The Kamikaze: Samurai Warrior A New Appraisal
SUBJECT AREA - History
THE KAMIKAZE: SAMURAI WARRIOR
A NEW APPRAISAL
John A. Forquer
United States Marine Corps
Military Issues Paper submitted to the Faculty
of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for AY 1994-95
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and
do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government
Title: The Kamikaze: A New Appraisal
Author: Major J.A. Forquer, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The WWII Kamikazes have been revered as the epitome of military discipline
and soldierly repute. The Kamikaze story also has a dark side. An analysis of the
leadership behind the development and continued employment of the Kamikaze tactics
reveals the calculated choice to sacrifice the flyer's lives for a "glorious death" not
Background: Prior to WWII, Japanese military leaders studied and worked tirelessly at
refining the science and art of their profession. During WWII, these leaders employed
their skills with great success against the moth-balled military of the United States.
When victory turned in favor of the United States, Japanese leaders departed from a
logical, methodical approach to war. The leaders increasingly relied on the Samurai
spirit to bridge the disparity of manpower and industry between Japan and the United
States. Japanese leaders, even after recognizing their impending defeat, were unable to
face it. They hid behind and ultimately disgraced, the Bushido Code. These leaders
sought to sacrifice an entire nation, not for victory or peace, but for glorious death.
Recommendation: History must clearly depict the entire Kamikaze story. Many pilots
were truly heroic. However, the leadership that developed and continued the employment of
the Kamikaze tactic demonstrates the failure of men. Their disregard for human lives as
illustrated by their continued use of Kamikaze tactics in the face of certain defeat, should be
recorded and used as a learning tool. A thorough understanding of this leadership failure
may serve to prevent it from being repeated.
Many discussions of the Japanese Kamikaze pilots focus almost exclusively
on the bravery and sacrifice of these pilots. While these pilots were respected and
revered, they were only one part of the Kamikaze legacy. The darker side of the
Kamikaze story involved the leadership behind the tactic. This paper focuses on
the leadership which developed, implemented and condoned the continued use of
the Kamikaze tactic. Part I provides background information on the influence of
Japanese history and culture on the Japanese military. Part II traces the events of
World War II that led to the development and expanded use of the Kamikaze
tactic. Part III covers the employment of the Kamikaze tactic. Part IV provides a
I. Japanese History, Culture, and The Military
A collection of ancient principles called the Bushido Code governed the
conduct of the ancient Japanese warrior known as the Samurai. These principles
emphasized honor, courage, loyally, self-sacrifice, unquestionable reverence for
the emperor, and contempt for defeat. This philosophy became inculcated into
the Japanese culture and national ideology. The Bushido Code continued to
influence the Japanese culture into the twentieth century.
During World War II, a new breed of Samurai warrior emerged, the
stone-laced Kamikaze. The term Kamikaze means "Divine Wind." It evolved
from the great storm of 1281 that occurred on the eve of the Mongol's planned
attack on Japan. This storm prevented the massive Mongol armada from certain
conquest of Japan. Accordingly, the Japanese viewed this fortuitous storm as
clear evidence of heavenly intervention. They attributed the salvation of the
Empire to the Kamikaze.
The World War II Kamikaze tactic, unlike its namesake, was not developed
as a means to save the Empire but instead was intended to buy Japan time to
rebuild their military. This World War II tactic required and celebrated suicide.
The notion of celebrated suicide was not adverse to Japanese culture as the
Japanese did not attach a disgraceful stigma to suicide. Suicide in Japan was both
commonplace and preferred over a life of shame. Suicide was a respected
response to tragedy, humiliation or the desire to share the fate of a respected
man's death. The Kamikaze tactic, therefore, was embraced by many Japanese
people. This tactic was also consistent with the Bushido Code's requirement of
The Japanese military also applied other principles of the Bushido Code.
In keeping with the code, this totalitarian system demanded courage, devotion,
and obedience. The system yielded a military characterized as rigid, extremely
disciplined, and unquestionably devoted. Not surprisingly, the Japanese employed
harsher disciplinary methods than any other World War II force. Even the
infamous severe discipline of the Prussian army before 1870 was mild in
comparison.1 The Japanese commonly applied brutal corporal punishment for
even minor infractions. They believed such punishment to instill a boundless
respect for authority and the chain of command. A young naval recruit named
Saburo Sakai described his experience as a naval recruit:
The petty officers would not hesitate to administer the severest beatings to
recruits they felt deserving of punishment. Whenever I committed a
breach of discipline or an error in training, I was dragged physically from
my cot by a petty officer. "Stand tall to the wall! Bend down, Recruit
Sakai!" he would roar. "I am not doing this because I hate you, but
because I like you and want you to make a good seaman. Bend down!"
