Military

Urban Offensive Air Support:  Is The United States Military

Prepared And Equipped?

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues

 

 

 

 

                               TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

Executive Summary                                                             i

 

Illustrations and Tables                                                      ii

 

 

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO URBAN OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT                        1

 

 

 

CHAPTER 2: MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN (MOUT)                        6

 

       The Urban Terrain                                                      7

       The Nature of Urban Combat                                             13

       Summary                                                                18

 

 

CHAPTER 3: THE LAW OF WAR AND PUBLIC OPINION                                  19

 

       Jus ad Bellum                                                          20

       Jus in Bello                                                           20

       Discrimination                                                         20

       Proportionality                                                        24

       The Media and Public Opinion                                           24

       Summary                                                                26

 

 

CHAPTER 4: URBAN OAS: EVOLUTION AND CASE STUDIES                              27

 

       World War I                                                            28

       Post-World War I                                                       28

       World War II                                                           29

       Korea                                                                  32

       Vietnam                                                                33

 

       1914 to 1968 Summary                                                   34

       Case Study:  Peace for Galilee                                         36

       Case Study:  Operation Desert Storm                                    43

       Case Study:  Operation Restore Hope                                    51

       Case Study:  The Russian Invasion of Grozny                            59

       Summary                                                                66

 

CHAPTER 5: REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE URBAN OAS                               67

 

       Air Superiority                                                        68

       Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)                               68

       Effective Targeting                                                    69

       Responsive Command, Control, and Communications                        77

       Effective Weapons                                                      80

       Capable Platforms and Sensors                                          92

       Cooperative Weather                                                    93

       Proficient and Trained Participants                                    94

       Summary                                                                96

 

 

 

CONCLUSION                                                                    97

 

NOTES                                                                        101

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                 113

 

ENCLOSURES

 

       Enclosure 1: Overhead Imagery of Mogadishu                            127

       Enclosure 2: City Maps of Mogadishu (1:12,500 scale)                  128

                    2A: Dense, Random Development                            129

                    2B: Close, Orderly Development                           130

                    2C: High-Rise Development                                131

                    2D: Industrial and Transportation Area                   132

 

                               EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Title: Urban Offensive Air Support: Is the United States Military Prepared and Equipped?

 

Author:  Major Jon M. Davis USMC

 

Thesis:  Will doctrine, training, and equipment shortfalls force fixture joint force

commanders to deny offensive air support (OAS) to their ground units in urban areas?

 

Background:  While all trends point to the fact that the fixture military battlefield will be

urban, the United States is woefully ill-prepared to conduct it. According to current

doctrine, the United States military will attempt to avoid urban areas in the conduct of a land

campaign. This doctrine has been steadfast over the last 40 years, and has resulted in a

military machine that lacks the training, and equipment to conduct urban warfare effectively.

Unfortunately, our opponents have identified this deficiency and have recently exploited it

(Mogadishu) for their tactical and strategic advantage. Traditionally, OAS has been a key

component of our ground-combat fire-support. Our current weapons work very well in rural

environments but have limited applicability in urban environments. This deficiency

represents our critical vulnerability in conducting urban ground combat operations.

       The keys to success in conducting urban OAS are effective weapons and delivery

platforms, integrated fixed and rotary-wing attack platforms, media education, and training.

The OAS platforms must have accurate navigation and a self-designation capability for

precision-guided munitions. The weapons for urban OAS must allow for accurate target

discrimination and low collateral-damage. Our current inventory is deficient in both fixed

and rotary-wing capabilities. The attack helicopter's shaped-charge warheads (TOW and

Hellfire) have a poor effect on targets in an urban environment. Our fixed-wing ordnance

has problems with discrimination and collateral damage. Currently the only ordnance

allowed by the rules of engagement (ROE) in urban close air support (CAS) scenarios are

weapons weighing 500 pounds or less. A potential problem for fixture efforts lies in the fact

that our procurement prods for fixture tactical fixed-wing precision munitions have a

minimum weight of 1,000 pounds. Both fixed and rotary-winged OAS platforms involved

in urban fire support require a low-yield, precision, blast-penetration weapon. The

integration of fixed and rotary wing OAS aircraft is essential in urban combat. If our

opponent can deny the low altitude regime to our attack helicopters, our fixed wing aircraft

must be able to fill in the void. Media education concerning our urban OAS capabilities,

limitations, and the law of war is essential to ensure that they project an accurate picture to

the American people. All of the services must initiate aggressive integrated fixed and rotary

wing urban OAS training programs. They can utilize existing DOD urban training areas and

possibly some bases that the Base Realignment and Closing (BRAC) Commission has

scheduled for closure. Additionally, training and readiness manuals must reflect these

requirements for both fixed and rotary wing OAS communities.

 

Recommendation:   In order to conduct effective urban combat, the United States must

specifically focus its training, procurement, and doctrine on the conduct of Urban OAS.

This urban OAS must allow for discrimination, proportionality, and a positive media

representation.

 

                            ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES

 

 

 

Table 1A: Projected World Population Growth                                   1

 

Table 1B: Urban Population Density Projection for Year 2000                   2

 

Table 1C: 20th Century Urban Combat                                           4

 

Illustration 2A:  Street Diagram                                              11

 

Illustration 5A:  Pioneer UAV                                                 73

 

Illustration 5B:  Predator UAV                                                75

 

Illustration 5C:  RBS-17 Blast-Penetrator Hellfire                            89

 

                                 CHAPTER I

 

                  Introduction to Urban Offensive Air Support

 

       Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not

       upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.

 

 

                                               - Giulio Douhet (1922)1

 

       The arena for land combat is evolving. Historically, the preponderance of military

 

operations have occurred in rural landscapes. The future area of military operations is

 

now emerging. Accelerated by the fusion of two demographic phenomena, the battlefield

 

is shifting to urban, vice rural, terrain. First, the global population explosion (table 1A) is

 

experiencing a disproportionate rate of increase in the third world. By the year 2025, 80

 

percent of the world's population will reside in third world nations.2 Second, the inability

 

of the rural areas of these third world nations to support the population explosion has led

 

to massed migrations to urban areas. This migratory trend will increase the percentage

 

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of people living in urban areas to 50 percent of the world's total population.4 The

 

population explosion when combined with an equal explosion in urban population will

 

create cities in the third world that have a population density (Table 1B) 10 to 25 times

 

greater than Washington, D.C.5

 

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       Compounding the urban density problem will be chronic shortages of food and

 

water that will increase the frequency of unrest. This unrest will manifest itself in urban

 

armed conflict and terror campaigns as recently witnessed in Somalia. As a result, we

 

must be able to conduct combat operations in urban environments.

 

       Cities have become lucrative targets for groups desiring to create unrest and

 

destabilize governments. They target the urban areas because they many times represent

 

the economic, political, and cultural centers of national power. A successful campaign in

 

an urban environment allows instant access to the national center of gravity, the people.

 

Consequently, we are observing a greater emphasis from potential adversaries on urban

 

military operations. Militias and guerrillas operated effectively in Sidon, Tyre, Panama

 

City, Mogadishu, Sarajevo, and Grozny because they realize the importance of the city in

 

achieving their strategic goals. Additionally, insurgencies target urban areas because it

 

provides them with their sources of power; people, money, and social unrest.

 

       The United States has fought in urban environments (table 1C) in virtually all of its

 

recent conflicts. Each of these urban combat operations were costly in resources and time.

 

As a result, the United States generated a system of warfighting that attacked and defeated

 

conventional armies in rural terrain, intentionally bypassing urban areas. This system

 

featured the application of massive firepower to overpower our opponents while

 

minimizing friendly casualties. A key ingredient to this system of warfighting has been use

 

of offensive air support (OAS). During the Second World War, extensive use of OAS

 

reduced enemy positions inside urban areas. Allied fighter-bombers destroyed cities and

 

villages with little regard for collateral damage or non-combatant casualties.7 The Second

 

World War was a total war, prosecuted by the military, and supported by the government

 

and the people of the United States. This support lessened the public's aversion to the

 

excessive force applied in Allied air attacks. Since 1945, the United

 

States participated only in limited wars. In these wars, the limited nature of the military

 

and political objectives also limited the people's acceptance of unlimited destruction.

