Foundations On Sand: An Analysis Of The First
United States
Occupation
Of Haiti 1915-1934
CSC
95
SUBJECT
AREA - Foreign Policy
United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Quantico, VA
22134
Foundations on Sand
An Analysis of the First United States
Occupation of Haiti
1915 - 1934
with
Supporting Documents
by Peter L. Bunce
Conference Group 10
June 5, 1995
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:
Foundations on Sand, An Analysis of the First United States Occupation
of Haiti, 1915-1934.
Author:
Peter L. Bunce, GS-13.
Thesis:
The first United States Occupation of Haiti, after a slow start, made a
great variety of capital improvements for Haiti, made changes in the Haitian
political system, and refinanced the Haitian economy, none of which had much
lasting impact on the Haiti people once the occupation was terminated.
Background:
The United States occupied Haiti originally to restore public order in
1915. It's self-imposed mandate quickly
expanded to reestablishing Haitian credit in the international credit system,
establishing good government and public order, and promoting investment in
Haitian agriculture and industry. After
a slow start, marred by a brutal revolt in 1918-20, the United States
Occupation of Haiti was reorganized and began to address many of the perceived
shortcomings of Haitian society. Its
international and internal debt was refinanced, substantial public works
projects completed, a comprehensive hospital system established, a national
constabulary (the Gendarmerie [later Garde] d'Haiti) officered and trained by
Marines, and several peaceful transitions of national authority were
accomplished under American tutelage.
After new civil unrest in 1929, the United States came to an agreement
to end the Occupation before its Treaty-mandated termination in 1936. Once the Americans departed in 1934, Haiti
reverted to its former state of various groups competing for national power to
enrich themselves. Almost all changes
the American Occupation attempted to accomplish failed in Haiti because they
did not take into consideration the Haitian political and social culture.
Recommendation: Before the United States intervenes in foreign countries,
particularly in those where nation-building improvements are to be attempted,
the political and social cultures of those countries must be taken into
consideration.
Contents
Part
I, The Occupation
1
Haiti Before the Occupation 1
Off to a Rough Start
17
Smooth(er) Sailing 22
Haitianization 26
Aftermath 27
Part
II, An Analysis of the Occupation
32
Goals of the Occupation 32
Imperialism and Racism 38
Culture 49
Part
III, The Never-ending Story
54
Annexes 57
Annex A: The US Marine Corps' Military
Campaigns
in the First United States
Occupation
of Haiti
57
Appendix
1: First Provisional Brigade of Marines
66
Appendix
2: Ships of the 1915 Haitian Campaign
73
Appendix
3: The Gendarmerie (Garde) d'Haiti,
1915-1934 74
Annex B: The Fiscal Case for Occupation 79
Appendix
1: Public Debt of Haiti, 1919 vs. 1922.
91
Appendix
2: Import and Export Figures, Fiscal
Year
1918-19.
96
Appendix
3: Haitian Government Expenses since
Fiscal
Year 1914-15. 97
Annex C: Documents Relating to the United States Occupation
of Haiti, 1915 - 1934.
99
Appendix
1: Admiral Caperton's Original
Instructions
for Haiti 101
Appendix
2: The Evolution of Admiral Caperton's
Authorization to
Land Troops in Haiti 102
Appendix
3: Admiral Caperton's Campaign Guidance
to 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines 106
Appendix
4, The United States Take-Over of Haitian
Customs, Financial, and Civil Administration 110
Appendix
5: Proclamation of Martial Law in Haiti 120
Appendix
6: The 1915 Haitian-American Treaty,
with
Extension
124
Appendix
7: The 1916 Gendarmerie Agreement and
Supporting Documents 129
Appendix
8: President Dartiguenave's Decrees of
5 April 1916 142
Appendix
9: The 1918 Haitian Constitution
(Marine Corps
Translation) 146
Appendix
10: The Official Report of the Death of
Charlemagne 167
Appendix
11: Major General Commandant Barnett's
Initial
Correspondence About Alleged Indiscriminate
Killings of Haitians 169
Appendix
12: Results of Major General Commandant
Lejeune's Investigation into Alleged Indiscriminate
Killings of Haitians. 176
Appendix
13: Report of the Mayo Court of
Inquiry, the
Final Report on Caco Casualties, and Reports of
Military Justice Proceedings 184
Appendix
14: Correspondence Between the
Commandant
of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti and the Financial Advisor
to the Republic of Haiti Regarding Changes in the
1916 Gendarmerie Agreement 299
Appendix
15: Diplomatic Messages Concerning Legislative
Elections in Haiti, 1921 210
Appendix
16: State Department Memo to President
Harding Regarding Progress of the US
Occupation of Haiti 215
Appendix
17:
The 1922-23 Haitian Loan Plan
225
Appendix
18: The 1925 Gendarmerie Agreement
231
Appendix
19: Haitianization and Withdrawal
Agreements 235
Endnotes 247
Bibliography
266
Dramatis Personae
(Presented Alphabetically)
George Barnett Major
General Commandant of the Marine
BrigGen, USMC Corps, 1914-1920; initiated first
investigation
into corvée
abuses in Haiti.
Benoit Batraville Caco
chief Charlemagne's ministre en chef
a. k. a. "Benoit" (see below), he
maintained Charlemagne's
revolt after his death in 1919;
alleged
cannibal
and bocor (voodoo wizard); killed
in
an ambush in 1920.
Arthur Bailly-Blanchard American Minister (Ambassador) to
Haiti,
1914-1922.
Dr. Rosalvo Bobo Chief challenger to
President Vilbrun
Guillaume Sam (see below) in July
1915;
one of the few serious challengers
to the
Haitian Presidency in the1911-1915
period
not to have succeeded to the
Presidency
(courtesy US Marine Corps).
Louis Borno Haitian Minister of Foreign Affairs under
Dartiguenave (below) who signed the
American-
Haitian Treaty of 1915 that
justified
the American occupation of Haiti.
President of Haiti, 1924-1930.
Smedley D. Butler Battalion commander, 1st Regiment of
Maj (later LtCol, BrigGen), USMC Marines, 1915; First commandant of the
Gendarmerie d'Haiti, 1915-1918;
returned to
Haiti in 1920 to assist General
Lejeune's
corvée
investigations.
William B. Caperton Commander,
Cruiser Squadron, Atlantic
Rear Admiral, USN Fleet in 1915; senior US officer in
the initial
occupation
of Haiti
Charlemagne Massena Peralte Member of the Haitian elite turned
Caco
a. k. a."Charlemagne" chief,
led Caco revolt in northern Haiti in
1918-1919
until his death in late 1919.
Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave President of Haitian Senate in July
1915,
was
elected first Haitian President of the US
Occupation period in August 1915 (courtesy
US Marine Corps). Forced to stand down in
favor of Louis Borno in 1924.
Josephus Daniels Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1921; later
Ambassador to Mexico. Perhaps best
known for the order making all U.S.
Navy
ships
"dry," anticipating Prohibition.
Robert B. Davis, Jr. United
States Chargé d'Affaires in Port au
Prince
at the time of the original
intervention. His cablegrams were
instrumental
in bringing Admiral Caperton
from
Cap Haitien to Port au Prince in July
1915 and landing troops. Also the U. S.
Plenipotentary in the 1915 American
-Haitian
Treaty that justified the American
occupation
of Haiti.
Warren G. Harding President of the United States,
1921-1923.
Herbert Hoover President of the United States, 1929-1933.
Charles E. Hughes US Secretary of State, 1921-1925; later
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Robert Lansing US Secretary of State, 1915-1920.
John A. Lejeune Assistant to the Commandant, 1915-1917;
Col (later MajGen), USMC Major General Commandant, 1920-1924.
John A. McIlhenny Financial
Advisor to the Republic of Haiti
(nominated by the President of the United
States,
appointed by the President of Haiti),
1919-1922.
Dr. Dana G. Munro US Minister (Ambassador) to Haiti,
1930-
1933. Later Professor of Laitn American
History
and Affairs at Princeton; author of
several
books on United States policy and
the
Caribbean.
Eugene Roy President
of Haiti, 1930. Succeeded Borno,
who
was forced into retirement;
outmaneuvered
in Haitian legislature by
Stenio
Vincent.
John H. Russell Commander,
1st Brigade 1917-1918 and
Col. (later BrigGen), USMC 1919-1922, United States High
Commissioner
in Haiti, 1922-1930; later
Major
General commandant of the
Marine
Corps.
Vilbrun Guillaume Sam Last "President" of Haiti prior to the US a. k.
a.k.a. "Guillaume Sam" occupation. Killed by a mob of the Haitian
elite
in Jul 1915, his body was later dragged
through
the street; the US intervened the
next
day.
Stenio Vincent Haitian
President 1930-1941; virtual dictator
1938-1941. Maneuvered out of power by
Elie
Lescot.
Littleton W. T. Waller Brigade Commander, Advance Force
Col. (later MajGen), USMC Brigade, which, upon deployment to
Haiti,
became
1st Provisional Brigade of Marines;
senior
American officer ashore in original
intervention.
Sumner Welles Chief of the Latin-American Division of the
State
Department, 1920-1921; American
Commissioner
to Dominican Republic,
1922-1925;
later Ambassador to Cuba,
under
Secretary of State.
Alexander S. Williams Butler's assistant in forming the
Capt (later Maj, LtCol), USMC Gendarmerie d'Haiti in 1915, succeeded
Butler
as Chef of the Gendarmerie
1918-1919;
outlawed the corvée in
November
1918; was blamed for much of
the
corvée abuses that resulted the Caco
revolt.
Woodrow Wilson President of the United States, 1913-1921
Frederick M. Wise Commandant
of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti,
LtCol, USMC 1919-1921.
Click
here to view image
Conciliate
Haitians to fullest extent consistent with maintaining order and
firm
control of situation, and issue following proclamation: 'Am directed
to
assure the Haitian people United States of America has no object in
view
except to insure, establish, and help to maintain Haitian
independence
and the establishing of a stable and firm government by the
Haitian
people in their attempt to secure these ends.
It is the intention to
retain
United States forces in Haiti only so long as will be necessary for
this
purpose.' Acknowledge.
Benson,
Acting1
(Radiogram
from Department of the Navy to Rear Admiral William B.
Caperton,
USN, Port au Prince, Haiti, 7 August 1915.)
Foundations on Sand
An Analysis of the First United States
Occupation of Haiti
1915 - 1934
Part I
The Occupation.
Haiti Before the Occupation.
Haiti is the second oldest
independent country in the New World, second only to
the
United States. Haiti first overthrew
its the French overlords in the wake of the French
Revolution
in 1794. It then suffered Spanish and
British interventions, and a Napoleonic
French
invasion and restoration of slavery in 1802 before finally achieving
independence
in
1804, all without significant outside assistance.2 According to legend, Jacques
Dessalines,
the bloody successor to Haiti's national hero Toussaint L'Ouverture (and
veteran
of the American Revolution), created the Haitian flag by ripping the white
center
out
of the French Tricolor.3 Haitians are
proud of their country and proud of their
independence.
By
the turn of the 20th Century, Haiti was a deeply troubled country. Its society,
since
the revolutions, had always been divided.
In the absence of the French
colonialists--all
of whom fled the country in 1804 or were killed--the mulâtres, the
mulatto
class, approximately three percent of the population, assumed the social role
of
the
colonials. The peasantry, almost
exclusively African in ancestry, remained peasants.
The
elite of Haiti, who for all intents and purposes ran (and run) Haiti, are
largely, not
exclusively,
mulâtres. Noirs, particularly those
with a military background or powerbase,
could
become part of the elite, and often ruled Haiti. But Haiti was and is most often
administered
for the benefit of the elite, and the elite are heavily mulâtre. "As in colonial
Saint
Domingue [Haiti], where the gens de couleur and black slaves hated each other,
racial
antagonism persisted between the elite and the black peasantry of Haiti."4
When
Haiti was a French colony, "Saint Domingue" was a rich jewel of the
French
empire--its exports were more than double of all of England's colonial trade in
1789.5 By the 20th Century, however, Haiti was in
debt, couldn't pay its bills or claims
against
it, and most of the Great Powers--save Russia and Japan--were threatening some
kind
of action.
Political
power in Haiti means the power to make money, usually through graft.
"'Under
[President Louis] Hyppolite in 1890, 1891, and 1892, there was a carnival of
contracts
in the Chambers [Legislature]. Every party
regular, senator, minister, deputy,
or
former volontaire de la révolution had at least one in the bag . . . Handsome
favors, to
be
sure, that [the] Good Fairy handed out to the faithful who had just ravaged the
four
corners
of the country with fire and sword.'"
Haiti's public debt increased from $4.4
million
in 1891 to over $25 million in 1895 after a flurry of public works instituted
by
Hyppolite
and his finance minister Frédéric Marcelin (who retired to France in 1895).6
Hyppolite's
successor, Simon Sam, resigned in 1902 amidst a scandal concerning
a
debt consolidation loan from German and French interests and the loss of over a
million
and
a quarter dollars in kickbacks and illegal payments. (Unusually, Sam's successor,
Pierre
Nord Alexis, prosecuted Sam and his immediate cronies in 1904, and Sam, several
Haitians,
a German, and two Frenchmen were convicted; not that anyone went to jail.)
Nord
Alexis feared foreign debt collectors (who were arriving with warships by this
time7)
and printed money instead of borrowing it.
Paranoid, sometimes murderous, Nord
Alexis,
after two more brushes with civil war, fled to a French cruiser in favor of
Antoine
Simon
in 1908. Simon and his immediate circle
returned to the tradition of looting
the
public purse.8
Surprisingly,
given the United States' domination of the Caribbean after the
Spanish
American War (1898), American financial investment in Haiti was quite small:
$4
million invested in Haiti compared with some $800 million in Mexico or $220
million
in
Cuba; a total of $1.7 billion in all of Latin America.9 About 65 to 70 percent of Haiti's
imports
came from the United States, the bulk of the balance coming from Germany and
France. Between the Haitian elite's growing desire
for foreign products, a severe drop
in
world agricultural prices in the 1890's (which effected all of Haiti's exports,
except cheap
labor),
and aggressive foreign competition, Haiti by 1900 was severely dependent on
foreign
imports, and had a lousy balance of payments.10
France
and Germany were the dominant financial players in Haiti at the turn
of
the 20th Century. France received about
two thirds of Haiti exports, and exported luxury
goods
in return. The Germans were striving to
overcome the French in the Haitian
markets: they exported more to Haiti than the French,
more Haitian exports were carried
on
German ships than French, and the Germans controlled the only railroad in
Haiti, to
the
Plain de Cul de Sac east of Port au Prince.11
The
Banque Nationale d'Haiti was Haiti's treasury and fiscal agent. Instead of
being
a financial entity controlled by the Haitian government, it was a French stock
company,
owned principally by French banks, led by the Banque de l'Union Parisienne.
It
charged a commission on the Haitian issue of paper currency and on the cashing
of
checks. Since the French blacklisted Haiti on the
world financial markets, so as to keep
the
Haitian account for themselves, the French funneled all loans to the government
through
the Banque, often at outrageous discounts*.12
To give an example of French loan
practices,
Haitian obstacles to establishing a bank in 1874 was multiplied by the various
political
and financial thieves inside and outside Haiti:
[Late 19th Century political leader
Antenor]Firmin and historian
Antione Magloire say the loan was 60 million
francs, to be repaid in forty
annual installments of 7.5 million francs, a
return of 400 percent. [Dantes]
Bellegarde says 50 million francs, but that the
Crédit-Général in Paris was
able to raise only 36.5 million, of which 26
million went to intermediaries
and private pockets in Port-au-Prince and Paris,
while the remaining 10
million francs were used to liquidate, at par, a
mountain of worthless
Haitian bonds bought up as scrap paper by
European speculators. The
Crédit-Général's commission alone exceeded 9.5
million francs.13
Finally chartered in 1880, the
Banque Nationale d'Haiti lost its charter in 1905,
after
refusing to back Nord Alexis' blizzard of paper money. A five year period of intense
____________________
*Discounting
was the practice of offering a loan at a certain level, then subtracting fees
and
allowing for variable exchange rates up front, leaving the borrower with the
balance
to
spend, but liable for repaying the entire amount, at whatever interest was
agreed upon
initially.
competition
between French, German, and American (relative newcomers) banking
interests
ensued over rechartering a new bank.
Finally, in late 1910, the Haitian
legislature
voted to dissolve the Banque Nationale d'Haiti, and created a new Banque
Nationale
de la République d'Haiti, which moved into the old Banque's headquarters.
French
banking interests, which put the package together with several German-American
private
banks, diplomatically invited in American interests (including the infamous
National
City Bank14). The French had a 75%
interest in the new bank, the Americans
and
the German-American banks 20%, and the German Berliner Handelsgesellschaft
Bank
5%. Not surprisingly, the new $13
million loan was discounted to $9.4 million.15
Another notorious incident which
demonstrates the inability of the Haitian
government
to control its own economy was the granting of a railroad concession to an
American
named in James P. McDonald. Haiti
promised to back bonds funding the
railroad
to the Haitian northern city of Cap Haitien at six percent, pay McDonald
regular
payments
as the railroad was completed, and grant him a fifteen mile wide right of way
for
banana plantations (Haiti is only thirty miles wide at its most narrow
point). In short,
the
government was prepared to give up roughly half the arable land in Haiti, and
go still
further
in debt, in return for a railroad that was never completed.16
After
a mere 15 months in power, Antoine Simon began to lose control of Haiti,
particularly
in the north country around Cap Haitien (helped not in some small part by the
boorish
behavior of McDonald's American engineers).
Simon and his army took ship to
Gonaives,
landed, and moved north and seized Fort Liberté, pillaging and slaughtering as
he
went.17
The
north had rebelled against Port au Prince before. Those of peasant stock who
had
lost their lands, and who rebelled at exploitation by the city dwellers and
foreign
concessionaires,
drifted into the private armies of petty warlords in the wilds of the north
country. Often described by Europeans and Americans
as bandits or mercenaries, these
men
became known as Cacos. Their loyalty
was to their local chiefs, bound through
family
ties and patronage.18 Now, in 1911,
these men and their leaders were to become
the
king (or president) makers of Haiti.19
The
Cacos rampaged through the north country (focusing, at least in part, on
McDonald
and his railroad camps), and boxed Simon into Fort Liberté. Simon escaped
to
Port au Prince, but his time had passed.
General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, a general
with
a northern power base, had Cincinnatus Leconte declared "Supreme Chief of
the
Revolution." Simon barely made it to a Dutch ship ahead
of an angry mob. Less than
two
weeks later (14 August 1911) Leconte was voted in as President by the National
Assembly.20
Leconte
apparently was an honest man and, according to observers, was willing to
try
to administer Haiti honestly.
Unfortunately, his administration lasted just under a
year:
until the National Palace blew up with him in it in early August, 1912. (He and previous
presidents
apparently stored ammunition and explosives in the basement to keep it out of
the
hands of rivals.) The real cause of the
explosion remains unknown.21
Leconte's
successor was Tancrede Auguste, a sugar plantation owner. His
administration
was marked with a continual fight with the new Banque Nationale over
retiring
the paper currency left over from Alexis Nord's administration. It was also short:
Auguste
was dead the following May after a mysterious illness; some said poison. After
a
chaotic funeral, to the point of a near rebellion in the capital, Michel
Oreste, was voted
in
as President, literally bribing his way into office with drafts on the national
treasury.
Oreste,
the first Haitian President to have no ties whatsoever with the military
(regular or
Caco),
made almost everyone in any position of power in Haiti angry with his
proposals:
reform
the Army, retire paper money, and reform the educational system (a great source
of
graft in the government).22
In
1914 the Cacos, whose quiet had been bought by Auguste and Leconte but not
Oreste,
rebelled in the north country, under the leadership of the Zamor family. The army
soon
went over to the Cacos, and Michel Oreste took ship under the cover of British,
American,
French and German marines on 27 January 1914.
Oreste Zamor, heading a
Caco
army with his brother Charles, was quickly elected President. Oreste and Charles
Zamor
soon fell out with a former collaborator and rival, Davilimar Théodore.
Unfortunately for the Zamor
brothers, the Banque proved difficult with funding
again,
the Orestes ran out of money and, therefore, soldiers. Amid much chaos,
Theodore
and
his ally Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, entered Port au Prince at the head of a Caco army as
Oreste
Zamor took refuge aboard a German commercial ship and his brother sought
safety
with a General Polynice and a Committee of Safety. Théodore was elected
President
on 7 November 1914.
Intervention and Occupation.
In January, 1915, Rear Admiral
William B. Caperton took command of the Cruiser
Squadron
of the United States Atlantic Fleet, flying his flag in the armored cruiser USS
Washington
(CA-11). The Atlantic Fleet's cruiser
squadron had the additional
responsibility
of monitoring political events in the Caribbean, and Admiral Caperton's
first
mission upon assuming command was to tour his new area of responsibility (Annex
C,
Appendix 1). Admiral Caperton's first
visit to Haiti was short and apparently
uneventful. But he no sooner departed for other ports
when he was recalled to Haiti. Still
another
revolt was forming in the north country of Haiti to challenge the Haiti
presidency. This time the proclaimed "Chief of the
Executive Power" was General
Vilbrun
Guillaume Sam, former President-maker, Caco leader, and now candidate for
President. Admiral Caperton intercepted Guillaume Sam
outside of Cap Haitien and
persuaded
him that the United States would not interfere with the transfer of power in
Haiti,
so long as Guillaume Sam curbed the behavior of his Cacos. Admiral Caperton
and
his gunboats and cruisers in effect shadowed Guillaume Sam down to coast to
Port
au
Prince, where he was duly elected President on 4 March 1915.23
In July 1915, the Washington, Rear
Admiral Caperton embarked, sat in Port au
Prince
harbor as still another Haitian presidency wound its way to a messy conclusion.
This
time it was Guillaume Sam, who was besieged in his palace by a new challenger,
Dr.
Rosalvo
Bobo. At daybreak on 27 July 1915, Sam
made a break for the French legation
next
door. Sam made it, although most of the
people accompanying him did not. He
sent
a
message to his chief of police, Charles-Oscar Etienne, at the police
Arrondissement in
the
lower city, to the effect that his presidency was over and that Etienne should
follow
the
dictates of his own conscience ["La partie est perdue, j'abandonne le
pouvoir. Faites
ce
que votre conscience vous dictera."].
Accounts vary, but somewhere between 160 and
'nearly
200' political prisoners, from Haiti's mulâtre elite--including ex-president
Oreste
Zamor,
died. The next day, a mob of the elite
attacked Guillaume Sam in the French
legation
and murdered him. Sam's mutilated body
was dragged through the streets.
Having
received a green light from the State Department via the Acting Secretary of
the
Navy,
Caperton met with the American and British chiefs of mission and the French
minister
aboard the Washington and, with their concurrence, decided to land troops and
restore
order.24
While his small landing force
secured the legations in Port au Prince, Admiral
Caperton
had a problem. With Guillaume Sam dead,
there was no one really in charge in
the
city. There was a revolutionary
committee formed by General Polynice,25 Charles
Zamor
(brother of the recently deceased ex-president), and others*, but no one, at
least to
American
eyes appeared to be in charge. The
landing force was disarming what remained
of
the Haitian Army in Port au Prince (and confiscated five wagon-loads of weapons
the
first
day), and the Haitian legislature was going through the opening stages of
voting for
still
another new President, but with the immediate crisis under control, Caperton
__________________________
*Haitian
politics in the late 19th, early 20th Century was a series of cycles of
recurring
personalities,
the details of which is beyond the scope of this paper; however, it can be
said
that most of the personalities in the revolutionary committee were prominent
figures
in
Haitian politics, although not all of them were necessarily supporters of the
late
President
Guillaume Sam, or of Dr. Bobo for that matter.
didn't
know what the United States Government wanted. The Secretary of State, Robert
Lansing
was relatively new (his predecessor, William Jennings Bryan, resigned in June
1915,
in a disagreement over President Wilson's handling of the Lusitania crisis), so
he
asked
the President: "The situation in
Haiti is distressing and very perplexing.
I am not
at
all sure what we ought to do or what we legally can do . . . I hope you can
give me
some
suggestion as to what course we can pursue." Wilson apparently answered the next
day:
I suppose there is nothing to do but to take the bull by
the horns
and
restore order . . .
1. We must send
to Port au Prince a force sufficient to absolutely
control
the city not only by also the country immediately about it from
which it draws its foods . . .
2.
We must let the present Haitian Congress know that we will
protect it but that we will not
recognize any action on its part that does not
put men in charge of affairs whom we
can trust to handle and put an end to
revolution.
3. We must give
all who now have authority there or who desire to
have it or who think they have it or
are about to have it understand that we
shall take steps to prevent the
payment of debts contracted to finance
revolutions.
. . . In other words, that we consider it our duty to
insist on
constitutional government and will,
if necessary (that is, if they force us
to
it as the only way), take charge of elections and see that a real
government is erected which we can
support.26
Caperton radioed Washington DC on 5
August that the president of the Haitian
Senate,
Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave, appeared most electable, and that he "realizes
Haiti
must
agree to any terms laid down by the United States, professes to believe any
terms
demanded
will be for Haiti's benefit, [and] says he will use all his influence with
[the]
Haitian
Congress to have such terms agreed upon by Haiti."27 To insure Dartiguenave's
election,
all Caperton had to do was neutralize the Cacos, take Dr. Bobo out of the
running,
and make sure the election in the Haitian legislature went for Dartiguenave.
The Marine 2nd Regiment landed in Port au Prince
on 4 August, and began
securing
the city. With the arrival of the
remainder of First Provisional Brigade of
Marines
through August 1915, the Caco problem, at least in theory, would be settled in
a
matter
of time (Annex A).
With
a flare of the dramatic, Caperton invited Dartiguenave and Dr. Bobo to the
American
legation on 8 August and, speaking through his chief of staff, Capt. Edward L.
Beach,
who spoke excellent French by all reports, challenged the two to do what was
right
for Haiti. Not surprisingly, both men
declared their devotion to the service of their
country. Caperton, according to his Senate testimony
in 1921, then asked:
"Senator Dartiguenave, in case Dr. Bobo should be
elected will
you promise that you will exert
every influence in your power to assist
him for Haiti's good; that you will
join with him heartily and helpfully and
loyally?"
"If Dr. Bobo is elected president I will give him
the most loyal,
earnest support in every effort he
may make for Haiti's welfare," replied
Dartiguenave, with simple dignity.
"Dr. Bobo, if Senator Dartiguenave is elected
president, will you
help him loyally and earnestly in
his efforts to benefit Haiti?"
"No I will not!" shouted Bobo. "If Senator Dartiguenave is elected
president I will not help him. I will go away and leave Haiti to her
fate. I
alone am fit to be president of
Haiti; I alone understand Haiti's aspirations,
no one is fit to be president but
me; there is no patriotism in Haiti to be
compared with mine; the Haitians
love no one as they love me."28
And so Dr. Bobo failed his
interview. He left a week later, aboard
a French ship,
for
Santo Domingo, where he was refused residence, and ended up in Cuba. He later
moved
to Jamaica, where he had a successful medical practice.29
On August 10, Admiral Caperton
received a cable from the Secretary of the Navy
ordering
that the election of the president of Haiti be allowed to take place and that
"the
United
States prefers election of Dartiguenave.
Has no other motive than that
establishment
of firm and lasting government by Haitian people and to assist them now
and
at all times in future to maintain their political independence and territorial
integrity."30 The next day, at Admiral Caperton's orders,
Captain Beach ordered the
revolutionary
committee in Port au Prince to resign.
Admiral Caperton himself, and
Captain
Beach, both ended up arguing the term "free election" with the Bobo
crowd. Dr.
Bobo's
supporters believed that a "free election" would be one that would
recognize his
military
position and elect him president.
Admiral Caperton's definition allowed none of
that. Finally, 2nd Regiment of Marines secured the
building and the Haitian
legislature--39
senators and 102 deputies--met in the Chamber of Deputies. Captain
Beach
was present as Admiral Caperton's representative, and probably acting as an
impromptu
floor manager for Dartiguenave.
"All senators and deputies were armed at
their
own request." Dartiguenave was elected on the first ballot: "...the vote was announced as 94 for
Dartiguenave,
16 for Bobo, and a scattering [31] for Cauvin, Thegun, and others." The
United
States formally recognized the Dartiguenave
government on 18 August 1915.31
While
only a complete optimist would claim that the United States had no influence
over
this
vote, a favorable vote of only 67% for the desired leader compares favorably
with the
more
familiar rigged election results in excess of 99% common in the mid- and
late-20th
Century. And, lest it be forgotten, Dartiguenave had
his own agenda:
Besides being a civilian with no army behind him (except,
of
course, the U.S. Marine Corps), he
was the first elite mulâtre from the
South the take office since 1876--an
office that, since the days of
Boisrond,
had been all but monopolized by noirs, generals, and men of the
North
and Artibonite. Not that Philippe Sudre
Dartiguenave had no
constituency: his constituency, like that of Haiti's
presidents for the next
thirty years, was the elite. Numerically insignificant, usually without
lucrative occupation save politics,
this was the group that, now more than
ever before, events were propelling
into a monopoly of office and, to the
extent the Americans would permit,
of entrenched power.32
Less than a month later, a Treaty
between the United States and Haiti gave the
legal
underpinnings for the United States occupation of Haiti (Annex C, Appendix 6).
Eighty
years after the fact, it is hard to imagine a sovereign nation agreeing to such
a
treaty: it is as if an adolescent was surrendering
his paycheck and check book to a
over-bearing
parent, to be put on a strict budget and with a solemn promise to behave.
For
the United States, it was contracting a huge responsibility against which we
will later
examine
the results of the occupation.
Another byproduct of the American
Haitian Treaty was the Haitian Union
Patriotique,
which was to become the principle organization of Haitian resistance to the
First
Occupation. Interestingly, it was an
organization of and for the Haitian elite, the
opinion
of the noir peasantry towards the Occupation was apparently neither desired nor
solicited.33 (A comment by the French minister in May
1916 (after the pacification of the
Artibonite
and the North by the Marines):
"'The peasants, the pure noirs,' he wrote, 'are,
like
the tradesmen in the towns, delighted with the American occupation.'"34)
Even before the signing of the
Haitian-American Treaty, Admiral Caperton,
acting
on instructions from the Navy Department, started taking over the financial and
civil
administration of Haiti35 (Annex C, Appendix 4). Like many aspects of the First
Occupation,
while this particular action was of dubious legality under international law,
it
was
established and conducted with the intention of maintaining a scrupulous
honesty.
This
had an immediate impact on the Haitian elite:
American assumption of customs control . . . for the
first time
brought
home to the elite (which in this context is to say all politicians)
some
hard practicalities of foreign intervention.
For that entire class,
whose
livelihood after all had been the public treasury, the blow, square in
the
pocketbook, was disastrous.
(Footnote: Adding injury, Paymaster
Conard
promptly stabilized the gourde at a fixed (5 to 1) exchange rate for
the
dollar, thus at one stoke putting out of business the currency
speculation,
both Haitian and foreign, that had so often gutted the treasury.
Elime
Elie, Dartiguenave's Finance Minister, pled in vain to Conard that
all
his friends had been accustomed to make their living from a floating
gourde
and 'it would be an economic crime to ruin their business.'36
Dartiguenave was unable to control
Port au Prince's streets, and Admiral Caperton
declared
martial Law on 3 September 1915.
Apparently Dartiguenave told Caperton that
this
action would also facilitate the Haitian legislature's acceptance of the
Haitian-
American
Treaty.37
For the United States, the easiest
part of the Treaty to implement would be the
requirement
for an American-officered constabulary to establish law and order in Haiti.
This
would become known as the Gendarmerie d'Haiti (in 1928 renamed the Garde
d'Haiti).
The forcing of the Haitian-American
Treaty through the Haitian legislature
was
brutal--Admiral
Caperton eventually had to threaten to withhold the Haitian government's
paychecks
before the Treaty would be ratified.38
The Americans were pushing for
constitutional
and legal changes in Haiti and Dartiguenave was unsure if he could deliver,
especially
with the "American insistence on eliminating graft, reducing palace
patronage,
stopping
double or triple pensions to single individuals, and ending fraud and kickbacks
on
government contracts."39
Using an ancient Haitian constitutional device,
Dartiguenave
dissolved
the Haitian Senate 6 April, 1916, and instituted a Council of State in its
place. He
then
designated the lower house a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the Constitution40
(Annex
C,
Appendix 8). Interestingly, a document
from the Butler Papers (Butler was Chef of
the
Gendarmerie by this time), entitled "Coup d'Etat" details the reports
the American had
and
made on the closing of the Senate41.
From the title, and its inclusion in Butler's
papers,
it would appear that Butler, his Marine Gendarmerie officers, or both,
disapproved
of Dartiguenave's action, even though it served American interests as well as
Dartiguenave's. This is especially interesting, considering
Butler's part in the closing of
the
Haitian legislature the following year.
According to his testimony before the Senate
investigating
committee in 1921, Colonel Waller, who had been told by Dartiguenave
that
he feared impeachment, was also opposed to the action.42
Nevertheless, Butler and Waller
enforced the closure of the Senate and, when
Dartiguenave
decided that even the Chamber of Deputies were too difficult to work with
and
ordered legislative elections, Waller and Butler held elections and enforced an
unusual
honesty. According to Waller's
proclamation, the role of the occupying forces
was
limited to maintaining order, restricting gatherings from closer than 30 feet
from
polling
places, placing a representative in each of the polling places, allowing
Gendarmes
who
were Haitian citizens to vote (but without their weapons), and some rules on
party
nominations
and the prevention of fraud.43 Some
observers view this election as more
free
of coercion than any of memory before it.44
However, as the primary purpose of
the new legislature was to draft a new
constitution
(Haiti's 17th since independence), it was not going to be very
cooperative. A
draft
constitution was written for the legislature by a Dr. Edmond Heraux--formerly
Antoine
Simon's Foreign Minister in 1908--which was duly passed to Washington for
suggestions. Dartiguenave received said suggestions, and
dumped them on the legislature
as
an American dictat. The legislature rebelled and starting
writing its own constitution
with
a decidedly anti-American tone.
Dartiguenave apparently wished the Marines to
close
down the legislature for him, which would allow him to rule unimpeded by any
other
Haitian legal body. But as he deferred
to Colonel Cole (Waller's successor), Cole
deferred
to Washington, who deferred to Dartiguenave.
Dartiguenave finally called in
Major
Butler and ordered him to close down the legislature. It did not reopen until 1930.
The American-amended constitution
was then passed to an all Haitian referendum
in
early 1918, and duly passed. The
Gendarmerie enforced the honesty of the election,
although
it was admittedly and openly pro-constitution, and the elite apparently
boycotted
the
referendum. And, despite his frequent
claims to the contrary, Franklin Roosevelt did
not
write the Haitian constitution: the
American "suggestions", incorporated in the
Heraux
draft, had their origin in the State Department.45
Off to a Rough Start.
The Marine suppression of the Cacos
brought peace to Haiti which, as noted
above,
was appreciated by the noirs and the tradesmen, if not the elite or the Cacos.
Public
order was maintained by the new Gendarmerie d'Haiti, a national police force,
manned
by Haitians and officered by Marines.
Public order, however, did not
immediately bring financial stability, as World
War
I was consuming most of the liquidity in World money markets at the time, and
nothing
was available for a Haitian consolidation loan. With Haiti's heavy debt, most of
the
revenues collected by the Navy paymasters--although the former skimming off of
funds
was halted--went to debt service, and not for improving the Haitian
infrastructure
as
desired.46 Main functions of government were therefore taken over by the
Gendarmerie
as it was the only organized "Haitian" entity capable of taking any
kind of
positive
action in Haiti at the time. These
functions included public health, prisons, and
public
works.47 Lacking sufficient funds to
improve roads, bridges, and culverts, Butler
found
a provision in the Haitian rural code that provided for Haitians to provide
labor in
lieu
of money for the payment of taxes.
Butler used this labor, called the corvée, in the
construction
of rural roads. According to his
testimony in 1921, he was able to bring the
cost
of buildings roads down to $205 a mile, from a pre-occupation cost of $51,000 a
mile
(a figure inflated, no doubt, by large amounts of graft). Butler "repaired" (rebuilt is
probably
a closer term) 470 miles of roads during his tenure as Chef of
Gendarmerie. He
took
pains to provide food, shelter, entertainment, and motivation to the laborers,
and
went
to the trouble to get President Dartiguenave out of Port au Prince to
periodically
praise
the laborers' efforts. (Butler's papers
include a collection of photographs of the
first
automobile trip taken in Haiti, outside of Port au Prince, apparently to Cap
Haitien.48)
Colonel Waller, in his testimony
before the same Senate committee, told of an
irrigation
project in the Cul de Sac valley in which he received more volunteer labor than
he
could employ and brought the project in at a cost of $800, down from a
(Haitian)
estimate
of $60,000.49
The system, as might have been
expected, also lent itself to abuse.
The Marines
made
the mistake of having Haitian civil officials in the process of recruiting
labor.
These
officials were not above using impressment instead of encouraging volunteers to
get
their numbers, nor were they above exempting certain persons who could bribe
their
way
out of their labor obligation, and putting the work back on those who had
already
performed
their obligation. Butler's successor,
Major A. S. Williams, saw that the corvée
system
was being increasingly abused, and causing increasing Haitian discontent with
the
Americans,
and abolished it on 1 October 1918.50
Brigadier General Albertus W.
Catlin, who succeeded Col. John H. Russell in
command
of the Marine brigade (Russell had succeeded Cole) in late 1918 after returning
from
combat duty in France, made a number of inspection trips, starting in March
1919,
to
investigate reports he had received of abuses of the corvée in the Hinche and
Maissade
districts
(Annex C, Appendix 11). General Catlin
found that the corvée was still in force
in
these districts and was using impressed labor.
In addition, much of the labor was being
used
for private projects as opposed to public works.51 The abuses of the corvée were
probably
more extensive than General Catlin was able to discover on his inspections, as
the
ensuing revolt, which Marine officers believed to have originated over
discontent
over
the corvée (which in itself resurrected the old paranoia over blancs
reinstating
slavery),
became widespread. The popular leader
of the revolt, Charlemagne Peralte, a
former
Caco General and a brother-in-law to the Zamor brothers, had been serving a
sentence
of hard labor in Cap Haitien when he bolted for the mountains, taking his
gendarme
guard with him. Charlemagne, and his
successor after his death, Benoit, were
found
to have political and financial connections with Dr. Rosalvo Bobo.52
The revolt would last until
1920. But if that had been the Marine's
only problem
in
Haiti, no one in Washington DC would probably have noticed. However, late in 1919,
Major
General Commandant of the Marine Corps George Barnett was reviewing a court
martial
case of two Marine privates accused of unlawfully executing Caco
prisoners. His
eye
caught an argument by the Marines' counsel to the effect that such executions
were
rather
common in Haiti. Barnett was shocked,
and immediately fired off a letter to Col.
Russell
(who had reassumed command of the Marine Brigade after General Catlin
returned
to the United States), ordering him to investigate and correct the situation
immediately. Col. Russell investigated, found abuses, and
started the slow process of
military
justice rolling (Annex C, Appendix 11).
Unfortunately, General Barnett's
letter to Colonel Russell got into the papers.53
Despite
Col. Russell's investigation, a later investigation by General Barnett's
successor,
Major
General John A. Lejeune (Annex C, Appendix 12) and now-Brigadier General
Butler,
and a formal Naval Board of Inquiry chaired by Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, all
of
which found that military justice had been imposed on all those who were
guilty,
within
naval jurisdiction, and within the statute of limitations54, the press
continued. In
particular,
The Nation accused the Marines of "racial snobbery, political
chicane" and
"torture...theft,
arson, and murder" . . . "actual slavery" . . . and a "five years' massacre of
Haitians."
The upshot was a Senate investigation which lasted from 1921 to 1922, sat in
Port
au Prince and as well as Santo Domingo, and allowed a representative of the
National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Union Patriotique
advisory
rights and a right to cross examination;55 and yet found that most of the
charges
had
been greatly exaggerated:
On the evidence before it the committee can now state--
(1) That the
accusations of military abuses are limited in point of
time
to a few months and in location to restricted area.
(2) Very few of
the many Americans who have served in Haiti are
thus
accused. The others have restored order
and tranquillity under
arduous
conditions of service, and generally won the confidence of the
inhabitants
of the country with who they came in touch.
(3) That certain
Caco prisoners were executed without trial.
Two
such
cases have been judicially determined
The evidence to which
reference
has been made shows eight more cases with sufficient clearness
to
allow them to be regarded without much doubt as having occurred.56
The committee also noted that the
thrust of most of the accusations had been an
effort
to discredit the entire occupation of Haiti.57
More importantly, the Committee
noted
that the occupation was not serving its goals and recommended changes:
¨
"...
[place] within reach of the Haitian masses, justice, schools, and agricultural
instruction
. . . [and] . . . send to Haiti a commission comprising a commercial
advisor,
an expert in tropical agriculture, and an educator . . ."
¨
"..advise
the Haitian government against permitting foreign interests to acquire
great
land holdings in Haiti."
¨
"...as
communications are opened up and as the peasants are secure in their life and
property, . . . reduce the force
of marines in the territory of the Republic and
ultimately to intrust the maintenance of order and peace exclusively to
the
gendarmes."
¨
Eliminate
provost courts for civil crimes and "offenses by the press against public
order."
¨
Raise
the caliber and qualifications of the Americans who represent the United
States in Haiti.58
Interestingly,
almost a year earlier, President Harding had apparently solicited an
evaluation
of the Occupation from the State Department shortly after his inauguration in
1921. Written by Sumner Wells, who at the time was
Chief of the Latin American
Division
of the State Department and who would become the American High
Commissioner
in the Dominican Republic in 192259, it recommended similar changes in
the
Occupation and its administration:
¨
Increase
the size of Gendarmerie d'Haiti in order to increase public order.
¨
Appoint
a single representative of the United States to represent the President in
Haiti
and subordinate all United States "Treaty officials" to this
representative.
¨
Change
the basic supervision of the Occupation of Haiti from the Navy Department
to
the State Department, which would presumed to be more diplomatic in budget
items,
for instance.
¨
Develop
the Haitian economy, principally by reforming the Haitian education
system60 (Annex C, Appendix 16).
Thus, getting recommendations from
all sides, the Occupation of Haiti entered a
period
of great change and, ultimately, some progress.
Smooth(er) Sailing.
On 10 March 1922, John H. Russell,
twice former commander of the First
Provisional
Brigade of Marines in Haiti and recently promoted to Brigadier General,
became
the United States High Commissioner in Haiti.61
According to the American-sponsored
Haitian constitution of 1918, a Haitian
President
served for a term of four years, and could be immediately reelected for a
second
term. However, under the Title VII, Transitory
Provisions of the constitution, the sitting
President--Dartiguenave--was
the one who decided the next legislative elections, it being
the
Haitian Senate which would elect the President (Annex C, Appendix 9). The Senate
itself
had not sat since 1916, when Dartiguenave with, if not the approval, at least
the
assistance
of the Americans, locked it out of the legislative building (above). In 1921,
Dartiguenave's
representatives began feeling out the Americans about reelection without
the
inconvenience of legislative elections. The State Department proved coy on this
particular
request, apparently preferring legislative elections if Dartiguenave wanted
reelection
as President (Annex C, Appendix 15).
To make a long story short,
Dartiguenave preferred not to suffer legislative
elections,
and the Americans preferred a new President.
Dartiguenave had proved
unpopular
among the Haitians and, in particular, the Haitian elite for years. So it was
with
little sorrow that Dartiguenave was out-maneuvered in his own Council of State.
Louis
Borno, one-time Foreign Minister for Dartiguenave, was elected President in May
1922. On the 15th, "for the first time since
Nissage-Saget [President 1870-74] and only
the
second time in the history of Haiti, a constitutional transfer of power took
place."62
Louis
Borno, like Dartiguenave, would be still another client-President of
Americans,63 or
a
strong-willed Haitian with his own agenda,64 depending on which interpretation
of the
First
United States Occupation you prefer, but he and John Russell could at least
work
together
in an atmosphere approaching mutual respect, and things were accomplished.
With the end of World War I, and a
world recovery taking place, the Haitian
Government
finally solicited a $16 million loan on which there were serious bids. The
National
City Bank took high bid of 92.137[%] in 1922 (which means a discount of just
under
8%, which compares rather favorably with loans taken by the Haitians prior to
the
Occupation)
at 6% interest. Of the $16 million face
value of the loan, the Haitians were
therefore
able to actually see over $15 million of it, which went to retire the claims of
the
National
Bank and the National Railroad, and refunded three outstanding French
loans.
A
second loan, also funded through National City Bank, for some $5 million paid
off
73,269
claims against the Haitian government settled by a joint American-Haitian
claims
commission. A third loan for $2.66 million, this time
through the Metropolitan Trust
company
of New York in 1923, finally relieved Haiti of the financial albatross of Mr.
McDonald's
National Railroad plan.65
Although, besides a peaceful
transition of political power, arguably the greatest
contribution
to Haiti made by the occupation, to quote the British minister in Haiti in
1929,
was that it "maintained peace and allowed the peasant to work in
safety," other,
more
tangible results were to the Occupation's credit during the Louis Borno-John
Russell
period:
¨
over
1000 miles of roads, with 210 bridges, serving 3000 motor vehicles;
¨
nine
major airfields and numerous auxiliary fields;
¨
15
modern lighthouses (as opposed to three antiques in 1915), 54 buoys, ten harbor
lights
and other aids to navigation;
¨
a
functioning telephone and telegraph system;
¨
ten
towns with running, potable water, and 64 villages with clean wells, in
addition
to
irrigation projects; and
¨
a Service de Santé Publique which included 11
hospitals--98% staffed by Haitians,
and
147 public clinics, not counting three military hospitals and the Catholic
hospital
in Port au Prince.66
One area in which the Americans
encountered an immense amount of resistance
was
in the area of public education. In his
memo for President Harding, Sumner Welles
accused
the Haitian elite publicly funding education at adequate levels, while actually
pocketing
the bulk of the money for themselves.67
In 1923, General Russell instituted a
Service
Technique de l'Agriculture et de l'Ensignement Professionel, or Service
Technique
as it became known, to provide a agricultural educational system for the noir
peasantry
under a Dr. George F. Freeman. This was
"a matter of extreme social
sensitivity
for the elite," who feared both the social consequences of an educated
noir
peasantry
and the loss of the noirs' loyalty to the blancs, who were improving their
lives.68
The "show window" of the
Service Technique was the Central School of
Agriculture
at Damien where
[in]
the way of things in Haiti, and more particularly because such studies
required
literacy and prior preparation, the students came from elite
families,
though, alas, with no more appetite for the dunghill side of
agriculture
(let alone for going out into the country to instruct peasant
noirs)
than their predecessors at Turgeau [a reference to the Haitian forces
under
Dessalines who took Port au Prince in October 1803]. To overcome
such
reservations, there was adopted a system of scholarships, or bourses,
whereby
each student received the not-inconsiderable sum of $25 a month
and,
as Dr. Freeman was later quoted in the New York World,
was
'virtually hired to go, by means of scholarships.' This incentive
notwithstanding,
student bousiers concentrated on academic work while
hired
peasants dug ditches, cleaned stables, slopped hogs, and shovel
manure.69
The American attempts at educational
reform was also strongly resisted by the
Catholic
church in Haiti, which saw its system of confessional schools threatened by the
proposed
American system. The Church had been in
opposition to the United States
Occupation
since 1915, when they declined to perform the traditional Te Deum to mark
Dartiguenave's
election. This appears to be primarily
a jurisdictional and religious (the
Catholic
church appeared to view the advent of the Americans in 1915 as the advent of
rampant
Protestantism) issue, as opposed to a nationalist issue, because the Haitian
laity
was
30 times more French and French Canadian than Haitian.70
Needless to say, elite students, and
not just those in the Service Technique, were
highly
politicized, nationalist, and, almost by definition, anti-American. Louis Borno, by
1929,
had also overstayed his political welcome, so students were anti-government as
well.
