Naval Maneuver Warfare CSC 1995 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting Executive Summary Title: Naval Maneuver Warfare Author: Lieutenant Commander Gary T. Cooper, United States Navy Thesis: What is new about maneuver warfare and the conduct of naval operations? Background: In March 1994, the Department of the Navy pub- lished Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1 Naval Warfare which for- mally adopts maneuver warfare and Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) as the preferred method of warfighting for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Counter to the perception that the U.S. Navy is adopting and marinizing concepts considered developed for ground combat, the concept of maneuver warfare is more conducive in its application to naval warfare than land warfare. By the nature of war at sea and the independent characteristics of the maritime environ- ment, naval warfare naturally employs the tenets of maneuver war- fare. Historically, the success of naval forces engaged in combat at sea required sound commander's intent in order to exploit movement and maneuver, tempo, flexibility, and coordination of naval fires. While OMFTS is a significant step in the right direction in maturing naval doctrine with the technological and sociopolitical challenges of the next generation, its focus does not incorporate the nonamphibi- ous missions of the U.S.Navy. Within the context of joint operations, the U.S. Navy historically employed OMFTS principals beyond the amphibious warfare environment by providing Navy fires to shape the deep, close and rear battle. With maneuver warfare, there is nothing new to the conduct of naval operations outside amphibious operations. What is new the U.S. Navy is the institutionalization of maneuver warfare doctrine and terminology parallel to that of the other armed services. Recommendation: Expand NDP-1 to doctrinally address the U.S. Navy missions currently utilizing OMFTS tenets and expand the con- text of maneuver warfare as it applies to overall naval operations. Naval Maneuver Warfare Outline I. Introduction II. Theory of Maneuver Warfare III. Theories of Naval Warfare ...The Beginning of Naval Maneuver Warfare IV. Modernization Towards Maneuver V. Naval Maneuver Warfare VI. Summary Bibliography Naval Maneuver Warfare In March 1994, the Department of the Navy published the first of A series of naval doctrine publications, Naval Warfare (NDP-1), formally put into print the naval doctrine necessary to incorporate the new naval strategic direction outlined in the Department of the Navy White Paper "...From the Sea."1 Naval Warfare, published as the doctrinal corner stone for future naval operations, formally accepted maneuver warfare as the preferred method of warfighting for the United States Navy and Marine Corps. Termed Operational Maneuver From the Sea, Naval Warfare introduced the concept of operational maneuver by the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps as part of Naval Expeditionary Forces to project power ashore in the littoral regions of the world. While it seems that Operational Maneuver From the Sea is a significant step in maturing naval doctrine with the technological and sociopolitical challenges of the 21st century, and is parallel to the evolving maneuver doctrine of the other armed services, its focus as naval doctrine is not a significant change to the way the U. S. Navy has operated since the turn of the century. The U. S. Navy, by the very nature of the maritime environment, utilizes the concepts and elements of maneuver warfare in its day-to-day operations in peacetime and at war. What may seem like a new and dramatic shift in the way the U. S. Navy conducts war at sea, is really just a formalization of unwritten institutional doctrine that evolved with the transition to modern naval warfare. This paper will demonstrate that the characteristics and fundamentals of maneuver warfare began incorporation into U. S. Navy doctrine during the technological evolution of modern naval fighting beginning in the late 1800s. The very nature of the physical and mental challenges of war at sea, inherently dependent on movement and maneuver, are similar to the maneuver warfare theory accepted today. Counter to the perception the Navy is adopting and marinizing warfighting concepts considered developed for a ground combat environment, the concept of maneuver in many respects is more conducive in its application to naval warfare than land warfare. Operational Maneuver From the Sea described in Naval Warfare is only new in its application to Navy and Marine Corps amphibious operations. It is not new to the strategic and tactical influence of war at sea traditionally conducted by the U. S. Navy. Numerous events throughout the history of modern naval warfare, such as the Allied invasion of Sicily in World War II; the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese Navy in 1941; Doolittle's Raid against Tokyo; the use of naval air and surface fires in Vietnam; and most recently the naval war in Operation Desert Storm, are among numerous examples of maritime forces influencing the strategic, operational, and tactical land battle "from the sea" using the principles of maneuver warfare. To explore maneuver warfare and its relation in naval warfare we must examine the theory of maneuver warfare; the basic theories of modern naval warfare; the impact of technology on the evolution of naval warfare; and finally address the design of naval maneuver warfare as it should apply to naval operations in the 21st century. II. Theory of Maneuver Warfare The basic tenets of maneuver warfare are inherent to the maritime environment and the conduct of naval operations. Maneuver warfare was not formally recognized or institutionalized until the publication of NDP-1. Before addressing how it applies to naval warfare it is necessary to define the basic principles of maneuver warfare and how they apply to naval warfare. Maneuver warfare is the indirect approach to warfighting that focuses on the enemy's weaknesses or vulnerabilities. Unlike the direct force-on-force approach of attrition warfare, maneuver warfare concentrates on destroying elements of the enemy's power that give strength and cohesion to its leadership. By contrast to other forms of warfare, maneuver warfare focuses on the enemy vice terrain. The goal is to invoke confusion and disorder within the enemy to break his will to fight. Properly executing maneuver means being more agile and efficient than the enemy. Instead of engaging in mutual slaughter, maneuver warfare focuses on those peripheral things which are important to the enemy to survive.2 It is characterized by adaptability and is not limited to particular doctrines developed for specific environments.3 Maneuver is movement relative to the enemy to put him at a disadvantage.4 Because of its indirect approach to the enemy, maneuver warfare allows a smaller military force to engage and win against a larger military force. The War of the Second Coalition between France and England demonstrates the indirect nature of naval warfare. The Royal Navy, along with subsidized allies, drove at the heart of Frances economy by controlling the seas and blockading French ports. The British also took the indirect approach of striking around the edges of continental France and her overseas possessions by strangling France's overseas commerce and taking possessions.5 In World War II, the deployment of surface forces to the North Sea by the British and Germans demonstrated how a small force could briefly achieve local equality and even superiority. When the smaller German forces deployed, the British naval forces were spread thin over a large area to have forces present to interdict the Germans if they attacked. The objective of the German navy was to deploy in a manner so as not allow the British time to react and assemble sufficient forces to concentrate an attack against the Germans.6 Even though the British had a significantly larger force, the Germans were able to exploit