 

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       The United States military's aversion to urban combat stems from a combination of

 

many factors. Historically urban combat involves: high casualties, the loss of operational

 

tempo, negative press coverage, and negative public opinion. Urban combat plays to our

 

weakness and our opponent's strengths. The United States' conventional force is superior

 

in firepower, mobility, and logistics in a rural battlefield. The urban environment will

 

impose limits on our mobility and firepower, allowing the defender to control the tempo of

 

operations. By forcing a fight in an urban environment, our opponent's weaker

 

conventional force can level the playing field. The American people will demand low

 

casualties (both friendly and non-combatant), and low collateral damage. Desert Storm

 

demonstrated to the world how superior the United States is in conventional rural

 

warfare. General Aideed's military forces in Mogadishu exposed our weakness in urban

 

combat. It is for exactly these reasons that our opponents will force the future military

 

confrontations to occur on urban terrain. According to the 1994 Defense Science Board

 

study on Military Operations In Urban Terrain, "We can no longer choose to avoid urban

 

areas. Our missions will specifically focus on them."9 An operational dilemma confronts

 

the United States military. While all trends point to the fact that the future military

 

battlefield will be urban, we are woefully ill-prepared to conduct battle in it. Our weakest

 

link in current capability is in the ability to provide urban OAS. Some military leaders

 

believe that current technological and political limitations will make OAS in urban

 

environments too difficult. They maintain that future urban fights will have to be infantry

 

only fights. That position is unacceptable. If the future battlefield is an urban one, we

 

must prepare to support the ground forces with all of our combined-arms. In order to

 

conduct effective urban combat, the United States must specifically focus its training,

 

procurement, and doctrine on the conduct of urban OAS. This urban OAS must allow for

 

discrimination, proportionality, and a positive media representation.

 

                               CHAPTER 2

 

                                 MOUT

       The attack or defense of a built-up area should be undertaken only when

       significant tactical or strategic advantage accrues through its seizure or control.

 

 

                                 - U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 90-10 MOUT.10

 

 

       The purpose of this chapter is to describe the impact that urban terrain has on

 

combat operations. At the conclusion of this chapter, the reader will realize that the

 

dynamic nature of both the terrain, and the ground combat element's (GCE) fire support

 

requirements, lend themselves to air delivered fires.

 

       The acronym MOUT (Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain) "classifies those

 

military actions planned and conducted on a terrain complex where manmade construction

 

impacts on the tactical options available to commanders."11 The United States' military

 

doctrine currently stresses the need to isolate or bypass urban environments in the conduct

 

of its tactical operations. Our potential opponents are aware of our lack of training,

 

equipment, and doctrine to accomplish urban combat operations. Third world powers may

 

view this lack of capability and will in this area as our Achilles heel. Our adversaries

 

recognize the need to operate in, and control, the cities since they represent the center of

 

political, economic and strategic power.12 In order to understand the unique requirements

 

for operational and tactical success in urbanized areas, we must first define the urban

 

terrain.

 

                          The Urban Terrain

 

 

       The 1994 Defense Science Board study on Military Operations in Urban Terrain,

 

defines a built-up area as a "concentration of structures, facilities and people that forms the

 

economic, political, and cultural center of a region."13 If not accustomed to looking at an

 

urban area as military terrain, it might look very confusing and disorderly. In fact, most

 

urban areas display quantifiable order. There are seven characteristics of urban terrain that

 

affect military operations:14

 

       1. Density of structures and population

       2. Building Construction

       3. Street Patterns

       4. Ports and waterways

       5. Subterranean features

       6. Function of urban area

       7. Size of urban area

 

       The density of the urban terrain is a major determinant in the selection of tactics

 

and fire support for a military operation for three reasons15. First, the urban terrain will

 

never allow the same potential for conventional maneuver and may render certain

 

firepower systems (i.e., armor, artillery) as inappropriate in their traditional roles. Second,

 

urban terrain density will limit the firepower support that we have traditionally enjoyed to

 

minimize collateral damage, non-combatant casualties, and loss of public support. Third,

 

density of the urban terrain will force the meeting engagement to occur at such close

 

ranges (25 to 100 meters) that supporting arms must be ultra-precise and yield controlled.

 

The urban terrain will display one of, or combinations of, the following structure densities:

 

dense random, close orderly block, dispersed residential, high-rise, or industrial and

 

transportation development.16

 

       Dense random development is typical of old inner city construction in third world

 

countries. The density of the structures brings with it the highest population density. The

 

narrow (7-15 meters), twisting, irregular streets limit the use of tanks, assault amphibian

 

vehicles (AAVs), and indirect fire artillery. Clear fields of fire and arming distance are

 

generally insufficient for the use of ground-based wire-guided missiles.17 Typical building

 

structure will include thick walls that will require penetrating weapons. These penetrating

 

weapons should not have excessive explosive content that would cause excessive

 

rubbling18, further reducing mobility. Limited explosive yields will also factor heavily in

 

trying to minimize the non-combatant casualties. The urban terrain will limit line of sight

 

communications, and favor the defender's use of ambush techniques. The random nature

 

of the terrain can lead to great confusion for the ground combat units and its fire-support

 

assets.

 

       Close, orderly block development consists of mixed residential and commercial

 

type buildings common to central areas of cities and towns. The streets are generally

 

wider and form rectangular patterns with buildings frequently forming a continuous front

 

along a block.19 The orderly lay-out of the streets helps in reducing the confusion

 

associated with random development. The proximity of the buildings will limit: armor

 

mobility, ground-based precision guided munitions, and communications. Typical building

 

structure will include thick walls that will require penetrating weapons of limited yield as

 

required for the dense, random development structures.

 

       Dispersed residential development consists of rowhouses, or single dwellings

 

where average street width between buildings is about 30 meters. Street patterns are

 

normally rectangular or curving in this type area.20 The proximity of the residential

 

buildings will limit fields of fire for precision guided munitions. Fire-support weapons

 

effect and requirements will vary due to the wide variety in construction quality. Due to

 

the constrained nature of this type development, fire-support planners will need to avoid

 

weapons that will generate excessive rubbling or fires. Even though the buildings are

 

close together, the relatively wide streets will afford a greater degree of mobility and

 

coordination than dense, random development. Recent combined-arms combat operations

 

in dispersed residential developments have occurred in Grozny, Chechnya.

 

       High-rise development is "...typical of modem construction in larger cities or

 

towns. It consists of multi-storied apartments, separated large open areas and one story

 

buildings. Wide streets are laid out in rectangular patterns."21 Recent combined-arms

 

combat operations in Beirut and Grozny have occurred in high-rise development areas.

 

During Desert Storm, coalition aircraft and cruise missiles flew successful strategic strike

 

missions in such parts of Baghdad. Yet, the tactical use of conventional combined-arms

 

weapons is relatively inefficient when addressing defensive positions located inside

 

high-rise buildings. A precision, deep-target penetrator is necessary if a high-rise building

 

is itself a target, or contains embedded targets, requiring destruction. The Russian Air

 

Force recently demonstrated this capability against the Presidential Palace in Grozny.

 

Traditional conventional air and ground precision weapons that have a low-yield (i.e.,

 

Hellfire, cannon) will attrite the exposed armor targets and personnel in this environment.

 

Fields of fire will generally be relatively unrestricted for both sides, with the defenders

 

using the cover of buildings to employ anti-tank weapons. Collateral damage is a prime

 

concern in the high-rise development due to the high post-conflict reconstruction costs and

 

negative media exposure. Enemy air defenses positioned on the tops of tall buildings will

 

modify the required sanctuaries for attack aircraft in this type area.

 

       "Industrial and transportation areas are usually found in the older sections of the

 

cities, on the fringes and in the new industrial areas beyond the suburbs. The buildings are

 

new, large, and functionally designed. Buildings are laid out unevenly with considerable

 

space between them and provide multiple vehicle routes."22 Strategic interdiction strikes

 

against targets in these areas may reduce an opponent's capacity to continue a conflict.

 

Coalition air forces conducted precision strikes against power plants and weapons of mass

 

destruction facilities during Desert Storm. These types of targets require precision,

 

high-yield weapons. Ground forces tasked with attacking enemy forces in this type of

 

urban terrain, will need precision, low-yield weapons for fire support. The low-yield

 

requirement is necessary for two reasons. First, the weapons must be low-yield to

 

minimize the rubbling of the objective area, allowing unrestricted friendly maneuver and

 

denying enemy forces additional refuge. Second, planners may need to minimize the

 

collateral damage to these industrial and infrastructure facilities to allow a rapid transition

 

to post-conflict normalization. The combat operations in the city of Grozny (before the 1

 

January 1995 invasion) have cost the Russians 400 billion rubles. To fix the damage from

 

combat operations it was going to cost 3.5 trillion rubles.23

 

       Other factors that define the urban terrain are building construction, street patterns,

 

ports and waterways, subterranean features, function, and size. Building construction

 

plays an important role in the selection of ordnance. Newer construction tends to be

 

multi-story and have more windows and thinner walls. The explosive yield and

 

penetration requirements of ordnance will be different for these structures than the older

 

type. The older building construction tends to have thick walls constructed of wood,

 

stone, stucco, or brick. Again planners must balance the fire support weapon's explosive

 

yield and penetration requirements in relation to the requirement to kill targets inside

 

buildings with minimal collateral damage.

