Urban
Offensive Air Support: Is The United
States Military
Prepared
And Equipped?
CSC
1995
SUBJECT
AREA - Strategic Issues
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
Executive
Summary i
Illustrations
and Tables ii
CHAPTER
1: INTRODUCTION TO URBAN OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT 1
CHAPTER
2: MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN (MOUT) 6
The Urban Terrain 7
The Nature of Urban Combat
13
Summary 18
CHAPTER
3: THE LAW OF WAR AND PUBLIC OPINION 19
Jus ad Bellum 20
Jus in Bello 20
Discrimination 20
Proportionality 24
The Media and Public Opinion 24
Summary 26
CHAPTER
4: URBAN OAS: EVOLUTION AND CASE STUDIES 27
World War I 28
Post-World War I 28
World War II 29
Korea
32
Vietnam 33
1914 to 1968 Summary
34
Case Study: Peace for Galilee 36
Case Study: Operation Desert Storm 43
Case Study: Operation Restore Hope 51
Case Study: The Russian Invasion of Grozny 59
Summary 66
CHAPTER
5: REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE URBAN OAS 67
Air Superiority 68
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
(SEAD) 68
Effective Targeting
69
Responsive Command, Control, and
Communications 77
Effective Weapons
80
Capable Platforms and Sensors 92
Cooperative Weather
93
Proficient and Trained
Participants
94
Summary 96
CONCLUSION
97
NOTES
101
BIBLIOGRAPHY 113
ENCLOSURES
Enclosure 1: Overhead Imagery of
Mogadishu 127
Enclosure 2: City Maps of Mogadishu
(1:12,500 scale) 128
2A: Dense, Random
Development 129
2B: Close, Orderly
Development
130
2C: High-Rise
Development
131
2D: Industrial and
Transportation Area 132
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Title:
Urban Offensive Air Support: Is the United States Military Prepared and
Equipped?
Author: Major Jon M. Davis USMC
Thesis: Will doctrine, training, and equipment
shortfalls force fixture joint force
commanders
to deny offensive air support (OAS) to their ground units in urban areas?
Background: While all trends point to the fact that the
fixture military battlefield will be
urban,
the United States is woefully ill-prepared to conduct it. According to current
doctrine,
the United States military will attempt to avoid urban areas in the conduct of
a land
campaign.
This doctrine has been steadfast over the last 40 years, and has resulted in a
military
machine that lacks the training, and equipment to conduct urban warfare
effectively.
Unfortunately,
our opponents have identified this deficiency and have recently exploited it
(Mogadishu)
for their tactical and strategic advantage. Traditionally, OAS has been a key
component
of our ground-combat fire-support. Our current weapons work very well in rural
environments
but have limited applicability in urban environments. This deficiency
represents
our critical vulnerability in conducting urban ground combat operations.
The keys to success in conducting urban
OAS are effective weapons and delivery
platforms,
integrated fixed and rotary-wing attack platforms, media education, and
training.
The
OAS platforms must have accurate navigation and a self-designation capability
for
precision-guided
munitions. The weapons for urban OAS must allow for accurate target
discrimination
and low collateral-damage. Our current inventory is deficient in both fixed
and
rotary-wing capabilities. The attack helicopter's shaped-charge warheads (TOW
and
Hellfire)
have a poor effect on targets in an urban environment. Our fixed-wing ordnance
has
problems with discrimination and collateral damage. Currently the only ordnance
allowed
by the rules of engagement (ROE) in urban close air support (CAS) scenarios are
weapons
weighing 500 pounds or less. A potential problem for fixture efforts lies in
the fact
that
our procurement prods for fixture tactical fixed-wing precision munitions have
a
minimum
weight of 1,000 pounds. Both fixed and rotary-winged OAS platforms involved
in
urban fire support require a low-yield, precision, blast-penetration weapon.
The
integration
of fixed and rotary wing OAS aircraft is essential in urban combat. If our
opponent
can deny the low altitude regime to our attack helicopters, our fixed wing
aircraft
must
be able to fill in the void. Media education concerning our urban OAS
capabilities,
limitations,
and the law of war is essential to ensure that they project an accurate picture
to
the
American people. All of the services must initiate aggressive integrated fixed
and rotary
wing
urban OAS training programs. They can utilize existing DOD urban training areas
and
possibly
some bases that the Base Realignment and Closing (BRAC) Commission has
scheduled
for closure. Additionally, training and readiness manuals must reflect these
requirements
for both fixed and rotary wing OAS communities.
Recommendation: In order to conduct effective urban combat,
the United States must
specifically
focus its training, procurement, and doctrine on the conduct of Urban OAS.
This
urban OAS must allow for discrimination, proportionality, and a positive media
representation.
