Foundations On Sand: An Analysis Of The First United States Occupation Of

Foundations On Sand: An Analysis Of The First United States

Occupation Of Haiti 1915-1934

CSC 95

SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy

United States Marine Corps

Command and Staff College

Quantico, VA 22134

Foundations on Sand

An Analysis of the First United States Occupation of Haiti

1915 - 1934

with

Supporting Documents

by Peter L. Bunce

Conference Group 10

June 5, 1995

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Foundations on Sand, An Analysis of the First United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934.

Author: Peter L. Bunce, GS-13.

Thesis: The first United States Occupation of Haiti, after a slow start, made a great variety of capital improvements for Haiti, made changes in the Haitian political system, and refinanced the Haitian economy, none of which had much lasting impact on the Haiti people once the occupation was terminated.

Background: The United States occupied Haiti originally to restore public order in 1915. It's self-imposed mandate quickly expanded to reestablishing Haitian credit in the international credit system, establishing good government and public order, and promoting investment in Haitian agriculture and industry. After a slow start, marred by a brutal revolt in 1918-20, the United States Occupation of Haiti was reorganized and began to address many of the perceived shortcomings of Haitian society. Its international and internal debt was refinanced, substantial public works projects completed, a comprehensive hospital system established, a national constabulary (the Gendarmerie [later Garde] d'Haiti) officered and trained by Marines, and several peaceful transitions of national authority were accomplished under American tutelage. After new civil unrest in 1929, the United States came to an agreement to end the Occupation before its Treaty-mandated termination in 1936. Once the Americans departed in 1934, Haiti reverted to its former state of various groups competing for national power to enrich themselves. Almost all changes the American Occupation attempted to accomplish failed in Haiti because they did not take into consideration the Haitian political and social culture.

Recommendation: Before the United States intervenes in foreign countries, particularly in those where nation-building improvements are to be attempted, the political and social cultures of those countries must be taken into consideration.

Contents

Part I, The Occupation 1

Haiti Before the Occupation 1

Off to a Rough Start 17

Smooth(er) Sailing 22

Haitianization 26

Aftermath 27

Part II, An Analysis of the Occupation 32

Goals of the Occupation 32

Imperialism and Racism 38

Culture 49

Part III, The Never-ending Story 54

Annexes 57

Annex A: The US Marine Corps' Military

Campaigns in the First United States

Occupation of Haiti 57

Appendix 1: First Provisional Brigade of Marines 66

Appendix 2: Ships of the 1915 Haitian Campaign 73

Appendix 3: The Gendarmerie (Garde) d'Haiti, 1915-1934 74

Annex B: The Fiscal Case for Occupation 79

Appendix 1: Public Debt of Haiti, 1919 vs. 1922. 91

Appendix 2: Import and Export Figures, Fiscal Year

1918-19. 96

Appendix 3: Haitian Government Expenses since Fiscal

Year 1914-15. 97

Annex C: Documents Relating to the United States Occupation

of Haiti, 1915 - 1934. 99

Appendix 1: Admiral Caperton's Original Instructions

for Haiti 101

Appendix 2: The Evolution of Admiral Caperton's

Authorization to Land Troops in Haiti 102

Appendix 3: Admiral Caperton's Campaign Guidance

to 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines 106

Appendix 4, The United States Take-Over of Haitian

Customs, Financial, and Civil Administration 110

Appendix 5: Proclamation of Martial Law in Haiti 120

Appendix 6: The 1915 Haitian-American Treaty, with

Extension 124

Appendix 7: The 1916 Gendarmerie Agreement and

Supporting Documents 129

Appendix 8: President Dartiguenave's Decrees of

5 April 1916 142

Appendix 9: The 1918 Haitian Constitution (Marine Corps

Translation) 146

Appendix 10: The Official Report of the Death of

Charlemagne 167

Appendix 11: Major General Commandant Barnett's Initial

Correspondence About Alleged Indiscriminate

Killings of Haitians 169

Appendix 12: Results of Major General Commandant

Lejeune's Investigation into Alleged Indiscriminate

Killings of Haitians. 176

Appendix 13: Report of the Mayo Court of Inquiry, the

Final Report on Caco Casualties, and Reports of

Military Justice Proceedings 184

Appendix 14: Correspondence Between the Commandant

of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti and the Financial Advisor

to the Republic of Haiti Regarding Changes in the

1916 Gendarmerie Agreement 299

Appendix 15: Diplomatic Messages Concerning Legislative

Elections in Haiti, 1921 210

Appendix 16: State Department Memo to President

Harding Regarding Progress of the US

Occupation of Haiti 215

Appendix 17: The 1922-23 Haitian Loan Plan 225

Appendix 18: The 1925 Gendarmerie Agreement 231

Appendix 19: Haitianization and Withdrawal Agreements 235

Endnotes 247

Bibliography 266

Dramatis Personae

(Presented Alphabetically)

George Barnett Major General Commandant of the Marine

BrigGen, USMC Corps, 1914-1920; initiated first

investigation into corvée abuses in Haiti.

Benoit Batraville Caco chief Charlemagne's ministre en chef

a. k. a. "Benoit" (see below), he maintained Charlemagne's

revolt after his death in 1919; alleged

cannibal and bocor (voodoo wizard); killed

in an ambush in 1920.

Arthur Bailly-Blanchard American Minister (Ambassador) to Haiti,

1914-1922.

Dr. Rosalvo Bobo Chief challenger to President Vilbrun

Guillaume Sam (see below) in July 1915;

one of the few serious challengers to the

Haitian Presidency in the1911-1915 period

not to have succeeded to the Presidency

(courtesy US Marine Corps).

Louis Borno Haitian Minister of Foreign Affairs under

Dartiguenave (below) who signed the

American- Haitian Treaty of 1915 that

justified the American occupation of Haiti.

President of Haiti, 1924-1930.

Smedley D. Butler Battalion commander, 1st Regiment of

Maj (later LtCol, BrigGen), USMC Marines, 1915; First commandant of the

Gendarmerie d'Haiti, 1915-1918; returned to

Haiti in 1920 to assist General Lejeune's

corvée investigations.

William B. Caperton Commander, Cruiser Squadron, Atlantic

Rear Admiral, USN Fleet in 1915; senior US officer in the initial

occupation of Haiti

Charlemagne Massena Peralte Member of the Haitian elite turned Caco

a. k. a."Charlemagne" chief, led Caco revolt in northern Haiti in

1918-1919 until his death in late 1919.

Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave President of Haitian Senate in July 1915,

was elected first Haitian President of the US

Occupation period in August 1915 (courtesy

US Marine Corps). Forced to stand down in

favor of Louis Borno in 1924.

Josephus Daniels Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1921; later

Ambassador to Mexico. Perhaps best

known for the order making all U.S. Navy

ships "dry," anticipating Prohibition.

Robert B. Davis, Jr. United States Chargé d'Affaires in Port au

Prince at the time of the original

intervention. His cablegrams were

instrumental in bringing Admiral Caperton

from Cap Haitien to Port au Prince in July

1915 and landing troops. Also the U. S.

Plenipotentary in the 1915 American

-Haitian Treaty that justified the American

occupation of Haiti.

Warren G. Harding President of the United States, 1921-1923.

Herbert Hoover President of the United States, 1929-1933.