 

       Street patterns will effect our ability to maneuver, coordinate fires, and exercise

 

command and control over a combined-arms urban operation. The street patterns may be

 

one of or any combination of six different types, radial, radial ring, rectangular, combined,

 

ray, and random.

 

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       Ports or waterways further help in defining urban terrain. Both attacker and

 

defender will covet these facilities in an urban conflict. The presence of ports and

 

waterways will assist the urban combat force in establishing easily recognizable control

 

features for both ground and air assets. They may assist mobility by using AAVs, but may

 

also create opportunities for defensive ambushes at choke points. The integrity of the port

 

facility will be important for an attacking force for lodgment and sustainment during an

 

assault phase of operations. The port's integrity is also important for post-conflict

 

normalization efforts. For these reasons, fire-support planners should exercise extreme

 

care in the selection of appropriate ordnance to support the military objectives.

 

       Fire-support planning in urban terrain will many times need to include a city's

 

subterranean networks. Most conventional weapons will have difficulty with this type of

 

target because of the deep penetration requirements. Deep bunkers and command and

 

control facilities represent strategic type target sets whose destruction will require deep

 

target penetrators. Tactical target sets, requiring less penetration, may require tactical

 

blast-penetrator weapons such as the AGM-65E (Laser Maverick).

 

       The function that the urban area serves may have a major effect on the amount of

 

force that the political leaders will allow the military force to expend. An urban area's

 

function may be political (such as being the seat of government), an industrial facility or

 

port, or it may be a religious or cultural center. An urban area's function may limit an

 

attacking military's fire-support options. During the battle for Hue City (Tet 1968),

 

artillery and close air support (CAS) "was not allowed out of fear that this historic and

 

symbolic city would be damaged beyond repair."25

 

       Population and size classify an urban area into one of four general categories:

 

large cities, towns, villages, and strips. Large cities have populations in excess of 100,000

 

and can cover more than 100 square miles. Towns (small cities) have populations between

 

3,000 and 100,000 and are not a portion of a large city. Villages have a population of less

 

than 3,000 people surrounded by rural areas. Strip areas are the urbanized terrain along

 

roads that connect villages and towns.26 The military and political risks will increase in any

 

urban combat operation as the size and population of the urban area increases. Collateral

 

damage, non-combatant casualties, friendly infantry attrition, and negative media coverage

 

will directly correlate to the size of the urban area.

 

 

 

                            The Nature of Urban Combat

 

 

       The traditional United States military strategy and doctrine call for avoiding urban

 

areas for many factors such as:

 

       1. Intensive manpower requirements.

 

       2. Slowing the tempo of maneuvering forces (i.e., an obstacle).

 

       3. Level of difficulty in conducting operations in urban terrain.

 

       4. Desire to minimize non-combatant casualties and damage to population centers.

 

       5. Lack of detailed pre-conflict intelligence for urban centers.

 

       6. Uncertainties regarding behaviors of indigenous population elements.

 

       7. Impact of conflict upon the political, ethnic, religious, and economic elements.

 

       8. Ability to control urban centers without entering (surround and quarantine).27

 

       Western nations that currently field large conventional armies (United States,

 

Russia, United Kingdom, France) stress the need to avoid urban warfare because the urban

 

terrain is not conducive to maneuver. Additionally, urban terrain's man-made and natural

 

obstacles hinder mobility, command, control, communication, and most importantly,

 

supporting fires.

 

       Urban areas tend to favor the defender. The urban battles fought in Beirut,

 

Mogadishu, and Grozny attest to the fact that urban terrain provides the defender with a

 

force multiplier. Given the doctrinal aversion to urban combat, a competent defender will

 

do everything in his power to draw the fight into the city. Ramzan Maltsegov, a Chechan

 

fighter in Grozny, stated that; "We were very happy they [the Russians] came into the city,

 

because we cannot fight them in an open field."28 Once in urban terrain, the defender has a

 

much better opportunity to control the tempo of operations. The defender accomplishes

 

this by creating an operational and moral dilemma for the attacking force in terms of:

 

attrition, delay, discrimination, proportionality, and negative media coverage. If the third

 

world urban defender can control the clock until CNN shows up, his chances of winning a

 

political victory increase exponentially.

 

       "The very nature of urban warfare requires decentralized control of assets due to

 

degraded communications, limited fields of fire, and reduced mobility."29 Decentralized

 

control allows small unit leaders and individual ground and aviation combat elements to

 

use their imagination, initiative and training to seize or defend a specific urban objective.

 

This is not to imply that integration of supporting arms is no longer critical. The

 

integration of supporting arms remains paramount in an urban environment. Battle plans

 

and orders need sufficient detail so that even small unit leaders understand the objective

 

and the intent of the commander. However, plans must be sufficiently flexible so that

 

subordinate leaders can quickly take the initiative under rapidly changing situations.

 

Major General Carl Ernst USA (JTF Somalia Commander) stated that "urban combat

 

operations require detailed planning. The planners will identify fire support needs through

 

analyzing the mission and its branches and sequels. The commander can approve the

 

fire-support assets for the operation based on the its potential requirements."30 This

 

pre-approval of the fire-support plan allows greater flexibility and subordinate initiative at

 

the tactical level.

 

       Considerations such as collateral damage worries, ROE compliance, and

 

immobility may limit the utility of artillery fire-support in an urban environment. The

 

dynamic nature of urban terrain and its associated combat in conjunction with strict

 

gun-target-line restrictions (to minimize problems associated with long and short rounds)

 

requires a more flexible fire-support system. This is not to say that artillery systems have

 

no utility in an urban environment. Poor weather conditions or a degrading tactical

 

situation may require these fires.

 

       The defender will use mutually supporting strong-points throughout his urban

 

defense in depth. He will attempt to break up the attacking unit's cohesion and isolate

 

individual elements for annihilation. The random layout, proximity, and robust

 

construction techniques of older third world cities will create a formidable defensive

 

position. This urban terrain many times will deny mutual support between attacking

 

ground units.

 

       One of the age old characteristics of urban combat is the presence of snipers.

 

According to the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One (MAWTS-1)

 

MOUT handbook:

 

       A trained sniper is not only an extremely lethal weapons system, but also an

       effective psychological one. Properly employed snipers will disrupt command

       and control, slow armored advance, and attrite assault support assets. Snipers

       have the ability to infiltrate any part of an urban area with relative ease....During

       the battle for Stalingrad, the 62nd Russian Army had 400 snipers who collectively

       killed over 6000 Germans. During the battle for Seoul in 1950, over 30 percent

       of the United Nations' casualties were caused by snipers.31

 

       For offensive ground combat operations in urban terrain there are two types of

 

attack: deliberate and hasty. The operational commander will initiate a deliberate attack if

 

the attack of the urban area is unavoidable. The three phases of a deliberate attack are:

 

isolation of the battlefield, assault, and clearing.32

 

       The isolation of the urban area will cut off or control the lines of communication

 

into the objective area. If possible, the objective will be to deny the urban defender any

 

logistics resupply; Additionally, we must isolate the urban battlefield to deny the urban

 

defender the ability to evacuate or introduce refugees. Aviation attack assets will play an

 

important role in this effort. The goal of the isolation phase is to isolate and fix the enemy

 

forces.

 

       After the attacking force isolates the urban battlefield, a combined-arms assault

 

phase will commence. The nature of the urban terrain will probably require a dismounted

 

infantry attack to find and fix the defender. On-call supporting arms will provide a means

 

to destroy any strong-point if required. The defender will do everything in his power to

 

strip the infantry from the armor assets. It will be his goal to isolate the armor where he

 

can ambush and annihilate them. A coordinated attack is essential and air power will play

 

a key role. Fixed and rotary-wing attack assets armed with appropriate ordnance will be

 

major participants in supporting the GCE with fires.

 

       The clearing operation is potentially the most costly in terms of attrition and public

 

support. This phase will involve initial detailed planning and coordination, followed by

 

decentralized, violent small unit actions. In the clearing operation, the GCE will

 

methodically clear small areas of the urban objective requiring timely and accurate fire

 

support. The CAS targets may be extremely close in this phase of the fighting. With our

 

current fixed-wing OAS weapons inventory, the GCE may need to pull back before calling

 

for fire.

 

       When the element of surprise offers substantial benefit to the GCE, the

 

commander may opt for a hasty attack. This does not release the participants from the

 

responsibility of having a solid combined-arms game-plan before commencing the attack.

 

It is in the hasty attack where a force's competency and training will show: good or bad.

 

In the hasty attack the attacking force will use pre-planned missions to get the air on

 

station over the objective area. OAS assets can assist with CAS if required. Additionally,

 

they can also provide armed-reconnaissance missions to attempt to isolate the objective

 

area and provide cuing to enemy or non-combatant activity entering the objective area.

