Marine
Forward Air Controllers: The Vital Link
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Aviation
Marine Forward Air
Controllers:
The Vital Link
by
Edmund F. Flores
Major
United States Marine
Corps
Military Issues Paper submitted
to the Faculty of the
United States Marine Corps Command
and Staff College in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for graduation.
April 1995
The views expressed in this paper are
those of the author and
do not reflect the official
policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the
U.S Government
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Title: Marine Forward Air Controllers: The Vital Link
Author: Major E. F. Flores, United States Marine
Corps
Thesis: Because Marine Forward Air Controllers
(FACs) provide much more than just
terminal
control of air support, their contribution to the Marine air-ground team should
not be
minimized
by replacing them with nonaviators.
Background:
The Marine Corps is a unique organization with a legal requirement to maintain
an
amphibious
capability. To accomplish this, it relies on ground forces that are relatively
light and
highly
mobile. Lacking heavy ground-based firepower, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces
look to
their
task-organized aviation components to compensate for this shortcoming.
Providing the
valuable
link between its air and ground forces are FACs permanently assigned to ground
combat
elements.
FACs are Marine aviators responsible for coordinating and controlling assault
support
and
close air support (CAS) operations within their units. Additionally, FACs
assist the more
senior
air officers (AOs) within the unit in advising their commanders on the tactical
employment
and
safety considerations invoked in aviation operations. The Marine Corps invests
heavily in
training
its FACs; from initial officer training and naval flight school to completion
of tactical air
control
party school. This training and the lessons learned throughout early campaigns
and wars
continues
to improve the sophistication and effectiveness of CAS. Jeopardizing this
success are
occasional
proposals by Marine units to train nonaviators to control CAS. The potential
problem
that
accepting these initiatives brings to the Marine Corps is the conclusion that
the aviator
requirement
no longer exists below the battalion AO level. Replacing FACs with nonaviator
terminal
air controllers could weaken the strong air-ground team concept that the Marine
Corps
continues
to rely upon.
Recommendation: The Marine Corps must continue to resist the
temptation to replace its FACs
with
nonaviator controllers in order to fully capitalize on the tremendous
capabilities of its
aviation
combat element.
OUTLINE
Thesis:
Because Marine Forward Air Controllers (FACs) provide much more than just
terminal
control
of air support, their contribution to the Marine air-ground team should not be
minimized
by
replacing them with nonaviators.
I.
INTRODUCTION
A. Marine Corps fights as a MAGTF (CE,
GCE, ACE, & CSSE)
B. Marine Corps relies heavily on
aviation
II.
BACKGROUND
A. Why the Marine Corps is different
B. Amphibious focus
III.
EVOLUTION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
A. Early years: Banana Wars
B. Maturation period: World War II
IV.
EVOLUTION OF FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS
A. Definitions
B. What an aviator brings to the
battalion
V.
TRAINING
A. Common initial training and naval
flight school
B. Tactical air control party school
VI.
FAC MANNING POLICY
A. Policy and guidance
B. Tactical terminal air controller
VII. EXCEPTIONS
VIII.
CONCLUSION
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
OUTLINE
Page
1.
INTRODUCTION
1
2.
BACKGROUND 4
3.
EVOLUTION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 7
4.
EVOLUTION OF FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS 11
5.
TRAINING
15
6.
FAC MANNING POLICY 17
7.
EXCEPTIONS
21
8.
CONCLUSION
23
NOTES
25
BIBLIOGRAPHY
32
The
primary reason for the Marine Corps' having airplanes is their use in close
support
of ground units.
Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, USMC
as quoted by
Roger Willock in Unaccustomed to Fear (1968)
The
Marine aviator and the Marine foot soldier must be a team.
Brigadier General Louis E. Woods, USMC
History of
Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (1980)
The
consensus of all groups was that the best forward air controller is a trained
fighter
pilot.
Central
Treaty Organization conference conclusion
Air Support of
Ground Forces Conference Proceedings (1966)
1.
INTRODUCTION
Marines are a different breed--they look
different, their mission is different, their
requirements
are different. The way they organize and train for combat is also unique
among
the United States (US) armed services. Even their motto, Semper Fidelis (always
faithful),
denotes an organization committed to being ready, at a moments notice, to
defend
our nation's vital interests. Inherent within the Corps' motto is the
supposition that
they
can respond quickly and decisively with a minimum of preparation and notice.
This
quick
response capability enables them to participate as part of a larger naval
expeditionary
force, thus projecting "the power and influence of the nation across the
seas
to
foreign waters and shores in both peace and war."1
The Corps is different partly because of
the way it organizes itself for battle. In
almost
every instance, it shows up as a total force package--ready to fight upon
arrival
with
everything from ground and combat service support to aviation assets. That is
how
Marines
operate. Whether participating as smaller Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
Operations
Capable) (MEU(SOC)) or a larger Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF),
Marines
always include their aviation. It is part of what they bring to the table when
they
deploy; more importantly, it is their doctrine.2
Just as aviation is an integral part of
how the Marine Corps organizes to fight, the
forward
air controllers (FACs) that coordinate and control air support are just as
essential
in
accomplishing the aviation mission. They are the interface, the conduit, that
gives the
Marine
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander the ability to unleash the potential
firepower
and mobility of Marine aviation. Because Marines always plan to fight as a
MAGTF,
FACs, along with the more senior air officer (AO) in a battalion, are an
essential
addition
to the ground combat element's (GCE's) table of organization.