What touched everything off was a
seemingly innocent decision by Dr. Freeman
of
the Service Technique. Dr. Freeman
needed funds to set up some experimental
stations
at Hinche--to serve the noir peasantry rather than just the elite students--and
proposed
on cutting back on bourses and paid labor at the main facility at Damien. The
students
went on strike, and were quickly joined by sympathy strikes in other elite
schools
in Port au Prince and Cap Haitien.
President Borno's reaction was initially
restrained
by General Russell, although Russell did cable Washington to request
reinforcements
for the Marine Brigade in case the Garde d'Haiti (the Gendarmerie d'Haiti
had
been redesignated on 1 November 1928) proved unreliable.
The
unrest continued on through November 1929 until the first week in December,
when
the situation at Les Cayes suddenly got out of hand. The peasantry of the region,
for
reasons other than why the students revolted, rebelled after agitators from
Port au
Prince
and Cap Haitien had their say, and headed for the town of Les Cayes. A patrol of
20
Marines stood in their way. The
confrontation eventually got out of hand, and 12
Haitians
died. President Hoover, who had been
inaugurated that year, called for an
investigation.71 Given President Hoover's predisposition to
get out of Haiti, it is hardly
surprising
that the resulting Forbes Commission recommended that the Occupation be
terminated
as soon as possible.72
Haitianization.
The United States Government signed
an agreement in 1931 with the Haitian
Government
(Annex C, Appendix 19), for a rather quick "Haitianization" of the
Treaty
services
in Haiti and the eventual withdrawal of all United States forces from
Haiti.
Louis
Borno stood down as President in early 1930, and the Council of State elected
Eugene
Roy as the new President. He took
office on 15 May 1930; the first Catholic Te
Deum
since 1914 was said for the new President.
Ironically, in a flurry of legislative
machinations
that represented a bitter struggle between the mulâtres and nationalistic
noirs,
Stenio Vincent, a light skinned noir, was elected President in November
1930.73) It
appears
that the United States Mission in Haiti originally believed that the United
States
Occupation
should last until at least 1936, in order to reassure holders of Haitian
government
bonds. However, the State Department,
and presumably President Hoover,
wished
to complete the process before the lapse of the Haitian-American Treaty of
1915.
The
agreement on Haitianization, which included no actual date for the termination
of the
Occupation,
although most other Treaty services were given transition dates, was signed
5
August 1931.74
A final agreement for the withdrawal
of United States military forces was finally
agreed
upon and signed with Haiti on 7 August 1933, with a termination date of 1
October
1934. After conversations between
President Vincent and President Roosevelt,
in
Cap Haitien in July of 1934, the date was moved up to 1 August 1934.75
Aftermath.
The actual withdrawal of American
troops in Haiti was somewhat of an
anticlimax: most equipment and troops were withdrawn
from Haiti prior to the actual
withdrawal
date, on 1 August 1934, at Marine Brigade headquarters, the American flag
was
lowered, with honors, and the Haitian flag was raised, with honors. The last aircraft
from
Marine Observation Squadron Nine left Bowen Field outside Port au Prince
and
flew
back to the United States.76 For the
Haitians, the "Second Independence" was one
big,
long party.77
The Constitution, modified in 1928,
was again changed in 1935 to invest more
power
in the President. According to the
first Haitian Chef of the Garde d'Haiti--
Démosthènes
Calixte, the same officer who was the Haitian deputy of the then-new Ecole
Militaire
in 1922 under General Russell--the Garde was rapidly politicized, beginning in
1934.78 This same officer offers some observations
(1939) to what happened to the
institutions
left the Haitians by the United States Marines Corps and Navy:
¨
The
Sanitation and Hygiene Service, which was originally an organization
trained by the officers of the Medical corps of the United States Navy,
has lost
its real purpose as an institution. The persons responsible for its
administration
are rank politicians and the most ill-bred
officials Haiti ever had.
¨
The
Public Works Administration was also organized by officers of the Civil
Engineer Corps of the United States Navy. But since its "Haitianization", it has
become
merely a payroll institution for all the friends of the President who are
jobless,
as well as those who do not care to work.
The engineers and architects
in
charge of various departments cannot do anything to remedy the situation.
This
is why this service has spent so much money and Haiti still has no roads, no
bridges,
and no sewers in areas where such construction is badly needed.
¨
The
Agricultural and Rural Education Service . . . was, after its
"Haitianization."
placed under another foreigner, a Belgian, who resigned in 1938. This
department
could have rendered great service if the five-year plan submitted by
the
scientific agriculturist-in-charge had been approved by the government. .
.
Political
opportunism was rampant. No attempt was
made even to try the plan.
¨
The
Contribution or Internal Tax Service was also organized by Americans. The
Haitians
who have replaced the Americans are competent and honest; but again
political
interference was followed by embezzlement of Government funds,
which
of course went unpunished.
¨
Education
is purposely neglected for the benefit of politics and social prejudice.
The
method of education in Haiti has always been a matter for
"discussion."
The
removal from office of competent administrators and personnel of the
Education
Department for political reason renders the problem practically
insoluble.
¨
There
cannot be an independent press in Haiti, because of the enactment of a law
against
a free press. A 'state of siege' is
maintained by the present government,
but
even in time of peace no one can express an honest opinion as to the general
condition
or administration of the country without being mistreated.79
Other observers, even those hostile
to the United States Occupation, have noted
the
deterioration of the infrastructure:
"American civil service reform, for instance, had
little
impact. After the occupation, Haitian
politics reverted to the 'spoils system'
whereby
successive administrations installed their own partisans in public
office."
"...The network of roads, potentially
the most significant legacy of the occupation,
didn't
last long because almost all roads were unpaved and required elaborate
maintenance."80
President Vincent became a dictator
in all but name in late 1938. He was
eventually
maneuvered out of power by Elie Lescot in 1941. Lescot was exposed in 1945
as
a virtual agent for Trujillo in the Dominican Republic (by the
Dominicans). Students
and
rioters took to the streets. In January
1946, the Garde, headed by an Executive
Military
Committee [Comité Exécutif Militaire] led by a Colonel Lavaud (a mulâtre) took
charge. The result was chaos--rioting, looting,
arson--with an ugly racial--noir versus
mulâtres--tone,
although there apparently was even some Communist influence in the
violence
as well.
The Comité eventually restored
order, resurrected the 1932 constitution, and
returned
Haiti to a state approaching normalcy.
In August 1946, presidential elections
were
held. Dumarsais Estimé, an Artibonite
noir, was declared the winner, a Te Duem
was
said in his honor, and the Garde went back to the barracks.
Estimé enacted a new constitution in
November. The Garde was redesignated
"L'Armée
d'Haiti" and its police functions were theoretically separated from the
military
functions. Estimé was a populist as well as a noir, and
he nationalized the Standard Fruit
holdings
as well as instituted an income tax for
the elite. He also was seen as a threat
by
Trujillo,
who worked steadily to destabilize him.
Estimé declared a state of siege in
1949 because of the threat from the Dominican
Republic. Faced with a loss of income from the
Standard Fruit nationalization and other
causes,
he suddenly required every worker to buy government bonds redeemable in 1959,
which
proved immensely unpopular. So did
Estimé's efforts to be reelected President
despite
a constitutional prohibition against presidents succeeding themselves. His
attempt
at modifying the constitution was blocked in Haitian Senate, even though the
attempt
was popular with the masses. Finally,
the army, with rioting groups supporting
both
sides of the position in the streets, faced Estimé and told him he had resigned
on 10
May
1950.
Initially, Colonel Franck Lavaud was
the new President, but Colonel Paul
Magloire,
initially declared the Minister of the Interior in the new junta, was the real
power
in the group. New national elections
were declared on 3 August, and Magloire
resigned
from the junta to run for President. He
was opposed by the Communist Party
and
an architect who wanted to execute Estimé
Elections on 10 October finalized
Magloire's
presidency, although the commentary at the time felt it reflected the popular
opinion
of most Haitians.81
In the end, however, Magloire fell
prey to the fatal disease of all Haitian elected
Presidents: the desire to hold on after his term of
office would expire. Magloire
attempted
a coup against himself--he resigned as President and, as commander in chief of
the
army, declared himself chief Executive Power (shades of 1915). The constitution was
suspended
and dissidents jailed. The people took
to the streets in a general strike, the
army
refused to support him, and Magloire fled to Jamaica in exile on 12 December
1956.82 Time didn't give his fall much play, the big
news that Christmas was the crushing
of
the Hungarian revolt by Soviet tanks.
Magloire's immediate successor,
Joseph Pierre-Louis, took office the same day he
left. He resigned 55 days later.
Haiti entered another riotous
election cycle. Rioters stormed schools
and attacked
mulâtres. The army--whose back pay had been
mysteriously paid by Dr. Francois
Duvalier,
an old follower of Estimé--attempted to gain control under Colonel Armand.
Opposed
by loyalist elements, the coup failed.
Rioting and looting prevailed in Port au
Prince.
On 26 May 1957, a Pierre Fignolé was
inaugurated as President. He didn't last
long. The man he appointed head of the Army turned
on him and demanded his
signature
on a letter of resignation on 14 June.
Fignolé was dead two days later.
Duvalier
was steadily gaining support in the army and in the country as well. On 22
September,
Francois Duvalier, was elected President in a ratio of three votes to two.83
Part II
An Analysis of the Occupation
Looking at the bleak history of the
Occupation and its aftermath, There are a
number
of questions that come to mind. Did it
accomplish anything? Did anything it
accomplished
amount to anything? If the answers to
the first two questions are yes, what
happened
to Haiti? The Occupation was scarcely
over before Haiti seemed to revert to its
bad
old ways.
Goals of the Occupation.
There is little written what the
United States' goals for the Occupation, and
it
is not difficult to find those commentators who denounce the entire occupation
as a
racist
exercise in imperialism by the United States.84 One of the few hints about actual
goals
is Sumner Well's memorandum for
President Harding, talking about the lack of
progress
in the occupation based on what was stated in the 1915 Haitian-American Treaty
(Annex
C, Appendix 16).
The 1915 Haitian-American Treaty is
often denounced as an ex post facto Treaty
that
served only to justify the American occupation.85 It was certainly after the fact, and
it
was often cited as if it were a moral contract that must be accomplished before
the
Occupation
could end. However, as a statement of
goals, it does offer some insight into
what
the United States hoped to accomplish through the Occupation (Annex C, Appendix
6).
I.
Finances. "...(T)he United
States will . . . aid the Haitian Government in the
proper
and efficient development of its agriculture, mineral and commercial resources
and
in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a first and solid
basis." (Article I)
This
was to be accomplished through the mechanism of the appointment of a General
Receiver
to collect and spend Haiti's customs duties for it. The General Receiver would
be
assisted by a Financial Advisor.
(Article II) Haiti would agree
that the General
Receiver
would receive all customs duties from Haiti.
(Article III). The Financial
Advisor
would "collate, classify, arrange and make full statement of" all of
Haiti's debts,
to
include all of their financial obligations.
(Article IV) These customs
duties collected
will
first pay the salaries of the appointed Americans, then pay off the public
debt, third,
pay
for a constabulary as specified later in the Treaty, and finally, meet the
expenses of
the
Haitian Government. (Article V) Haiti could not increase its pubic debt
without the
agreement
of the United States. (Article
VIII)
II.
Security. Haiti agreed to an
American officered and organized constabulary,
which
Haiti would pay for. (Article X)
III. Resources. In response to
American "aid [to] the Haitian Government in the
proper and efficient development of its
agriculture, mineral and commercial resources,
the
Haitians agreed to not give or sell any of Haiti's territory (Article XI),
settle all claims
with
the United States (Article XII), and develop its resources with the assistance
of the
United
States. (Article XIII)
In return, the United States agreed
to help preserve Haitian independence and
maintain
a Government "adequate for the protection of life, property and individual
liberty." (Article XIV). The treaty was to run for ten years, and for a further ten if
"for
specific
reasons presented by either of the . . . parties, the purpose of this treaty
has not
been
fully accomplished." (Article XVI)
Article XVI (and the Treaty extension of 1917)
is
the origin of the obligation of the United States to stay until 1936, which was
mentioned
repeatedly in debates about the Haitian Occupation in the 1930's, came from.
The financial situation that the
Americans found in 1915 was awful.
Haiti had
borrowed
so much money that its debt service was threatening to overload its
budget.
However,
even when they were paying off their debt service, the Haitian would rather
take
out further loans rather than cut back on current expenses. By the time the
Occupation
began, according to testimony given at the 1921-22 Senate investigations,
Haiti
was unable to borrow any more money, or pay off the debts it had already taken
on.
As
was noted in Part I, World War I's effect on the World financial markets
precluded a
major
consolidation loan for Haiti until 1922.
However, as was presented to the Senate in
1922,
some progress had been made in reducing the debt burden in the years up to
1922
(Annex
B). Near the end of the Occupation,
General Russell's annual report stated
At the end of the fiscal year, 1928-29, the Government of
Haiti had
an
unobligated cash balance of more than $4,000,000. Bonded
indebtedness
had decreased from $30,772,000 to $17,735,479, in spite of
the
contraction of new loans, 1922, 1923, and 1924, totaling $22,695,000
[the
debt consolidation loans] utilized chiefly to refunded previous bonded
indebtedness,
and satisfy claims against the Government, but also to effect
material
improvements.
Government revenues have more than doubled, chiefly
through
better
collections and yields of existing taxes enabling the various
department
of the Government to undertake the greatest program for
public
welfare the country has ever seen.
Internal revenue has been
increased,
yielding over $1,200,000 during the year just finished, or more
than
one-fourth the total receipts of thirteen years ago (1915-16) and
further
important increases are forecast. A
sound currency has been
achieved.86
While the Great Depression caused
serious government deficits in the early
thirties,
and therefore caused the curtailment of many developmental programs, Haiti was
still
in good enough shape in 1935 to be the only one of fifteen Central and South
American
countries not to have defaulted on public dollar bonds.87
Article X of the 1915
Haitian-American Treaty provided for an American
organized
and officered constabulary funded through Haitian customs revenue. As noted
in
Annex A, Appendix 3, it was first renamed the Garde d'Haiti in 1928 and again,
after
the
Occupation, renamed the L'Armée d'Haiti.
Despite its relatively small size--some
2100
enlisted gendarmes in a country of 3.5 million--it had served Haiti, and the
Occupation
well.
To begin with, it had replaced a
pre-Occupation army "of thirty-eight (38) line
and
four (4) artillery regiments of a total paper strength of over 9,000, a
Gendarmerie of
over
1,800, plus four regiments of the President's guard, the whole officered by 308
generals
and 50 colonels, not to mention the honorary generals created by the President
pro
tem among his friends."88 In addition to being a drain on the treasury, a
source of
corruption,
and a burden on the civil society (business people pressed to supply money,
draft
animals; a system of conscription more resembling impressment, etc.), the army
was
a
constant threat of insurrection or coups d'etat against the sitting government.
Michel
Oreste
was the first truly civilian president of Haiti.89
As was shown in Part I, the
Gendarmerie/Guarde quickly proved a useful tool of
the
Haitian Government, even if some Occupation leaders had reservations over their
use
(viz.,
locking the Haitian Senate out of their chambers in 1916, closing the Haitian
legislature
in 1917), although, admittedly, these early actions served the Occupation as
well
as the Dartiguenave presidency. The
Marine Corps, as might be expected, would
argue
that the establishment and maintenance of order was generally good for
Haiti.90
Many
other observers (but not all) would
agree, including a British minister who had
little
other good to say about the Americans and their Occupation: "What has America
done
for Haiti in the fourteen years since the intervention? Primarily, maintained peace
and
allowed the peasant to work in safety."91
The main shortcoming in the American
institution of the Gendarmerie/Garde was
the
failure to effectively separate the military function of the guard from the
police
function;92
this would have severe implications not only during the Duvalier years, but up
through
to the ouster of Aristide and the Second United States Occupation of
Haiti. To
its
credit, the United States did not use the Garde as a vehicle to set up a
pro-American
military
dictator such as Somoza in Nicaragua or Trujillo in the Dominican Republic;
however,
the centralized organization of the Garde and, to an extent, its
professionalism,
allowed
it to be used more effectively by Duvalier and his successors.93
In addition to its police and military functions (which included
Coast Guard and
prisons),
the Gendarmerie/Garde also served as the principle builder of Haitian
infrastructure
and at one time or another built Haitian internal communications (telephone
and
telegraphs, roads and airfields), fire services in Port au Prince and Cap
Haitien, traffic
control
as well as vehicle registration, communal administration, and public works
construction.94
As noted in part 1, claims against
the Haitian government--in excess of 70,000
separate
claims--were paid off in 1923. As far
as natural resources went, Russell reported
in
1930 that Haiti still was dependent on the coffee crop, and the coffee crop of
1928-29
suffered
from poor weather. As a means of
diversification, sisal plantations were started
on
land abandoned to cultivation, a pineapple plantation and cannery started, and
corn
and
other new crops started.10 However, the
Depression reduced the coffee price by 40
per
cent between 1930 and 1935; logwood exports went nowhere by 1935; the pineapple
company,
rolling by 1932, was also killed by the Depression. On top of that 1935 was a
year
of severe weather. To compensate, the
Haitians granted a banana monopoly to
Standard
Fruit in 1935, but nationalized it--killing the golden goose--in 1947.96
The most serious failure of
resources, as shown in Part I, was the failure to extend
significant
education to the noir peasantry.
Despite the recognition of this factor in
Sumner
Well's memorandum in 1921, almost all of the significant contributions of the
Service
Technique went to the benefit of the elite, and those students rebelled when
their
allowances
were cut. A more telling statistic
comes from General Russell's 1930 report:
"there
are almost 400,000 children of school age and the existing schools of all types
(including
national, religious and private schools) can only accommodate slightly more
than
100,000 students."12 The 100,000
number included all of the elite's children, the
shortfall
fell entirely upon the noir peasantry.
American success in providing Haiti
with a government "adequate for the
protection
of life, property and individual liberty," is problematical. On one hand, three
of
the four peaceful transitions of power up to the end of the Occupation occurred
during
the
Occupation. On the other, the
Occupation acquiesced in the Presidents Dartiguenave and
Borno
operating from the Constitution's Transitory Articles, and the closing of the
Haitian
Senate in 1916 and the Chamber of Deputies in 1917, until Roy took office and
legislative
elections were held in October, 1930.
The constitution itself, written in
Haiti, modified by the US State Department and
thrown
to a national referendum when it appeared the Chamber of Deputies would not
approve
it, has been criticized on a number of issues, most notably the provision, new
in
1918,
allowing foreigners to own property (particularly land) in Haiti.98 However, a
major
area of disagreement between the United States and the Haitian governments in
1922,
was a Haitian law "interpreting" this constitutional provision in
such a way that the
article
was all but nullified.99 It is also
interesting to note that neither the amendments to
that
constitution passed during President Borno's administration in 1927, nor the
1932
constitution
written during the Haitianization period removed this provision.100
Imperialism
and Racism.
As noted above, the United States
Occupation of Haiti in 1915 to 1934 has been
accused
of both imperialism (or colonialism) and racism. Both charges have a bearing on
an
analysis of the Occupation and need to be addressed. Of the two, imperialism
probably
rates the shorter answer.
If Imperialism (or colonialism) is
the long term taking over of a country or region
for
the purpose of economic
exploitation, then the Occupation,
however dubious its
status
in international law of the time or by political standards of the end of the
20th
Century,
was not Imperialism. The period of the
Occupation was fixed by Treaty,
however
ex post facto it may have been, and American officials appear to have had every
intention
of abiding by its limits. In any case,
as discussed in Part I, other factors
prevented
the US Occupation from reaching its stated treaty limit of 1936.
Another line of investigation that
could be followed is the opportunities the
Occupation
gave the United States business community in Haiti. It is true that the
German
business community was for all intents and purposes shut down in Haiti in
1917-18,
but that was more due to war paranoia that to present an opening to the United
States
business community.101 Franklin
Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
and
John McIlhenny, then financial Advisor to Haiti, apparently sought out some
sort of
financial
investments in Haiti in the 1917-19 time frame, assisted by Roosevelt's cousin
Harry,
who was serving with the Gendarmerie at the time. Although apparently nothing
came
to fruition, it was a surprising breach of government ethics, even for
1917.102 Other
investment
opportunities simply did not materialize.
Both Standard Oil and the United
Fruit
Company declined to invest in Haiti at the time because of State Department
investment
regulations.
However, with the United States
controlling Haitian customs, it was apparently
easy
to abrogate an 1907 Franco-Haitian commercial convention, to favor American
imports. The National City Bank did float the Series
A, B, and C loans for Haiti in
1922-23,
and the Banque Nationale was by then a subsidiary of the National City Bank,
from
which the bank profited.103 However,
the National City Bank was induced to sell
out
its interest to Haiti for a bare $1 million in 1936, when President Vincent
nationalized
the Banque.104
Perhaps the most critical evaluation
that might honestly be made of the
Occupation
is that
[it] was a matter of US self-interest. It was not principally and
exclusively
a philanthropic act because after US troops landed in Haiti, it
took
much pressure from local dissidents and American sympathizers to
force
the occupation troops to withdraw (Weatherly [U. G., Haiti: An
Experiment
in Pragmatism. The American Journal of
Sociology, Vol. 32,
No.
3 (1926), pp. 353-66], 1926: 354). The
public statements made by the
White
House and the State Department that the United States came to
rescue
a friendly neighbor in trouble were purely whitewashing
propaganda
created for international and national consumption (Buell [R.
L. The American Occupation of Haiti (New
York: Foreign Policy
Association,
1929), 1929: 341). The occupation was
instead a strict
application
of the Monroe Doctrine that viewed the Caribbean as mare
nostrum.105
Racism is a much more difficult
issue to address, particularly because of what one
author
called "the American racial mores of the day"106 have changed so
dramatically
since
1915. Nevertheless, the case that the
Americans conducted their Occupation with
severe
racial prejudices is based on three basic arguments or sets of evidence: language
used
by the Americans, testimony of racial prejudice by Haitian citizens, and an
allegation
that Marine Corps policy deliberately selected Southerners for duty in Haiti,
"because
they can handle Negroes."
The chief villain in the racist
language argument is Colonel (later Major General)
Littleton
W. T. Waller, USMC (1856-1926). As the
first commander of the Marine
Brigade
pacifying and garrisoning Haiti, he might be expected to have set a tone for
the
conduct
of the Occupation. Waller was of the
old Marine Corps, when it was referred to
as
America's "colonial infantry."
He was a veteran of the Spanish-American War, served
in
the Boxer Rebellion, commanded the Marine Battalion on Samar, and commanded
brigades
in interventions in Cuba and Mexico before the landing in Haiti.
Colonel Waller was born into a
slave-holding family in Virginia before the Civil
War. A family who lost eleven members, ten of
them children, in the Nat Turner Slave
Rebellion
in 1831.107 Waller was also infamous as
the "Butcher of Samar." In
January
1902,
while commanding the Marine Battalion (as was customary in those days, the
battalion
was provisional and otherwise undesignated), Waller allegedly ordered the
murder
of eleven natives on Samar, one of a number of atrocity cases that arose out of
the
Philippine
Insurrection. Waller was
court-martialed for murder in March 1902 and was
eventually
acquitted.108
Writing Colonel (later Major General
Commandant) John A. Lejeune, then
Assistant
to the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, in October 1915,
Waller
remarked, "you can never trust a nigger with a gun." Hans Schmidt quotes this
remark
twice in his The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 and once in
Maverick
Marine, a biography of Smedley Butler, in building his case on the role of
American
racism in the Occupation of Haiti.109
Elizabeth Abbott, in Haiti: The
Duvaliers
and Their Legacy, uses the phrase to characterize the entire US Occupation.110
Waller
probably was a racist--given his background and history this is probably an
unremarkable
conclusion--and, as Schmidt makes his case in both US
Occupation--quoting
Waller liberally--and Maverick Marine, this was certainly the
manner
in which Waller spoke on a regular basis.111
However, on occasion, Waller rose
above his racist prejudices: recall
from Part I
his
disagreement with shutting down the Haitian Senate even when it would serve
immediate
Occupation objectives as well as Haitian President Dartiguenave's. Waller
was
also ready to counsel his protégé Smedley Butler on curbing his behavior
towards the
elite: "There is more harm done by such an act
than can be remedied by months of work
and
labor."112 Another point to
remember is that Colonel Waller commanded 1st
Provisional Brigade of Marines for only 15 months (Annex
A, Appendix 1), and was
senior
American officer present (after Caperton's departure for Santo Domingo) only
from
May to November 1916.
A much more appropriate person for
scrutiny would be John H. Russell, twice
brigade
commander of 1st Brigade and United States High Commissioner from 1922 to
1930. If any officer's personal prejudices had a
significant influence on United States
policy
in Haiti, it would be his. Yet, to many
observers, General Russell, who spoke
rather
good French, was decidedly not a racist.
A Haitian who had no shortage of critical
remarks
about the Occupation, B. Danache, who once called Waller and Butler
"torturers
without
scruple," had kind words for both General and Mrs. Russell.113 Even critics of
the
Occupation note that General Russell "pursued a policy designed to
eliminate racial
friction."114
Finally, as we discuss language, we
must acknowledge that what constitutes
permissible
language in racial, sexual, or any other context, changes as society evolves.
Insensitive,
even brutal, racial characterizations colored the language of many white
Americans,
and not just southerners or racists, in the early part of this century, which
is
why
use of language is so inaccurate a gauge of racism. Even Smedley Butler, whose use
of
crude racial characterizations is well documented, and his wife are seen by a critic of
the
Occupation as "perhaps relatively liberal, and at least made an effort to
be polite and
gracious."115
However we characterize the official
racial tone of the Occupation, it was
certainly
seen by at least part of the Haitian population as racist. This segment was the
elite,
particularly the mulâtres. As they were
the literate class in Haiti, their opinion is
the
one on the written record. As they
spoke French, and many spoke English before the
Occupation
was through, they were the Haitians that outsiders--supporters of the
Occupation
as well as critics--sought out to talk to.
And the elite did not mince words:
"The Americans have taught us many things," Le
Nouvelliste [Port
au Prince] newspaper owner Ernest
Chauvet told author Seabrook [author
of The Magic Island, 1929]. "Among other things they have taught us
that
we are niggers. You see, we really didn't know that
before. We thought
we were negroes."116
The problem with this position is
that, despite elite perceptions otherwise, most
Americans
appear to have had separate opinions of the elite and the noir peasantry, the
former
rather negative, the latter rather positive.
One of the more noted of these separate
characterizations
is from Smedley Butler's testimony before the Senate investigating
committee
in 1921:
The Haitian people are divided into two classes; one
class wears shoes and
the
other does not. . . Those that wear
shoes I took as a joke. . . They
wore
cut-away coats, brass-head canes, stove-pipe hats 3 inches in
diameter,
and anything else they could put on to make themselves
conspicuous. But the people who were barefooted, the
women wearing
themselves
hubbards and the men dungarees half way up to their knees,
with
scarred feet, indicating the hardest kind of toil, and with great blisters
on
their hands, and with the palms of their hands as hard as a piece of sole
leather--those
people you could absolutely trust.117
Other famous Marines besides Smedley
Butler served in Haiti, particularly in the
early
years, and some of their memoirs echo Butler's characterization of the two classes
in
Haiti: A. A. Vandergrift, who served
twice in Haiti, once as Butler's adjutant, and was
later
Commandant of the Marine Corps118, or Frederick M. "Dopey" Wise,
another double
veteran
of Haiti and Chef of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti from July 1919 to January
1921.119
Memoirs
of enlisted Marines with Haitian service are more rare, but best known of
these,
The
White King of La Gonave, by Marine Sergeant and Gendarmerie Lieutenant Faustin
Wirkus,
may not offer the colorful parallels of Butler, but the general comparisons in
his
book
are much the same.120 Former Brigade
commanders Eli Cole and Russell also have
been
quoted in similar statements showing favor towards the peasantry and distrust
towards
the elite.121
To some writers, the Marine and American attitude towards the
elite constitutes
racism;
I read mostly contempt for a parasitic level of society. Even Hans Schmidt, the
most
quoted writer of the racist analysis of the Occupation, in building his case,
comes
close
to recognizing this contempt:
The cultural clash between Americans and the Haitian
elite was all
the more exacerbated because the
Americans, who subscribed to political
ideologies
of democracy and egalitarianism, were repulsed by the very
concept
of elitism and that was fundamental to the social and economic
position
of the elite in Haiti. This revulsion,
of course, ignored the
paradox
of American racial and cultural elitism.
During the early years of
the
occupation American military commanders were especially trenchant
in
this respect, scorning the aristocratic pomposity of the elite while
expressing
affection for the common people. This
attitude was firmly
rooted
in ideals of democratic egalitarianism. . .122
How the actual peasant noir felt
about this American attitude comes to us only
second
hand, the old peasant quoted in Abbott's Haiti (fn 91), for instance. Other
interpretations
come to us filtered through one political view or another, such as the
anti-Occupation
Occupied Haiti (1927) by Emily Balch:
It may be true that the peasants in general like the
Occupation. It is
possible that they are sufficiently
conscious of the benefits that have come
with it, and ascribe them
sufficiently clearly to the Americans.
One is told
that they now build their houses on
the roadside as they did not date to do
in the old days, for fear of being
seized by some revolutionary enterprise
or to serve as soldiers. Again this story is laughed at, and one is
told the
houses always stood as they do now.
It is hard to believe that given the deep-seated
traditional belief that
the return of the white men spelled
a return of slavery, and given the land
situation,
the peasants do not feel uneasy under their new white masters.123
However, there is no mistaking how
the elite felt: Americans had not
understood:
the
social experiment [that was Haiti, nothing] that calls for shame or
concealment.
. . [T]hey throw the history of Haiti
in our face--its long
tissue
of revolutions and massacres. . . .
Efforts to help the masses have
been
made again and again and in many ways, . . .
The American
invasion
might have been a good thing if, although unjust and even
infringing
for a time upon our independence, it had been temporary and
had
led ultimately to the reign of justice and liberty. But such is not the
case.
. . .
"Even the good that they do turns to our hurt, for
instead of
teaching
us, they do it to prove that we are incapable.
They are exploiters.
. ."124
Bit if the Americans had contempt
for the elite, the elite returned it in kind:
"But it is a grand joke, isn't it?" Chauvet
continued. 'The sergeant's
wife
or the captain's, who maybe did her own washing at home, is our
social
superior and would feel herself disgraced to shake hands with any
nigger. Why, many of those white Marine Corps people
couldn't have
entered
my mulatto father's house except by the servants' entrance."125
Haitian civil courts never were
controlled by the Occupation and were also
perceived
as anti-white and anti-American:
"though a black foreigner might win his case
against
a Haitian, a white man stood little chance and a white American none at
all."126
Most
curious--to me at least--is the Haitian elite's scorn towards American Blacks,
whom
they
considered servile. In 1924, the
Haitian ambassador in Washington informed the
State
Department that even the noirs looked down on American Blacks [something I
doubt,
as relatively few noirs then lived in the cities and larger towns where they
would
have
come in contact with them]. This had
serious impact on American representation in
Haiti
which, since the end of the 19th Century, had been largely black, a small legion
which
had included Ambassadors (ministers) Frederick Douglass (1889-91) and Dr. H.
W.
Furniss (1905-1913), and CPT Charles Young, 9th Cavalry, USA, the first black
American
military attaché and the first military attaché assigned to Haiti. As a result, the
President
was forced to appoint White diplomats to Haiti rather than Black
Republicans
he had wanted to reward.127
Balch repeats the elite's
accusation--repeated in turn by Schmidt (less the
prostitution)
and Abbott, that the Occupation brought about the hereto unknown
phenomenon
of public intoxication and prostitution.128
Other sources confirm the public
intoxication--as
it was Prohibition back in the United States,
Americans
tended
to take advantage of being out of the United States in that regard (much to the
disapproval
of the British, incidentally).129 As of yet, other sources do not confirm the
prostitution
charge.
While I do not doubt that many an
individual American was a racist, or at the least
used
language with nasty racial characterizations, it must be remembered that this
behavior
is being reported by a class of people who have been displaced from positions
of
power
or influence and, in many cases, income by the Occupation. The elite also feared
rising
American influence--to their disadvantage--among the noirs. This was the same
class,
through various patriotic organizations, which fed atrocity stories back to the
Nation
and other periodicals in 1919-1922, many of which were found to be exaggerated
or
without basis in fact. (Part I) Therefore, the magnitude of the reports--not
the
existence
of prejudicial behavior--must be taken with several grains of salt.
For more than 30 years, various
writers and periodicals such as Harry Franck in
Roaming
Through the West Indies (1920),130The New York Times (1920),131 Balch
(1927),132
James Leyburn in The Haitian People (1941),133 Selden Rodman in Haiti: The
Black
Republic, The Complete Story and Guide (1954),134 and even Time magazine
(1954)135
repeated as fact or alluded to a Marine Corps policy that had recruited
Southern
officers
for service in Haiti "because they can handle blacks." (Colonel Waller, true to
form,
had made a similar statement about his qualifications in a letter to Lejeune in
1916.136)
The truth of the matter is that no
such policy existed. In 1964, an
analysis by a
history
student in Wellesley College, followed up by both critics and supporters of the
Occupation--both
academic and Marine--shows, statistically that the charge is inaccurate.
In
fact, as shown in Table 1, the proportion of Southern officers to the total
number of
Marine
officers serving in Haiti varies randomly from year to year; the lack of a
pattern
or
of a fixed proportion of officers being Southern strongly suggests the lack of
policy
in
such a matter. In addition, no one has
found any documentary evidence, or personal
Table 1, Southerners in the
Population
Southern
Marine
Marine Southern Southern Marines
Year U.
S. Population1 Population2 in Haiti3 Populaiton4 Marines5 in Haiti6
1910
92,228,531 24.28
1916
328 77 22.56 19.48
1917 372
72 24.73 31.94
1918
1919 1767
59 20.43 28.81
1920 106,021,431 1098 80 23.78 22.67 22.5
1921 976
75 22.54 22.66
1922 1028
88 20.82 21.59
1923 1043 118 21.57 20.34
1924 1067 109 21.56 18.35
1925 1101 119 22.16 18.49
1926 1094
94 22.21 29.79
1927 1121
97 21.23 24.74
1928 1185
90 20.84 26.67
1929 1173
80 20.72 30
1930 122,906,848 1180 88 23.44 20.51 23.86
1931 1183
87 19.7 17.24
1932 1173
77 20.03 15.58
1933
1934
1940 132,165,131 24.06
__________________________________
1 Includes total United States population for the
50 states only.
2 Includes total population of commissioned and
warrant officers of the U.S. Marine Corps, only if born in one of what are now
the 50 states.
3 Includes all United States born commissioned
and warrant officers in the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Haiti.
4 The percentage of U.S population born in one of
the following states: Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.
5 The percentage of Marine Corps Officers born in
one of the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.
6 The percentage of Marine Corps officers in
Haiti born in one of the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia.
Source:
Ann Hurst Harrington. 137
recollection,
that any such policy existed, either for First Brigade or the Gendarmerie.
Ironically,
while the majority of Marine officers serving in Haiti were not Southern, many
of
President Wilson's appointees
were. Except for the possible exception
of John
McIlhenny,
who had awful personal relations with President Dartiguenave, most of these
men
acquitted themselves well.138
Analysis of the racial situation,
based on all of the above, is of an Occupation that
had
no officially racist policy, perhaps even one discouraging racist behavior and
word
during
the Russell years, yet due to the racist attitudes of individuals--both
American and
the
Haitian elite--the general social climate in Haiti's cities was, at times, very
racially
charged. However, amongst the noirs in the countryside,
those Americans who had
regular
contact with them through the Gendarmerie and other means, with exceptions,
generally
shared feelings of affection and mutual respect with the people they were in
contact
with.
Culture.
In 1930, President Hoover's Forbes
Commission, amongst its findings, included
"The
failure of the Occupation to understand the social problems of Haiti, its
brusque
attempt
to plant democracy there by drill and harrow, its determination to set up a
middle
class--however
wise and necessary it may seem to Americans--all these explain why, in
part,
the high hopes of our good works in this land have not been
realized."139 This is
probably
the major failing of the Occupation, and when one wonders why the effects of
the
Occupation were so short lived, this is why.
The Occupation addressed problems and
applied
solutions that simply did not apply to Haiti.
One must remember that for the bulk
of its first century of freedom, Haiti was an
isolated
country, partially because the United States wanted little contact with a free
Black
country, and partially because the Haitians wanted the blancs to have no excuse
to
reestablish
slavery. This led to a peculiarly
insular Haitian society and a peculiarly
Haitian
method of transferring power and governing the country. It had also been a poor
country
for all of its history since independence and this led to intense competition
for the
riches
of the country. This fed a competition
for power in Haiti, for it was those in power
who
disbursed the riches.
Initially, the elite--made up of the
mulâtres descended from the French
colonialists--had
the easiest access to power through education, social position and
birthright. For the noir, the route to power led through
the military, and by the beginning
of
the 20th Century this had become so routine that American officers observed
that
"there
is a regular procedure in this warfare" that one Senator likened to
American
elections.140 A ritual battle would be fought near the
town of Saint-Marcs, and the
challenger
to the Presidency, if he won, marched on Port au Prince, and was voted into
the
Presidency. In most cases, the new
President then disbursed the spoils of his victory
until
challenged by a new power. The military
noirs thus became part of the elite.
Through all this squabbling for
power, the peasantry, exclusively noir, stood by,
struggling
to provide a living for themselves and their families, and, if they
participated
Click
here to view image
in
the process at all, it was in being exploited or killed. It was this situation the
Americans
sought to change through the imposition of a new constitution and the orderly
installation
of several Presidents. The class of
Haitians who temporarily lost power and
income
through this process--the elite--resisted.
Many of the American reforms were in
the
long run essentially pointless. Putting
Haitian finances to rights and
restoring their
credit,
to which a great deal of effort was eventually expended (Annex B; Annex C,
Appendix
17), was of little interest to the elite.
Their accounts had never been that
important
to them, except as a source of graft.
Increased credit meant nothing more than
increased
opportunity for future graft.
An improved Gendarmerie, intended as
a source of public order during the
Occupation,
was, after the Occupation, quickly politicized and became an efficient tool
for
forcing the transfer of power. It was
much more efficient than the corruption-plagued
pre-Occupation
Haitian Army that had so lost any efficiency that private armies--the
Cacos--had
become more effective in forcing the transfer of power.
Improved agriculture techniques and
education for the noir peasantry were
resisted
by the elite because anything that enfranchised the peasantry increased the
competition
for the power and the riches. However,
many peasants resisted agricultural
reforms
simply because they were new and untried in Haiti, and in many cases they were
right
in resisting inappropriate agricultural methods. Improved medical facilities for the
peasantry
were only a source of plunder for the elite,142 the elite had their own
hospitals
and
doctors.
One glaring example of the American
inability to grasp the Haitian culture was
the
Occupation's allowing the Borno presidency to use the Gendarmerie to persecute
practitioners
of Voodoo. The Americans were persuaded
that Voodoo was witchcraft,143
even
though individual Americans, serving with the Gendarmerie for example, were
perfectly
capable of understanding Voodoo's role as a religion.144
In some ways those who accuse the
Americans of racism have a point: many
of
the
American administrators--Marine and civilian--were incapable of understanding
that
Haitians
were a culture completely different from the Black culture that they had been
accustomed
to in the United States and thought they knew; witness Colonel Wise
complaining
about "one of those American Treaty Officials arrived with a book entitled
'The
Development of the Negro Mind,' from which he quoted on all occasions!"145
Despite all the good intentions,
despite the years of hard work, despite the lives
lost
or ruined, the Occupation failed to have a lasting impact on Haiti (except
perhaps in
legend),
because the areas the Occupation sought to improve were not those areas that
would
fundamentally alter Haitian society.
Part III
The Never-ending Story
Without going into the Duvaliers and
what led to the Second United States
Occupation
of Haiti, some observations about the fall of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the
Second
Occupation, and the recent turn-over of the pacification effort to the United
Nations,
based on my research on the First Occupation are offered.
The military coup that overthrew
Aristide was nothing special in Haitian politics.
United
States political actors and events made it so.
While the election that brought
Aristide
to power was nominally democratic, it does not mean that Haiti was a
democratic
country subsequently overthrown by a military coup. The elections were
simply
a new means of seizing power, and therefore the riches, in Haiti and was
probably
viewed
by the elite--and Aristide--and no more valid, or less valid, a method than
marching
on Port au Prince at the head of a Caco army.
Haiti is a more violent country than
it was prior to the First Occupation.
Part of
this
is because the Duvaliers politicized the noir peasantry more than his
predecessors,
and
those seizing power must either organize them or suppress them. Aristide organized
the
peasantry, Cedras suppressed them. It
is still all part of the struggle for power in
Haiti.
Aristide was able to bring a new
player into the struggle for power in Haiti--the
United
States, acting this time as an agent for Aristide instead of itself. The departure of
the
United States, particularly if the United Nations is unable to maintain order,
will
simply
renew the struggle for power.
Change to a different political
system will not occur in Haiti unless either the
culture
of seizing political power and therefore riches changes, or one of the parties
departs
the scene. Neither seems likely. Absent Aristide, the elite--still mulâtre
although
with
a strong noir, primarily military, component--will resume the struggle for
power and
riches
amongst itself.
The noir peasantry, who a hundred
years ago fled to the hills to escape oppression
or
exploitation, however, now has nowhere to go.
The lush forests that Smedley Butler
fought
through are largely gone for lumber, fuel, or charcoal. Charcoal is often the only
cash
crop the noir peasantry has access to.
Forests, which covered about 60 per cent of
Haiti
in 1923, now cover only 3 per cent. The
coffee trees, that provided the crop that
John
Russell and his advisors were so worried about Haitian dependence on, have gone
for
charcoal with the most recent U.S. embargo.
The farmland, of which originally only
11
percent of the country was even considered suitable, has mostly washed away, no
longer
held to the ground by the trees.146
The chances for Haitian migration
are largely gone. These is probably
little more
room
in the Dominican Republic for any more illegal workers; Cuba has not been a
source
of employment since Castro came to power; the United States has cut off illegal
migrations
during the Aristide crisis.
The
question is becoming, given the lack of real political reform in Haiti
(Aristide
in
power will soon be indistinguishable from the elite); given the destruction of
the
Haitian
economy--which the American embargo hastened, but didn't cause; given the
prospects
for no end to the oppression of the noir peasantry; given the lack of a safety
valve
so these people can escape; when will
these people explode?
Annexes
Annex
A: The US Marine Corps' Military
Campaigns in the First United States
Occupation
of Haiti.
The day after the mob attacked
Guillaume Sam and dragged his body through the
streets, Admiral Caperton landed troops to restore
order.147
Under command of Capt. George Van
Orden, USMC, the Cruiser Squadron
Marine
Officer, a two-battalion landing force composed of three companies of seamen,
12th
Company of Marines (earlier detached from 2nd Regiment), and the Marine
detachment
from the Washington, was landed at 5:45pm.
The landing force cleared the
streets
from the harbor to the foreign legations and established guards there. The 12th
Company
furnished most of the guards, while the remainder of the landing force
bivouacked
nearby.148 The 24th Company,
transported from Guantanamo, Cuba,
reinforced
the landing force the following day.149
Caperton
radioed for a regiment of Marines on the 28th.150 Col. John A. Lejeune,
Assistant
to the Commandant and, in the temporary absence of the Major General
Commandant,
Acting Commandant, detached the 2nd Regiment from the Advanced Base
Brigade
in Philadelphia and dispatched it to Haiti aboard the battleship USS
Connecticut
(BB-18)
within 24 hours of notification. In his
memoirs, Lejeune stated that the
necessary
arrangements took an hour to accomplish over the phone. A week later,
Caperton
requested further reinforcements and Lejeune dispatched 1st Regiment on the
armored
cruiser USS Tennessee (CA-10) (often reported as a battleship, even in
contemporary
sources) as the requested reinforcements, and the Advanced Base Brigade
headquarters
under Col. Littleton W. T. Waller to take charge. Admiral Caperton would
be
the senior American officer present in Haiti, Col. Waller became the senior
American
officer
ashore.151
Second Regiment, commanded by Colonel Eli
Cole, landed at Port au Prince on 4
August
1915. The next day, Col. Cole, 2nd
Regiment, and the Washington landing party
persuaded
the Haitian commander of Fort Nationale, Port au Prince, to surrender his
command
to the Marines. Fourteen cannon, 450
rifles, and a million rounds of
ammunition
were captured with the fort. The
garrison and other Haitian troops in Port au
Prince
were detained for a time at the old Dessaline Barracks.152 On 8 August, the
Haitian
gunboat Nord Alexis arrived at Port au Prince from Cap Haitien, with 766
Haitian
soldiers
to be demobilized by Marines. After
putting 30 of the most destitute into the
hospital,
the Marines paid off the remainder at 10 gourdes (about $2.00) a head. The
soldiers
were apparently quite delighted at the deal (Caperton described them later as
destitute
and with nothing to eat) and apparently happy to go, although some thought they
had
to bribe their way out of the Navy Yard, and offered some of their bounty to
the
Marine
sentries.153
First
Regiment (Col. Theodore P. Kane), Colonel Waller, a signal company and
Headquarters,
1st Brigade arrived in Port au Prince on 15 August 1915. Colonel Cole
took
command of First Regiment (Col. Kane took over Second Regiment) and took it to
Cap
Haitien, landing about 18 August. The
Artillery Battalion (at the time the only
artillery
battalion organized as such in the Marine Corps), equipped with 12 3-inch
landing
guns and two 4.7-inch heavy field guns were landed on 31 August after a return
trip
to the United States by the USS Tennessee.154
Col. Waller's campaign guidance was
written
by Admiral Caperton (Annex C, Appendix 3).