the advantages of time and space to gain the operational and tactical advantage. More than brute force, maneuver warfare is an analytical thought process tempered by judgment that focuses on the enemy's command and control. Lethality of arms is important, but maneuver places a higher demand on military command and judgment.7 The basis of this thought process and the foundation behind maneuver warfare theory is the competitive decision cycle synthesized by John Boyd. A retired fighter pilot, Boyd observed patterns in decision making during air-to-air and ground combat engagements. He summarized these patterns as a time-competitive observation- orientation-decision-action cycle or "OODA Loop." Boyd concluded that the commander who could execute his decision cycle faster than his opponent would usually gain the operational and tactical advantage. The effect of executing a faster cycle caused confusion, disorder, ineffective and time-late decisions by the opposing commander.8 The "OODA Loop" process is a feature of human nature. It begins with each opponent observing the operational or tactical situation. Each notes the forces, physical surroundings and the enemy situation. These observations orient and form a mental picture of the situation. From his analysis, he chooses a course of action and places this action into effect. The commander begins the decision cycle again by observes the reaction of the enemy, reorients, executes a follow on action to begin the cycle again. The functional goal of the "OODA Loop" is to complete the decision cycle faster than the opponent. Ultimately, by the time the opponent reacts, the "faster" commander is executing another action causing the opponent to fall behind as the battle unfolds.9 The process of the decision cycle is evident in naval warfare at the tactical and operational levels of war. From the early days of sail to present day naval operations, war at sea is the process of competing commanders. The physical characteristics of the sea as a warfighting medium, places a greater emphasis on movement, maneuver and commander's tactical ability. It is evident to the naval decision processes by the way ship combat information centers structure to provide combat essential information needed for the decision cycle. The decision cycle, or Boyd's Theory, is what is meant by the term "maneuver" within the context of maneuver warfare. It is "cycling" of the enemy until he no longer can keep up with the battle which inhibits his ability to fight as an effective and efficient force. The ideal outcome in a combat engagement is for the opponent to become passive in his operational and tactical actions, opening him up to be annihilated or captured at the lowest risk to friendly forces.10 A key element during the decision cycle not directly addressed by Boyd is surprise. Carl von Clausewitz stated, "Surprise lies at the foundation of all undertakings." "When it is successful...confusion and broken courage in the enemy's ranks are the consequences... these multiply a success." The surprise element of maneuver warfare is critical. Remaining unpredictable through a fast decision cycle increases the tempo of the operation.11 Doing the unexpected increases the observation and orientation time of the opponents decision cycle. The method for a fast and efficient "OODA Loop" is through a decentralized command structure in that decisions are made at the lowest operational and tactical level. This is done organizationally through commander's intent.12 Commander's intent is a concise expression of the purpose of an operation, description of the desired end state, and the way which the objectives facilitate follow on mission.13 Commander's intent only states the mission and objectives, its does not direct the "how" of the mission. Commander's intent is inherent to naval operations. Communications during the early days of sea travel were extremely limited or nonexistent. Success of naval missions relied on issuing commander's intent prior to deployment. Captains of naval vessels were given their mission with liberal latitude on how to execute that mission. It creates an independence and initiative within the officer corps of naval service that allow it to operate effectively without oversight. Even with the improved "real time" communication systems in place today, captains of U. S. Navy ships are still given the latitude of how to execute their mission. Of many examples during the Pacific campaign in World War II, Admiral Nimitz issued this sample of commander's intent to Vice Admiral Fletcher before the Guadalcanal amphibious operations regarding the Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers:14 "You will be governed by the principal of calculated risks which you shall interpret to the the avoidance of your force to attack by superior force without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy. This applies to the landing phase as well as during preliminary air attacks." As can be seen, Admiral Nimitz gives direction, but leaves the latitude of "judgment" and the "how" to Vice Admiral Fletcher. The "independent" nature of naval warfare requires commander's intent and the competence of subordinate leadership to execute it. Commander's intent and Boyd's decision cycle are the mental mechanical tools required for executing maneuver warfare. In order for maneuver warfare to be successful, it requires the integration of four additional areas to provide further focus to the mission: center of gravity, critical vulnerability, focus of effort and main effort.15 Centers of gravity are those things the enemy gains his strength and will to fight.16 These centers can be strategic or operational in nature. The destruction and exploitation of the center of gravity produces disorder and causes the opponent to loose cohesion and the will to fight. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 focused on the destruction of the operational center of gravity for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the carriers and battleships. During Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqi operational center of gravity was the Republican Guard. Because of its inherent strategic nature, naval warfare focuses on enemy centers of gravity. This has been demonstrated during the numerous blockade actions and merchant ship interdictions. It is still ongoing in naval operations today enforcing the United Nations embargo of Iraq. Critical vulnerabilities are those elements of a military force susceptible to attack and whose degradation or destruction will lead to defeating the enemy's center of gravity and ultimately his will to resist.17 In naval warfare these critical vulnerabilities include the weaknesses in the warfare areas within the naval battle space. These areas consist of the air, surface, subsurface, and electronic warfare elements and include logistics, and command and control. A surface combatant deficient, or "blind", within one of these battle space elements has a critical vulnerability within that area. More than a month after the beginning of World War II, German U-boats began an interdiction campaign against coastal shipping just off the eastern shore of the United States. From the end of January 1942 and for the next nine months, the Germans had unparalleled success against American shipping. Sinkings of merchant ships began to exceed the new ship construction by 200,000 tons a month. The primary reason for the German success was due to the failure of the United States Navy to prepare for and react to the U-boat operation against American shipping. Two key illustrations can be drawn from this scenario: the Germans successfully exploited a critical vulnerability of sub-surface warfare element and the Germans successfully engaged a numerically superior force with only a few number of U-boats by using the tenets of maneuver warfare.18 Focus of effort is the primary task or mission to be accomplished by a force. Its goal or mission is the exploitation of an enemy's critical vulnerability or the paramount objective the commander