Charles E. Hughes US Secretary of State, 1921-1925; later

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Robert Lansing US Secretary of State, 1915-1920.

John A. Lejeune Assistant to the Commandant, 1915-1917;

Col (later MajGen), USMC Major General Commandant, 1920-1924.

John A. McIlhenny Financial Advisor to the Republic of Haiti

(nominated by the President of the United

States, appointed by the President of Haiti),

1919-1922.

Dr. Dana G. Munro US Minister (Ambassador) to Haiti, 1930-

1933. Later Professor of Laitn American

History and Affairs at Princeton; author of

several books on United States policy and

the Caribbean.

Eugene Roy President of Haiti, 1930. Succeeded Borno,

who was forced into retirement;

outmaneuvered in Haitian legislature by

Stenio Vincent.

John H. Russell Commander, 1st Brigade 1917-1918 and

Col. (later BrigGen), USMC 1919-1922, United States High

Commissioner in Haiti, 1922-1930; later

Major General commandant of the

Marine Corps.

Vilbrun Guillaume Sam Last "President" of Haiti prior to the US a. k.

a.k.a. "Guillaume Sam" occupation. Killed by a mob of the Haitian

elite in Jul 1915, his body was later dragged

through the street; the US intervened the

next day.

Stenio Vincent Haitian President 1930-1941; virtual dictator

1938-1941. Maneuvered out of power by

Elie Lescot.

Littleton W. T. Waller Brigade Commander, Advance Force

Col. (later MajGen), USMC Brigade, which, upon deployment to Haiti,

became 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines;

senior American officer ashore in original

intervention.

Sumner Welles Chief of the Latin-American Division of the

State Department, 1920-1921; American

Commissioner to Dominican Republic,

1922-1925; later Ambassador to Cuba,

under Secretary of State.

Alexander S. Williams Butler's assistant in forming the

Capt (later Maj, LtCol), USMC Gendarmerie d'Haiti in 1915, succeeded

Butler as Chef of the Gendarmerie

1918-1919; outlawed the corvée in

November 1918; was blamed for much of

the corvée abuses that resulted the Caco

revolt.

Woodrow Wilson President of the United States, 1913-1921

Frederick M. Wise Commandant of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti,

LtCol, USMC 1919-1921.

Click here to view image

Conciliate Haitians to fullest extent consistent with maintaining order and

firm control of situation, and issue following proclamation: 'Am directed

to assure the Haitian people United States of America has no object in

view except to insure, establish, and help to maintain Haitian

independence and the establishing of a stable and firm government by the

Haitian people in their attempt to secure these ends. It is the intention to

retain United States forces in Haiti only so long as will be necessary for

this purpose.' Acknowledge.

Benson, Acting1

(Radiogram from Department of the Navy to Rear Admiral William B.

Caperton, USN, Port au Prince, Haiti, 7 August 1915.)

Foundations on Sand

An Analysis of the First United States Occupation of Haiti

1915 - 1934

Part I

The Occupation.

Haiti Before the Occupation.

Haiti is the second oldest independent country in the New World, second only to

the United States. Haiti first overthrew its the French overlords in the wake of the French

Revolution in 1794. It then suffered Spanish and British interventions, and a Napoleonic

French invasion and restoration of slavery in 1802 before finally achieving independence

in 1804, all without significant outside assistance.2 According to legend, Jacques

Dessalines, the bloody successor to Haiti's national hero Toussaint L'Ouverture (and

veteran of the American Revolution), created the Haitian flag by ripping the white center

out of the French Tricolor.3 Haitians are proud of their country and proud of their

independence.

By the turn of the 20th Century, Haiti was a deeply troubled country. Its society,

since the revolutions, had always been divided. In the absence of the French

colonialists--all of whom fled the country in 1804 or were killed--the mulâtres, the

mulatto class, approximately three percent of the population, assumed the social role of

the colonials. The peasantry, almost exclusively African in ancestry, remained peasants.

The elite of Haiti, who for all intents and purposes ran (and run) Haiti, are largely, not

exclusively, mulâtres. Noirs, particularly those with a military background or powerbase,

could become part of the elite, and often ruled Haiti. But Haiti was and is most often

administered for the benefit of the elite, and the elite are heavily mulâtre. "As in colonial

Saint Domingue [Haiti], where the gens de couleur and black slaves hated each other,

racial antagonism persisted between the elite and the black peasantry of Haiti."4

When Haiti was a French colony, "Saint Domingue" was a rich jewel of the

French empire--its exports were more than double of all of England's colonial trade in

1789.5 By the 20th Century, however, Haiti was in debt, couldn't pay its bills or claims

against it, and most of the Great Powers--save Russia and Japan--were threatening some

kind of action.

Political power in Haiti means the power to make money, usually through graft.

"'Under [President Louis] Hyppolite in 1890, 1891, and 1892, there was a carnival of

contracts in the Chambers [Legislature]. Every party regular, senator, minister, deputy,

or former volontaire de la révolution had at least one in the bag . . . Handsome favors, to

be sure, that [the] Good Fairy handed out to the faithful who had just ravaged the four

corners of the country with fire and sword.'" Haiti's public debt increased from $4.4

million in 1891 to over $25 million in 1895 after a flurry of public works instituted by

Hyppolite and his finance minister Frédéric Marcelin (who retired to France in 1895).6

Hyppolite's successor, Simon Sam, resigned in 1902 amidst a scandal concerning

a debt consolidation loan from German and French interests and the loss of over a million

and a quarter dollars in kickbacks and illegal payments. (Unusually, Sam's successor,

Pierre Nord Alexis, prosecuted Sam and his immediate cronies in 1904, and Sam, several

Haitians, a German, and two Frenchmen were convicted; not that anyone went to jail.)

Nord Alexis feared foreign debt collectors (who were arriving with warships by this

time7) and printed money instead of borrowing it. Paranoid, sometimes murderous, Nord

Alexis, after two more brushes with civil war, fled to a French cruiser in favor of Antoine

Simon in 1908. Simon and his immediate circle returned to the tradition of looting

the public purse.8

Surprisingly, given the United States' domination of the Caribbean after the

Spanish American War (1898), American financial investment in Haiti was quite small:

$4 million invested in Haiti compared with some $800 million in Mexico or $220 million

in Cuba; a total of $1.7 billion in all of Latin America.9 About 65 to 70 percent of Haiti's

imports came from the United States, the bulk of the balance coming from Germany and

France. Between the Haitian elite's growing desire for foreign products, a severe drop

in world agricultural prices in the 1890's (which effected all of Haiti's exports, except cheap

labor), and aggressive foreign competition, Haiti by 1900 was severely dependent on

foreign imports, and had a lousy balance of payments.10

France and Germany were the dominant financial players in Haiti at the turn

of the 20th Century. France received about two thirds of Haiti exports, and exported luxury

goods in return. The Germans were striving to overcome the French in the Haitian

markets: they exported more to Haiti than the French, more Haitian exports were carried

on German ships than French, and the Germans controlled the only railroad in Haiti, to

the Plain de Cul de Sac east of Port au Prince.11

The Banque Nationale d'Haiti was Haiti's treasury and fiscal agent. Instead of

being a financial entity controlled by the Haitian government, it was a French stock

company, owned principally by French banks, led by the Banque de l'Union Parisienne.