ILLUSTRATIONS AND
TABLES
Table
1A: Projected World Population Growth 1
Table
1B: Urban Population Density Projection for Year 2000 2
Table
1C: 20th Century Urban Combat 4
Illustration
2A: Street Diagram
11
Illustration
5A: Pioneer UAV
73
Illustration
5B: Predator UAV
75
Illustration
5C: RBS-17 Blast-Penetrator
Hellfire 89
CHAPTER I
Introduction to Urban
Offensive Air Support
Victory smiles upon those who
anticipate the changes in the character of war, not
upon those who wait to adapt themselves
after the changes occur.
- Giulio Douhet (1922)1
The arena for land combat is evolving.
Historically, the preponderance of military
operations
have occurred in rural landscapes. The future area of military operations is
now
emerging. Accelerated by the fusion of two demographic phenomena, the
battlefield
is
shifting to urban, vice rural, terrain. First, the global population explosion
(table 1A) is
experiencing
a disproportionate rate of increase in the third world. By the year 2025, 80
percent
of the world's population will reside in third world nations.2 Second, the
inability
of
the rural areas of these third world nations to support the population
explosion has led
to
massed migrations to urban areas. This migratory trend will increase the
percentage
Click
here to view image
of
people living in urban areas to 50 percent of the world's total population.4
The
population
explosion when combined with an equal explosion in urban population will
create
cities in the third world that have a population density (Table 1B) 10 to 25
times
greater
than Washington, D.C.5
Click
here to view image
Compounding the urban density problem
will be chronic shortages of food and
water
that will increase the frequency of unrest. This unrest will manifest itself in
urban
armed
conflict and terror campaigns as recently witnessed in Somalia. As a result, we
must
be able to conduct combat operations in urban environments.
Cities have become lucrative targets
for groups desiring to create unrest and
destabilize
governments. They target the urban areas because they many times represent
the
economic, political, and cultural centers of national power. A successful
campaign in
an
urban environment allows instant access to the national center of gravity, the
people.
Consequently,
we are observing a greater emphasis from potential adversaries on urban
military
operations. Militias and guerrillas operated effectively in Sidon, Tyre, Panama
City,
Mogadishu, Sarajevo, and Grozny because they realize the importance of the city
in
achieving
their strategic goals. Additionally, insurgencies target urban areas because it
provides
them with their sources of power; people, money, and social unrest.
The United States has fought in urban
environments (table 1C) in virtually all of its
recent
conflicts. Each of these urban combat operations were costly in resources and
time.
As
a result, the United States generated a system of warfighting that attacked and
defeated
conventional
armies in rural terrain, intentionally bypassing urban areas. This system
featured
the application of massive firepower to overpower our opponents while
minimizing
friendly casualties. A key ingredient to this system of warfighting has been
use
of
offensive air support (OAS). During the Second World War, extensive use of OAS
reduced
enemy positions inside urban areas. Allied fighter-bombers destroyed cities and
villages
with little regard for collateral damage or non-combatant casualties.7 The
Second
World
War was a total war, prosecuted by the military, and supported by the
government
and
the people of the United States. This support lessened the public's aversion to
the
excessive
force applied in Allied air attacks. Since 1945, the United
States
participated only in limited wars. In these wars, the limited nature of the
military
and
political objectives also limited the people's acceptance of unlimited
destruction.
Click
here to view image
The United States military's aversion
to urban combat stems from a combination of
many
factors. Historically urban combat involves: high casualties, the loss of
operational
tempo,
negative press coverage, and negative public opinion. Urban combat plays to our
weakness
and our opponent's strengths. The United States' conventional force is superior
in
firepower, mobility, and logistics in a rural battlefield. The urban
environment will
impose
limits on our mobility and firepower, allowing the defender to control the
tempo of
operations.
By forcing a fight in an urban environment, our opponent's weaker
conventional
force can level the playing field. The American people will demand low
casualties
(both friendly and non-combatant), and low collateral damage. Desert Storm
demonstrated
to the world how superior the United States is in conventional rural
warfare.
General Aideed's military forces in Mogadishu exposed our weakness in urban
combat.
It is for exactly these reasons that our opponents will force the future
military
confrontations
to occur on urban terrain. According to the 1994 Defense Science Board
study
on Military Operations In Urban Terrain, "We can no longer choose to avoid
urban
areas.
Our missions will specifically focus on them."9 An operational dilemma
confronts
the
United States military. While all trends point to the fact that the future
military
battlefield
will be urban, we are woefully ill-prepared to conduct battle in it. Our
weakest
link
in current capability is in the ability to provide urban OAS. Some military
leaders
believe
that current technological and political limitations will make OAS in urban
environments
too difficult. They maintain that future urban fights will have to be infantry
only
fights. That position is unacceptable. If the future battlefield is an urban
one, we
must
prepare to support the ground forces with all of our combined-arms. In order to
conduct
effective urban combat, the United States must specifically focus its training,
procurement,
and doctrine on the conduct of urban OAS. This urban OAS must allow for
discrimination,
proportionality, and a positive media representation.
CHAPTER 2
MOUT
The attack or defense of a built-up
area should be undertaken only when
significant tactical or strategic
advantage accrues through its seizure or control.