And with that he would swing a large stick of wood and with every ounce
of strength he possessed would slam it against my upturned bottom. The
pain was terrible, the force of the blows unremitting. There was no choice
but to grit my teeth and struggle desperately not to cry out. At times I
counted up to forty crashing impacts into my buttocks. Often I feinted
from the pain. A lapse of consciousness constituted no escape however.
The petty officer simply hurled a bucket of cold water over my prostrate
form and bellowed for me to resume position, whereupon he continued his
discipline until satisfied I would mend the errors of my ways.2
Like the disciplinary procedures, Japan's military award system and daily
expectations were also harsher than other World War II forces. The Japanese
award system only acknowledged individual performance posthumously. In
addition, Japanese leaders expected their soldiers and sailors to perform to their
absolute limits daily. They considered anything short of total and unselfish
dedication to the Emperor a disgrace.
The Bushido ideal of contempt for defeat also influenced how the Japanese
viewed combat. They regarded defeat in combat as the ultimate humiliation. The
Japanese expected a soldier or sailor to win, die by the hands of his enemy, or
commit suicide. Commanders who recognized imminent defeat in battle,
therefore, launched hundreds of soldiers in banzai charges into overwhelming
enemy machine-gun and artillery fire, knowing that the attack would be suicidal.
These commanders believed that such a drive embodied the spirit of the ancient
Samurai warrior and would result in a "glorious death."3 Military commanders
thought no greater honor could be bestowed upon them than the opportunity to
give their lives and the lives of their men for their emperor. Thus, soldiers
incapable of participating in these bonsai charges due to injury or sickness were
Toward the end of the war, many in the civilian population adopted the
Kamikaze philosophy. Thousands of military and civilians viewed the imminent
defeat and the unconditional surrender of Japan as a disgrace. Accordingly, they
II. Setting The Stage: Events Leading to the Development of the Kamikaze
The Japanese-military had service leaders but no unified commander. As a
result, the Japanese Army and Navy constantly battled over military strategy.
Only the Emperor could consolidate the efforts of the two services.
Unfortunately for Japan, the emperor behaved like a constitutional monarch. He
did not exercise his leadership until after the U.S. dropped the atomic bombs.
Continuous inter-service strife, therefore, plagued the Japanese military through
much of World War II.
Because of the unresolved disagreements between the army and navy and
many poorly conceived compromises, the military adopted two separate strategies.
The army adopted a strategy of a northward drive through China into Russia.
The navy planned to push southward against the U.S., Great Britain, and Holland.
This dual strategy forced Japan to attempt the impossible task of building a
military capable of matching the U.S. and Russia. The army's term for this
expansion, Hakko Tai, (meaning eight directions) stated the hope that the entire
world could be brought under Japanese control.4 However, a protracted war on
such a scale required an industrial capacity and resource base far beyond Japan's.
war on such a scale required an industrial capacity and resource base far beyond
Although Japan never had the resources for a protracted war, in the first
stages of World War II, Japan's military was well equipped, trained, and prepared
for war. Initially, the Japanese won several battles in their quest to rule the
world. These initial victories gave the Japanese false hope. They deluded
themselves into thinking victory was imminent. They planned and executed a
successful operation that proved to be the beginning of the end for Japan - the
bombing of Pearl Harbor. This attack woke the sleeping giant of the West (the
U.S.) and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's worst nightmare became a reality. After
the U.S. declared war on Japan, the U.S. rapidly converted its unmatched
industrial capacity to war production and set it into accelerated motion.
With the U.S.'s entry in the war, victory no longer seemed imminent for
Japan. The defeat of Midway in 1942 started a series of defeats for Japan from
which it never recovered. Japanese defeats at Midway and Guadacanal, while
costly to both sides, were more easily absorbed by the U.S. with its vast
resources. Moreover, Japan could no longer protect its desperately needed supply
ships with the land-based aircraft previously launched from these islands. The
Japanese Navy could not meet this additional requirement because of its
numerous losses of carrier-based aircraft.