Martial law was proclaimed by
Admiral
Caperton in Port au Prince and vicinity on 3 September 1915.155
In accordance with Admiral
Caperton's instructions to Colonel Waller, 2nd
Regiment
secured Port au Prince and its environs, while Colonel Cole and 1st Regiment
occupied
Cap Haitien on the northern coast.
After initial expectations of an attack on Cap
Haitien
from the local Caco bands did not materialize, local patrolling began. The
landing
of the USS Connecticut battalion (composed of seamen equipped as infantry),
allowed
Colonel Cole to send 19th Company by sea to Port de Paix on 24 August as the
first
step in spreading control along the northern coast. A military government was
proclaimed
in Cap Haitien under Colonel Cole on 1 September 1915.156
At this time, Major Smedley D.
Butler, battalion commander of 1st Battalion, 1st
Regiment,
reported on various operations to both, or either, Colonel Cole, his regimental
commander,
and Colonel Waller, the brigade commander.
On one such operation
reporting
to Colonel Waller, Butler and his
adjutant, First Lieutenant A. A. Vandergrift,
took
ship to Gonaives, where Butler took commander of a tiny ad hoc battalion
consisting
of
7th Company and the Marine detachment of the USS Castine (PG-6), a total of
five
officers
and 104 Marines, counting Butler and Vandergrift. Butler's mission was to open
the
rail line (which no longer appears on modern maps) to the interior town of
Ennery,
approximately
30 kilometers inland.
Butler's problem was a Caco chief
named Rameau, a "General, in command of a
rabble
of thieves and vagabonds, squatting in the surrounding bushes," whom he
notified,
when
he arrived in Gonaives on 20 September 1915, that he would not tolerate any
interference
with the rail line or with the food supply for Gonaives. He also told Rameau,
through
the American consul, that he wanted to meet with him to give him the warning in
person. Before the meeting could come off, however,
Butler and several squads from 7th
Company
were off chasing Cacos who had been burning the rail line. By the time he
returned
to Gonaives, 24 hours later, Butler had chased the Cacos out of their
headquarters
in a small town named Poteaux, and had a chance to warn Rameau in
person. Rameau led about 450 Cacos, who, according
to Butler's report to Waller, "not
half
of whom had serviceable rifles."
Rameau came into Gonaives the following
morning,
the 22nd, and met with Butler who again repeated his warning, and offered
Rameau
money
for his guns and men.
The morning of the 23rd, Butler and
sixty Marines boarded a small train for
Ennery. The major problems encountered on the trip
were those repairing the damage
caused
by the Cacos, and it was 9:30 at night before the train reached Ennery. After hasty
repairs
to the locomotive, the Marines headed back to Gonaives, stopping briefly at
Potceaux
to discover that Rameau and his men "had left for their homes the morning
[sic]
and
that all was quiet."157
Major
Butler returned to the north on 9 October, landing from the USS Nashville
(PG-7)
at Fort Liberté with 15th Company, 2nd Regiment and several attached officers
from
the 11th. At the same time, reinforced
elements of 13th Company
occupied
Grande Riviere from Cap Haitien. Butler
expanded his operating area south to
Ouanaminthe,
routing Cacos out of several old French forts used as bases in the area.158
At
the same time, Colonel Waller was diplomatically disarming the old Haitian
army--about
750 from Fort Liberté and Ouanaminthe.
He also tried to bring in several
Caco
chiefs in the same manner.159 The
problem was that not all the Caco chiefs were
willing
to sign agreements with Waller nor be bought off.
First Regiment was now in position
to finish the war with the Cacos. Using
Major
Butler's battalion and elements of the USS Connecticut battalion, under
Butler's
command,
the Marines were in position by the end of October 1915 to remove Caco
bases
and forts from the north country and the border area with the Dominican
Republic.
In
a campaign that stretched from 9
October to 27 November 1915, Butler, at times
working
with 5th, 11th, 13th, and 23rd Companies as well as the 15th, plus the 2nd,
3rd,
and
4th Connecticut companies, destroyed four Caco camps and seven old French forts
used
as bases by the Cacos, destroyed 122 rifles, and reported 21 Cacos killed and at
least
10 wounded.160 An assault by Lt. Edward
A. Ostermann and six Marines of 15th
Company
seized old Fort Dipitié from about two dozen Cacos on the night of 24 October
1915.161 The campaign culminated in an assault on old
Fort Riviere under the cover of
automatic
rifles and machine guns and its capture after hand to hand fighting. A ton of
dynamite
was carried by mules to the fort to destroy it after its capture. While Butler did
not
report Caco casualties in the Fort Riviere assault, others present reported at
least 30
Cacos
dead.162 Other sources quote 50 dead
Cacos. In any case, Secretary of the
Navy
Josephus
Daniels telegraphed Caperton halting further operations. The campaign was
over
anyway.163 Second Regiment, besides
garrisoning and controlling Port au Prince,
apparently
secured the southern peninsula of Haiti through vigorous patrolling and
avoided
the sharp actions 1st Regiment experienced with the Cacos.164
Three enlisted men were reported
killed in the initial occupation of Haiti and one
officer
and 13 enlisted wounded.165 Two
officers and three enlisted men were awarded
Medals
of Honor for valor in the campaign.166
Nineteen Sixteen saw a shift in the
Marine forces in Haiti and in Santo Domingo
(now
the Dominican Republic), its neighbor on the island of Hispaniola. Various
companies
from 1st and 2nd Regiments were dispatched to the Dominican Republic
during
1916. In April, in a move to
rationalize the chain of command, all units in the
Dominican
Republic were subordinated to 1st Regiment, 2nd Provisional Brigade of
Marines;
and all units in Haiti were subordinated to 2nd Regiment, 1st Provisional
Brigade
of Marines. Second Regiment from this
point on represented all or most of the
"muscle"
for 1st Provisional Brigade of Marines.167
First Marine Brigade settled into a
normal
garrison routine.168
Building on resentments over the
corvée, an impressed labor system, a Caco
general
named Charlemagne started a Caco revolt in October 1918. Initially, the new
Gendarmerie
held off the rebels, but eventually they asked for help. First Marine
Brigade
was in a low strength period--barely battalion strength by World War II
standards--but
pitched in the defense of Port au Prince and participated in the aggressive
patrolling
of the north country and the Artibonite region that followed. Charlemagne
himself
was finally killed in 1919 by two Marine sergeants attached to the Gendarmerie
leading
a patrol of 12 Gendarmes in what amounted to a Special Operation (Annex C,
Appendix
10). The rebellion lingered on in the
Artibonite region, led by Benoit
Batraville,
and included a second assault on Port au Prince, before Benoit and his
followers
were hunted down in the border country and killed in May 1920. After the
death
of Benoit, most organized resistance from the Cacos ceased, although scattered
outlaws,
as they were often characterized, were skirmished with and captured up to the
end
of 1921. The campaign required the
enlargement of the 1st Provisional Brigade of
Marines
by 50%, and saw its first deployment of aircraft.169
The routine of 1st Provisional
Brigade of Marines after the Caco revolt soon
enough
returned to the norms of Caribbean garrison life.170 The strength of the 1st
Brigade
gradually waned to half that of a modern infantry battalion as commitments in
more
important areas drew away troops and resources from Haiti, reflecting service
realities
in a "tween wars" Marine Corps hard pressed for resources (see
Appendix 1).
Throughout its service in Haiti, 1st
Brigade endured incredible personnel and
command
turmoil. As can be seen in Appendix 1,
there were 18 brigade commanders in
19
years. Second Regiment had 22
commanders in the same period. Eighth
Regiment
had
nine commanders in six years. Even
allowing for the detachment of 1st Regiment to
Dominica
in early 1916, only two of six original companies of Marines were present in
mid-1917,
joined by five new companies. Two years
later, as the Caco revolt heated up,
six
new companies were added, and 8th Regiment was formed by the end of the year.
However,
by the mid-1920s, both regiments were ghosts of their former selves and 8th
Regiment
was deactivated 31 June 1925. That the
Brigade was able to quickly respond to
the
corvée crisis in 1919, to replace Gendarmes in the Hinche-Massaide region, and
then
to
lend effective support to the Gendarmerie during the early months of the Caco
revolt
appears,
at this distance, to be little short of miraculous. That the Brigade was able to
maintain
its professionalism, training, and discipline--most of the atrocity allegations
in
1919-21
were of Marines serving as Gendarmerie officers--is a tribute to the inherent
strengths
of the Marine Corps in those leans years between the World Wars.
The 1st Brigade played a very
limited role in the civil disturbances in
October-December
1929. The sole "combat", if
it can be called that, was the so-called
"Les
Cayes Massacre" when a section of Marines, defending themselves against a
mob of
some
1500, killed 12 and wounded another 23 rioters.171
Department of State
August 15, 1934
Statement
by the Secretary of State
Haiti:
Today the withdrawal of our Marine and naval forces from
Haiti is being
completed. Under an agreement between the two Governments of August
7, 1933, the Haitian Garde, which
has been trained and partly officered by
our Marines, would be turned over to
the complete command of Haitian
officers on October 1, 1934, and our Marine and naval
forces would be
withdrawn during the month of October. However, when President
Roosevelt visited Cap Haitien July 5
last, President Vincent [of Haiti]
requested that, if at all possible,
the date for carrying out these movements
should be advanced; and President Roosevelt stated that
we would
advance the date for turnover the command of the Garde to
August 1,
instead of October, and would
withdraw our forces from Haiti in the
following
fortnight. . . 172
Companies C and D, 2nd Marines were
transferred to the United States in July
1934.
Headquarters, 2nd Marines and Company B
were deactivated.173
Appendix
1: First Provisional Brigade of Marines
There have been a number of "1st
Provisional Brigade of Marines" in the history
of
the US Marine Corps, dating back to at least 1899, usually organized for
expeditionary
purposes. The early history of "1st Marine
Regiment" follows a similar pattern.
The first permanent Marine regiments were
organized in 1913 as part of the
Advance
Base Force. 1st and 2nd Marines were
originally designated 1st and 2nd
Regiments,
Advance Base Force Brigade. However,
except for one exercise, on the
island
of Culebra with the Atlantic Fleet in early 1914, both regiments would see more
service
as expeditionary regiments.
After returning to the United States in
late 1914, after duty in Vera Cruz, Mexico,
First
and Second Regiments were reequipped as fixed and mobile (base) defense
regiments,
respectively. According to the 1915
report of the Commandant of the Marine
Corps,
1st Regiment was to reorganize and reequip with four 5-inch gun companies, a
searchlight
company, an engineer company, a mine company, and an air defense
company. Second Regiment was split between the
Advanced Base Force base at the
Philadelphia
Navy Yard, Pensacola Naval Air Station, the New Orleans naval station, and
the
USS Washington (probably the 12th Company).
The Artillery Battalion (one wonders
why
they decided to maintain an artillery battalion of three 3-inch gun batteries
when 1st
Regiment
was to have four 5-inch (fixed) gun batteries) was stationed at the Naval
Academy. Nevertheless, the entire brigade would
deploy, in stages over July and August
1915,
as infantry regiments and an artillery battalion. "The force in Haiti
includes the
technical
companies which have been engaged in advance base training in
Philadelphia.
Owing
to this interruption in the training of the fixed defense force, its efficiency
as an
advance
base organization will be materially interfered with."
First Provisional Brigade of Marines were
apparently the first significant
deployed
Marine force to use motor transport for troops and artillery. A Marine aviation
squadron
deployed to Haiti in 1919 and was
attached to 1st Brigade. The
1919
Commandant's
report states the squadron, and a detachment in Santo Domingo were
performing
a wide variety of missions:
"Offensive operations with machine guns and
bombs;
reconnoitering, photographing, and photographic map making; contact patrols
and
cooperating with ground troops; quick transmission of messages, papers, and
officers;
regular mail service between different units." The Marine squadron, under
various
designations, would remain attached to 1st Brigade until it was withdrawn in
1934.174
August
1915:
1st Provisional Brigade
3rd Company (Signal)
1st
Regiment 2nd Regiment
1st Battalion 1st
Battalion
5th
Company 15th Company
11th
Company 16th
Company
19th
Company 17th Company
23rd
Company 2nd
Battalion
2nd Battalion 7th Company
4th Company 12th
Company
6th Company 20th
Company
22nd Company 24th
Company
USS Connecticut Battalion Marine Detachment, USS 1st
Conn. Company Washington
2nd Conn. Company
3rd Conn.
Company
4th Conn. Company
Marine Detachment, USS
Connecticut
Artillery Battalion
1st Company
9th
Company
13th
Company
Reported
Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (August 1915):
88 officers, 1,941 Marines.
September
1916:
1st
Provisional Brigade of Marines
2nd
Regiment
Naval
Detachment
1
& 2 Secs, 7th Company
1
& 2 Secs, 17th Company
16th
Company
18th
Company
19th
Company
20th
Company
22nd
Company
23rd
Company
(11th & 15th Companies detached;
10th Company to return to 2nd Regiment in
November.)
Reported
Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (December 1916): 61 officers, 1,020 Marines.
June
1917:
1st Provisional Brigade of Marines
2nd
Regiment
15th
Company
19th
Company
53rd
Company
54th
Company
57th
Company
64th
Company
65th
Company
Reported
Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (December 31, 1918): 64 officers, 884 Marines
(including
Gendarmerie detachment).
June
1919:
1st Provisional Brigade of Marines
2nd
Regiment
36th
Company
53rd
Company
54th
Company
57th
Company
64th
Company
65th
Company
100th
Company
148th
Company
153rd
Company
196th
Company
197th
Company
1st
Division, Squadron E, Marine Aviation Force (attached)
Reported
Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (July 1, 1919):
98 officers, 1,526 Marines
(including
Gendarmerie detachment).
December
1919:
1st Provisional Brigade of Marines
2nd Regiment 8th
Regiment
53rd Company 36th Company
54th Company 57th
Company
62nd Company 63rd
Company
64th Company 100th
Company
153rd Company 148th
Company
197th Company 196th
Company
Squadron
E, Marine Aviation (attached)
(Redesignated 4th Air Squadron, 1 January
1921)
Reported
Marine Corps Strength in Haiti (December 31, 1919): 83 officers, 1,261
Marines
(including Gendarmerie detachment).
July
1924:
1st Provisional Brigade of Marines
2nd Regiment 8th Regiment
53rd
Company 36th Company
54th
Company 57th Company
64th
Company 63rd Company
153rd
Company 100th Company
197th
Company 148th Company
196th
Company
Observation
Squadron No. 2 (VO-2M) (attached)
(redesignated 1 March 1923)
July
1925:
1st Provisional Brigade of Marines
2nd Regiment 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment
36th
Company 54th Company
53rd
Company (Machine Gun)
63rd
Company
64th
Company
VO-2M
(attached)
January
1933:
1st
Marine Brigade
2nd Marines
Company
B
Company
C
Company
D
VO-9M (attached) (redesignated 1 July 1927)
Commanders
1st
Provisional Brigade of Marines
Col Littleton W. T. Waller 15 Aug 1915 - 21 Nov 1916
BrigGen Eli K. Cole 22 Nov 1916 - 27 Nov 1917
Col John H. Russell 28 Nov 1917 - 6 Dec 1918
BrigGen Albertus W. Catlin 7 Dec 1918 - 14 Jul 1919
LtCol Louis McCarty Little 15 Jul 1919 - 1 Oct 1919
Col John H. Russell 2 Oct 1919 - 14 Jan 1922
Col George Van Orden 15 Jan 1922 - 28 Mar 1922
Col Theodore P. Kane 29 Mar 1922 - 15 Nov 1923
Col William N. McKelvy 16 Nov 1923 - 21 Jan 1924
BrigGen Ben H. Fuller 21 Jan 1924 - 11 Jun 1925
Col William N. McKelvy 12 Jun 1925 - 25 Jun 1925
Col Harold C. Snyder 26 Jun 1925 - 29 Jul 1925
BrigGen Ben H. Fuller 30 Jul 1925 - 7 Dec 1925
Col John T. Myers 8 Dec 1925 - 24 Jan 1928
Col Presley M. Rixey, Jr. 25 Jan 1928 - 22 Feb 1928
Col Louis M. Gulick 23 Feb 1928 - 24 Jun 1929
Col Richard M. Cutts 25 Jun 1929 - 11 May 1931
BrigGen Louis McCarty Little 3
Jun 1931 - 15 Aug 1934
1st
Regiment
Col Theodore P. Kane 8 Aug 1915 - 15 Aug 1915
Col Eli K. Cole 16
Aug - 8 May 1916
2nd
Regiment (later, 2nd Marines)
Col Eli K. Cole 31
Jul 1915 - 15 Aug 1915
Col Theodore P. Kane 16 Aug 1915 - 30 Jun 1916
Col Eli K. Cole 1
Jul 1916 - 30 Nov 1916
LtCol Philip M. Bannon 1 Dec 1916 - 10 Jan 1918
Maj Richard S. Hooker 11 Jan 1918 - 31 Mar 1918
Maj John W. Wadleigh 1 Apr 1918 - 28 Apr 1918
LtCol Richard S. Hooker 29 Apr 1918 - 20 Jul 1919
LtCol Thomas H. Brown 21 Jul 1919 - 2 Oct 1919
Col Randolph C. Barkeley 3 Oct 1919 - 20 Oct 1921
Col George Van Orden 21 Oct 1921 - 9 Jul 1923
Col William N. McKelvy 10 Jul 1923 - 10 Jun 1925
Maj Maurice E. Shearer 11 Jun 1925 - 30 Jun 1925
Col Harold C. Snyder 1 Jul 1925 - 8 Apr 1926
Col Macker Babb 9 Apr 1926 - 30 Jun 1927
Maj Archibald Young 1 Jul 1927 - 19 Aug 1927
Col Presley M. Rixey 20 Aug 1927 - 21 May 1929
Col Richard P. Williams 22 May 1929 - 30 May 1930
Col Edward B. Manwaring 31 May 1930 - 15 May 1932
Col Harry G. Bartlett 16 May 1932 - 16 Jun 1932
Col James T. Buttrick 17 Jun 1932 - 27 Dec 1933
Col Eli T. Fryer 28
Dec 1933 - 31 May 1934
Maj Samuel P. Budd 1 Jun 1934 - 15 Aug 1934
8th
Regiment
LtCol Thomas M. Clinton 17 Dec 1919 - 4 Jan 1920
LtCol Louis McCarty Little 5 Jan 1920 - 28 Jul 1920
LtCol Thomas M. Clinton 28 Jul 1920 - 19 Sep 1920
LtCol Louis McCarty Little 20 Sep 1920 - 30 Apr 1921
Col Dickinson P. Hall 1 May 1921 - 9 Apr 1923
Col James T. Bootes 9 Apr 1923 - 29 Apr 1923
LtCol Harry R. Lay 30 Apr 1923 - 30 May 1923
Col James T. Bootes 31 May 1923 - 20 Jul 1924
Col Harold C. Snyder 24 Jul 1924 - 31 Jun 1925
Artillery
Battalion
Maj Robert H. Dunlap 15 Aug 1915 - 17 May 1916
1st
Division, Squadron E, Marine Aviation Force (later 4th Air Squadron, VO-2M, and
VO-9M)
Capt. Harvey B. Sims 22 Feb 1919 - 30 Nov 1919
Capt Roy S. Geiger 1 Dec 1919 - 20 Jan 1921
Capt Arthur H. Page, Jr. 21 Jan 1921 - 28 Mar 1921
Maj Francis T. Evans 29 Mar 1921 - 4 Mar 1923
Capt. Louis M. Bourne 5 Mar 1923 - 12 Nov 1925
Maj Roy S. Geiger 13 Nov 1925 - 8 Jul 1927
Capt. Russell A. Presley 9 Jul 1927 - 28 Aug 1928
Maj Francis T. Evans 29 Aug 1928 - 2 Jul 1930
Maj James E. Davis 3 Jul 1930 - 15 May 1932
Maj James T. Moore
16 May 1932 - 15 Aug 1934175
Appendix
2: Ships of the 1915 Haitian Campaign..
Ship
Name Pennant Type Comments
United
States Ships176
USS
Connecticut* BB-18 Pre-Dreadnaught
Battleship
USS
Washington** CA-11 Armored Cruiser renamed USS Seattle,
November
1916
USS
Tennessee CA-10 Armored Cruiser renamed USS Memphis,
May 1916
USS
Castine PG-6 Gunboat
USS
Nashville PG-7 Gunboat
USS
Marietta PG-15 Gunboat
USS
Sacrament PG-19 Gunboat
USS
Eagle none Converted
Yacht
USS
Jason AC-12 Collier (Coal carrier)
USS
Osceola AT-48 Tug
USS
Solace AH-2 Hospital
Ship
Haitian
Ships177
Nord Alexis unknown Gunboat fate
unknown
if any
Pacifique unknown Gunboat Blown
ashore, August
if any 1915
_________________________________
*Not
believed assigned to Cruiser Squadron, US Atlantic Fleet, 1915.
**Flagship,
Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, Cruiser Squadron, US Atlantic Fleet.
Appendix
3: The Gendarmerie (Garde) d'Haiti,
1916-1934.
For the United States, the easiest
part of the Haitian-American Treaty to
implement
would be the requirement for an American-officered constabulary to establish
law
and order in Haiti. This would become
known as the Gendarmerie d'Haiti
From the documentary evidence, the
actual Gendarmerie Agreement appeared to
be
in some period of negotiation between the United States and Haiti. An original
English-language
draft, for example, set forth a requirement for 1,296 Gendarmes178,
while
the final document required 2100 (Annex C, Appendix 7). Additionally, the
American
officers in the original document would report to the Haitian Secretary of
State
for
the Interior, in the final document they report to the President of Haiti.
While the Gendarmerie agreement was
not officially signed until August 1916,
the
documentary evidence shows that the United States was actively recruiting and
organizing
a Gendarmerie in December 1915 and January 1916, using Article X of the
American-Haitian
Treaty as their authority (Annex C, Appendix 7). (The Gendarmerie
Agreement
would be renegotiated at least twice before the end of the Occupation (Annex
C,
Appendices 14 and 18)). By 1 February,
1916, the first Chef of the Gendarmerie,
Smedley
Butler and Colonel Waller felt they were in a position to take over the law
enforcement
mission.
The organization of the Gendarmerie
was completed by October 1916, and a total
of
117 Gendarmerie posts were established throughout the country. Four Gendarmerie
districts
were established in the country, consisting of Port au Prince, the Cape, the
Artibonite,
and the South. Eighteen Gendarmerie
companies were raised and were
roughly
divided amongst the four districts.
What amounted to a battalion (1st, 4th, and
17th
companies) garrisoned Port au Prince.179
A small coast guard of six officers,
eight petty officers, and 30 seamen was
authorized
by the original agreement. By 1921, a
force of four former-US Navy
submarine
chasers (relatively small, wooden patrol boats with a nominal anti-submarine
capability
[probably removed for the Haitians]) was in operation.180
Haitians were recruited as
volunteers, clothed in uniforms supplied by the Marine
Corps,
and provided with surplus American weapons (Krag rifles by most reports).
While
Butler would brag to the Senate investigating committee in 1921 that he was
able
to
recruit the best men in Haiti for the Gendarmerie, he was also forced to admit
that
initially
he had problems with disease in the ranks ("95 percent of them had blood
diseases
and 85 percent had intestinal worms") that had to be eradicated before the
troops
could
be effective.181
The Caco revolt of 1918-20 was the
Gendarmerie's first major crisis, and one
might
argue its finest hour. The initial Caco attacks initially fell on Gendarmerie
posts,
and
there are many reports of outnumbered gendarmes loyally defending their posts,
often
successfully, and in some cases bravely protecting their wounded Marine
officers. 182
Limited
offensive operation, particularly in the Artibonite, were conducted by small
Gendarmerie
units and their Marine offices. 183 Eventually, however, the Marine Brigade
had
to be called in to assist in a problem that had grown out of control.
Major A.S. Williams, Butler's
successor, was the man who had outlawed the
corvee'
(it was certain officers ignoring this order that led, in part to the
investigations of
1920-22
and, in some Marines' opinions, one of the primary causes of the Caco
revolt.)184
Colonel
Frederick M. ("Dopey") Wise, Williams, successor, found that the
Gendamerie
at
the height of the Caco revolt had been pretty much worn down and out:
I found
the Gendarmes in Port au Prince well drilled, well
uniformed, well armed. They had been the show troops of
my
predecessors. But outside of Port au Prince they were in
bad shape. Their
uniforms were in rags. Most of then were barefooted. Their rifles were a
joke. They were discarded Krags, most of them with the
sights knocked
off. If they hit a house at point-blank range with those
weapons they were
doing well. Their barracks were tumble-down. Their morale
was pretty
low..185
Colonel
Wise got money from the financial advisor for uniforms, barracks, an
increased
rations allowance, and new Springfield '03 rifles from the Marines. He spread
the
Marine standard of drill throughout the Gendarmerie and emphasized
marksmanship.
His
troops responded well, and became a significant fighting force.186 The special
operation
that killed Charlemagne, the principle Caco leader, was led by two Marine
enlisted
men serving as Gendarmerie officers, but also included 12 gendarmes; all their
intelligence
came from gendarme sources as well, including at least one man operating
under
cover with the Cacos (Annex C, Appendix 10).
The Gendarmerie Agreement of 1916
had been renegotiated in 1920 to allow for
easier
financial administration by the Chef of the Gendarmerie, although Colonel Wise
did
not receive everything he had wanted, and the ability of the Gendarmerie to
surge by
467
men in times of emergency, finances permitting. Established strength would still be
81
American officers, 383 Haitian non-commissioned officers, and 2100 gendarmes,
but
would
also now include 39 Haitian officers.187
(Annex C, Appendix 14) Soon
after
General
Russell arrived in Port au Prince as High commissioner, an Ecole Militare for
the
commissioning
of Haitian officers (capacity 12) was established in Port au Prince, with
a
Haitian officer as deputy to its American commander.188
One complaint about the Marine
officers up to the time of the Caco revolt
.
. . was that the ex-enlisted Garde officers were ill-educated, raw rankers,
an
accusation that during World War I, wen the best Marines of all ranks
were
going to France, was probably true. But
Russell's earliest effort was
to
upgrade this class of officer not only by diligent selection but by a
three-month
indoctrination course before the officers were passed for duty
with
the Garde. In 1930, 49 Garde officers
were college graduates; 51 had
high
school diplomas or some college courses.
That same year 85 spoke
French
and 92 also spoke Créole. The entire
group, 116 Americans in all,
averaged
over four years in Haiti and thirteen years in the Corps.189
Although the Gendarmerie (Garde
after 1928) was the local police force as well as
the
Haitian military, it had never received significant riot control training,
which is one of
the
reasons the Marines had to be called into handle the Les Cayes incident that
eventually
resulted in 12 deaths. Nevertheless,
General Russell could say in his final
report:
. . . the Garde d'Haiti is less than a fourth of the
numerical strength of the
old forces. An
officers' school as been created and a military career is
one which a self-respecting Haitian
can adopt. The men are modernly
housed, equipped, uniformed, educated if illiterate, and
paid $10.00 a
month, a suitable pay for Haitian conditions. Prisons are immaculately
clean and airy; buildings have workshop facilities. Graft has been
eliminated. A
modern accounting and purchasing system has been
introduced which has effected important economies. Due to supervision
by district commanders Haitian communal revenues,
previously dissipated
in graft and unwise expenditures, have greatly increased
and communal
administration strengthened. A reorganized medical department has more
than halved the death and disease rate among personnel
and prisoners. In
the first four years of the Occupation, the Garde also
carried over an
important road-building program.190
In 1930, General Russell reported a
force of 2,622 enlisted gendarmes, in a total
strength
of 3,460 (one gendarme for every 3.4 square miles and 690 inhabitants of Haiti);
36%
of its officers were Haitian, and the Ecole Militaire had graduated 17
aspirants the
previous
year. In addition to its police and
military duties, Russell reported the
following:
¨
Communications;
309.5 miles of telephone lines, 9 airfields built through Garde
labor.
¨
Police
services, fire and traffic control.
¨
communal
administration; Garde commanders were communal advisors and had to
supervise the collection and distribution of communal
revenues.
¨
Marksmanship;
a hitherto unknown Haitian military skill.
¨
Construction,
a four year program that resulted in 24 modified and eight new
outpost buildings.
¨
Coast
Guard, which also has the responsibility for 15 lighthouses and a buoy
system.191
A
lot of the Haitianization negotiations went into the Haitianization of
the Garde
(Annex C, appendix 19). On August 1, 1934, the completely
Haitianized Garde, with its
new
Haitian Commander, Colonel Démosthènes P. Calixte--the same Haitian who was
the
first Haitian deputy commander of the Ecole Militaire, saluted the Marine
Brigade as
it
left Port au Prince, and hoisted the Haitian flag over the former Marine
headquarters.
Gendarmerie
(Garde) d'Haiti Commanders, 1915-1934 (appointment as Haitian general of
division):
LtCol. Smedley D. Butler 3
Dec 1915-1 May 1918
Col. Alexander S. Williams 2 May 1918 - 18 Jul 1919
LtCol. Frederick M. Wise 19
Jul 1919 - 16 Jan 1921
LtCol. Richard S. Hooker 17 Jan 1921 - 14 Apr 1921
LtCol. Douglas C. McDougal 15 Apr 1921 - 11 Apr 1925
Col. Julius S. Turrill 12 Apr 1925 - 12 May 1927
Col. Frank E. Evans 18 May 1927 - 31 Mar 1930
Col. Richard P. Williams 1 Apr 1930 - 21 Jun 1933
LtCol. Clayton B. Vogel 22
Jun 1933 - 31 Jul 1934191
Annex
B: The Fiscal Case for Occupation.
One of the basic justifications for
the American intervention and occupation of
Haiti
was that Haiti was incapable of handling its own finances. The Senate committee
investigating
the United States Occupations of Haiti and Santo Domingo heard evidence
on
the finances of both countries.
John A. McIlhenny, financial advisor
to the government of Haiti (1919-1922),
presented
the US Government's case on the financial state of Haiti at the time of the
Occupation.
Fiscal
Year 1912-13 (Haitian fiscal years ran 1 October to 30 September):
Total
Revenues: $5,073,691.40
Debt
Service: 2,507,533.07
Balance
for all other expenses 2,506,138.33
Expended
on all other expenses
3,787,426.48
Deficit 1,281,288.15
Loan
(in partial coverage of the deficit)
607,902.76
The $600,000 loan was nominally at 6 2/3 per
cent interest; but as McIlhenny explained,
discounting
and exchange rate manipulations (favorite areas for graft in and around the
Haitian
Government) resulted in a drastically different picture.
The loan was issued at 94, meaning that
for every 100 dollars of the loan the
Haitian
government was liable for, it only would receive 94 to spend. In theory.
This
particular
loan would only accept payment at an exchange rate of 3.50 gourdes to the
dollar,
while the commercial rate for the gourde at the time of the loan was 4.70 to
the
dollar. So, translated into gourds, instead of 100
dollars discounted to 94 dollars (a
discount
rate of "94"); the loan really was at a rate of 470 gourdes,
discounted to 329.
The
real discount rate was therefore 61.
[My math comes out to 70.] Thus,
the Haitian
Government
was paying 6 2/3 per cent interest on a loan principle (in gourdes) of
2,857,142.97
gourdes, but only received an even 2 million gourdes to try to balance their
budget.
The $600,000 balance or so of the
1912-13 deficit was taken care of by a
"statutory
advance" from the Banque Nationale, which was required, by its concession,
to
hold
at the disposal of the Haitian Government.
Fiscal
year 1913-14:
Total revenues: $5,018,801.32
Debt
service: 4,231,091.31
Balance: 787,710.01
Other
Expenditures: 3,803,244.85
Deficit: 3,015,534.84
Three
loans totaling a little over $1 million partially covered the deficit, the
remainder of
the
deficit was covered by the Banque Nationale.
These internal loans were at the same 6
2/3
percentage rate as the loan for 1912-13, with the same legerdemain as that
loan:
Amount Nominal Loan Gourde Commercial Actual
of
Loan Discount Rate Gourde
Rate Discount
500,000
80 3.50
4.75 59
300,000 80 3.50
5.00 56
240,000
80 3.50
6.00 47
The balance of the deficit was
covered by still more loans from the Banque
Nationale
and by "unauthorized private loans, which now constitute claims of more or
less
doubtful validity." These loans to
private individuals were covered by the
government
by issuing "bons du tresor", denominated in either gold or gourdes
depending
on the issue. These bons de tresor were
also issued to cover government
salaries.
Fiscal
year 1914-15
Total
Revenue $3,311,548.14
Debt
Service
754,892.82
Balance
2,556,655.28
Other
Expenses 3,082,700.53
Deficit
526,045.25
The low debt service for 1914-15 was
because "a revolutionary government",
presumably
that of Guillaume Sam, "took revenue service away from the bank . . .
revenue
pledges disregarded . . . and only $754,892.82 was devoted to debt
service." So
in
1914-15, the new Guillaume Sam government ignored at least three quarters of
his new
government's
obligation to make debt service payments and was still unable to balance
the
budget. According to McIlhenny's
testimony, the government issue "paper flat
money"
worth 3 million gourdes (which at a nominal rate of 5 gourde to the dollar
would
barely
cover the year's deficit) and had the effect of pushing the gourde rate down to
9.90
to
the dollar.
Mr. McIlhenny's opening statement
concluded "the borrowing capacity of Haiti at
home
and abroad was exhausted. Its paper
money was practically worthless. For
four
years
it had been the scene of uninterrupted revolution."
During
these years [1911-1915] a large part of [the Haitian
Government's] running expenses had been left unpaid. Revenue pledges,
if observed, left an amount for other expenses than debt
services which
was only about 20 per cent of the amount required for
that purpose, and
the deficit could no longer be covered by loans, whether
internal or
external, or by issues of flat money. The closing of foreign markets by
war restrictions affecting Haiti's export products, and
practical cessation of
foreign commerce because of lack of maritime
transportation, resulted in
an enormous decrease in customs revenues, which then
constituted fully
95 per cent of the total revenue of the country. Financially and politically
Haiti was in a condition of complete collapse.
At
the time of the Intervention, Haiti was in arrears on three French loans (1875,
1896,
1910), for a total of over 12 million French francs on loans totaling over 120
million
francs. There were also another loan
covering "the interest coupon maturing May
15,
1915, on the external loan of 1910."
In May 1916, Admiral Caperton's revenue
collectors
made payments to the French Banque de l'Union Parisienne of just under
$300,000,
extinguishing the loan, and leaving Haiti of a small credit of just under
400,000
francs.
McIlhenny was asked about the public
debt of Haiti for the years 1919 and 1922,
and
he presented the balance sheets found in Appendix 1. It was noted by the Senate
panel
that Haiti's public debt had been reduced about $4.5 million between 1919 and
1922. This McIlhenny noted would be about $5
million if the value of his sinking funds
were
included. He did not call attention to
the fact that the external funded debt of Haiti
was
reduced from almost $26 million to $8.3 million in part because the exchange
rate for
the
French franc fell from 18 cents to 9½ cents.
McIlhenny then offered a short statement
on
"outstanding fiduciary" Haitian currency for the two years, remarking
that it, as a debt,
was
in addition to what was shown on the two balance sheets presented in Appendix
1.
Fiduciary
currency outstanding February 28, 1919:
Paper money
equivalent to............
$1,775,594.40
Nickel
coin equivalent to............
1,400,000.00
Copper
coin equivalent to.......... 49,000.00
$3,224,594.40
Less
revenue for retirement of paper money (Dec. 31,1918) 1,735,664.69
Net
debt on account of fiduciary currency... 1,488,929.71
Fiduciary
currency outstanding February 28, 1922:
Nickel
coin equivalent to..............
$1,400,000.00
Copper
coin equivalent to............. 49,000.00
$1,449,000.00
Less
reserve for retirement of nickel coin (Jan. 31, 1922)
Nickel
coin equivalent to............... 184,448.37
United
States currency................. 49,467.80
233,916.67
Present net debt on account of
fiduciary currency..
1,215,083.83
Reduction in net debt on account of fiduciary
currency 273,845.88
At the
request of the committee, McIlhenny then presented comparative
statements
of Haitian receipts and expenses.
Comparative statement of Haitian receipts and
expenses.
Receipts
Year Expenses1
Customs. Internal. Total
1911-12. $6,324,652.21 (2) $6,324,652.21 (3)
1912-12. 5,073,691.40 .... 5,073,691.41 ....
1913-14. 5,018,801.32 .... 5,018,801.32 ....
1914-15. 3,311,548.14 .... 3,311,548.14 ....
1915-16. 4,559,002.14 $109,878.38 4,668,880.52 ....
1916-17. 3,795,364.88 136,375.46 3,931,740.34 $3,350,471.58
1917-18. 3,178,022.53 154,245.14 3,332,267.67 2,922,999.49
1918-19. 5,747,117.43 216,761.87 5,963,880.30 2,818,486.84
1919-20. 6,421,000.41 374,820.28 6,795,820.69 4,080,373.25
1920-21. 3,606,173.00 360,102.42 3,966,275.42 3,819,625.70
1. Other than debt service, and including
certain expenses properly pertaining to past
years
as detailed in table below.
2. No separate record of internal revenue prior
to American intervention; amount was
negligible
and is probably in customs receipts.
3. There are no data to determine expenditures
to the first year shown.
Debt
Service. Other Expenses.
Year. Total.
External. Internal. Past. Current.
1912-13 $1,391,997.44 $1,175,555.63 .......
$3,787,426.48 $6,354,979.55
1912-14 3,199,310.71 1,031,780.59 ... 3,803,244.85 8,034,336.16
1914-15
511,002.35 243,890.51 ... 3,082,700.53 3,837,593.39
1915-16 1321,531.38
215,237.17 ... 2,227,358.36 2,764,126.91
1916-17 .... .... ... 3,350,471.58 3,350,471.58
1917-18. .... .... ... 2,922,999.49 2,922,999.49
1918-19 .... 2281,409.25
3$70,056.00 2,748,430.54 3,099,896.09
1919-20
43,000,000.00 549,000.00 ... 4,080,373.25 7,129,373.25
1920-21 62,896,789.00 7187,989.00 834,560.00 3,785,065.70 3,819,625.70
1. Including transfers by Admiral Caperton to
France in the amount of $296,715.06.
2. Composed of $181,981.25 interest on
indebtedness to Banque Nationale from Jan. 1,
1917
to Sept. 30, 1918, and $99,428 interest and amortization on short-term
Compaigne
Haitienne
de construction notes for the current year and from Oct. 1, 1919 to Feb. 29,
1920,
of the following fiscal year.
3. Composed of $41,120 arrears of P. C. S.
Railroad interest guaranty for balance of year
1916-17
and part of year 1917-18, and $28,936.30 arrears of wharfage pledged to Wharf
Co.
of Port au Prince for the fiscal years from 1915-16 to 1917-18.
4. For arrears of interest to Dec. 31, 1919.
5. For interest on the short-term Compaignie
Haitienne de Construction notes for the
balance
of the current year from Mar. 1 to Sept. 20, 1920.
6. Composed of $2,200,000 for arrears of
interest and amortization to Sept. 30, 1920, and
$695,789.47
for service of current fiscal year.
7. Composed of $84,000 interest and
amortization on the short-term Compaigne
Haitienne
de construction notes for the current year, and $103,989.29 interest on the
note
to
the Banque Nationale for the fiscal year 1918-19.
8. Arrears of P. C. S. Railroad interest
guaranty for balance of fiscal year 1917-18.
Amounts shown under
"Current" above are amounts actually paid for those years.
Some
items of current expense not paid during year accrued, thus total of
"Past" and
"Current"
columns show a more accurate basis of comparison of amounts available for
debt
service after other expenses:
1913-14.......$1,231,374.84 1917-18...... $409,268.18
1914-15....... 228,847.61 1918-19......3,145,393.46
1915-16.......
2,441,522.61 1919-20......2,715,447.44
1916-17....... 581,268.76 1920-21...... 146,649.72
Average
of last 10, 5, and 3 years of the receipts, expenses, and amounts available for
debt
service:
Available
Receipts. Expenses for
debts.
Last
10 years..... $4,838,745.80 ..... ...
Last
5 years..... 4,797,996.88 $3,398,391.37 $1,399,605.21
Last
3 years ...... 5,575,325.47 3,572,828.60
2,002,496.87
_______________________________________________________________________________
Under
the [1922] loan project, the following amounts would be required [annually]:
$16 million external
debt..................................
1$1,110,000
$5 million
internal............................................... 350,000
1$1,460,000
1. Increasing at the annual rate of $5,000.
According
to McIlhenny's testimony, the Haitian budget for ordinary expenses
had
been $3,481,064.43, excluding debt service, since fiscal year 1919-20. Over the two
year
period since that first fiscal year, it had been necessary to seek
extraordinary or
supplemental
credits for emergencies such as, in the previous year, fighting a small pox
epidemic,
$48,000; fires, $2,000; League of Nations [dues?], $10,000; fire protection
system
for Port au Prince, $10,000; purchase of real property, $10,000; supply
purchase
fund,
$15,000; water system for Port au Prince, over $20,000; geodetic survey,
$25,000.
Nevertheless,
McIlhenny thought that the current year budget could be kept within the
allotted
$3,481,064.43. Added to that the
projected $1,460,000 for debt service under the
loan
project, then the revenue requirement to meet Haiti's annual expenses would be
$4,
941,064.43.
To this, would have to be added the
annual interest and sinking fund guaranty on
the
national railroad bonds, a further $248,120.71. This would bring the total revenue
requirements
to $5,189,185.14.
"This amount is well within the
average receipts of the last three years, but is
more
than the average receipts for the past five years." McIlhenny pointed out the five
year
average was thrown off by World War I, and given the current increases over
previous
years in customs receipts, he would anticipate that total annual revenues would
amount
to some $6 million.
In response to a question about
customs duties, McIlhenny said that coffee
exports,
which was about 95% of Haitian exports at the time, had a export duty of 32%,
or
three cents gold per pound. At current
prices, the export duty did not effect exports to
France,
but combined with the United States import duties, it was priced out of the
coffee
markets
by Brazilian and Santos coffees.
McIlhenny said his goal was to reduce the
export
duty on the coffee, which adversely effected the Haitian peasant, by increasing
the
internal
revenue of Haiti.
Apparently there was no internal
revenue collection in Haiti prior to the U. S.
Occupation,
although some laws were on the books.
While the Occupation was not
responsible
for the collection of internal taxes, the Haitians had made some effort for
their
collection under U. S. urging. It
turned out that McIlhenny had had to go to the
Banque
Nationale for the records of tax collections because the Haitian treasury
didn't
keep
such records. Discovering that internal
revenue taxes were due on the rental of
government
property, McIlhenny approached the responsible Ministry of the Interior
official
for the records, the man told McIlhenny that the he had stopping keeping the
records
about fours prior because they were too much trouble to keep. So in many cases,
McIlhenny
had no way of finding out just what the Haitian government was legitimately
owed,
and so even if he had wanted to lower tariffs to help Haitian exports, he
couldn't do
so
until he could figure out what the Haitian government was owed for the laws
already
on
the books. In another case, the Banque
Nationale had records of $41,000 for
collections
for laws that McIlhenny could not find on the books (other testimony held that
they
were an income tax and transfer stamps based on a law passed in 1907 and modified
in
1913.)192
When McIlhenny's testimony resumed
on 15 March, 1922, questioning began
with
expenditures for the maintenance of the government, based on an estimated $6
million
government revenue. The following
figures are from a memorandum read to the
committee
by McIlhenny.
Present
actual annual cost of debt service (including amortization only in the cases of
the
external
loans and in the Compaigne Haitienne de Construction short term notes):
External
funded debt, 6,952,097.21 francs @ 9½
cents.............................$660,449.23
Internal
loans of 1912 and 1913................................................ 44,885.63
Internal
loans of 1914.......................................................... 104,353.82
Banque
Nationale short-term note................................................. 103,989.29
Irrigation
and market Cayes.................................................... 4,392.22
Sambour
commission1............................................................. 66,677.05
Bons
Fouchard................................................................ 939.59
Compaigne
Haitienne de Construction............................................... 84,000.00
1,069,686.83
1. The Sambour Commission adjudicated a
floating debt, and bonded it at 6 per cent.
Although
the bonds were never issued, the 6 per cent interest was due annually on the
amount.
The above figures did not include
the debts for the Haitian railroad company.
Part
of
this was because of the different funding schemes over the years yielded
internal as
well
as external debts, financed at variable rates of interest between 6 and 6 2/3
percent.
Total
internal and floating debt came to over $10 million as of 28 February
1922. Based
on
that figure, McIlhenny figured the debt service as:
Service
of internal debt; interest, 6 per cent; and amortization, 1
percent........................................................$753,860.23
Service of external debt, 6,952,097.21 francs
at par, 19.3
cents........................................................1,341,854.56
(It
must be remembered that McIlhenny was still promoting his debt consolidation
plan,
which
would most commonly be known as the 1922-23 loan plan) According to
McIlhenny,
his debt consolidation plan compared favorably with this at:
$16,000,000
external series.................................................... $1,110,000
$5,000,000
internal series, interest 6 per cent and amortization 1 per cent.... 350,000
Total cost of debt service under refunding plan... 1,460,000
However, McIlhenny's figures got
worse when he figured the current external debt
(denominated
in French francs) at the current exchange rate for the franc (9½ cents) as
opposed
to the "at par" rate (19.3 cents):
Service
of internal debt, as above........................................... $753,860.23
Service
of external debt, at the current exchange rate.........................
660,449.23
Total
approximate cost of present debt service at current rate of
exchange............................................1,414,309.46
While the current exchange rate
brought total debt service about $46,000 under
the
refunding plan, McIlhenny advised not depending on the continued devaluation of
the
franc
and going ahead with the refunding plan.
He was still arguing for anything that
would
reduce the import/ export tax burden, which McIlhenny said was born entirely by
the
peasant class.
The Senators' questioning then
turned to the national railroad, which McIlhenny
said
was $1,700,071.29 in interest arrears, plus $230,407.77 in arrears for the
sinking
fund,
for a total of $1,930,479.06.