FACs are Marine aviators3 trained to
support the GCE maneuver elements by
coordinating
and controlling assault support and close air support (CAS) operations. As
terminal
controllers of CAS, they are responsible for controlling aircraft (both
fixed-wing
and
rotary-wing)4 in close proximity to friendly personnel. Similar to the AOs,
they are
also
responsible for advising the commander on the tactical employment and safety
considerations
involved in aviation operations. The Marine Corps places great emphasis
on
the safety of its personnel, particularly those locked in close battle with the
enemy.
Because
of this, FACs have the responsibility for the final clearance to drop ordnance
on
all
CAS missions. Not only must FACs ensure that they are adequately marking the
target,
they must also be absolutely sure that the CAS aircraft is attacking what is
marked.5
Fratricide is not acceptable.
Can nonaviators control CAS in the
Marine Corps? There is little doubt that
nonaviators
can learn the procedures to control CAS in most situations and achieve
adequate
results. The real question is, "should they be allowed to?" Since
World War
II,
when the Marines and other armed services first recognized the benefits of
having an
aviator
control CAS, initiatives to consider alternative sources for FACs has been the
source
of much debate.6 Although the advantages to having an aviator FAC is a
universally
accepted concept, Marine units continue to draft and forward contrary
proposals
on a fairy regular basis.7 Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) assigns FACs
to
GCEs (e.g., infantry battalions, tank battalions, etc.) on each coast as well
as to the four
air
and naval gunfire liaison companies
(ANGLICO). Of the 124 total FACs assigned,
roughly
20 (16%) receive orders to ANGLICO.8 Although a minority population, the
ANGLICO
units is where the majority of requests to augment the numbers of FACs
originates.
The main concern in granting approval for the smaller, specialized ANGLICO
units
to permanently augment their FAC positions with nonaviators is that the Marine
Corps
would feel the repercussions for years to come.
In justifying the need for a decision in
1990 on a program designed to augment
aviator
FACs with nonaviators, Aviation Manpower Support at HQMC stated:
This Program is in response to numerous
General Officer inquiries regarding the
training of members of the ground combat
elements as FACs...Historically all
FACs have been designated aviators,
however, in crisis situations personnel other
than FACs have coordinated air strikes.9
Other
reasons cited to justify proposals to replace the aviator requirement are
aviator
retention
problems, better ways to employ expensively trained pilots, and a potential
lack
of
aviator FACs with every element which might require air support.
With today's lethality in weaponry, the
margin for error is small and can result in
unacceptable
friendly casualties. However, Marine FACs are much more than just safety
observers.
Located within the operations sections of their maneuver units, they represent
the
aviation perspective (in addition to the AO) during the planning and execution
phases
of
day-to-day training and real world operations. Their invaluable insight into
the complex
world
of aviation combined with their basic understanding of Marine infantry tactics
make
them
force multipliers. In order for the Marine air-ground team to work effectively
and
to
reduce the risk of fratricide, the Marine Corps must continue to staff its FAC
positions
with
aviators and resist the occasional temptation to replace them with
nonaviators.10
2.
BACKGROUND
Compared to the other US military
services, the Marine Corps is not a large
organization.
It does, however, possess a large fleet of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft
upon
which it depends for firepower and mobility. Unlike the Army and Air Force, the
Marine
Corps fully integrates its air delivered fires with land action to maximize the
shock
effect
provided by today's modern weaponry.
What makes the Marine Corps different
from the other US military services is a
simple
matter of law. Following World War II, proponents of atomic weapons felt
confident
that the Marines and their amphibious warfare tactics were no longer necessary
for
the nation's defense.11 Additionally, because of the enormous wartime growth
seen by
all
services, the Army's leadership wanted to unify the armed services; the Navy
and
Marine
Corps did not.12 After the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alexander
A.
Vandegrift, convinced both General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Army's Chief of
Staff,
and
President Harry S. Truman that the Marines had no ambition of becoming a second
land
army, the National Security Act (NSA) became law in 1947.13 The new law not
only
protected
the Corps from extinction, it also reaffirmed the Marine Corps' relationship
with
the
Navy and formally recognized its unique amphibious function.14
The emotional fight to protect the
Marine Corps and define its limits culminated in
Public
Law (PL) 416 of the 82nd Congress on 28 June 1952.15 The new law, amending
the
NSA of 1947, guaranteed that the Marine Corps would consist of:
...not less than three combat divisions,
three air wings, and such other land combat,
aviation,
and other services as may be organic therein...and [to] provide fleet
marine forces of combined aims, together
with supporting air components, for
service with the fleet in the seizure
and defense of advanced naval bases and for the
conduct of such land operations as may
be essential to the prosecution of a naval
campaign....In addition, the Marine
Corps...shall perform such other duties as the
President may direct.16
The
law recognized two main points. First, the United States must maintain a viable
and
potent
force-in-readiness. Second, maintaining and improving the amphibious landing
techniques
was of paramount importance. Both points addressed the concerns of those
interested
in the nation's defense following the country's ill-prepared entry into the
Korean
War,
a conflict raging at the time of PL 416's enactment.