 

 

                                                                        Summary

 

            The urban battlefield presents enormous problems for the attacking force. Current

 

doctrine stresses the need to avoid urban combat if at all possible.  The United States

 

military has not rained or procured adequately for an urban combat environment.

 

Unfortunately, our opponents realize our weakness in this type of warfare and will

 

intentionally force an urban confrontation.  The GCE may or may not require fire support

 

to achieve its objective in an urban environment.  The commander is responsible to ensure

 

that the GCE has access to fire support if it needs it.  The unique terrain associated with

 

an urban environment presents major problems for indirect fire-support, but is well suited

 

to attack aviation.  If the GCE needs this type of fire-support, do we currently train and

 

equip our OAS force to provide it?

 

            Even if the United States trains and equips its force to conduct urban OAS

 

operations, it must account for the additional strain on public opinion and support.  A

 

negative media representation of the urban effort will quickly seed doubt in the mind's of

 

our allies and the American people.  This negative media representation can dwarf the

 

tactical complexities associated with urban combat operations if the military does not

 

follow the precepts of just war theory.

 

 

                                   CHAPTER 3

 

                       The Law of War and Public Opinion

 

 

       We have learned at considerable expense that when a nation endeavors to make

       war nice, or accepts limitations on the use of force beyond those required by war

       treaties, it does so at its own peril.

 

                                 - COL Hays W. Parks (Retired USMC Lawyer)33

 

 

       The purpose of this chapter is to identity the constraints imposed by the people of

 

the United States on the use of urban OAS. The law of war concerning the use of OAS in

 

urban warfare, is nebulous at best. Each nation has signed different conventions that

 

supposedly act as guides for conduct in war. Historically, it seems as though the more

 

powerful force will abide by the law of war as they see it, and the weaker force will

 

disregard the law of war in an attempt to survive. Instead of a long discourse on the

 

intricacies of the law of war, this chapter will define the limits on the use of air power in

 

urban areas in terms of the just war concepts of discrimination and proportionality.

 

Given these concepts, this chapter will attempt to derive requirements for an urban OAS

 

effort.

 

       The law of war reflects an attempt by nations to establish certain minimum

 

standards of conduct that will protect innocent persons from intentional or incidental

 

injury to the greatest extent possible.34 The military use of air power has been subject to

 

legal regulation since the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899. In that conference,

 

European diplomats tried to limit the military attack potential of the hot air balloon. The

 

law of air warfare has evolved steadily since 1899 due to rapid changes in technology and

 

capability. Obedience to the laws of war will present immense challenges to urban

 

attacker and defender alike. The attacking force will use its advantage in air power to

 

impose its will on the defender. The defender will do everything in its power to deny the

 

advantage of air power to the attacker. Intentional violations of the law of war were

 

common in previous conflicts to achieve or deny victory. The foundations for our current

 

law of war reside in the just war principles of: jus ad bellum (justification for use of force)

 

and jus in bello (the restraints and limits on use of force).

 

                                Jus ad Bellum

 

 

       The United States national leadership will decide whether the resort to armed

 

conflict is just. For the purposes of this paper, we will assume that the resort to arms is

 

just and that the national leadership is providing proper guidance to the military leaders in

 

the field. The national leadership is responsible to ensure that the resort to arms and the

 

force applied to achieve victory will serve the national interest and secure the future peace.

 

                               Jus in Belio

 

       The major tenets of jus in bello theory are discrimination and proportionality.

 

These two concepts and their impact on public opinion will constitute the remainder of the

 

chapter.

 

                             Discrimination

 

       The just war concept of discrimination means that the belligerent parties will make

 

every effort to distinguish between military targets and civilian objects. The principle of

 

discrimination prohibits intentional air attacks on non-combatants or non-military objects.35

 

OAS efforts in urban terrain will need: accurate targeting, precision weapons, and realistic

 

training to discriminate successfully between military and civilian targets. On paper the

 

rules appear simple enough, but in war nothing is simple. In war (to include operations

 

other than war) the old fighter pilot's adage of "if you aren't cheating, you aren't trying"

 

seems to be the rule instead of the exception. In war, the weaker belligerent does not

 

want to lose and will do everything possible (including violating the law of war) to

 

magnify the difficulties associated with discrimination.

 

       The first task in the effort to discriminate in urban combat is deciding who is a

 

combatant and who in a non-combatant. The Geneva Convention of 1949 states that

 

persons are civilians if they do not belong to any of the following categories:

 

       1. Prisoners of war

 

       2. Members of the armed forces

 

       3. Members of militia and resistance movements

 

       4. Inhabitants of a non-occupied country who take up arms on the approach of an

       attacking force.36

 

Additionally, any civilian or structure that produces services or warfighting equipment for

 

the fighting force is a valid military target. In conventional rural warfare discrimination

 

can be problematic. Once the fight enters the urban area, successful discrimination

 

becomes more difficult. If our opponent chooses to fight in the urban area as a guerrilla

 

or non-uniformed militia, discrimination is incredibly difficult. Targeting a militia

 

anti-tank team located in an rowhouse surrounded by non-combatant housing makes

 

discrimination much more difficult.

 

       If the attacking force has difficulties in distinguishing between combatants and

 

non-combatants and military targets and civilian objects in an urban terrain, will it be able

 

to employ its fires? If the attacking force employs its fires and kills non-combatants, is it

 

culpable? The law of war accounts for this dilemma by placing the responsibility with the

 

defender to remove the non-combatants from its defensive area.

 

 

       A party to a conflict which places its own civilians in positions of danger by

       failing to carry out the separation of military activities from civilian activities

       necessarily accepts, under international law, the results of otherwise lawful

       attacks upon valid military objectives in their country.37

 

 

       The history of urban warfare demonstrates that the defender will attempt to deny

 

the attacker the ability to employ offensive air support (OAS) by mixing his fighters

 

among the non-combatants and using civilian structures. While this practice is illegal

 

under the law of war, recent combat experiences show that the court of world opinion will

 

judge the attacker guilty of attacking civilians. Is current world opinion condemning the

 

Chechan fighters for using residential areas for anti-tank ambushes which result in massive

 

Russian retaliation?

 

       When the Israelis invaded Lebanon in 1982, the Palestine Liberation Organization

 

(PLO) military leadership immediately shifted its defensive positions into Lebanese towns

 

and villages. The PLO emplaced its artillery and anti-aircraft weapons on top of or next to

 

hospitals, schools, churches, or mosques.38 Additionally, the PLO moved equipment and

 

forces to the lower floors of high-rise apartment buildings, while forcing the civilian

 

tenants of those buildings to remain in the upper floors.39 The PLO did this for the

 

following reasons: to shield itself from attack, and to negate the firepower advantage

 

enjoyed by the Israelis. Additionally, if the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) failed to restrain

 

its fires, its tactics would turn world opinion against the operation because the IDF was

 

attacking civilian targets. As the PLO predicted, the international press denounced the

 

IAF urban air attacks even though it was the PLO that was violating the law of war.

 

       Air defense activities may impact the ability of the attacker to discriminate. If the

 

defender launches a surface-to-air missile (SAM) at an attacking aircraft, the pilot will

 

have to take evasive action to defeat the threat. If during his defensive maneuvering he

 

has to jettison his bombs, they will very likely not hit the intended target. In this case the

 

defender is culpable for the non-combatant casualties and collateral damage created by the

 

jettisoned bombs because he denied the attacker the ability to discriminate. During the

 

Gulf War, Iraqi air defense systems hit, and disabled, a cruise missile. The stricken missile

 

veered off course and impacted a civilian structure. In this case, the Iraqis were

 

responsible for the errant impact according to the law of war.

 

       The international media will very likely not report that the defenders were at fault

 

for an errant bomb, or cruise missile impact, caused by threat defenses. For this reason the

 

commander may have to establish additional restrictions (ROE) on his forces to minimize

 

the potential for this type of media manipulation. During the Gulf War, the joint force air

 

component commander (JFACC) decided to restrict the F-16s from strike missions near

 

Baghdad. The JFACC introduced this restriction out of the fear that a pilot may jettison

 

bombs indiscriminately while avoiding an Iraqi SAM.40 Even though the pilot's actions

 

would have been legal within the law of war, the mere fear of negative public opinion

 

generated by media reports negated the value of the F-16 contribution to the strategic

 

effort.

 

                            Proportionality

 

       The concept of proportionality essentially means that the application of combat

 

power, and resulting destruction of life and property, should not be disproportionate to

 

the military or political advantage gained.41 Destroying an entire city block to kill a sniper

 

is disproportionate. The national and military leadership must balance this concept with

 

the tactical requirements for success. One of a commander's primary responsibilities is the

 

protection of his force. While a military commander should exercise care to minimize

 

collateral civilian casualties and damage, he must also provide the fire support his forces

 

need to be successful (with minimal friendly casualties).

