The Effects Of Restrictive Rules Of Engagement On The Rolling Thunder
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
Title: The Effects of Restrictive ROEs on the Rolling Thunder Air Campaign
Author: Major Matthew J. Dorschel, United States Air Force
Thesis: The ROEs that were in place for the Rolling Thunder air campaign were
overly restrictive and made the conduct of the air campaign inefficient and hampered its
Background: The air war over North Vietnam has been at the center of many heated
debates on the proper application of air power and how it should be used and controlled.
Rolling Thunder provides an excellent example of how difficult the task of planning and
executing a successful air campaign is. Restrictive rules of engagement were put in place
for Rolling Thunder chiefly due to the fear of escalation and direct involvement of the
Soviet Union or China in the war. The goals of the air campaign were limited and
President Johnson hoped to achieve results through tightly controlled, applied pressure on
the N. Vietnamese government. The controls however, violated accepted air doctrine and
tied the hands of the military commanders that were tasked to meet the arduous objectives
of the campaign. Rolling Thunder barely achieved any of the desired results -- restrictive
rules of engagement undoubtedly played a major part in the failure of U.S air power in this
singular black mark on the record of American military aviation.
Recommendation: US leaders must evaluate national objectives in future wars and decide
if they can be met with military means. Then, rules of engagement must allow those tasked
to accomplish the mission, to do so in a way consistent with proven doctrine and strategy.
As Desert Storm illustrated, airpower can achieve decisive results without restrictive rules
United States air commanders possessed superior numbers of aircraft and a more
capable air force than did North Vietnamese commanders during the air war in Southeast
Asia. Then why did they experience such poor results? Specifically, why was the famous
Rolling Thunder air campaign unable to achieve decisive results that might have positively
influenced the outcome of the war in Vietnam? The overly restrictive rules of engagement
(ROE), which put limits on where aircraft could fly, which targets they could attack, and
how they may attack those targets, were a significant reason that American air
commanders were unable to execute a successful campaign in Southeast Asia.
The restrictive ROEs in Vietnam were put in place by President Johnson to ensure the
war did not escalate (Johnson feared Chinese and Soviet intervention). The President
hoped to achieve results by using an "air pressure campaign" to coerce the North
Vietnamese to discontinue supporting the Vietcong (VC). These restrictions violated Air
Force doctrine and tied the hands of air commanders that were tasked with the execution
of the air war in Southeast Asia.
Many airmen who flew during the Vietnam War believe that victory would have been
possible for the United States had there been less restrictive ROEs. That assertion may no
be entirely true; certainly there are multiple causes for the failures of U.S. air power in the
Vietnam conflict; however, it is apparent that overly restrictive ROEs will have a dramatic
negative affect on the outcome of any air campaign.
In all likelihood, America's involvement in future conflicts will be "limited" and
political concerns will be similar to those that were important during the Vietnam War. As
military leaders we must do what we can to ensure that ROEs will enable us to accomplish
favorable results, not keep us from achieving our objectives. The lessons from Vietnam
and specifically from the Rolling Thunder campaign have shaped Air Force doctrine and
continue to influence the way airmen plan and execute an air campaign.
U.S. involvement in Vietnam began as far back as 1954, but the "official" position until
late 1963 was that no combat missions were to be conducted. It was not until the Gulf of
Tonkin incident in August of 1964 that U.S. air strikes became more aggressive: "On 4
August, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked two U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of
Tonkin. President Johnson ordered air attacks on the North Vietnamese boat bases and
their supporting fuel storage facilities in reprisal."1 A substantial deployment of U.S.
aircraft began and further attacks on U.S. facilities led to stronger action than retaliatory
In the spring of 1965 the inability of the South Vietnamese military to thwart the
Vietcong and what appeared to be a collapse of their government led American leaders to
the determination that a bombing campaign was needed. The campaign was to achieve the
following objectives: reduce the flow of men and material from North Vietnam to South
Vietnam, send a clear message to the North Vietnamese leaders that continued action
would exact a high price, and raise the morale of the South Vietnamese.2
From March of 1965 to November of 1968, a limited air campaign aimed at these
objectives was run -- it was called Rolling Thunder. This strategic air interdiction
campaign was conducted with rules of engagement that covered all aspects of the
campaign, from planning to execution. The ROEs were so restrictive that it was all but
impossible to achieve the desired results; they forced commanders and planners to go
against the central principles of Air Force bombing doctrine.