- U.S. Army
Field Manual (FM) 90-10 MOUT.10
The purpose of this chapter is to
describe the impact that urban terrain has on
combat
operations. At the conclusion of this chapter, the reader will realize that the
dynamic
nature of both the terrain, and the ground combat element's (GCE) fire support
requirements,
lend themselves to air delivered fires.
The acronym MOUT (Military Operations
in Urbanized Terrain) "classifies those
military
actions planned and conducted on a terrain complex where manmade construction
impacts
on the tactical options available to commanders."11 The United States'
military
doctrine
currently stresses the need to isolate or bypass urban environments in the
conduct
of
its tactical operations. Our potential opponents are aware of our lack of
training,
equipment,
and doctrine to accomplish urban combat operations. Third world powers may
view
this lack of capability and will in this area as our Achilles heel. Our
adversaries
recognize
the need to operate in, and control, the cities since they represent the center
of
political,
economic and strategic power.12 In order to understand the unique requirements
for
operational and tactical success in urbanized areas, we must first define the
urban
terrain.
The Urban Terrain
The 1994 Defense Science Board study on
Military Operations in Urban Terrain,
defines
a built-up area as a "concentration of structures, facilities and people
that forms the
economic,
political, and cultural center of a region."13 If not accustomed to
looking at an
urban
area as military terrain, it might look very confusing and disorderly. In fact,
most
urban
areas display quantifiable order. There are seven characteristics of urban
terrain that
affect
military operations:14
1. Density of structures and population
2. Building Construction
3. Street Patterns
4. Ports and waterways
5. Subterranean features
6. Function of urban area
7. Size of urban area
The density of the urban terrain is a
major determinant in the selection of tactics
and
fire support for a military operation for three reasons15. First, the urban
terrain will
never
allow the same potential for conventional maneuver and may render certain
firepower
systems (i.e., armor, artillery) as inappropriate in their traditional roles.
Second,
urban
terrain density will limit the firepower support that we have traditionally
enjoyed to
minimize
collateral damage, non-combatant casualties, and loss of public support. Third,
density
of the urban terrain will force the meeting engagement to occur at such close
ranges
(25 to 100 meters) that supporting arms must be ultra-precise and yield
controlled.
The
urban terrain will display one of, or combinations of, the following structure
densities:
dense
random, close orderly block, dispersed residential, high-rise, or industrial
and
transportation
development.16
Dense random development is typical of
old inner city construction in third world
countries.
The density of the structures brings with it the highest population density.
The
narrow
(7-15 meters), twisting, irregular streets limit the use of tanks, assault
amphibian
vehicles
(AAVs), and indirect fire artillery. Clear fields of fire and arming distance
are
generally
insufficient for the use of ground-based wire-guided missiles.17 Typical
building
structure
will include thick walls that will require penetrating weapons. These
penetrating
weapons
should not have excessive explosive content that would cause excessive
rubbling18,
further reducing mobility. Limited explosive yields will also factor heavily in
trying
to minimize the non-combatant casualties. The urban terrain will limit line of
sight
communications,
and favor the defender's use of ambush techniques. The random nature
of
the terrain can lead to great confusion for the ground combat units and its
fire-support
assets.
Close, orderly block development
consists of mixed residential and commercial
type
buildings common to central areas of cities and towns. The streets are
generally
wider
and form rectangular patterns with buildings frequently forming a continuous
front
along
a block.19 The orderly lay-out of the streets helps in reducing the confusion
associated
with random development. The proximity of the buildings will limit: armor
mobility,
ground-based precision guided munitions, and communications. Typical building
structure
will include thick walls that will require penetrating weapons of limited yield
as
required
for the dense, random development structures.
Dispersed residential development
consists of rowhouses, or single dwellings
where
average street width between buildings is about 30 meters. Street patterns are
normally
rectangular or curving in this type area.20 The proximity of the residential
buildings
will limit fields of fire for precision guided munitions. Fire-support weapons
effect
and requirements will vary due to the wide variety in construction quality. Due
to
the
constrained nature of this type development, fire-support planners will need to
avoid
weapons
that will generate excessive rubbling or fires. Even though the buildings are
close
together, the relatively wide streets will afford a greater degree of mobility
and
coordination
than dense, random development. Recent combined-arms combat operations
in
dispersed residential developments have occurred in Grozny, Chechnya.
High-rise development is
"...typical of modem construction in larger cities or
towns.
It consists of multi-storied apartments, separated large open areas and one
story
buildings.
Wide streets are laid out in rectangular patterns."21 Recent combined-arms
combat
operations in Beirut and Grozny have occurred in high-rise development areas.
During
Desert Storm, coalition aircraft and cruise missiles flew successful strategic
strike
missions
in such parts of Baghdad. Yet, the tactical use of conventional combined-arms
weapons
is relatively inefficient when addressing defensive positions located inside
high-rise
buildings. A precision, deep-target penetrator is necessary if a high-rise
building