It charged a commission on the Haitian issue of paper currency and on the cashing of

checks. Since the French blacklisted Haiti on the world financial markets, so as to keep

the Haitian account for themselves, the French funneled all loans to the government

through the Banque, often at outrageous discounts*.12 To give an example of French loan

practices, Haitian obstacles to establishing a bank in 1874 was multiplied by the various

political and financial thieves inside and outside Haiti:

[Late 19th Century political leader Antenor]Firmin and historian

Antione Magloire say the loan was 60 million francs, to be repaid in forty

annual installments of 7.5 million francs, a return of 400 percent. [Dantes]

Bellegarde says 50 million francs, but that the Crédit-Général in Paris was

able to raise only 36.5 million, of which 26 million went to intermediaries

and private pockets in Port-au-Prince and Paris, while the remaining 10

million francs were used to liquidate, at par, a mountain of worthless

Haitian bonds bought up as scrap paper by European speculators. The

Crédit-Général's commission alone exceeded 9.5 million francs.13

Finally chartered in 1880, the Banque Nationale d'Haiti lost its charter in 1905,

after refusing to back Nord Alexis' blizzard of paper money. A five year period of intense

____________________

*Discounting was the practice of offering a loan at a certain level, then subtracting fees

and allowing for variable exchange rates up front, leaving the borrower with the balance

to spend, but liable for repaying the entire amount, at whatever interest was agreed upon

initially.

competition between French, German, and American (relative newcomers) banking

interests ensued over rechartering a new bank. Finally, in late 1910, the Haitian

legislature voted to dissolve the Banque Nationale d'Haiti, and created a new Banque

Nationale de la République d'Haiti, which moved into the old Banque's headquarters.

French banking interests, which put the package together with several German-American

private banks, diplomatically invited in American interests (including the infamous

National City Bank14). The French had a 75% interest in the new bank, the Americans

and the German-American banks 20%, and the German Berliner Handelsgesellschaft

Bank 5%. Not surprisingly, the new $13 million loan was discounted to $9.4 million.15

Another notorious incident which demonstrates the inability of the Haitian

government to control its own economy was the granting of a railroad concession to an

American named in James P. McDonald. Haiti promised to back bonds funding the

railroad to the Haitian northern city of Cap Haitien at six percent, pay McDonald regular

payments as the railroad was completed, and grant him a fifteen mile wide right of way

for banana plantations (Haiti is only thirty miles wide at its most narrow point). In short,

the government was prepared to give up roughly half the arable land in Haiti, and go still

further in debt, in return for a railroad that was never completed.16

After a mere 15 months in power, Antoine Simon began to lose control of Haiti,

particularly in the north country around Cap Haitien (helped not in some small part by the

boorish behavior of McDonald's American engineers). Simon and his army took ship to

Gonaives, landed, and moved north and seized Fort Liberté, pillaging and slaughtering as

he went.17

The north had rebelled against Port au Prince before. Those of peasant stock who

had lost their lands, and who rebelled at exploitation by the city dwellers and foreign

concessionaires, drifted into the private armies of petty warlords in the wilds of the north

country. Often described by Europeans and Americans as bandits or mercenaries, these

men became known as Cacos. Their loyalty was to their local chiefs, bound through

family ties and patronage.18 Now, in 1911, these men and their leaders were to become

the king (or president) makers of Haiti.19

The Cacos rampaged through the north country (focusing, at least in part, on

McDonald and his railroad camps), and boxed Simon into Fort Liberté. Simon escaped

to Port au Prince, but his time had passed. General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, a general

with a northern power base, had Cincinnatus Leconte declared "Supreme Chief of the

Revolution." Simon barely made it to a Dutch ship ahead of an angry mob. Less than

two weeks later (14 August 1911) Leconte was voted in as President by the National

Assembly.20

Leconte apparently was an honest man and, according to observers, was willing to

try to administer Haiti honestly. Unfortunately, his administration lasted just under a

year: until the National Palace blew up with him in it in early August, 1912. (He and previous

presidents apparently stored ammunition and explosives in the basement to keep it out of

the hands of rivals.) The real cause of the explosion remains unknown.21

Leconte's successor was Tancrede Auguste, a sugar plantation owner. His

administration was marked with a continual fight with the new Banque Nationale over

retiring the paper currency left over from Alexis Nord's administration. It was also short:

Auguste was dead the following May after a mysterious illness; some said poison. After

a chaotic funeral, to the point of a near rebellion in the capital, Michel Oreste, was voted

in as President, literally bribing his way into office with drafts on the national treasury.

Oreste, the first Haitian President to have no ties whatsoever with the military (regular or

Caco), made almost everyone in any position of power in Haiti angry with his proposals:

reform the Army, retire paper money, and reform the educational system (a great source

of graft in the government).22

In 1914 the Cacos, whose quiet had been bought by Auguste and Leconte but not

Oreste, rebelled in the north country, under the leadership of the Zamor family. The army

soon went over to the Cacos, and Michel Oreste took ship under the cover of British,

American, French and German marines on 27 January 1914. Oreste Zamor, heading a

Caco army with his brother Charles, was quickly elected President. Oreste and Charles

Zamor soon fell out with a former collaborator and rival, Davilimar Théodore.

Unfortunately for the Zamor brothers, the Banque proved difficult with funding

again, the Orestes ran out of money and, therefore, soldiers. Amid much chaos, Theodore

and his ally Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, entered Port au Prince at the head of a Caco army as

Oreste Zamor took refuge aboard a German commercial ship and his brother sought

safety with a General Polynice and a Committee of Safety. Théodore was elected

President on 7 November 1914.

Intervention and Occupation.

In January, 1915, Rear Admiral William B. Caperton took command of the Cruiser

Squadron of the United States Atlantic Fleet, flying his flag in the armored cruiser USS

Washington (CA-11). The Atlantic Fleet's cruiser squadron had the additional

responsibility of monitoring political events in the Caribbean, and Admiral Caperton's

first mission upon assuming command was to tour his new area of responsibility (Annex

C, Appendix 1). Admiral Caperton's first visit to Haiti was short and apparently

uneventful. But he no sooner departed for other ports when he was recalled to Haiti. Still

another revolt was forming in the north country of Haiti to challenge the Haiti

presidency. This time the proclaimed "Chief of the Executive Power" was General

Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, former President-maker, Caco leader, and now candidate for

President. Admiral Caperton intercepted Guillaume Sam outside of Cap Haitien and

persuaded him that the United States would not interfere with the transfer of power in

Haiti, so long as Guillaume Sam curbed the behavior of his Cacos. Admiral Caperton

and his gunboats and cruisers in effect shadowed Guillaume Sam down to coast to Port

au Prince, where he was duly elected President on 4 March 1915.23

In July 1915, the Washington, Rear Admiral Caperton embarked, sat in Port au

Prince harbor as still another Haitian presidency wound its way to a messy conclusion.

This time it was Guillaume Sam, who was besieged in his palace by a new challenger, Dr.

Rosalvo Bobo. At daybreak on 27 July 1915, Sam made a break for the French legation

next door. Sam made it, although most of the people accompanying him did not. He sent

a message to his chief of police, Charles-Oscar Etienne, at the police Arrondissement in

the lower city, to the effect that his presidency was over and that Etienne should follow

the dictates of his own conscience ["La partie est perdue, j'abandonne le pouvoir. Faites

ce que votre conscience vous dictera."]. Accounts vary, but somewhere between 160 and

'nearly 200' political prisoners, from Haiti's mulâtre elite--including ex-president Oreste

Zamor, died. The next day, a mob of the elite attacked Guillaume Sam in the French

legation and murdered him. Sam's mutilated body was dragged through the streets.