 

       The concept of proportionality applied to tactical urban combat situations implies

 

the need for weapons that contain just enough explosive yield to achieve the desired target

 

effect. Excessive explosive yield weapons may create excessive non-combatant casualties

 

and collateral damage. The United Nations (UN) is currently applying this concept in

 

urban CAS operations in Bosnia.  The current ROE limits the CAS platforms to weapons

 

that have an explosive yield of 500 pounds or less.42 If the force commander used

 

higher-yield weapons when lower-yield weapons were more appropriate (and available),

 

then he could be violating the concept of proportionality.

 

 

 

                          The Media and Public Opinion

 

       Post-war history suggests that the media will report the disproportionate

 

application of force regardless of the actions of the defenders. The media can sway public

 

opinion against the application of overwhelming force, as in the reported wanton slaughter

 

of retreating uniformed Iraqi forces on the Basra road. Media misrepresentation can

 

quickly sway public opinion against the use of force even if it is legal with the law of war.

 

It seems as if the media is not necessarily misrepresenting the facts in reporting military

 

strikes on civilian targets, but rather it may not know what the law of war is. The

 

following two examples highlight the media's lack of understanding of the law of war.

 

       During Desert Storm the United States Air Force (USAF) conducted a strategic air

 

operation against command and control facilities to isolate the Iraqi leadership. The Al

 

Fidros bunker was a command and control facility built for the Iraqi military and

 

considered a perfectly legitimate military target. Unknown to the coalition targeteers, the

 

Iraqis were using the facility as a protective shelter for women and children. When USAF

 

F-111s destroyed the bunker "the consequences quickly went well beyond the tragic loss

 

of life claimed by Iraqi officials. Using the magnifying glass of television to project around

 

the world the horror of women and children maimed and killed by coalition bombs, the

 

Iraqi leadership immediately exploited the situation to attempt to constrain the air

 

campaign through political pressure."43 The Iraqi leadership was successful in that all

 

future strikes in Baghdad required Commander in Chief(CINC) approval, further

 

constraining the strategic bombing effort.

 

       The January 4, 1995, Washington Post contained a front page story titled "Russian

 

Jets Focus on Civilian Targets."44 This article went on to describe a Russian air attack on

 

a market place that sold assault weapons to the Chechan fighters. It also described

 

another air attack that caused a car loaded with grenades and bullets to explode. The

 

media reported these targets as civilian. In fact, both these targets were valid military

 

targets.

 

 

                               Summary

 

       The law of war represents those limitations imposed on the waging of war by

 

international law and national policy.  The law of war should not impede effective military

 

operations. The purpose of the law of war is to ensure that the use of force and violence

 

is not excessive, disproportionate, purposeless, or unnecessary. It attempts to protect

 

combatants and non-combatants alike.  A combat action may be absolutely legal in terms

 

of international law and national policy, but it may be disproportionate in the eyes of the

 

American public. Additionally, the national leadership may restrict legal combat power in

 

an attempt to foster world opinion or to achieve a better peace after conflict resolution.

 

The law of war, and the theories of discrimination and proportionality serve as a moral

 

compass for the national leadership and the military in the conduct of combat operations.

 

                                   CHAPTER 4

 

           Urban Offensive Air Support: Evolution and Case Studies

 

 

       From its baptism of fire in the First World War, attack aviation has evolved from a

 

strategic weapon (i.e., Gott Strafe England) to a weapon applied across the operational

 

spectrum. The study of 20th century conflict provides numerous examples of urban

 

ground combat involving the use of supporting attack aircraft. The purpose of this

 

chapter is to identify the recurring requirements and problem areas encountered in urban

 

OAS operations. To do this we will investigate some of the lessons learned from early

 

urban OAS efforts in World War I, the Spanish Civil War, World War II, Korea, and then

 

Vietnam. The problems encountered in the conduct of urban OAS in these conflicts

 

provide valuable insight into the nature of this type of combat. The second portion of the

 

chapter will deal with four urban OAS case studies reflecting recent developments in

 

tactics and technology. The case studies we will investigate are: Operation Peace for

 

Galilee, Desert Storm, Restore Hope, and the Russian invasion of Chechnya. These urban

 

OAS case studies all have three major characteristics in common: each involved military

 

conflicts with limited objectives, in each the defender violated the law of war in an attempt

 

to deny the attacker the use of OAS, and each involved instantaneous feedback from the

 

public through the mass-media. Throughout the chapter, I will attempt to extract lessons

 

learned that are applicable for future urban operations.

 

                                  World War I

 

       Then, on August 26 (1914), occurred the incident that shocked a naive world and

       brought to brisk ferment the long simmering British dread of German dirigibles.

       Antwerp, already badly damaged by an unremitting artillery siege, was bombed

       from the air. Twelve civilians were killed, many more injured, and part of a

       hospital damaged.

 

                                                    -The Great Air War45

 

       The German Air Service targeted urban areas during the First World War to break

 

the will of its opponents. Kaiser Wilhelm directed that his air service only attack "docks,

 

shipyards, armories, and other prime military objectives." Unfortunately, the accuracy of

 

the weapons and delivery systems rendered this directive impossible. Although the urban

 

air attacks during the First World War were strategic strikes, they demonstrated the

 

problems associated with discrimination in air delivered weapons. The relatively untrained

 

aircrew when matched with bombs with poor ballistic accuracy made the discrimination

 

between military and civilian targets next to impossible.46

 

 

 

                           Post-World War I

 

       Post-war theorists such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell wrote extensively on

 

the use of air power as a strategic weapon. Operational reality and fiscal constraints in the

 

post-war world brought forth another application of air power, tactical attack aviation.

 

Most notable in these efforts were the United States Marine Corps in the Banana Wars,

 

the Royal Air Force conducting air control in the Middle East, and the German Condor

 

Legion in the Spanish Civil War. Of these tactical efforts, only the Condor Legion's

 

involved extensive tactical air operations in urban environments.

 

       The German Air Force conducted urban CAS operations during the battles of

 

Bilbao (1936) and Ebroin (1938). During these operations the Germans found that

 

coordinating their attacks was extremely difficult in an urban environment. Poor radios

 

limited air-to-ground communications, and the German pilots had difficulty in

 

discriminating between friend and foe. The Condor Legion made no attempt to achieve

 

proportionality in its air attacks, which created tremendous international outrage towards

 

the German effort. The Condor Legion did make progress in air-to-ground urban CAS

 

coordination in that it used panels, pyrotechnics, colored lights, and signaling mirrors to

 

assist the attack pilots in identifying targets and friendly positions.47 The German army

 

resorted to some of these techniques in Poland, France, and the Soviet Union during

 

World War II. More importantly, the Germans determined that OAS would be an integral

 

part of their future urban combat operations.

 

 

 

                                   World War II

 

       The Second World War involved extensive urban OAS. We will limit our

 

discussions to the urban OAS experiences in France (1944), Stalingrad (1942), Cassino

 

(1944), and Saipan (1944). The most extensive and notable urban OAS operations in the

 

Second World War occurred in the European Theater. The Second World War was a

 

total war, in which collateral damage and non-combatant casualties were secondary

 

concerns. Throughout this conflict, the Germans and the Allies developed innovative new

 

techniques in weapons delivery and control in urban environments. To counter these

 

advances, the defenders developed innovative tactics to deny the use of tactical air support

 

in these environments.

 

       The Allies progressively improved their use of OAS throughout the European

 

campaign. The allies used fighter-bombers (P-47s, P-51s, and Typhoons) very effectively

 

in urban OAS during the Normandy break-out. Fighter-bombers would range in front of

 

advancing ground forces reporting enemy activity (armed reconnaissance) and attacking

 

them in coordination with ground controllers (CAS).48 The lack of concern for collateral

 

damage and non-combatant casualties reduced the requirement for precise target

 

discrimination and proportional weapons.49 This same lack of concern for proportionality

 

created tremendous problems for the advancing ground troops. The indiscriminate use of

 

high-explosive aviation ordnance rubbled the streets of the French towns delaying the

 

ground advance and creating excellent cover for German snipers. In this case, a more

 

proportional attack on the French towns may have assisted the ground advance.