wishes to accomplish during an operation. All actions and supporting actions are oriented in achieving the objective.19 The main effort is the unit, controlled by a single designated commander, that is constitutes the principal means by which the mission is accomplished. The commander ensures the success of the mission by providing the preponderance of force and directing the command structure in support of the mission.20 In April and May 1994, the U. S. Atlantic Command sponsored exercise Agile Provider 94. The purpose of the exercise was to validate the "...From the Sea"concept and demonstrate the transition of a naval force from blue water to the littoral and execute an opposed amphibious assault. This transition phase of this exercise illustrates the shift of the main effort in order to accomplish the mission or main effort.21 The focus of effort, or mission, for Agile Provider was establishment of a lodgement in to vicinity of Camp Lejeune. During the blue water and transition phase, the main effort was battlespace dominance. After suppressing the submarine, surface, air and land threats, the main effort shifted to the amphibious operation. The designation of the main effort is central to the completion of the mission and as shown with Agile Provider, is a phased process with the deployment and arrival of naval forces. Commander's intent focuses the supporting units to the main effort which creates a synergistic effect of combat power critical to the success of the mission.22 This pattern of main effort and focus of effort is evident in every successful major naval operation. During World War I and II, the convoy system across the North Atlantic, and amphibious operations in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters demonstrate designation of main effort and focus of effort. Maneuver warfare is not only the positioning of ships and forces, it is also the discrete employment of fires through indirect means.23 The Soviet Navy adopted maneuver into its doctrine in the mid 1980s. They define naval maneuver as the coordinated movement or redirection of forces during combat to a new sector, line, or area, in order to assume an advantageous position, create a required grouping of forces, employ weapons effectively, or evade an enemy strike. Maneuver includes not only the organized movements of one's own forces but also the switching of fires.24 A skillfully executed maneuver makes it possible to seize and hold the initiative, to thwart the opponent's intentions, and to concentrate superior forces in the main sector of the strike.25 Tactical maneuvers are accomplished through the physical movement of individual ships, their tactical groups, or tactical and operational tactical forces, or by shifting the fires of missiles.26 The Soviet Navy today, successfully uses maneuver warfare to organize combat power during an operation to increase survivability and protection of forces during transit to and operation in the area of interest.27 This has not always been the case. In the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese successfully utilized maneuver coordinated with concentrated fires. When engaging the Chinese, they would bring the main force against one of the Chinese provincial squadrons and defeat it before the other Chinese squadrons were committed. During the Russo-Japanese War, they learned the value of the column and broadside fire. Using speed and maneuver, they would break up the enemy formations and concentrate fire against each fraction of the enemy fleet. Operating in semi-independent divisions, with clear commander's intent, the Japanese attained the greatest flexibility and efficiency in battle.28 The basic tenets of focusing on the enemy, commander's decision cycle, commander's intent, centers of gravity, critical vulnerability, main effort and focus of effort are a part of naval operations. The terminology is different. But, how did the theories of naval warfare develop to what they are today? What is the history to naval doctrine? III. Theories of Naval Warfare...The Beginnings of Maneuver Maneuver warfare is subliminally inherent to the way the U. S. Navy conducted naval operations strategically, operationally, and tactically. How and when did it start? The prime impetus to the theory of "how navies fight" began at the turn of the century when the inventions of the industrial revolution fundamentally changed the conduct of warfare. Before the industrial revolution, war on land was the dominate form of aggressive political action. War at sea, and movement on the sea, was relatively inefficient and only played a minor role in the overall conduct of war. The world was essentially in a regional concept and had not developed to the global interdependent society it is today. Navies were assigned missions to protect commerce, look after imperial interests, exploration and research, and "show the flag."29 Improvements in the efficiency of maritime travel during the industrial revolution opened the focus and opportunity from a regional to a global view. For most of the nineteenth century, maritime strategy was nothing more than practical seamanship linked to local circumstances, shaped by immediate demands, with no general theories of war at sea. No body of historical data had been accumulated to base naval theory, and no analytical methods developed to sift through the every day maritime facts and shape them into broad principles.30 Up to this point in history, strategic objectives were focused on territory and thus the dominate form of warfare in national strategic power was the effectiveness of ground combat. The sea had relatively little influence on the outcome of land battle other than limited transportation of supplies an troops. In of itself, the sea had little intrinsic property value because it could not be occupied or fortified as land could be.31 As such, theories of land warfare were well established and documented before the serious study of naval warfare. At the turn of the century two key figures emerged forward in the first step in the development of modern naval doctrine: Alfred T. Mahan and Julian Corbett. Drawing from the influences of Jomini and Clausewitz, Mahan and Corbett were instrumental in attempting to apply the existing theories of land warfare for war at sea. Mahan and Corbett foresaw the growing dependency and necessity of maritime power. Their primary objective was to fill the void in naval doctrine by formalizing the theories and principles of naval warfare. Mahan and Corbett had the foresight to interpret the influence of seapower on history and its role in the future. In the growing global environment, the sea would be the catalyst of the making of a major world power. Julian Corbett quoted in his works Maritime Strategy in 1991, "If England were to lose command of the sea, it would be all over for her."32 Alfred Mahan, the fore father of twentieth century U. S. Naval doctrine, turned to Jomini and his well-tried principles of land warfare to try to cultivate a naval doctrine applicable for a modern navy.33 From Jomini, he learned the importance of massing force at the decisive point in battle. Using the fleet as an offensive weapon, it followed that direct engagement with the enemy was the central criteria of war at sea.34 Mahan felt that this direct head-on engagement with the enemy was the most effective and essential element in all naval strategies. To Mahan, naval warfare needed to adopt the fundamental elements of attrition warfare. Mahan also learned that in order for attrition warfare to be effective upon the sea, the most important principle was concentration of firepower. Ships in concentrated formations the most effective in defeating the enemy. Splitting the fleet as the Russians did during the Russo- Japanese War weakened the overall strength of the fleet and the stage for defeat.35 Attrition warfare, fundamental to the early days of naval war at sea, is the direct approach to warfighting. It is the application of force directly on the strength of the opposing force. Based on mass and