 

the two decades following the war in Vietnam, the United States has not been involved in

 

conflicts requiring substantial participation by its naval gunfire platforms. Even though

 

some naval gunfire was utilized in Lebanon and Grenada, it was limited to a relatively

 

short period of time and under fairly restrictive rules of engagement. The most recent

 

contribution of naval gunfire, as a portion of that larger group of fire support assets that

 

may comprise naval guns and missile systems now known as naval surface fire support,

 

occurred during the 1991 Gulf War. During that conflict, naval combatants launched

 

Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) against strategic targets deep into Iraq, and

 

the last two active battleships, the USS Missouri (BB-63) and the USS Wisconsin (BB-

 

64), provided naval gunfire support to forces ashore with their sixteen inch guns.

 

Because of the Persian Gulfs shallow waters and mine threat, the Navy's modern five

 

inch equipped combatants were kept at such a great range from the coast that they were

 

incapable of being employed in roles similar to those of the destroyers and cruisers of the

 

World War II, Korea, and the Vietnam eras: ships that in the past routinely conducted

 

bombardment missions against enemy positions in support of ground troops. Ironically,

 

in a conflict which highlighted the latest and the greatest of the country's smart weapons,

 

the only ships that were capable of being employed in the classic role of providing naval

 

gunfire support against tactical targets were the two remaining Iowa class battleships.

 

 

                                   CONTENTS

 

Chapter                                                                                                                                     PAGE

 

 

      1.   NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT: THE MISSION THAT

              WON'T GO AWAY                                                                                                                     1

 

      2.   WHAT FORM OF NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT IS

              CURRENTLY AVAILABLE                                                                                                  17

 

      3.   NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT: WHAT ARE THE

              FUTURE POSSIBILITIES?                                                                                                            23

 

      4.   CONCLUSION: COULD THE NAVY'S LIMITED FIRE SUPPORT

              ASSETS BE STRETCHED TO THIN?                                                                                         38

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                                                                   47

 

                                                                                    Chapter One

 

                            NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT:

                               THE MISSION THAT

                                WON'T GO AWAY!

 

 

      On the surface combatants of today's Navy, there are only two weapon systems

 

available to be employed against land targets. The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

 

TLAM), an expensive missile best suited for the engagement of static, long range

 

strategic targets, and the five inch naval gun, generally utilized against tactical targets

 

close to the beach because of its limited range (roughly 23,000 meters). Since the TLAM

 

will most likely remain in the near term as weapon reserved for use against operational

 

and strategic targets, this chapter will focus upon the ability of the five inch gun to

 

support operations in the littoral areas of the world.

 

      When discussing the value of the five inch naval gun with members of both the

 

military and civilian communities, many questions will arise. Is the five inch gun too

 

small of a weapon, with a limited range, to be of value in major operations in littoral

 

theaters, to include those requiring amphibious operations? Has the world of amphibious

 

warfare evolved to a point where there is no longer a need for a naval gun? Should the

 

concept of naval gunfire, as a form of naval surface fire support, pass into history books?

 

Although future commanders may have to rely upon it to support amphibious operations,

 

some members of the military do not seriously consider naval gunfire a viable naval

 

surface fire support asset. In addition to the limited naval surface fire support assets

 

currently available, another problem has also arisen: a possible over reliance upon

 

aviation. The Marine Corps, while allowing its artillery assets to shrink, is therefore

 

placing an increased reliance upon its air assets to support future amphibious operations.1

 

Following the nation's success in the 1991 Gulf War, the focus of attention has been on

 

the superb accomplishments of the country's air assets. But that was the LAST WAR!

 

The Israeli forces were dealt a severe blow in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War partially because

 

it became to dependent upon the past successes of its air force in the 1967 War. Could

 

the United States make the same error?

 

      Should the fire support available from 5"/54 caliber naval gunfire be discounted,

 

or allowed to slowly disappear? In the past, ships armed with six inch and smaller guns

 

have provided vital support in amphibious operations. For example, during World War II

 

there are numerous actions where such support provided by destroyers and light cruisers

 

(cruisers equipped with six or five inch guns) proved to be critical to the success of

 

various amphibious assaults.