Several other factors also exacerbated Japan's deteriorating ability to wage
war against the United States. First, the allies developed superior weaponry,
particularly in air defense and radar. Second, the disparity in experience levels
between Japanese and American pilots consistently grew due to heavy Japanese
pilot combat casualties. These Japanese pilot losses were particularly high at the
battle for Saipan. While America lost 126 pilots, almost 500 Japanese pilots died.
This led to the American reference to the battle as the "Mariannas Turkey Shoot."
The battle for Saipan resulted in almost total annihilation of Japan's experienced
After the battle of Saipan, Japan struggled desperately to train new pilots
to fill this critical void. The Japanese sacrificed the quality of pilot training to
speed up the replacement process. Before the Pacific Campaign, Japanese pilot
training required 4OO flight hours as a prerequisite to the start of aircraft carrier
qualification training. Eight hundred hours of total flight time, according to flight
instructors and experienced pilots, was required to meet the minimum proficiency
for carrier operations. After Saipan, however, several factors prevented Japan
from meeting these standards: the impossible time required for such training and
the growing shortage of both fuel and pilot candidates.
While the flight instructors and aviators asserted that a minimum of 800
flight hours was required for pilot training, the Fleet admirals balked at what they
viewed as "lofty" flight time training requirements. They insisted that proficient
carrier pilots could be produced in 200 hours or less. They rationalized this
training reduction with the belief that the Bushido spirit would make up for the
lack of experience. Accordingly, they eliminated training in aerobatics, combat
techniques, navigation, and dead reckoning. These new pilots, some as young as
14, were thrown into battle with as little as one week of flight training.
The Japanese flight instructors did not share the Fleet admirals' optimism
about the revised training program. They referred to these new pilots as "the
black-edged cherry blossoms," which illustrates their belief that the pilots' life span
would be short. The skyrocketing increase in training casualties alone indicated
the accuracy of their assessment.5
These young, ill trained pilots fared worse in battle than in training. The
inexperience of the Japanese pilots greatly contributed to Japan's inability to
protect its navy against the growing air superiority of American Forces. The
Japanese defeat in the Philippines virtually eliminated Japan's ability to defend
naval forces. As the Allies rapidly drew closer to the sacred homeland, a
decimated Japanese Navy and Army Airforce lay in ruins. The Japanese pilot
corps was virtually stripped of experience. The new pilots lacked training to face
their thoroughly trained, battle hardened, and experienced enemy.6
As the war crept closer to Japan, the allies virtually destroyed the Japanese
Navy. This eliminated the unmet need for carrier qualified pilots as no carriers
existed. However, the need for well trained land based pilots remained. As with
the carrier pilots, the Japanese land-based pilots were also far less qualified than
their American counterparts. These new warriors were motivated and eager but
they lacked the skills and experience to perform the tactics necessary to
accomplish their mission.
The commander of Japan's First Air Fleet, Vice Admiral Takajiro Onishi,
was particularly concerned with Japan's deteriorating situation. As an experienced
carrier officer and ace from the China war, he recognized the serious
consequences of this flawed combat pilot replacement program. He knew that
effective airpower was critical to stop the advancing allied armada and the threat
the allies posed to the Japanese homeland.
III. The Kamikaze Tactic
A. Onishi's Plan. The poor quality of replacement pilots frustrated Onishi.
He believed a new Japanese weapon was needed immediately to stop the Allies.
Onishi's search for a new weapon was premised on the belief that Japan would
never surrender. He did find a weapon to compensate for the disparity between
Japanese and allied pilots. He believed the airplane should be used as an
extension of the warrior spirit. Onishi opined the ultimate weapon would be the
use of the plane as a human bullet. He only intended the human bullet to be
used as a stop gap measure. He believed that the employment of this weapon,
the Kamikaze tactic, would provide time for Japan to rebuild their forces.
Unfortunately, Onishi's new weapon subordinated the most basic of human
instincts, self preservation, to a predisposed death for the Emperor.
