Battlefield Operational Functions And The Soviet Campaign Against Japan In 1945 CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - History United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College Quantico, Virginia Master of Military Studies Thesis Paper Andrew L. Hallman, Central Intelligence Agency 1st Mentor: Dr. McKenna 2nd Mentor: Dr. Strange 3rd Reader: Col. Comello Battlefield Operational Functions and the Soviet Campaign Against Japan in 1945 Executive Summary Title: Battlefield Operational Functions and the Soviet Campaign Against Japan in 1945. Author: Andrew L. Hallman, Central Intelligence Agency Thesis: Analysis of a military force's capabilities in terms of the six Battlefield Operational Functions is a useful tool for explaining a campaign's outcome. Background: Operation AUGUST STORM, the Soviets' victorious attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria in August 1945 was a decisive campaign. Japan was pushed from the Asian mainland and the Soviet Union was established as an Asian power. The collapse of the Kwantung Army shocked observers who had expected a tougher fight for Manchuria. Our assessment of the campaign shows that the Soviets were superior in all six of the US Army's Battlefield Operational Functions: intelli- gence, command and control, synchronization, movement and maneuver, protection, and fires. Recommendation: When combined with knowledge of a force's doctrine and organization and the local geography, analysis of a force's capabilities in terms of Battlefield Operational Functions can serve as a useful planning and execution tool for today's military professional. Introduction The Soviet campaign against Japanese-held Manchuria, Korea, southern Sakhalin Island, and the Kurile Islands in 1945 was a short, one-sided campaign in which the Red Army decisively defeated the Japanese forces. Subsequently, Japan was pushed out of mainland Asia, and the Soviets acquired southern Sakhalin Island, the Kurile islands, and installed a friendly regime in North Korea. From a military perspective, the Soviet attack on Manchuria illustrateded the development of combined arms op- erations in World War II, and showed how the Red Army had developed its doctrine, upgraded its equipment, and produced a capable corps of senior officers. The Japanese performance in this campaign reflected a lack of such developments. Fur- thermore, the Kwantung Army's equipment shortfalls showed how Japan's defense industries could not supply its needs, espe- cially with their dependence on foreign sources of critical raw materials. Analysis of the campaign using the six battlefield oper- ational functions, as defined by the US Army, helps to explain why it was so one-sided in favor of the Soviets. Such analysis shows that, by the end of World War II, the importance of the number of soldiers in an army and the dominance of the defense - adages proven repeatedly in war since the mid-nineteenth century - were no longer synonymous with military success. However, two other trends with their roots in nineteenth century wars were clearly vital to the Soviet success against Japan in Manchuria. These were the role of the military-industrial base, and a professional of- ficer corps that is able to adapt to the changing nature of war. Combatants Strategic Goals Soviet and Japanese strategic goals for the campaign in Manchuria present an interesting contrast. Moscow's strategy was clear, set according to realistic assessments of the political and military situation in the theater, and looked to the future. Tokyo's strategy for defending Manchuria was simple, but unrealistic and not supported by Japan's national strategy. Japan merely wanted to hold Manchuria, whereas the Soviets developed a viable plan to seize the Japanese posses- sions in Northeast Asia. Soviet strategy regarding Japan changed in the late 1930's and early 1940's from one of wariness to one of oppor- tunism, i.e., attack when Japan was so weakened as to be judged incapable of strong resistance. Stalin committed the Soviet Union to attacking Japan at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. At that time, the United States and Britain anticipated a long, bloody campaign on the Japanese mainland in late 1945 and wanted Soviet support. Later, when the 1. Department of the Army. Japanese Monograph No. 155. Record of Operations Against Soviet Russians on Northern and Western Fronts of Manchuria, and in North Korea (August 1945). Japan, 1960. p. iii. United States had produced nuclear weapons, the other allies would have preferred to finish off the Japanese by themselves, and keep the Soviets' role in East Asia to a minimum. The Soviet leadership realized its people were tired of war, but believed it had to seize the chance to increase their influ- ence in post-war Asia. Other than wanting a role in the peace settlement with Japan, Stalin wanted to retake southern Sakhalin Island - lost in the 1905 war with Japan - and take Japan's Kurile Islands. Also, the Soviets sought to gain influence in post-war China by getting some trade concessions with that country.2 Manchuria had been held by Tokyo since 19313, and was a backwater as Japan's national strategy in the summer of 1945 concentrated on the defense of the home islands. The United States seized Okinawa that summer, while Japan's holdings in southeast Asia were being rapidly retaken by the allies. Subsequently, Tokyo concentrated its dwindling military resources on the home islands and failed to back their rhet- oric concerning the defense of Manchuria with adequate men 2. Jones,F.C. Manchuria Since 1931. London, United Kingdom, 1949. pp. 225-231. 