Having received a green light from the State Department via the Acting Secretary of the

Navy, Caperton met with the American and British chiefs of mission and the French

minister aboard the Washington and, with their concurrence, decided to land troops and

restore order.24

While his small landing force secured the legations in Port au Prince, Admiral

Caperton had a problem. With Guillaume Sam dead, there was no one really in charge in

the city. There was a revolutionary committee formed by General Polynice,25 Charles

Zamor (brother of the recently deceased ex-president), and others*, but no one, at least to

American eyes appeared to be in charge. The landing force was disarming what remained

of the Haitian Army in Port au Prince (and confiscated five wagon-loads of weapons the

first day), and the Haitian legislature was going through the opening stages of voting for

still another new President, but with the immediate crisis under control, Caperton

__________________________

*Haitian politics in the late 19th, early 20th Century was a series of cycles of recurring

personalities, the details of which is beyond the scope of this paper; however, it can be

said that most of the personalities in the revolutionary committee were prominent figures

in Haitian politics, although not all of them were necessarily supporters of the late

President Guillaume Sam, or of Dr. Bobo for that matter.

didn't know what the United States Government wanted. The Secretary of State, Robert

Lansing was relatively new (his predecessor, William Jennings Bryan, resigned in June

1915, in a disagreement over President Wilson's handling of the Lusitania crisis), so he

asked the President: "The situation in Haiti is distressing and very perplexing. I am not

at all sure what we ought to do or what we legally can do . . . I hope you can give me

some suggestion as to what course we can pursue." Wilson apparently answered the next

day:

I suppose there is nothing to do but to take the bull by the horns

and restore order . . .

1. We must send to Port au Prince a force sufficient to absolutely

control the city not only by also the country immediately about it from

which it draws its foods . . .

2. We must let the present Haitian Congress know that we will

protect it but that we will not recognize any action on its part that does not

put men in charge of affairs whom we can trust to handle and put an end to

revolution.

3. We must give all who now have authority there or who desire to

have it or who think they have it or are about to have it understand that we

shall take steps to prevent the payment of debts contracted to finance

revolutions.

. . . In other words, that we consider it our duty to insist on

constitutional government and will, if necessary (that is, if they force us

to it as the only way), take charge of elections and see that a real

government is erected which we can support.26

Caperton radioed Washington DC on 5 August that the president of the Haitian

Senate, Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave, appeared most electable, and that he "realizes Haiti

must agree to any terms laid down by the United States, professes to believe any terms

demanded will be for Haiti's benefit, [and] says he will use all his influence with [the]

Haitian Congress to have such terms agreed upon by Haiti."27 To insure Dartiguenave's

election, all Caperton had to do was neutralize the Cacos, take Dr. Bobo out of the

running, and make sure the election in the Haitian legislature went for Dartiguenave.

The Marine 2nd Regiment landed in Port au Prince on 4 August, and began

securing the city. With the arrival of the remainder of First Provisional Brigade of

Marines through August 1915, the Caco problem, at least in theory, would be settled in a

matter of time (Annex A).

With a flare of the dramatic, Caperton invited Dartiguenave and Dr. Bobo to the

American legation on 8 August and, speaking through his chief of staff, Capt. Edward L.

Beach, who spoke excellent French by all reports, challenged the two to do what was

right for Haiti. Not surprisingly, both men declared their devotion to the service of their

country. Caperton, according to his Senate testimony in 1921, then asked:

"Senator Dartiguenave, in case Dr. Bobo should be elected will

you promise that you will exert every influence in your power to assist

him for Haiti's good; that you will join with him heartily and helpfully and

loyally?"

"If Dr. Bobo is elected president I will give him the most loyal,

earnest support in every effort he may make for Haiti's welfare," replied

Dartiguenave, with simple dignity.

"Dr. Bobo, if Senator Dartiguenave is elected president, will you

help him loyally and earnestly in his efforts to benefit Haiti?"

"No I will not!" shouted Bobo. "If Senator Dartiguenave is elected

president I will not help him. I will go away and leave Haiti to her fate. I

alone am fit to be president of Haiti; I alone understand Haiti's aspirations,

no one is fit to be president but me; there is no patriotism in Haiti to be

compared with mine; the Haitians love no one as they love me."28

And so Dr. Bobo failed his interview. He left a week later, aboard a French ship,

for Santo Domingo, where he was refused residence, and ended up in Cuba. He later

moved to Jamaica, where he had a successful medical practice.29

On August 10, Admiral Caperton received a cable from the Secretary of the Navy

ordering that the election of the president of Haiti be allowed to take place and that "the

United States prefers election of Dartiguenave. Has no other motive than that

establishment of firm and lasting government by Haitian people and to assist them now

and at all times in future to maintain their political independence and territorial

integrity."30 The next day, at Admiral Caperton's orders, Captain Beach ordered the

revolutionary committee in Port au Prince to resign. Admiral Caperton himself, and

Captain Beach, both ended up arguing the term "free election" with the Bobo crowd. Dr.

Bobo's supporters believed that a "free election" would be one that would recognize his

military position and elect him president. Admiral Caperton's definition allowed none of

that. Finally, 2nd Regiment of Marines secured the building and the Haitian

legislature--39 senators and 102 deputies--met in the Chamber of Deputies. Captain

Beach was present as Admiral Caperton's representative, and probably acting as an

impromptu floor manager for Dartiguenave. "All senators and deputies were armed at

their own request." Dartiguenave was elected on the first ballot: "...the vote was announced as 94 for

Dartiguenave, 16 for Bobo, and a scattering [31] for Cauvin, Thegun, and others." The

United States formally recognized the Dartiguenave government on 18 August 1915.31

While only a complete optimist would claim that the United States had no influence over

this vote, a favorable vote of only 67% for the desired leader compares favorably with the

more familiar rigged election results in excess of 99% common in the mid- and late-20th

Century. And, lest it be forgotten, Dartiguenave had his own agenda:

Besides being a civilian with no army behind him (except, of

course, the U.S. Marine Corps), he was the first elite mulâtre from the

South the take office since 1876--an office that, since the days of

Boisrond, had been all but monopolized by noirs, generals, and men of the

North and Artibonite. Not that Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave had no

constituency: his constituency, like that of Haiti's presidents for the next

thirty years, was the elite. Numerically insignificant, usually without

lucrative occupation save politics, this was the group that, now more than

ever before, events were propelling into a monopoly of office and, to the

extent the Americans would permit, of entrenched power.32

Less than a month later, a Treaty between the United States and Haiti gave the

legal underpinnings for the United States occupation of Haiti (Annex C, Appendix 6).

Eighty years after the fact, it is hard to imagine a sovereign nation agreeing to such a

treaty: it is as if an adolescent was surrendering his paycheck and check book to a

over-bearing parent, to be put on a strict budget and with a solemn promise to behave.

For the United States, it was contracting a huge responsibility against which we will later

examine the results of the occupation.

