Beyond The Weinberger Doctrine CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - History EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Beyond The Weinberger Doctrine Author: Major Scott T. Campbell, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The Weinberger Doctrine provides a legitimate framework concerning the use of military force where our national interests are considered vital to our national security; in this post Cold War era--less than vital national interests requires us to go beyond the Weinberger Doctrine. Background: The current state of world affairs and the use of military means to pursue our national interests are becoming more and more complicated. The Weinberger Doctrine provided a legitimate framework for the commitment of military forces during the later stages of the Cold War. Additionally, it still provides a legitimate framework for those situations where our national interests are considered vital to our national security. Our current national security strategy of Engagement and Enlargement identifies several national interests that are categorized as being less than vital to our national security. We need to use a different set of criteria when determining whether to use military force in these situations. Recommendation: When our national interests are considered less than vital to our national security, we need to get away from the use of a checklist and start to analyze each situation in which we are contemplating the use of military force. We need to ask ourselves: (1) Does the benefit of using military force override the costs we are willing to pay? (2) What is the desired end--state? (3) Are the forces deployed commensurate with their mission? (4) Is the military the most effective element of our national power? and (5) Is the use of force overwhelming and decisive? BEYOND THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE Major Scott T. Campbell The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the world's only remaining superpower is a fundamental fact. The result however; is a very complex and different world. The Soviet Union, which dominated almost every aspect of America's security strategy is gone. In its place new countries have been born all across Eurasia. All of them are struggling--struggling to become democracies, struggling to develop market economies and struggling to develop multiethnic societies.1 In this post Cold War era, the use of military means to pursue our national interests are becoming more and more complicated. We continue to ask ourselves the same fundamental question presented by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger: "under what circumstances, and by what means, does a great democracy such as ours reach the painful decision that the use of military force is necessary to protect our interests or to carry out our national policy?"2 On 28 November 1984, while addressing the Washington Press Club, then--Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger proposed the following six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad: (1) The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.... (2) If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning.... (3) If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.... (4) The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed--their size, composition, and disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.... (5) Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.... (6) The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.3 These six points now comprise the tenets of what has become known as the Weinberger Doctrine. The doctrine provided a legitimate framework for the commitment of military forces during the latter stages of the Cold War. Additionally, it still provides a legitimate framework for those situations where our national interests are considered vital to our national security.4 In this post Cold War era, our current national security strategy of Engagement and Enlargement identifies several national interests that are categorized as being less than vital to our national security. It is precisely for this reason that I propose we need to go beyond the Weinberger Doctrine. We need to utilize a different set of criteria when determining whether to use military force in these situations! The current state of world affairs and the use of military force also requires us to address the War Powers Resolution. Several arguments exist concerning the impracticality of the resolution and that it is even unconstitutional. In this post Cold War era, the resolution will continue to be tested. Our national security strategy of Engagement and Enlargement recognizes that "our nation can only address this era's dangers and opportunities if we remain actively engaged in global affairs."5 The global interdependence created during the Cold War, has critically linked our national security to events and access overseas. We learned after World War I that the United States can not afford to abandon its allies and resort to isolationism. As stated by Mr. Weinberger, "Stark isolationism quickly would lead to a far more dangerous situation for the United States: We would be without allies and faced by many hostile or indifferent nations."6 Our national security strategy states, "We can and must make the difference through our engagement; but our involvement must be carefully tailored to serve our interests and priorities."7 Our involvement or the means to accomplish our policies may consist of a single element or any combination of the four elements of national power: political, economic, military and social. Our national security strategy of