3. Jones, F.C. Manchuria Since 1931. p. 19. and materiel. In fact, the Kwantung Army was stripped of many of its best formations to support other fighting fronts in the years leading up to 1945. Additionally, when the Soviets attacked, Tokyo informed the Kwantung Army that their prior- ity was the defense of Korea. Simply put, the Japanese strategy regarding Manchuria was to engage the Soviets in a war of attrition using delaying tactics, and try to gain a favorable peace accord.4 4. Department of the Army. Japanese Monolog No. 154, Record of Operations Against Soviet Russians. Eastern Front(August 1945). Japan, 1954 p. 7. Combatants' Forces The forces that fought in Manchuria in August 1945 were not evenly matched from the perspective of combat power. Although, the Soviets held a wide advantage in weapon systems such as aircraft, armored combat vehicles, and artillery, the ratio of men was not so unfavorable for Japan, especially considering that it held what appeared to be strong defensive positions on rugged terrain. However, the Kwantung Army of 1945 was truly a hollow force. This army was directed by Japan's Imperial General Headquarters to "create the semblance of strength" in order to deceive Soviet intelligence.5 The size of the opposing armies in Manchuria is best measured in terms of men and materiel, not number of units. So many Japanese units were much less than authorized strength, and Soviet formations were smaller than Japanese units with the same name, e.g., corps, divisions, and brigades. To illustrate, the Japanese 128th Infantry Division had 14,000 men, or 9,000 less than its table of 5. Department of the Army. Japanese Monograph No. 155. p. iii. organization requirement.6 The authorized strength of a Soviet Rifle (Infantry) Division was 11,780 men, or half that of its Japanese counterpart.7 Therefore, to say that five Soviet armies opposed three Japanese armies in Manchuria is not as important as the military capabilities of each force. The Soviet armies opposing Manchuria in August 1945 were a formidable force. According to Soviet sources used by the most prominent U.S. historian of this campaign, the Soviet Far East Command controlled 1,577,000 men in August 1945, about one-third of whom were assigned to rear support services. The same sources state that this command possessed over 28,000 artillery weapons and 3,700 main battle tanks.8 Soviet equipment was mostly fairly new, such as T-34 tanks, and largely built at plants constructed in the Urals region since 1945. Opposing this force, the Japanese had 1,215 total armored vehicles and 6,700 artillery weapons, most of which 6. Department of the Army. Technical Memeorandum ORO-T-38. Soviet Armor in Action Against the Japanese Kwantung Army, Augsu 1945. Chevy Chase, MD, 1952 p.13. 7. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth Papers No. 7. August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria. Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1983. p.50. 8. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth Papers No. 7. p.42. were obsolete compared to Soviet equipment.9 Japanese armaments production, under pressure from bombing and reduced supplies of raw materials, declined in the war, e.g., total Japanese tank production fell from 1,165 in 1942 to 342 in 1944.10 Furthermore, the Japanese forces suffered from short- ages of ammunition for many weapons, including artillery and small arms. The Red Army enjoyed a big advantage in terms of air and naval support in their campaign against Japan. The Soviets had 3,700 combat aircraft in theater, opposed by the Japanese 2nd Air Army's 1,800 aircraft, most of which were obsolete and/or training aircraft.11 Although Japanese aircraft are reported to have inflicted some damage to Red Army vehicle columns in the campaign, the Soviets enjoyed air superiority. More important, the Soviet air units were controlled by ground commanders, and air operations were coordinated with Soviet ground actions. 9. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth Papers No. 7. p.28. 10. Department of the Army. Technical Memeorandum ORO-T-117 (A.D. Coox and L. Naisawald) Survey of Allied Tank Casualties in World War Two. Chevy Chase, MD, 1951. p. 77. 11. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth Papers No. 7. pp.28 & 42. Soviet naval strength in the Far East consisted of 12 major surface combatants and 78 submarines, as well as amphibious craft and the Amur River Flotilla's riverine ves- sels used to assist the ground forces in the Amur and Sungari River crossing operations.12 Soviet naval vessels operating out of bases from Vladivostok north played a critical role in support of the assaults on Korea, Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. The Japanese navy was no factor in this campaign, and did nothing to stop at least six Soviet amphibious land- ings - three in North Korea, two in southern Sakhalin Island, and in the Kurile Islands. The quality of military units is always a debatable subject, but most observers agree that the Soviet formations were superior in terms of training and combat experience to their Japanese counterparts. Other than local, border-guard- type units, the major Soviet units were shipped to Asia directly from the war in Europe where they had gained valuable combat experience against the Germans. For example, the 6th Guards Tank Army had been a spearhead of the Red Army's drive through the Ukraine to Czechoslavakia from 1943 12. The Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of WWII. Volume 22.p.3002. to May 1945. The Kwantung Army, on the other hand, had been stripped of many of its best individuals and units to replen- ish Japanese armies in other theaters. In 1945, the Kwantung Army's ranks included many raw recruits of dubious caliber, and the army had not gained any significant combat experience since 1939.13 13. Hayashi, Saburo. Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War Quantico, VA, 159. pp.14-17. Role of Geography The physical geography of Manchuria was a major influence on the combatants' campaign plans, their force structure and alignment, as well as on the Soviets' rapid advances in the last few days of the campaign. The remoteness of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands meant that the Soviets had to rely heavily on naval support, and that the Japanes garrisons were isolated and were not well-supported by the home islands. Manchuria is essentially a geographic bowl, consisting of a central plain with mountain barriers to the west, north, and east (see map 1). The Greater Khingan mountains in western Manchuria range to 6,000 feet, with few roads or rail lines traversing the region. To the west of the southern Greater Khingan mountains, arid desert landscape stretches to the Soviet border. The northern Greater Khingan mountains and the Lesser Khingan mountains of northern Manchuria range to 5,500 feet, and include forested and swampy areas. The Eastern Highlands form another natural barrier along Manchu- ria's eastern border, ranging to 4,000 feet and generally are heavily forested, with swamps around the Amur and Sungari rivers in northeastern Manchuria. The central plain of Man- churia is largely flat, open country with many roads, a substantial population, industrial development and intensive agriculture.14 Manchuria's geography influenced Japanese defense plans. The Kwantung Army's most comprehensive defense positions were along the eastern and northern borders, whereas the western defenses consisted of, for the most part, scattered strong points. This alignment reflected the economic geography of the Soviet border areas surrounding Manchuria. The only significantly populated areas were in the east from Khabarovsk south to Vladivostok. Therefore, Japan expected the main Soviet effort to come against eastern and northeastern Manchuria, and the Kwantung Army was subsequently oriented in those directions (see map 2). From the Soviet perspective, geography dictated that their forces attacking into western Manchuria had to be heavily motorized to more effectively traverse the long dis- tances across the desert and the Greater Khingan mountains. 14. Jones, F.C. Manchuria Since 1931. pp. 1-12. Opposite eastern Manchuria, the dense concentration of forward and fortified Japanese defenses dictated that heavy artillery and engineer support be assigned to infantry units designated to assault such positions. Motorized Soviet units would be assigned to exploit breakthroughs made by these assault units in the east, as well as to spearhead columns in the north and west that would bypass Japanese strongholds. Other assets such as logistics and bridging units would be apportioned according to the supported units' specific tasks. For example, the 300th Rifle Division of the 2nd Red Banner Army was given additional bridging support because of its mission to cross very rugged hilly terrain.15 15. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth Papers No. 7 p. 154. Synopsis of Operation AUGUST STORM Operation AUGUST STORM began on 9 August 1945 with simultaneous attacks by three Soviet Fronts into western, northern, and eastern Manchuria. Subsequently, the Soviets attacked southern Sakhalin Island -- held by Japan since 1905 -- and then attacked the Kurile Islands on l8 August. The most potent of the three Soviet strikes into Manchu- ria was that of the Trans-Baikal Front's five armies which attacked from the west, crossing the deserts of Inner Mongo- lia and the Greater Khingan mountains. This armor-heavy force captured the major central Manchurian cities of Mukden, Chang'chun, and Tsitsihar by 20 August - covering a distance of about 600 miles in 11 days. These operations decided the campaign. The 1st Far Eastern Front and 2nd Far Eastern Front attacked into eatern and northern Manchuria, respectively, and made advances of up to 200 miles, often against fierce resistance, by the time large-scale, organized Japanese