Apparently, the Haitian government, before the
Occupation,
got itself into a contract with the railroad company where it was required to
pay
"kilometric guaranties", in effect, it had to guarantee the interest
on bonds that the
railroad
company issue upon the completion of every 20 kilometers of line ($20,000 per
kilometer). In other words, since a total of 177
kilometers (!) of railroad had been
completed,
the Haitian Government was responsible for the interest on $3,544,581.60 par
value
of outstanding railroad bonds. Normal
annual charge were for $212,674.90 for
interest
and $5,445.81 for amortization, meaning that the Haitian government was almost
nine
years in arrears. The debt still stood,
however, despite the fact that the railroad had
never
produced any income for the Haitian government, and it had been recently
decided
by
its engineers that the current planned route had been in error.
Finally, on the 19th, McIlhenny
responded to questions about the internal revenue
fees. McIlhenny had originally taken the estimate
of the Ministers of the Interior and
Finance
that revenues from the rentals of government land would be $9,000; the actual
amount
turned out to be $23,473, even through there were no assessment rolls or other
accounting
devices to actually check where the money came from.
Consular fees were another area
where the estimates fell well short of the actual
"product". For 1919-20, the estimate was $2,000 and the
product was really $9,686.71.
This
is despite the fact that the amount actually collected, in Cuba at least, was
much
higher. It turns out that the Haitian counsels
collected $2 from each Haitian laborer that
went
to Cuba to work. In 1919-20, 29,181
Haitians went to Cuba to work. Of their
$2,
one
dollar went to the counsel, one dollar was supposed to be sent to Haiti for the
Government. However, only $1,984 in consular fees came
in from Cuba in 1919-20, less
than
7% of what was supposed to have been collected.194
Appendix
1: Public Debt of Haiti, 1919 vs. 1922.
Public
debt of the Republic of Haiti.
Condition as of February 28, 1919.
Appendix
2: Import and Export Figures, Fiscal
Year 1918-19.
Click
here to view image
Appendix
3: Haitian Government Expenses since
Fiscal Year 1914-15.
1. Sanitation (under the department of war), FY 1914-15
Salaries for
hospitals.......................$7,666.80
Supplies for
hospitals....................... 1,200.00
Rations for
hospitals........................ 4,668.00
13,534.80
Since the Occupation, hospital expenses
1916-17 (estimated) $60,000
1917-18 177,974.15
1918-19 191,751.34
1919-20 267,718.26
1920-211 308,296.46
1921-22 (appropriated) 268,200.00.
1. Expenses in 1920-21 were abnormally high due
to a smallpox epidemic which cost
about
$48,000 to fight.
2. Public Works, Fiscal Year 1914-15
Repair of public buildings $8,000
Repair of public roads 6,000
Repair of prisons 7,000
Repair of bridges 6,000
Repair of wharves, etc. 7,000
Nothing in 1914-15 was appropriated
for construction. Since the Occupation,
"repair
of prison" was included under Gendarmerie allocations for maintenance and
repair
of prisons.
Public
works appropriation, FY 1919-20:
Construction and repair of public
buildings $24,000
Repair and maintenance of streets,
etc. 68,400
Irrigation, etc. 24,000
Ports, harbors, wharves and quays 9,600
Public roads, bridges, etc. 180,000
Construction of school buildings,
etc.
12,000
Current expenditures did not include
special projects like repaving the streets of
Port
au Prince, or the rebuilding of the Presidential Palace, both of which had been
completed
by 1921. In his testimony, McIlhenny
gave the past four years expenditures
for
public works:
1917-18......$329,476.81 1919-20......$639,936.05
1918-19......
451,288.07 1920-21...... 526,925.63
3. Education.
The Haitian 1914-15 appropriation for education was $23,016.80; no
figures
were available as to their actual expenditures. Budget appropriations in 1919-20,
kept
education at roughly $400,000, even though the salaries of Haitian teachers
were
raised
25% in 1919. In 1917, the Occupation
contracted a Mr. Bourgeois as
superintendent
of education. His contract was
terminated in 1920. In his final
report, Mr.
Bourgeois
said the $360,000 that the Occupation was spending on education in Haiti was
being
thrown away because of the incompetence of the entire system.
4. Justice.
In 1914-15, the appropriation was $192,438, and again McIlhenny could
only
assume
the money was spent. In 1919-20 and
1920-21, the appropriation had been fixed
at
$245,759.
5. Government Operations. No figures for the period prior to the
Occupation apparently
exist. In 1915-16, under Admiral Caperton's
administration, the Haitian government was
allotted
$100,000 a month for governmental expenses.
Since then their annual expenses
have
climbed slightly, partially because of a 19% pay increase for clerical workers
approved
in 1919.
1917-18...........$1,109,577.77 1919-20.............$1,698,049.34
1918-19............
1,161,374.26 1920-21............. 1,401,100.69198
Annex
C: Documents Relating to the United
States Occupation of Haiti, 1915 - 1934.
These
documents have been arranged as a series of appendices, which follows. Footnotes
as
to the source of the documents are at the end of the paper. If particular documents
were
submitted as evidence to the 1921-22 Senate Committee investigating the
occupations
of Haiti and Santo Domingo, there will be a note preceding the document as
to
who submitted the document and when.
Editorial and clarifying remarks, including
ship
pennant numbers, are in brackets--[ ].
Editing and formatting are as close to the
original
document as is possible in this format.
Ship pennant numbers are from
Silverstone,
U.S. Warships of World War I.
Appendix
1: Admiral Caperton's Original
Instructions for
Haiti
Appendix 2: The Evolution of Admiral Caperton's
Authorization
to Land Troops in Haiti
Appendix 3: Admiral Caperton's Campaign Guidance to
1st
Provisional Brigade of Marines
Appendix 4, The United States Take-Over of
Haitian
Customs, Financial, and Civil
Administration.
Appendix 5: Proclamation of Martial Law in Haiti
Appendix 6: The 1915 Haitian-American Treaty, with
Extension (1917)
Appendix 7: The 1916 Gendarmerie Agreement and
Supporting Documents
Appendix 8: President
Dartiguenave's Decrees of 5 April
1916.
Appendix 9: The 1918 Haitian Constitution (Marine
Corps Translation)
Appendix 10: The Official Report of
the Death of
Charlemagne
Appendix 11: Major General Commandant Barnett's Initial
Correspondence About Alleged
Indiscriminate Killings of Haitians.
Appendix 12: Results of Major General Commandant
Lejeune's Investigation into Alleged
Indiscriminate Killings of Haitians
Appendix 13: Report of the Mayo Court of Inquiry,
the
Final Report on Caco Casualties, and
Reports of Military Justice
Proceedings.
Appendix 14: Correspondence Between Commandant of
the Gendarmerie d'Haiti and the
Financial
Advisor to Haiti regarding Changes
in the
1916 Gendarmerie Agreement
Appendix 15: Diplomatic
Messages Concerning
Legislative Elections in Haiti, 1921
Appendix 16: State Department Memo to President
Harding Regarding Progress of the US
Occupation of Haiti
Appendix 17: The
1922-23 Haitian Loan Plan
Appendix 18: The 1925 Gendarmerie Agreement.
Appendix 19: Haitianization
and Withdrawal Agreements
Appendix
1: Admiral Caperton's Original
Instructions for Haiti
Presented
by Admiral Caperton as evidence before Senate investigating committee, 11
October
1921.
January 5, 1915
To: Commander Cruiser Squadron, United States
Atlantic Fleet, USS Washington,
flagship,
via Commander in Chief United States
Atlantic Fleet.
Subject: Movement orders--Washington
1.
On January 10, or as soon thereafter as practicable, proceed with the
Washington
to San Domingo City, S. D., stopping at such ports en route as may be
necessary
for coal and men.
2.
Upon arrival at San Domingo City, S. D., communicate with the diplomatic
representative
of the United States and acquaint yourself with the political conditions in
San
Domingo.
3.
After such length of stay at San Domingo City as you may deem necessary
for
the
purpose indicated, proceed to Port au Prince, Haiti, where you will also
communicate
with
the American minister and acquaint yourself with the political conditions in
Haiti.
After
such length of stay at Port au Prince as you may consider advisable, proceed to
Habana
[sic], Cuba, via Guantanamo, for coal and stores, at discretion.
4.
Upon arrival at Habana, communicate with the American minister and
acquaint
yourself
with the political conditions existing in Cuba.
5.
After such length of stay at Habana as you may consider necessary for
the
purpose,
proceed with the Washington to Vera Cruz, via Tampico and Tuxpam,
acquainting
yourself in each locality with the political conditions in Mexico.
6.
The department desires that you conduct a military inspection of such units
of
your
command as the Washington may fall in with from time to time and as opportunity
offers.
7.
The department will be pleased to receive any suggestions or
recommendations
you
may consider it necessary to make in connection with the political situation in
West
Indian
and Mexican waters.
Josephus
Daniels199
Radiogram,
19 January 1915: Rush. Ten p. m.
Tuesday. Department directs you
proceed
Cape Haitien, Haiti, without delay to report conditions. Under what orders did
you
sail to-day for Guacanayabo [sic], Gulf of Cuba.
Fletcher.200
Appendix
2: The Evolution of Admiral Caperton's
Authorization to Land Troops in Haiti
Presented
by Admiral Caperton as evidence before Senate investigating committee, 11
and
12 October 1921. All cables and
radiograms are addressed to Admiral Caperton
unless
stated otherwise.
Radiogram
[undated; probably about 2 July 1915]:
French Marines landed Cape Haitien.
Proceed
there with USS Washington, thank French commander, take necessary steps
protect
property and preserve order. Dispose of
vessels on Mexican coast to best
advantage. USS Marietta en route to Vera Cruz.
(signed) Daniels201
Cablegram
[27 July 1915]: Guillaume in French
legation. Revolutionists in entire
control
of city. Outgoing government shot 70
[sic] political prisoners in their cells,
including
ex-President, on account of which trouble is feared. Large number of soldiers
killed
and wounded in fighting this morning.
Not known at present in whose favor is
movement. City quiet, but under circumstances your
presence and American ship
desired.
Davis, Chargé d'Affaires202
Cablegram
[27 July 1915]: French legation
threatened. Forcible entry attempted
for the
purpose
of taking out president. English Chargé
and French Minister have cabled for
ships. Situation very grave, and presence of
warship as soon as possible necessary.
Davis203
Radiogram
[27 July 1915 to the Secretary of the Navy]:
Cable dispatch from Port au
Prince
reports a revolutionary faction attacked the Arrondissement and palace at Port
au
Prince
Tuesday morning, and has overthrown Guillaume government. Revolutionary
faction
now controls city. Government
officials, including Guillaume, have taken refuge
in
French and Dominican legations. Leader
of revolution not yet known. American
legation
at Port au Prince reports outgoing government shot 70 political prisoners,
including
ex-President Zamor, and a large number of soldiers killed and wounded in
fight. Latest cablegram from American legation just
received as follows: 'French
legation
threatened and forcible entry attempted for the purpose of taking out
president.
English
Chargé and French Minister have cabled for ships. Situation very grave.'
Cape
Haitien
at present quiet but growing uneasy.
Gen. Blot [Bobo-ist general who seized Cap
Haitien
earlier] received message from Port au Prince, stating revolutionists had
control
of
city, and asked him to join them. This
message signed by Delva, Polynice, Delinois,
Robin,
Etienne, and Delacourt and Zamor. Have
withdrawn detachment from shore and
am
proceeding with Washington to Port au Prince.
Am leaving Eagle to tend situation
Cape
Haitien. Have requested marine company,
naval station, Guantanamo Bay, stand by
to
embark on Jason for expeditionary service in Haiti; unless otherwise directed
will use
this
company to reinforce [sic] Washington's battalion if situation requires.
[Caperton]204
Radiogram
[28 July 1915 to Secretary of the Navy]:
Dominican legation violated
Tuesday; Gen. Oscar, chief of Arrondissement,
forcibly removed and killed. At about
10:30
this morning French legation invaded by mob of about 60 Haitian, better class;
President
Guillaume forcibly removed from upstairs room and killed at legation gate, and
body
cut in pieces and paraded about town.
No government or authority in city.
Many
rival
leaders in town. Am landing force in
city for purpose preventing further rioting and
for
protection foreign lives and property, and to preserve order. Have directed naval
station
Guantanamo, Cuba, to send company of marines Port au Prince. Account large
city,
will require regiment of marines from United States at once for
patrolling. Suggest
USS
Montana [CA-13], USS North Carolina [CA-12], or USS Tennessee as transport.
Caperton205
Radiogram
[3:00 p. m., 28 July 1915, from the Acting Secretary of the Navy]: State
Department
desires that American forces be landed at Port au Prince and that American
and
foreign interests be protected; that representatives of England and France be
informed
of
this intention--informed that their interests will be protected and that they
be requested
not
to land. In acting on this request be
guided by your knowledge of present conditions
in
Port au Prince and act at discretion.
Department has ordered Jason, with marines at
Guantanamo
Bay, to proceed immediately to Port au Prince.
If more forces are
absolutely
necessary, wire immediately.206
Radiogram
[28 July 1915 to Secretary of the Navy]:
Landing at Port au Prince decided
on
after consulting with American chargé d'Affaires, French Minister, and British
chargé
d'Affaires. Informed Gen. Polynice and three others
[Haitian revolutionaries in apparent
control
in Port au Prince], who seemed to be leaders ashore, of my intention to land
and
protect
lives and property and preserve order.
They assented to this landing but said they
could
not guarantee peaceful entry, but would do all they could to explain our
intentions
to
the populace and prevent disturbances and would cooperate with us. Descartes
(French
Warship) expected tonight. No foreign
men-of-war in harbor excepting
Washington
at present. Considered immediate
landing necessary. Landing made at
Biszoton
with two companies of marines and three companies of seamen at 5:30 p. m.
USS
Eagle reports conditions Cape Haitien quiet.
Eagle has landed 20 men Cape Haitien
to
protect French consulate for fear of attack on refugees there. Landing at request of
French
consul.
Caperton207
Radiogram
[11:20 a. m., 29 July 1915 to Secretary of Navy and Commander in Chief, US
Atlantic
Fleet]: Landing force established in
city. Slight resistance during early
part of
night
as advance was being made. This
resistance easily overcome. No
casualties our
forces. As there is no government or authority in
town, am required assume military
control
in city. Am proceeding disarm bodies
Haitian soldiers and civilians to-day.
Can
not
see now this can develop into any other than absolute military control of
city.
Regiment
of marines absolutely necessary, and should be sent at once. Two Haitian
gunboats
at Cape Haitien and most of army in that vicinity. Earnestly recommend USS
Nashville
be ordered take charge situation Cape
Haitien and that USS Castine be made
available
as soon as possible.
Caperton208
Radiogram
[30 July 1915]: The department appreciates
the excellent manner in which
disturbance
at Port au Prince has been handled and directs that you retain military control
of
city until further orders. Acknowledge.
Daniels209
Radiogram
[31 July 1915 to Secretary of the Navy]:
Port au Prince quiet during day, but
still
unsettled. French minister informed me
he had received dispatches from Paris,
France,
Government stating that French Embassy, Washington, had been directed inform
United
States Government that France considered landing legation guard at Port au
Prince
necessity
for national honor. French minister
repeated his conviction that we were ably
protecting
life and property and assured me his guard would be confined to legation and
that
arms of French guard would not be carried by them outside of legation. He further
stated
that he wishes it understood he does not intend interfering in any way my
actions
in
town. Press dispatches received to-day
from United States indicate State Department
evidently
thinks de facto government exists Port au Prince. No de facto government
exists
Port au Prince. All government
functions at present undertaken carried on by
committee
citizens acting practically under my direction. Chamber deputies asked
permission
elect president, but deferred in compliance my request. Time for election
President
not propitious for maintaining law and order.
USS Eagle reporting heavy firing
outside
Cape Haitien; reports Bobo will attempt
enter Cape Haitien. Blot in control
there
at
present. Blot has taken Gonaives,
Haiti. Army in north menace peace and
order, both
Port
au Prince and Cape Haitien. May have to
occupy Cape Haitien. Department may
expect
request for another regiment of marines.
Caperton210
Radiogram
[about 31 July 1915, from USS Nashville, Cap Haitien]: Blot left on
Pacifique,
some other gentlemen on Nord Alexis, also some troops. Have landed and
taken
charge. Will prevent entering of armed
persons until some leader can take charge.
Blot
troops from country entered town 6 a. m., Wednesday; some firing. Have now gone
back
country. At present all quiet in town;
expect Bobo will try to come in.
(signed)
Olmstead211
Radiogram
[2 August 1915, to the Secretary of the Navy]:
Large number Haitian
revolutions,
largely due existing professional soldiers called Cacos, organized in bands
under
lawless, irresponsible chiefs, who fight on side offering greatest inducement
and
but
nominally recognize the government.
Cacos are feared by all Haitians and practically
control
politics. About 1,500 Cacos now in Port
au Prince, ostensibly disarmed, but
retain
organization and believed to have arms and ammunition hidden. They have
demanded
election Bobo President, and Congress, terrorized by mere demand, is on point
complying,
but restrained by my request. Present
condition no other man can be elected
account
fear Cacos. Believe can control
Congress. Can prevent any Cacos
outbreak in
Port
au Prince after arrival regiment of marines USS Connecticut. Stable
government
not
possible in Haiti until Cacos are disbanded and power broken. Such action now
imperative
at Port au Prince if United States desires to negotiate treaty for financial
control
Haiti. To accomplish this must have
regiment of marines in addition to that on
Connecticut. Majority populace well disposed and
submissive, and will welcome
disbanding
Cacos and stopping revolutions. Should
agreement with Haiti be desired,
recommend
Capt. Beach, USN, be appointed single commissioner for United States, with
full
instructions and authority. He has
conducted my negotiations on shore, and I believe
has
confidence generally of Haitians. As
further relations between United States and
Haiti
depend largely on course of action taken at this time, earnestly request to be
fully
informed
of policy of United States
Caperton212
Appendix
3: Admiral Caperton's Campaign Guidance
to 1st Provisional Brigade of
Marines
Presented
by Admiral Caperton as evidence before Senate investigating committee, 11,
12,
and 19 October 1921.
No.
7645-15
Cruiser Squadron
United States Atlantic Fleet
U. S. S. "Washington," Flagship
Port au Prince, Haiti, August 15, 1915--1:30pm
Campaign
Order No. 8
Forces:
(a)
Northern detachment, Capt. E. H. Durell; Connecticut, Nashville, First
Regiment
marines, less Second Battalion and band; (b) main body, Washington, Castine,
Eagle,
First Brigade marines, less one battalion.
1. No further news.
2. This force will maintain military control of
Port au Prince and Cape Hatien
[sic]
pending negotiations United States and Haiti.
3. (a)
Northern detachment, maintain military control Cape Hatien; (b) main
body
will maintain military control Port au Prince.
Troops on shore maintain military
control
Port au Prince and sufficient outlying territory to insure food supply for
city.
Occupy
St. Marc, Leogane, and Petionville.
Washington
remain Port au Prince and support main body of troops.
Castine
patrol coast St. Marc to Gonaives, both inclusive. Support troops St.
Marc
and vicinity.
Eagle
patrol coast Leogane to Miragoane, both inclusive. Support troops Leogane
and
vicinity.
Protect
life and property and preserve order.
4. Base is at Guantanamo Bay. Osceola will carry mail, stores, and provisions
between
various detachments and base. Jason and Solace remain Port au Prince for
the
present.
5. Squadron commander on Washington. Make 8am and 8pm daily reports and at
such
other times as may be necessary to keep squadron commander fully and frequently
informed
of situation. Use seventy-fifth
meridian mean time.
W.
B. Caperton
Rear Admiral; Commander, Cruiser
Squadron,
Commanding
United States Forces in Haitian Waters.
Copies
to: Operations, commander in chief,
Washington, Connecticut, Tennessee,
Castine,
Nashville, Eagle, commandant Guantanamo.
Extracts to Solace, Jason; commander
First Brigade; commander First
Regiment.213
No.
7644-15
Cruiser Squadron,
United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. "Washington," Flagship
Port au Prince, Haiti, August 15, 1915
From: Commander cruiser squadron, United States
Atlantic Fleet, commanding
United States forces in Haitian
waters.
To: Col. Littleton W. T. Waller, United States
Marine Corps.
Subject: Letter of instructions.
1.
The commander cruiser squadron has assumed military control of the
cities of
Port
au Prince and Cape Haitien. A national
government has just been formed at Port au
Prince
with Dartiguenave as President, and this Government is now organizing and
assuming
control of civil affairs throughout Haiti.
Important negotiations are going on
between
the United States and Haiti, of which you will be kept informed.
2.
It is my intention to support the present Haitian Government and to
carry on
negotiations
with it, while maintaining military control of the cities of Port au Prince and
Cape
Haitien.
3.
You will maintain military control of the city of Port au Prince and of
such
outlying
territory as may be necessary to insure food supply for the city, and will
protect
life,
and property and preserve order.
4.
The employment of the forces in Haitian waters will be as given in
campaign
order
No. 8. You personally will have direct
charge of the troops at Port au Prince and
vicinity. Col. Eli E. Cole will have charge of the
troops at Cape Haitien.
5.
I will directly, in conjunction with the American chargé d'Affaires,
carry on the
negotiations
and have charge of the important relations with the Haitien officials. These
duties
will be carried on by me, either personally or through members of my staff.
W. B. Caperton214
[4
September 1915]
From: American Chargé d'Affaires, San Domingo
To: Commander cruiser squadron.
Have reliable information that deposits
of munitions of war being made in Haiti at
following
places on border mountain near town of Bourg St. Louis or Mirebelais, houses
in
towns of Fonds Parisien and La Mission or Fonds Verettes; the latter place can
be
reached
via railroad and Lake el Fondo.
Johnson,
American Chargé215
September
4, 1915.
From:
Commander cruiser squadron.
To: Secretary of the Navy and Commander in
Chief.
Caco situation north Haiti becoming critical. These Cacos will not come within
our
lines and surrender arms and disband on account leaders who are endeavoring to
obtain
exorbitant bribes. Liberal offer of 15
gourdes per soldier and 100 gourdes per
chief
to pay for their rifles and give them sufficient money to return to their homes
not
accepted
after repeated efforts both through channels in north and through their leaders
in
Port
au Prince. These Cacos have again begun
infesting Cape Haitien [sic] and are
preventing
market people and foodstuffs entering town.
Believe furnishing work on
railroad
construction vicinity Cape Haitien as recommended in my radiogram 16029
might
induce many men to desert their chiefs and go to work. Unless prompt measures
are
taken in this connection will be forced to consider very soon offensive
operations
against
these Cacos. 11504.
Caperton216
CRUISER
SQUADRON, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
USS Washington, Flagship,
Port au Prince, Haiti, September 5,
1915--10 a. m.
Campaign
order No. 9
(a)
First detachment.--Capt. E. H. Durell, Connecticut, Nashville. First Regiment
Infantry,
less Second Battalion, one battery Field Artillery.
(b)
Second detachment.--Commander J. F. Carter, Castine. Seventh and
Twenty-fourth
Companies Infantry.
(c)
Third detachment.--Maj. N. H. Hall.
Sixth and Twelfth Companies Infantry.
(d) Fourth detachment.--Commander L. McNamee,
Sacramento. Fourth and
Seventeenth
Companies Infantry.
(e)
Main body.--Washington, Marietta, Eagle. First Brigade Infantry, less one
battalion
and six companies. One battalion Field
Artillery, less one battery.
1.
The Cacos will remain in arms in north Haiti. South Haiti is at present quiet.
Negotiations
relative to the treaty with present Haitian Government are continuing. This
Government
without funds and not at present strong; efforts to strengthen and support it
are
continually under way.
2.
This force will assume and maintain military control of the ports of
entry of
Haiti
and collect customs thereat pending negotiations between United States and
Haiti.
3. (a)
First detachment maintain military control Port de Paix and military
government
Cape Haitien [sic]. Nashville patrol
Port de Paix and Cape Haitien.
Connecticut
support these operations.
(b)
Second detachment maintain military control St. Marc and Gonaives. Castine
patrol,
St. Marc and Gonaives and support these operations.
(c)
Third Detachment occupy Jeremie.
Maintain military control Petit Goave and
Miragoane.
(d)
Fourth Detachment occupy Les Cayes (Aux Cayes) and Jacmel. Sacramento
patrol
Les Cayes and Jacmel and support these operations.
(e)
Main body will maintain military control under martial law at Port au
Prince.
Washington
support these operations. Marietta
patrol Petit Goave, Miragone, and
Jeremie
and support third detachment. Eagle
continue repairs.
(x)
Maintain military control and administer customs at all ports occupied.
Protect
life and property and preserve order.
Disarm all Haitian troops encountered.
4. Base is at Guantanamo. Osceola will make trips between base and
various
detachments
with stores, mail, and provisions.
Jason and Solace remain Port au Prince
for
the present.
5.
Squadron commander on Washington.
Make daily and such other reports as
may
be necessary to keep squadron commander fully and frequently informed of the
situation. Use seventy-fifth meridian mean time.
W. B. Caperton,
Rear
Admiral, Commander Cruiser Squadron,
Commanding
United States Forces in Haiti and Haitian Waters.217
Appendix
4, The United States Take-Over of Haitian Customs, Financial, and Civil
Administration.
Presented
in evidence before the Senate investigating committee by Admiral Caperton on
19
October, 1921.
August
19, 1915.
From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Commander cruiser squadron.
State
Department desires you assume charge of following customhouses: Jacmel,
Aux
Cayes, Jeremie, Miragoane, Petit Goave, Port au Prince, St, Marc, Gonaives,
Port de
Paix,
Cape Haiten [sic]. Funds collected to
be used for organization and maintenance
efficient
constabulary, for conducting such temporary public works as will afford
immediate
relief through employment for starving populace and discharged soldiers, and
finally
for supporting Dartiguenave government.
Conger [sic] with chargé d'Affairs for
purpose
of having President Dartiguenave solicit above action. Whether President so
requests
or not, proceed to carry out State Department's desire; supply American
officials
placed
in charge with necessary customs guards.
Direct officials collect all import and
export
duties to be immediately deposited by them with respective local branches of
National
Bank of Haiti in separate account opened your name. Draw against this account
for
purposes mentioned above, surplus to be held for time being by United States
Government
in trust for people of Haiti.
Acknowledge. 20019.
Daniels218
August 21, 1915.
From: Commander Cruiser Squadron.
To: Commanding officer Connecticut.
In accordance orders Navy Department
you will control customhouse Cap
Haitien,
with an American officer as collector of customs. Collect all import and export
duties. Open account in local branch, National Bank
of Haiti in name of commander
Olmstead,
military governor, and deposit total customs receipts therein daily from now
on. Draw against this account for the following
purposes: First, for conducting such
temporary
public works as will afford immediate relief through employment for starving
populace
and discharged soldiers, and second, for supporting local military government.
Surplus
will be held by American military governor in trust for Haitian people.
Acknowledge.
Caperton.219
No.
8186-15.
CRUISER
SQUADRON, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
USS Washington, Flagship
Port
au Prince, Haiti, August 24, 1915.
From: Commander cruiser squadron, United States
Atlantic Fleet.
To: Commanding United States forces in Haitien
[sic] waters.
Subject: Letter of Instructions.
Reference: (a)
Campaign order No. 9.
1.
The following instructions will be followed for the purpose of
administering
customs
and such other civil duties as may be assumed by the United States forces in
Haitien
waters.
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION
2.
The squadron commander will administer the customs through an
'administrator
of customs,' who will have general charge of the collection of customs at
all
ports and the depositing of receipts, in accordance with instructions given by
the
squadron
commander and in accordance with the Haitian law not inconsistent with these
instructions. For the purpose of insuring uniformity of
administration the 'administrator
of
customs' is authorized to issue directly to the local commander such detailed
instructions
as may be necessary relative to the customs collection, depositing of receipts,
keeping
of accounts, rendition of returns, and such other administrative matters as
comes
within
his province.
3.
Detachment commanders will appoint from their respective commands for
each
port in which customs are to be collected a commissioned Navy pay or Navy line
officer
as 'collector of customs' and 'captain of the port.'
4.
Detachment commanders will exercise general supervision over the
administration
of customs within the limits of their respective commands, being guided
by
the instructions of the squadron commander acting through the 'administrator of
customs.'
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
5.
Detachment commanders will have charge of such other civil affairs as
may be
assumed
within the limits of their respective commands and of the disbursement of funds
allotted
to them by the squadron commander to meet obligations incurred thereby.
6.
Disbursements will be made by detachment commanders only under the
following
appropriations:
'Appropriation constabulary;' to be
used for the organizations and maintenance of
an
efficient constabulary. (For use at
Port au Prince only for the present.)
'Appropriation
public works;' to be used for the conducting such temporary public
works
as will afford an immediate relief through employment for the starving
population
and
discharged soldiers.
'Appropriation military and civil
government of the United States forces;' to be
used
for the maintenance of the customs and port services and such military
government
as
the United States may establish.
7.
Detachment commanders will submit to the squadron commander by radio not
later
than the 25th of each month, confirmed by letter, estimates covering the funds
desired
under each appropriation for each town for the coming calendar month.
8.
Funds will then be allotted by the squadron commander to each detachment
commander
from the funds on deposit in the local branch of the National Bank of Haiti in
each
town, and these funds so allotted will be placed to the credit of the
detachment
commander
in these local banks.
9.
Each detachment commander will render the following returns covering
funds
allotted
to them by the squadron commander as specified in paragraph 8:
(a)
At the end of each quarter, beginning September 30, 1915, an account
current
with
all substantiating vouchers.
(b)
At the end of each calendar month a statement of cash received and
expended.
10. The commanding officer of the Washington
will assume the duties of a
'detachment
commander,' indicated herein under 'civil administration' for Port au
Prince.
He
will in addition assume the duties of 'captain of the port' at Port au Prince.
W. B. Caperton.220
No. 8282-15.
CRUISER
SQUADRON, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
USS Ship Washington, Flagship
Port au
Prince, Haiti, August 23, 1915.
From: Commander cruiser squadron, United States
Atlantic Fleet, commanding United
States forces in Haitian waters.
To: Paymaster Charles Morris, United States
Navy, USS Washington (via commanding
officer).
Subject: Appointment as 'administrator of customs'
and 'collector of customs' at Port au
Prince.
1. There is inclosed herein Navy
Department's radiogram No. 20018, directing the
seizure
of certain customhouses and a letter of instructions relative to the
administration
of
the customs service. Customhouses at
St. Marc and Cape Haitien [sic] have already
been
seized. The customs house at St. Marc
is administered in exact accordance with
department's
radiogram 20018. The customhouse at
Cape Haitien is administered in the
same
manner, except that the account with the local branch of the National Bank of Haiti
has
temporarily been placed in the name off commander P. N. Olmstead. The seizure and
administration
of the remaining customhouses will be undertaken as soon as possible.
2.
You are hereby appointed 'administrator of customs' and 'collector of
customs'
at
Port au Prince.
3. You will establish an office at Port au
Prince and administer the customs
service
in accordance with department's radiogram No. 20018, the letter of instructions
No.
8186-15, of August 24, 1915, and the Haitian law where this law is not
inconsistent
with
these instructions.
4. This is in addition to your present duties.
W.
B. Caperton.221
No. 8283-15
CRUISER SQUADRON, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
USS
Washington, Flagship,
Port
au Prince, Haiti, August 23, 1915.
From: Commander cruiser squadron, United States
Atlantic Fleet, commanding United
States forces in Haitien [sic] waters.
To: Paymaster Charles Morris, United States
Navy, USS Washington (via commanding
officer).
Subject: Appointment as 'fiscal officer' for 'civil
administration.'
Reference: (a)
Navy Department's radiogram 20018. Inclosure: 1.
1. There is inclosed herewith a letter of
instructions No. 8186-15 of August 24,
1915,
relative to 'civil administration,' assumed by the United States forces in
Haitian
waters.
2.
You are hereby appointed the 'fiscal officer' for the squadron commander
in
connection
with the funds placed to his credit by the various collectors of customs.
3.
Funds will only be disbursed under the following appropriation:
'Appropriation constabulary'; to be used
for the organization and maintenance of
an
efficient constabulary.
'Appropriation public works'; to be
used for conducting such temporary public
works
as will afford an immediate relief through employment for the starving populace
and
discharged soldiers.
'Appropriation military and civil
government of the United States forces,' to be
used
for the maintenance of the customs and port services and such military
government
as
the United States may establish.
'Appropriation Haitian Government,'
to be transferred to the Dartiguenave
government
as may be determined by the squadron commander. The funds remaining
after
such disbursements will be left in the admiral's account and held by him in
trust for
the
people of Haiti.
4.
You will keep the necessary accounts and files and the returns rendered
by the
detachment
commanders.
5.
You will each month after the receipt of the detachment commanders'
estimates
prepare a synopsis of those estimates and a synopsis of the allotment which you
consider
necessary for the different detachment commanders for the coming month, and
will
submit same to the squadron commander for his approval. Upon approval of these
allotments
you will make the necessary arrangements through the National Bank of Haiti
to
place the funds so allotted to the credit of detachment commanders.
6.
This is in addition to your present duties.
W.
B. Caperton222
CRUISER
SQUADRON, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
USS
Washington, Flagship,
Port
au Prince, August 25, 1915.
Capt.
E. H. Durell, United States Navy,
USS
Connecticut, Cape Haitien [sic], Haiti
Dear
Durell: I am inclosing herewith a draft
of campaign order No. 9, which I
have
not yet issued, but will in the immediate future as soon as the necessary
reconnaissances
are completed at the southern ports. I
am sending this advance copy so
that
you may have a general outline of the deployment of the forces in Haitian
waters. It
will
be signed by me in a few days and your regular copy sent to you then. So far as your
detachment
is concerned you may consider it in effect now. I am enclosing herewith a
letter
of instruction which will become effective immediately upon receipt.
Paymaster Charles Morris, United
States Navy, has been appointed 'administrator
of
customs,' and will immediately proceed with the administration of customs for
the
entire
coast of Haiti. You are, of course, the
detachment commander referred to in the
letter
of instructions, and will immediately assume the administrative duties directed
therein
for your two towns. We have to be a
little patient for the first month or so, until
we
begin to get some funds to our credit.
After that I think matters will run more
smoothly.
Under direction of the Navy
Department, the customs receipts are to be placed to
my
credit in a single account in the National Bank of Haiti. You will open an account in
my
name at this bank both at Cape Haitian and Port de Paix. You will proceed to shift
the
money on hand at Cape Haitian from Commander Olmstead's account to my account,
keeping
out sufficient funds as you may need to cover expenditures for one week in that
town. Please advise me when this has been done and
how much you have placed to my
credit.
I suggest that you immediately send
in for both towns estimates for the month of
September
of the amounts of money desired, in accordance with the letter of instructions.
I
will then immediately make an allotment by transferring funds to your credit at
each
place. I intend to have each town self-supporting;
that is, the customs receipts at each
place
must support the work at that place.
You will account for the present use two
appropriations: (a)
'Public works' and (b) 'military and civil government of United States
forces.' In these two I think you will have plenty of
leeway to meet all expenses of your
administration
and undertake such sanitary and cleaning-up jobs as you wish.
If you need funds for immediate uses
at Port de Paix, take funds out of
Commander
Olmstead's account at Cape Haitian before transferring to my name and
inform
me of the amount so taken.
It is very necessary that the method
outlined in the letter of instructions and in the
circular
letter of the administrator of customs to the collectors of customs is followed
in
order
to carry on the business uniformly throughout the Republic. The scheme is roughly
to
collect the customs, put them in my name, and then I allot to you what I can
out of
these
funds to pay for your two towns. After
that I leave it entirely to your business and
as
to how you spend your money. No further
action is necessary on my part. The
only
restriction
is that money must be spent only under the two appropriations mentioned. I
think
these will leave you plenty of leeway to give you anything you please.
With reference to the Nashville
controlling Port de Paix and Cape Haitien, I
consider
it necessary to have the Nashville touch in at Port de Paix frequently, at your
discretion,
in order to get news, investigate conditions, support as necessary the landing
force
there and maintain communication with it.
I am not as yet ready to leave any
detachments
in isolated positions without their being in reach of the prompt support of a
naval
vessel. This may interfere with
Commander Olmstead's present duties as 'military
governor'
at Cape Haitien. If it does you are
authorized to relieve him from that duty and
appoint
Col. Cole or anyone else you may have available in his place.
A battery of artillery will be
landed at Cape Haitien in the near future by the
Tennessee. The force you will then have ashore at Cape
Haitien, supported by the
Connecticut's
bluejacket battalion, will give you practically the number of troops that
Col.
Cole thought were necessary there. I
would suggest that this bluejacket battalion be
kept
aboard the Connecticut as a reserve, ready to land at either Port de Paix or
Cape
Haitien.
In this connection it is very
desirable to have the bluejacket battalion--officers,
petty
officers, and men--given thorough instruction in their military duties on
shore. The
department
available has no more troops available to increase the force in Haiti at the
present
time, and we must therefore be prepared to use our seamen to reinforce our
marines
at any threatened point. In Port au
Prince, I have directed Waller to furnish
instruction
through one of the marine officers to the Washington's seaman battalion. He
is
running a school in the simple military duties for officers and petty officers
under the
charge
of a marine captain. I think this is of
highest importance.
With reference to the 2,000
ex-Government troops in the vicinity of Ouanaminthe,
I
don't presume that the orders issued by the President [of Haiti] that they
board the Nord
Alexis
and come to Port au Prince will be effective.
I told him of the situation there with
reference
to their troops they would board the Nord Alexis, as it will do no harm
to
try.
I have been investigating
Montreuil's activities and am endeavoring to get a line
on
him which will give you anything definite to work on. You, of course, have
orders
to
arrest him immediately of he attempts to start any revolutionary trouble.
Bobo is out of it, and neither he
nor any of his so-called factions can be
recognized
by us. We are having our own troubles in Port as Prince endeavoring to get
the
treaty through. Things are not entirely satisfactory, and I may be forced to
establish a
military
government here. My general plan with reference to you is to give you entire
freedom
consistent with carrying out the general ideas with which you are familiar.
Very sincerely,
W.B.Caperton 223
From:
Commander Cruiser Squadron. August 29, 1915.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Believe providing work will do great deal toward stopping present
disorders in
north. Understand from reliable sources that
national railroad of Haiti can immediately
employ
about 1,500 men on new construction between Bahon and Pignon, about the same
number
between St. Marc and Petit Riviere de L'Aritbonite, and about 1,000 between
Gonaives
and Gros Morne, under present contract with Haitian Government.
Recommend
State Department use good offices to induce national Railroad of Haiti to
begin
this work at once. Funds from customs
will not be available for me to begin
extensive
public works as directed in department's radiogram 20018 at once, and early
employment
men in north extremely desirable.
16029.
Caperton.224
August 31, 1915.
From: Commander Cruiser Squadron.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Unless
otherwise directed will occupy and begin administering customhouse at
Port
au Prince at 10 a.m., September 2.
Caperton.225
No. 8639.
CRUISER SQUADRON, UNITED STATES
ATLANTIC FLEET,
USS
Washington, Flagship
Port au Prince, Haiti, September 1, 1915.
From: Commander Cruiser Squadron, United States
Atlantic Fleet, commanding United
States forces in Haitian waters.
To: Paymaster Charles Conard, United States
Navy. Subject: Appointment as
'administrator of customs.'
Reference: (a) Commander
Cruiser Squadron's letter of instructions No. 8186-15 of
August
24, 1915.
1.
You are hereby appointed "administrator of customs" and will
immediately
relieve
Paymaster Charles Morris, United States Navy, of the duties of that office.
2.
You will establish an office at Port au Prince and administer the
customs
service
in accordance with department's radiogram No. 20018, reference (a), and the
Haitian
law where this law is not inconsistent with these instructions.
This shore duty beyond the seas is
required by the public interests.
W. B. Caperton226
8642-15.
CRUISER SQUADRON, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
USS
Washington, Flagship,
Port
au Prince, Haiti, September 1, 1915.
From: Commander Cruiser Squadron, United States
Atlantic Fleet, commanding United
States forces in Haitian waters.
To: Paymaster Charles Conrad, United States
Navy.
Subject: Appointment as fiscal officer for
"civil administration."
Reference:
(a) Navy Department's radiogram
No. 20018.
1.
You are hereby appointed the "fiscal officer" for the squadron
commander in
connection
with the funds placed to his credit by the various "collectors of
customs" and
will
immediately relieve Paymaster Charles Morris, United States Navy, of the duties
of
that
office.
2.
Funds will only disbursed under the following appropriations:
"Appropriation
constabulary," to be used for the organization and maintenance of
an
efficient constabulary.
"Appropriation public
works," to be used for conducting such temporary public
works
as will afford an immediate relief through employment for the starving populace
and
discharged soldiers.
"Appropriation military and
civil government of the United States forces," to be
used
for the maintenance of the customs and port services and such military
government
as
the United States may establish.
"Appropriation Haitian
Government," to be transferred to the Dartiguenave
government
as may be determined by the squadron commander.
The funds remaining after such
disbursements will be left in the admiral's account
and
held by him in trust for the people of Haiti.
3.
You will keep the necessary accounts and files and the returns rendered
by the
detachment
commanders.
4.
You will each month after the receipt of the detachment commanders'
estimates
prepare a synopsis of those estimates and synopsis of the allotment which you
consider
necessary for the different detachment commanders for the coming month, and
will
submit same to the squadron commander for his approval. Upon approval of these
allotments
you will make the necessary arrangements through the National Bank of Haiti
to
place the funds so allotted to the credit of detachment commanders.
5.
This shore duty beyond the seas is required by the public interests.
W.
B. Caperton.227
No. 8655-15.
CRUISER SQUADRON, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
USS
Washington, Flagship,
Port
au Prince, Haiti, September 1, 1915.
The
American Chargé d'Affaires,
American Legation, Port au Prince,
Haiti.
Sir: I have the honor to report that at 10 a.m., Thursday, September
2, 1915, in
accordance
with orders of the Navy Department, I will assume charge of the customhouse
at
Port au Prince, Haiti.
I request that you inform the
Haitian government of this intention and request that
they
take the necessary steps to inform the Haitian Administration of Customs.
I further request that you ask the
Haitian Government to direct the Haitian
Administrator
of Customs to meet Paymaster Charles Conard, United States Navy, at the
customhouse
at 10 a.m., Thursday, so that an amicable arrangement can be made in the
premises.
I am, sir, respectfully,
W. B. Caperton,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Commander Cruiser
Squadron,
and Commanding United States Forces
in Haitian Waters228
No.
8781-15.
CRUISER SQUADRON, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
USS Washington, Flagship
Port
au Prince, Haiti, September 2, 1915.
The
American Chargé d'Affairs
American Legation, Port au Prince,
Haiti
Sir: I have the honor to state that the following appointments have
been made by
me to administer the customs and port service
at Port au Prince:
Paymaster Charles Conrad, United States Navy, administrator of
customs for all
customhouses
taken charge of in Haiti.
Paymaster Herbert R. Stevens, United
States Navy, collector of customs at Port au
Prince.
Lieut. Commander Willis McDowell,
United States Navy, captain of the port at
Port
au Prince.
I request that you inform the
Haitian Government and all foreign diplomats and
consular
representatives of these appointments.
I am, sir, respectfully,
W. B. Caperton,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
Commander Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet,
Haiti,
and Commanding United States Forces in
Haitian waters.229
No.
8759-15.
CRUISER SQUADRON, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
USS
Washington, Flagship,
Port
au Prince, September 2, 1915.
The
American Chargé d'Affairs,
Port au Prince, Haiti.
Sir: I have the honor to request that you inform the Haitian
Government that, in
the
name of the United States Government, I will administer the customhouses of
which I
have
assumed charge for the benefit of the Haitian people and for the support of the
present
Haitian government.
The funds collected will be used for
the organization and maintenance of an
efficient
constabulary, will be used for conducting such temporary public work as will
afford
immediate relief, through employment, for the starving populace and discharged
soldiers,
and for supporting the Haitian Government.
I am, sir, respectfully,
W. B. Caperton,
Rear
Admiral, United States Navy,
Commanding Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic
Fleet,
Commanding
United States Forces in Haitian Waters.230
September 4, 1915.
From: Commander cruiser squadron.
To: Secretary of the Navy and commander in
chief.
Expedition
consisting of Marietta and sixth company of marines will leave Port
au
Prince Sunday afternoon to occupy Jeramine and customhouse that place. Paymaster
Manning
H. Philbrick has been appointed collector customs and captain of the port of
Jeramine. No further news. 22204.
Caperton.231
September
7, 1915.
From: Commander cruiser squadron.
To: Secretary of the Navy and Commander in
Chief.
Passed
Assistant Paymaster Fred E. McMillen and Passed Assistant Paymaster
Henry
R. Snyder appointed collectors of customs and captains of the port at Petit
Goave
and
Miragoane, respectively. These officers
sent to those ports on USS Osceola to-day.
Pauleus
Sanon, minister foreign affairs, and Antoine Sansaricq, minister agriculture,
resigned
to-day. 22407.
Caperton.232
Appendix
5: Proclamation of Martial Law in Haiti
OFFICE
OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR
Cape
Haitien, Haiti
September
1, 1915
ORDER
NO. 1
1.
The undersigned having this day taken over the duty of Military Governor
of
Cape
Haitien, Haiti, the following appointments are announced: the duties pertaining to
the
various positions will be performed under the immediate direction of the
Military
Governor
and will be in addition to the regular military duties assigned these officers.
(a)
POLICE AND ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL LAW, Captain William T.
Hoadley. Captain Hoadley is appointed Provost
Judge and is empowered to try cases of
breaches
of the peace and violation of civil ordinances or of military regulations
established
for the government of the town; in cases between natives of Haiti, as far as
practicable,
he will be guided in his administration of punishments by local laws. All
sentences
imposed will be referred to the Military Governor for his action.
(b)
PUBLIC WORKS, Captain William W. Low.
(c)
PUBLIC HEALTH, Past Assistant Surgeon Joseph R. Phelps, U. S. Navy.
(d)
RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS OF FUNDS, Captain Jeter R. Horton,
A.
Q. M. At the end of each calendar
month the disbursing officer will make a
statement
in quadruplicate of cash received and expended under the headings of:-
1.
Appropriation Military and Civil Government of the United States Forces.
2.
Appropriation Public Works.
At
the end of each quarter beginning September 30, 1915, he will submit
in
quadruplicate an account current with all substantiating vouchers.
2.
Heads of Departments will give careful consideration to the needs of the
city in
their
various Departments, and from time to time will submit reports as to the work
that is
most
urgently needed for the preservation of public health and order, bearing in
mind that
at
present funds are not available for starting new works of any considerable
magnitude.
In
no case will the amounts allotted to the various departments for any calendar
month be
exceeded
during that month.