With the amphibious focus clearly its
primary role, the Marine Corps thus had the
responsibility
to "develop in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases
of
amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, techniques, and equipment
used by
landing
forces."17 Making this requirement even more critical today is the
steadily
shrinking
number of overseas bases to which America has access.18 This increases the
need
to keep and maintain sea-based forces. When our national interests are at
stake, a
forcible
entry option must always be available.
In developing amphibious doctrine, the
force structure of the Marines must be such
that
"strategic and tactical mobility is preserved by lightly equipped Marine
forces which
are
manpower intensive in comparison with other conventional forces."19 To
meet this
need,
the Marine Corps remains committed to traveling light while still maintaining
the
necessary
firepower to meet its requirements. How the Marines organize to fight is
through
the MAGTF concept. MAGTFs are combined armed forces composed of a
command
element (CE), a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element
(ACE),
and a combat service support element (CSSE). Led by a single commander,
MAGTFs
remain flexible in size to be responsive to accomplish specific missions.
Although the MAGTF relies greatly on the
contributions of all of its individual
elements,
it is heavily dependent on the ACE for air support. Doctrinally, Marine
aviation
supports
the MAGTF by accomplishing six functions: antiair warfare, offensive air
support,
assault support, air reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and command and
control.
To best understand how the ACE integrates within the MAGTF, it is helpful to
view
its contributions within the context of firepower, mobility, and
aviation-unique
support:
Firepower. Lacking heavy, ground-based
firepower in exchange for increased
transportability, the MAGTF looks to the
ACE to make up for this deficit. The
inherent flexibility and range of
aviation extends its reach and improves its
responsiveness over great distances.
Mobility. Through its sea- and
land-based assets, the ACE provides the means to
quickly transport a ground force (GCE or
CSSE) to practically any position on the
battlefield. This capability allows the
MAGTF commander the opportunity to
mass forces quickly and also provides
for the rapid buildup of combat power
ashore during amphibious operations.
Aviation-Unique Support. The airborne
electronic warfare and command &
control capability that the ACE provides
to the MAGTF is invaluable. Through
the specialized products the ACE
provides, the MAGTF is in a better position to
carry out its assigned missions.20
The
Marine Corps air-ground team is a balanced force of air and ground weapons
under
the
command of a single Marine. During hearings conducted on CAS by a special
Senate
Armed
Services subcommittee in the autumn of 1971, then deputy chief of staff(DCIS)
for
Marine aviation, Major General Homer S. Hill, stated, "The task of
projecting forces
from
the sea toward hostile shores requires highly mobile, self-sufficient forces of
combined
arms capable of delivering a high level of firepower. Because of the tactical
flexibility
and combat effectiveness of aviation weapons systems, heavy reliance in
amphibious
operations is placed in CAS."21
The heavy reliance on CAS during
amphibious operations to which Major General
Hill
referred was born of necessity. When no other fire support means are available,
the
ACE
must be ready.22 In order to provide this capability, the Marine Corps invests
heavily
in its potent aviation arsenal. With so
much at stake, it makes little sense to
potentially
jeopardize the quality of air support by compromising on the requirements
necessary
to become a FAC. Marine FACs must wear wings in order to fully capitalize
on
the tremendous capabilities that aviation provides.
3.
EVOLUTION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
Relying heavily on aviation to provide
the bulk of its firepower, the Marine Corps
continues
to build on the tradition and lessons learned on how to conduct effective CAS.
Depending
upon the individual's background and experiences, CAS can take on many
descriptions.
The recognized definition for all US and allied forces, as listed in the Joint
Chiefs
of Staff Publication 1 (JCS Pub 1) Department of Defense [(DOD)] Dictionary of
Military
and Associated Terms, is: "Air action against hostile targets which are in
close
proximity
to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission
with
the
fire and movement of those forces."23 Simply stated, CAS is placing air
delivered
ordinance
where and when the Marines on the ground need it.
To Marines on the ground, the most
important ingredients of CAS are getting it
quickly
and accurately onto target. To someone pinned down by fire, minutes seem like
an
eternity. Delay scan mean the difference between life and death. Failure to
execute any
portion
of a CAS mission in a timely and correct manner can result in a number of
unwanted
situations, the least of which is a loss of momentum while the worst can be
unacceptable
losses inflicted on friendly personnel. Possesssing the tools to perform CAS
is
one thing, successfully executing the procedures is another matter. As the former
Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps and Commanding General of the Marine
forces
during Operation Desert Storm, Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, stated,
"It
is
one thing to possess modern weapons and quite another to successfully employ
them
with
fully synergistic effect in concert with other military capabilities."24
One of the
MAGTF
commander's biggest challenges is to ensure the blending of his elements into a