concentration of firepower, attrition warfare confronts the enemy directly. It is slow, calculated, linear and more predictable. The goal of attrition is to inflict as much damage on the enemy as possible to compel your opponent to stop, quit, surrender or compel him to do what you want him to. Attrition warfare is an effective form of warfare for military powers with little experience and is easier to be proficient at. To be effective in attrition warfare, a military power need only to master the basics of military skills and possess sufficient quantities of personnel, weapons and munitions.36 In land warfare, attrition's most vivid illustrations occurred during some of the battles of the American Civil War. Massive formations of ground forces engaging head on with the goal of destroying the opponent before he could destroy you. Pickett's charge at Gettysburg vividly illustrates the force on force and tremendous number of casualties associated with attrition warfare. Ship-to-ship engagements during the age of sail demonstrated similar examples of attrition warfare at sea. In the Battle of Lepanto in October 1571, the ships of the Turkish and Christian fleets opposed each other in three squadrons abreast, each squadron deployed line abreast. The squadrons would close, fire their guns and maneuver to grapple, board, and fight men against men.37 All very characteristic to combat engagements on land. The attrition style of warfare was used up to the American Revolution and the War of 1812, British and American vessels would maneuver and position themselves relative to each other broadside, and pound the opponent with naval gunfire until sinking or surrendering. Attrition warfare can be an effective type of warfare in certain type of scenarios. The serious drawback to attrition warfare is the high casualty rates in both men and material associated with it. The operational and tactical advantage is usually given to the opponent who has the most in men and material before the engagement. Lethality of weapons and the multi-dimensional naval battlespace make the inherent risks of this direct approach undesirable and more costly in modern naval warfare. Unfortunately, Mahan, in all his wisdom, conceded to the mistaken belief that attrition warfare strategy was durable and immune to inevitable technological advancements.38 With the evolution of modern weaponry, pure attrition warfare became more costly in terms of men and materials. By contrast to Mahan, Julian Corbett offered no general theory of warfare at sea. Instead, Corbett focused his thoughts on the nature of maritime strategy and what the meaning of naval warfare meant to the power of a nation. Corbett drew his theories from the works and experiences of Carl von Clausewitz who summarized war as a direct "extension of politics by other means."39 While many theorist of naval warfare tried to mechanically adopt land warfare concepts to the maritime environment, Corbett countered that the interest and requirement of naval warfare differed in fundamental ways from those of land warfare. For example, the adage that lines of communication "must be protected" is much more difficult to enforce at sea than on land. This difficulty was the physical geographical differences of the sea and land. Because of these physical differences, Corbett analyzed naval warfare in its own terms, having its own unique characteristics. He stated that "you cannot conquer the sea because it is not susceptible of ownership."40 This led to Corbett's most important contribution to the early theories of naval warfare. What mattered most was not Mahan's concept of physical destruction of the enemy, but the act of passage on the sea. To Corbett, command of the sea was a relative and not an absolute. Command could be general or local, temporary or permanent.41 Today, this concept is defined as "sea control." Amplifying the studies of Corbett, John R. Thursfield in 1914, made direct comparisons between the physical and philosophical differences of war on land and war at sea. He analyzed, compared and contrasted what was common and uncommon between the these two different warfare environments. These forms of warfare, he concluded, held similar goals in the destruction of the enemy and appropriation of the enemy's resources. The major difference of the two forms of warfare was the decisive impact of a conflict through the physical occupation of territory. Naval warfare by its very nature does not acquire portions of the sea as territory. The sea is not territory in the sense land is; the sea is a common avenue of transportation for all nations and is exclusive to "possession" by anyone. Continentally, man lives from the land; at sea, man can only survive on it. The only strategic or operational objective naval warfare can accomplish on the sea is to "control" the use of it.42 A warring nation that has achieved a predominant capacity to use the sea, and control its use by others, is said to have "command of the sea." Specifically, command of the sea, or sea control, is the ability to defend's one's own sea communications and have ability to deny to the enemy the freedom of sea communications he requires to carry on war.43 Some of these differences of war at sea and war on land are so obvious they function as a barrier to achieving a deeper comprehension of the individuality of the two environments. Strategically, navies and armies represent two reasonably distinctive "cultures." As a result, naval warfare and land warfare accomplish different kinds of objectives, they wage war differently and as a consequence have different perspectives on the actual conduct of war. Armies have occupation or possession goals, and navies have use or denial-of-use goals. Naval warfare is not about the direct military effect of fighting ships, which is the realm of tactics. It is the exploitation of maritime lines of communication for the interconnection, organization, and purposeful application of the war-making potential of nations.44 Naval warfare is about sea control; and only through sea control can nations, through their navies, achieve the desired strategic effect ashore, where people live.45 Mahan and Corbett defined two fundamental methods of control the sea: the actual physical destruction or capture of enemy warships and merchants, and naval blockade. Among the numerous examples of sea control there are two classic examples in the War of 1812 between the United States and Britain and the Cuban Missile Crisis. During the opening months of the War of 1812, the American Navy was extremely successful in sea control, through interdiction, against the British. Within the first year of the war, the Americans captured three British frigates, several smaller men-of-war and interdicted up to 500 merchant vessels. By 1813, the British, realizing the tenacity of the Americans, and reacting to the legend the Americans had won the war, reacted by deploying an overwhelming naval strength along the American coast. This increase in the number of ships deployed along the coast bottled up many of the American frigates in their ports for the duration of the war.46 The Cuban Missile Crisis in the early 1960s serves as another example of sea control and denial-of-use. Threatened by the deployment of Soviet strategic nuclear missiles to Cuba, the United States mounted an extensive armada of naval warships which effectively blockaded, euphemistically known as a "quarantine," Cuba on all "offensive equipment under shipment to Cuba." This strangulation of Cuba effectively compelled the Soviets to back down and cease shipment and withdraw the missiles deployed in Cuba.47 The theories of naval warfare by Mahan and Corbett focused on the art of naval warfare and defined the differences of land warfare and war at sea. They set the initial mind set towards the employment of maneuver type doctrine. The principles of sea control, focus on the enemy, and maneuver for tactical advantage form the foundation which naval maneuver warfare is today. IV. Modernization Towards Maneuver Warfare The greatest impact on "how" navies fight is the tools they fight with. Mahan and Corbett formed the theoretical foundation for the conduct of naval warfare, but the modernization of naval weapon systems had the most dramatic effect. Theories of the purpose of sea power and "sea control" coupled with the modernization of naval warfare formed the need for naval warfare to become more indirect. The lethality of weapons made direct attrition tactics less effective and more costly in national strategy. Naval strategy needed to emphasize efficiency in battle while preserving costly assets. The transformation of the U. S. Navy into a modern fighting force began a full decade before Alfred Mahan published his doctrine of sea power during the early 1900s. The initial catalyst for change and modernization of the U. S. Navy began with William H. Hunt, then secretary of the navy. Hunt convinced that as international relations expanding globally, the strength and political clout of the United States depended on a strong and respectable navy.48 He set forth the initiative to increase naval funding to modernize and expand the U.S. fleet. This modernization of the U.S. Navy led to improved efficiency of movement upon the sea; expanded effectiveness and diversity of weapons; and expansion and fusion of the naval battlespace with that of land warfare. The introduction of steam propulsion made movement on the sea faster, more efficient, and more maneuverable. This was the third major milestone in the evolution of naval warfare. After 2,000 years of oar propulsion and 300 years of sail propulsion, naval warfare moved into the third form of propulsion, steam.49 In addition to the advent of steamships, steel hulls and improved metal construction techniques increased the size and speed of ships.50 These improvements to naval construction had a tremendous impact upon the tempo of operations within the naval battlespace by increasing the speed and maneuverability of ships. It expanded the tactical and operational flexibility of surface combatants so that they could engage, disengage, and advantageously maneuver to the best position for offensive or defensive operations. Steam propulsion stimulated naval theorists into extensive speculation about its impact on tactics. For example, during the days of sail, navies adopted the simple column due to the difficulties of keeping station. With steam propulsion, theorists believed there was no longer any limit to maneuver and any formation was now possible.51 This lead to innovations in formations from the indented line to the echelon, or inverted V formation. The significance of these formations is that they began to accentuate relative position to the enemy and exploit the freedom to maneuver. This opened the options available to the commander. He could "maneuver" at will for the best positional advantage. Along with the development of steam propulsion, the industrial revolution offered improvements in the efficiency and lethality of naval weapons. Naval ships incorporated armor; the iron hull; rifled, built-up guns; and the percussion-fused shell.52 These new innovations improved the physical protection of ships and the accuracy and range of naval gunfire allowing them to engage at greater distances. Combined with the speed and maneuverability of steam propulsion, the effectiveness of these weapon systems affected the naval battlespace by expanding it out giving it greater depth and speed. Bernard Brodie in his works Sea Power in the Machine Age studied the debate between guns and armor in 1812. He observed that at a range of 1,000 yards, the USS Constitution was invulnerable to enemy ships of the same class. In 1860, with the improvements in armor, ships at the same range could not inflict catastrophic damage to each other. If however, an armored ship engaged an unarmored one, the armored ship could close with impunity. The unprotected ship would have to keep the range open to survive the engagement.53 Maneuver was inherent to the survival of the weaker ships. Steam surface navies never gained enough experience in combat to mature the doctrinal transition from sail to the modern navy. Before the Navy developed a doctrine, the aircraft and the aircraft carrier arrived to present new problems to naval warfare.54 The introduction of aviation and the submarine into naval warfare expanded the naval battlespace by adding air and subsurface warfare to the two dimensional surface problem. Sir Peter Gretton in his study, Maritime Strategy, characterized these new expanded dimensions as the four 'environmental forms of warfare.' He described these as amphibious warfare, undersea warfare, to include submarines and mines; surface ship warfare; and air warfare above the sea.55 The naval commander faces not only the problem of surface warfare, but the added asymmetrical elements of aviation and subsurface warfare. Initially deployed as an observation platform, the airplane could influence naval operations from over- the-horizon either from a sea platform or from a land base.56 Aviation provided the ability to observe and attack the enemy without direct commitment of naval forces. Later in the War in the Pacific during World War II, the full effects of armed naval aircraft were demonstrated during the carrier battles. The submarine exploited the undersea vulnerability of surface ships by being able to maneuver within striking distance, virtually undetected, upon its opponent. A far greater impact that the submarine had upon naval warfare was the uncertainty of whether or not it was actually there, could affect enemy decision making. The expansion of war at sea by these four forms of warfare and the additional dimensions to the naval battlespace complexes the naval problem more by adding a higher level of uncertainty and fluidness to the situation. In the battle for the Atlantic during World War II, the Germans initiated a tactic of "tonnage warfare," the strategic corollary of earlier wolf-pack tactics. Founded on concentrating U-boat activity, "tonnage warfare" deployed in areas where the most Allied merchant tonnage might be sunk at minimum cost to the Germans. It was also located where Allied defenses offered little retaliation. When Allied defenses became strong in one area, the Germans would redeploy to another to capitalize on "soft spots."57 Naval modernization took a simple war and complicated it. The naval battlespace grew into a complex environment that is multidimensional, larger in size, and faster in tempo. The lethality of weapons pushed the naval battlespace horizons out. The airplane, with its speed and range, and the submarine, with its ability to close virtually undetected, increased the overall tempo of the naval battle. During the initial modernization program of the U. S. Navy, naval warfare was relatively simple with the interactive influence of the land and sea warfare environments ending at the beachline. Each environment existed in its own entity. With the exception of embryonic amphibious operations, there was relatively no influence between the battlespaces. The modernization of warfare marked the beginning of a fusion process between the sea and land battlespace. The efficiency and lethality of weapons combined with aviation created the ability for land and naval elements to influence the other from beyond the beachline to deep within each battlespace. Now, naval forces could influence the land battle through naval fires and land based forces could execute limited range sea control. What is important about the advances and modernization of naval warfare is it marks the beginning of an institutionalization change in naval doctrine. The battlespace and doctrine expanded from the addition of new battlespace dimensions that influenced the conduct of war at sea and land. The incorporation of aviation in to modern warfare merged the continental and maritime battlespace. In addition, aviation initiated the successful fusion of land and sea strategy. This began to break down much of the barriers which existed between the two warfare environments. With modern weaponry, a land power could influence the naval battlespace and naval warfare now had an important impact on the land battle. The "from the sea" influence was effective in World War II when aircraft launched from ships and successfully attacked land targets. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese and Doolittle's raid on Tokyo are successful employments of naval fires, influencing the land battle, from the sea. During the Battle of Savo Island in August 1942 the Japanese were successful in sea control by land based aviation. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, commanding the carrier battle groups covering the Marine amphibious landings, requested he be given permission to withdraw because of the increasing threat of land based Japanese torpedo planes.58 World War I demonstrated the initiative to influence the ground battle through maneuver warfare. When ground combat in France reached stalemate in the fall of 1914, Britain sought means of outflanking the Western Front to join hands militarily with Russia to strengthen the Eastern Front. Britain used the mobility available from sea supremacy to strike at the weak points around the edges of the enemy's position. Sound in concept, it was a failure due to inadequate intelligence, poor planning, and a series of tactical errors.59 The focus from this plan was to hit the weak points, a key element of maneuver warfare. The British learned this lesson in the campaign in Norway during World War II. The Royal Navy with its shortage of aircraft carriers would not operate successfully in area dominated by land-based aircraft. The German assault on Denmark and Norway showed how an inferior navy with limited objectives, time and a secure supply line could maintain it in the face of British sea power.60 Another case in point exists today. Iran is geographically situated along the Straits of Hormuz and can effectively execute sea control from its anti-surface ship missile sites along the coast. This can effectively cutting of commercial and military lines of communication into the Persian Gulf. Any land based nation geographically situated at strategic choke points can employ limited, but effective sea control. The Royal Navy learned this lesson during the Faulkland Island War. Unable to provide the fleet complete battlespace superiority, they lost a number of ships within range of the unsuppressed land-based air power of the Argentines.61 The strategy and expansion of influence on sea control, by land and sea powers, coupled with the technological advances propelled the Navy toward the indirect approach to warfighting. Advantageous position, usually in terms of weapon range and sensor reach, became the frame of reference. Movement over greater distances, over a shorter time is the means, but position is the end.62 V. Naval Maneuver Warfare As illustrated in this paper, the tenets of maneuver warfare are inherent to the way navies have conducted naval operations. What is new in the publication of Naval Warfare (NDP-1) is the formal institutionalization of maneuver into naval doctrine. This institutionalization of doctrine will bring the terminology of naval warfare in line with the other armed services maneuver warfare doctrines. It will allow the senior U. S. Navy leadership to "speak the language" in joint operating environments. However, Naval Warfare also accepted a concept of maneuver warfare as it applies to the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps. Termed Operational Maneuver From the Sea by the Marine Corps, this new method of warfighting introduces the use of operational maneuver by U. S. Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary forces to project power ashore. While this is in line with the institutionalization of naval doctrine, its focus as overall doctrine is limited only to the projection of Marine ground forces ashore. It does not address the other tasks and responsibilities of U. S. Navy forces. As defined, Operational Maneuver From the Sea will not get the serious attention it deserves from those Navy Officers in the non-amphibious elements of naval warfare.63 Maneuver warfare as it applies to naval operations needs definition to encompass the missions assigned to the naval services. As discussed previously, naval warfare encompasses two fundamental styles: attrition and maneuver. Within an overall concept of Naval Maneuver Warfare there are two sub elements: Operational Maneuver From the Sea and Naval Operational Maneuver. Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) addresses the elements and requirements of the sea-land fusion. It is this fusion of land warfare with the uniqueness of the naval battlespace which expands the maneuver medium from the beachline to the limits of movement or weapon systems. OMFTS exploits the flexibility of the adjacent littoral waters and adds additional elements of firepower, logistics and maneuver to the continental battle. This naval influence to the land battle creates a synergistic effect of naval capabilities from the rear area and will have a direct impact on the deep, close and rear battles. Within the naval context, OMFTS is a "positional" relationship to the geography of the coast and inland area of operations. Dimensionally, OMFTS defines the battlespace as left, right, deep, close, on the surface and air. Maneuver warfare executes the actions and reactions relative these positional aspects of the battlespace. OMFTS is more than just the influence of naval power during an amphibious operation. It also offers naval firepower, lethal and nonlethal, to the Joint Task Force Commander to shape and react to the evolving battlespace. Effective naval firepower consisting of naval surface fire support, naval aviation, land attack cruise missiles, and electronic warfare systems has proved effective in land engagements. The culmination of the development of modern naval warfare and the fusion of the sea-land battlespace demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm was extremely effective. Naval surface fires shaped the battlefield in Kuwait; naval aviation launched air strikes against close and deep targets; Tomahawk cruise missiles destroyed strategic targets; and naval amphibious forces created a multi front threat to the Iraqis. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the viability and effectiveness of OMFTS. Despite the successes of Operation Desert Storm and the potential successes using maneuver warfare, modern weaponry raises serious questions about the potential costs of amphibious operations.64 Historically, a typical amphibious assault took place within visual range of the landing site. In today's environment the proliferation o effective lethal weapons and improved sensors, the direct method of amphibious assault has a significant risk of mounting high casualty rates. The Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and the introduction of the MV-22 into the amphibious inventory will enable naval amphibious forces to launch assaults from up to 200 miles offshore. This will allow amphibious operations to come undetected from over-the-horizon, using the sea as a maneuver medium and land at the weak points of the enemy's defenses. The time involved in successfully executing operational maneuver from over-the-horizon is significantly more extensive than that of traditional amphibious assault. Striking the enemy's weaknesses through sea maneuver is a key element of OMFTS. Maneuver warfare reduces the risk of friendly casualties. The American people hold elected government officials responsible in the commitment of military forces only after satisfied a thorough consideration of the options and likely outcomes have been explored. If military forces are committed, national values play an important role in what is acceptable conduct by those military forces. The media's ability to bring the Vietnam War into every home revealed the real horrors of war causing a generational shift in what is acceptable for the American way of war. It is expected the values of the American public placed