ELI K. COLE233
PROCLAMATION
To the People of Port au Prince, Haiti
Information have been received from
the most reliable sources that the present
Government
of Haiti is confronted with conditions which they are unable to control,
although
loyally attempting to discharge the duties of their respective offices; and
these
facts
having created a condition which requires the adoption of different measures
than
those
heretofore applied; and in order to afford the inhabitants of Port au Prince,
and
other
territory thereafter described, the privileges of the government, exercising
all the
functions
necessary for the establishment and maintenance of the fundamental rights of
man: I hereby, under my authority as Commanding
Officer of the Forces of the United
States
of America in Haiti and Haitien [sic] Waters, proclaim that Martial Law exists
in
the
city of Port au Prince and the immediate territory now occupied by the forces
under
my
command.
I further proclaim, in accordance
with the law of nations and the usages, customs,
and
functions of my own and other Governments, that I am invested with the power
and
responsibility
of Government in all its functions and branches throughout the territory
above
described; and the proper administration of such Government by Martial Law will
be
provided for in regulations to be issued from time to time, as required, by the
Commanding
Officer of the Forces of the United States of America in Haiti and Haitien
Waters.
The Martial Law herein proclaimed,
and the things in that respect so ordered, will
not
be deemed or taken to interfere with the proceedings of the Constitutional
Government
and Congress of Haiti, or with the administration of justice in the courts of
law
existing therein; which do not affect the military operations or the
authorities of the
Government
of the United States of America.
All the Municipal and other civil
employees are, therefore, requested to continue
in
their present vocations without change; and the Military Authorities will not
interfere
in
the functions of the Civil Administration and the Courts, except in so far as
related to
persons
violating military orders or regulations, or otherwise interfering with the
exercise
of
Military Authority. All peaceful
citizens can confidently pursue their usual
occupations,
feeling that they will be protected in their personal rights and property, as
well
as in their proper social relations.
The Commanding Officer of the United
States Expeditionary Force, Colonel
Littleton
W. T. Waller, United States Marine Corps, is empowered to issue the necessary
regulations
and appoint the necessary officers to make this martial law effective.
Done at the city of Port au Prince, Haiti,
this third day of September, A. D., 1915.
W. B. CAPERTON
Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Commanding the Forces of the United States of America
in Haiti and Haitien Waters234
From:
Commanding office Castine.
To:
Commander cruiser squadron.
Castine arrived Gonavies 5 p.m.
Monday; immediately sent landing force to
assist
marine detachment in patrolling town. One hundred fifty Cacos a few miles from
town
under Chief Rameau. Cacos endeavoring to stir up inhabitants against Americans.
It
is reported that Cacos sympathizers having come into town in last few days,
inhabitants
fear
town will be burned by Cacos sympathizers. Many people leaving Gonaives in
small
craft.
Much excitement prevails. Can disperse Cacos difficult. Will maintain
regulations
patrol
of town to-night and await developments to-morrow. 19006.
Cater.235
From:
Commander cruiser squadron.
To:
Commanding officer Castine.
09007. Do not take offensive unless
necessary to protect life and property and
hold
time. Charles Zamor should arrive Gonaives to-day. He has promised to consult
with
Rameau and arrange difficulty. Believe you can arrange conference with Cacos
through
Charles Zamor and obtain results in that way. Have already told Zaomor we can
tolerate
these Cacos' annoyance and unless they cease will be forces take strong
measures.
11507.
Caperton236
Headquarters
U. S. Expeditionary Forces Operating in Haiti
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, September 24, 1915
Special
Orders
No. 23
1. Martial law having been proclaimed in all
territory occupied by American
troops,
the Commanding Officers of outlying posts are informed that it is not intended
to
interfere
with the civil functions and local courts so long as they are conducted in a
satisfactory
manner.
2. When conditions demand it martial law may be
extended by the post
commander
to any branch of the local government by issuing a proclamation to that
effect.
3. The object of martial law is any locality
should be to establish peace, order and
justice,
and the commanding officer of a post has the necessary authority to obtain the
above
mentioned object thru the process of martial law.
By order of Colonel Waller:
L. J. MAGILL
Major, A. A & I., Marine Corps
Adjutant General.
Copies
to:
Major
General Commandant,
Commander, Cruiser Squadron,
C. O., 1st Regiment,
C. O., 2d Regiment,
Major N. H. Hall, M.C., C.
O., USS CONNECTICUT,
Major S. D. Butler, MC, C.
O., USS SACRAMENTO,
C. O., Port de Paix C. O., USS CASTINE,
C. O., Gonaives, C. O., USS EAGLE,
C. O., St. Marc,
C. O., Petit Ecave,
C. O., Miragoane,
C. O., Jeremie,
C. O., Aux Cayes,
C. O., Jacmel,
C. O., Cape Haitien,
Chief Quartermaster,
F I L E.237
Appendix
6: The 1915 Haitian-American Treaty, with Extension
Preamble
The United States and the Republic
of Haiti desiring to confirm and strengthen the
amity
existing between them by the most cordial cooperation in measures for the
common
advantage; And the Republic of Haiti
desiring to remedy the present
condition
of its revenues and finances, to maintain the tranquillity of the republic, to
carry
out
plans for the economic development and prosperity of the republic and its
people;
And
the United States being in full sympathy with all of these aims and objects and
desiring
to contribute in all proper ways to their accomplishment; The United States
and
Republic of Haiti have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects in
view,
and
have appointed for that purpose, Plenipotentiaries, The President of the United
States,
Robert Beale Davis, Junior, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States; And the
President
of the Republic of Haiti, Louis Borno, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
and
Public Instruction, who, having exhibited to each other their respective
powers,
which
are seen to be full in good and true form, have agreed as follows:
Article I
The Government of the United States
will, by its good offices, aid the Haitian
Government
in the proper and efficient development of its agricultural, mineral and
commercial
resources and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a firm and solid
basis.
Article II
The President of Haiti shall
appoint, upon nomination by the President of the
United
States, a General Receiver and such aids and employees as may be necessary,
who
shall collect, receive and apply all customs duties on imports and exports
accruing at
the
several custom houses and ports of entry of the Republic of Haiti.
The President of Haiti shall
appoint, upon nomination by the President of the
United
States, a Financial Advisor, who shall be an officer attached to the Ministry
of
Finance,
to give effect to whose proposals and labors the Minister will lend efficient
aid.
The
financial Advisor shall devise an adequate system of public accounting, aid in
increasing
the revenues and adjusting them to the expenses, inquire into the validity of
the
debts of the Republic, enlighten both Governments with reference to all
eventual
debts,
recommend improved methods of collecting and applying the revenues and make
such
other recommendation to the Minister of Finance as may be deemed necessary for
the
welfare and prosperity of Haiti.
Article III
The Government of the Republic of
Haiti will provide by law to appropriate
decree
for the payment of all customs duties to the General Receiver, and will extend
to
the
Receivership, and the Financial Adviser, all needful aid and full protection in
the
execution
of the powers conferred and duties imposed herein; and the United States on its
part
will extend like aid and protection.
Article IV
Upon the appointment of the
Financial Advisor, the Government of the Republic
of
Haiti, in cooperation with the Financial Advisor, shall collate, classify,
arrange and
make
full statement of all the debts of the Republic, the amounts, character,
maturity and
condition
thereof, and the interest accruing and the sinking fund requirements to their
final
discharge.
Article V
All sums collected and received by
the General Receiver shall be applied, first, to
the
payments and salaries and allowances of the General Receiver, his assistants
and
employees
and expenses of the Receivership, including the salary and expenses of the
Financial
Adviser, which salaries will be determined by previous agreement; second, to
the
interest and sinking fund of the public debt of the Republic of Haiti; and
third, to the
maintenance
of the constabulary referred to in Article X, and then remainder to the
Haitian
Government for purposes of current expenses.
In making these applications the
General Receiver will proceed to pay salaries and
allowances
monthly and expenses as they arise, and on the first of each calendar month,
will
set aside in a separate fund the quantum of the collection and receipts of the
previous
month.
Article VI
The expenses of the Receivership,
including salaries and allowances of the
General
Receiver, his assistants and employees, and the salary and expenses of the
Financial
Adviser, shall not exceed five per centum of the collections and receipts from
customs
duties, unless by agreement by the two Governments.
Article VII
The General Receiver shall make
monthly reports of all collections, receipts and
disbursements
to the appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Department of State of
the
United States, which reports shall be open to inspection and verification at
all times
by
the appropriate authorities of each of the said Governments.
Article VIII
The Republic of Haiti shall not
increase its public debt except by previous
agreements
with the President of the United States, and shall not contract any debt or
assume
any financial obligation unless the ordinary revenues of the Republic available
for
that
purpose, after defraying the expenses of Government, shall be adequate to pay
the
interest
and provide a sinking fund for the final discharge of such debt.
Article IX
The Republic of Haiti will not
without a previous agreement with the President of
the
United States, modify the customs duties in a manner to reduce the revenues
therefrom;
and in order that the revenues of the Republic may be adequate to meet the
public
debt and the expenses of the Government, to preserve tranquility and to promote
material
prosperity the Republic of Haiti will cooperate with the Financial Advisor in
his
recommendation
for improvement in the methods of collecting and disbursing the
revenues
and for new sources of needed income.
Article X
The Haitian Government obligates
itself, for the protection of domestic peace, the
security
of individual rights and full observance of the provisions of this treaty, to
create
without
delay an efficient constabulary, urban and rural, composed of native Haitians.
This
constabulary shall be organized and officered by Americans, appointed by the
President
of Haiti, upon nomination by the President of the United States. The Haitian
Government
shall clothe these officers with the proper and necessary authority and
uphold
them in the performance of their functions.
These officers will be replaced by
Haitians
as they, by examination, conducted under direction of a board to be selected by
the
senior American officer of this constabulary and in the presence of the
representative
of
the Haitian Government, are found to be qualified to assume such duties. The
constabulary
herein provided for, shall, under the direction of the Haitian Government,
have
supervision and control of arms and ammunition, military supplies, and traffic
herein,
throughout the country. The high
contracting parties agree that the stipulations in
this
Article are necessary to prevent factional strife and disturbances.
Article XI
The Government of Haiti agrees not
to surrender any of the territory of the
Republic
of Haiti by sale, lease or otherwise, or jurisdiction over such territory, to
any
foreign
government or power, not to enter into any treaty or contract with any foreign
power
or powers that will impair or tend to impair the independence of Haiti.
Article XII
The Haitian Government agrees to
execute with the United States a protocol for
the
settlement, by arbitration or otherwise, of all pending pecuniary claims of
foreign
corporations,
companies, citizens or subjects against Haiti.
Article XIII
The Republic of Haiti, being
desirous to further the development of its natural
resources,
agrees to undertake and execute such measures as in the opinion of the high
contracting
parties may be necessary for the sanitation and public improvement of the
Republic,
under the supervision and direction of an engineer or engineers, to be
appointed
by
the President of Haiti upon nomination by the President of the United States,
and
authorized
for that purpose by the Government of Haiti.
Article XIV
The high contracting parties shall
have the authority to take such steps as may be
necessary
to insure the complete attainment of any objects comprehended in this treaty;
and,
should the necessity occur, the United States will lend an efficient aid for
the
preservation
of Haitian Independence and the maintenance of a Government adequate for
the
protection of life, property and individual liberty.
Article XV
The present treaty shall be approved
and ratified by the high contracting parties in
conformity
with their respective laws, and the ratification thereof shall be exchanged in
the
City of Washington as soon as may be possible.
Article XVI
The present treaty shall remain in
full force and virtue for the term of ten years, to
be
counted from the day of exchange of ratifications, and further for another term
of ten
years
if, for specific reasons presented by either of the high contracting parties,
the
purpose
of this treaty has not been fully accomplished.
In faith whereof, the respective
Plenipotentiaries have signed the present
Convention
in duplicate, in the English and French languages, and have thereunto affixed
their
seals.
Done at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, the
16th day of September in the year of our Lord
one
thousand nine hundred and fifteen.
/s/ Robert Beale Davis, Jr.
(SEAL)
Chargé d'Affiares of the
United States
/s/ Louis Borno
(SEAL)
Secrétaire d'Etat des Relations Extérieures et de
l'Instruction
Publique238
The Republic of Haiti having
recognized as urgent the necessity of a loan for a
term
of more than ten years destined for the amelioration of its financial and
economic
situation,
considering for now this necessity as a specific reason susceptible of giving
to
the
Convention of September 16, 1915, a duration of twenty years and desiring on
consequence
to exercise the right which it holds from Article XVI of this convention:
And the United States of America,
conforming itself to Article first of the said
convention
and assuring its good offices for the full accomplishment of its aims and
objects,
Have decided to conclude an
additional act to this Convention, with a view to
facilitating
a prompt realization of the loan and to offer to the capitalists the serious
guarantee
which they claim of an uninterrupted stability indispensable to the development
of
the wealth of the Republic of Haiti;
And have been appointed as
Plenipotentiaries,
By the President of the United
States of America,
Mr. Arthur Bailly-Blanchard, envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of
the United States of America,
By the President of the Republic of
Haiti,
Mr. Louis Borno, Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs and Public worship,
Who having exhibited to each other
their respective full powers found t be in good
and
true form, have agreed as follows:
Article 1. The two High Contracting Parties declare to admit the urgent
necessity
for
a loan for a period of more than ten years for the benefit of the republic of
Haiti as one
f
the specific reasons indicated in Article XVI of the Convention of September 16, 1915,
and
agree to fix at twenty years the life of the said Convention.
Article 2. The present act shall be approved by the High contracting Parties
in
conformity
with their respective established procedures and the approvals thereof shall be
exchanged
in the city of Port-au-Prince as soon as may be possible.
Signed and sealed in duplicate in
the English and French languages, at
Port-au-Prince,
Haiti, the 28th day of March, 1917.
A. Bailly-Blanchard [SEAL]
Louis Borno [SEAL]239
Appendix
7: The 1916 Gendarmerie Agreement and Supporting
Documents
GENDARMERIE
AGREEMENT
-oOo-
The undersigned, duty authorized
thereto by their respective Governments, have
this
day agreed:
1. That the Constabulary contemplated by Article
X of the Treaty between the United
States
of America and the Republic of Haiti, signed at Port-au-Prince on September 16,
1915,
shall be known as the Haitian Gendarmerie; that its strength and the amounts to
be
extended
for pay, rations, and expenses of operation, et cetera, shall be as set forth
in the
following
table:
Personnel Per
Month Per Annum
1
Commandant - Gen'l Division............$250.00 $3,000.00
1
Asst. commandant - Gen'l Brgde.......... 200.00 2,400.00
4
Directors - Colonels............... 200.00 9,600.00
8
Inspectors - Commandants.............
150.00 14,400.00
1
Quartermaster - Paymaster, Director.........
200.00 2,400.00
2
Assistant Quartermaster - Paymasters, Inspectors.... 150.00 3,600.00
1
Surgeon, Director...............
200.00 2,400.00
2
Surgeons, Inspectors.............. 150.00 3,600.00
18
Captains................... 150.00 32,400.00
18
First Lieutenants................ 100.00 21,600.00
3
First Lieutenants (Hospital Corps).........
100.00 3,600.00
39
Second Lieutenants...............
60.00 28,080.00
8
Second Lieutenants (Machine Gun)..........
50.00 4,800.00
6
Second Lieutenants (Hospital Corps)........
60.00 4,320.00
19
First Sergeants................. 25.00 5,700.00
112
Sergeants...................
20.00 26,880.00
262
Corporals...................
15.00 47,160.00
40
Field Musicians................. 10.00 4,800.00
2100
Gendarmes.................
10.00 252,000.00
Pay
Personnel............... $478,140.00
Rations.
2,533
Enlisted Men at 10 cents per diem.
92,455.00
Personnel-Clerical Force
Per
Month Per Annum.
1
Secretary........... $100 $1,200
1
Clerk to Commandant..... 45
540
1
Clerk to Assistant Commandant.. 45 540
2
Clerks............ 50 1,200
11
Field Clerks......... 45 5,940 9,420.00
Forage
and Remounts............... 40,000
Uniforms....................
66,000
Ammunition
and Target Practice............. 15,000
Hospital,
medicine, etc................. 10,000
Transportation,
maps, office supplies
intelligence
service................ 35,000
Miscellaneous,
rent and repair of barracks,
tools,
kitchen utensils, lights, etc............
20,000 186,000.00
Total
land forces..............$766,015.00
Coast Guard.
Annual
Cost of Maintenance.
2
Inspectors......... $1,800 $3,600
4
First Lieutenants........ 1,200 4,800
4
Engineers.......... 276 1,104
4
Quartermasters.......... 216 864
30
Seamen.......... 156 4,680 $15,048
Fuel......................... 20,000
$35,048
II.
A coast guard shall be established, operated and maintained as a
constituent
part
of the Gendarmerie, under the direction and control of the Commandant of the
Gendarmerie,
and in addition to the annual expenses heretofore set forth, the sum of
$75,000
shall be allotted [sic] for the purchase of the necessary coast guard vessels
for
this
service. These vessels may be used for
the transportation of troops, Government
employees,
and the supplies of all departments, at the discretion of the Commandant of
the
Gendarmerie, subject to the discretion of the President of Haiti.
III. All American officers of the Gendarmerie shall be appointed by
the President
of
Haiti upon nomination by the President of the United States, and will be replaced
by
Haitians
when they have shown by examination, as provided in Article X of the Treaty,
that
they are fit for command.
IV.
The Gendarmerie shall be considered the sole military and police force
of the
Republic
of Haiti, clothed with full power to preserve domestic peace, the security of
individual
rights, and the full observance of the provisions of the Treaty. It shall have
supervision
and control of arms and ammunition, military supplies, and traffic therein
throughout
the Republic. It shall be subject only
to the direction of the President of Haiti;
all
other officers desiring the services of the Gendarmerie shall be required to
submit
requests
to the nearest official of that organization.
The private guard referred to in
Article
175 of the Constitution of Haiti shall be composed of one hundred men of the
Gendarmerie,
chosen by the President of Haiti, which men shall wear distinctive insignia
while
employed on that service. [This section
does not appear in the published version of
the
agreement in McCrocklin, Garde d'Haiti, Appendix C. The reference to Article 175
of
the Constitution is an apparent reference to the pre-1918 Haitian Constitution
as the
Marine
Corps translation of the 1918 Constitution, from the Butler Papers (Appendix 9,
below)
only contains 127 numbered articles.]
V.
All matters of recruiting, appointment, instruction or training,
promotion,
examination,
discipline, operation, movement of troops, clothing, rations, arms and
equipment,
quarters and administration shall be under the jurisdiction for the
Commandant
of the Gendarmerie.
VI.
The Gendarmerie shall be organized and officered as provided for in
Article
X
of the Treaty. The clerical force of
the Gendarmerie shall be Haitian citizens.
VII. Rules and regulations for the administration and discipline of
the
Gendarmerie
shall be issued by the Commandant, after being approved by the President
of
Haiti. Infraction of the rules or
regulations by members of the Gendarmerie may be
punished
by arrest, suspension of duty without pay, forfeiture of pay, or dismissal,
under
regulations
promulgated by the Commandant of the Gendarmerie and approved by the
President
of Haiti.
VIII. Other offenses committed by gendarmes will be investigated by the
Gendarmerie
officers as directed by the Commandant of the Gendarmerie. If the
behaviour
[sic] of a gendarme is unjustified, he may, at the discretion of the Commandant
of
the Gendarmerie, be discharged from the Gendarmerie, and after his guilt is
established,
be punished in the same manner as other Haitian citizens, or, of not
discharged
he will be punished as provided for in Articles VII and IX of this agreement.
Officers
and enlisted men of the United States Navy and Marine Corps, serving with the
Gendarmerie
will continue to be subject to the laws of the United States for the
government
of the Navy.
IX.
A tribunal consisting of five officers of the Gendarmerie is authorized
for the
trial
of gendarmes charged with conspiracy
against the Government of Haiti. This
Tribunal
will be ordered by the Commandant of the Gendarmerie and in case of
conviction
is authorized to inflict the punishment of death or such other punishment as
the
Tribunal may adjudge and deem proper, in accordance with the laws of
Haiti. All
sentences
of this Tribunal, after being reviewed and approved by the Commandant of the
Gendarmerie,
must be confirmed by the President of Haiti before being carried into
execution.
X. Persons violating the laws governing traffic
in arms, ammunition, and military
stores
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000 United States currency or
imprisonment
not exceeding five years, or both.
XI.
The Haitian Gendarmerie shall be under the control of the President of
Haiti
and
all orders from him pertaining to the Gendarmerie shall be delivered to the
Commandant
through the Minister of the Interior.
All other civil officials desiring
protection
or the services of the Gendarmerie will make application to the senior officer
of
the Gendarmerie in the locality.
XII. The sum of $801,063, United States Currency, shall be
appropriated
annually
for pay and allowances, equipment, uniforms, transportation, administration,
and
other current expenses of the Haitian
Gendarmerie. Allotments for the various
needs
of
the Gendarmerie shall be made from this sum by the Commandant, but the total of
such
allotments in any month shall not exceed one-twelfth of the total annual
appropriation,
provided, however, that the surplus from one month may be allotted in
subsequent
months.
XIII. Reports of expenditures shall be made by the Commandant as
directed by
the President of Haiti.
XIV. The laws necessary to make effective the above provisions shall
be
submitted
to the legislative body of Haiti.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned
have hereunto signed their names and
affixed
their seals in duplicate.
Done at Washington, D. C., this 24th
day of August, nineteen hundred and
sixteen.240
Headquarters, US Expeditionary Force Operating
in Haiti
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, December 14, 1915
From: Expeditionary Commander.
To:
Subject: Gendarmerie.
1.
The following is published for the information of all concerned:
"Article
10 - The Haitien [sic] Government obligates itself for the
preservation
of domestic peace, the security of individual rights and the
full
observance of the provisions of this Treaty, to create without delay, an
efficient
constabulary, urban and rural, composed of native Haitians. This
constabulary
shall be organized and officered by Americans, appointed by
the
President of Haiti upon nomination by the President of the United
States. The Haitien government shall clothe these officers
with the proper
and
necessary authority and uphold them in the performance of their
functions. These officers will be replaced by Haitiens,
as they, by
examination
conducted by a to be selected by the Senior American Officer
of
this constabulary, in the presence of a representative of the Haitien
Government,
are found to be qualified to assume such duties.
The constabulary herein provided for, shall, under the
direction of
the
Haitien Government, have supervision and control of arms and
ammunition, military supplies and traffic therein,
throughout the country.
The
high contracting parties agree that the stipulations in this article are
necessary
to prevent factional strife and disturbance."
3
[sic]. In order to carry out the
provisions of the Treaty, so far as is possible
under
present conditions, the following will be noted and observed:
The Republic is divided into four
constabulary districts:
District of the Cape
Comprising the northern part of
Haiti and bounded on the south
by
a line passing through the following towns
(west to east):
Anse
Rouge - Gros Morne - Marmelade - Pignon - Thommonde -
Platanal
- Banica, on the Dominican Border.
District of the Artibonite
Comprising the central part of Haiti; bounded on the
north by the
District
of the Cape and on the south by a line passing through the
following towns (west to east):
Mont Rouis - Merebalais - Lascaobas - La Laguna - Banica
(on the
border).
District of Port-au-Prince
Bounded on the north by the Artibonite and on the
southwest by a
line
drawn between Leogane and Jacmel, including Leogane by excluding
Jacmel.
District
of the South
The
entire peninsula west of the Leogane - Jacmel line.
These district boundaries are not
exact and Gendarmerie officers will disregard
them,
when necessity or expediency so indicates.
4. District Commanders
(normally Directors) will be responsible for the conduct
of
the Gendarmerie within their districts, subject to such administrative rules as
may be
issued. It is not practicable at this time to
formulate these rules and, for the present,
District
Commanders and Military superiors will exercise a general supervision, leaving
to
the Company Commander, so far as is possible, decisions regarding the internal
affairs
of
the native companies under their control.
5.
Reports will be submitted, dated on the 1st, 10th and 20th of each month
by
officers
immediately in charge of the recruiting and training of companies and sections
[platoons],
showing the strength (officers, noncommissioned officers and privates) and
number
unformed, of the companies, the names of officers and noncommissioned officers
and
Marines associated with the training, and the degree of ability shown. These reports
will
give in detail the system of training and will indicate progress. Methods which have
proved
excellent as well as methods which have proven failures and as such abandoned,
will
be reported upon. These reports cannot
be too full for from them will be finally
compiled
the uniform system of training to be followed.
These reports will be submitted
through
military channels and forwarding seniors will make such comments and
recommendations
as may, in their opinion, be called for.
6.
The authorized strength of a company is as follows:
1 1st Sergeant $28.00 (includes
$3.00 commuted ration)
3 Sergeants 23.00 ( do do do do )
9 Corporals 18.00 ( do do do do )
72 Privates 13.00 ( do do do do )
and
each company consists of three equal sections.
1st sergeants may be made when two
sections
are complete. For the present it is not
considered desirable to appoint native
lieutenants,
though special cases will be considered.
7.
The requirements for recruits are laid down in the recruiting circulars
forwarded
herewith [not found]. It is considered
desirable that all Gendarmerie know
how
to read and write but this requirements may be waived in the case of
particularly
desirable
applicants. All noncommissioned
officers must know how to read and write
French.
8.
The infantry drill of the "Landing Force" will be followed
except that the army
interval
of 4" between men will be taken.
It is the intention to arm the Gendarmerie with
Krag
carbines and instructors will consider the issue of this ram [arm?]. No bayonets.
The
drill book will be ready for issue by the middle of January and is printed in
French.
9. As the pay is
attractive, punishments of loss of pay will be most effective, and
so
far as is possible a system of fines will be instituted. Confinement, except for restraint,
is
not considered desirable. Company
Commanders are authorized to inflict punishments
and
a record will be kept of such punishments.
A summary of these punishments will be
included
in the tri-monthly reports.
10.
So far as local conditions make it desirable, men will be paid in
gold. In case
they
are paid in gourdes the pay roll (supply forwarded herewith) will be kept in
gold. In
this
connection it will be noted that it is impracticable to obtain pennies and
accounts
will,
therefore, have to be computed to the nearest five cents under. The pay-rolls will be
prepared
in duplicate and the legend below the space for signature is to be interpreted
literally.
11.
The uniform for the Gendarmerie is a copy of the Marine officers' coat
with
long
trousers. Chevrons will be furnished
gratuitously in the near future, these will be
white,
of the design and size of U. S. Marine Corps field chevrons. U. S. Marine Corps
leggings,
flannel shirts, shoes and campaign hats will be issued when received, together
with
company numerals; these numerals will be worn with the lower side touching the
ribbon
of the hat. Requisitions will be made
at once by officers in charge of companies.
All
khaki and articles of equipment will be furnished from the Headquarters of the
Gendarmerie
upon requisitions submitted through this office; receipt for same should be
given. Until the term of enlistment is formally
entered upon, one flannel short, one hat,
one
pair of leggings and one pair of shoes will be issued. In the future it is probable that
a
small issue of socks and underwear will be made annually.
12.
It is impossible at this stage of the organization of the Gendarmerie to
lay
down
many detailed rules. Officers charged
with the recruiting and training must always
bear
in mind the native character, the conditions which have obtained in Haiti, and
the
position
and prestige which it is confidently hoped the Gendarmerie will occupy in the
Republic. A change of attitude or of methods will have
a bad effect, and before any new
method
or standard if presented [sic] to the native its probable reception by him must
be
considered.
13.
The following schedule will be considered as authority for engaging
recruits.
All increases are authorized for January
1916:
1st Co.- Port-au-Prince Complete
2nd Co. 1st
See. Petionville Complete
2nd Sec. L'Archaie To be enlisted
& trained at
Petionville.
3rd Sec. Thommazeau To be enlisted
and trained at
Petionville.
3rd
Co. Cape Haitien Complete
4th
Co. Port-au-Prince Complete
5th
Co. Miragoane (1st Sec0 Complete
Petit Goave (2d Sec) Complete
Anse a Veau (3d Sec) To be enlisted and trained at Petit
Goave
6th
Co. 1st & 2d Sec Jeremie Complete
3d Sec Authorized
7th
Co. Aux Cayes, 2 Sec Complete
Aquin, 1 Sec Authorized
8th
Co. 1st & 2d Sec Jacmel Complete
3d Sec. Authorized
9th
Co. 1st Sec. St. Marc Complete
2nd Sec. Authorized
10th
Co. 1st & 2d Sec Gonaives Complete
3d Sec. Authorized
11th
Co. 1st Sec Port du Paix Complete
2d Sec. Authorized
12th
Co. Cape Haitien Complete
13th
Co. Ft. Liberte, 1st Sec Complete
2d Sec. Authorized
14th
Co. 1st Sec. To be enlisted and trained at Grande
Riviere for Hinche.
15th
Co. 1st Sec Ft Liberte Enlisted
& being trained at Fort
Liberte for Ouanaminthe.
16th
Co. 1st Sec. To be enlisted and trained at
Port-au-Prince for Lascaobas.
17th
Co. Port-au-Prince Complete
18th
Co. St. Sec. Port-au-Prince Authorized.
14.
Under the terms of the modus vivendi, the "Expeditionary
Commander" is the
"Chief
of Constabulary" and all communication and requisitions will be addressed
to the
"Expeditionary
Commander." The following
tentative details have been made of officers
for
definite duties in connection with the organization, all exercising their
functions under
the
direction of the Expeditionary Commander.
Major S. D. Butler - In charge of organizing.
Capt. A. S.
Williams - Ass't to Officer in Charge.
It is not practicable at this time
to consider the various officers who are associated
with
constabulary training as being definitely attached to certain companies, and
they are
therefore
not listed.
15.
A thorough knowledge of French is essential to best success, and where
two
or
more American officers (counting noncommissioned officers) are serving together
in
constabulary
work and have volunteered for service with the constabulary, the
employment
of a language teacher at a salary of not more than $30.00 U. S. Currency per
month
is authorized and provision will be made in submitting estimates for the
payment
of
these instructors.
16.
It is directed that, as far as practicable, noncommissioned officers of
Marines,
who
are applicants, be placed on duty with the constabulary.
17.
A supply of Haitien law books is forwarded. These are Gendarmerie property
and
will be carried [on unit property books] as such.240
COPY
HEADQUARTERS U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OPERATING
IN HAITI.
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, January 19, 1916.
General
Orders
NO. 30.
1.
The Haitien [sic] Police having been abolished, leaving many towns and
localities
without adequate police protection, the following instructions will be carried
out
pending the detail of Gendarmerie for duty in such towns and localities as are
not now
policed
or guarded by that organization.
2.
Each Detachment Commander who has not already done so, will recommend
immediately
to these Headquarters the minimum number of chiefs and men required for
the
various towns in the vicinity of the district under his command, the pay of the
chiefs
not
to exceed 75 gourdes per month each, and pay of the men not to exceed 30
gourdes
per
month each, one chief being allowed for each town or sub-division.
3.
The number of police formerly employed by the Haitien Government in
various
towns must not be taken as a basis for the number required, as it was,
invariably,
greatly
in excess of actual requirements.
Generally speaking, the smaller towns require
about
four (4) men and the larger towns not to exceed eight (8) men each.
4.
The Chiefs and the men will be known for the time being as "Rural
Guards,"
and
the estimate for the maintenance thereof will be included as a separate item
under
"Constabulary,"
as this rural guard, while in existence, will be considered a part of, and
supplementary
to, the regularly organized Gendarmerie, and the men in it will be given to
understand
that their employment is purely temporary and will last only until the
Gendarmerie
has been sufficiently instructed to take charge in these localities.
5.
The names of the towns and the number of men required for each, with the
amount
in gourdes required to defray the pay, will be sent to this office by radio as
soon
as
these facts have been determined.
6.
It is desired that this rural guard be organized on as economical a basis
as is
consistent
with reasonable protection of life and property.
By order of Colonel Waller:
L. J. Magill
Major, A. A & I., Marine Corps,
Adjutant General242
GENDARMERIE D'HAITI
General
Orders No 35 Port-au-Prince, January 31, 1916
I - The following rules and regulations will
govern the Gendarmerie d'Haiti:
II - All
civil and supervisory functions which may devolve upon the Gendarmerie,
will be performed under the
direction of the several District Commanders.
III - In
general these functions are:
1 -
Preservation of order.
2 - Protection of individual rights.
3 -
Protection of property.
4 -
Supervision of arms.
5 -
Prevention of smuggling.
6 -
Protect and report on conditions of
highways and bridges. When so ordered
by
the commandant of the Gendarmerie
the Gendarmes will require according to
law, the proper inhabitants to
alter or repair public highways and bridges, and will
supervise the work. At the request of the major of the Commune
they may, when
ordered by the proper officer of the
Gendarmerie; undertake this work.
7 -
Protect and report on the condition of
the telegraph and telephone service.
When
ordered by a commissioned officer
the Gendarmerie will have the authority to
censor all messages and to take
charge of any station or office when necessary for
the good of the public.
8 -
Protect and report on condition of
public buildings.
9 -
Report on and supervise the use of
public lands according to law.
10 -
Collection of vital statistics
including the census, when directed.
11 - Report on and protect public irrigation
works.
12 - Enforce sanitary orders and regulations.
13 - Report on and enforce regulations preventing
spread of animal diseases.
14 - Report on and enforce regulations preventing
spread of epidemics.
15 - Plenary control in time of great disorder
following war, rebellion, earthquakes,
typhoons, etc.
16 - Control of prisons.
17 - Issuance of permits for travel
within the Republic.
18 - Agricultural reports.
19 - Require all weights and measures to conform
to legal standards.
20 - Enforce harbor and docking regulations.
IV - Of
these functions the first five are purely police and will be performed for the
present according to the best
judgment of the officers concerned.
Definite rules
for the control of arms will be
issued shortly, but at present the control of arms
lies with the military authorities
alone. Function 16 for the present will
generally
be a function of the military
authorities, except when the prisons are small and the
duty is incidental to the duties of
the Gendarmes performing local police duties.
Eventually all prisons will be taken
over and the prisoners cared for by the
Gendarmerie. Function 17 is a function of the Ministry of
the Interior when he
chooses to exercise it personally,
but ordinarily the permits are issued by the
Commandant de Place. This functionary no longer existing[,] these
papers will be
issued by the senior Gendarmerie
officer serving in the Commune where in the
applicant resides.
V - The
supervision to be exercised in the case of the function listed will be general
for the present unless an emergency
justifies direct control. District
Commanders will require from all
officers now serving in connection with the
Gendarmes report on all these
matters particular attention being given to means of
communication.
VI - It
is expected that all officers concern will inform themselves in detail on all
matters which will eventually come
under Gendarmerie supervision and control in
order that all information which
will tend to increase the present and future
efficiency of the Gendarmerie may be
at hand when wanted.
VII
- Reports will be made weekly through
district Commanders to these headquarters.
LITTLETON W. T. WALLER
Colonel, United States Marine Corps, Commanding
U. S. Expeditionary Forces243
HEADQUARTERS U.S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES OPERATING
IN HAITI
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, February 14, 1916
From: Expeditionary Commander
To:
Subject: Commissioning of Haitien [sic] Gendarmerie
d'Haiti
1.
Then following is furnished for your information and guidance. Inform all
concerned.
2.
Haitien men, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five who are
recommended
by the President or Secretary of the Interior of the republic of Haiti, by a
Detachment
Commander of the Expeditionary Forces or a District commander of the
Gendarmerie,
will be given to understand that, to obtain commissions in the
Gendarmerie,
they must enlist.
3.
Upon enlistment they will be formed into a class and quartered in a
seperate
[sic]
part of the quarters occupied by the other enlisted men, or will be allowed to
live
outside
barracks at their own expense. They
will receive every consideration compatible
with
discipline.
4.
They will not be required to drill in the ranks with the other enlisted
men, but
will
be drilled and instructed in a class by themselves. They will be required to
demonstrate
their ability to do duty as a private, but will not be required to do so
outside
the
limited of their garrison.
5. When considered, by their Commanding
Officer, fit to be non-commissioned
officers
they will be recommended for warrents in the order of their efficiency and
general
desirability. If after a reasonable
period as non-commissioned officers they are
considered
desirable they will be sent into the outlying districts to command small
Gendarmerie
posts or stations. If after a thorough
trial on this duty, they still prove
desirable,
there [sic] commanding officer will report on them, through Detachment
Commander,
Headquarters Expeditionary Force, grading them according to their general
desirability
and efficiency, more weight being given to their showing as detached post
commanders
than their ability as drill masters.
6.
Any man, now enlisted who, in the opinion of their Commanding Officers
are
qualified
as required by par. 3 [?], will be so reported upon to Expeditionary
Headquarters. All Haitiens, now commissioned, will be
reported on by their
Commanding
Officers and are eligible for permanent appointment, but as 2nd Lieutenants
only. All Captains and 1st Lieutenants will be
Americans for the time being.
7.
Hereafter all desirable men who are recommended for commissioned and
enlist,
will be transferred to Port au Prince, for instructions and trial, those who
desire to
come
from other districts to enlist for commissions in Port-au-Prince may do so at
their
own
expense. In this connection it is
desired to allot a number of Haitien [sic] Officers,
to
be commissioned throughout the Republic, as follows:
District
of Port-au-Prince 12
" " the Cape 12 (including Hinche)
" " " Artibonite 4
"
" " South 8
9.
If at any time they are found undesirable, or if for any other reason it
is
considered
impracticable, to commission them, they will be informed and given the
privilege
of leaving the Gendarmerie honorably.243
Appendix
8: President Dartiguenave's Decrees of
5 April 1916.
Presented
as evidence by Admiral Caperton before a Senate investigating committee, 20
October
1921.
(A
translation of the decrees as published in "Le Moniteur", 5 April
1916.)
DECREE CONCERNING THE COUNCIL OF STATE
Dartiguenave, President of the Republic
Whereas it has been shown by experience that legislative business
requires a
special
preparation, which consequently necessitates the presence of a suitable organ
with
the
political assemblies and with the
executive authority:
DECREES
ARTICLE 1. A council of state is appointed whose functions are:
1. To give advice on all plans which the
government may consider fit to
submit
to it.
2. To prepare and draw up bills, decrees,
decisions, or other documents
concerning
subjects in regard to which the Government requires its attention.
3. To give advice on all questions submitted to
it by the President of the
republic
and the secretaries.
ART. 2. Councilors of state may be charged by the executive authority to
support
before
the legislative body the bills which have been passed by the council of state.
ART.
3. The council of state is composed of
21 members, appointed by the
President
of the Republic. The secretaries of
state have the power to participate as a
deliberative
body at the meetings of the general assembly and sections.
ART. 4. The bureau of the council of state, composed of a president and
two
secretaries,
is elected by the council by secret ballot.
The mandate of the bureau lasts for
one year and may be indefinitely renewed.
In
the
absence of the President the council is presided over by the senior section
president.
ART.
5. The functions of councilor of state
are incompatible with every other
public
salaried function. Nevertheless, specialists,
engineers, jurists, or others may be
detached
from a public service to take part in the work of the council as extraordinary
councilors,
with a consulting voice; and in this case, during their special mission, they
retain
the rights, prerogatives and salary belonging to their former positions but are
not
able
to draw their salary with that from the council of state.
ART. 6. The council of state is divided into four sections. A public
administrative
regulation will decided on the interior order of the operations of the
council,
on the division of these operations among the sections, on the functioning of
the
general
assembly, on the rotation of members between the sections, on the organization
of
the personnel which will be nominated by the President of the Republic, and in
general
on
all the measures necessary to the satisfactory running of the institution.
ART. 7. A monthly remuneration of $150 will be handed to each councilor
of
state.
Issued at the National Palace, Port au
Prince, April, 1916, the one hundred and
thirteenth
year of independence.
DARTIGUENAVE.
By
the President:
CONSTANTIN MAYARD,
The
Secretary of the Interior.
EMILE ELIE,
The
Secretary of Finance and Commerce.
E.
DORNEVAL,
The
Secretary of Justice and Public Worship.
LOUIS
BORNO,
The
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Public Works.
LEON
AUDAIN,
Secretary
of Public Instruction.
A. ANDRE,
Secretary
of War, Navy, and Agriculture.244
DECREE
Dartiguenave, President of the Republic
Whereas the life and development of
nations obey the natural laws to which the
public
law must adapt itself;
Whereas for a long time public
opinion and the directing authorities have
recognized
the necessity of reforming the existing constitution; and the two former
legislatures
have formally manifested their willingness to do so;
Whereas to the reasons generally
admitted up to last year there have been added
others
of still more urgent a nature, created by the new conditions imposed on the
Nation;
Whereas
it is indispensable, in order that the convention of September 16, 1915,
may
be properly applied and may produce the advantages embodied in it, to
accomplish
the
revision at as early a date as possible, of a large number of constitutional
texts,
notably
those concerning public defense, finances, local institutions, reports of the
public
authorities,
the numbers of deputies, and of senators, the right of real estate property;
Whereas the present chamber of
deputies was formed by a special popular
consultation
which invested it directly with constituent authority, and the distinctive
fundamental
character is not possessed by the senate of the Republic;
For these reasons and on the advice of the council of the
secretaries of state,
DECREES
ARTICLE 1. The senate of the Republic is dissolved.
ART. 2. The chamber of deputies will be convened in exclusive capacity of
constituent
assembly to revise, in cooperation with the executive authority, the
constitution
of October 9, 1889, and take in hand organized decrees of public
administration
and all other acts of an urgent character the plans of which will be
presented
to it by the executive.
It will consist of an absolute
majority of its members. (A majority of
one more
than
half the number of members.)
ART. 3. A salary of $300 per month will be allowed to the constituents
present in
their
seat.
ART. 4. The present decree will be published and executed by the
secretaries of
state,
each acting with respect to that which concerns him.
Issued at the National Palace,
Port-au-Prince, April 5, 1916, one hundred and
thirteenth
year of independence.
DARTIGUENAVE.
By
the President:
CONSTANTIN MAYARD,
Secretary
of the Interior.
LEON AUDAIN,
Secretary
of Public Instruction.
EMILE ELIE,
Secretary
of Finance and Commerce.
A. ANDRE,
Secretary
of War, Navy, and Agriculture.
E. DORNEVAL,
Secretary
of Justice and Public Worship.
LOUIS BORNO,
Secretary
of Foreign Affairs and Public Works.246
Appendix
9: The 1918 Haitian Constitution
(Marine Corps Translation).
LIBERTY
EQUALITY FRATERNITY
REPUBLIC OF HAITI
___________________________
C O N S T I T U T I O N
of the
REPUBLIC OF HAITI
___________________________
CHAPTER I
TITLE I
___________________________
Art[icle]. 1. The Republic of Haiti is one and indivisible, free, sovereign and
independent
Its territory, including the islands
dependent thereon, is inviolable and cannot be
alienated
by any treaty or by any convention.
Art. 2. The territory of the Republic is divided into Departments. Each
Department
is subdivided into Arrondissements and each Arrondissement into
Communes.
The number and limits of these
subdivision are determined by law.
TITLE II
HAITIANS AND THEIR RIGHTS
Section 1
Civil and Political Rights
Art. 3. The rules relative to nationality shall be determined by law.
Art. 4. All foreigners who find themselves in the territory of Haiti
shall enjoy the
same
protection granted to Haitians.
Art. 5. The right to ownership of landed property is granted to
foreigners residing
in
Haiti, and to associations formed by foreigners for the needs of their
residential,
agricultural,
commercial, industrial and educational purposes.
This right shall end within a period
of five years after the foreigner has ceased to
reside
in the country, or after the association has ceased active operations.
Art. 6. Every Haitian over 21 years or age is entitled to exercise
political rights,
if
he has the other qualifications required by the Constitution and by law. Foreigners may
acquire
Haitian nationality by following the rules established by law. Haitians by
naturalization
shall not be admitted to the exercise of political rights until they have
resided
five years within the Territory of the Republic.
Art. 7. The exercise of political rights shall be suspended by virtue of
judicial
sentences,
given in conformity with the laws of Haiti, which carry with them suspension
of
civil rights.
Art. 8. All Haitians are equal before the law. They are all equally admissible to
civil
and military offices, without other motive for preferment than personal merit
or
service
rendered to the country.
Art. 9. Individual liberty is guaranteed. No one can be detained except upon
probable
cause relative to an act punishable by law and upon the warrant of a legally
competent
official.
For this warrant to be executed it
is necessary that:
1.
It should express the motive of the detention and the provision of the
law
which
punish the act presumed;
2.
That the person be notified, and that a copy be left with the person at
the time
of
arrest.
Apart from the case of flagrante
delicto, the arrest is subject to the forms and the
conditions
above stated.
All arrests or detentions made
contrary to this provision, and all acts of violence
or
rigor employed in the execution of the warrant of arrest, are arbitrary acts,
against
which
the injured parties may, without previous authorization, have recourse before
the
competent
court, in prosecution either the authors or the executors.
Art. 10. No one can be deprived of the right to trial before the judges assigned
to
him
by the Constitution or the law.
Art. 11. Domiciliary visits and seizure of papers shall not be made except
by
virtue
of law and in the manner and forms it prescribes.
Art. 12. No law shall have a retrospective effect.
Art. 13. No penalty shall be established except by law, nor shall any
penalty be
imposed
except in the cases where the law has determined.
Art.
14. The right of property is
guaranteed.
No one shall be deprived of his
property except for public use in the cases and in
the
manner established by law, and upon previous payment of a just compensation.
Property
shall not be confiscated for political reasons.
Art. 15. Except in the case of treason, the penalty of death for political
offenses is
abolished.
The law shall determine the penalty
to be imposed in place thereof.
Art. 16. Every one has the right to express his opinions on all matters
and to
write,
to print and to publish his thoughts.
Writings shall not be submitted to
previous censorship.
Abuse of this right shall be defined
and punished by the law, without thereby
abridging
in any way whatever the freedom of the press.
Art. 17. All forms of
worship are equally free.
Everyone has the right to profess
and freely practice his religion, provided that the
public
order is not disturbed thereby.
Art. 18. The right to teach is free.
All persons have the right to found private
educational establishments in conformity with
law and under the control, and supervision
of the State.
Primary instruction is
compulsory.
Public instruction is gratuitous in
all grades.
Art. 19. The right to trial by jury is established in criminal cases and
in cases
involving
political offenses and those committed by the press.
Art. 20. Haitians have the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed to
discuss all
questions,
by complying with the laws regulating the exercise of this right, without,
however,
submitting to a previous authorization.
This provision shall not be
applicable to meetings in the public places, which shall
be
entirely subject to the police regulations.
Art. 21. Haitians have the right to join and form associations, according
to the
law.
Art. 22. The right of petition is personally exercised by one or several
individuals,
never in the name of a body. Petitions
may be addressed to the Legislative
Power
or to the Executive Power.
Art. 23. The secrecy of private correspondence entrusted to the mails is
inviolable. The law shall establish who are the agents
responsible for this violation.