The ROEs in place for the air campaign over North Vietnam included restrictions on
where aircraft could fly, what conditions aircraft could attack enemy forces (when they
were considered hostile), and what degree of force could be used both in self-defense and
attack.3 Another part of the ROEs restricted pilots from attacking certain types of targets
that were off limits; some of these were: enemy airfields, SAM sites, power plants, naval
craft in some areas, a 30 mile area around Hanoi, and a 10 mile area around Haiphong.4
The inability to attack certain targets made it difficult to stop the flow of men and material
into South Vietnam, and the requirements to spare North Vietnamese civilians limited the
use of certain types of munitions, such as B-52s and napalm. Until early 1967, in many
instances U.S. pilots were not allowed to engage enemy fighters unless they themselves
had been attacked first.
According to the 1964 Air Force Manual I-I, Aerospace Doctrine, United States Air
Force Basic Doctrine, the goal of strategic interdiction was to reduce enemy logistical
support to levels below that necessary to sustain combat operations and to use the
principles of surprise and mass to attack those targets vital to enemy war-fighting
capability. By not following these proven principles of war, the air commanders were
unable to wage an effective air campaign and Rolling Thunder lacked the impact that was
necessary for achieving the stated political and military objectives.
Rolling Thunder ROE: -- Violation of Doctrine
Restrictive ROEs not only made it difficult to damage the most important targets in
North Vietnam, they had an equally negative affect on the commanders and aircrews that
were tasked to plan and fight with the tight restrictions. Civilian leaders believed that the
restrictions were necessary to keep the war limited and achieve the objectives of reducing
the supply flow and sending a clear message to North Vietnam leaders; they imposed the
restrictions hoping that the threat of future destruction would force North Vietnam to the
negotiation table.5 This philosophy was not embraced by military planners and aircrews
who felt it was in violation of their training and contrary to Air Force doctrine.
U.S. Military planners and airmen realized that the limited style of warfare they were
fighting was not producing the needed results. Air commanders proposed a set of tasks
that was designed to achieve decisive results and reduce the war-making capability of
North Vietnam. They wanted to disrupt external assistance being provided to North
Vietnam and impede the flow of supplies into the south, and directly attack the resources,
facilities, and operations in North Vietnam which were contributing the most to the
enemy's war effort.6 However, civilian leaders were not convinced and the ROEs that
protected these targets were kept while weak blows to the North Vietnamese periphery
continued. The fear inside the beltway was that a more efficient air campaign would risk
unacceptable civilian losses and collateral damage.
The disagreement between the military and civilian leaders continued throughout the
Vietnam War, partly due to a mistrust that civilian leaders had for military leaders.
The president and his advisors often disregarded the advice of military experts, believing
that: "Generals know only two words: spend and bomb."7 The often referred to Tuesday
lunches at the White House (where President Johnson did much of the planning and
targeting for the air campaign) did not even regularly include the chairman of the JCS until
Due to the lack of military expertise, the targeting and planning effort was weak and
very ineffective. There was never a lack of significant targets in North Vietnam, but
aircrews were forced to fly against seemingly insignificant targets and even re-attack
destroyed targets, while SAM sites and MiG airfields were off limits until 1967.9 The JCS
target list was virtually ignored and targets remained protected for almost all of the
Rolling Thunder campaign. Two of the most significant target areas on the list were
Hanoi and Haiphong; targets in these areas could only be attacked if approved by LBJ's
Tuesday lunch group. Often, these targets were approved for short periods or during
periods of poor weather, which made it difficult (if not impossible) to achieve any desired
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara testified before Congress in 1967, in response
to the targeting questions and stated that the targets influencing operations in South
Vietnam were the roads and material moving over these roads. McNamara's testimony
was an attempt to explain U.S. policy; he insisted that other North Vietnam targets were
not fundamental to the operations in South Vietnam.10 Many military commanders
disagreed with this assessment to no avail, "the President and the Secretary of Defense
continued to make the final decisions on what targets were authorized, the size and
frequency of sorties, and in many instances even the tactics used by the American
Another restriction that tied the hands of American military commanders was the ROE
that restricted the use of the B-52 in North Vietnam. This weapon had great range,
armament capacity, and it struck fear into the enemy like no other weapon; it was
extremely effective in South Vietnam. The B-52 was prohibited from extensive use in
Rolling Thunder because civilian authorities believed it would have signaled a higher level
of escalation, and that it might cause Chinese or Soviet intervention.12 This prohibitive
measure to maintain the limited objectives of the war denied air commander from using the
principal of mass, and forced them to fly multiple fighter sorties where one B-52 would
have accomplished the job more effectively.