Onishi asserted that "The country's salvation depends on the appearance of
the soldiers of the gods. Nothing but the sacrifice of our young men's lives to
stab at the enemy carriers can annihilate the enemy fleet and put us back on the
road to victory."7 He also stated, "What greater glory can there be for a warrior
than to give his life for Emperor and country."8 Despite his positive rhetoric,
considerable resistance to formalizing suicide tactics existed in the military and
civilian communities. To circumvent the opposition, Onishi repeatedly attempted
to gain a personal audience with the Emperor to convince him of the need for
such desperate measures. Onisihi, however, never obtained a meeting with the
Emperor. Eventually, the Naval Chief of Staff gave Onishi approval to covertly
begin organizing special attack squadrons. This decision reflected the Bushido
spirit of readiness to die for the Emperor.
Onishi intended to use the Kamikaze tactic as a temporary measure only.
He planned to use the Kamikaze tactic to delay Western advancement to Japan so
that Japan could recover from its losses. Once Japan had rebuilt the military,
Onishi planned to abandon Kamikaze tactics.
Kamikaze acts were not unprecedented. Every air force in the world had
experienced isolated incidents where injured pilots in damaged aircraft hurled
themselves at enemy targets. These incidents showed the considerable damage
that suicide tactics could inflict. What distinguished Japan's new approach,
however, was the "voluntary" nature. Unlike their predecessors, these Japanese
pilots were neither wounded nor were their aircraft damaged. These were
organized, clearly suicidal, one-way missions.
The evolution of suicide tactics was slow and costly. Because of the
ongoing lack of cooperation between the army and navy, suicide tactics were
developed independently within both branches. Critical lessons learned during the
initial stages of employment were not exchanged between the army and navy.9
This lack of communication undoubtedly resulted in wasting many lives.
When the official sanctioning of suicide tactics was revealed, it was fraught
with great consternation throughout the Japanese public and military. While the
Japanese culture did not view suicide as a disgrace, some viewed ordering a
person to commit suicide for the Emperor as both inhumane and unnecessary.
B. The Propaganda. The deteriorating situation for Japan required
desperate measures. Japanese leaders knew America possessed vast resources but
believed she lacked the stomach for the horrors of kamikaze attacks. Some
Japanese believed the Kamikaze tactics would raise the stakes of the war and
break the American will to fight. What Japan lacked in resources and equipment,
it attempted to make up for in fighting spirit.
The initial success of suicide attacks exceeded even Admiral Onishi's high
expectations. Yet even these reported successes failed to gain the complete
Japanese approval of Kamikaze tactics. The Emperor's response to the initial
successes of suicide squads concerned Onishi. The Emperor was critical of the
commander responsible for the tactics.10 In a cablegram to the special attack
units, Onishi described the Emperor's response as follows:
His Majesty said "Was it necessary to go to this extreme? They certainly
did a magnificent job!" His Majesty's words suggest that His Majesty is
greatly concerned. We must redouble our efforts to relieve His Majesty of
this concern. I have pledged every effort toward that end.11
Admiral Onishi believed wholeheartedly in his plan but realized the
continuance of his suicide program required the Emperor's approval, even if
through silent consent. Two grave consequences resulted from his concern about
what the Emperor thought. First, squadron commanders forwarded reports which
grossly exaggerated enemy damages inflicted by Kamikazes to Imperial
Headquarters to gain the Emperor and people's approval. These false reports
garnered additional Japanese support by assuring the people that the deaths of
these pilots were not without strategic reward. The second related consequence
was the expansion of the Kamikaze program. The purpose shifted from a
temporary delay tactic to the use of Kamikazes as the central focus of an offensive
strategy. This expansion was due in great part to the inflated battle damage
reports. The Imperial Headquarters, which believed these reports, created the
propaganda "that the Kamikazes could win the war for them."12 Onishi did
nothing to correct this false perceptions.
C. The Kamikaze Pilots and Squadrons. The initial Kamikaze pilots were
some of Japan's finest. As the survivors of destroyed squadrons, these pilots
were the best and the luckiest. There was no "rotation" of Japanese combat
pilots. "A warrior went to war and fought until he was victorious or dead."13
Almost all of them had been shot down at least once, and none expected to
survive the war. They flew on the ragged edge, and some were ready to try
anything new. As this supply of experienced pilots was rapidly exhausted, they
were replaced by innocent, unknowing teenagers.