 

       The defending forces were also a source of innovation in urban operations. During

 

the battle for Stalingrad (1942-1943), the Soviets realized that the German forces relied

 

heavily on OAS for their urban assaults. To counter this, the Soviets generated new urban

 

ground combat tactics that forced the meeting engagements to occur at extremely close

 

ranges. These close range engagements cost the Soviets heavily in terms of casualties, but

 

the tactic denied the Germans the use of attack aviation out of fear that they would engage

 

their own troops. General Chuikov, the Soviet commander in Stalingrad stated:50

 

            I came to the conclusion that the best method of fighting the Germans would be

            close battle, applied day and night in different forms. We should get as close to

            the enemy as possible so that his air force could not bomb our forward units....It

            seemed to me that it was precisely here, in the fighting for the city, that it was

            possible to force the enemy into close fighting and deprive him of his trump card

            --his air force.

 

       One of the most important lessons in urban OAS application occurred during the

 

assault on Cassino and Monte Cassino (6th century abbey and cultural landmark) during

 

February to May 1944. "Cassino was a well built city of strong stone buildings with the

 

four story abbey standing as a fortress above it."51 In this battle, air attack assets

 

conducted an extensive urban bombing raid that was uncoordinated with the ground

 

force's attack. The first attempt at taking Monte Cassino involved a massive air strike by

 

254 medium and heavy bombers dropping 576 tons of bombs on the abbey. At the

 

conclusion of the bombing, the ground forces were not ready to assault, nullifying the

 

effectiveness of the air support. The air strike reduced the abbey to a pile of rubble, but

 

the German defenders were able to move into the ruins and set up impregnable positions

 

among the shattered masonry.52 On March 15, the allies flew 1,000 bombing sorties

 

against the city of Cassino. When the bombers departed the area, the Allied troops began

 

their assault. The defenders made very good use of the "rubbled" terrain for fighting

 

positions and were able to beat back the allied attack, inflicting heavy casualties. The

 

rubble created by the bombing...

 

       created a paradise for German snipers who grew overnight like weeds in different

       parts of the rubble. The allies were clearly going to pay for their failure to

       coordinate these air strikes with follow-up infantry forces.53

 

       The Pacific theater operations rarely required urban OAS. One exception was the

 

assault on Saipan in 1944. Marine Corps attack aircraft attempted to provide urban CAS

 

with mixed results. After action reports noted that out of 76 attacks against urban targets,

 

only 17 were effective. The rugged construction of the urban targets highlighted the

 

deficiencies of the aviation ordnance in hard-target penetration. The Marines felt that

 

three factors reduced the effectiveness of the urban CAS: lack of precise targeting,

 

inappropriate ordnance, and poor weapons accuracy.54

 

The major lessons learned from World War II urban OAS concerned:

 

       1. The need for proportionality in balancing the requirement to kill targets and to

       minimize urban rubbling.

 

       2. An urban defender can deny the attacker the use of OAS if the defender forces

       the meeting engagement to take place inside the range that the pilot could

       discriminate friend from foe.

 

       3. Urban OAS requires ordnance appropriate for the urban target sets.

 

 

                                  Korea

 

       During the Korean War, major urban OAS operations took place in Seoul after the

 

Inchon landing. Prior to the ground assault, Marine attack aircraft conducted armed

 

reconnaissance and interdiction missions against North Korean Army targets in the city.

 

One of the results of these attacks was the rubbling of the urban terrain.  According to

 

Colonel Robert Heinl (retired USMC historian):

 

       As the infantry advanced on Seoul, deep air support strikes were conducted in,

       and around, the city to attrite the enemy and prevent reinforcement. These strikes

       contributed to the rubble in the city which hampered the infantry's advance in a

       manner reminiscent of the Monte Cassino campaign of World War II.55

 

Marine Corsairs provided essential CAS to the assault troops once they entered Seoul.

 

Using tactics the Russians used during World War II, the North Korean defenders forced a

 

meeting engagement that was too close for the Marines to employ CAS. The rubbled

 

urban terrain provided excellent cover for snipers that accounted for 30 percent of the

 

casualties during the Seoul assault.56 The major lessons learned from the urban OAS effort

 

in Korea concerned proportional weapons that limited rubbling, and the need for pilots

 

and weapons that could discriminate friend from foe in very close meeting engagements.

 

 

 

                                    Vietnam

 

       The low-intensity conflict nature of the military objectives during the Vietnam War

 

limited the application of urban OAS. The major urban ground battle of the Vietnam War

 

occurred during Tet in 1968. The battle for Hue City started when two North Vietnamese

 

Army (NVA) battalions invaded and occupied the urban terrain on January 31, 1968. Hue

 

City consisted of old stone buildings and had a population of about 140,000 citizens. The

 

NVA "defensive positions were strongpoints several blocks apart. Each strongpoint was

 

normally a three story building surrounded by a courtyard with a stone fence."57 Since

 

Hue City was the historic capital of Vietnam, the military and political leadership of the

 

United States was reluctant to allow artillery and air support to the counter-attacking

 

Marines. As the tactical situation on the ground grew worse, the weather started to

 

deteriorate. Once the United States national leadership realized the gravity of the situation

 

and sanctioned the necessary fire-support, the weather and tactical situation limited the

 

opportunities for effective OAS. The Marines resorted to artillery and mortar support but

 

found that the city's vertical obstructions reduced the effectiveness of these types of

 

fire-support. Additionally, the artillery support rubbled the urban terrain, inhibiting

 

friendly maneuver and creating sanctuaries for enemy snipers. "By February 13th the city

 

was a shambles -- nearly every building in the populous area was shattered by rockets,

 

mortars, or artillery."58 The battle became one of small units fighting through the rubble

 

with organic infantry weapons. When the weather was good enough for OAS, the tactical

 

situation limited its utility. According to LtCol. E.C. Cheatham (CO 2Bn/5th Marines),

 

the NVA forced the meeting engagements at a range that was inside the CEP of the

 

fixed-wing aviation attack assets (250 feet). Additionally, the utility of attack helicopters

 

was minimal because the "NVA 12.7 machine guns probably would have defeated the

 

gunships."59

 

       The major lesson confirmed concerning urban fire support from the Hue City battle

 

was that urban combat will reduce the capability of a force to employ its supporting arms.

 

Rubble stops tanks, and urban vertical structures mask artillery and mortar fire. The

 

weather, air defenses, target identification problems, poor communications, ordnance

 

inaccuracy, and fear of excessive collateral damage reduced the effectiveness of CAS. The

 

Marines still felt, even given these deficiencies, that the ground combat element (GCE)

 

needed CAS in an urban battle.60

 

                                  1914 to 1968

 

                                    Summary

 

       With each new conflict in the 20th century, the belligerents found new ways to

 

employ air power in urban environments. Belligerents sometimes incorporated the lessons

 

learned from previous combat and other times had to re-learn the same lessons over again.

 

Analyses of urban OAS efforts from the Second World War through Hue City highlight

 

several recurring problem areas.  First, excessive rubbling of the urban environment will

 

lead to problems for the attacking ground forces (Cassino, Stalingrad, Saipan, Seoul,

 

Hue).  Second, the pilot and ordnance must be able to discriminate between opposing

 

forces (Stralingrad, Seoul, Hue).  Third, the verticality of urban terrain will reduce the

 

effectiveness of indirect fire assets (artillery and mortars) but will not affect the air

 

delivered weapons.  Lastly, in every conflict the weaker power forced the stronger power

 

to conduct urban combat operations even though its doctrine called for its avoidance.

 

These historical examples provide valuable insight into the problems encountered

 

by forces attempting to conduct urban OAS. World War I's, II's and Korea's belligerents

 

did not worry about the problems associated with excessive collateral damage and

 

non-combatant casualties.  The United States military does not have that luxury anymore.

 

Therefore, more detailed analysis of urban combat where these factors were (or should

 

have been) key concerns is necessary.

 

 

                                                                        Case Studies

 

            For the purposes of this paper, I chose four examples of urban combat that utilized

 

attack aviation.  Each OAS effort had to deal with collateral damage and non-combatant

 

restrictions for political and tactical reasons.  In each example we will discuss:

 

                        1. The nature of the conflict and the associated urban terrain.

 

                        2. The requirements for effective OAS and how the attacking force met them.61

 

                        3. The results and lessons learned.

 

 

                           Peace for Galilee (1982)

 

 

       The 1982 war in Lebanon pitted the Israeli military machine against the military

 

forces of Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Israeli goals in

 

Lebanon for this war were to:

 

       1. Establish a 25 mile buffer-zone in southern Lebanon to eliminate the terrorist

       haven for cross-border attacks.

 

       2. Destroy the PLO as a military threat and political adversary.

 

       3. Expel Syrian peacekeeping forces from Lebanon.

 

       4. Stabilize the Lebanese political situation and promote an Israel friendly

       government.

 

       5. Improve Israel's ability to control the West Bank.62

 

 

The fighting in Lebanon took one of two forms for the Israelis. The first form

 

was the wide open combined-arms armor battle that the Israelis had trained and equipped

 

for following the lessons learned from the 1973 War. The second form took place along

 

the coastal line of advance, including urban combat operations in Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut.