The crews that flew the aircraft found the ROEs not only overly restrictive but
extremely complicated, confusing, and difficult to learn and remember. The list of
restrictions and limitations was so long and changed so often that they were difficult to
comprehend on the ground, much less remember and keep straight while in a fast moving
combat situation.13 Crews depended on daily study and on radar controllers to keep them
from violations of the complex ROEs, and from flying where they might not be able to
defend even when fired on.
Several incidents of ROE violations led to court-martial charges; one that led to
charges against the commander and the aircrew was the strafing of the Soviet ship
Turkestan in 1967 near Haiphong.14 Fear of ROE violations and the consequences of
them led to a dilemma; many aircrews felt as if they could not accomplish their mission
without either getting killed by the enemy or brought up on court-martial charges by their
American air losses over North Vietnam rose continuously with over 500 aircraft lost
during 1966 and 1967. Crews began to see that it was highly unlikely they would survive
a 100-mission tour in Southeast Asia.16 Many of these losses resulted from restrictions
against attacking SAM sites or other significant targets in or around populated areas. The
ROE restrictions allowed the North Vietnamese to continuously build up their air defense
systems in the most critical areas of the region (with Hanoi being the most significant).
The combination of restrictive ROEs and the heavy enemy air defenses made the job of air
commanders and each aircrew member more difficult than it should have been.
North Vietnam Exploits U.S. ROE:
The restrictive ROEs in North Vietnam aided the enemy by providing sanctuaries and
restricted areas where they had the space and time to build up their air defenses to engage
U.S. aircraft. The piecemeal approach to attacks in North Vietnam did not allow
concentrated bombing and actually strengthened the will of the North Vietnamese as
opposed to weakening it. American leaders made it clear in public statements that we had
no intention of destroying the government of North Vietnam; the leaders in North
Vietnam saw this as an opportunity to exploit an American weakness.17
The most significant restricted areas that provided sanctuary were the 30 mile area
around Hanoi, the 10 mile area around Haiphong, and a 25 to 30 mile "buffer zone" along
the Chinese border. These sanctuaries prevented attacks against key targets in the north
without prior approval from Washington. The North Vietnamese took advantage of this
by offsetting the damage done by our aircraft in non-protected areas. Because Haiphong
Harbor was a safe port, they were able to ship up to 85% of their war goods by sea and
download them with impunity 24 hours a day at that location.18 These safe havens
allowed the enemy to stockpile war materials until they could be moved to the south. The
"buffer zone" along the Chinese border was thousands of square miles where the North
Vietnamese could store and transport materials with no fear of U.S. attack. This made
any attempts at reducing the ability of the enemy to sustain their combat operations almost
The enemy also took advantage of the restrictions in areas where attacks might result
in civilian casualties. North Vietnamese put air defense systems and war materials in or
near populated areas to protect them. Because of improvements in air defense systems,
the enemy was able to effectively identify/target U.S. aircraft from these sanctuaries. Even
when U.S. intelligence showed these areas to be crowded with supplies (and a legitimate
target according to the laws of war), ROEs prevented our aircraft from hitting them.19
When restrictions were lifted in some areas (1967) any collateral damage was used by
the enemy as a propaganda tool to charge the U.S. with indiscriminate bombing of
innocent people. Exaggerated reports of collateral damage were effective in destroying
the already decaying support for U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
Because U.S. airmen were required to positively identify targets, they were normally
restricted to fly during the day and in periods of good weather. When the enemy realized
this they took advantage by concentrating forces and materials in protected areas during
the day, and moving at night or during periods of poor weather. They were able to do this
in part because of the relatively short distances between prohibited areas; large quantities
of rolling stock could be moved the short distances at night or in periods of lousy weather.