Art. 24. French is the official language; its use is obligatory in
administrative and
judicial
matters.
Art. 25. No previous authorization shall be required to prosecute public
officials
for
offenses committed by them during their administration, save for the exceptions
established
by the Constitution.
Art. 26. Nothing shall be added to the Constitution or taken away from it
by
means
of a law. The letter of the
Constitution shall always prevail.
TITLE III
THE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE POWERS
TO WHICH THE EXERCISE THEREOF
IS DELEGATED
Art. 27. The National Sovereignty is vested in the universality of its
citizens.
Art. 28. The exercise of this Sovereignty is delegated to three
powers:
The Legislative Power, the Executive
Power, and the Judicial Power.
They form the Government of the
Republic, which is essentially civil, democratic
and
representative.
Art. 29. Each power is independent of the other two in its functions,
which it
exercises
independently.
None of them can delegate its
functions no go beyond the limits ascribed to it.
Art. 30. Individual responsibility is formally attached to all public
functions.
The law regulated the method of
procedure to be followed in the case of
proceedings
against public officials for acts of their administration.
CHAPTER I
LEGISLATIVE POWER
Section I
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
_______________
Art.
31. The Legislative Power is exercised
by two Chambers: A Chamber of
Deputies
and a Senate which form the Legislative Body.
Art.
32. The number of Deputies is to be
fixed in proportion to the population, on
the
basis of not more than one Deputy for each 60,000 inhabitants.
Pending a census of the population,
the number of Deputies is fixed at 35;
distributed
among the Arrondissements now existing as follows: Three Deputies for the
Arrondissement
of Port au Prince, two for each of the
Arrondissements of Cape Haitian,
Aux
Cayes, Port de Paix, Gonaives, Jeremie, Saint Marc, Jacmel, and one Deputy for
each
of the other Arrondissements.
The Deputy is elected directly by
the plurality of votes cast in primary assemblies
of
the circumscription, in the manner and under the conditions prescribed by law.
Art. 33. To be a member of the Chamber of Deputies, it is necessary:
1st, that one shall have completed
twenty-five years of age.
2nd, that one shall be in possession
of his civil and political rights.
3rd, that one shall have been a
resident for at least one year in the Arrondissement
to
be represented.
Art. 34. The members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected for two years
and
they
are indefinitely reeligible. The term
of office begins on the first Monday of April of
even
numbered years.
Art. 35. In case of vacancy in the office of Deputy by death, resignation,
disqualification
or otherwise, a successor to fill the unexpired term of office shall be
chosen
in his electoral circumscription at a special election which shall be called
immediately
by the President of the Republic. Such
election shall be held within the
period
of thirty days after the call of the primary assembly, and in conformity with
the
terms
of Article 107 of this Constitution.
The same procedure shall prevail in case of
non-election
in one or several circumscriptions.
SECTION II
The Senate
Art. 36. The Senate is composed of fifteen Senators. The term of office of
Senators
is six years and begins on the first Monday of April of even numbered years.
Senators
are indefinitely reeligible.
Art. 37. The Senators represent the Departments which are five in number,
as
follows: Four Senators for the Department of the
West; three each for the Departments of
the
North, of the South, and of Artibonite; two for the Department of the
Northwest.
Senators shall be elected by direct
vote of the people in the primary assemblies of
the
several Departments in the manner and under the conditions prescribed by
law.
The candidates in the several
Departments receiving the largest total number of
votes
being elected.
At the first election after the
adoption of this Constitution the election shall take
place
in the following manner:
In each Department the candidate
receiving the largest number of votes shall be
elected
Senator for such Department for a term of six years; the candidate receiving
the
next
largest number of votes shall be elected for a term of four years; in each of
the
Departments
of the North, of the South and of the Artibonite, the candidate receiving the
third
largest number of votes, and in the Department of the West, the candidates
receiving
the
third and fourth largest number of votes, shall be elected for a term of two
years.
Thereafter, in the regular
elections, the candidates receiving the largest number of
votes
in each of the several Departments, shall be elected for the full term of six
years.
The Senate shall be renewed by
thirds every two years.
Art. 38. To be elected Senator, it is necessary:
1st, that one shall have completed
this thirtieth (30th) year;
2nd, that one shall be in possession
of his civil and political rights;
3rd, that one shall have been a
resident for at least two years in the Department to
be
represented.
Art. 39. In case of a vacancy in the office of Senator by death,
resignation,
disqualification
or otherwise, a successor to fill the unexpired term of office shall be
chosen
in his Department at a special election which shall be called immediately by
the
President
of the Republic.
Such election shall be held within
the period of 30 days after the call of the
primary
assembly in conformity with Article 107 of this Constitution.
The same procedure shall prevail in
case of non-election in or more Departments.
Section III
The
National Assembly
Art. 40. The two Chambers shall meet in joint session and form the
National
Assembly
in the cases provided by the Constitution.
The powers of the National Assembly
are limited and cannot embrace other
subjects
than those especially attributed to it by the Constitution.
Art. 41. The President of the Senate presides over the National Assembly,
the
President
of the Chamber of Deputies is the Vice President thereof. The Secretaries of
the
Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies shall be the Secretaries of the National
Assembly.
Art.
42. The attributes of the National
Assembly are:
1st, to elect the President of the
Republic and to administer to him the
Constitutional
oath of office.
2nd, to declare war upon the report
of the Executive Power.
3rd, to approve or reject treaties
of peace and other treaties and international
conventions.
Art. 43. In years of regular presidential elections the National Assembly
shall
proceed
to the business of electing the President on the second Monday in April and
shall
continue
that business to the exclusion of all other business, meeting every day
excepting
Sundays
and legal holidays until a President is elected.
Art. 44. The election of the President of the Republic is made by a secret
ballot
and
by an absolute majority thereof.
If, after the first count, no
candidate has secured the number of votes required for
an
election, a second ballot shall be taken.
If on this second ballot no
candidate is elected the election shall be concentrated
on
the three candidate who have obtained the greatest number of votes.
If, after three ballots, none of
these three candidates has been elected, the election
shall
be made from the two who shall have received the greatest number of votes. The
candidate
of these two who secures the largest number of votes shall be proclaimed
President
of the Republic.
If the votes for the two candidates
are equally divided, the election shall be
decided
by lot.
Art. 45. In case the office of the President becomes vacant, the National
Assembly
is bound to meet within a period of ten days after such vacancy occurs with or
without
convocation by the Council of the Secretaries of State.
Art. 46. The meetings of the National Assembly are public. Nevertheless, it may
go
into secret session upon the request of five members, and decide thereafter by
an
absolute
majority whether or not the meeting shall continue to be held in public.
Art. 47. In case of urgency when the Legislative Body is not in session,
the
Executive
Power may convene the National Assembly in extra session. He shall
communicate
in a written message to the National Assembly the reasons for this measure.
Art. 48. The presence in the National Assembly of a majority of each of
the two
Chambers
is necessary for the transaction of business by it, but a smaller number may
adjourn
from day to day and may compel the attendance of members in such manner and
under
such penalties as the National Assembly may prescribe.
CHAPTER II
Section I
The
Exercise of Legislative
Power
Art. 49. The seat of the Legislative Body is established in the Capital of
the
Republic.
Art. 50. The Legislative Body meets by right on the first Monday of April
in each
year. The session shall date from the organization
of the Bureaus of the two Chambers.
The
session is for a term of three months.
In case of necessity, this period may be
extended
to four months, either by the Executive Power or the Legislative Body.
The President of the Republic can
adjourn the chambers. But the
Adjournment
cannot
be for more than one month, nor can there be more than two adjournments in the
course
of the same session.
Art. 51. In the intervals between the regular sessions, and in the case of
urgency
the
President of the Republic may call an extra session of the Legislative
Body.
The President, in a message
addressed to the Legislative Body, gives the reasons
for
such a measure.
In the case of an extra session, the
Legislative Body cannot deal with any other
subjects
than the one for which the extra session was called.
Art. 52. Each chamber is the judge of the election of its members and
shall decide
finally
all contests which may arise on the subject.
Art. 53. The members of each Chamber shall individually take the oath to
maintain
the rights of the people and to be faithful to the Constitution.
Art. 54. The meetings of the Chambers are public.
Each Chamber may resolve itself into
a Secret Committee at the request of five
members,
and decide thereafter by an absolute majority whether or not the meeting
should
continue to be held in public on the same question.
Art. 55. The Legislative Power enacts laws on all subjects of public
interest. The
initiative
belongs to each of the two Chambers, as well as to the Executive Power.
Nevertheless,
the law of the Budget, and laws concerning the assessment,
distribution
and mode of collection of taxes and contributions, these having for object the
creation
of revenues or the increase the expenses of the State, must be first voted by
the
Chamber
of Deputies.
In case of difference between the
two Chambers with reference to these laws, each
Chamber
shall designate in equal number, by lot, an interparlementary commission to
settle
definitely the disagreement.
The Executive Power alone shall have
the right to initiate legislation involving the
expenditure
of public monies; and neither Chamber shall have the right to increase the
expenditures,
or any item thereof, proposed by the Executive Power.
Art. 56. Each Chamber, by its own rules, fixes its discipline and
determines the
method
according to which it exercises its functions.
Each Chamber may punish its members
for disorderly conduct and may expel a
member
by a majority of two-thirds of its membership.
Art. 57. The members of the Legislative Body, except in case of flagrante
delicto,
or
of treason or felony punishable by corporal or ignominious punishment, shall
not be
subject
to prosecution or arrest, during the period of the session without the
authority of
the
Chamber to which they belong.
In any case they shall be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the
session
of their respective Chamber and in going to a returning to the same.
Art. 58. Neither Chamber shall take any measure without the presence of
the
absolute
majority of the members, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may
compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties
as
each Chamber may prescribe.
Art. 59. No act of the Legislative Body shall be passed except by a number
of
votes
equal to or greater than a majority of the members present, except as otherwise
provided
for in this Constitution.
Art. 60. No project of law can be adopted by either Chamber without having
been
voted
article by article.
Art. 61. Each Chamber has the right to amend and divide the articles and
amendments
thereto proposed. The amendments voted
by one Chamber shall not be
made
a part of the bill until after they have been voted by the other Chamber; and
no bill
shall
become a law until it shall have been passed in the same form by both Chambers.
Any
project of law may be withdrawn from discussion so long as such project has not
been
definitely adopted.
Art. 62. Every bill voted by the Legislative Body shall be immediately
sent to the
President
of the Republic, who before promulgating it, has the right to make objections
thereto
in whole or in part. In that case he
shall return it to the Chamber in which it
originated
with a written message stating his objections.
If the bill is amended by this same
Chamber it is sent to the other Chamber with
the
objections. If the bill thus amended is
passed by the second Chamber it shall be sent
anew
to the President to be promulgated.
If the objections are rejected by
the Chamber in which the bill originated, it is sent
to
the other Chamber with the objections.
If the Second Chamber rejects it
likewise, the bill is sent to the President who
must
thereupon promulgate it.
The rejection of the objections is
voted in each Chamber by a majority of
two-thirds
of each Chamber. In this case the votes
of each Chamber shall be determined
by
yeas and nays, and the votes of the members shall be noted opposite their names
in the
record.
If in each of both Chambers there is
not a majority of two-thirds of the members
to
reject the bill, the objections are accepted.
Art. 63. The right to object shall be exercised within the period of eight
days
from
the date of presentation of the bill to the President, exclusive of Sundays and
days of
adjournment
of the Legislative Body in conformity with Article 50 of this Constitution.
Art. 64. If within the period prescribed by the preceding articles the
President of
the
Republic does not make any objection, the law must be promulgated, unless the
session
of the Legislative Body ends before the expiration of the prescribed period, in
which
case the bill shall fail to become law.
Art. 65. A bill rejected by one of the two Chambers cannot be reintroduced
during
the same session.
Art. 66. The laws and all other acts of the Legislative Body become
official
through
the publication thereof in the "Moniteur" and the insertion in a
printed numbered
bulletin
entitled: Bulletin des Lois.
Art. 67. A law takes the date of its definite adoption by the two
Chambers; but it
becomes
binding only after its promulgation in conformity with the law.
Art. 68. No one can present petition to the Legislative Body in person.
Art. 69. Each member of the Legislative Body shall receive a monthly
salary of
one
hundred and fifty dollars, dating from the taking of his oath of office.
Art. 70. The function of members of the Legislative Body is incompatible
with
any
other salaried State function.
CHAPTER III
THE EXECUTIVE POWER
Section I
The President of the Republic.
Art.
71. The Executive Power is exercised by
a citizen who takes the title of
"President
of the Republic."
Art. 72. The President of the Republic is elected for a term of four
years.
He shall be inaugurated on the
fifteenth of May, except when elected to fill a
vacancy;
in this case he is elected for the unexpired term, and shall enter upon his
duties
immediately
after his election.
The President is eligible for
immediate reelection. A President who
has been
reelected
may not be elected for a third term until a period of at least four years has
elapsed.
citizen who shall have served three terms as President shall not again be
eligible
for
the office.
Art. 73. To be eligible for election to the office of President of the
Republic it is
necessary:
1.
To have been born of Haitian father, and never to have renounced the
Haitian
nationality.
2.
To be over forty years of age.
3.
To be in the enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Art. 74. The President, shall, before entering upon his duties, take
before the
national
Assembly, the following oath:
I swear before God and before the Nation to observe and to cause to
be
faithfully observed, the Constitution and the laws of the Haitian People,
to
respect their rights, to maintain the national independence and territorial
integrity."
Art. 75. The President of the Republic appoints and dismisses the
Secretaries of
State.
He is charged with the duty of
seeing that the provisions of the treaties of the
Republic
are carried out.
He causes the seal of the Republic
to be affixed to the laws and promulgates them
within
the delays prescribed by Articles 62, 63 and 64.
He is charged with the execution of
the Constitution, and of the laws, acts, and
decrees
of the Legislative Body and of the national Assembly.
He issues all regulations and
decrees necessary for that purpose, without ever
being
able to suspend or interpret the laws, acts and decrees themselves, not dispense
with
executing them
He makes no appointment to public office except by virtue of the
Constitution, or
by
virtue of the express provisions of the law and ion accordance with the
conditions
which
it prescribes.
He provides, in accordance with the
law, for the internal and external safety of the
State.
He makes all treaties and
international conventions subject to the sanction of the
National
Assembly.
Except in the case of indictment or
impeachment he has the right of pardon, and
commutation
of sentences relative to contradictory condemnations finally adjudicated.
He
grants amnesty in political offenses, subject to the provision of the law.
He
commands and directs the armed forces of the Republic, and confers rank
therein
according to law.
He may require the opinion in
writing of the principal official in each of the
ministerial
departments, upon any of the subjects relative to the duties of their
respective
departments.
Art. 76. If the President becomes unable temporarily to exercise his
functions, the
Council
of Secretaries of State is charged with the Executive Authority as long as the
disability
lasts.
Art. 77. In case a vacancy occurs in the office of President of the
Republic for
Executive
Authority rests temporarily in the council of the Secretaries of State [sic].
It shall immediately convoke the
National Assembly for the purpose of electing a
successor
to serve for the unexpired portion of the Presidential term of office.
In case the legislative bodies are
in session, the National Assembly shall be
convoked
without delay. If the Legislative Body
is not in session, the National Assembly
shall
be convoked in accordance with Article 45.
Art. 78. All acts of the President, excepting the decrees appointing or
revoking
the
Secretaries of State, shall be countersigned by the Secretary of State whom
they may
concern.
Art. 79. The President has no other power than these formally conferred
upon
him
by the Constitution and the special laws enacted by virtue of the Constitution.
Art. 80. At the opening of each session of the Legislative Body, the
President
shall
transmit to each of the two chambers, separately, a message in writing, giving
an
account
of his administration during the preceding year and explaining the general
situation
of the Republic, both at home and abroad.
Art.
81. The President of the Republic
receives from the Public Treasury an
annual
salary of twenty-four thousand dollars.
Art. 82. The President shall reside in the National Palace of the Capital.
Section II
Secretaries of State.
Art. 83. The Secretaries of State are five in number:
They shall be assigned to the
several ministerial departments which are
necessitated
by the service of the State. A decree
shall assign the Secretaries of State
to
the several Departments in conformity with the law.
Art. 84. To be eligible to the office of Secretary of State it is necessary:
1.
To be over thirty years of age.
2.
To be in the enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Art. 85. The Secretaries of State shall compose a Council under the
Presidency of
the
President of the republic, or of one of their number designated by the
President.
All
the deliberations of the Council shall be recorded in a register; the minutes
of
each meeting shall be signed by members of
the council present.
Art. 86. The Secretaries of State have the right to the floor of either
chamber of
the
Legislative Body, as well as to the floor of the National Assembly, but only
for the
purpose
of discussing projects of law proposed by the Executive Power, and of
sustaining
objections
raised by it, or to make any other official communication.
Art. 87. The Secretaries of State shall be responsible each in that which
concerns
him
for the acts of their Departments, as well as for the non-execution of the laws
pertaining
thereto.
They shall correspondence [sic]
directly with the authorities subordinate to them.
Art. 88. Each Secretary of State shall receive from the Public Treasury an
annual
salary
of six thousand dollars ($6,000).
CHAPTER
III [sic]
The
Judicial Power.
Art. 89. The Judicial Power is vested in one Supreme Court and in inferior
courts,
of
which the mode and extent of jurisdiction shall be established by law.
Art.
90. The judges of all courts are
appointed by the President of the Republic.
He appoints and revokes the officers
of the Public Ministry near the Supreme
Court
and the other courts , the Justices of the Peace and their assistants.
Art. 91. No one can be appointed Judge of officer of the Public Ministry,
if he is
not
over thirty years of age for the Supreme Court, and over twenty-five years for
the
other courts.
Art. 92. The Supreme Court does not judge as to facts. Nevertheless, when upon
a
rehearing, even upon exception, the same case, between the same parties, shall
be
presented,
the Supreme Court allowing the appeal, will not remand the case, and a full
bench
will decide upon the merits of the case.
Art. 93. The Judges of the Supreme Court, those of the Courts of Appeal of
first
instance,
shall be appointed for life.
The law shall settle the conditions
under which they shall cease to enjoy the
privilege
of irremovability, and the mode of their retirement on account of age or any
other
disability or by reason of the suppression of a court.
They shall no be transferred from
one Court to another or entrusted with other
functions,
even if superior without their consent.
Art. 94. The functions of Judge are incompatible with all other public
salaried
functions.
Incompatibility resulting from
relationship or alliance shall be regulated by law.
The
law will regulate also the conditions required to be Judge in all grades.
Art. 95. Commercial litigation shall be within the jurisdiction of the Courts
of
First
Instance and of the Justice of the Peace, in conformity with the Code of
Commerce.
Art. 96. The sittings of the Courts shall be public, unless this publicity
is deemed
detrimental
to the public order or morals; in that case a declaration to that effect shall
be
made
by the court.
The hearings in cases of political
offenses and of offenses committed through the
press
shall never be secret.
Art. 97. Every judicial decree or decision shall set forth the ground upon
which it
is
rendered. It shall be rendered in open
court.
Art. 98. The Supreme court shall take cognizance of all cases of conflicts
according
to the mode established by the law.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction
to revise all decision rendered by a Military
Court
for lack of jurisdiction or excess of power.
Art. 99. The Supreme Court, sitting in full bench shall decide upon the
constitutionality
of laws. The Courts shall refuse to
apply any law declared
unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court.
Neither shall they apply decrees and
general regulations of public administration,
which
are not in conformity with the laws.
CHAPTER IV
Prosecution
of the Members
of the Power of State.
Art. 100. The Chambers of Deputies impeaches the President and causes him
to
be
tried before the Senate for high treason or any other crime or misdemeanor
committed
in
the exercise of his functions. It also
impeaches:
1.
The Secretaries of State in cases of malversation, treason, abuse or
excess of
power,
or any other crime or misdemeanor committed in the exercise of their functions.
2.
In case of forfeiture, the Judges of the Supreme Court, or one of its
sections
and
any officer of the public ministry near the Supreme Court.
The arraignment cannot be pronounced
except by a majority of two-thirds of the
Members of the Chamber.
In arraigns them [sic] in
consequence before the Senate sitting as a high court of
justice.
At the opening of the sitting, each
member of the high court of Justice shall take
the
oath to judge with the impartiality and the firmness as becomes an upright and
free
man
according to his conscience and his intimate convictions.
When the President of the Republic
is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court
shall preside. The High Court of
Justice shall not pronounce any other penalty than
deposition,
removal or the depriving of the right to fill any public function during one
year
at least and five years at most; but the party convicted shall be liable to
individual
trial,
before the ordinary courts according to law if there is occasion to apply other
penalties
or to decide upon the exercise of civil suit.
No one can be judged nor condemned
except by a majority of two-thirds of the
members of the Senate.
The limitations imposed upon the
length of sessions of the Legislative Body in
Article
50 of this Constitution, shall not serve to terminate proceedings when the
Senate
is
sitting as a high court of justice.
Art. 101. In case of forfeiture, any judge or officer of the Public
Ministry shall be
arraigned
by one of the sections of the Supreme Court.
If the entire court is involved then
a full bench of the Supreme Court shall
pronounce
the arraignment.
Art. 102. The law shall determine the mode of proceeding against the
President of
the
republic, the Secretaries of State and the judges in cases of crimes or
misdemeanors
committed
by them, either in the exercise of their functions or outside of this exercise.
CHAPTER IV
Communal
Institutions.
Art. 103. There shall be a council for each Commune.
This institution is fixed by
law.
The President of the Communal
Council shall have the title of Communal
Magistrat.
A law shall provide in the Communes
or in the Arrondissements public officials
who
shall directly represent the Executive Power.
Art. 104. The following principles should form the bases [sic] of the
Communal
Institutions:
1.
Election of the Communal Councils by the primary assemblies every two
years.
2.
The Communal Councils have cognizance of everything that is of Communal
interest,
without prejudice of the approval of their acts in the cases and according to
the
mode
determined by law.
3.
The publicity of the sittings of the Councils within the limits
established by
law.
4.
The publicity of the budgets and accounts.
5.
The intervention of the Executive Power to prevent the councils from
exceeding
their powers and injuring the general interests.
Art. 105. The Communal Magistrates are paid by their Communes.
Art. 106. The Communal Council
can disburse per month only one twelfth part
of
the sums voted for its annual budget.
CHAPTER V
Primary Assemblies.
Art. 107. The primary assemblies meet in the manner prescribed by law
without
previous
convocation, in each Commune, on the tenth of January of even numbered
years. Their object is to elect at the periods
fixed by the Constitution, the
Deputies
of the People, the Senators of the Republic, the Municipal Councilors and to
decide
upon the amendments proposed to the Constitution.
They can not consider any other
subject except which is assigned to them by this
Constitution. They are required to dissolve so soon as
this is accomplished [sic].
Art. 108. The law prescribes the qualifications required to exercise the
right to
vote in the primary assemblies.
TITLE IV
Finances.
Art. 109. Taxes for the benefit of the State and of the Communes shall be
levied
only
by law. No tax can be levied on the
Communes except with their formal consent.
Art. 110. The laws levying the taxes shall endure for one year only.
Art. 111. No special privilege with regard to taxation shall be
established. No
exemption,
increase or decrease of taxes shall be made except by law.
Art. 112. No pension, gratuity gratification, subsidy or allowance
whatsoever, to
be
paid out of the Public Treasury, shall be granted, except by a law proposed by
the
Executive
Power.
Art. 113. The simultaneous holdings of several salaried State offices is
formally
forbidden, except as professors in secondary
and high schools.
Art. 114. The budget submitted by each Secretary of State shall be divided
into
chapters
and shall be voted article by article.
Transfers of appropriations are
forbidden.
The Secretary of State for finance
shall be bound, on his personal responsibility,
to
limit expenditures for the benefit of a ministerial department so that, at the
end of any
month,
the total disbursement shall not exceed the proportional share of the total
amount
appropriated
for the year for that department, unless, in extraordinary cases, authority for
the
excess expenditures shall be authorized by the Council of the Secretaries of
State.
The
general accounts of the receipts and expenses of the republic shall be kept by
the
Secretary of State for Finance, in accordance with the mode of accounting to be
established
by law.
The fiscal year shall begin on the
1st of October and shall end of the 30th of
September
of the following year.
Art. 115. Each year, the Legislative Body passes upon:
1st, the accounts of receipts and
expenditures for the preceding year or years;
2nd,
the General Budget of the State, containing an estimate of and the amount of
funds
allotted to each Secretary of State, for the year. Nevertheless, no salary already
fixed
by special law can be increased or decreased by virtue of an item in the
budget, but
any
such change can only be affected by a change of the special laws.
Art. 116. The general accounts and the budgets prescribed by the foregoing
article
must be submitted to the Legislative Body by the Secretary of State for
Finance,
within
eight days at the latest after the opening of the Legislative session.
The examination and liquidation of
the accounts of the general administration and
of
all other offices accountable to the Public Treasury shall be made in
accordance with
the
mode established by law.
Art. 117. In case for any reason the Legislative Body does not pass the
budget for
any
or several Ministerial Departments before adjournment, the budget or budgets
for the
Department
concerned for the current fiscal year shall remain in force for the ensuing
fiscal
year.
TITLE V
The Public Force.
Art. 118. An armed force, designated as the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, is
established to
maintain
order, to secure the people in their rights and to police the cities and the
country.
This shall be the sole armed force of the
republic.
Art. 119. Regulations for the maintenance of discipline in the Gendarmerie
and
the
punishment of offending members of its personnel shall be established by the
Executive
Power and shall have the force of law.
These regulations shall provide for
the organization of Gendarmerie
Courts-Martial,
shall prescribe their powers, and shall define the obligations of the
members
and rights of persons brought to trial before them.
The judgments of Gendarmerie
Courts-Martial are subject only to review by the
Supreme
Court and then only upon question that jurisdiction was lacking or that the
powers
of the court were exceeded.
TITLE VI
General Provisions.
Art. 120. The National Colors shall be blue and Red, horizontally
placed.
The coat of arms of the Republic
shall consist of a palm tree surmounted by a cap
of
liberty adorned by a trophy with a legend "L'Union Fait la Force".
Art. 121. No oath shall be imposed except in accordance with the
Constitution or
the
law.
Art.
122. The National Fete days shall
be:
That of the independence of Haiti,
the first of January; and that of Agriculture, the
first
of May.
Other legal holidays shall be
determined by law.
Art. 123. No law, decree or rule of the public administration shall be
obligatory
until
after its publication in the manner and form established by law.
Art. 124. All the elections shall be by secret ballot.
Art. 125. Martial law can only be declared in the case of peril imminent to
the
interior
or exterior security.
The decree of the President of Haiti
declaring martial law must be signed by a
majority
of the Secretaries of State present in the Capital.
Report thereof shall be made at the
opening of the Chamber by the Executive
Power.
Art. 126. The exercise of martial Law shall be regulated by a special law.
Art. 127. The present Constitution and all the treaties now in force or to
be
concluded
in the future, and all the laws decreed in conformity with this Constitution or
with
these treaties shall constitute the law of the land and their relative
superiority is
determined
by the order in which they are mentioned.
All provisions of laws which are not
contrary to the prescriptions of this
Constitution
or to the treaties now in force or in the future remain in force until they
shall
have
been formally amended or repealed, but those which are contrary thereto are and
remain
abrogated.
TITLE VII
Revision of the Constitution.
Art. 128 Amendments to the Constitution shall be adopted by the majority
of the
votes
cast by the entire electorate of the Republic.
Either Chamber of the Legislative
Body,
or the President of the Republic by means of a written message to the
Legislative
Body,
may propose amendments to this Constitution.
Proposed Amendments may not be
submitted to the country for adoption until
their
submission shall have been approved by both Chambers of the Legislative Body by
two-thirds
of their respective membership.
They shall then be published
immediately in the "Moniteur".
During the three months preceding
the vote, the text of the proposed amendments
shall
be posted by each Communal Magistrate in the principle public places of his
commune,
and shall be printed at least twice each month in the public press of Haiti.
At
the next succeeding regular biennial meeting of the primary assemblies, the
proposed
amendments
shall be voted upon, amendment by amendment, by yes or no, in separate
secret
ballot and such proposed amendments as shall have received an absolute majority
of
all the votes cast on the amendments throughout the entire Republic at such
election
shall
become integral part of the Constitution on the date of meeting of the
Legislative
Body.
SPECIAL ARTICLE
All acts of the Government of the
United States during its Military Occupation in
Haiti
are ratified and validated.
No Haitian can be subject to civil
or criminal process for any act performed in
execution
of the orders of the Occupation or under its authority; nor shall the acts of
the
Military
Courts of the Occupation be subject to review by the Haitian tribunals, but
this
shall
not be held to abridge the right of pardon.
Similarly the acts of the Executive
Power up to the promulgation of this
Constitution
are ratified and validated.
TITLE VIII
Transitory Provisions.
Art[icle]. A. The term of office of the citizen who is
President of the Republic at
the
time of the adoption of this Constitution shall end on the fifteenth (15th) day
of May,
nineteen
hundred and twenty-one.
Art. B. The terms of office of Communal Council existing at the time of
the
adoption
of this Constitution shall end in January 1920.
Art. C. The first elections for the membership of the Legislative Body,
after the
adoption
of this Constitution, shall be held on January 10th of an even numbered year.
The year shall be set by the
President of the Republic in a decree issued at least
three months before the meeting of the
Primary Assemblies;
The sessions of the Legislative Body
so elected shall begin on the Constitutional
date immediately following these first
elections.
Art. D. A Council of State, instituted on the same principle as that by
the Decree
of
April 5, 1916, consisting of twenty-one members apportioned among the different
Departments
shall exercise the Legislative Power until a duly elected Legislative Body
shall
have been constituted, at which time this Council of State shall cease to
exist.
Art. E. The irremovability of the Judges is suspended during a period of
six
months,
from the promulgation of this Constitution.
IN THE NAME OF THE REPUBLIC
The President of the republic orders
that the seal of the republic be affixed to the
above
Constitution submitted to popular suffrage and ratified June 12, 1918, and that
it be
printed,
published and executed.
Done at the National Palace, at Port
au Prince, June 19, 1918, the 115th year of
Independence.
DARTIGUENAVE
By the President:
The Secretary of State for the
Interior and Public Worship,
OSMIN CHAM
The Secretary of State for Finance
and Commerce,
DR. EDMOND HERAUX
The Secretary of State for Public
Works and Agriculture,
FURCY CHATELAIN
The Secretary of State for Foreign
Relations and Justice,
ED. DUPUY
The Secretary of State for Public
Education,
AUG. SCOTT246
Appendix
10: The Official Report of the Death of
Charlemagne
From: District Commander, District of Grande
Riviere
To: Chief of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti
Subject: Charlemagne M. Peralte
1.
In the month of August, the undersigned arranged with two Haitians and a
gendarme
named Jean Edmond Francois to effect the capture of Charlemagne Massena
Peralte. These two Haitians, whose names I
communicated to you verbally, as generals,
and
the gendarme, as their secretary, took up a position at Capois and organized a
Caco
camp.
2.
At different times, chiefs such as Papillon, Albert Jean Jacques, Osiris
Joseph,
Ti-Jacques,
Mercelin and others visited the camp at Capois and in view of the fact that
Charlemagne
had not arrived, several attacks were made on Capois to offset the
suspicion,
if any existed, that all was not right in the camp. During one of these attacks
the
report was given out that the undersigned had been wounded and in order to give
publicity
to this fact I went about my duties in Grande Riviere with my arm in a sling.
3.
On Sunday morning, October 26, 1919, Charlemagne Massena Peralte, his
brother
Saint Remy Peralte, Adhemar Francismar, Papillon, Estravil, and many other
chiefs
and about 1,200 bandits arrived at Capois.
The undersigned then arranged, through
the
men mentioned above, too have the town of Grande Riviere attacked, and if
possible
during
the attack to have Charlemagne at a place called Mazaire to await news of the
attack.
4.
This was arranged and Grande Riviere reinforced by Gendarmes and a
machine
gun manned by Marines. News was
received that Charlemagne had agreed to
the
attack and would wait for reports at Mazaire.
5.
On the night of the attack on Grande Riviere, Friday Oct. 31, 1919, the
undersigned,
Second Lieutenant William R. Button, Gendarmerie d'Haiti (faces
blackened),
and twenty gendarmes, dressed in old civilian clothes took up positions near
Mazaire
and while in position about seven hundred bandits passed on their way to make
the
attack on Grande Riviere. About ten
o'clock a gendarme, who had been with the
bandits,
as secretary, arrived and notified me that Charlemagne had changed his mind and
would
await reports of the attack on a high hill between Capois and Grande Riviere,
that
the
countersign for the night was "General Jean" and that a detachment of
bandits would
bring
him the reports when he would descend and enter Grande Riviere in triumph.
6.
The undersigned then decided to modify his plan to the extent that he
would be
the
bandit detachment bringing the reports, and with Edmond Francois in the lead,
proceeded
and after three hours of difficult mountain climbing, arrived at the first
outpost
of
Charlemagne's band . . . We went
forward, the secretary leading, followed by the
undersigned
(armed with a .45 Colt automatic and another .38 Colt revolver) in turn
followed
by Lt Button (armed with the machine gun [a BAR--Browning Automatic
Rifle])
on turn followed by gendarmes armed with carbines, with ammunition in small
Haitian
macoots. We passed the first outpost of
about 20 men, who stood on both sides
armed
principally with machetes, without any trouble, they apparently being all
excited
over
the capture of Grande Riviere. After
walking about five minutes we were again
halted
by the second outpost of about 40 men and after necessary countersign was
given,
advanced. At the third outpost and the fourth we were not
halted and we passed there
without
any comment. . . At the fifth outpost
we were halted and it appeared that we
would
have to get in action as the leader there was on the job with a revolver in his
hands.
When
we passed he raised his revolver. The undersigned,
by appearing to be greatly
exhausted
and winded, got by. But he grabbed Lt
Button by the arm and said, "Where
did
you get such a nice looking rifle" referring to the machine gun. The undersigned had
arrived
about 8 paces ahead of Button and Button said:
"Let me go, don't you see my
Delegue
is getting out of sight." At the
same time Button jerked away and followed the
undersigned
narrowly escaping being detected. The
sixth outpost was the immediate
guard
over Charlemagne, about thirty paces distant from where Charlemagne was. The
secretary
and the undersigned passed this post, when the secretary said to me "Up
there
he
is." Lt Button and myself advanced
to within fifteen feet of Charlemagne who was
standing
over a fire and was speaking with his woman when two men halted us and
worked
the bolts of their rifles. Charlemagne
attempted to get away, evidently becoming
suspicious
and his men were getting their arms ready whereupon I said to Button "All
right"
and opened fire on the escaping Charlemagne; Button opening on the Cacos with
his
light Browning.
7.
All gendarmes were placed in position to offset any counter attack. Search
was
made for any dead and the undersigned found Charlemagne's body, shot through
the
heart. Nine other bandits were killed and it is
also surmised that St. Remy Peralte was
wounded
and got away. Captured nine serviceable
rifles, three revolvers, two hundred
rounds
ammunition, seven swords, fifteen animals and large amount of correspondence.
All
invaluable articles which were not deemed necessary to transport were
burned. I
brought
Charlemagne's body into Grande Riviere at 9:00 a. m. November 1, 1919.
/s/ HERMAN H. HANNEKEN248
Appendix
11: Major General Commandant Barnett's
Initial Correspondence About
Alleged
Indiscriminate Killings of Haitians.
Presented
as evidence by General Barnett before a Senate investigating committee, 24
October
1921.
(Confidential)
September
27, 1919
From: The major general commandant.
To: The brigade commander, First Provisional
Brigade, Marines, Port au Prince, Haiti.
Subject: Unlawful acts by members of the Gendarmerie
d'Haiti and marines in Haiti.
1.
It appears from the testimony in the general court martial cases of
Pvts. Walter
E.
Johnson and John J. McQuilkin, jr., Marine Corps, and from the argument of the
counsel
for the defense in the case of Pvt. Johnson, First Lieut. F. L. Spear, that
unlawful
executions
of Haitians, called Cacos, have occurred in Haiti. You will issue immediately
necessary
and proper instructions regarding these unlawful actions.
2.
It appears that Sergt. Brokaw, lieutenant of the Gendarmerie, has been
transferred
north to the hospital, so no action can be taken in his case.
3.
Make an investigation and submit a confidential report regarding the
actions of
Lieut.
Spear, as stated in his argument as counsel for the defense in the
court-martial case
of
Pvt. Johnson. A copy of this argument
is attached hereto [not included].
4.
Such unwarranted and unlawful actions on the part of officers and men of
the
Marine
Corps or of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti can not be tolerated under any
circumstances.
George Barnett249
(Personal.)
Headquarters First Provisional
Brigade,
United
States Marine Corps,
Port au Prince, Republic of Haiti,
October
17, 1919
Maj.
Gen. George Barnett,
Major General Commandant United
States Marines Corps,
Headquarters
United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC
My Dear General: I received your letter in the last mail, and
am answering it at
once
to assure you that I have taken up the matter you mention most seriously and
will go
into
it thoroughly. I am enclosing herewith
a copy of a confidential order I have just
issued,
as well as a proclamation. The
proclamation will be published in all the
newspapers
in Haiti, posted in all towns, and read at the markets to the people of each
town
by the majistrat (mayor).
I have gotten out several other
proclamations since my arrival, with a view of
quieting
the fears of the people regarding the bandits.
Almost immediately upon my arrival
things began popping here right and left and,
together
with an unsatisfactory political situation, kept me on the jump.
[Body of letter is a report on the
current situation in the 1918-20 Caco revolt.]
As you know, General, I shall give
my best to the situation here, which is far from
satisfactory;
and with the backing that I know I may expect from headquarters, I feel
confident
I can clear it up and make a record for the corps.
With kindest regards to Mrs. Barnett
and yourself,
Very
sincerely,
John H. Russell
[General
Barnett's evidence included the French original of Col. Russell's proclamation
to
the
Haitian people, which is omitted here.]
NEW
ADDRESS TO THE POPULATION.
Headquarters First Provisional
Brigade,
United States Marine Corps,
Port
au Prince, Republic of Haiti,
October
15, 1919.
CITIZENS: You have now all be assured that the reign of corvee has been
definitely
abolished. At a certain time a certain
form of work had been judged as
necessary
by your government, which was the means of open [sic] certain parts of your
country
which was almost inaccessible, but a year ago it had been decided that the need
for
such work was not necessary. Corvee,
consequently, has been abolished and will
never
be in usage in Haiti.
The occupation intends to establish
for you, in your country, a permanent peace,
in
order that you may engage yourself in your agricultural enterprises and others,
and thus
be
able to earn an honest living.
To this I pray you to continue your
former occupation with zeal in the persuasion
that
you are entirely and sincerely protected by the occupation.
The occupation is determined to
enforce only the laws of Haiti and have them
respected,
and it will assure its entire protection to all the good and peaceable citizens
while
it will drive out the bandits.
John
H. Russell
Colonel, United States Marine Corps
commandant
of the Brigade
Headquarters, First Provisional
Brigade,
United
States Marine Corps,
Port
au Prince, Republic of Haiti,
October
15, 1919
Confidential
Order:
1.
The brigade commander has had brought to his attention an alleged charge
against
marines and gendarmes in Haiti to the effect that in the past prisoners and
wounded
bandits have been summarily shot without trial. Furthermore, that troops in the
field
have declared and carried on what is commonly known as an "open
season" where
care
is not taken to determine whether or not the natives encountered are bandits or
"good
citizens"
and where houses have been ruthlessly burned merely because they were
unoccupied
and native property otherwise destroyed.
2.
Such action on the part of any officer or enlisted man of the Marine
Corps is
beyond
belief; and if true, would be a terrible smirch upon the unblemished record of
the
corps,
which we all hold so dear.
3.
Any officer, noncommissioned officer, or private of the Marine Corps, or
any
officer
or enlisted man of the United States Navy attached to this Brigade, or any
officer,
noncommissioned
officer, or private of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, guilty of the
unjustifiable
and illegal killing of any person whomsoever will be brought to trial before
a
general court martial or military commission on a charge of murder or
manslaughter, as
the
case may warrant.
4.
The unjustifiable maltreatment of natives and the unlawful violation of
their
person
or property will result in the trial and punishment of the offender.
5.
All officers and noncommissioned officers are enjoined to see that the
provisions
of this order are most strictly enforced, and anyone having a knowledge of the
violation
of this order and not promptly reporting it will be considered an accessory to
the
crime.
6.
This order will be furnished to all commanding officers, and the
contents of
this
confidential order will be carefully and fully explained to every officer,
noncommissioned
officer, and private in the Marine Corps and Gendarmerie d'Haiti in
Haiti.
7.
Commanding officers will report in writing to the brigade commander,
when
every
officer and enlisted man in their respective commands have been thoroughly
informed
and are fully aware of the contents of this order.
8.
The chief of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti will report in writing to the
brigade
commander,
when every officer and enlisted man in the Gendarmerie and coast guard is
fully
conversant with the contents of this order.
9. Upon arrival in Haiti, all commissioned
officers and enlisted men of the
Marine
Corps will immediately be fully informed of the contents of this order and the
commanding
officer of units to which they are assigned will report in writing to their
immediate
senior in command that this has been done.
10.
The chief of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti will have the contents of this
confidential
order carefully explained to all officers and men joining his organization and
will
be held strictly responsible that all officers and men in the Gendarmerie
d'Haiti are at
all
times thoroughly familiar with it.
John H. Russell250
[The
following report was submitted as evidence by Maj. T. C. Turner, USMC, Col.
Russell's
officer investigating Gen. Barnett's allegations and former First Brigade adjutant
and
acting chief of staff; 26 October 1921.]
Headquarters,
First Provisional Brigade,
United
States Marine Corps,
Port
au Prince, Republic of Haiti,
March
13, 1920
Confidential
From: The brigade commander.
To: The Major General Commandant
Subject: Report of investigation of certain
irregularities alleged to have been committed
by officers and enlisted men in the
Republic of Haiti.
1.
From a careful reading and study
of the attached testimony [not included
here],
statements, and other reports, I am reluctantly forced to the opinion that Maj.
Clarke
H. Wells, formerly Gendarmerie department commander in northern Haiti, is
responsible
for the conditions in northern Haiti as found by Brig Gen. Catlin [former First
Brigade
Commander, see below] on his inspection of the Hinche-Maissade districts in
March,
1919. If such conditions were not
actually due to his orders and instructions.
2.
I am further of the opinion that those Gendarmerie officers under Maj.
Well's
command
who were enlisted men in the Marine Corps, on duty in said districts, were
acting
in accordance with what they believed to be the policy of their department
commander.
3.
It is difficult to believe that Capt. Doxy was not fully aware of Maj.
Well's
policy
and of the existing orders and conditions in the Hinche-Maissade district.
4.
There is no doubt, however, in my mind as to whether or not the evidence
as
here
brought out is sufficient to warrant a trial before a general court martial on
charges if
such
a serious nature. It is extremely
doubtful if further evidence can be procured.
5. The event referred to herein occurred over a
year ago. Many changes have
taken
place in the personnel of the Gendarmerie since that time. Nearly all the interested
parties
have either returned to the United States or have been discharged from the
service.
Mr.
Lavoie, former captain G. D. H. and private United States Marine Corps, has
left the
service
and Haiti, and his whereabouts is unknown.
6.
It is therefore recommended that these papers be referred to the office
of the
Judge
Advocate General, United States Navy, where the sworn statements and other
evidence
may be carefully sifted and weighed with a view of determining whether or not
it
is sufficient to warrant a trial.
7.
If the decision is in the affirmative, it is requested that specimen
charges and
specification
be prepared by the Judge Advocate General's office, and that a competent
officer
be assigned to temporary duty with this brigade to act as judge advocate of the
court. At present, there is no officer attached to
the brigade who is considered to have
sufficient
legal knowledge to conduct a trial, to the best interest of the Government,
where
skilled opposing counsel is present.
8.
The return to Haiti of all witnesses and interested parties would, of
course, be
necessary.
John H. Russell251
[Brig.
Gen. Albertus W. Catlin, USMC, succeeded Col. Russell in Command of 1st
Provisional
Brigade in late November 1918, being relieved by Col. Russell in turn in
September
1919. Gen. Catlin appeared before the
Senate investigating committee on 9
November
1921, but his report, referred to by Col. Russell, above, was not given as
evidence,
although Gen. Catlin did answer questions on his March 1919 inspection of the
Hinche-Maissade
district, which later resulted in the preferring of court martial charges
against
several Marines. Gen. Catlin did offer
the following letter from Lieut. Col.
Richard
Hooker, who apparently was Assistant to the Chief of the Gendarmerie at the
time
of the report.]
February 15, 1919
Personal.
My Dear General: I left for Hinche Tuesday last, arriving
back here to-day. I
inspected
the whole district south of San Michel.
I am sending this to you by special
messenger,
as I consider immediate action most urgent.
The Fifty-fourth Company will
leave
here for Hinche district Tuesday at the latest on a hike, arriving in Hinche
next
Friday
or Saturday. This will give you time to
approve or modify my recommendations
given
later in this letter.
I found the following conditions
existing: The corvee is still going on,
camouflaged
either accidentally or otherwise by the payment of one gourde [20+] to not
more
than one gourde forty per week per man.
Men are kept for long periods of time on
this
work, and in order the escape the draft they take to the hills, joining the
so-called
Cacos. The magistrate of Maissade is a bad egg and
should be removed, being back of
the
corvee and using about 50 for his own garden.
This can be taken up earlier. It
was
very
hard for me to find out anything from the gendarmes themselves, as the entire
district
was expecting me. I questioned all the
natives I could get to come to me, and
together
with the information I received from the priests I an certain the corvee is at
the
bottom
of the whole trouble, as it was in 1917, when Hinche was attacked the first
time.
The
other cause, which is equally as important as the corvee, is the indiscriminate
strong-arm
work being pulled off. A great many
innocents have suffered; and those who
are
outside the towns, not necessarily with the Cacos, are remaining in the bush
through
fear
of the gendarmes, who are given and helped in their methods by officers of the
Gendarmerie
unqualified by intelligence or experience to act in executive capacities. I
am
sorry to have to state that I got the impression that the offices higher up
were
approving
these methods.
I ran into a horrible condition in
San Michel. On Wednesday or Thursday I
had a
talk
with Lieut. Haug. He was in a frightful
mental condition and on the verge of a
nervous
breakdown. He volunteered and told me
the following, which I corroborated by
the
magistrate, his interpreter, and the priests:
On the 4th of February he ordered some
prisoners
to work on the "place". When
15 or 20 minutes had passed and the prisoners
had
not arrived he went personally to investigate.