 

The Israelis had not trained or equipped for the urban combat they encountered along the

 

coastal line of advance. The political failure resulting from the protracted urban

 

operations in the West dwarfed the brilliant success against Syrian forces in the East. For

 

our discussions we will limit ourselves to the western operations, specifically the

 

operations in the cities of Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut.

 

       The urban terrain in Tyre and Sidon consisted of well-constructed stone or

 

concrete structures in a dense random development typical of older third world villages.

 

Beirut was a historic trade and cultural center that contained a mixture of high-rise,

 

industrial, close-orderly block, and dense random development. "Destroying the PLO

 

meant occupying or dominating Beirut -- the political and military center of PLO strength

 

in Lebanon..."63

 

       The assault along the west coast of Lebanon was an infantry fight. The coastal line

 

of advance contained urban areas that favored defensive anti-armor ambushes. The major

 

operational error committed by the Israelis was that they initially committed their armor

 

and APCs before the infantry troops in close urban terrain.64 The PLO ambushed the

 

Israeli APCs and tanks in urban areas such as Tyre and Sidon, inflicting heavy casualties.

 

Israeli Defense Force (IDF) infantry should have spearheaded the assault, calling for

 

armored support as required by the tactical situation.

 

 

 

                        Requirements for Effective OAS

 

       The Israeli Air Force (IAF) established complete air superiority over the battlefield

 

early in the operation. IAF aircraft operated without prohibitive interference from Syrian

 

fighter aircraft throughout their urban OAS missions.

 

       Israeli targeting efforts in Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut had difficulty throughout the

 

operation in separating PLO positions from the non-combatants. The Israelis dedicated

 

the majority of their UAV sorties (Tadiran Mastiff and IMI Scout65) in the East against the

 

higher threat Syrian forces. The IAF photo-reconnaissance assets were able to get

 

excellent imagery of the Syrian air defense and army locations, but they "lacked the

 

targeting and intelligence to precisely identify and characterize targets in urban

 

environments."66 The IAF was able to provide overhead imagery of the urban objective

 

areas to assist the ground commanders with navigation and coordination. Additionally,

 

even though the Israelis had infrared (IR), synthetic aperature radar (SAR), and

 

side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) sensors, they lacked the ability to integrate the

 

information for night targeting into the battlefield decision making system. As a result, the

 

IDF forces in the West fought blind in their protracted urban advance.

 

       Target marking for CAS missions required unique solutions in an urban

 

environment. The Israeli forward air controllers (FACs) marked enemy targets with

 

colored smoke during day operations and spot-lights at night. Since collateral damage

 

was a concern for the CAS strikes, the aircraft carried a mix of live and inert ordnance.

 

The pilot first dropped a practice bomb. From the practice-bomb impact, the FAC

 

confirmed that the pilot had the right target and allowed the live ordnance delivery, or

 

provided a correction for the pilot.

 

       The Israeli command and control system grew progressively more responsive as

 

the fight moved into Beirut. To limit command and control problems in urban

 

environments, the IDF placed wire lines in sewer and around telephone poles. It used

 

UAVs for radio relay, and placed flags on top of buildings to mark friendly positions.67

 

Intelligence elements of the battle staff coordinated the pre-planned CAS missions. The

 

ground units needing the support forwarded the immediate requests for CAS. In spite of

 

these techniques, the IDF complained about excessive response times for CAS.68

 

            The intent of the ROE for OAS operations in Lebanon was to limit collateral

 

damage, non-combatant casualties, and international condemnation. The ROE the Israeli

 

pilots operated under in Lebanon's urban areas was:

 

       1. The pilots had to have highly detailed urban target maps to distinguish

       military objectives from civilian objects and other protected property.

 

       2. Pilots and FACs had to positively verity all objects as military targets prior to

       any attack. A FAC had to mark each target to verify it.

 

       3. If the CAS aircraft lost its bomb-aiming equipment, the pilot had to abort the

       mission.

 

       4. Attack aircraft had to deliver a single bomb per attack, at the minimum

       possible safe altitude, under visual conditions (no radar bombing).

 

       5. The pilots were to make absolute maximum use of precision guided munitions

       (PGMs)69 and bombs no bigger than the MK-82 (500 pounds) for CAS

       operations.

 

       The IDF divided Beirut into two sectors. The ROE limited IAF bombing

 

operations North of Corniche due to concern over collateral damage and civilian

 

casualties. The ROE South of Corniche required less discrimination from the IAF. High

 

casualties in Tyre and Sidon convinced the IDF that they did not want to conduct a house

 

to house fight in Beirut. Therefore, they isolated the portions of the city that they felt

 

were mainly PLO and gradually intensified the artillery, air, and naval gun-fire

 

bombardment.70

 

       The enemy air defenses that the IAF had to deal with over the urban target areas

 

were generally low-threat for fixed-wing aircraft and medium-threat for rotary-wing

 

aircraft. The PLO air-defense systems consisted of SA-7s, ZSU 23-4s, and other AAA

 

systems.71 The-fixed-wing aircraft could avoid the threat by remaining above a certain

 

minimum altitude and dispensing decoy flares during target attacks. The rotary-wing

 

aircraft could use IR jammers or decoy flares to deny the IR missile threat but needed to

 

avoid the threat area for the AAA.

 

       The IAF employed both lethal and non-lethal weapons during Operation Peace for

 

Galilee. The non-combatants in Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut greatly outnumbered the PLO

 

fighters. One of the IDF's goals was to separate the civilians from the PLO fighters. To

 

accomplish this the first phase of each urban attack was a psychological operation aimed at

 

the non-combatants. Through leaflet drops and loud-speakers72 the IDF warned that the

 

IAF would bomb the area and that the non-combatants should vacate the area

 

immediately. The IDF encouraged people to leave the urban areas and left open multiple

            

escape routes.73

 

       The purpose of the lethal weapons the IAF had at its disposal was to fight the type

 

of conflict they experienced in the 1973 War. That conflict convinced the IDF that it

 

needed ordnance such as the AGM-65A Maverick, Cluster Bomb, Walleye Glide Bomb,

 

TOW, and HARM missile to attrite large, SAM-protected, armor forces in open terrain.

 

These weapons had very little applicability in Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut in 1982.

 

       Throughout the conflict, ground forces used OAS when they could not bring tank

 

or artillery fire to bear on the enemy.74 The urban terrain provided the PLO fighters

 

excellent cover and concealment, hoping that it would force the IAF to limit its attacks in

 

order to minimize civilian casualties. The IAF had to resort to using MK-82 (general

 

purpose) bombs in urban operations for several reasons:

 

       1. The IAF's AGM-65A TV Mavericks displayed poor accuracy and target effect

       in urban environments. The TV seeker would break lock in urban clutter forcing

       the missile to miss the target. The AGM-65A's shaped-charge warhead had

       minimal effect on urban structures.

 

       2. The shaped-charge kill mechanism of the cluster munition bomblet had a poor

       effect on targets in urban areas. Additionally, the IDF was concerned that

       unexploded cluster munition bomblets could cause friendly casualties during an

       assault.75

 

       3. The IAF felt that the TOW was vulnerable to hostile countermeasures76 and

       was only good against armor targets due to its shaped-charge warhead.

 

 

       The anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) threat forced the IDF to keep the Merkava

 

tank out of heavy combat in Beirut, increasing the reliance on fixed-wing CAS. As a

 

result of these factors, the IAF used the MK-82 general purpose extensively in all urban

 

environments. This is a free-fall bomb and is only as precise as the delivery platform and

 

the targeting information.

 

 

       The IAF and IDF experienced serious problems in executing combined

       operations in urban and built-up areas where there were large numbers of

       civilians. Throughout the war the IAF was called upon to attack small bands of

       PLO or Syrian troops who were fighting in close proximity to IDF troops and

       Lebanese civilians.... Accurate targeting and delivery were often impossible and

       fratricide and civilian casualties resulted.... IAF pilots either hit civilian targets or

       refused to drop their bombs because they had no way to distinguish ground

       targets.77

 

 

 

       The IAF's lack of low-yield precision weapons generated higher non-combatant

 

casualties than necessary.78 Compounding the IDF's problem, the international media

 

reported large civilian casualties in IAF urban bombing raids. The negative publicity

 

generated by a large strike on August 12, 1982, caused the Israeli cabinet to rescind the

 

military's authority to conduct bombing operations without prior cabinet approval.79 This

 

further restricted the commander's tactical options in the field.