Many Kamikazes eagerly volunteered for their one-way mission under the
honor of the Bushido code. Some of these pilots volunteered, not in the hope
of achieving victory, but due to the despair of the situation. One of these
"volunteers" reasoned that "since I'm going to be killed anyway, I may as well
make it account for something."14
Initially, adequate numbers of volunteers existed to staff the Kamikaze
squadrons. However, when the mission of these squadrons expanded and public
support waned, there were not enough volunteers to fill the squadrons. As a
result, the pressure on potential candidates was tremendous. Leaders told young
pilots that Japan needed selfless warriors in these desperate times to put aside
their worldly interests and eagerly sacrifice themselves. In doing so, their spirits
would forever dwell in the Yasukuni Shrine for all of Japan to pay them
One Kamikaze squadron commander, Captain Yoshiro Tsubaki, explained
to his young pilots the gravity of Japan's situation and that it was now time to
make a great decision. He stated "Any of you unwilling to give your lives as
divine sons of the Great Nippon Empire will not be required to do so. Those
incapable of doing so will raise their hands--now."16 This was, undoubtedly, an
attempt to relieve the conscience of a commander who preferred to let volunteers
commit suicide rather than to sentence them to death. However, his patriotic
speech failed to rally the unanimous support for certain death that he had hoped
for. Infuriated, the Captain called forward the six pilots who had raised their
hands and "castigated the honest dissenters as cowards and then announced
shamelessly that he had lied to them all, that these six would be set up as horrible
examples to the others. These were to be the first to die."17
Captain Tsubaki's actions were not an anomaly. Throughout World War II
Japanese military leaders ordered thousands of men involuntarily to their death.
These "sentenced" pilots often had weeks or months before their mission to
contemplate the fate awaiting them. Many of these designated Kamikaze drank
heavy after learning of their assignment and numerous accounts exist of drunken
pilots being helped into their planes before taking off on their missions.18 As the
motivation and spirit began to diminish in the Kamikaze squadrons, several
methods were developed to ensure that pilots could not change their minds, once
airborne, and safely abandon their mission. For example, pilots who returned to
the base were ridiculed, labeled as cowards, and deemed unfit to serve the
Emperor. Even those pilots who returned to their base because they could not
locate their assigned target due to bad weather were subjected to ridicule.19 As a
result, many pilots unable to find their targets crashed hopelessly into the water.
Moreover, officials bolted some canopies shut to prevent the pilots from escaping
Japanese military commanders were frustrated with the hopelessness of
their struggle and frantically sacrificed every available life in suicide tactics. The
cold brutality and commitment of commanders not to survive the defeat of Japan
was not directed solely at the military. During the battles for Saipan and
Okinawa, in the face of the approaching allies, military commanders ordered
civilians to commit mass suicide by jumping off the cliffs. When some families
hesitated to jump, soldiers shot them. A brutal incident on Okinawa was
described by Saburo Inenaga, "As the fighting drew to an end, civilians hid with
the military in the caves at the southern tip of the island. When a frightened
child cried out, a soldier grabbed it from the mother's arms and strangled the
child to death in front of everyone."20
D. The Effectiveness of Kamikaze Tactics. As the Japanese had predicted,
the kamikaze attacks did adversely affect on American morale. The number of
mental disease cases in the U.S. Navy from 9.5 per thousand in 1941, to 14.2 per
thousand in 1944. In his report to the Secretary of the Navy, Fleet Admiral King
attributed this increase to "the increase in tempo of modern war with its grueling,
unfamiliar horrors."21 In contrast to Japan's hope, however, America's will to fight
grew stronger despite the horrors of Kamikaze tactics.
Although the Kamikaze pilots did not break the American will they
inflicted more damage than the pilots who engaged in conventional tactics. At the
battle for Okinawa for example, the U.S. Navy incurred more combat casualties
than the Army and Marine Corps did ashore because of these Kamikazes. The
destructive effect to the allied fleet ships was approximately eight times greater
for suicide tactics than conventional aircraft attack methods.22 This figure was a
testament to both the failures of the conventional pilots and the large volume
(over 3,800 at Okinawa) of Kamikaze pilots. The destructive impact of the
Kamikaze was costly as "No more than 1 to 3 percent of the suicide pilots actually
hit Allied warships."23
Americans quickly adopted measures to counter the Kamikazes through
improved detection and gunnery skills. Additionally, during this period deep
battles destroyed more than 50 percent of the Japanese aircraft on the ground.
The combination of allied counter measures and destruction of Japanese aircraft
rendered the Kamikaze tactic ineffective in stopping allied advancement.