Engagement and Enlargement takes all of these into account. The three primary objectives that President Clinton has stressed are: Enhancing Our Security. Taking account of the realities of the post--Cold War era and the new threats, a military capability appropriately sized and postured to meet the diverse needs of our strategy, including the ability, in concert with regional allies, to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. We will continue to pursue arms control agreements to reduce the danger of nuclear conflict and promote stability. Promoting Prosperity at Home. A vigorous and integrated economic policy designed to stimulate global environmentally sound economic growth and free trade and to press for open and equal U.S. access to foreign markets. Promoting Democracy. A framework of democratic enlargement that increases our security by protecting, consolidating and enlarging the community of free market democracies. Our efforts focus on preserving democratic processes in key emerging democratic states including Russia, Ukraine and other new states of the former Soviet Union.8 As stated by Richard N. Haass, the loss of "national cohesion has created a period of history that can be characterized as one of 'international deregulation.' There are new players, new capabilities, and new alignments, but as of yet, no new rules."9 The current world situation requires us to look beyond the Weinberger Doctrine. The circumstances in which military means may now be utilized are numerous. Our primary focus is no longer just simply warfighting. As described by Mr. Haas, we are now faced with the fact that, "Military interventions can be classified according to the following purposes: deterrence, prevention, compellence, punishment, peacekeeping, peace--making, nation--building, interdiction, humanitarian assistance, and rescue."10 These additional responsibilities also include several gray areas. I concur with Mr. Weinberger in his statement that, "The most likely challenge to the peace--the gray area conflicts--are precisely the most difficult challenges to which a democracy must respond."11 As these gray areas, situations in which our national interests are considered less than vital, continue to increase; it is my opinion that the Weinberger Doctrine is no longer such an enduring guide. While I do not believe that we can create a checklist that pertains to every potential conflict; I do believe that we must now ask ourselves certain fundamental questions and apply certain principles concerning the use of our military forces. The following criteria must be addressed as we continue the debate concerning the commitment of our military forces. (1) First, Once our political interests and objectives are clearly identified, we need to ensure that the benefit of using military force overrides the costs we are willing to pay. If we determine that the costs are too great, then we should use some other element of national power. The first point emphasizes our interests. As stated by Mr. Nuechterlein, there are four basic interests that could apply to any state: "defense of the homeland, economic well--being, favorable world order, and promotion of values."12 He also divided these down into four levels of intensity: Survival Issues: The very existence of the nation--state is in jeopardy, either as a result of overt military attack on its own territory or from the imminent threat of attack should an enemy's demands be rejected.... Vital Issues: Serious harm will likely result to the state unless strong measures, including the use of conventional military force, are employed to counter an adverse action by another state or to deter it from undertaking a serious provocation... Major Issues: The political, economic, and ideological well--being of the state may be adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment which thus require corrective action in order to prevent them from becoming serious threats.... Peripheral Issues: The well--being of the state is not adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but the interests of private citizens and companies operating in foreign countries are endangered.13 As a result of the end of the Cold War, Edwin J. Arnold, Jr. identifies that, "For the first time in this century, none of the most powerful states of the world seems to harbor aggressive intent."14 The threat of involvement over issues concerning survival or vital issues has been greatly reduced. What we are now experiencing is a number of regional conflicts throughout the world. These conflicts can be categorized as either major or peripheral issues. Somalia is one example. Our interests in Somalia were in line with our national security strategy of promoting democracy and enhancing our security. We identified our interests in Somalia, but did we evaluate the costs we were willing to accept? That the humanitarian operation in Somalia quickly came to an end on "October 3 when 18 U.S. soldiers were killed and 75 wounded while raiding the stronghold of Mohammad Farah Aideed"15 would seem to indicate that we did not. In Bosnia, it is evident that the political leadership did evaluate the benefit to cost ratio. Secretary of Defense William Perry stated, "It would take hundreds of thousands of troops and probably significant casualties to impose the outcome we want--world peace."16 In this case, the cost of using military force to achieve our political objective outweighs the benefit; however, this is not to say that we do not have political interests in Bosnia. Our interests are humanitarian interests to limit the spread of violence and suffering while the world works for a peaceful solution. As the world's