Possibly the greatest advantage that restrictive ROEs gave the enemy was time. The
ability of the enemy to build up their air defenses was due in large part to the freedom of
movement they enjoyed in the havens protected by ROEs. The air defense system in
North Vietnam was almost non-existent in 1965, but by the end of 1967 it became one of
the most complete and sophisticated systems in the world. SAM sites increased from 15
in 1965 to 270 by 1968; missiles fired from these sites increase from 200 in 1965 to almost
3,500 in 1967. The number of AAA guns grew from 700 in 1965 to over 7,400 in spring
The predictable nature of the American offensive also gave a distinct advantage to the
enemy in Southeast Asia; because of restrictions on where aircraft could fly -- the North
Vietnamese knew our likely routes and concentrated their defenses is these areas. The
redundancy of the attacks allowed the enemy to predict with measured success what the
most likely targets were and when they would be hit.
The Bottom Line: Military Objectives
The initial objectives of Rolling Thunder were to stop the flow of men and material
into South Vietnam, send a clear signal to the North Vietnamese leaders that continued
support of the Vietcong would exact a high price, and build up the morale of the South
Vietnamese. Although Rolling Thunder was effective in raising the morale of the South
Vietnamese, it only slowed the flow of men and materials into South Vietnam, and the
campaign had no noticeable effect on the support for the Vietcong from Hanoi.21
The objective of stopping the flow of men and material into the south would have been
problematic regardless of restrictive ROEs. The enemy by nature could operate on very
limited supplies and was able to move these supplies in small amounts over difficult
terrain. The only way to completely halt the flow would have been total destruction of the
enemy regime or occupation of its territory. Restrictive ROEs did limit the amount of
bombing in North Vietnam, however, this alone was not enough to keep Rolling Thunder
from achieving the goal of interdicting their supply lines. The flow of men and supplies
continued to increase throughout the campaign: "In 1965 approximately 12,000 North
Vietnamese soldiers had infiltrated South Vietnam, but by 1968 over 300,000 North
Vietnamese troops had entered South Vietnam."22
Even with these problems Rolling Thunder was able to destroy a fair amount of the
North Vietnamese infrastructure; according to reports the bombing destroyed 77 percent
of all ammo depots, 65 percent of fuel storage facilities, 59 percent of all power plants, 55
percent of major bridges, and 39 percent of railroad yards.23 However, this success was
not enough to keep North Vietnam from being able to withstand a long war against the
United States (both economically and politically).24
A continuous flow of materials and a large, unoccupied labor force allowed the North
Vietnamese to withstand much of the destruction. Russia and China were able to supply
the enemy along routes that were protected by ROEs and to store and disperse the
supplies from ROE protected sanctuaries. Food and POL imports from outside sources
kept the North Vietnamese well supplied, and they were able to continue the guerrilla style
fight that was so effective.25 The large North Vietnamese labor force also did much to
offset the destruction that Rolling Thunder accomplished. This force (over 300,000) of
laborers was able to quickly repair the damage to major targets and almost nullify bombing
efforts. An example of the effectiveness of this labor force and their determination was
revealed in a 1965 Peking radio broadcast that reported how after U.S. aircraft hit a
certain bridge, that night more than 3,000 people with lamps and tools repaired it and it
was back in service immediately.26
If bombing restrictions had been lifted, it may have been easier for air commanders and
crews to accomplish their mission, but the guerrilla warfare style of fighting and the
agrarian nature of the enemy society would have made it difficult to accomplish more with
a synergistic air campaign. American air power was geared towards fighting an
industrialized country that relied on that industry day-to-day, but the North Vietnamese
had almost no industry and the transportation system was limited. Repair of damaged
LOCs, use of secondary roads and trails, use of ox and horse carts, and when necessary
even use of bicycles are all evidence of the extreme measures that the enemy was willing
to take to ensure supplies continued to move south.27
Some would also argue that due to the nature of guerrilla warfare, a more efficient
interdiction campaign would have done no more than require the North to take longer in
achieving their objectives. Determination, patience, and a will to continue are hallmarks of
the guerrilla warfighter, and those were characteristics that the American war machine
could not attack. The determination of the North Vietnamese was evident throughout
Rolling Thunder, willingly accepting great losses of trucks, rail cars and logistical