Another byproduct of the American Haitian Treaty was the Haitian Union

Patriotique, which was to become the principle organization of Haitian resistance to the

First Occupation. Interestingly, it was an organization of and for the Haitian elite, the

opinion of the noir peasantry towards the Occupation was apparently neither desired nor

solicited.33 (A comment by the French minister in May 1916 (after the pacification of the

Artibonite and the North by the Marines): "'The peasants, the pure noirs,' he wrote, 'are,

like the tradesmen in the towns, delighted with the American occupation.'"34)

Even before the signing of the Haitian-American Treaty, Admiral Caperton,

acting on instructions from the Navy Department, started taking over the financial and

civil administration of Haiti35 (Annex C, Appendix 4). Like many aspects of the First

Occupation, while this particular action was of dubious legality under international law, it

was established and conducted with the intention of maintaining a scrupulous honesty.

This had an immediate impact on the Haitian elite:

American assumption of customs control . . . for the first time

brought home to the elite (which in this context is to say all politicians)

some hard practicalities of foreign intervention. For that entire class,

whose livelihood after all had been the public treasury, the blow, square in

the pocketbook, was disastrous. (Footnote: Adding injury, Paymaster

Conard promptly stabilized the gourde at a fixed (5 to 1) exchange rate for

the dollar, thus at one stoke putting out of business the currency

speculation, both Haitian and foreign, that had so often gutted the treasury.

Elime Elie, Dartiguenave's Finance Minister, pled in vain to Conard that

all his friends had been accustomed to make their living from a floating

gourde and 'it would be an economic crime to ruin their business.'36

Dartiguenave was unable to control Port au Prince's streets, and Admiral Caperton

declared martial Law on 3 September 1915. Apparently Dartiguenave told Caperton that

this action would also facilitate the Haitian legislature's acceptance of the Haitian-

American Treaty.37

For the United States, the easiest part of the Treaty to implement would be the

requirement for an American-officered constabulary to establish law and order in Haiti.

This would become known as the Gendarmerie d'Haiti (in 1928 renamed the Garde

d'Haiti).

The forcing of the Haitian-American Treaty through the Haitian legislature was

brutal--Admiral Caperton eventually had to threaten to withhold the Haitian government's

paychecks before the Treaty would be ratified.38 The Americans were pushing for

constitutional and legal changes in Haiti and Dartiguenave was unsure if he could deliver,

especially with the "American insistence on eliminating graft, reducing palace patronage,

stopping double or triple pensions to single individuals, and ending fraud and kickbacks

on government contracts."39

Using an ancient Haitian constitutional device, Dartiguenave

dissolved the Haitian Senate 6 April, 1916, and instituted a Council of State in its place. He

then designated the lower house a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the Constitution40 (Annex

C, Appendix 8). Interestingly, a document from the Butler Papers (Butler was Chef of

the Gendarmerie by this time), entitled "Coup d'Etat" details the reports the American had

and made on the closing of the Senate41. From the title, and its inclusion in Butler's

papers, it would appear that Butler, his Marine Gendarmerie officers, or both,

disapproved of Dartiguenave's action, even though it served American interests as well as

Dartiguenave's. This is especially interesting, considering Butler's part in the closing of

the Haitian legislature the following year. According to his testimony before the Senate

investigating committee in 1921, Colonel Waller, who had been told by Dartiguenave

that he feared impeachment, was also opposed to the action.42

Nevertheless, Butler and Waller enforced the closure of the Senate and, when

Dartiguenave decided that even the Chamber of Deputies were too difficult to work with

and ordered legislative elections, Waller and Butler held elections and enforced an

unusual honesty. According to Waller's proclamation, the role of the occupying forces

was limited to maintaining order, restricting gatherings from closer than 30 feet from

polling places, placing a representative in each of the polling places, allowing Gendarmes

who were Haitian citizens to vote (but without their weapons), and some rules on party

nominations and the prevention of fraud.43 Some observers view this election as more

free of coercion than any of memory before it.44

However, as the primary purpose of the new legislature was to draft a new

constitution (Haiti's 17th since independence), it was not going to be very cooperative. A

draft constitution was written for the legislature by a Dr. Edmond Heraux--formerly

Antoine Simon's Foreign Minister in 1908--which was duly passed to Washington for

suggestions. Dartiguenave received said suggestions, and dumped them on the legislature

as an American dictat. The legislature rebelled and starting writing its own constitution

with a decidedly anti-American tone. Dartiguenave apparently wished the Marines to

close down the legislature for him, which would allow him to rule unimpeded by any

other Haitian legal body. But as he deferred to Colonel Cole (Waller's successor), Cole

deferred to Washington, who deferred to Dartiguenave. Dartiguenave finally called in

Major Butler and ordered him to close down the legislature. It did not reopen until 1930.

The American-amended constitution was then passed to an all Haitian referendum

in early 1918, and duly passed. The Gendarmerie enforced the honesty of the election,

although it was admittedly and openly pro-constitution, and the elite apparently boycotted

the referendum. And, despite his frequent claims to the contrary, Franklin Roosevelt did

not write the Haitian constitution: the American "suggestions", incorporated in the

Heraux draft, had their origin in the State Department.45

Off to a Rough Start.

The Marine suppression of the Cacos brought peace to Haiti which, as noted

above, was appreciated by the noirs and the tradesmen, if not the elite or the Cacos.

Public order was maintained by the new Gendarmerie d'Haiti, a national police force,

manned by Haitians and officered by Marines.

Public order, however, did not immediately bring financial stability, as World

War I was consuming most of the liquidity in World money markets at the time, and

nothing was available for a Haitian consolidation loan. With Haiti's heavy debt, most of

the revenues collected by the Navy paymasters--although the former skimming off of

funds was halted--went to debt service, and not for improving the Haitian infrastructure

as desired.46 Main functions of government were therefore taken over by the

Gendarmerie as it was the only organized "Haitian" entity capable of taking any kind of

positive action in Haiti at the time. These functions included public health, prisons, and

public works.47 Lacking sufficient funds to improve roads, bridges, and culverts, Butler

found a provision in the Haitian rural code that provided for Haitians to provide labor in

lieu of money for the payment of taxes. Butler used this labor, called the corvée, in the

construction of rural roads. According to his testimony in 1921, he was able to bring the

cost of buildings roads down to $205 a mile, from a pre-occupation cost of $51,000 a

mile (a figure inflated, no doubt, by large amounts of graft). Butler "repaired" (rebuilt is

probably a closer term) 470 miles of roads during his tenure as Chef of Gendarmerie. He

took pains to provide food, shelter, entertainment, and motivation to the laborers, and

went to the trouble to get President Dartiguenave out of Port au Prince to periodically

praise the laborers' efforts. (Butler's papers include a collection of photographs of the

first automobile trip taken in Haiti, outside of Port au Prince, apparently to Cap

Haitien.48)

Colonel Waller, in his testimony before the same Senate committee, told of an

irrigation project in the Cul de Sac valley in which he received more volunteer labor than

he could employ and brought the project in at a cost of $800, down from a (Haitian)

estimate of $60,000.49

The system, as might have been expected, also lent itself to abuse. The Marines

made the mistake of having Haitian civil officials in the process of recruiting labor.