remaining military super power, we need to use our military power judiciously. Regardless of what level or intensity of political interest, we need to continue to apply the cost to benefit analysis before we utilize our military forces. We need to ensure that the level of our military involvement is in line with our political objectives. (2) Second, Not only do we need to continue to clearly identify our political and military objectives, but we need to identify the desired end--state or the conditions that will signal the end to our use of military force. As Clausewitz has stated, "No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it."17 One point I want to clarify is that the identification of end--state conditions should not be confused with end--dates. We need to identify end--state conditions that will signal the end of military force application and when we can withdraw our forces. In Beirut, the United States as part of the first Multinational Force (MNF) was responsible for the evacuation of Yasir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) trapped in West Beirut. Mr. Weinberger stated that after accomplishing the objective, it "was agreed with our associates that after ten quiet days following the departure of the PLO forces, it was time to leave, and we left."18 Clearly defined objectives enable us to define end--state. When our end--state can not be achieved, we either need to redefine the mission or withdraw our forces. The second MNF was assigned the mission--to "establish a presence. Later the mission was defined to be the interposition of the MNF between the withdrawing armies of Israel and Syria, until the Lebanese armed forces were sufficiently trained and equipped to take over that role."19 The problem was that neither Syria nor Israel was withdrawing. Hindsight tells us that with no mission, the MNF should have been pulled out. General Colin Powell, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, "Military force should be used only when we can measure that the military objective has been achieved."20 When defining end--states, we need to be aware that Clausewitz also stated, "The original political objectives can greatly alter during the course of the war and may finally change entirely since they are influenced by events and their probable consequences."21 When political objectives change, we need to be aware that the end--state, mission and the forces deployed may also have to be adjusted accordingly. As stated in our national security strategy, we need to be aware of our exit strategy. "Do we have timelines and milestones that will reveal the extent of success or failure."22 The identification of end--state conditions will prevent mission creep. (3) Third, We need to continually evaluate the mission and the environment. Forces need to be deployed commensurate with their mission and objectives. In today's environment, the need to continually evaluate each mission is even greater. The issue we are faced with is; do we task organize with a preponderance of combat forces or combat service support forces? The original mission of the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNISOM I) under a U.S. led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was to create a secure environment for famine relief. In this situation, there was a lesser need for combat service support forces and a greater need for combat forces. Although the preponderance of UNITAF forces consisted of combat troops, it also consisted of specialized units such as medical units, civil affairs, psychological operations units, special operations forces and others. The success of UNITAF can be attributed to the appropriately balanced force structure matched to accomplish the mission. On 4 May 1993, the official turnover between UNITAF forces and the U.N. led forces signaled the start of UNISOM II. As the mission continued, UNISOM II transitioned to a nation--building operation. UNISOM II forces were not appropriately structured nor equipped to accomplish the mission. The specialized forces present for UNITAF were not found among their forces. These forces should have been provided to support the new mission or the mission should have been terminated or scaled back. We need to continually reassess the mission, and the forces we have committed to ensure that the committed forces are commensurate with their objectives. Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell stated, we need to be aware of "How might he situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?"23 (4) Fourth, Military power should be employed in conjunction with the other elements of national power; not necessarily as a last resort. The world situation in which the Weinberger Doctrine was developed has completely changed. The end of the Cold War has all but eliminated the threat of superpower confrontations over survival issues. Our national interests now include major and peripheral issues. As mentioned earlier, the interventions that the military may now be involved in are numerous. My argument is that the use of military force strictly as a last resort; no longer applies. Instead the political leadership of our country is challenged by a dynamic world situation. We must now weigh each element of national power against the other to determine which is the most effective concerning our particular national interests. In my opinion, Weinberger's sixth test restricts our ability to effectively utilize all our elements of national power. President Bush believed that "force can be a useful backdrop to diplomacy, a complement to it, or, if need be, a temporary alternative."24 "Bush clearly believed that the use of military force