A corporal was standing in front of the
prison
door, and when questioned, refused point blank to either let the prisoner out
to
work
or to obey any order from Haug. Haug
then told him to give him the key to the
prison,
and when he reached to take the key from the corporal, the corporal caught him
by
the
throat, and assisted by two other gendarmes, held him against the wall. Haug tried to
pull
his gun and found that other gendarmes had secured their rifles and had them
pointed
at
him threatening to shoot. Haug is over
50, and he is in horrible physical condition, his
mentality
is not strong, and he does not yet realize the enormity of the mutiny. The next
day,
while I was out of San Michel, Capt. Gibbons, of Gonaives, arrived to make an
investigation. Gibbons was supposed to have mad an
investigation much sooner, as he
knew
at least seven days previously that mutinous or similar conditions existed at
San
Michel. He claims that he knew nothing of the
assault. When I arrived in the evening
I
found
that he had conducted his investigation by informing Haug that he was going to
do
his
best to drive him out of the Gendarmerie and other like remarks. This was while my
orderly,
Sasse [a Marine], was present. He
conducted the investigation by calling each
gendarme
in separately, excluding Haug, and making him stand outside. My confidential
interpreter
told me later that the gendarmes were very much pleased because they had put
their
officer in a bad hole and would get a new officer, which they wanted. I,
unfortunately,
was too late to be present before the investigation started and to prevent
Haug
from being placed in the position of the accused. I took charge later to the extent of
ordering
Gibbons back to Gonaives, with instructions to return with sufficient men to
place
the mutineers under arrest and to regarrison the place with reliable men. Wells not
knows
of it, and if the Gendarmerie does not act immediately and properly I will take
charge. The news of the affair has spread rapidly
and may become serious, although at
present
I do not believe so if action is immediately taken.
The situation in that whole district
is, to say the least, out of hand, and I strongly
recommend the following:
One squad stationed in San Michel,
for the present at least.
One squad at Maissade.
The rest of the Fifty-fourth Company
at Hinche.
I will personally go to Hinche
primarily as nearly all the people know me, and I
believe
to a certain extent trust me.
Give the men now out two weeks to
return to their farms and towns excepting, of
course,
those who through leadership have placed themselves outside the law.
Promise and see that these men who
return are not proceeded against as the
majority
of them have been forced through fear to take to the bush and not important.
Stop the corvee.
In my opinion, I do not believe it
would be proper to start a military campaign
immediately
until all efforts to regain the lost confidence of the people in us are tried
out.
Very
sincerely,
R. C. Hooker.
In reading this letter over in some
respects it does not seem strong enough and in
other
too strong, but I can not impress too strongly on you that in my opinion a
change of
régime
is most necessary and do not believe any gendarme change will help.
P.S.--Private Sasse, the bearer of this
letter, was with me and can give you any
details
not included.252
Appendix
12: Results of Major General Commandant
Lejeune's Investigation into
Alleged
Indiscriminate Killings of Haitians.
October 12, 1920
From: Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune,
United States Marine Corps and
Brig. Gen. Smedley D. Butler, United States Marine Corps.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Investigation of offenses alleged to have
been committed by certain officers of
the Gendarmerie of Haiti at Hinche
and Massade [sic], Haiti, during the winter of
1918-19.
1.
During the month of August last it came to the attention of the Major
General
Commandant
that the report of an investigation into the alleged misconduct of certain
officers
of the Gendarmerie of Haiti, which the brigade commander had been directed to
make
by the former Major General Commandant in an order approved by the Secretary of
the
Navy under date January 12, 1920, could not be found at headquarters United
States
Marine
corps. A searching inquiry was made,
and no information in regard to the report
could
be obtained from anyone on duty at headquarters Marine Corps or in any office
of
the
Navy Department. The Major General
Commandant also communicated by radio
with
the brigade commander in Haiti in regard to the matter, and learned from him
that
the
report in question had been transmitted by mail from Haiti on March 20,
1920.
Apparently
it had been lost in transit. On August
12, 1920, just prior to our leaving
Washington
for Haiti, you gave us verbal instructions to make a careful supplementary
investigation
of the whole matter and to report in full to you on our return to the United
States.
2.
In compliance with your instructions, every effect was made to obtain
full and
reliable
information on the subject. We examined
all officers of the marine Corps and of
the
Gendarmerie of Haiti now serving there who had any knowledge of the affair; also
a
number
of enlisted gendarmes, Haitian officials, ex-gendarmerie officers, and the
French
priest
at Hinche, as well as two ex-gendarmerie officers now living in Santo Domingo.
Some
of the witnesses had left the island and are now in the United States. An effort is
now
being made to get in touch with them.
3.
In our opinion, the evidence obtained by us and by the board of
investigation
establishes
the following facts, viz:
(a)
The abolition of corvée or enforced labor on the roads by the people of
Haiti,
which
had been in effect under the supervision of the Gendarmerie of Haiti in
accordance
with
the rural code of the country since 1916, was directed in an order issued by
the
commandant
of the Gendarmerie, to take effect on October 1, 1918.
(b)
The order was not obeyed at Hinche and Maissade [sic].
(c) The unauthorized corvee continued until
March, 1919, when it was stopped
by
Brig. Gen. A. W. Catlin, United States Marine Corps, and then brigade
commander,
who
made a personal investigation of conditions at Hinche and Maissade at the time.
(d)
During the winter of 1918 and 1919 there was a serious increase in the
activity
of bandit bands, conditions finally becoming so grave that the Gendarmerie of
Haiti
was unable to handle the situation single handed, and in March, 1919, the
marines
were
brought into the district of Hinche to take charge of the situation.
(e)
Nearly all the witnesses examined stated it to be their opinion that the
serious
bandit
situation in the vicinity of Hinche was badly mishandled by the officer who
commanded
the Gendarmerie in the department of north Haiti. A number of these
witnesses
also stated that the above-mentioned officer gave his subordinate officers
orders
to report "everything quiet," in spite of the fact that collision
with the bandits were
frequently
taking place. These witnesses also
stated that, in their opinion, this officer
desired
to conceal the true state of affairs from his superiors so as to prevent the
gendarmes
being superseded by the marines who, at the time, were concentrated at Port
au
Prince and Cape Haitien. Some evidence
indicates that his orders to officers were
partly
responsible for illegal executions and continuance of corvee.
(f)
During the months of November and December, 1918, and January 1919,
several
bandit prisoners (names unknown) were illegally executed at Hinche by
gendarmes
acting under orders of Gendarmerie officers, and there is strong evidence that
Garnier
Jean, the notary at Maissade, was killed by the gendarme officer on duty at
that
place.
(g)
During the investigation in March 1919, by the then brigade commander of
the
conditions existing in Hinche and Maissade, the illegal executions of prisoners
mentioned
in the previous paragraph became known to him.
He transferred the officers
of
the Gendarmerie against whom charges were made, but took no further
disciplinary
action
in the matter.
(h)
We recommend that the brigade commander be directed to institute general
court-martial
proceedings against all persons implicated who can be brought within the
jurisdiction
of the court.
4.
We deem it appropriate to state at this time that the misconduct above
outlined
is
not indicative of the general state of affairs in the Gendarmerie of Haiti, but
that it
constitutes
an exception of the general rule of good conduct on the part of its officers
and
men. The officers and enlisted men of the Marine
Corps assigned to duty with the
Gendarmerie
have performed constructive work of the highest value; they have overcome
almost
insuperable difficulties in organizing and training the Gendarmerie, and have
made
it a military force which reflects great credit on Haiti and the United
States. The
officers
and enlisted men of the Marine Corps serving with the Gendarmerie have gained
the
loyal support of the enlisted gendarmes by means of their justness, kindness,
and
unselfish
devotion to duty. The Gendarmerie
officers, on the other hand, with on accord
stated
that they had perfect confidence in the courage and loyalty of the gendarmes.
5.
We found the military situation and general conditions in Haiti at the
time of
our
visit there to be excellent from the Marine Corps point of view. The Marine Corps
organizations
exhibited every evidence of efficiency, splendid discipline, and high
morale. Our investigation showed that the present
brigade commander has brought to
trial
all persons reported for committing offenses against the inhabitants. All papers are
transmitted
herewith.
John
A. Lejeune.
S. D. Butler253
RESUME
OF TESTIMONY TAKEN THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT, U.
S.
MARINE CORPS, and BRIGADIER GENERAL SMEDLEY D. BUTLER, U. S.
MARINE
CORPS, DURING AN INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN ALLEGED
IRREGULARITIES
RUMORED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY OFFICERS
AND
ENLISTED MEN OF THE U. S. MARINE CORPS IN THE REPUBLIC OF
HAITI.
---------oOOo---------
These
irregularities were:
1st: Illegal execution of Haitiens [sic].
2nd: Imposition of force labor upon citizens of
Haiti in the District of
Hinche.
In explanation it should be stated
that force labor or "Corvee," which is legal
under
the provision of the Code Rural of the Republic of Haiti in connection with the
maintenance
of a road system, had been stopped by order on October 1, 1918. It has been
alleged
that prisoners have been executed by Marines without trial, and that Haitians
had
been
required to work on the roads in the vicinity of Hinche between October 1,
1918,
and
March 13, 1919.
There is included herewith a
"Report of Proceedings of a Board of Investigation
convened
at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, by order of the Major General Commandant, to inquire
into
certain irregularities alleged to have been committed by officers and enlisted
men in
the
Republic of Haiti, March 13, 1920 [sic]"
The
following Marines and Ex-Marines were interrogated by the Major General
Commandant
and General Butler, and gave, in substance, the following testimony:
FREDERICK C. BAKER:
Formerly a sergeant of Marines
and
Captain
in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, stationed at Gonaives, Haiti, in the
Department
of the North, commanded by Major Clarke
B. Wells,
U.S.
Marine Corps, at that time serving as a colonel of Gendarmerie
d'Haiti. Mr. Baker stated that at no time did he hear
Major Wells give an
order
to continue "corvee" work, but did know that "corvee" was
in
existence
contrary to General Orders. Mr. Baker
is now employed as
Superintendent
of a cotton plantation at St. Michel, Haiti.
FREEMAN LANG:
Formerly an enlisted man in the
marine
Corps
and Lieutenant in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, at present employed on a
cotton
plantation conducted by Frederick C. Baker, at St. Michel,
Haiti,
stated that he was in Hinche prior to October 1, 1918, and that he
left
Hinche about November 25, 1918. That by
the orders of Ernest
Lavoie,
a former enlisted man in the Marine Corps, and Captain of the
Gendarmerie
d'Haiti, he worked "corvee" until about November 15, 1918.
He
heard Major Wells tell Lavoie to confiscate all newspapers that
contained
news relative to the stopping of the "corvee" so that the people
in
the vicinity of Hinche would not know that "corvee" had been stopped.
Saw Lavoie tear up the official
newspaper - "Le Moniteur," containing the
news of the stopping of "corvee". This paper was addressed to the
Magistrates of Massaide and
Hinche. Heard Major Wells tell Lavoie
"We
are out in the hills and can get
away with most anything." Later
Lavoie
told him (Lang) the same thing in
connection with "corvee" work.
All this
was prior to November 5, 1918, and
after the order stopping "corvee" had
been received by the officers at
Hinche. Stated that he never heard
anyone
accuse Lavoie of shooting prisoners;
that he considered Lavoie very
erratic. He further stated that every time Major
Wells came to Hinche he
drank
rum with Lavoie, and about once a month would drink heavily,
Lavoie
doing the same. Stated that on one
occasion he (Lang) wrote a
typewritten
report, at Lavoie's dictation, to Major Wells, reporting a fight;
that
he marked the envelope "Personal" and sent it by special messenger.
Stated
that at that time he reported by radio "All Quiet," On one occasion
Captain
Stallworth, of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti,
reported a fight by radio,
and
was censured by Major Wells, and detached to another district.
HARRY OSMAN:
Formerly an enlisted man in the
Marine Corps
and
lieutenant of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, at present employed on Mr.
Baker's
cotton plantation, stated in substance, that he was on duty at the
Headquarters
of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, that an
enlisted
man of the marine corps and Lieutenant of the Gendarmerie
d'Haiti,
Dercas L. Williams, now a sergeant of the Marine corps confined
at
Quantico, Va. told him (Osman) that Lavoie and he (Williams)
had
crucified people in Hinche - had nailed them to a cross. That they had
killed
fourteen (14) one afternoon. Osman further stated that Lavoie told
him
that he (Lavoie) started "Cacos" in Hinche by his working of the
"corvee".
LAWRENCE BOLTE:
Formerly an enlisted man in the Marine
Corps
and a lieutenant in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, and now employed by
Baker
at St. Michel, stated that he was stationed at Fort Liberte, Haiti,
from
some time prior to October 1, 1918, until December 31, 1918; that he
heard
no one give an order to continue "corvee" work after the order
stopping it had come out. Knew nothing about shooting of prisoners or
"corvee",
but that he forwarded messages during this period from Hinche,
signed
"Lavoie", and reporting "everything quiet."
EDWARD J. SIEGER:
Formerly an enlisted man in the Marine
Corps,
and a lieutenant of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, stated, in substance,
that
he arrived at Hinche about November 10, 1918, and left in two or
three
days for Thommassique.
"Corvee" was being worked at that time,
and
continued until Lieutenant-Colonel Hooker inspected some time about
the
first of February 1919.
"Corvee" was being worked under Lieutenant
Williams. Stated that on November 1, 1919, he heard
Lieutenant-Colonel
A.
S. Williams, U.S. Marine Corps, at that time Chief of the Gendarmerie
d'Haiti,
tell Lavoie "to go out to Hinche and clean it up." That he
(Lieutenant-Colonel
Williams) did not want any Provost Court prisoners.
That
if he (Lavoie) found any of them that were "Cacos" and actually had
arms
in their possession, to do away with them; that they (the Cacos) had
raised
"Hell," while he (Lavoie) was away, and that it was time to quiet
them
down, or words to that effect. He
further stated that he was in
Hinche
some time in February 1919, and heard shots one afternoon; that
he
asked Pharmacist's Mate Neuland, U.S. Navy, what they were, and was
told
it was some Gendarmes "bumping off," (shooting) prisoners out
towards
the cemetery on the Maissade Road near Hinche; that there were
six
(6) or seven (7) scattered shots. He
further stated that while he was
stationed
at Thommassique, near Hinche, that major Wells told him to
report
"everything quiet" and not to make any reports of "Caco"
troubles.
PERE BELOIT, the Roman Catholic Priest at Hinche, stated,
in
substance,
that while he had never seen any prisoners shot by marines or
Gendarmes,
he had been told that they were being shot, and had heard rifle
shots. That Captain Lavoie had come to him and had
told him that he had
boiled
and skinned a Haitien [sic] named Ciceron Lacroix, and had his
skeleton
hanging up in his (Lavoie's) house.
Father Beloit further stated
that
he had gone with Lavoie and had seen a skeleton, supposed to be
Lacroix. That there had been no unrest among the
Haitiens until
Charlemagne Peralte had escaped from prison in Cape
Haitien some time
in
August 1918; that he (Peralte) had sworn an oath to drive all the whites
from
the Island because the whites had degraded him by making him
sweep
the streets of Cape Haitien while a prisoner.
That Peralte was the
leader
in the revolt; had gathered the Haitiens together; that the discontent
among
the natives which caused them to join Peralte, was the illegal
enforcement
of the "corvee" law after the first of October 1918. That
prior
to that time they had been quiet.
He (Father Beloit) was much
incensed
that the articles had appeared in American newspapers attacking
the
administration of the Marines in Haiti, and that he wished to write an
article
in defense of the Marines; that he had lived in Hinche thirteen (13)
years,
and with the exception of the brutalities alleged to have been
committed
or practiced by Lavoie and his subordinates, he had nothing but
words
of praise for the conduct of affairs under the Americans. He stated
that
General Catlin had visited him in March 1919, and that he had told
him
of these stories of atrocities just as he told us.
PATRICK F. KELLY:
At present an enlisted man in the Marine
Corps
and a Captain in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, stationed at Grande
Riviere,
stated that he was in Hinche during the first attack on that place in
made
by the "Cacos" on October 16, 1918; that he was relieved by Lavoie
about
the first of November 1918, and knew nothing about the shooting of
prisoners
nor working of "corvee".
PLINY DAGGETT:
Formerly an enlisted man in the Marine corps
and
a lieutenant in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, and was now employed on a
sugar
plantation at Barahons, San Domingo, stated, in substance: That he
left
Hinche some time in February 1919; had been stationed there but a
few
months. He stated that some time in
January 1919, six (6) or seven
(7)
Caco prisoners were taken to the cemetery and shot by Lieutenant
Andre,
a Haitian officer in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti.
States that he knows
one
Caco was shot by order of Lavoie at some other time in January 1919;
that
all of these men were shot without
trial as far as he knew. He saw
Freeman
Lang, some time in November 1918, at which time Lang was a
lieutenant
in the Gendarmerie, shoot with a machine gun a Haitien
prisoner
running across the Champ de Mars in Hinche near the radio tent.
Saw
a human skeleton hanging over a clothes line back of a house
occupied
by a medical lieutenant in the Gendarmerie named Neuland.
Never
heard anyone give any orders to shoot prisoners, but did hear Major
Welles
tell Lavoie to report everything quiet some time in November
1918. He saw "corvee" being worked in
the Hinche District in January
1919. Stated that Dorcas L. Williams, an enlisted
man in the Marine
Corps,
and at the time a lieutenant in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, and now a
sergeant
of Marines confined at Quantico, Va., told him that a man had
been
wounded in his house in Maissade during the raid by Cacos (this
was
in reference to the alleged murder of a Haitien by Williams). He
thinks
that no member of the Gendarmerie in the District of Hinche would
have
dared to act on his own responsibility in the matter of killing
prisoners
in Hinche. Heard Lavoie say that they
did not want any
prisoners
at the Department Headquarters in Cape Haitien.
FRANK VERDIER:
Now an enlisted man in the Marine Corps
and
a Captain in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, states that he went through
Hinche,
stopping a few days, during the period October 1, 1918 to March
1,
1919. That Major Wells told him to
report "everything quiet."
Stated
that
he knew nothing of the shooting of prisoners or working
"corvee." Verdier further stated that a Gunnery Sergeant named "Nick"
Carter
was stationed at Hinche in November 1918 with a Lewis machine
gun. Private Wilhelm of the Marine Corps and a
Hospital Corps man of
the
Navy named Neuland were both stationed at Hinche at that time, and
they,
together with Carter, if found, should, if
possible, have their
statements
taken.
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL RICHARD S. HOOKER, U. S.
Marine
Corps, Assistant to the Chief of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, states
that
he was ordered by General Catlin to investigate conditions in Hinche
in
February 1919 [see above]; That he did so; that he found "corvee"
work
on
the road to Maissade, District of Hinche; that he heard these rumors of
the
shooting of prisoners and the fighting taking place between the
Gendarmes
and the Cacos notwithstanding the reports from Major Wells
that
all was quiet. That he wrote a note on
a Corona typewriter to General
Catlin,
setting forth the result of his investigation; that he kept no copy
of
his notes and that no record of it could be found in the files of the
Brigade
Headquarters at Port au Prince, Haiti.
Colonel Hooker further
states
that General Catlin, before leaving Haiti, said to him (Hooker) in
substance
as follows: "I suppose you wonder
why I never did anything
about
the Hinche matter." Hooker said
"that he did," whereupon General
Catlin
further stated, in substance:
"that he did not do anything because it
was
during the period of the consideration of the Versailles Treaty, and
that
he did not wish to embarrass our President by having stories of
cruelty
appear about our own soldiers when we were taking a position on
the
side of "Humanity", or words to that effect.
We questioned other Marines but
could find out nothing, and they all disclaimed
any
knowledge of "Corvee" or shooting.
As far as we could find out, there
were no rumors of any illegal shooting of
prisoners
prior to October 1918 nor subsequent to March 1919, except on those occasions
which
are a matter of record in the Judge Advocate General's Department of the Navy,
in
view
of the trial of the offenders by General Court-Martial. In one instance which
occurred
at Croix de Boquet, near Port-au-Prince, involving a Marine named Brokaw, he
(Brokaw)
was adjudged insane by a board of medical survey [see below], and sent back
to
the United States.
There are appended hereto eight (8)
statements of Gendarmes who served in
Hinche
during the period October 1, 1918, to March, 1919, relative to the shooting of
prisoners. These statements involve FREEMAN LANG. [Not included.]
There are also appended hereto four
(4) statements from Gendarmes relative to the
killing
of Mr. Garnier Jean by Sergeant Dorcas L. Williams, U. S. Marine Corps. [Not
included.]
There is also appended an extract
from a letter written by Captain George D.
Hamilton,
U.S.M.C., to Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Hooker, U.S.M.C., relative to orders
issued
by Major Wells to him (Hamilton) to shoot Cacos. [Not included.]254
Appendix
13: Report of the Mayo Court of
Inquiry, the Final Report on Caco Casualties,
and
Reports of Military Justice Proceedings.
From
various persons' testimony before the Senate investigations committee, October
and
November
1921; names of persons named in various previous reports are in bold.
Department of the Navy
Washington, October 16, 1920.
To: Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, United States
Navy.
Subject: Court of inquiry into the alleged
indiscriminate killing of Haitians and
unjustifiable
acts by members of the United States naval service, including those
detailed
to duty with the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, against the persons and property of
Haitians
since the American occupation July 28, 1915.
1.
A court of inquiry consisting of yourself as president and of Rear
Admiral
James
H. Oliver, United States Navy, and Maj.
Gen. W. C. Neville, United States Marine
Corps,
as additional members, and of Maj. Jesse F. Dyer, United States Marine Corps,
as
judge advocate, is hereby ordered to
convene at the Navy Department, Washington, D.
C., at 10 o'clock a. m., Tuesday, October 19,
1920, or as soon thereafter as
practicable;
and
thereafter to meet at such places as
may be deemed necessary to inquire into the
question
of the conduct of the personnel of the United States naval service in Haiti
since
the
Navy were landed in that country on
July 28, 1915, with a view to determining
whether
any unjustifiable homicides have been committed by any of such personnel;
whether
any other unjustifiable acts of
oppression or of violence have been perpetrated
against
any of the citizens of Haiti, or any unjustifiable damage or destruction of their
property
has occurred. In case the court finds that any of the
above-mentioned acts have
been
committed by any of such personnel the court will so report in its findings and will
further
report as to the degree of
responsibility attached to each and every person
immediately
or mediately responsible for such unjustifiable acts and if further
proceedings
should be had in the matter. If further
proceedings are recommended the
court
will comply with the provisions of
section 533, Naval Courts and Boards,
1917.
2.
The court will include in its findings its conclusions as to whether
'practically
indiscriminate
killings of natives has been going ton for some time,' as alleged in the
letter
from Brig. Gen. George Barnett, United States Marine Corps, to Col. John H.
Russell,
United States Marine Corps.
3.
The attention of the court is particularly invited to section 511, Naval
Courts
and
Boards, 1917.
JOSEPHUS DANIELS
Secretary of the Navy
From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: Admiral Mayo, president, court of inquiry.
The department's precept of October
16, ordering the court of inquiry, of which
you
are president, is hereby amended to add to paragraph 2 the following: "Also its
conclusions
as to the general conduct of the personnel of the naval service in Haiti since
July
28, 1915.254
(Navy
News Bureau. Release morning papers of
Sunday, Dec. 19, 1920.)
Secretary
Daniels authorizes the following:
The court of inquiry which convened
on October 19, 1920, by order of the
Secretary
of the Navy to inquire into the conduct of the personnel of the naval service
that
has
served in Haiti since June 28, 19195, has submitted its findings, which General
Lejeune,
commandant of the Marine Corps, and Secretary Daniels today approved.
Following are the conclusions of the
court:
The court, having thoroughly
inquired into all the facts and circumstances
connected
with the allegations contained in the precept and having considered the
evidence
adduces, finds as follows:
FINDING
OF FACTS
1.
The court finds that two unjustifiable homicides have been committed,
one
each
by two of the personnel of the United States naval service which has served in
Haiti
since
28 July 1915, and that 16 other serious acts of violence have been perpetrated
against
citizens of Haiti during the same period by individuals of such personnel.
2.
The court finds further that these offenses were all isolated acts of
individuals
and
that in every case the responsible party was duly brought to trial before a
general
court-martial,
convicted, and sentences.
3.
The court has found no evidence of the commission of any other
unjustifiable
homicides
or other serious, unjustifiable acts of oppression or of violence against any
of
the
citizens of Haiti, or unjustifiable damage to destruction of their property,
caused by
any
of the personnel in question.
4.
In view of the fact that only unjustifiable acts found by the court to
have been
committed
are those wherein disciplinary actions that has already been taken and where
no
further proceedings could be had in the matter, the court has not deemed it
necessary
to
report further upon the question of responsibility.
CONCLUSIONS
Referring to paragraph 2 of the
receipt, it is the conclusion of the court that there
have
been no proper grounds for the statement that 'practically indiscriminate
killing of
natives
has been going on for some time,' as alleged in the letter from Brig. Gen.
George
Barnett,
United States Marine Corps, to Col. John H. Russell, United States Marine
Corps.
Referring to the amendment to the
precept calling for the conclusions of the court
as
to the general conduct of the personnel of the naval service in Haiti since
July 28,
1915,
the court does not consider that the small number of isolated crimes or
offenses that
have
been committed by a few individuals of the service during the period in
question are
entitled
to any considerable weight in forming a conclusion as to the general conduct of
such
personnel. It was inevitable that some
offenses would be committed. However,
considering
the conditions of service in Haiti, it is remarkable that the offenses were so
few
in number and that they all may be chargeable to the ordinary defects of human
character,
such defects as result in the commission of similar offenses in the United
States
and
elsewhere in the best-regulated communities.
The general conduct of our troops of
occupation can be fairly judged by the
results
of the occupation.
Now, for the first time in more than
a hundred years tranquillity and security of
life
and property may be said to prevail in Haiti.
The Haitian people themselves
welcomed the coming of our men and are
unwilling
to have them depart.
The establishment and maintenance of
tranquil conditions and the security of life
and
property all over the Republic of Haiti has been an arduous and dangerous and
thankless
task. That task our marines have
performed with fidelity and great gallantry.
The court cannot refrain from
recording its opinion of much, and that the most
serious
part, of the reflections which have been made upon the officers who have served
in
Haiti.
The outstanding characteristic of
those officers, from the brigade commander
down,
has been their sympathetic attitude toward every step that would lead to a
betterment
of the country and to improvement of the physical, mental, and moral
conditions
of the population.
With slender resources and
inadequate administrative authority they have
accomplished
much, where anything more than suppression of an organized insurrection
seemed
impossible.
The above remarks apply with
particular force to those officers and enlisted men
of
the Marine Corps who have been serving as officers of the Gendarmerie of
Haiti.
After a careful study of the matters
in issue, based not only on the evidence in the
record
but also upon other original and reliable sources of information, and the
court's
own
observations while in Haiti, the court regards the charges which have been
published
as
ill considered, regrettable, and thoroughly unwarranted reflections on a
portion of the
United
States Marine Corps which has performed difficult, dangerous, and delicate duty
in
Haiti in a manner which instead of calling for adverse criticism is entitled to
the
highest
commendation.
The record of the proceedings of
this twenty-first day of the inquiry was read and
approved;
and the court having finished the inquiry, then, at 11 o'clock a. m., adjourned
to
await the action of the convening authority.
H. T. Mayo
Rear
Admiral, United States Navy, President
Jesse F. Dyer
Major,
United States Marine Corps, Judge Advocate256
Headquarters
United States Marine Corps,
Adjutant and Inspector's Department,
Washington,
October 25, 1920.
From: Maj. Edwin N. McClellan, United States
Marines Corps.
To: The Major General Commandant via the
adjutant and inspector.
Subject: Error in the report of Brigadier General
Barnett (reference (a).)
Reference: (a)
Report of affairs in the Republic of Haiti, October, 1920. [Not included.]
1.
An error in addition caused an excess of 1,000 casualties to Haitians in
the
above
reference. In preparing the above
report the following tabulation by years was
made
but added up incorrectly to show 3,250 instead of 2,250:
1915--------------------------------------- 212
1916--------------------------------------- 50
1917--------------------------------------- 2
1918--------------------------------------- 35
1919--------------------------------------- 1,861
1920--------------------------------------- 90
Total----------------------------- 2,250
2.
No explanation, except extreme haste in the preparation of this report,
can be
made
of this grave error.
E.
N. McCLELLAN
Major,
United States Marine Corps.257
The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, October 29, 1921.
My
Dear Senator: In compliance with the
requests contained in your two letters of the
25th
instant I enclose herewith the following papers concerning the charges
preferred
against
Maj. Clarke. H. Wells, United States Marine Corps:
[List of
documents omitted.]
These inclosures will show that one
charge was preferred against Maj. Wells and
that
it was withdrawn before trial.
Inclosure (C) will show that Major Wells was first
temporarily
released from arrest in order that "he may not be unduly prejudiced before
the
court
of inquiry" convened "to investigate conditions in Haiti," while
inclosure (G)
revoked
the order for Maj. Well's trial in view of the fact "that the exhaustive
evidence
adduced
by the said court of inquiry fails to contain evidence upon which court-martial
proceedings
could be held in the case of Maj. Wells."
The questions regarding the
mental
condition of Louis Brokaw, formerly private, United States Marine Corps, and
lieutenant,
Gendarmerie d'Haiti, are fully answered in the following inclosed papers
marked.
[List of
documents omitted]
The last address of Mr. Brokaw, as
given by him on April 22, 1921, in a
communication
to the office of the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, was
"Route
No. 1, Fairview, Fulton County, Ill."
[Paragraph
describing documents already in the possession of the committee omitted.]
Trusting that I have furnished you
with the desired information and papers, I am,
Very
sincerely yours,
EDWIN DENBY
Hon.
Medill McCormick
United States Senate, Washington, D.
C.
(A)
Headquarters
United States Marine Corps
Washington,
D. C., November 1, 1920
From: The major general commandant.
To: The Secretary of the Navy. Subject: Investigation of affairs in Haiti.
Inclosures: 22
[not included.]
1.
In September, 1919, the record of the proceedings of a general
court-martial at
Port
au Prince, Haiti, in the cases of Pvts. Walter E. Johnson and John J.
McQuilkin,
jr.,
United States Marines Corps, were received in this office and were found to
contain
references
by counsel to a practice of executing Haitian prisoners without trial. The
Major
General Commandant immediately referred the matter to the brigade commander
in
Haiti for a full investigation, with the object of bringing such practice, if
it existed, to a
stop,
and of bringing all persons found to be guilty of such practice to punishment.
2.
On December 9, 1919, the brigade commander, Col. John H. Russell, United
States
Marine Corps, forwarded the record of investigation, conducted by the assistant
adjutant
and inspector attached to brigade headquarters, with recommendation that the
statements
of officers and men in the United States be obtained. This was accomplished
and
all papers were returned to Haiti on January 12, 1920, with instructions that
the
investigation
be completed as soon as practicable and the full report, together with
recommendations
of the brigade commander, submitted to these headquarters.
3.
On March 20, 1920, the brigade commander mailed the complete report, but
it
was
never received, being apparently lost in the mail. The fact that the report had not
been
received was not discovered until august last, and it was not until the return
last
months
of Gens. Lejeune and Butler from a trip of inspection in Haiti and Santo
Domingo
that
all of the report was available at these headquarters.
4.
[Description of inclosures, most of which, except for individual
statements,
have
been reproduced, above.]
5.
On or about August 25, 1918, the commandant of the Gendarmerie issued an
order
abolishing the system of corvée (enforced labor) on the public roads. This was
extended
by another order, October 18, 1918, to include the Hinche/Maissade districts,
which
had been interpreted as being outside of the limits of the first order. The system
was
continued in those districts notwithstanding the said orders and caused a great
deal of
unrest
and disturbance. The continuation of
the corvée was repeatedly denied by Maj.
Clarke
H. Wells, the commander of the Gendarmerie in the Department of the North,
Haiti. Finally the brigade commander personally
investigated the matter and found the
corvée
still in existence at Hinche and Maissade.
6.
Lieut. Col. Alexander S. Williams was chief of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti,
and
from
the evidence available it does not appear that he kept himself sufficiently informed
of
conditions. Moreover, it appears from
the statement of Edward J. Seiger, formerly an
enlisted
man in the Marines Corps and a Lieutenant in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, that
Lieut.
Col. Williams, on November 1, 1918, told Capt. Lavoie, of the Gendarmerie, that
no
provost prisoners were wanted; that if Lavoie found that any of the prisoners
were
"Cacos"
and actually had arms in their possession to do away with them. These
statements,
if made, would show at least that the chief of the Gendarmerie approved of
the
unlawful killings of prisoners, and such approval would have had a baleful
effect in
the
indoctrination of his subordinates.
There appears, however, to be insufficient
evidence
for bringing Lieut. Col. Williams to trial at this time, and it is recommended
that
action
on his case be deferred until after the receipt of the record of proceedings of
the
court
of inquiry now in session.
7.
There is evidence that Maj. Clarke H. Wells had knowledge of the
continuation
of the system of corvée in the Hinche-Maissade districts during the period
November
1, 1918, to March 31, 1919, in the department under his command, and failed
to
suppress it, well knowing that the order of the chief of the Gendarmerie of
August 25,
1918,
and October 18, 1918 prohibited corvée; that on or about November 2, 1918, he
gave
orders over the telephone from Cape Haitien to Frederick C. Baker, at that time
a
private
in the Marine Corps and a captain in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, to "bump
off",
meaning
to kill, prisoners; that on or about March 19, 1919, he have Captain George D.
Hamilton
orders to kill any man whom Capt. Hamilton thought to be a Caco and not to
bring
him to prison; that at divers times during the period November 1, 1918, to
March
31,
1919, he gave orders to his juniors to suppress reports of any unfavorable
conditions
in
regard to the state of peace in the Department of the North, of which he was in
command. In view of the foregoing I recommend that
Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United
States
Marine Corps, be brought to trial by general court-martial for these offenses,
and
for
such other offenses as may be warranted by the evidence.
8.
From the statements in the attached papers it would appear that Doras L.
Williams,
now a sergeant in the Marine Corps at Quantico, Va., and then a lieutenant in
the
Gendarmerie d'Haiti, beat to death with a stick one Garnier Jean during the
month of
March,
1919, in the town of Maissade; that he had three prisoners, names unknown, shot
to
death during the month of March, 1919, at the same place; that during the
period
November
1, 1918, to March 31, 1919, he permitted work under the corvee system on the
roads
in the Maissade district in violation of the orders of the commandant of the
Gendarmerie. It is recommended that he be brought to
trial for these offenses, and for
such
others as may be in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General be warranted by
the
evidence.
9.
From the statements available it appears that former Pvt. Ernest Lavoie,
formerly
a captain in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, was guilty of numerous offenses. He was
discharged
on July 20, 1919, upon expiration of enlistment, and his present address is not
known. In case it is possible to bring within the
jurisdiction of a naval court-martial, it is
recommended
that he be brought to trial. While his
present whereabout [sic] are
unknown
he could probably be located in case of necessity.
10.
From the statements of certain native gendarmes it appears that former
Sergt.
Freeman
Lang, while a lieutenant in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, committed certain alleged
offenses. He was discharged in January, 1919, and is
now living in Haiti. It case it is
possible
to bring within the jurisdiction of a naval court-martial, his trial is
recommended
.
JOHN
A. LEJEUNE
(K) [Originally included out of
sequence.]
Navy
Department,
Washington, November 1, 1920.
To: Maj. Edwin N. McClellan, United States
Marine Corps, Judge Advocate, General
Court-Martial, Marine Barracks, Port au Prince, Haiti.
Subject: Charge and specification in case of Clarke
H. Wells, Major, United States
Marine Corps.
1.
The above-named officer will be tried before the general court-martial
of
which
you are judge advocate upon the
following charge and specification. You
will
notify
the president of the court accordingly,
inform the accused of the date set for
his
trial,
and summon all witnesses, both for the
prosecution and the defense.
Charge: Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline.
Specification: In that Charles H. Wells, then a major in
the United States Marine
Corps,
while serving in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti in the command of the department of
the
north
of the Republic of Haiti, did, on November 2, 1918, at Cape Haitien, Haiti, by
telephone
to Frederick C. Baker, then a private, United States Marine Corps, while
serving
as a captain in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti at Gonaives, Haiti, willfully,
maliciously,
and
without proper authority or justification, deliver and cause to be delieved to
the said
Capt
Baker an order to "bump off" any undersirable or useless Haitian
prisoners which
he,
the said Baker, might have captured or might capture in the operations at that
time
being
conducted by the Gendarmerie d'Haiti against the Cacos in the vicinity of
Maissade,
Haiti, by words "Bump off," used as aforesaid, meaning and intending
to
kill
such aforesaid prisoners; the United States then being in a state of war.
----------------------
Acting Secretary of the Navy.
(B)
Department of the Navy,
Office
of the Judge Advocate General,
Washington, November 5, 1920
From:
The Judge Advocate General.
To:
the Major General Commandant,
Subject:
Investigation of conditions in Haiti and the trial by court-martial of certain
officers of the Marine Corps.
Reference:
Your letter of November 1, 1920, and inclosures.
1.
Referring to the subject matter of above-mentioned reference, you are
informed
that one charge and specification of a charge were prepared against Maj.
Clarke
H. Wells, United States Marine Corps, and orders issued for trial of said
officer
on
November 1, 1920. This action was
necessary to prevent the statue of limitations from
preventing
the prosecution of said case, as the offense upon which the charge and
specification
were based was alleged to have been committed on November 1, 1918. The
two-year
limitation prescribed by article 61, A. G. N., expired November 1, 1920, and
would
have barred the prosecution had not orders been issued for trial before the
expiration
of two years from the date of the offense.
2.
In view, however, of the fact that a court of inquiry has been convened
by
order
of the Secretary of the Navy to investigate certain alleged irregularities in
Haiti,
among
which matters to be investigated are those contained in the above-mentioned
reference,
the Secretary of the Navy has directed that the trial of Maj. Wells be deferred
until
after the court of inquiry, which is now in session, has completed its work and
rendered
its report. The Secretary has also
directed that no further charge and
specifications
be prepared against persons in the Marine Corps based upon the
irregularities
reported in the above-mentioned reference until after the court of inquiry
has
submitted its report.
3.
The Secretary of the Navy has directed that the charge and specification
prepared
against Maj. Wells on November 1, 1920, be returned to the department, where
they
will be held pending further developments.
4.
With reference to the case of Doras L. Williams, United States Marine
Corps,
you
are informed that unless arrest is considered necessary to prevent escape, he
need not
be
placed under arrest until after the completion of the investigation now being
conducted
by
the court of inquiry, unless otherwise ordered by the Secretary of the Navy.
GEO. R. CLARK.
(C)
Department of the Navy,
Washington, November 5, 1920.
From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: The Major General Commandant.
Subject: Investigation of conditions in Haiti and the
trial by court-martial of certain
officers
of the Marine Corps.
References: (a)
Your letter November 1, 1920.
(b) Letter of Judge
Advocate General to the Major Commandant, dated
November
5, 1920.
1.
The charge and specification preferred by the department against Maj.
Clarke
H.
Wells, United States Marine Corps, on November 1, 1920, have been temporarily
withdrawn
from the court and ordered returned to the department pending the completion
of
the investigation of other charges against said officer and other alleged
irregularities in
Haiti
by the court of inquiry of which Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo is president. The
charge
and specification are not to be regarded as having been quashed or abandoned by
the
department but merely as held in temporary abeyance.
2.
It is directed that Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine Corps, be
temporarily
released from arrest and restored to duty pursuant to section 52 Naval Courts
and
Boards. The order temporarily releasing
him from arrest should be in writing and
should
inform of the reasons for his release; also that his temporary release from
arrest
and
restoration to duty will not be a bar to any subsequent investigation or trial
of the
case
that the Secretary of the Navy may think proper to order on the charge already
preferred
or other charges now being investigated.
3.
The reasons for the temporary release from arrest of Maj. Wells are that
he
may
not be unduly prejudiced before the court of inquiry convened by order of the
department
to investigate conditions in Haiti; that he may have every opportunity to
defend
himself as an interested party before said court; that the department may have
opportunity
to investigate other charges against and in order that he may not be held an
unreasonable
length of time under arrest awaiting trial be court-martial.
JOSEPHUS
DANIELS
(D)
Headquarters
United States Marine Corps,
Washington, November 8, 1920.
From: The Major General Commandant.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Temporary withdrawal of charge and
specifications against Major Clarke H.
Wells, United States Marine Corps.
References: (a)
Letter of Secretary of the Navy to Major General commandant,
forwarding charge and specifications of date November 1,
1920. (b) Letter
Major General Commandant to Major
Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine
Corps, of date November 6, 1920,
placing him under arrest. (c) Letter of
Secretary of the Navy to Major General Commandant, No.
5526-321, of date
November 5, 1920, directing
temporary withdrawal of charge and
specifications
preferred by the department against
Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine
Corps, on November 5, 1920, and
release from arrest.
1.
In compliance with reference (c), Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United States
Marine
Corps,
has this date been released from arrest
and restored to duty, pending completion
of
the investigations of the court of inquiry, of which Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo,
United
States Navy, is president.
2.
Maj. Wells has been informed that his temporary release from arrest and
restoration
to duty is not a bar to subsequent investigation of, or trial upon, the charge
and
specifications
preferred against him by the department under date of November 1, 1912
[sic],
or upon any other charges and specifications that may hereafter the preferred
against
him
in connection with the case.
3. The receipt for the court, of
which Brig. Gen Eli K. Cole, United States
Marine
Corps, is president, bearing date of November 1, 1920, is returned herwith.
Maj.
Wells
has been allowed to retain the copy of the charge and specifications furnished
him
at
the time of his arrest.
JOHN A. LEJEUNE.
(E)
Headquarters United States Marine
Corps,
Washington, December 29,1920
From:
The Major General Commandant
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Investigation of affairs in Haiti.
References: (a)
Major General Commandant's letter November 1, 1920, same subject.
(b) Record of proceedings of court inquiry.
1.
The court of inquiry convened October 19, 1920, to inquire into the
conduct of
the
personnel of the naval service that has served in the Republic of Haiti since
July 22,
1915
[sic], of which Rear Admiral H. T. Mayo, United States Navy, was president,
included
in its findings a paragraph as follows:
"4. In view of the fact the only unjustifiable acts found by the
court to have been
committed
are those wherein disciplinary action has already been taken, and where no
further
proceedings could be had in the matter, the court has not deemed it necessary
to
report
further upon the question of responsibility."
The court had before it all of the
reports and evidence upon which my
recommendations,
contained in reference (a), were based.
It is quite apparent that the
court
considered all charges and found them, except those already subjected to
disciplinary
action, to be unsupported by sufficient evidence. The court did not
recommend
any further action.
2.
In view of the findings of the court after an exhaustive investigation,
I desire to
withdraw
the recommendations for trials of officers and enlisted men as contained in
paragraphs
6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of my letter of November 1, 1920, reference (a), inspect to
Lieut.
Col. Alexander S. Williams, Maj. Clarke H. Wells, Sergt. Dorcas L. Williams,
former
Pvt. Ernest Lavoie, and former Sergt. Freeman Lang, and to recommend that
no
further action be taken.
JOHN A.
LEJEUNE.
(F)
Department
of the Navy,
January
7, 1921.
From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: The Major General Commandant.
Subject: Investigation of affairs in Haiti.
References: (a)
Your letter December 29, 1920, 53086 AQ-17 hdh. (b)
Letter from the
Secretary
of the Navy to the Judge Advocate General, January 7, 1921,
26251-26072.
1.
A court of inquiry, of which Rear Admiral H. T. Mayo, United States Navy,
was
president, and consisting of high
ranking officers of the Navy and Marine Corps,
was specially convened for the purpose of
inquiring into the conduct of the
personnel of
the
naval service that has served in the
Republic of Haiti since July 22, 1915.
In view of
the
finding of the court that the only unjustifiable acts committed were those wherein
disciplinary
action has already been taken, and that
further fact that the exhaustive
evidence
adduced by the said court of inquiry fails
to contain evidence upon which
court-martial proceedings could be held in the cases of
Lieut. Col. Alexander B.
Williams,
Maj. Clarke H. Wells, Sergt. Dorcas L. Williams, former Pvt. Ernest
Lavoie,
and former Sergt. Freeman Lang, United
States Marine Corps, the department
considers
that no further action is warranted in their cases.
2.
The department, on November 1, 1920, directed the trial by general
court-martial
of Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine Corps, based upon certain
alleged
offenses, the facts of which were meager and questionable. The trial, however,
was
directed in order that, if the offenses had been committed, the statue of
limitations
would
not bar subsequent trial. The
department, on November 5, 1920, directed the delay
of
Maj. Wells' trial pending the findings of the court of inquiry convened as
above. The
order
of the department that Maj. Wells be brought to trial had been revoked, under
date
of
January 7, 1921, for the reasons set forth in paragraph 1 of this letter.
JOSEPHUS DANIELS.
(G)
Department of the Navy
Washington, January 7, 1921
From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: Judge Advocate General.
Subject: Revoking order for trial of Maj. Clarke H.
Wells, United States Marine Corps,
by general court-martial.
Reference: (a)
Letter from Major General Commandant to Secretary of the Navy,
December 29, 1920, 26283-3725: 4.
1.
A court of inquiry, of which Rear Admiral H. T. Mayo, United States
Navy,
was
president, and consisting of high ranking officers of the Navy and Marine
Corps, was
specially
convened for the purpose of inquiring into the conduct of the personnel of the
naval
service that has served in the Republic of Haiti since July 22, 1915. In view of the
finding
of the court that the only unjustifiable acts committed were those wherein
disciplinary
action has already been taken and that no further proceedings could be had in
the
matter, and the further fact that the exhaustive evidence adduced by the said
court of
inquiry
fails to contain evidence upon which court-martial proceedings could be held in
the
case of Maj. Wells. The previous order
of the department dated November 1, 1920,
that
Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine Corps, be brought to trial by general
court-martial
is therefore hereby revoked.
JOSEPHUS DANIELS
(H)
DISABILITY
UNDER 10 PER CENT
From: Board of Medical Survey.
To: Commandant Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., for
transmission to the Bureau of
Medicine
and Surgery.
Subject: Report of medical survey.
Place, United States Naval Hospital,
Washington, D. C.
Date, October 17, 1919.
Name, Brokaw, Louis Abraham. Grade or rate, private, United States Marine
Corps.
Attached to United States Naval
Hospital, Washington, D. C. How long at
this
place?
Sixteen days.
Admitted from naval hospital,
Charleston, S. C. Date October 1,
1919.
Born: Place, Fulton County, Ill.
Date, December 21, 1889.
Enlisted: Place, Marine Barracks, Port Royal, S. C. Date, October 4, 1916.