These officials were not above using impressment instead of encouraging volunteers to

get their numbers, nor were they above exempting certain persons who could bribe their

way out of their labor obligation, and putting the work back on those who had already

performed their obligation. Butler's successor, Major A. S. Williams, saw that the corvée

system was being increasingly abused, and causing increasing Haitian discontent with the

Americans, and abolished it on 1 October 1918.50

Brigadier General Albertus W. Catlin, who succeeded Col. John H. Russell in

command of the Marine brigade (Russell had succeeded Cole) in late 1918 after returning

from combat duty in France, made a number of inspection trips, starting in March 1919,

to investigate reports he had received of abuses of the corvée in the Hinche and Maissade

districts (Annex C, Appendix 11). General Catlin found that the corvée was still in force

in these districts and was using impressed labor. In addition, much of the labor was being

used for private projects as opposed to public works.51 The abuses of the corvée were

probably more extensive than General Catlin was able to discover on his inspections, as

the ensuing revolt, which Marine officers believed to have originated over discontent

over the corvée (which in itself resurrected the old paranoia over blancs reinstating

slavery), became widespread. The popular leader of the revolt, Charlemagne Peralte, a

former Caco General and a brother-in-law to the Zamor brothers, had been serving a

sentence of hard labor in Cap Haitien when he bolted for the mountains, taking his

gendarme guard with him. Charlemagne, and his successor after his death, Benoit, were

found to have political and financial connections with Dr. Rosalvo Bobo.52

The revolt would last until 1920. But if that had been the Marine's only problem

in Haiti, no one in Washington DC would probably have noticed. However, late in 1919,

Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps George Barnett was reviewing a court

martial case of two Marine privates accused of unlawfully executing Caco prisoners. His

eye caught an argument by the Marines' counsel to the effect that such executions were

rather common in Haiti. Barnett was shocked, and immediately fired off a letter to Col.

Russell (who had reassumed command of the Marine Brigade after General Catlin

returned to the United States), ordering him to investigate and correct the situation

immediately. Col. Russell investigated, found abuses, and started the slow process of

military justice rolling (Annex C, Appendix 11).

Unfortunately, General Barnett's letter to Colonel Russell got into the papers.53

Despite Col. Russell's investigation, a later investigation by General Barnett's successor,

Major General John A. Lejeune (Annex C, Appendix 12) and now-Brigadier General

Butler, and a formal Naval Board of Inquiry chaired by Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, all

of which found that military justice had been imposed on all those who were guilty,

within naval jurisdiction, and within the statute of limitations54, the press continued. In

particular, The Nation accused the Marines of "racial snobbery, political chicane" and

"torture...theft, arson, and murder" . . . "actual slavery" . . . and a "five years' massacre of

Haitians." The upshot was a Senate investigation which lasted from 1921 to 1922, sat in

Port au Prince and as well as Santo Domingo, and allowed a representative of the

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Union Patriotique

advisory rights and a right to cross examination;55 and yet found that most of the charges

had been greatly exaggerated:

On the evidence before it the committee can now state--

(1) That the accusations of military abuses are limited in point of

time to a few months and in location to restricted area.

(2) Very few of the many Americans who have served in Haiti are

thus accused. The others have restored order and tranquillity under

arduous conditions of service, and generally won the confidence of the

inhabitants of the country with who they came in touch.

(3) That certain Caco prisoners were executed without trial. Two

such cases have been judicially determined The evidence to which

reference has been made shows eight more cases with sufficient clearness

to allow them to be regarded without much doubt as having occurred.56

The committee also noted that the thrust of most of the accusations had been an

effort to discredit the entire occupation of Haiti.57 More importantly, the Committee

noted that the occupation was not serving its goals and recommended changes:

¨ "... [place] within reach of the Haitian masses, justice, schools, and agricultural

instruction . . . [and] . . . send to Haiti a commission comprising a commercial

advisor, an expert in tropical agriculture, and an educator . . ."

¨ "..advise the Haitian government against permitting foreign interests to acquire

great land holdings in Haiti."

¨ "...as communications are opened up and as the peasants are secure in their life and

property, . . . reduce the force of marines in the territory of the Republic and

ultimately to intrust the maintenance of order and peace exclusively to the

gendarmes."

¨ Eliminate provost courts for civil crimes and "offenses by the press against public

order."

¨ Raise the caliber and qualifications of the Americans who represent the United

States in Haiti.58

Interestingly, almost a year earlier, President Harding had apparently solicited an

evaluation of the Occupation from the State Department shortly after his inauguration in

1921. Written by Sumner Wells, who at the time was Chief of the Latin American

Division of the State Department and who would become the American High

Commissioner in the Dominican Republic in 192259, it recommended similar changes in

the Occupation and its administration:

¨ Increase the size of Gendarmerie d'Haiti in order to increase public order.

¨ Appoint a single representative of the United States to represent the President in

Haiti and subordinate all United States "Treaty officials" to this representative.

¨ Change the basic supervision of the Occupation of Haiti from the Navy Department

to the State Department, which would presumed to be more diplomatic in budget

items, for instance.

¨ Develop the Haitian economy, principally by reforming the Haitian education

system60 (Annex C, Appendix 16).

Thus, getting recommendations from all sides, the Occupation of Haiti entered a

period of great change and, ultimately, some progress.

Smooth(er) Sailing.

On 10 March 1922, John H. Russell, twice former commander of the First

Provisional Brigade of Marines in Haiti and recently promoted to Brigadier General,

became the United States High Commissioner in Haiti.61

According to the American-sponsored Haitian constitution of 1918, a Haitian

President served for a term of four years, and could be immediately reelected for a second

term. However, under the Title VII, Transitory Provisions of the constitution, the sitting

President--Dartiguenave--was the one who decided the next legislative elections, it being

the Haitian Senate which would elect the President (Annex C, Appendix 9). The Senate

itself had not sat since 1916, when Dartiguenave with, if not the approval, at least the

assistance of the Americans, locked it out of the legislative building (above). In 1921,

Dartiguenave's representatives began feeling out the Americans about reelection without

the inconvenience of legislative elections. The State Department proved coy on this

particular request, apparently preferring legislative elections if Dartiguenave wanted

reelection as President (Annex C, Appendix 15).

To make a long story short, Dartiguenave preferred not to suffer legislative

elections, and the Americans preferred a new President. Dartiguenave had proved

unpopular among the Haitians and, in particular, the Haitian elite for years. So it was

with little sorrow that Dartiguenave was out-maneuvered in his own Council of State.

Louis Borno, one-time Foreign Minister for Dartiguenave, was elected President in May

1922. On the 15th, "for the first time since Nissage-Saget [President 1870-74] and only

the second time in the history of Haiti, a constitutional transfer of power took place."62

Louis Borno, like Dartiguenave, would be still another client-President of Americans,63 or

a strong-willed Haitian with his own agenda,64 depending on which interpretation of the

First United States Occupation you prefer, but he and John Russell could at least work

together in an atmosphere approaching mutual respect, and things were accomplished.

With the end of World War I, and a world recovery taking place, the Haitian

Government finally solicited a $16 million loan on which there were serious bids. The

National City Bank took high bid of 92.137[%] in 1922 (which means a discount of just

under 8%, which compares rather favorably with loans taken by the Haitians prior to the

Occupation) at 6% interest. Of the $16 million face value of the loan, the Haitians were

therefore able to actually see over $15 million of it, which went to retire the claims of the

National Bank and the National Railroad, and refunded three outstanding French loans.