on the elected official are also applied to the military services in their conduct of war.65 The American populous will be intolerant of any operation that involves high casualty rates. OMFTS reduces the potential of high casualties on both sides while still accomplishing the mission. By contrast to OMFTS, Naval Operational Maneuver is the application of maneuver warfare theory to the pure maritime environment. It is "situational" maneuver vice the "positional" aspect of land warfare. In Naval Operational Maneuver, the battlespace drives the "situation" naval forces meet with. Because ships at sea inherently maneuver, the left-right aspect constantly changes. To complicate the problem the constantly changing situation is magnified by the four warfare environments of the naval battle space: air, surface, subsurface and electronic environments. The "flanks" of the naval battlespace are not physically defined as they are in ground combat or in relation to an amphibious landing. The flanks in Naval Maneuver Warfare include the individual warfare environments of the naval battle space. The goal in Naval Operational Maneuver is to compel the enemy through his decision cycle, to concentrate more attention to one warfare area over another. This creates a gap and vulnerability of another warfare area to exploit. OMFTS and Naval Operational Maneuver draw from the same tenets of maneuver warfare doctrine. The breakdown of Naval Maneuver Warfare into two distinct categories emphasizes the particular idiosyncrasies of these dynamic environments. While the basic concepts are the same, the widening of the naval doctrine from just amphibious operations and OMFTS will ensure a broader institutionalization in to naval warfare. The application of maneuver warfare becomes universal to all of naval operations; and universal to joint warfare. VI. Conclusions There is nothing new about Naval Maneuver Warfare. The concepts of maneuver warfare are fundamental to the conduct of naval operations. Naval forces have used maneuver on the sea to gain positional and situational advantage from the inception of naval warfighting. Focusing on the enemy, positional advantage, indirect application of force, and commander's intent are concepts not new to naval warfare and have evolved from the modernization of warfare. The bulk of U. S. Navy doctrine has been unwritten and passed along through the shared experiences of its officers. These shared experiences do not need to be written as doctrine. A large part of U. S. Navy doctrine exists in commander's intent.66 What has changed is the institutionalization of a tactical and operational naval strategy parallel with the strategy adopted for land warfare. Naval Warfare has taken these unwritten concepts of navy doctrine and published a starting point the for the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps to formally publish how it intends to conduct war. With the technological developments incorporated into naval warfare and future systems in development, the battlespace for the next war will involve elements of land and naval warfare. There will be few operations in the future that will rely solely on naval or land power. Institutionalization of maneuver warfare places the Navy on a level playing field with the other armed services and the Navy itself. Naval doctrine now becomes institutionalized rather than the style of a particular naval commander. Naval commanders from all warfighting environments of the naval battlespace will have a greater understanding and easier translation of the joint operation at hand. Confusion or short sidedness as demonstrated during Guadalcanal can be prevented before it happens. Because doctrine will have a common thread between ground combat and naval operations, each service will have a better understanding of the capabilities of the other. The full potential of what each service brings to the table creates the absolute maximum synergistic effect possible. From a selfish standpoint, the Navy only stands to gain from universally adopting a common "joint" vocabulary by institutionalizing Naval Maneuver Warfare. The results will be better amphibious and naval component commanders, as well as, experienced Joint Task Force Commanders. Not only will the Navy have the doctrinal background to execute the mission, but it will have the credibility with other component commanders to ensure the efforts of combat power are focuses and efficient. For the nation, maneuver warfare is the only doctrine acceptable. The mass media increases the public awareness of the horrors of war virtually "real time" and decreases the tolerance of human suffering. Maneuver warfare if conducted properly, minimizes casualties and decreases destruction. In addition, national military assets are becoming increasingly more costly to procure and maintain. Maneuver warfare will allow the nation to do more with less. Maneuver warfare must be practiced to be effective. It is not a doctrine which can be pulled out of a play book. It is not tactics. Because of the intense coordination between numerous assets from different warfighting capabilities, it is absolutely critical that these warfighting capabilities be engaged and synergistically tuned to perfection. Effective warfare proficiency cannot be done solely from reading and studying. It is a hands-on evolution. The practice of maneuver in actual combat without adequate training has the strong potential to backfire and generated unacceptable levels of casualties. Frank Uhlig, Jr. in his article "How Navies Fight, and Why" stated there were five robust, resilient missions of naval warfare. These include: the strategic movement of troops, acquisition of advanced bases, landing of armies, blockage, and struggle for mastery of the local sea.67 Naval Maneuver Warfare supports these missions while staying within the sociopolitical environment that exists today. The U.S. Navy does not need to change course with maneuver warfare; it has been on course. 1 Department of the Navy White Paper," ...From the Sea",(Washington DC: Department of the Navy, September1992). 2 James F. Dunnigan, How to Make War (New York: Westview Press, 1988), 574. 3 William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder:Westview Press,1985),7. 4 Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1993), 2-13. 5 Potter, Sea Power A Naval History (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1960), 148. 6 Potter, 517. 7 Fleet Marine Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, March 1989), 29. 8 Lind,7. 9 Lind,6-7. 10 Lind, 6-7. 11 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: Penguin Books, 1982), 269. 12 Naval Doctrine Publication(NDP)1, Naval Warfare (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, March 1994), 35. 13 FM100-5,Glossary-2. 14 George Carroll Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1969),384. 15 NDP-1, 35. 16 NDP-1, 72. 17 Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP)2, Naval Intelligence (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, September 1994), 63. 18 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 59-62. 19 NDP-1, 73. 20 NDP-1, 73. 21 Executive Summary for Agile Provider 94, May 1994. 22 NDP-1. 38. 23 Milan Vego, Soviet Naval Tactis (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 45. 24 Vego, 45. 25 Vego, 45. 26 Vego, 46. 27 Vego, 48. 28 Potter, 364-365. 29 Potter, 229. 30 John Gooch, "Maritime Command: Mahan and Colbert". In Seapower and Strategy. Ed.Colin S. Grey and Roger W. Barnett, 25-56. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989. 31 Colin S. Gray, "Seapower and Landpower".In Seapower and Strategy. Ed. Colin S.Gray and Roger W. Barnett, 25-46. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 1989. 32 Julian Corbett, Maritime Strategy (London: Longman. Green and Co, 1911),87. 33 Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1911), 17 and Gooch, pp 25-46. 34 Mahan, 8. 35 Mahan, 386. 36 Dunnigan, How to Make War,, 574. 37 Potter, 18. 