The Kamikaze evolved from desperation and represented at the time,
Japan's greatest capability to inflict damage on the U.S. Navy. The overpowering
strength of allied forces had crippled Japan's military, rendering conventional
tactics useless. Japan put into practice the Bushido laws that followed logically
from generations of spiritual conditioning and developed the Kamikaze tactic.
Onishi viewed the Kamikaze attack for what it was, a desperate act. He
supported and developed these unprecedented squadrons as a temporary tactic to
slow the American advance and give the Japanese Army and Navy a chance to
recover from its defeats. Onishi had a clear hope that the employment of the
Kamikaze would ultimately save more lives than it would lose. He quickly
realized the ineffectiveness of the Kamikaze to achieve operational success but did
nothing to end the use of this tactic. Instead he allowed Tokyo to continue to
believe that Kamikazes could win the war for Japan, an idea he helped create
through inflated battle damage reports.
Onishi was not the only Kamikaze advocate. Many other military leaders
supported the continuation of Kamikaze and other suicide tactics and encouraged
their expansion in both the military and civilian population. These leaders
adopted the suicide slogan: "100 million die together." This death wish embodied
the dream that Japan could be saved through the total sacrifice. These suicide
tactics, divorced from any hope of victory, became a method of achieving glorious
death and saving face. Japanese military leaders were more than willing to
sacrifice every man, woman, and child in Japan.
Japan's inability to meet the industrial demands of the war against the U.S.
and its leadership's refusal to recognize its deficiencies led to Japan's defeat.
Although Japan's young soldiers and sailors were well trained and disciplined, its
military leadership refused to face the reality of Japan's impending doom. Japan's
solution, and the coward's way out. Unfortunately they imposed their choice on
both willing and unwilling Japanese boys and men. Japan's military leaders
senselessly wasted the lives of many of Japan's best brains and men (and boys).
Never had a nation needed its young men greater than Japan during its post-war
period of rebuilding. Military leadership held the fate of Japan in its hands and
chose to throw it away for "glorious death." The Kamikaze should not be
remembered solely for the courage of the individual pilots. The Kamikazes
should also be remembered for the disgraceful egos of the leaders that abused
their power and hopelessly sentenced these great warriors to death.
We must study history accurately and completely. Lest we repeat it, we
must study the failures as closely as we study the victories. As the 50th
anniversary of "V-J" day approaches, the news has been replete with attacks on
the United States' decision to drop the atomic bombs. These articles cite the
horrors the bombings inflicted and the 140,000 Japanese that perished. However,
little mention has been made of the Kamikaze. The Kamikaze represented the
failure of Japanese military leadership. This leadership was ready to willingly
offer every man, woman, and child in a senseless suicidal gesture.
1Bernard Millot, Divine Thunder: The Life and Death of the Kamikazes (New York:
McCall Publishing Co., 1970), 7.
3Hatsuho Naito, Thunder Gods: The Kamikaze Pilots Tell Their Story (New York:
Kodansha International, 1989), 4.
4Edwin P. Hoyt, The Kamikazes (New York: Arbor House Publishing Co., 1983),
7Edwin P. Hoyt, The Kamikazes (New York: Arbor House Publishing Co., 1983),
10Rikihei Inoguchi and Tadashi Nakajima. The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force
in WW II. (Wisconsin: George Banta Co., 1958), 64.
12Edwin P. Hoyt, The Kamikazes (New York: Arbor House Publishing Co., 1983),
13Edwin P. Hoyt, The Kamikazes (New York: Arbor House Publishing Co., 1983),
15Edwin P. Hoyt, The Kamikazes (New York: Arbor House Publishing Co., 1983),
16Edwin P. Hoyt, The Kamikazes (New York: Arbor House Publishing Co., 1983),
18Bernard Millot, Divine Thunder: The Life and Death of the Kamikazes (New York:
McCall Publishing Co., 1970), 197.
20Saburo Inenaga, WWII and The Japanese: 1931-1945. (New York: Random House,
21Richard O'Neil, Suicide Squads: WW II. (New York: Saint Martin Press, 1981),
22Richard Fine, Anti-Aircraft Action in the Philippines Campaign, 17: Oct 1944-Jan 13,
1945, AAORG Study No. 4, (LO) 376-45, Feb 3, 1945.
23Saburo Inenaga, WWII and The Japanese: 1931-1945. (New York: Random House,
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