A second loan, also funded through National City Bank, for some $5 million paid off

73,269 claims against the Haitian government settled by a joint American-Haitian claims

commission. A third loan for $2.66 million, this time through the Metropolitan Trust

company of New York in 1923, finally relieved Haiti of the financial albatross of Mr.

McDonald's National Railroad plan.65

Although, besides a peaceful transition of political power, arguably the greatest

contribution to Haiti made by the occupation, to quote the British minister in Haiti in

1929, was that it "maintained peace and allowed the peasant to work in safety," other,

more tangible results were to the Occupation's credit during the Louis Borno-John

Russell period:

¨ over 1000 miles of roads, with 210 bridges, serving 3000 motor vehicles;

¨ nine major airfields and numerous auxiliary fields;

¨ 15 modern lighthouses (as opposed to three antiques in 1915), 54 buoys, ten harbor

lights and other aids to navigation;

¨ a functioning telephone and telegraph system;

¨ ten towns with running, potable water, and 64 villages with clean wells, in addition

to irrigation projects; and

¨ a Service de Santé Publique which included 11 hospitals--98% staffed by Haitians,

and 147 public clinics, not counting three military hospitals and the Catholic

hospital in Port au Prince.66

One area in which the Americans encountered an immense amount of resistance

was in the area of public education. In his memo for President Harding, Sumner Welles

accused the Haitian elite publicly funding education at adequate levels, while actually

pocketing the bulk of the money for themselves.67 In 1923, General Russell instituted a

Service Technique de l'Agriculture et de l'Ensignement Professionel, or Service

Technique as it became known, to provide a agricultural educational system for the noir

peasantry under a Dr. George F. Freeman. This was "a matter of extreme social

sensitivity for the elite," who feared both the social consequences of an educated noir

peasantry and the loss of the noirs' loyalty to the blancs, who were improving their

lives.68

The "show window" of the Service Technique was the Central School of

Agriculture at Damien where

[in] the way of things in Haiti, and more particularly because such studies

required literacy and prior preparation, the students came from elite

families, though, alas, with no more appetite for the dunghill side of

agriculture (let alone for going out into the country to instruct peasant

noirs) than their predecessors at Turgeau [a reference to the Haitian forces

under Dessalines who took Port au Prince in October 1803]. To overcome

such reservations, there was adopted a system of scholarships, or bourses,

whereby each student received the not-inconsiderable sum of $25 a month

and, as Dr. Freeman was later quoted in the New York World,

was 'virtually hired to go, by means of scholarships.' This incentive

notwithstanding, student bousiers concentrated on academic work while

hired peasants dug ditches, cleaned stables, slopped hogs, and shovel

manure.69

The American attempts at educational reform was also strongly resisted by the

Catholic church in Haiti, which saw its system of confessional schools threatened by the

proposed American system. The Church had been in opposition to the United States

Occupation since 1915, when they declined to perform the traditional Te Deum to mark

Dartiguenave's election. This appears to be primarily a jurisdictional and religious (the

Catholic church appeared to view the advent of the Americans in 1915 as the advent of

rampant Protestantism) issue, as opposed to a nationalist issue, because the Haitian laity

was 30 times more French and French Canadian than Haitian.70

Needless to say, elite students, and not just those in the Service Technique, were

highly politicized, nationalist, and, almost by definition, anti-American. Louis Borno, by

1929, had also overstayed his political welcome, so students were anti-government as

well.

What touched everything off was a seemingly innocent decision by Dr. Freeman

of the Service Technique. Dr. Freeman needed funds to set up some experimental

stations at Hinche--to serve the noir peasantry rather than just the elite students--and

proposed on cutting back on bourses and paid labor at the main facility at Damien. The

students went on strike, and were quickly joined by sympathy strikes in other elite

schools in Port au Prince and Cap Haitien. President Borno's reaction was initially

restrained by General Russell, although Russell did cable Washington to request

reinforcements for the Marine Brigade in case the Garde d'Haiti (the Gendarmerie d'Haiti

had been redesignated on 1 November 1928) proved unreliable.

The unrest continued on through November 1929 until the first week in December,

when the situation at Les Cayes suddenly got out of hand. The peasantry of the region,

for reasons other than why the students revolted, rebelled after agitators from Port au

Prince and Cap Haitien had their say, and headed for the town of Les Cayes. A patrol of

20 Marines stood in their way. The confrontation eventually got out of hand, and 12

Haitians died. President Hoover, who had been inaugurated that year, called for an

investigation.71 Given President Hoover's predisposition to get out of Haiti, it is hardly

surprising that the resulting Forbes Commission recommended that the Occupation be

terminated as soon as possible.72

Haitianization.

The United States Government signed an agreement in 1931 with the Haitian

Government (Annex C, Appendix 19), for a rather quick "Haitianization" of the Treaty

services in Haiti and the eventual withdrawal of all United States forces from Haiti.

Louis Borno stood down as President in early 1930, and the Council of State elected

Eugene Roy as the new President. He took office on 15 May 1930; the first Catholic Te

Deum since 1914 was said for the new President. Ironically, in a flurry of legislative

machinations that represented a bitter struggle between the mulâtres and nationalistic

noirs, Stenio Vincent, a light skinned noir, was elected President in November 1930.73) It

appears that the United States Mission in Haiti originally believed that the United States

Occupation should last until at least 1936, in order to reassure holders of Haitian

government bonds. However, the State Department, and presumably President Hoover,

wished to complete the process before the lapse of the Haitian-American Treaty of 1915.

The agreement on Haitianization, which included no actual date for the termination of the

Occupation, although most other Treaty services were given transition dates, was signed

5 August 1931.74

A final agreement for the withdrawal of United States military forces was finally

agreed upon and signed with Haiti on 7 August 1933, with a termination date of 1

October 1934. After conversations between President Vincent and President Roosevelt,

in Cap Haitien in July of 1934, the date was moved up to 1 August 1934.75

Aftermath.

The actual withdrawal of American troops in Haiti was somewhat of an

anticlimax: most equipment and troops were withdrawn from Haiti prior to the actual

withdrawal date, on 1 August 1934, at Marine Brigade headquarters, the American flag

was lowered, with honors, and the Haitian flag was raised, with honors. The last aircraft

from Marine Observation Squadron Nine left Bowen Field outside Port au Prince and

flew back to the United States.76 For the Haitians, the "Second Independence" was one

big, long party.77

The Constitution, modified in 1928, was again changed in 1935 to invest more

power in the President. According to the first Haitian Chef of the Garde d'Haiti--

Démosthènes Calixte, the same officer who was the Haitian deputy of the then-new Ecole

Militaire in 1922 under General Russell--the Garde was rapidly politicized, beginning in

1934.78 This same officer offers some observations (1939) to what happened to the

institutions left the Haitians by the United States Marines Corps and Navy:

¨ The Sanitation and Hygiene Service, which was originally an organization

trained by the officers of the Medical corps of the United States Navy, has lost

its real purpose as an institution. The persons responsible for its administration

are rank politicians and the most ill-bred officials Haiti ever had.

¨ The Public Works Administration was also organized by officers of the Civil

Engineer Corps of the United States Navy. But since its "Haitianization", it has

become merely a payroll institution for all the friends of the President who are

jobless, as well as those who do not care to work. The engineers and architects

in charge of various departments cannot do anything to remedy the situation.