resistance ended. The Japanese government decided on 16 August that the campaign in Manchuria was lost and ordered the Kwantung Army to seek a cease-fire.16 On this day the major city of Mutanchiang fell to the Soviets after four days of heavy combat.17 However, because of delays in getting messages sent, discussing cease-fire terms with the Soviets, and the fact that many Japanese units had lost communications with higher headquarters, fighting continued for a few more days in many areas. The key outcome of the campaign was to cement the Soviet Union's place as a Pacific power. For example, the acquisi- tion of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands gave Moscow a base for a future nuclear weapon bastion in the sea of Okhotsk. Also, Japan was kicked off the Asian mainland, and the newly independent Korea was split into halves, setting the stage for the Korean war. From the perspective of casu- alties, Operation AUGUST STORM took a modest toll, especially compared to Soviet and Japanese losses in other campaigns. Estimates of killed vary, but were almost certainly well 16. Department of the Army. Japanese Monograph No. 154. Record of Operations Age Soviet Russians. Eastern Front (August 1945). p. 21. 17. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth Papers No. 8. August Storm: Soviet Tactical and operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945. Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1983. p.69. under 100,000 total, mostly Japanese, which reflected the emphasis on maneuver as opposed to attrition in this operation. Battlefield Operational Functions Battlefield Operations Functions is a term used for six functions of military planning and execution. These functions are intelligence, command and control, synchroniza- tion, movement and maneuver, protection, and fires. Any senior military staff should take these six functions into account to ensure that planning and execution are complete, coordinated, and complementary. Additionally, I believe that analyzing a campaign or battle by comparing the antagonists' performance in these functional areas provides a useful explanation for the outcome of the conflict. The manner in which the combatants fought out this campaign may offer some insights to currently serving professionals. Intelligence Military intelligence refers to the process of collect- ing and analyzing data on the enemy, and disseminating this information in a useable form and timely manner so that it may be used to enhance planning and execution of military operations. Intelligence played a vital role in Operation AUGUST STORM - the Soviet name for the campaign - and my analysis suggests that the Soviets had superior intelligence at both the strategic and operational/tactical levels vis-a- vis their Japanese opponents. Stalin benefitted from the services of Richard Sorge's espionage ring throughout World War II. However, given that it was up to Moscow to decide the times and places to attack Manchuria, strategic intelligence was not critical to the Soviets in Operation August Storm. Soviet strategic intelli- gence in the Far East in August 1945 would have been mostly concerned with whether the Japanese would surrender to the US and other allies before the Soviet Union could earn a place at the peace settlement. At the operational level, an example of Soviet intelligence was that the Soviet Far Eastern Command system- atically briefed officers from units arriving from the western Soviet Union on Japanese equipment, organization, and tactics.18 This may seem like an obvious measure, but given that these units were rushed into action, and had all manner of issues - such as maintenance, training and logistics - to be concerned with, it shows the priority assigned to intelli- 18. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth Papers No. 8. p.12. gence in the Red Army. Additionally, Soviet operational intelligence on Japanese defenses in Manchuria, such as for- tifications, enabled the Red Army to task organize their units in an appropriate fashion to fit the unit's capabilities and missions. At the lower levels, the Soviet armies attacking Manchu- ria gained intelligence through long-range reconaissance forces, including aircraft. In the west, the Trans-Baikal Front sent ground reconaissance units up to 150 miles in front of the main body. Reports from these units gave Soviet commanders time to decide how to deploy to defeat Japanese units. At the strategic level, there is no published evidence that Tokyo had any reliable information on Soviet intentions concerning relations with Japan other than that of official statements or contacts. They had no spies in the Kremlin. High-level Japanese intelligence must be faulted in its esti- mate of 14 June 1945, in which it stated that a Soviet attack on Manchuria would not be made with a large force before September. From an operational perspective, Japanese intelligence failed their commanders badly by underestimating the size of the Soviet forces surrounding Manchuria, especially from the west. The Red Army's capability to cross the desert of Inner Mongolia and the Greater Khingan mountains was also misjudged by the Kwantung Army. Subsequently, strong Japanese forces and fortifications were placed on only two avenues of approach into western Manchuria, in the vicinity of the cit- ies of Hailar and Wuchakou (see map 3). On 9 August 1945, the Soviet Trans-Baikal front advanced into Manchuria on seven major axes, rendering the Japanese 3rd Area Army's defense plans useless.19 At the tactical level, it is more difficult to give a good assessment of Japanese intelligence's performance. Nev- ertheless, the Japanese 4th Army, assigned to defend northern Manchuria, provides a good example. This unit's intelligence collection plan consisted of observation by forward-deployed ground troops, military police watch on local populaces, and radio-listening posts.20 In the face of this, the 19. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth Papers No. 7, p.85. 20. Department of the Army. Japanese Monolog No. 155, Record of Operations Against Soviet Russians on Northern and Western fronts of Manchuria (August 1945). p. 177. well-disciplined Red Army could curtail Japanese intelligence collection by employing good security practices such as lim- iting or concealing activity near the border and limiting radio transmissions. Command and Control Command and control refers to the exercise of authority of a properly designated commander of his assigned forces, and includes the planning, direction, coordinating, and con- trolling of military operations. Additionally, at the operational and tactical levels, effective command and control requires adequate communications between commanders, and subordinate initiative based on standard operating proce- dures and knowledge of the senior commander's intent. Soviet command and control was clearly superior to that of the Jap- anese in Operation AUGUST STORM. David Glantz is especially harsh in his assessment of the Kwantung Army's senior leader- ship's performance. According to Glantz,"..it was the higher echelon leadership of the Kwantung Army who engineered the army's overall mediocre performance."21 21. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth Papers No. 7, p.174. At the operational/tactical level, perhaps the outstand- ing feature of Soviet command and control in Operation AUGUST STORM was subordinate commanders' exploitation of good commander's intent. Major units were assigned very deep objectives and given wide latitude in how they gained these objectives, as long as they completed their assigned missions and kept higher headquarters informed of their progress. Furthermore, the Red Army used coded radio messages for secure communications on the march.22 This procedure protect- ed the Soviets from Japanese radio interception. For example, the Trans-Baikal Front's 39th Army's reconaissance units called their headquarters every four hours on their march across Inner Mongolia and the Greater Khingan mountains.23 Japanese plans for defending Manchuria were set through- out the Kwantung Army in August 1945. But they were unrealistic. On 10 August the Imperial General Headquarters ordered General Yamada, the Kwantung Army commander, to 22. Rand Corporation (J. Despres, L. Dzirkals, T. Whaley). Report R-1825-NA. Timely Lessons of History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy. Santa Monica, CA, 1976. p.30. 23. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth Papers No. 7, p.137. defeat the Russians everywhere.24 They forgot Frederick the Great's well-known dictum that "he who defends everything defends nothing". Furthermore, changes in these plans made in the first couple of days of the campaign were not expedi- tiously disseminated because of command and control problems. The fact that Imperial General Headquarters had to make major decisions slowed decision-making. Additionally, the Japanese reaction to the Soviet attack is subject to question from an operational/tactical view. Japanese commanders should have withdrawn units from western and northern Manchuria more quickly once news of Soviet bypass-type advances was received. Bypassed units, usually located in fortifications and with little mobility, were not much threat to the Soviets in Operation August Storm. Effective command and control needs viable communications links, something that plagued the Kwantung Army throughout the campaign. Even before fighting began this army experienced technical problems with communications at the highest levels. For example, the Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Company was embarked on a major project building 24. Hayashi, Saburo. Kogun. p. 174. land-lines between major commands when the Soviets attacked.25 Another example of a command and control problem was Kwantung Army commander General Yamada's absence from his headquarters for the first 18 hours of the campaign. He was away on a routine trip which his staff advised against26. Japanese command and control was further weakened by several major headquarters moving during the campaign, due to tacti- cal reasons or to avoid Soviet bombing. For example, when Kwantung Army headquarters moved from Chang-chun to Tunghua on the second day of the campaign, it took the operations section but left the intelligence section behind because of communications shortfalls at the new location.27 Synchronization Synchronization refers to the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative com- bat power at a decisive time and place. Effective synchroni- zation of action can overwhelm an opponent who may be otherwise able to fend off piecemeal, uncoordinated attacks. 