is one of the means available at any time to achieve national interests, not only as a last resort."25 I look at each element of national power as a tool that can used to accomplish our national objectives. If military power is the most effective tool to accomplish our objective; we have analyzed the benefit to cost ratio; our objectives are clearly identified and achievable; then we should use it. Some examples of the use of force other than as a last resort includes the Clinton Administration attack against Iraq in 1993. Information obtained was persuasive enough to indicate that Iraq did in fact plan an assassination attempt against President Bush.26 Additionally, "The Reagan Administration bombed Libya when it determined that Libya was responsible for a terrorist attack in Berlin."27 Many people subscribe to the "just war" theory in which the use of military force should not be taken until all other options have failed. True isolationists use the Weinberger Doctrine as an argument for not getting involved. As a democratic society, most people would assume this is the most reasonable approach; however, it has the potential to work against us. The Gulf War is a good example. If we waited for diplomacy and economic sanctions to work, the coalition had a greater chance of breaking apart. The passage of time also would have allowed Iraq more time to prepare their WMD capabilities and possibly inflict a greater number of casualties.28 In Grenada, if we waited, we were looking at a possible hostage situation or the possibility of the government aligning with Cuba or the Soviet Union.29 Another argument is the importance of acting early to prevent a crisis from developing into an even larger crisis. For example, most of us would agree that when our national interests are involved, we would much rather intervene early and prevent a regional crisis from turning into an international crisis. If we look at the situation of the Philippines in December of 1989, the United States responded to a request from Corazon Aquino, "Where some military leaders were attempting a coup d'etat."30 The United States responded by over flying the facilities captured by the insurgents to intimidate them. As the situation unfolded, "The coup collapsed the following day."31 This may be an over simplification of the benefits of an early intervention, but the point is made. Early intervention prevented this event from escalating into a major contingency. Technological developments such as precision guided munitions have also put a spin on this argument. It is now possible "for the United States to use compellent force, that is, to strike targets in one place (i.e., the capital city of an adversary) to influence behavior elsewhere."32 The use of precision guided munitions provides minimal risks to U.S. forces and greatly reduces the risk of collateral damage. My fourth argument demonstrates that we should not limit the use of our military force to strictly being utilized as a last resort. There are benefits to early intervention and situations where the use of military force may be the most appropriate means to accomplish our political objectives. (5) Fifth, Overwhelming and decisive use of force when military intervention is required. The use of overwhelming force will ensure "quick, decisive, and low casualty results that have come to characterize US military operations."33 This point is in line with my first argument. Once our political interests and objectives have been identified and we have determined that the benefit of using military force overrides the costs we are willing to pay; we need to commit our troops in a manner that will guarantee a high probability of victory at the lowest possible cost. Through overwhelming force, we also advance the possibility of deterring a conflict by demonstrating to our potential adversaries our willingness to use maximum force. The strategy of overwhelming force emphasizes the use of decisive force to rapidly overwhelm an adversary. During the Gulf War, our deployment of a large military force not only resulted in an overwhelming victory, but it also gave added incentive to diplomatic attempts to end the war peacefully. The results obviously demonstrate that we learned what Secretary Weinberger had hoped we had learned from Vietnam. "If a war is not serious enough for us to have to win it, it is not serious enough to enter it."34 The use of overwhelming force also brings up a discussion concerning the War Powers Resolution. The point brought out by Edwin J. Arnold is that overwhelming force "alters the nature and duration of guaranteed public and congressional support for committing U.S. forces. Under such conditions, operations involving overwhelming and rapid application of military force would theoretically be completed before support could erode."35 I propose that we continue to strive for these results and that overwhelming force should be applied whenever we are considering the use of military force. I do want to discuss one point concerning our emphasis on minimizing casualties. We need to remember the lessons from our past. As stated by Grant T. Hammond, "If war lasts long enough (like Korea and Vietnam) the adversary does not have to win militarily. Rather, he has only to not lose."36 Too much emphasis on low casualty rates can quickly become a weakness. In this post Cold War era, the "remarkable trinity" of the people, the government, and the military as described in Carl von Clausewitz's, On War is more applicable today than ever before. Modern technology that provides almost instantaneous press and media coverage can easily influence the will of the American people. As we learned in