This is why this service has spent so much money and Haiti still has no roads, no

bridges, and no sewers in areas where such construction is badly needed.

¨ The Agricultural and Rural Education Service . . . was, after its "Haitianization."

placed under another foreigner, a Belgian, who resigned in 1938. This

department could have rendered great service if the five-year plan submitted by

the scientific agriculturist-in-charge had been approved by the government. . .

Political opportunism was rampant. No attempt was made even to try the plan.

¨ The Contribution or Internal Tax Service was also organized by Americans. The

Haitians who have replaced the Americans are competent and honest; but again

political interference was followed by embezzlement of Government funds,

which of course went unpunished.

¨ Education is purposely neglected for the benefit of politics and social prejudice.

The method of education in Haiti has always been a matter for "discussion."

The removal from office of competent administrators and personnel of the

Education Department for political reason renders the problem practically

insoluble.

¨ There cannot be an independent press in Haiti, because of the enactment of a law

against a free press. A 'state of siege' is maintained by the present government,

but even in time of peace no one can express an honest opinion as to the general

condition or administration of the country without being mistreated.79

Other observers, even those hostile to the United States Occupation, have noted

the deterioration of the infrastructure: "American civil service reform, for instance, had

little impact. After the occupation, Haitian politics reverted to the 'spoils system'

whereby successive administrations installed their own partisans in public office."

"...The network of roads, potentially the most significant legacy of the occupation,

didn't last long because almost all roads were unpaved and required elaborate

maintenance."80

President Vincent became a dictator in all but name in late 1938. He was

eventually maneuvered out of power by Elie Lescot in 1941. Lescot was exposed in 1945

as a virtual agent for Trujillo in the Dominican Republic (by the Dominicans). Students

and rioters took to the streets. In January 1946, the Garde, headed by an Executive

Military Committee [Comité Exécutif Militaire] led by a Colonel Lavaud (a mulâtre) took

charge. The result was chaos--rioting, looting, arson--with an ugly racial--noir versus

mulâtres--tone, although there apparently was even some Communist influence in the

violence as well.

The Comité eventually restored order, resurrected the 1932 constitution, and

returned Haiti to a state approaching normalcy. In August 1946, presidential elections

were held. Dumarsais Estimé, an Artibonite noir, was declared the winner, a Te Duem

was said in his honor, and the Garde went back to the barracks.

Estimé enacted a new constitution in November. The Garde was redesignated

"L'Armée d'Haiti" and its police functions were theoretically separated from the military

functions. Estimé was a populist as well as a noir, and he nationalized the Standard Fruit

holdings as well as instituted an income tax for the elite. He also was seen as a threat by

Trujillo, who worked steadily to destabilize him.

Estimé declared a state of siege in 1949 because of the threat from the Dominican

Republic. Faced with a loss of income from the Standard Fruit nationalization and other

causes, he suddenly required every worker to buy government bonds redeemable in 1959,

which proved immensely unpopular. So did Estimé's efforts to be reelected President

despite a constitutional prohibition against presidents succeeding themselves. His

attempt at modifying the constitution was blocked in Haitian Senate, even though the

attempt was popular with the masses. Finally, the army, with rioting groups supporting

both sides of the position in the streets, faced Estimé and told him he had resigned on 10

May 1950.

Initially, Colonel Franck Lavaud was the new President, but Colonel Paul

Magloire, initially declared the Minister of the Interior in the new junta, was the real

power in the group. New national elections were declared on 3 August, and Magloire

resigned from the junta to run for President. He was opposed by the Communist Party

and an architect who wanted to execute Estimé Elections on 10 October finalized

Magloire's presidency, although the commentary at the time felt it reflected the popular

opinion of most Haitians.81

In the end, however, Magloire fell prey to the fatal disease of all Haitian elected

Presidents: the desire to hold on after his term of office would expire. Magloire

attempted a coup against himself--he resigned as President and, as commander in chief of

the army, declared himself chief Executive Power (shades of 1915). The constitution was

suspended and dissidents jailed. The people took to the streets in a general strike, the

army refused to support him, and Magloire fled to Jamaica in exile on 12 December

1956.82 Time didn't give his fall much play, the big news that Christmas was the crushing

of the Hungarian revolt by Soviet tanks.

Magloire's immediate successor, Joseph Pierre-Louis, took office the same day he

left. He resigned 55 days later.

Haiti entered another riotous election cycle. Rioters stormed schools and attacked

mulâtres. The army--whose back pay had been mysteriously paid by Dr. Francois

Duvalier, an old follower of Estimé--attempted to gain control under Colonel Armand.

Opposed by loyalist elements, the coup failed. Rioting and looting prevailed in Port au

Prince.

On 26 May 1957, a Pierre Fignolé was inaugurated as President. He didn't last

long. The man he appointed head of the Army turned on him and demanded his

signature on a letter of resignation on 14 June. Fignolé was dead two days later.

Duvalier was steadily gaining support in the army and in the country as well. On 22

September, Francois Duvalier, was elected President in a ratio of three votes to two.83

Part II

An Analysis of the Occupation

Looking at the bleak history of the Occupation and its aftermath, There are a

number of questions that come to mind. Did it accomplish anything? Did anything it

accomplished amount to anything? If the answers to the first two questions are yes, what

happened to Haiti? The Occupation was scarcely over before Haiti seemed to revert to its

bad old ways.

Goals of the Occupation.

There is little written what the United States' goals for the Occupation, and

it is not difficult to find those commentators who denounce the entire occupation as a

racist exercise in imperialism by the United States.84 One of the few hints about actual

goals is Sumner Well's memorandum for President Harding, talking about the lack of

progress in the occupation based on what was stated in the 1915 Haitian-American Treaty

(Annex C, Appendix 16).

The 1915 Haitian-American Treaty is often denounced as an ex post facto Treaty

that served only to justify the American occupation.85 It was certainly after the fact, and

it was often cited as if it were a moral contract that must be accomplished before the

Occupation could end. However, as a statement of goals, it does offer some insight into

what the United States hoped to accomplish through the Occupation (Annex C, Appendix

6).

I. Finances. "...(T)he United States will . . . aid the Haitian Government in the

proper and efficient development of its agriculture, mineral and commercial resources

and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a first and solid basis." (Article I)

This was to be accomplished through the mechanism of the appointment of a General

Receiver to collect and spend Haiti's customs duties for it. The General Receiver would

be assisted by a Financial Advisor. (Article II) Haiti would agree that the General

Receiver would receive all customs duties from Haiti. (Article III). The Financial

Advisor would "collate, classify, arrange and make full statement of" all of Haiti's debts,

to include all of their financial obligations. (Article IV) These customs duties collected

will first pay the salaries of the appointed Americans, then pay off the public debt, third,

pay for a constabulary as specified later in the Treaty, and finally, meet the expenses of

the Haitian Government. (Article V) Haiti could not increase its pubic debt without the

agreement of the United States. (Article VIII)

II. Security. Haiti agreed to an American officered and organized constabulary,

which Haiti would pay for. (Article X)

III. Resources. In response to American "aid [to] the Haitian Government in the

proper and efficient development of its agriculture, mineral and commercial resources,

the Haitians agreed to not give or sell any of Haiti's territory (Article XI), settle all claims

with the U