watercraft to mention a few. The enemy also continued to buildup his air defense systems
to offset the bombing campaign. When U.S. bombing increased the North Vietnamese
countermeasures increased; the enemy met each challenge and responded by showing
By the end of 1967, Rolling Thunder had failed to achieve two out of three of the
stated goals of the campaign; it hadn't broken the will of the North Vietnamese
government or stopped the flow of material to the south. A 1967 Senate Armed Services
report on the bombing campaign reached the following conclusions:
...the achievement of campaign objectives, to a greater extent, can
not be attributed to inability or impotence of air power. It attests, rather,
to the fragmentation of US air might by overly restrictive controls,
limitations, and doctrine of gradualism placed on US aviation forces which
prevented them from waging the air campaign in the manner and according
to the time table which was best calculated to achieve maximum results.28
This committee (along with the military commanders) recommended fewer controls
and continued bombing in North Vietnam to achieve better results. In retrospect it seems
that fewer ROEs were a big part of the problem; the strong will of the North Vietnamese
people along with the guerrilla nature of the war were also factors in the equation that led
to the lack of impact that Rolling Thunder had in Vietnam.
The restrictive ROEs in North Vietnam kept the United States from going beyond the
limited goals that our civilian leaders decided were necessary. This made the job of air
commanders and crews that flew in North Vietnam difficult at best. Even the limited goals
that were stated for the Rolling Thunder air campaign from 1965 to 1968 were virtually
impossible to achieve. The ROEs were in violation of accepted and published U.S. Air
Force doctrine and long standing principles of war. Because of limitations, U.S. airpower
was applied in a piecemeal fashion and never had the effect that air commanders believed
The ROEs were an effective way for President Johnson and his secretary of defense to
control the level of violence, and prevent Chinese or Soviet intervention. In Vietnam
restrictions made it difficult to match military strategy with published doctrine; this factor
alone may not be responsible for the lack of impact that the bombing campaign in North
Vietnam had, but it was a significant factor. Civilian control of the military is extremely
important, our elected officials have to answer to the American people; but the expertise
of military advisors should be considered when trying to achieve military goals.
The effect that ROEs had on commanders and aircrews was profound. Commanders
were tasked with stopping the flow of supplies into the south, but safe zones provided
sanctuary for the enemy, and many vital targets were within these protected areas. Crews
were forced to fly in predictable ways, fly the same routes over and over, and operate in
ways that went against their training and experience. The continuous changes to the rules
and the complexity of them made learning and remembering them a difficult task and the
predictable nature of the campaign and the protected areas in North Vietnam caused heavy
American losses. It was all but impossible to inflict the kind of damage necessary to
achieve the stated goals of the offensive.
The success that Rolling Thunder did achieve was offset by the advantage that the
enemy had due to the limitations imposed by Washington on the air campaign. War
supplies continued to move into North and South Vietnam through protected areas, and
ROEs allowed them to stockpile and disperse them without harassment from American
aircraft. The restrictions also gave the enemy time to develop an effective air defense
system which knocked out a large number of American aircraft.
The lessons of Vietnam need to be remembered and applied to future conflicts that the
United States may be involved in. Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union a "new
world order" and a cloudy world political picture make it more likely that we must be
prepared for low intensity conflicts with limited aims. Air Force doctrine has not changed
that much since the 1960s; we still advocate intensive bombing to take out key centers of
gravity and destruction of the enemy capability to make war (while limiting collateral
damage). War as a political objective is no more than measured violence; uncertainty
about the correct amount of violence and how to control it will be key features of future
During Desert Storm, General Homer (the joint forces air component commander)
insisted on centralized control and decentralized execution for the air campaign. The air
operations in the Gulf were a good example of air commanders being able to match
published doctrine with the military strategy. ROEs were appropriate during the war in
the Gulf and allowed us to achieve our objectives while minimizing civilian casualties and
securing domestic and international support.