Vietnam, "Military actions not fully supported by the American people cannot succeed."37 The impact that the press and the media now have to influence the will of the American people is another reason that we need to apply the principle of overwhelming force. The final issue pertaining to the use of military force is the argument concerning the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution "Public Law 93--148 was passed by the 93rd Congress on November 7, 1973."38 This law is commonly referred to as the War Powers Act. It states that the President, as the Commander in Chief, can introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or potential hostile situations outside the territory of the United States for an initial period of sixty days. The sixty days can be extended for thirty days if approved by Congress. At the end of this ninety day period, if directed by Congress, the President has to remove the forces involved. As stated by Mr. Haass, "The centrality of the decision--making authority in the executive branch has been compromised by the legislative branch to an extent that actively interferes with that process."39 One of the problems with the War Powers Act is that it interferes with the President's ability to conduct his foreign policy. In line with our national security strategy, the National Command Authorities may determine that it is in our interests to get involved in a peace keeping or nation building mission. The problem is: it places the burden of action on those who want to continue the policy (that is a particular intervention) rather than those who want to change it. At the same time, there has not been a corresponding acceptance or responsibility by Congress for the outcome of decisions concerning the employment of military forces.40 It is to the point where the legislative branch uses this authority strictly for partisan gains. A great debate concerning the argument surrounding the War Powers Resolution argument was stated in an article written by former commandant of the Marine Corps P. X. Kelly. In it he stated: The foreign policy of the United States continues to be compromised--sometimes dangerously--by the political posturing of Congress and the 1973 War Powers Resolution. The lesson was driven home during Operation Desert Shield four years ago, last year in Somalia and earlier this month as many members of both houses of Congress sought to distance themselves from the political accountability in the event harm comes to any U.S. forces in Haiti prior to next months congressional elections. In fact, for more than two decades, Congress has used the War Powers Resolution as an insurance policy. Whenever the president sends troops into harms way, legislators demand that he 'obey the law' by getting their approval. They then demand as a condition of support a public withdrawal date and other assurances that make a successful operation virtually impossible--knowing that a wise president will be forced to go forward alone. This way, if the mission fails or there are significant U.S. casualties, members of Congress can avoid political accountability to the voters--after all, the president 'broke the law.' On the other hand, if the president succeeds, despite being weakened by congressional opposition, members of Congress explain that they were behind the president on the merits from the beginning (surely they can't be criticized for demanding compliance with the 'law') and they march proudly in victory parades. It's a brilliant tactic--if you don't care about the lives of our troops.41 It has been argued that the War Powers Resolution is even unconstitutional. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell stated that: the Resolution expanded Congress' authority 'beyond the power to declare war to the power to limit troop deployment in situations short of war,' and concluded: 'Into the very situation that requires national steadiness and resolve, the War Powers Resolution introduces doubt and uncertainty. This does not serve our Nation. The War Powers Resolution therefore threatens not only the delicate balance of power established by the constitution. It potentially undermines America's ability to effectively defend our national security.'42 It is precisely for these reasons that I recommend that the War Powers Resolution needs to taken to the U.S. Supreme Court and decided on; once and for all. The current state of the world affairs will continue to put the resolution to test. Conclusion The world has changed dramatically since Secretary Weinberger first published his six tests concerning the use of military force. With the end of the Cold War, our enemies are no longer clearly identified. Our national security strategy is no longer based on deterrence and preventing the spread of communism. While still concerned with political interests that are considered vital, many of our interests currently fall into the categories described by Mr. Nuechterlein as either "major" or "peripheral." Today, the difficult decisions surrounding the commitment of our military forces in these situations remains even more difficult. Since the Weinberger Doctrine, several of our prominent political and military leaders have attempted to either add or delete to the doctrine. What I propose is that we get away from the use of a checklist and start to analyze each situation in which we are contemplating the use of force. We need to ask ourselves: does the benefit of using military force override the costs we are willing to pay, what is the desired end--state, are the forces deployed commensurate with their mission, is military power the most effective element of national power and is the use of force