38 Wayne P. Hughes,Jr.,"Maritime Command: Mahan and Corbett". In Seapower and Strategy. Ed. by Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, 45-73. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989. 39 Clausewitz, 109. 40 Corbett,89. 41 John Gooch, 25-46. 42 James Thursfield, Naval Warfare (Cambridge: University Press, 1913), 12-15. 43 Potter, 14. 44 Gray,3-26. 45 Colin S.Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 1. 46 Nathan Miller, The U.S. Navy, A History (New York: Quill, 1990), 68. 47 Miller, 260. 48 Miller, 148. 49 Potter, 241. 50 Edward L.Beach, The United States Navy, 2OO Years (NewYork: Henry Holt and Company, 1986), 386. 51 Potter, 242. 52 Potter, 241. 53 Beach, 514. 54 Potter, 338. 55 Peter Gretton, Maritime Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1999), 102. 56 Potter, 636. 57 Potter, 547. 58 Stephen D. Regan, In Bitter Tempest (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1994), 191. 59 Potter, 474. 60 Potter, 518. 61 James F.Dunnigan and Austin Bay, A Quick and Dirty Guide to War (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985), 128. 62 Hughes, 62. 63 Peter F. Herrly's review of NDP-1 Naval Warfare in Proceedings (December 1994), 82. 64 Lind, 37. 65 FM 100-5, page 1-3. 66 James J. Tritten, Naval Doctrine...From the Sea (Norfolk: Naval Doctrine Command,December 1994), 3. 67 Frank Uhlig, Jr.,"How Navies Fight, and Why,"in Naval War College Review (Winter 1995), 35. Naval Maneuver Warfare Bibliography Builder, Carl H. The Masks of War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). "Carriers for Force 2001: A Strategy Based Force Structure", down loaded from Chief of Naval Operations Leadership Bulletin Board, November 1994. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1968). Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: the Anatomy of Failure i in War (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1991). Corbett, Julian S. Some Principals of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co.,1911). Darrieus, Gabriel. War on the Sea, Strategy and Tactics (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1908). Dunnigan, James F. How to Make War (New York: Westview Press, 1988). Field Manual (FM) 100-5. Operations. Washington DC: Department of the Army. June 14, 1993. Fioravanzo, Giuseppe. A History of Naval Tactical Thought (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1979). Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1. Operations. Washington,DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, March 6, 1989. "Force Sustainment... From the Sea", down loaded from Chief of Naval Operations Leadership Bulletin Board, November 1994. "Forward...From the Sea". Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 1994. "...From the Sea". Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, September 1992. "...From the Sea: Joint Operations", down loaded from Chief of Naval Operations Leadership Bulletin Board, November 1994. Gooch, John. "Maritime Command: Mahan and Corbett". In Seapower and Strategy. Ed. Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, 27-46. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Gray, Colin S. "Seapower and Landpower." In Seapower and Strategy. Ed. Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, 3-26. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1989. . The Leverage of Sea Power (New York: The Free Press, 1992): 1-30. Griffith, Samuel B. Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). Gundmundsson, Bruce I. "Attack or Assault?" Marine Corps Gazette (February 1991): 38-39. "Field Stripping the Schwerpunkt" Marine Corps Gazette (December 1989): 30-32. Herrly,m Peter F. Review of Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare in Proceedings, December 1994, page 82-83. Hughes, Wayne P., Jr. "The Strategy-Tactics Relationship". In Seapower and Strategy. Ed. Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, 47-73. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1989. "Innovation... From the Sea", down loaded from Chief of Naval Operations Leadership Bulletin Board, November 1994. Jeremiah, David E. Review of Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare in Proceedings, December 1994, page 82. Joint Publication 1. Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces. Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 11, 1991. Keegan, John. The Price of Admiralty: the Evolution of Naval Warfare (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1990). Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1985). . "The Theory and Practice of Maneuver Warfare". In Maneuver Warfare, An Anthology. Ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr., 3-17. San Fransisco, Ca: Presidio, 1993. . "Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare" Marine Corps Gazette (January 1988): 16-17. . "Tactics in Maneuver Warfare" Marine Corps Gazette (September 1981): 36-39. Mack, William P. and Albert H. Konetzni, Jr., Command at Sea. 4th ed. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1982). Mahan, Alfred T., "Naval Principals." In Mahan on Naval Warfare. Ed. Allan Westcott, 50-67. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948. Martin, L.W., The Sea in Modern Strategy (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967): 9-26. McGwire, Michael. "Maritime Strategy and the Super-powers". In Seapower and Influence, Old Issues and Challenges. Ed Jonathan Alford, 56-65. Osmun: Grower and Allanheld, 1987. Muise, Robert J. "Cleansing Maneuver Warfare Doctrine", Proceedings (November 1994): 47-49. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, July 1994. Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1. Naval Warfare. Washington DC: Department of the Navy. March 1994. Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2. Naval Intelligence. Washington DC: Department of the Navy. September 1994. "Naval Forward Presence: Essential for a Changing World", down loaded from Chief of Naval Operations Leadership Bulletin Board, November 1994. O'Keefe, Sean, "A World Lit by Lightening", Proceedings (January 1995): 28- 31. "The OPNAV Assessment Process", down loaded from Chief of Naval Operations Leadership Bulletin Board, November 1994. Owens, William A. "Naval Voyage into an Uncharted World", Proceedings (December 1994): 30-34. Picotte, Leonard F. Commander, Amphibious Group Two, Department of the Navy. Interview by the author, December 20,1994. Pierce, Terry C. "Maneuver Warfare: The 'Gators Play, Too" Proceedings (November 1989): 48-52. . "The Tactical-Strategic Link" Proceedings (September 1990): 66-69. . "MAGTF Warlords: A Naval Perspective" Marine Corps Gazette (July 1991): 38-40. . "Who's in Charge?" Proceedings (August 1991): 32-37. . "Not a 'CVN Gator"' Proceedings (June 1993): 74-76. . "Operational Maneuver From the Sea... Making it Work" Marine Corps Gazette (October 1993): 61-65. . "Today's Challenge for Fleet Sailors and Marines: OMFTS", Draft Potter, E.B. and others, eds. Sea Power(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,1960). Rosinski, Herbert. The Development of Naval Thought (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977). Schmitt, John F. "Understanding Maneuver as the Basis for Doctrine" Marine Corps Gazette (August 1990): 91-99. Smith, Edward A., Jr., "What '...From the Sea' Didn'tSay" Naval War College Review (Winter, 1995): 9-33. Sundt, Wilbur A. Naval Science: An Illustrated Text for the NJROTC Student (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1978). Thursfield, James R. Naval Warfare (Cambridge: University Press, 1913). Truver, Scott. Review of Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare in Proceedings, December 1994, page 84-85. Uhlig, Frank, Jr. "How Navies Fight, and Why" Naval War College Review (Winter, 1995): 34-39. Vego, Milan. Soviet Naval Tactics (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1992). Warden, John A. Review of Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare in Proceedings, December 1994, page 83-84. Wode, Christopher M. 'Operational Maneuver ...From the Sea", Amphibious Warfare Review (Summer/Fall 1994): 34-37.