 

      Ships involved in operations such as those conducted at Sicily, Salerno, and

 

Normandy proved invaluable to the success of the landing force. In regard to Sicily and

 

Salerno, the fire from these ships blunted strong Axis armored counterattacks that could

 

have pushed the landing force back into the sea. At Normandy's Omaha Beach on D-

 

Day, June 6, 1944, as the Army's Sherman tanks and artillery were lost in the pounding

 

surf, the destroyer became the primary fire support asset for the ground forces pinned to

 

the beach.2 This aggressive employment of the five inch guns directly contributed to the

 

eventual reduction of the German defenses allowing the American forces to finally move

 

off the beach.

 

      There are many instances of the successful utilization of six inch and smaller

 

caliber guns. Guns that when properly utilized have proven to be the deciding factor in

 

the success of some actions. Admittedly, the current five inch naval gun and its

 

ammunition lack the lethality to successfully engage hardened targets. The successful

 

use of the five inch gun hinges upon its utilization against those targets that are most

 

susceptible to its high rate of fire and fragmentation pattern: targets such as infantry units

 

in the open, in trenches with no or limited overhead cover, artillery positions,

 

communications/radar sites and antiaircraft positions. Typically these targets are those

 

that would pose the greatest threat to forces during amphibious operations. Future

 

landing sites may be selected so that the enemy's artillery and antiaircraft batteries would

 

most likely be exposed in open emplacements; an area where a well thought out

 

countermech plan could isolate the landing site, canalizing and delaying the deployment

 

of a counterattacking armor formation. The five inch gun, delivering high rates of fire

 

upon formations attempting to pass through choke points, will, because of its smoke,

 

dust, and blast effects, seriously degrade the observation capabilities of the personnel

 

within enemy armored vehicles, strip those vehicles of supporting dismounted infantry

 

and engineers, and slow the advance of the enemy's counterattacking force. These naval

 

fires combined with a well planned coordinated air effort could ensure not only the

 

successful establishment of the beachhead, but additionally severely degrade the

 

effectiveness of the enemy's mobile reserve force.

 

      Additionally, it is also capable of providing superior fire support to

 

reconnaissance assets operating beyond the range of artillery weapons on the coastal

 

flanks of the amphibious objective area (AOA). The most significant capability of the

 

current naval gun is very much similar to that same capability it had successfully

 

demonstrated in conflicts since World War II. The ability to remain on station and

 

provide continuous fire support. As a former enemy noted:

 

 

      Fire power of warships must not be underestimated. ... The fire curtain provided

      by the guns of the Navy so far proved to be the best trump cards of the Anglo-

      United States invasion Armies. It may be that the part played by the Fleet was

      more decisive than that of the air forces because its fire was better aimed and,

      unlike the bomber formations, it had not to confine itself to short bursts of fire.

 

 

                                     Except from a German military periodical

                                     regarding the effectiveness of naval gunfire

                                     during the Allied invasion of Normandy3

 

 

      In numerous conflicts, naval surface combatants have demonstrated that they are

 

fully capable of supplying the ground force commander with 24 hour, all weather fire

 

support. This fire support has often been the deciding factor in circumstances that

 

required an immediate response. Even though aircraft are capable of delivering an

 

overwhelming volume of fire power in a relatively short period of time, history has

 

proven that aircraft assets are hard pressed to provide continuous support 24 hours a day.

 

 

                                 World War II

 

 

      Six inch and smaller caliber guns played important roles in numerous actions

 

during World War II. One example of the superior value of these guns in support of

 

ground forces can be found by examining 'Operation Avalanche', the invasion of Salerno.

 

This operation clearly demonstrated how effective and useful the smaller caliber guns

 

can be in support of an amphibious assault. When naval guns are applied in concert with

 

other assets at the operational commanders disposal such as air and artillery, they can

 

have a decided impact upon ultimate success or failure of the amphibious operation.

 

      Students of amphibious warfare should note that in this operation Allied forces

 

landed in lightly defended areas, hoping to quickly establish sufficient combat power

 

ashore prior to a counterattack by an extremely capable enemy. The defender did not

 

possess the assets to defend all of the possible landing sites, but did have the ability, even

 

with the Allied control of the air, to respond to an amphibious assault with a strong