25. Department of the Army. Japanese Monograph No. 155, p.93. 26. Department of the Army. Japanese Monograph No. 154. p.3. 27. Department of the Army. Japanese Monograph No. 154. p.15. There can be no doubt that the Red Army affected superior synchronization of action, compared to the Japanese, in Oper- ation August Storm. At the strategic level, Stalin pushed his commanders to move up the start date for attacking Manchuria. While the US atomic bomb attacks and Stalin's desire to get in on the war against Japan before it ended were the primary motivations for this decision, the earlier-than-expected attack caught the Kwantung Army in a less prepared state than it may have been in, say, October, and helped maximize the Soviet advan- tages in combat power. From an operational perspective, the Soviet decision to attack Manchuria on three sides was a masterful stroke. The Japanese were never able to mount a viable response. Never- theless, some Kwantung Army units in eastern and northern Manchuria did a creditable job slowing the Soviet advance. For example, the Japanese 132nd Independent Mixed Brigade fought a series of delaying engagements while retreating in northeast Manchuria, and were a viable, combat-capable unit prepared to fight from fortifies positions at the campaign's closure.28 However, Soviet columns in western Manchuria seized key Japanese headquarters, communication lines, and logistics facilities in central Manchuria within a few days of war, making further Japanese resistance untenable. The Red Army synchronized their efforts at the tactical level, too. For example, the Soviets withheld artillery and air support from some initial attacks, which went against standard doctine, in order to allow light infantry to surprise and neutralize some objectives.29 Also, the Soviet Air Force engaged in both close air support and strategic bombing in support of senior ground commanders. As an exam- ple, the Japanese First Area Army's headquarters, as well as communications and transportation targets in the city of Mu- tanchiang were bombed on 9 August, in conjunction with the Soviet First Far Eastern Front's ground attack against this headquarter's subordinate units in eastern Manchuria.30 Japanese synchronization can be summed up as ineffectual in Manchuria. While one can argue that Japanese units in 28. Department of the Army. Japanese Monograph No. 154, pp. 331-346. 29. Rand Corporation. Report R-1825-NA p.42. 30. Department of the Army. Japanese Monograph No. 154, pp. 4&9. eastern Manchuria conducted a semblance of a delaying action, the quick collapse of the northern and western defenses made coordination of action for the whole Kwantung Army impossible. Furthermore, where Japanese unites did hold, there was a lack of support by or for adjacent units, largely due to the Japanese tactics, which relied on fixed positions, as well as a lack of counter-attacking forces and supporting fires. Movement and Maneuver Movement and maneuver refers to the directed movement of military forces in order to avoid enemy strengths, attack enemy weaknesses, and gain and maintain the initiative on the battlefield. The Soviets again displayed a clear superiority to the Japanese in this critical battlefield function, due as much to audacity as to superior mobility, combat support, and the obvious advantage in initiative that the aggressor force possesses. This superiority was most evident in western Manchuria, where the Soviets stunned the Japanese with their ability to move the Trans-Baikal Front across a desert and rugged mountain range. The Kwantung Army was never able to recover in the west. Operationally, the Red Army planned a campaign that would rely on maneuver as much as firepower to defeat their opponent. The Soviets sought to gain deep objectives and bypass Japanese strongpoints where possible. Red Army commanders expected the Japanese to defend doggedly, so fre- quently bypassed, thus neutralizing, strongly defended positions, and maybe shelling or bombing the positions before accepting surrender at the end of the short campaign. For example, the Japanese 107th Infantry Division was located at Wuchakou, astride one of the key communications routes in western Manchuria, on 9 August 1945. The Soviet 124th Rifle Division fixed the 107th in place while other Soviet forces had passed to the south by 13 August. The 107th's telephone line and route of retreat was cut. Subsequently, the 107th wandered around the mountains, occasionally harassing Soviet units until surrendering on 30 August.31 Soviet maneuver and envelopment was not restricted to land operations; the Red Army made amphibious assaults in North Korea, Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands, and even an airborne assault on Port Arthur (Darien). These amphibi- 31. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth papers No. 8. pp.141-148. ous and airborne operations were facilitated by the Soviets' air superiority and domination of the Sea of Japan. The Japanese failure to use effective movement and maneuver ensured that the Soviets would always have the ini- tiative on the battlefield. At the operational level, the Kwantung Army planned to fight a delaying action, which meant that they would always be reacting to Soviet initiatives. This was the case of the Japanese units in the area of Hailar in northwest Manchuria, where the Soviets' 205th Tank Brigade conducted a demanding march across difficult terrain and at- tacked the garrison. The prepared defenses in front of Hailar were quickly rendered untenable and the Japanese had to hastily retreat, reacting to the Soviets all the way east across the Greater Khingan mountains.32 The size of the Manchurian theater gave the Soviets ample room to move, and their superior mobility gave them the means to do so. Protection The concept of protection refers to the conservation of the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at 32. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth papers No. 8. pp.160-165. the decisive time and place. Protection also includes decep- tion operations. Once again, Soviet superiority over the Japanese was evident in this battlefield operational function. At the strategic and operational levels, the Soviets' protection was superb in that they concealed the size and disposition of their forces from the Japanese, and were able to achieve a high degree of surprise in their attack of 9 August. Soviet expertise at 'Maskirovka', or masking, is well-renowned, and was put to good use as units arriving in theater from the western Soviet Union were sent to their assembly areas. These assembly areas were well away from the border, and the Soviet border guards, directed by the secret police, were alert to any transgressors. Also, Japanese aircraft did not overfly Soviet territory. Official Japanese estimates immediately prior to the Soviet attack indicated that they thought there were two Soviet armies west of Manchuria, two to the north, and three to the east. In reality, there were five, three, and four armies, respectively. 33. Rand corporation. Report R-1825-NA. p.22. The Japanese used the concept of protection only in the sense that they retreated in many instances to conserve their weaker force. The Japanese had no serious deception plan, either. Fires Fires is the use of all fires, both lethal and non-lethal, that are available to a force in order to achieve a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign. To be effective, commanders must be able to concentrate fires, shift fires quickly, and, above all, use appropriate fires on different targets. The Soviets enjoyed a wide advantage over their Japanese opponents in terms of fires. The Red Army learned in their war with Germany to employ the principle of mass in fire support. Units assigned particularly difficult or critical missions in the attack against Japanese units were given massive fire support, up to 200 guns per kilometer of front in designated breakthrough areas.34 As an example, the Soviets' 264th Rifle Division was given the support of an ad hoc 'artillery destruction group' 34. Rand corporation. Report R-1825-NA. p. 43. including 24 203mm howitzers for its attack across the Ussuri river into northeastern Manchuria.35 Generally, the Soviets assigned priority of fires, including air attacks, to Japanese command and control facilities.36 Using a principle learned at great cost by World War I armies, the Soviets often withheld fire support to some attacks in tough terrain to allow their light infantry forces to achieve surprise and neutralize enemy outposts, especially in the tough, heavily- defended terrain of eastern Manchuria.37 In spite of their overall success, fire support was a problem for the Red Army in this campaign. Their artillery force, mostly towed pieces, was not as mobile as their armor and infantry, especially in the mountainous terrain of much of the theater. Therefore, the artillery clogged the roads and its ammunition requirements put a big strain on the logistics system.38 Subsequently, the practice of using artillery to reduce bypassed Japanese strongpoints may not have been strictly an option, but a result of the artillery's 35. Glantz, David M. The Leavenworth Papers No. 8 p.60. 36. Rand corporation. Report R-1825-NA. p. 30. 37. Rand corporation. Report R-1825-NA. p. 42. 38. Rand corporation. Report R-1825-NA. p. 451 inability to keep pace with maneuver elements. The Kwantung Army's use of fires was constrained by its comparative lack of weapons, and its general shortage of ammunition. For example, one source reports that the Kwantung Army of August 1945 only had 500-600 rounds per artillery piece and an astonishingly low 100 rounds per rifle.39 Furthermore, the Japanese 2nd Air Army possessed only 40 bombers.40 At the tactical level, Japanese fire support units tend- ed to be positioned in prepared fortifications. One partic- ularly telling example of the Japanese inadequacy in fires occurred during the fierce fighting for the eastern Manchuri- an city of Mutanchiang. On 13 August 1945, the Japanese 126th and 135th Infantry Divisions prepared to defend the city with a total of just 30 artillery weapons against two Soviet armies advancing in a pincer.41 Another interesting point is that a principal anti-tank weapon of the Japanese was the 37mm gun, whose projectile could not penetrate the Soviet 39. Department of the Army. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-38. Soviet Armor in Action Against the Japanese Kwantung Army, August 1945. p. 14. 40. The Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of WWII. p.2999. 41. Glantz, David M. The Leavenworth Papers No. 8. p.89. T-34 tank. Given that the T-34 was a well-known equipment item by 1945, one would have thought that the Japanese would have been better prepared to deal with it. Conclusions The outcome and even the pace of Operation AUGUST STORM was not surprising when one conducts a comparative analysis of each side's capabilities in terms of battlefield operation- al functions. This superiority was a result of the Soviets' doctrine -- emphasizing such aspects as combined arms forces, task-organization of units, and deep attack objectives -- combined with superior intelligence and command and control, and fueled by a competent logistics system. Therefore, anal- ysis of potential combatants by a comparison of battlefield operational functions capabilities can help determine the outcome of a conflict with some degree of reliability, as well as identify weaknesses of any potential combatant. The abysmal Japanese failure in Manchuria can be ascribed in part as rooted in its failure to ensure competence in the battlefield operational functions. Furthermore, the basic premise that a sufficient number of determined soldiers occupying well-prepared defensive positions can hold out indefinitely against attackers was invalidated in this campaign. This premise had some limited validity in the defensively favorable geography of the Pacif- ic Islands or southeast Asia, but was inappropriate for a large, open theater such as Manchuria. To quote Dr. Joe Strange, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College, the Japanese tried to fight "...a 20th century military power with a 16th century Samurai mentality."42 I believe that the Soviet-Japanese conflict in Manchuria is a relevant learning tool for today's professional military because of the fact that our operational and tactical doctrine for U.S. ground forces today is not significantly different from that of the Soviets in 1945. We seek to use maneuver and not attrition, backed by overwhelming fires, and enhanced by superior intelligence, command and control, syn- chronization, and protection to defeat our opponents. Those analysts who believe that Operation DESERT STORM was an aberration in warfare would do well to notice the similarities between that operation and Operation AUGUST STORM, and see these campaigns as the appropriate method to conduct large-scale ground warfare against conventional 42. Strange, Joseph. Japan: Strategy and Strategic Process in World War Two. Lecture at Quantico, VA, 1993. opponents. Therefore, today's officers should know what happened in Manchuria as a way to ensure that their units are prepared to face whatever challenges face them in the future. Bibliography 1. Department of the Army. Japanese Monograph No. 154. Record of Operations Against Soviet Russians. Eastern Front August 1945). Japan, 1954. 2. Department of the Army. Japanese Monograph No. 155. Record of Operations Against Soviet Russians on Northern and Western Fronts of Manchuria, and in North Korea (August 1945). Japan, 1960. 3. Department of the Army. Pamphlet No. 20-230. Russian Combat Methods in World War Two. Washington, DC, 1950. 4. Department of the Army. Technical Memorandum ORO-T- 38. Soviet Armor in Action Against the Japanese Kwantung Army, August 1945. Chevy Chase, MD, 1952. 5. Department of the Army. Technical Memorandum ORO-T- 117. (A.D. Coox and L. Naisawald) Survey of Allied Tank Casualties in World War Two. Chevy Chase, MD, 1951. 6. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth Papers No. 7. August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategy Offensive in Manchuria. Combat Studies Institute, USA C&GSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1983. 7. Glantz, David M. Leavenworth Papers No. 8. August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945. Combat Studies Institute, USA C&GSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1983. 8. Hayashi, Saburo. Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War. Tr Alvin D. Coox. 3rd ed. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1959. 9. Jones, F.C. Manchuria Since 1931. London, United Kingdom, Broadwater Press, 1949. 10. Rand Corporation (John Despres, Lilita Dzirkals, Tom Whaley) Report. R-1825-NA. Timely Lessons of History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy. Santa Monica, CA, 1976. 11. Strange, Joseph. Japan: Strategy and Strategic Process in World War Two. Lecture to USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA. 15 October 1993. 12. The Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of World war Two, Volume 22. Orbis Publishing Ltd, London, United Kingdom, 1972. Click here to view image