Our success in Desert Storm illustrates that we can plan and execute an effective air
campaign without ROEs that violate doctrine or accepted principles of war. Both military
and civilian leaders need to evaluate national objectives in future wars and decide if they
can be met with military means. The limits that may be placed on the military could
prohibit success within those restrictions. Once this evaluation is accomplished and we
match doctrine and strategy, airpower will accomplish what it sets out to.
1 Tifford, Earl H., SETUP: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
University Press, June, 1991), p 81.
2 Winston, Donald D., Bomb Restriction Criticism Has Little Effect on Supplemental, Aviation Week &
Space Technology, 20 February 1967, p 18.
3 Drake, Ricky J., The Rules of Defeat: The Impact of Aerial Rules of Engagement on USAF
Operations in North Vietnam. 1965-1968. Air University Press, 1993, p 4.
4 Ibid. p4.
5 Department of Defense Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971-1972).
6 Drake, Ricky J., The Rules of Defeat: The Impact of Aerial Rules of Engagement on USAF
Operations in North Vietnam, 1965-1968. Air University Press, 1993. p 20.
7 Gelb Leslie H., & Richard K. Betts., The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. (Washington D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1979) p 137.
8 Broughton, Jacksel M., Going Downtown: The War against Hanoi and Washington. (New York:
Pocket Books. 1990). p 90.
9 Broughton, Jacksel M., Thud Ridge. (New York: Bantam Books, 1985), p 6.
10 McNamara, Robert S., Text of Hearings before Armed Services Committee on Air War Against N.
Vietnam, Part 4. (90th congress, 1st session, 25 August 1967), p 278.
11 Momyer, William W., Airpower in Three Wars. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force.
1978). p 19.
12 Schlight John., The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965 - 1968. (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988). p 49.
13 Broughton, Jacksel M., Going Downtown: The War against Hanoi and Washington. (New York:
Pocket Books, 1990), p 202.
14 Broughton. Jacksel M., Thud Ridge. (New York: Bantam Books, 1985), p 261.
15 Basil, G.I., Pak Six: (Associated Creative Writers, 1982). p 93-94.
16 Broughton, Jacksel M., Going Downtown: The War against Hanoi and Washington. (New York:
Pocket Books, 1990),p 179.
17 Parks, W. Hays, Rolling Thunder and the Law of War. (Air University Review, Jan-Feb, 1982), p 3.
18 Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant., Report on the War in Vietnam. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
19 Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant., Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect. (San Rafael, CA: Presidio
Press, 1968), p 118-119.
20 Lewy, Gunter., America in Vietnam. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) p 405.
21 Broughton, Jacksel M., Thud Ridge. (New York: Bantam Books. 1985), p xii.
22 Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant, Strategy for Defeat Vietnam in Retrospect. (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press,
23 Lewy, Gunter, America in Vietnam. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1978). p 389-390.
24 Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Project Checo Report: Rolling Thunder, July 1965 - December
1966 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p 133.
23 Clodfelter, Mark., The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. (New York:
Free Press, 1989) p 135.
26 Ibid., p 202.
27 Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Project Checo Report: Rolling Thunder, July 1965 - December
1966 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967). p 127.
28 Broughton, Jacksel M., Going Downtown: The War against Hanoi and Washington. (New York:
Pocket Books, 1990), p 188.
29 Paret Peter., Innovation and Reform in Warfare. The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military
History. 1957-1987. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988) p 407.
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Schlight, John. The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive. 1965 - 1968.
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Presidio Press, 1978.
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University Press, June 1991.
"Vietnam Rules of Engagement Declassified." In Congressional Record. 99th Cong., 1st sess., 6
March 1985, vol. 131, no. 26, S2632-2641.
Winston, Donald C. "Bomb Restriction Criticism Has Little Effect on Supplemental." Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 20 February 1967.
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