 

       The IAF's attack platforms consisted of A-4 Skyhawks, C-2 Kfirs, F-4 Phantoms,

 

and AH-1 Cobras. These platforms could deliver air to ground ordnance during daylight

 

conditions with fair accuracy by 1982 standards. The IDF regular forces trained in

 

MOUT for 10 years prior to Peace for Galilee. They integrated infantry, armor, artillery,

 

and engineers, but failed to include OAS assets. When the ATGM threat reduced the

 

survivability and usefulness of the Merkava tank in urban environments, the IDF called on

 

CAS to fill the void. The Israeli pilots are some of the best in the world, but they had not

 

trained to the urban standard, and their ineffectiveness highlighted this deficiency.

 

 

 

                                Lessons Learned

 

       The lessons learned by the IDF in Lebanon's urban OAS operations were:

 

 

       1. Planning for urban operations requires great detail and will involve a combined

       arms approach.80

 

       2. To be successful in future urban combat situations, aircrew training must adapt

       at every level, from private to commander, to stress realism, operational

       challenges, battlefield initiative and innovation.

 

       3. The IDF relied excessively on firepower, at the expense of more

       innovative solutions to tactical problems (i.e., large scale use of artillery barrages

       in urban environments vice low-yield precision weapons).81

 

       4. Low-precision weapons are not suitable in urban environments where

       non-combatant discrimination is a priority.

 

       5. Tactical urban operations deserve a priority in the allocation of overhead

       RSTA assets. The high probability of tactical set-backs and ambushes require

       overhead information at the tactical level.

 

       6. Favorable media coverage is essential in urban operations. The military can

       shape the effects of media coverage by steadfast ROE compliance, appropriate

       weapons, and media education and training.

 

       7. The military must employ its force in a proportional and discriminate manner

       to retain the support of its people in a limited war.82

 

 

 

       A major premise of Israeli strategic doctrine is that the effects of war are judged

       by their impact not only on the battlefield, but on Israeli society.

 

 

 

                      Operation Desert Storm (199O-1991)

 

 

       During Desert Storm ground combat operations in urban environments were

 

relatively rare. USMC AH-1Ws and AV-8Bs provided urban CAS during the Iraqi attack

 

at Khafji.83 Once the ground campaign started, the sparsely populated desert terrain

 

permitted a ground scheme of maneuver that did not have to deal with significant urban

 

combat. The terrain was perfect for the air-land battle that the NATO forces had been

 

training to for over ten years. Additionally, this air-land battle did not have to contend

 

with towns and trees as it did in a European scenario. What Desert Storm did provide was

 

an excellent example of precision urban interdiction by air power in the Iraqi capital,

 

Baghdad.

 

       Although, the strategic air strikes flown against Baghdad were not in direct

 

support of a ground assault, they must receive attention in this paper for the following

 

reason. The outstanding capabilities in accuracy displayed by the coalition air forces, and

 

then televised to the world, changed the level of expectation for future conflict. Our

 

future urban OAS missions must display the same level of discrimination that the public

 

witnessed during Desert Storm.

 

         The United States and its coalition allies conducted combat operations to achieve

 

limited objectives in Desert Storm. The coalition goals were to expel Saddam Hussein's

 

military from Kuwait, to restore the Kuwaiti government, and to weaken the military

 

potential of the Iraqi armed forces. The objectives did not include the occupation of Iraq,

 

the devastation of the Iraqi people, or the destruction Iraq's future economic viability.

 

The coalition decided to employ strategic air strikes against targets inside Baghdad to

 

destroy the command and control capability of the Iraqi leadership. The coalition wanted

 

to "exploit air powers reach and lethality to achieve operational and strategic objectives...

 

by striking key elements of the enemy's society, will, or overall national power."84

 

       Baghdad served as the political, cultural, and religious capital of Iraq. The urban

 

terrain in Baghdad contained a mix of development types. The older sections of Baghdad

 

contained dense random and close-orderly block development with the typical stone and

 

concrete construction. Iraq was a major oil producer and, as a result, Baghdad's urban

 

terrain included modern high-rise and industrial development. The majority of the

 

coalition targets were in areas of high-rise and industrial development.

 

 

 

                        Requirements for Effective OAS

 

       In the opening days of the air offensive in Iraq, the coalition quickly established air

 

supremacy. As a result, the Iraqi fighter threat was insignificant after the third day of

 

operations. Coalition air assets carried out a comprehensive attack on the Iraqi integrated

 

air-defense system (IADS). Coalition air attacked command and control centers, early

 

warning radars, and SAM sites early in the campaign. Coalition attack and electronic

 

warfare (EW) aircraft continually suppressed the SAM sites throughout the campaign.

 

Non-stealth strike packages would include a SEAD capability with jammer aircraft (EA-6B

 

and EF-111) and HARM and ALARM (anti-radiation missiles) shooters. The primary

 

missile threats in the skies over Baghdad were the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 missile systems.

 

Iraqi AAA was always present, forcing attack aircraft to remain at high altitude in the

 

target area. Coalition aircraft suffered minimal attrition from SA-2s and SA-3s over

 

Baghdad and still managed to accomplish their mission.

 

       The strategic nature of the targets in Baghdad tied the command and control and

 

targeting effort directly to the national leadership. The United States national leadership

 

did not micro-manage the air war as President Johnson did during the Vietnam War. The

 

national leadership did exercise control over the targeting effort in that President Bush

 

approved the strategic target list generated by coalition planners before the air war started.

 

Additionally, the national leadership participated in the formulation of the ROE that

 

ensured that the strategic attack effort would not damage the cohesion of the coalition or

 

national prestige.

 

       The national leadership informally articulated five formal restraints to serve as

 

guidance for the conduct of the strategic strikes.

 

 

       1. The planners should plan the air strikes so that they minimize Iraqi

       non-combatant casualties.

 

       2. The strategic strikes should not damage Iraqi cultural and religious structures.

 

       3. The planners and pilots must limit the damage to the Iraqi economy and

       capacity for post-war recovery.

 

       4. The coalition planners must protect the lives of any hostages to the maximum

       extent possible.

 

       5. The coalition will not use nuclear weapons.85

 

 

The coalition air planners used this guidance in the formulation of their target list and

 

strike plans. The national command authority was able to review and approve the target

 

list before the air war started. This centralized control was essential for the success of the

 

strategic air effort. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

 

of Staff(CJCS) received briefings on: attack missions, target categories, munition effects,

 

and estimated collateral damage.86

 

       The targeting effort was able to use the extensive international data base

 

concerning Baghdad's urban terrain. Overhead satellite imagery, national and international

 

intelligence, and contractor construction reports helped planners to create an accurate

 

picture of the targets in Baghdad. While the targeting effort was on the overall a

 

resounding success, there was one notable exception. The attack against the Al Firdos

 

bunker, a valid military target, created an international embarrassment for the national

 

leadership. USAF penetration bombs destroyed the bunker that Iraqi military officers

 

were using to protect their wives and children from air attack. According to the law of

 

war, the Iraqi government was culpable for the deaths of these non-combatants. The Iraqi

 

government should not have allowed non-combatants to use a military facility and still

 

expected them to enjoy immunity as civilians. Legal or not, the attack still generated

 

negative public opinion towards the United States.

 

       The strategic strikes conducted in Baghdad used a variety of the following

 

precision guided and precision delivered weapons:

 

 

       1. Tactical Land Attack Missile (TLAM) cruise missiles (blast and non-lethal

       warheads)87

 

       2. Paveway II and III series of LGB (both GP and penetration warheads):

       GBU-16 (1,000lb), GBU-10 (2000lb), GBU-24 (2,000lb), GBU-27 (2,000lb for

       F-117), and the GBU-28 (4,700lb deep penetrator)88

 

       3. Extended-Range Data-Link (ERDL) Walleye glide bombs

 

       4. Stand-off Land Attack Missiles (SLAM)

 

       5. MK-83 and MK-84 General purpose bombs.89

 

 

The precision strike capabilities offered by coalition weapons were exceptional. The 282

 

US Navy TLAM strikes (180 in the first two days) demonstrated a very credible capability

 

throughout the campaign to strike strategic targets with precision.90 Additionally,

 

coalition air forces used deep-penetrator LGBs with a high degree of success. Some

 

analysts believe that the strategic bombing effort in Baghdad had little effect on the Iraqi

 

war effort.91 What is certain, however, is that the coalition hit the targets it wanted to.  At

 

a minimum, the nightly CNN videos of precision weapons slamming into key government

 

buildings in the Iraqi capital had a psychological impact on Saddam Hussein and his

 

military.

 

       Except for the TLAM strikes, the key to the-weapons' high precision was the high

 

capability of the manned delivery platforms. The LGBs required precise and steady laser

 

illumination for successful terminal guidance. Likewise, the Walleye and SLAM missiles

 

required highly capable delivery platforms to guide them successfully to the target.

 

Initially, strike aircraft such as F-15Es, F-16s, F/A-18s, A-6Es, and Tornados delivered

 

non-precision ord