overwhelming and decisive? I have also discussed that we need to do away with the War Powers Resolution. This will provide the President with the greatest amount of flexibility in carrying out his foreign policy and provide the opportunity to effectively utilize the points that I have discussed. Utilizing our national security strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, I have demonstrated that we must go beyond the Weinberger Doctrine when we are weighing the use of our military forces abroad. If we apply the criteria I have discussed, then we as a nation, can achieve what Secretary of Defense Weinberger originally intended; "national unity of purpose."44 1 William J. Perry, speech in Philadelphia, Nov. 3, 1994 as quoted in Defense Issues, "The Rules of Engagement," Vol.9 No. 84, 2 Caspar W. Weinherger Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, New York: Warner Books, 1990, p.446 3 Ibid,p.453--454 4 Secretary Weinherger's tests are used by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. (Ret.) to analyze national security decisions made during the Persian Gulfwar in On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1992pp. 11--13, 17, 31--32, 117, 171 and Thomas R. Dubois, "The Weinberger Doctrine and The Liberation of Kuwait," Parameters Vol. XXI, No. 4 (Winter 1991--1992), pp. 24-38. 5 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994). p. ii 6 Caspar W. Weinberger The Uses of Military Power Defense, January 1985, p. 5 7 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. i 8 Ibid., p.5 9 Richard N. Haass Intervention: The use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994,p.5 10 Haas, Intervention, p. 50 11 Weinberger, Fighting, p. 447 12 Donald E. Nuechterlein "The Concept of 'National Interest': A Time for New Approaches," Orbis, 23(Spring 1979), p.76 13 Ibid., pp. 79--80 14 Edwin J. Arnold, Jr. "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests," Parameters Spring 1994, p. 10 15 Fred Barnes "Peacekeeping disenchantment," Asia--Pacific Defense Reporter,, February--March 1994, p. 35 16 Perry, Defense Issues p. 3 17 As quoted in Weinberger, Fighting p. 453 18 Ibid., p. 150 19 Ibid.,p. 1 20 Les Aspin "With the Soviets and Cold War Gone, What is the Future for US Forces?", ROA National Security Report, November 1992, p. 23 21 Carl von Clasewitz On War ed. and trans., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 92 22 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement p. 10 23 Colin L. Powell "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, Vol.71, No. 5, p. 38 24 George Bush "The Use of Military Force: The President's Difficult Choice," Defense Issues,8(No. 1, 1993),p.2 25 Arnold, Parameters p. 12 26 Haass, Intervention, 55--56 27 Ibid., p.56 28 Ibid., p.88-89 29 Ibid., p.89 30 Ibid., p.29 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., p.16 33 Arnold, Parameters, p.12 34 Weinberger, Fighting. p. 181 35 Arnold, Parameters p. 7 36 Grant T. Hammond "Paradoxes of War," Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1994, p.13 37 Ibid., p.361 38 Haass, Intervention p.167 39 Ibid., p. 175 40 Ibid.,p.79 41 P.X. Kelley and Robert F. Turner "Out of Harms Way: From Beirut to Haiti, Congress Protects Itself Instead of Our Troops," The Washington Post, 23 October 1994, Sec. C, p.2, cols. 1--2. 42 Ibid.,col.5 43 Bard E. O'neill discusses that a government's response should be based after an in depth analysis of the environment, popular support, organization, unity, and external support. For more information see Bard E. O'neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Brassey's (US), Macmillian Publishing Company, New York, 1990 44 Weinberger,Fighting, p.456 BIBLIOGRAPHY Perry, William J., speech in Philadelphia, Nov.3,1994 as quoted in Defense Issues, "The Rules of Engagement," Vol. 9 No.84 Weinberger, Caspar W. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, New York: Warner Books, 1990 Summers, Harry G.,Jr. Colonel (Ret.) On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1992 Dubois, Thomas R. "The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait," Parameters, Vol. XXI, No. 4 (Winter 1991--92) A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994) Weinberger, Caspar W. "The Uses of Military Power", Defense, January 1985 Haass, Richard N. Intervention: The use of American Military Force in the Post--Cold War World, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994 Nuechterlein, Donald E. "The Concept of 'National Interest': A Time for New Approaches," Orbis, 23 (Spring 1979) Arnold, Edwin J., Jr. "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interests," Parameters, Spring 1994 Barnes, Fred "Peacekeeping disenchantment," Asia--Pacific Defense Reporter, February--March 1994 Aspin, Les "With the Soviets and Cold War Gone, What is the Future for US Forces?" ROA National Security Report, Noverber 1992 Powell, Colin L. "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93 Bush, George "The Use of Military Force: The President's Difficult Choice," Defense Issues, 8 (No. 1, 1993) Hammond, Grant T. "Paradoxes of War," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994 Kelley, P. X. and Robert F. Turner "Out of Harms Way: From Beirut to Haiti, Congress Protects Itself Instead of Our Troops," The Washington Post, 23 October 1994, Sec. C Wettering, Frederick L. and John N. Petrie "Dealing with Anarchy," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994 Clausewitz, Carl von On War, ed. and trans., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976 O'neill, Bard E. Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Brassey's (US), Macmillian Publishing Company, New York, 1990