Copy of
abstract of health record.
(During present enlistment and
subsequent to any prior survey)
Date
of Disease Day
on
Name of Ship or Station transfer or injury sick list
Marine
Barracks, Port Royal Dec 27, 1916 None 0
Navy
Yard, Charleston Jan 14, 1917 do 0
Marine
Barracks, Port au Prince Sep
17, 1917 Poisoning by alcohol 0
Field
Hospital, Port au Prince Sep 21, 1917 do 4
Marine
Barracks, port au Prince, Haiti Apr 4, 1918 None 0
Constabulary May 29, 1919 do 0
Territorial
Hospital, Port au Prince,
Haiti Jul 30, 1919 Demential precox 0
USS
Kittery Aug
14, 1919 do 0
United
State Naval Hospital,
Charleston Sep 30, 1919 do 47
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRESENT
HISTORY OF CASE.
Diagnosis: Dementia precox.
Origin not in line of duty. Disability is not the result of his own
misconduct.
Facts
are as follows: Predisposition existed
prior to enlistment. Article 29L2,
Navy
Regulations, complied with. No
statement.
Upon admission to this hospital
patient was somewhat tense, nervous, and
physical
examination showed tremor of eyelids and vasomotor disturbance of the
hands.
However,
he was oriented and in touch with his environment. Stated that he thought he
had
been poisoned while on duty in the Tropics.
He admits having been a heavy drinker,
which
was probably responsible for his condition at this time. All symptoms have now
disappeared
and he is apparently reacting on his normal mental level.
W. M. M.
Present condition: Unfit for service.
Probable future duration: Permanent.
Recommendation: That he be discharged from the United States
Marine Corps.
No
menace.
[Signatures and endorsements omitted.]258
Department of State
Washington,
September 30, 1920.
The
Secretary of the Navy.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge, by reference from the Attorney
General,
the
receipt of your letter addressed to him on September 17, 1920, in which you
request
him
to cause the apprehension of one Ernest Levoie, with a view to his extradition
to
Haiti.
In reply I beg to state that there
is an extradition treaty in force between the
United
States and Haiti, and that if the Haitian Government shall request the
extradition
of
Levoie for an offense set forth in the treaty the department will give prompt
consideration
to such request. It should be pointed
out in this connection, however, that
the
treaty provides that neither of the contracting parties shall be obliged to
deliver up its
own
citizens, and that under the laws of the United States as interpreted by the
courts, the
Government
of the United States, in view of this treaty provision, would be without
authority
to extradite an American citizen to Haiti.
I have the honor to be, sir, your
obedient servant,
Norman H. Davis,
Undersecretarty.
(For the Secretary of State).
Office of the Attorney General
Washington , D. C., September 24, 1920.
Hon.
Josephus Daniels,
Secretary
of the Navy
Dear Mr. Secretary: I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter
of September
17th
requesting me to bring about the apprehension of Ernest Levoie, one-time
captain
of
the Haitian gendarmes, with a view to his extradition to Haiti.
As Haiti is a foreign sovereignty a
request for the extradition of any person to that
country
must come through its minister by way of the State Department. A copy of your
letter
has therefore been sent to the Secretary of State.
Wm. L. FRIERSON.
Acting
Attorney General.259
Appendix
14: Correspondence Between the Commandant
of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti and
the
Financial Advisor to the Republic of Haiti Regarding Changes in the 1916
Gendarmerie
Agreement
February
11, 1920
My
Dear Mr. McIlhenny:
The
Haitien [sic] Minister at Washington sent down
here
the proposed new Gendarmerie Agreement and it was sent over to me for comment
and
I am enclosing you my reply. I have
given the thing a great deal of thought and
either
Article XII has to stand as it is, or my proposed changes will have to be
inserted, so
as
to allow the Gendarmerie to be properly run from a financial standpoint. Personally
we
would get along fine, but suppose we were both were replaced and the new men
did
not
get along, and then the Chief of the Gendarmerie would be absolutely under the
control
of the Financial Advisor and I dont [sic] think it fair to my successor. From the
present
state of the market at home, it is impossible to forseewhat [sic] the price of
supplies
are and they have to be paid for in cast and we cant [sic] hold Colonel Radford
[unidentified]
down to different "Items" so we have to rob Peter to pay Paul as
small
monthly
shipments cannot be made. If Article
XII was changed and the old items stand
we
might as well close up shop. The
Gendarmerie is in a very serious condition due to
lack
of money and men and it is nearly six months now wince I made my original
request
for
an ingrease [sic], and during that time I have had them properly uniformed which
increased
their morale, consequently they are fighting fine, but I soon will not be able
to
do
this unless I get money and then they will get ragged again and the people will
laugh
at
them and call them vagabonds and the morale of this splendid organization will
be
badly
shattered. You must realize that
getting these men clothed cost a great deal more
than
I am allowed and furthermore we are filled up which took a great deal more
clothing.
The
Caco situation is improving and we are getting lots of rifles but we have not
the men
and
the increase is absolutely necessary to clean the thing up. I must confess I am getting
a
bit discouraged as I have worked my head off and knew a long time ago what was
needed
and you cant [sic] run the Gendarmerie on a shoe string.
Hoping to see you back in the near
future and remember me very kindly to Mrs.
McIlhenny,
the children and Alec Legree.
Sincerely
F. M. Wise
MEMORANDUM
Changes in old Gendarmerie agreement
and present agreement.
4
Directors reduced to 3
9
Inspectors increased to 10
21
first Lieutenants increased to 23
8 Second Lieutenants, Machine Gun increased to
10 #
Pay
$478,140 increased to $481,140.
Rations
$92,445 increased (from .10 to .15cts per day) to $138,667.50.
Personnel,
Clerical Force changed from detailed ratings to a lump sum, amount not
changed.
Uniforms
$66,000 increased to $109,175.
Hospital
$10,000, increased to $15,000.
COAST
GUARD.
2
Inspectors reduced to 1
4
First Lieutenants reduced to 3.#
Total
$35,048. reduced to $32,048.
Enlisted
Gendarmes to increased for one year not exceeding 467 etc/ additional to
agreement.
#Increases
and reductions in the personnel of the Land Forces and Coast Guard does not
make
any difference in the total of the pay of the personnel of the Land Forces and
of the
Coast
Guard.
Article
XII
(Original
agreement)
Allotment for the various needs of
the Gendarmerie shall be made from this sum
by
the Commandant, but the total of such allotment in any month shall not exceed
one-twelfth
of the annual appropriation, provided, however, that the surplus from one
month
may be allotted [sic] in subsequent months.
(Later
modified)
"To be divided among the
several Items as specified in Article I of this agreement
and in no other proportion, except that in
case of urgent necessity a portion of the sum
provided
for one or more Items may be diverted in the service of another with the
consent
in writing of the Financial Advisor.
A
Proposed agreement [hand-written on original]
AMENDMENT
OF THE HAITIEN [sic] GENDARMERIE AGREEMENT.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The
undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have this day
agreed
that
Articles I and XII of the Haitien [sic] Gendarmerie Agreement, made by and
between
the
Government of the United States of America and of the Republic of Haiti, on
24th of
August,
1916, shall be and they are hereby amended so as to read as follows:
Article I
_______________________________________
That the Constabulary comtemplated
[sic] by Article X of the Treaty between the
United
States of America and the Republic of Haiti, signed at Port au Prince on
September
16, 1916, shall be known as the Haitien Gendarmerie; that it's strength and
amounts
to be expended for pay, rations and expenses of operation, etcetera, shall be
as
set
forth in the following tables:
PERSONNEL PERMONTH PER
ANNUM
1
Commandant
$250.00 $3,000.00
1
Assistant Commandant 200.00 2,400.00
4
Directors 200.00 9,600.00
9
Inspectors 150.00 16,200.00
1
Quartermaster, Paymaster, Director 200.00 2,400.00
2
Assistant Quartermaster, Paymaster,
Inspectors 150.00 3,600.00
1
Surgeon Director 200.00 2,400.00
2
Surgeon Inspectors 150.00 3,600.00
18
Captains 150.00 32,400.00
21
First Lieutenants 100.00 25,200.00
3
First Lieutenants Hospital Corps 100.00 3,600.00
39
Second Lieutenants 60.00 28,080.00
8
Second Lieutenants (Machine Gun)
50.00 4,800.00
6
Second Lieutenants Hospital Corps
60.00 4,320.00
19
First Sergeants 25.00 5,700.00
112
Sergeants 20.00 26,880.00
262
Corporals 15.00 47,160.00
40
Field Musicians 10.00 4,800.00
2100
Privates 10.00 252,000.00
Pay
Personnel....... $478,140.00
Amount
Brought Forward................................................ $478,140.00
Rations
2533 Enlisted men at 15 cents per
diem...........138,667.50
PERSONNEL
CLERICAL FORCE PER MONTH PER ANNUM
1
Secretary $100.00 1200.00
1
Clerk to Commandant
45.00 540.00
1
Clerk to Asst. Commandant
45.00 540.00
2
Clerks 50.00
1200.00
11
Clerks 45.00 5940.00 9,420.00
$626,227.50
Forage
and Remounts............40,000.00
Uniforms............... 109,175.00
Ammunition
and Target practice......
15,000.00
Hospital,
Medicines, etc.......... 15,000.00
Transportation,
maps, office supplies,
intelligence
service etc......... 35,000.00
Miscellaneous,
rent, and repair of Barracks, tools
and
kitchen utensils, lights etc........ 20,000.00 234,175.00
Total
Land Forces.............$860,402.50
COAST GUARD
Annual
Cost of Maintenance
2
Inspectors
at $1800.00 $ 3,600.00
4
First Lieutenants 1200.00 4,800.00
4
Engineers 276.00 1,104.00
4
Quartermasters
216.00 864.00
30
Seamen 156.00 4,680.00
Fuel 20,000.00
$ 35,048.00
It is further provided that if the
conditions of Haitien Government's Finances shall
warrant
the expenditure of funds for such purposes, and [sic] additional number of men,
not
exceeding 467, may be enlisted in the Gendarmerie for a period of one year,
upon the
recommendation
of the Commandant as to the necessity and advisability of such
enlistment,
and upon the consent in writing of the Financial Advisor, and that said
periods
of such enlistment may thereafter be extended in further periods of six months
each
upon like recommendations by the Commandant and like consent of the Financial
Advisor. Pay, and clothing and subsistence allowances
for such enlisted men for the
period
or periods of their enlistment are hereby authorized at the rates before
specified.
Article
XII The sum of $895,450.50 United
States Currency, shall be appropriated
annually
for pay and allowances, equipment, uniforms, transportation, administration,
and
other current expenses of the Haitien Gendarmerie and Coast Guard, to be
divided
among
the several items as specified in Article I of this agreement, and in no other
portion,
except that in case of urgent necessity a portion of the sum provided for one
or
more
items may be diverted in the service of another item with the consent in
writing of
the
Financial Advisor.
In case of the enlistment of an
additional number of men referred to in Article I of
this
Agreement, a further sum shall be appropriated for their pay and clothing and
subsistence
allowances as provided in Article I of this Agreement.
..............As
provided in said Article I of this agreement.
[sic]
The total expenditures from the
amount appropriated in this Article, as authorized
by
the Commandant, shall not exceed in any one month for any item one twelfth of
the
total
annual appropriation therefor, provided, however, that the surplus from one
month
may
be allotted in subsequent months.
In witness whereof the undersigned
have hereunto signed their names and affixed
their
seals in triplicate.
Done in , this
day of 1920.
B
C O P Y
February 11, 1920
To
The Minister of the Interior
From
The Chief of the Gendarmerie.
Mr. Minister:
The
changes suggested in the present Gendarmerie Agreement are very
satisfactory
with certain modifications under Article I which I have the honor to submit as
follows:
Personnell[sic] PER MONTH PER ANNUM
1
Commandant...................................... $250.00 $3,000.00
1
Assistant Commandant............................. 200.00 2,400.00
3
Directors........................................ 200.00 7,200.00
10
Inspectors...................................... 150.00 18,000.00
1
Quartermaster-Paymaster Director................. 200.00
2,400.00
2
Assistant, Quartermaster, Paymaster, Inspectors.. 150.00
3,600.00
1
Surgeon...Director............................... 200.00
2,400.00
2
Surgeons, Inspectors.............................
150.00 3,600.00
18
Captains........................................
150.00 32,400.00
23
First Lieutenants...............................
100.00 27,600.00
3
First Lieutenants (Hospital Corps)............... 100.00
3,600.00
39
Second Lieutenants.............................. 60.00 28,080.00
10
Second Lieutenants, Machine Gun................ 50.00
6,000.00
6
Second Lieutenants, Hospital Corps.............. 60.00 4,320.00
19
First Sergeants................................. 25.00
5,700.00
112
Sergeants...................................... 20.00 26,880.00
262
Corporals...................................... 15.00 47,160.00
40
Field Musics.................................... 10.00
4,800.00
2100
Privates...................................... 10.00 252,000.00
Pay personnel............... $481,140.00
Amount
brought forward.....................
$481,140.00
Rations............................ 138,667.50
Personnel
Clerical Forces......................
9,420.00
Hospital,
Medicines, etc.....................
15,000.00
Maintenance
and Operations.................... 229,175.00
Total
Land Force..................
870,402.50
COAST GUARD
PERSONNEL PER
MONTH PER ANNUM
1 Inspector................ 150.00 1,800.00
3 First Lieutenants............... 100.00 3,600.00
4 Engineers................. 20.00 960.00
4 Quartermasters.............. 15.00 720.00
30 Seamen................. 10.00
3,600.00
Rations,
38 men........
2,774.00
Maintenance
and Operations... 18,594.00
Total Sea Force.................. 22,048.00
That
there also be inserted in this Article a provision that all money derived from
fines
and
forfeitures imposed upon the personnel shall revert to Maintenance and
Operations.
The
reason for the above changes are as follows:
PERSONNEL. One Director was changed to one Inspector
and one Second Lieutenant
(Machine
Gun) by change in Gendarmerie Agreement, copy appended marked
"A". The
services
on two First Lieutenants and one Second Lieutenant, M.G. Coast Guard can be
of
more use ashore than afloat and the above tables of strength of personnel
provides for
their
transfer from the Coast Guard to the Land Forces.
PERSONNEL,
CLERICAL FORCE. It is impossible to
furnish a table as to what the pay
of
clerks should be as their value in business life is constantly increasing and
raises have
to
be made from time to time, and this is accomplished by reducing the number, so
a
lump
sum for this purpose is absolutely necessary.
MAINTENANCE
AND OPERATIONS. To reduce paper work
and give the
Gendarmerie
a more efficient purchasing power without getting special permission, it is
recommended
that the old items "Forage and remounts" "Uniforms"
Ammunition and
target
practice" Transportation, maps office supplies, intelligence service
Miscellaneous,
[sic]
rent and repair of barracks, tools, kitchen ustensils [sic], lights, etc,"
be pooled that
10,000
dollars be taken from the old title "Fuel; Coast Guard" and the whole
put under
one
item "Maintenance and Operations".
From the present stage of the market it is
impossible
to forecast the needs of the Gendarmerie under any of the old item [sic].
COAST
GUARD. One inspector was abolished and
one First Lieutenant and Second
Lieutenant,
Machine Gun, substituted by change in the Gendarmerie Agreement, copy
appended
marked "B". Two First
Lieutenants and one Second Lieutenant, M. G. are
transferred
to the land forces as their services on shore can be of more use and 10,000
dol.
"Fuel
transferred to "Maintenance" and Operations" land force. The rations in the Coast
Guard
has to be 20 cents [per diem] as the men are at sea a great part of their time
and
have
to live on preserved food which is naturally more expensive.
The above changes do not call for
any increase in the allotment as per the
Amended
Agreement, proposed. They are necessary
for the proper administration, and
will
promote economy and efficiency and it is urhently [sic] recommended that they
be
adopted,
or Article XII remain as it is, as my original request of September 19th, 1919
for
an
increase in allotment and personnel did not in any way suggest a change in the
above
mentioned
Article.
It is imperative that the increase
in clothing, rations and medecines [sic] be
effective
from January 1st 1920 as we were absolutely out of funds.
Be pleased to accept, Mr. Minister,
the assurance of my high consideration.
s/ F. M.
WISE
Chief
of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti
C
The undersigned, duly authorized by
their respective governments, have this day
agreed
that Articles I and XII of the Haitian Gendarmerie Agreement, made by and
between
the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Haiti,
on
the 15th of August, 1916, shall be and they are hereby amended so as to read as
follows:
ARTICLE I.
That the Constabulary contemplated
by Article X of the Treaty between the
United
States of America and the Republic of Haiti, signed at Port-au-Prince on
September
16, 1915, shall be known as the Haitian Gendarmerie; that its strength and
amounts
to be expended for pay, rations, and expenses of operation, et cetera, shall be
as
set
forth in the following table:
Personnel PER
MONTH PER ANNUM
1
Commandant...................................... $250.00 $3,000.00
1
Assistant Commandant............................. 200.00 2,400.00
3
Directors........................................ 200.00 7,200.00
10
Inspectors...................................... 150.00 18,000.00
1
Quartermaster, Paymaster, Director................. 200.00
2,400.00
2
Assistant, Quartermaster, Paymaster, Inspectors.. 150.00
3,600.00
1
Surgeon, Director............................... 200.00
2,400.00
2
Surgeon, Inspector............................. 150.00 3,600.00
18
Captains........................................
150.00 32,400.00
23
First Lieutenants...............................
100.00 27,600.00
3
First Lieutenants (Hospital Corps)............... 100.00
3,600.00
39
Second Lieutenants.............................. 60.00 28,080.00
10
Second Lieutenants, Machine Gun................ 50.00
6,000.00
6
Second Lieutenants, Hospital Corps.............. 60.00
4,320.00
19
First Sergeants................................. 25.00
5,700.00
112
Sergeants...................................... 20.00 26,880.00
262
Corporals...................................... 15.00 47,160.00
40
Field Musicians.................................... 10.00
4,800.00
2100
Privates...................................... 10.00 252,000.00
Pay personnel............... $481,140.00
Rations.
2533
enlisted men at 15 cents per diem
$138,667.50
---Personnel - Clerical Force Per annum 9,420.00
Forage
and remounts $40,000.00
Uniforms 109,175.00
Ammunition
and target practice
15,000.00
Hospital,
medicine, et cetera
15,000.00
Transportation,
maps, office supplies,
intelligence
service, et cetera.
35,000.00
Miscellaneous,
rent and repair of barracks,
tools,
kitchen utensils, lights, et cetera, 20,000.00 234,175.00
Total land
forces. $863,402.50
Coast Guard
Annual Cost of Maintenance
1 Inspector $150.00 $1,800.00
3 First Lieutenants 100.00 3,600.00
4 Engineers 20.00 960.00
4 Quartermasters 15.00 720.00
30 Seamen 10.00
3,600.00
Rations,
38 men 2,774.00
Maintenance
and Operations 18,594.00
Total . $32,048.00
It is further provided that if the
condition of the Haitian Government's finances
shall
warrant the expenditure of funds for such purpose, an additional number of men,
not
exceeding
467, may be enlisted in the Gendarmerie for a period of one year, upon the
recommendation
of the commandant as to the necessity and advisability of such
enlistment,
and upon the consent in writing of the Financial Advisor, and that said
periods
for such enlistment may thereafter be extended in further periods of six months
each
upon like recommendation by the Commandant and like consent of the Financial
Adviser. Pay, and clothing and subsistence allowances
for such enlisted men for the
period
or periods of their enlistment are hereby authorized at the rates before
specified.
ARTICLE XII.
The sum of $895,450.50 United States
currency, shall be appropriated annually
for
pay and allowances, equipment, uniforms, transportation, administration, and
other
current
expenses of the Haiti Gendermarie and Coast Guard, to be divided among the
several
items as specified in Article I and this Agreement, and in no other proportion,
except
that in case of urgent necessity a portion of the sum provided for one or more
items
may be diverted in the service of another item with the consent in writing of
the
Financial
Adviser.
In case of the enlistment of the
additional number of men referred to in Article I
of
this Agreement, a further sum shall be appropriated for their pay and clothing
and
subsistence
allowances as provided in Article I of this Agreement.
The total expenditure from the amount
appropriated in this Article, as authorized
by
the Commandant, shall not exceed in any one month for any item one-twelfth of
the
total
annual appropriation therefor, provided, however, that the surplus from one
month
may
be allotted in subsequent months.
In witness whereof the undersigned
have hereunto signed their names and affixed
their
seals.
Done in duplicate at Washington,
this twenty-third day of March, 1920.
FRANK L. POLK
CH. MORAVIA. 260
WASHINGTON,
D.C.
April
9, 1920.
Colonel
Frederick M. Wise,
Chief of the Gendarmerie.
Port
au Prince, Haiti.
My
Dear Colonel Wise:
I received your letter setting out
your views as to the changes necessary to be
made
in the Gendarmerie schedule, in due time, and have given them most careful and
exhaustive
study. That I have not written to you
before acknowledging receipt of your
letter
and advising you of the action which I have taken has been due to the fact that
I
have
not been very well and have hardly been in condition to do any work at all.
Before taking any final action on
the Gendarmerie Agreement and in order that I
might
be sure not to take any action which, while contrary to your wishes, would be
of
serious
detriment to you and your corps, I first went to consult with [Assistant]
Secretary
[of
the Navy] [Franklin D.] Roosevelt, laid your letter before him, and showed him
the
proposed
revision of the agreement as recommended by me. From him I went to [Major]
General
[Commandant] Barnett and he called in General McCawley [unidentified]. I then
laid
before them your letter and my revision of the schedule. We discussed the matter at
length. All of these gentlemen, Mr. Roosevelt,
General Barnett, and General McCawley,
agreed
that the revision of the schedule as proposed by me would not be an unnecessary
burden
upon the administration of the Gendarmerie Corps, and for that reason and for
the
further
reason that it would be necessary to open negociations [sic] with the Haitien
[sic]
Government
again with all of the delays that such negotiations would entail. I did not
change
the schedule as you requested except in one particular of the clerk hire. Instead of
carrying
the salaries of the clerks as had been done in the old schedule, their salaries
were
lumped
under an appropriation in a lump sum of $9,000 for the purpose of enabling you
to
adjust your salaries in accordance with the changing conditions in Haiti.# I hope, my
dear
Colonel Wise, that my action in this matter will not be too great a
disappointment to
you,
and I wise very much that you believe me that what I have done has been most
carefully
done and only after having advised with the best trained and qualified men of
my
acquaintance on this subject.
Just when I return to Haiti I do not
know? In the meantime I have written to
the
General
Receiver and Acting Financial Advisor, Mr. Maumas, requesting him to make
provision
for the increase in Gendarmerie Schedule and trust that your administrative
burdens
will be lightened somewhat by this action.
With sincere regards, believe
me,
Very
truly yours.
J.
H. McILHENNY
Financial Advisor to the Republic of Haiti.
#I
took up with the Solicitor of the State Department the question of whether or
not it
would
be possible to make the agreement retroactive to the first of January. He advised
me
that it would not be possible, and therefore your desire in this particular
could not be
carried
out.261
Appendix
15: Diplomatic Messages Concerning Legislative Elections in Haiti, 1921
TRANSLATION
LEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
HAITI
WASHINGTON.
The Minister of Haiti presents his
compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of
State,
and has the honor, in compliance with his Government's instructions, to deliver
to
him
the following note:
"The Haitien [sic] Government
deems it its most imperative duty to remind the
Government
of the United States, as the presidential term is nearing its end, of a few
provisions
in the Constitution of the Republic voted by a plebiscite on June 12, 1918, and
to
apply for its cooperation in the measures to be taken for their enforcement so
that no
infringement
will be made of the main object of the Convention of September 16, 1915,
which
is to maintain order and tranquillity on the territory of the Republic.
"Articles 40, 41, 42, 43, and
44 of the Constitution map out the rule of the
National
Assembly: it is the National Assembly
which, among other functions, elect the
President
of the Republic and administers to him the constitutional oath.
"Article C of the provisional
clauses of the Constitution reads:
'The
first elections of the members of the legislative body, after
this convention is adopted, will take place on the 10th
of January of an
even numbered year.'
'The
year shall be fixed by a decree of the President of the
Republic published at least three months before the
meeting of the primary
assemblies.'
"In October, 1919, the
President of the Republic did not deem it necessary to avail
himself
of the right conferred upon him by the second paragraph of that article. He did
not
consider the moment to be favorable, as the mind were too far apart.
"It is necessary to recall that
on the day after the Convention was voted on, the
Legislative Chambers, because of their hostile attitude,
were dissolved and that those
elected
in January 1917, showed such strong inertia in their opposition to the
enforcement
of
the Convention that they had the same fate two months after they had met?
"It is needless to say that
those measures were not provided by Constitution of
1889
then in force, and that they were imposed by circumstances.
"Since then, on the strength of
the Constitution, a Council of State, consisting of
21
members, has been wielding the legislative power.
"At the present time, although
the minds are none the less apart--maybe they are
more
so--it would be proper for the President of the Republic, in applying the rules
laid
down
by the Constitution, to fix the date of the forthcoming elections at January
10,
1922,
if no cloud arises to darken the political horizon and threaten the order in
the
country.
"But in order to facilitate the
loyal execution of the Convention, it is important to
have
a legislative body made of men animated by the desire of effecting a peaceful
transfer
of the power and not of professional politicians who afford no guarantee of
morality
or patriotism.
"On that account the Government
must not and may not stand aloff [sic] from the
election. It is a sacred duty entailed upon it to
assist by loyal means the candidates whom
it
believes apt to promote the welfare of the nation. There must be no impediment to its
action
as there was in the election of January 10, 1917, and its best friends, who are
also
the
best friends of the Government of the United States, must not be systematically
thrust
aside
and fought by the ill-advised American occupation.
"The Haitien government
therefore calls upon the Government of the United
States
for its honest cooperation in the legislative elections. To its mind that cooperation
must
consist in joint action looking to happy results for the country, that of the
Haitien
Government
consisting in giving by every means at its disposal aid and comfort to the
candidates
whom it may deem worthy of electing; that of the Government of the United
States,
in guaranteeing order and, so far as it may be in its power, supporting those
candidates.
"That policy of cooperation
will end in endowing the country with legislative
chambers
equal to their mission, the main attribute of which is to make the Haitien
mother
country grand and prosperous."
Port au Prince, June 10, 1921.
A.
Blanchet262
The
Honorable
Arthur Bailly-Blanchard,
American
Minister,
Port-au-Prince.
Sir:
The Department acknowledges receipt
of your dispatch No. 521 of July 15, 1921,
forwarding
a copy of a note received by you from the Foreign Office, dated June 10,
1921,
regarding the legislative elections in Haiti in 1922, the original of which was
received
by the Department on July 2, from the Haitien [sic] Minister in Washington.
The
Department transmits herewith, for your information, a copy of its reply to the
note
of
the Haitien Government above referred to, the original of which has been
delivered to
the
Haitien Minister here.
The views of the Department
regarding the request of the Haitien Government to
cooperate
with it in securing the election of candidates to the National Legislature
satisfactory
to the Haitien Government is clearly expressed in its communication to the
Haitien
Government.
If the President Haiti, therefore,
feels it essential that Legislative elections be held
on
January 10, 1922, this Government, while assisting the Haitien Government to
maintain
order, will insist that no undue influence be exerted by the Haitien Executive
to
control
the results of those elections. The
Department recognizes the fact that present
conditions
in Haiti would render it improbable that any truly free elections could be
held,
because
of the ignorance and illiteracy of the majority of the voters. It is likewise
regretfully
forced to the conclusion that the results of the Legislative elections, if held
without
the exertion of undue influence by the Haitien Executive, would probably result
in
the election of a National Legislature largely anti-American in Sentiment. It
appreciates
the fact that the election of such a Legislature would render more difficult
the
efforts
of the Government of the United States to cooperate with the Government of
Haiti
in
pursuing a constructive policy contemplating rapid improvement in the economic
and
political
life of the Republic.
Because of these considerations, the
Department has not considered it necessary
to
advise the President of Haiti to decree the holding of Legislative elections on
January
10,
1922, as he is authorized to do by the Constitution. In view of the special conditions
now
obtaining in Haiti, the Department would interpose no objection should the
President
of
Haiti determine to abstain once more from holding the elections for the
National
Legislature,
and thus permit the election of his successor to be undertaken by the Council
of
State, as it is authorized to do, in the event that no Legislative Body exists,
by the
transitory
provisions of the present Constitution.
You may so inform the President of
Haiti
after he has received the Department's reply to the note addressed to it by the
Haitien
Government under the date June 10.
I am, Sir,
Your
obedient servant,
Charles E.
Hughes263
The Secretary of State presents his
compliments to the Minister of Haiti and has
the
honor to acknowledge the receipt of his communication of July 2, 1921, with
which
he
transmitted, by instruction of the Haitien [sic] Government, a note addressed
by that
Government
to the Government of the Untied States under date of June 10, 1921.
The Secretary of State requests that
the Minister of Haiti be so good as to transmit
to
his Government the following reply to the note of the Haitian Government
transmitted
with
the note of the Minister of Haiti under acknowledgment:
"The
Government of the United States has given most careful consideration
to the note of the Haitian
Government dated June 10, 1921, in which the Haitian
Government states that it believes
it to be its duty to remind the Government of
the United States of Certain
provisions of the existing Constitution of Haiti, and
to request of this Government its
cooperation in the measures to be taken for their
application. The articles referred to by the Haitian
Government are Articles 40,
41, 42, 43, and 44, which detail the
powers and duties of the National Assembly,
and the Haitian Government calls
attention to particular to the provisions of those
articles which relate to the
election by the National Assembly of the President of
the Republic. The Haitian Government likewise refers to Article
C in the
transitory provisions of the
Constitution, which provides that
'The
first elections of members of the Legislative Corps after the adoption
of
the present Constitution shall take place on January 10 of an even
numbered
year. The year shall be fixed by a
decree of the President of the
Republic
published at least three months before the meeting of the
primary
assemblies.'
"The Haitian Government states
further that the President of Haiti did not find it
desirable, because of conditions
then existing, to exercise the power conferred
upon him by the second part of the
Article above quoted in the month of October,
1919. The Haitian Government also calls attention to the fact that by
virtue of the
Constitution, since no National
Legislature is therefore in existence, a council of
State composed of twenty-one
members, since 1917 has exercised and continues
to exercise the legislative
power.
"The
Haitian Government believes that if no unforeseen circumstances
occur which would seem to threaten
disorder, it would now be fitting for the
President of Haiti to set the next
elections for the National Legislature for the
tenth of January 1922, and states
that in order to facilitate the loyal execution of
the Convention of September 16,
1915, it is important that the Legislative
Chambers be composed of men animated
by the desire to effect in a peaceful
manner the transmission of power,
and not of professional politicians who
offer
no guarantee of character or of
patriotism. The Government of Haiti,
therefore,
asks the Government of the United
States to lend it frank cooperation in the
Legislative elections, which
cooperation, in it opinion, should consist in joint
action by the two Governments,
'That
of the Haitian Government consisting in lending, by all the means it
has
at its disposal, aid and assistance to the candidates who seem
worthy
of being elected; that of the United States in guaranteeing order
and
in supporting these candidates so far as it may lie in its power.'
"In
reply to this communication, the Government of
the United States
desires first of all to assure the
Government of Haiti once more, that it is its most
earnest desire to cooperate in every
proper way with the Haitian Government in
the promotion of the prosperity and
tranquillity of Haiti. It is the firm
conviction
of the Government of the United
States that the ends which both Governments
desire so sincerely to attain, can
only be gained by encouraging and supporting in
every way possible the processes of
stable and constitutional government in the
Republic. The foundation upon which such government must rest is the
holding of fair and free elections
in which the electorate of Haiti, as prescribed by
the Constitution, can participate
without coercion of any kind. It would
seem,
therefore, to the Government of the
United States that it would be derelict in its
Treaty obligations and in its
sincere friendship for the Haitian people if the
American Occupation of the Republic
of Haiti countenanced the holding of any
election in the Republic in which
the properly qualified voters of the Republic
were not permitted to cast their
votes without being subject to Intimidation or the
exertion of improper influences and
the result of which was not the freely
expressed opinion of the majority of
such voters.
"In
the event, therefore, that the President of
Haiti deems it necessary to
fix the next elections for the
National Legislature for the tenth of January 1922,
the Government of the United States,
accordance with its obligations under the
Convention of September 16, 1915,
will cooperate with the Government of Haiti
in maintaining the peace of the
Republic should disorder threaten, but it cannot
consent, for the reasons set forth,
to the holding of elections in the Republic the
result of which would be determined
in any manner other than by the will of the
Haitian people freely
expressed."
Department
of State,
Washington, September 2, 1921.
838.00/1787
SW/ALC
LA264
Appendix
16: State Department Memo to President
Harding Regarding Progress of the
US
Occupation of Haiti
Copy
July
19, 1921.
My
dear Mr. President:
I hand you herewith a memorandum on
Haitian affairs, which has been prepared
by
Mr. [Sumner] Welles, the chief of the Latin-American Division of this
Department,
and
revised under my direction. It presents
the general outline of a plan for improving
conditions
in Haiti, and especially for making our administration, now embarrassed by a
lack
of co-ordination among numerous officials, more efficient.
In order to accomplish the purposes
stated, it would be necessary to have an
amendment
of the existing treaty with Haiti. In
at least one respect the amendment would
be
agreeable to the Government of Haiti, and has indeed been suggested by the
President
of
Haiti, that is the consolidation of the treaty offices of Receiver General and
Financial
Adviser. If the treaty were to be amended, it might
be well to provide for a supervision of
education,
as suggested in the memorandum, in order that during our occupancy an
important
contribution should be made to the removal of illiteracy in Haiti which is
appalling.
I am disposed, however, to question
the advisability at this time of negotiating a
new
treaty and submitting it to the Senate and thus inviting a discussion of
affairs in
Haiti,
and probably also of affairs in Santo Domingo, as it could hardly be expected
that
this
discussion would be confined to the matters strictly involved or would be
conducted
in
the absence of the natural desire to make political capital out of anything
that could be
turned
up. Further, the situation in Haiti
needs immediate attention and ought not to
await
the negotiation and ratification of a new treaty. We cannot leave Haiti at the
present
time, and I conceive it to be the duty of the administration to do its utmost
to
perfect
the methods of administration and to make our occupation of the greatest
benefit
to
the inhabitants of Haiti. But my though
is that much can be accomplished without
waiting
for a new treaty through the selection of your personal representative, as
suggested
in the memorandum, and by having it distinctly understood, as a matter of
administration,
that the treaty officials should act in accordance with your direction. We
could
withdraw out Minister for a time, as has been done in Cuba, so as to
give
to your representative, as in the case of General Crowder, freedom from any
embarrassment
by reason of a dual representation of the government.
The
President,
The White House.
I have thought it well to send you
the memorandum in order that you might have
all
that is in our thought, and it may well be that within a few months a favorable
opportunity
may exist for the presentation of a new treaty embodying this plan.
At present my suggestion is:
1.
That a loan be secured, as indicated in the plan, in order to relieve
the financial
situation
in Haiti. This can be done without an
amendment of the treaty.
2.
That provision be made to improve the Gendarmerie as stated in the
memorandum.
3.
That through the selection of an officer of the Marines, who will act as
your
direct
representative, something may be done to coordinate the activities of the
officers
nominated
by this Government. In this way
substantial progress may be made in securing
harmonious
effort and in renewing the difficulties which have stood in the way of making
our
occupation a substantial benefit to the people, aside from the mere keeping of
order.
I shall be glad to discuss the
matter with you at your convenience or to receive
any
suggestions you may care to make. I
believe that the financial situation is very
serious
and that a loan should be floated at an early date.
Faithfully yours,
(Signed)
Charles E. Hughes.
Enclosure:
[untitled]
In order to appreciate more clearly
the significance of that which has taken place
in
Haiti during the five and a half years of American occupation, it is desirable
to review
briefly
the events which led up to the signing on September 16, 1951 [sic], of the
Treaty
between
the United States and Haiti, to promote the "finances, economic
development
and
tranquillity of Haiti."
The Republic of Haiti since it
gained its independence has been the scene of
almost
continuous revolution. Its recent
history exemplified this as clearly as the early
years
of its independence. Since the year
1886, when General Salomon completed his
full
Presidential term, every President except one has been overthrown by
revolution,
some
escaping to nearby islands, others being assassinated. As the result of these
successive
revolutions, the Republic by the summer of 1915 had reached a stage of
exhaustion
and devastation more lamentable than at any period of its independence. It is
necessary
to add that these continuous revolutions were not wholly due to the
dissatisfaction
of the great mass of the Haitian people, but were caused usually by either
the
intrigues which arose among the very small number of education Haitian
politicians
who
compose the governing class, or by the activities of foreign merchants,
principally
German,
doing business in Haiti, who hoped to profit by the placing in office of some
President
committed to their interests. It is
worthy emphasizing the number of educated
Haitians
at 2 per cent of the total population, and that the members of the ruling class
form
by a fraction of this number.
Between the years 1910 and 1915, the
foreign relations of the Haitian
Government
became seriously involved by reason of the pressure which was brought to
bear
by the Governments of France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the United
States,
to
settle the claims against the Government of the nationals of the foreign
countries
named. In view of the unwillingness or inability of
the Haitian Government to settle
these
claims in a manner satisfactory to the foreign Governments concerned, armed
demonstrations
were resorted to in numerous cases. The
German Government was the
most
insistent in demanding satisfaction of these claims and went so far as to
inform the
United
States in July 1914, that she desired to participate equally with the United
States
in
any proposed control of the Haitian customs which might subsequently be
undertaken
by
this Government, in view of the importance of the claims of German subjects
against
the
Haitian Government.
During the period between 1910 and
1915, armed forces of all the powers
mentioned
above had been landed at various points in Haiti on the ground that lives and
property
of their national were endangered. It
is particularly noticeable that the
Commander
of the German warship [SMS] BREMEN, in 1911, landed a considerable
force
at Port au Prince at a time when there existed no disturbance which could have
been
construed
as warranting such action.
During the years 1914 and 1915,
Haiti was in a state of continuous disturbance,
which
culminated in July of the latter year with the murder by armed mobs of
ex-president
Oreste Zamor and President Sam, the latter having been dragged by a mob
from
the French Legation, where he had taken refuge, and torn to pieces in the
street.
Upon
the murder of the President, the members of the Cabinet, who were charged by
the
Constitution
with the functions of the Executive until a successor could be elected by
Congress,
had all taken refuge in Foreign Legations or escaped from the country, so that
there
was no Executive to assume directions of affairs. At this juncture, on July 28th, the
U.
S. S. WASHINGTON arrived, and it was deemed absolutely necessary, in this
emergency,
that American forces be landed not only to protect the lives and property of
foreigners
resident in Haiti, but to prevent, likewise, the danger of an occupation of
Haiti
by
the forces of foreign Governments which felt obliged to demand reparation for
the
violation
of their Legations.
From July 28, until August 12, there
was no Government in Haiti of any
description. On the latter date, the Legislative Chamber,
under the protection of United
States
marines, assembled and elected Sudre Dartiguenave, President of the former
Senate,
President of the Republic. Aside from
the necessity of supporting the new
Government
temporarily, since a withdrawal of the armed support of the United States
would
have resulted in the immediate overthrow of the Dartiguenave Government, it
appeared
essential from a humanitarian viewpoint to aid the Haitian people to free
themselves
from the hopeless conditions which continued revolution and a policy of
despotic
militarism had produced. In a large
portion of the Island, agriculture was
practically
abandoned and in those sections through which successive revolutionary and
governmental
armies had passed, the country was devastated, nothing remaining of the
crops
of the small land owners, as the armies lived on the country as they went. The
absolute
devastation of the country districts re-acted on business in the cities and
commerce
was almost at a standstill.
A Treaty was therefore negotiated
with President Dartiguenave shortly after his
election
which was signed on September 16, 1915, for the following purposes, as set
forth
in
the preamble: To remedy the condition
of the revenues and finances of Haiti; to
maintain
the tranquillity of the Republic; and to carry out plans for the economic
development
and prosperity of the Republic and its people.
In return for the assistance
and
cooperation of the United States towards these ends, the President of Haiti
agreed to
appoint,
upon nomination by the President of the United States, a General Receiver to
collect
and apply all customs duties on imports and exports. The President of Haiti
likewise
agreed, under the same conditions, to appoint a Financial Advisor, whose duties
were
to be the devising of an adequate system of public accounting; to aid in
increasing
the
public revenues and adjusting them to the
expenses; to inquire into the validity of the
debts
of the Republic; to enlighten both the Government of the United States and the
Government
of Haiti with reference to all eventual debts; to recommend improved
methods
of collecting and applying the public revenues and to make such other
recommendations
as might be deemed necessary for the welfare and prosperity of Haiti.
The
Haitian Government further obligated itself to create an efficient constabulary
composed
of native Haitians, organized and officered by Americans, and agreed to
appoint,
upon nomination of the President of the United States, engineers to assist ion
the
sanitation
of the Republic and in the development of public works. Under the terms of
the
Treaty, the Haitian Government agreed to execute with this Government a
protocol
for
the establishment of a claims commission, which protocol was duly signed on
October
3, 1919, in which the Haitian Government bound itself top meet the payment of
the
claims against it, upon the terms and at a time to be fixed in accord with the
financial
Adviser,
(not later than two years after the date of the signature of the protocol) by a
national
loan of $40,000,000 gold.
The history of the five years and a
half of the so-called occupation of Haiti by the
United
States is unfortunately not one of which the United States can afford to be
very
proud. There is very little of positive benefit to
the Haitian people that has resulted,
beyond
the gradual tranquilization of the Republic.
This lack of concrete achievement on
our
part can, it is believed, be attributed to three causes - first, the abnormal
situation
created
by the war, which prevented the flotation of the loan so much needed by the
Haitian
Government, and rendered it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out public
improvements
of any considerable extent; second, the lack of an efficient organization of
the
so-called American Treaty officials in Haiti, and in certain instances, an
unwise
selection
of these officials; and third, the continuous and insistent obstruction by the
members
of the Haitian Government of the great majority of reforms initiated or desired
by
the American Treaty officials, due to the fact that the member of the Haitian
government,
inclusive of the President, were not sincerely desirous of cooperating with
the
United States in promoting the welfare of the Haitian people, but were desirous
of
benefiting
themselves and their political associates at the expense of the great mass of
the
Haitian
populace. It was realized by these
Haitian politicians that if the needed reforms
were
instituted, the opportunities for graft which they had previously enjoyed would
be
minimized.
The situation created in Haiti by
the signing of the Treaty of 1915, is, at best, an
anomalous
one. There are now functioning two
executive authorities - that of the
Government
of the United States, and that of the Government of Haiti. The Government
of
Haiti is composed of the President and his Cabinet, the Council of State (which
functions
as a legislative body, although its members are Presidential appointees), and
the
Judiciary,
composed of native Haitians. The
Government of the United States is
represented
by the American Minister who receives his instructions from the Department
of
State; by the Military Representative of the United States in Haiti, who is, at
the same
time,
Military Governor of Santo Domingo and is responsible to the Navy Department;
by
the Commander of the forces of Occupation, also responsible to the Navy
Department;
and
by the Treaty officials: namely, the
Financial Advisor, the Receiver General of
Customs,
the Sanitary Engineer, the Engineer of Haiti and the Chief of the
Gendarmerie.
All
of the latter officials, however, while nominated by the President of the
United States,
are
appointed by the President of Haiti and are technically officials of the
Haitian
Government. This system where the authority is divided,
and where the functions of the
various
officials are not clearly indicated, has given rise to ever increasing friction
between
the American officials in Haiti and the members of the Haitian Government and
has
made impossible a truly efficient accomplishment of the objects of the Treaty.
For convenience sake, it may be well
to consider in turn the four chief objectives
towards
which it is believed the attention of this Government should be directed in
bringing
about a change in the present status of affairs: namely, the modification of the
present
military occupation; the reorganization of the power and duties of the Treaty
officials;
the readjustment of Haitian finances; and "the carrying out of plans for
the
economic
development and prosperity of the Republic and its people."
1.
The Change in the Status of the American Military Occupation.
During the period in which the
American military forces have occupied Haiti,
they
have succeeded in establishing tranquillity in the Republic by making a
continuance
of
revolutionary movements impossible and by putting a stop to the bandit or
"Caco"
raids. There appears to be no doubt that the great
mass of the Haitian people are grateful
to
the American Marines for the service which they have performed and that the
greater
number
of the charges which have been brought against the Marines of alleged outrages
and
atrocities are unfounded, and originated with that small group of politicians
in Port au
Prince
which is bitterly opposed to American occupation. It is believed by the Navy
Department
that the marines cannot be withdrawn from Haiti until the native
constabulary,
or Gendarmerie, is better organized and disciplined than it is at present, and
that
withdrawal of the American forces at this time would seriously endanger the
stability
of
the present Haitian Government. It
would therefore seem to be wise to concentrate, so
far
as is possible, upon the organization on a more efficient basis, to enlarge it,
and to
officer
it as provided in the Treaty with American officers peculiaryly [sic] fitted
for the
work. It is believed possible that if such
reorganization of the Gendarmerie were
energetically
taken up, the presence of the American Marines in Haiti would not be
necessary
after a few years' time, except, perhaps, small forces in Port au Prince and
Cape
Haitian
[sic] in the nature of legation of Consular guards.
2.
Reorganization of the Power and Duties of Treaty Officials.
As stated above, one of the chief
causes for the unsatisfactory conditions which
prevail
in Haiti today is the inefficient organization of the Treaty officials. The Treaty
officials,
while they are attached to the Haitian Government, have acted far too often
independently
of control or suggestion wither by the Haitian Government or by the
Government
of the United States, and it is essential, of the objects of the Treaty are to
be
performed,
that the duties and functions of those officials be clearly defined and that
their
responsibilities
to some higher authority be definitely indicated. The primary need in
effecting
such an organization is a centralization of authority whereby the desires of this
Government
and of the Haitian Government can be carried out by a small group of
responsible
officials and as a result of which the present system of having seven
semi-independent
Treaty officials, acting upon their own authority to a large extent, can
be
abolished.
3. Readjustment of Haitian Finances.
One of the chief causes of complaint
of the Haitian Government, and indeed, of
the
Haitian public, is the fact that although the United States is obligated by the
Treaty to
assist
in placing the finances of Haiti on a stable basis, the financial conditions in
the
Republic
today are worse, if anything, than they were when the Treaty was signed. The
primary
need of the Haitian Government is to float a loan which will make it possible
to
refund
and consolidate the existing public debt, - a result which will secure for
current
expenditure
income now pledged and segregated for the payment of interest and
amortization
on this debt; to provide for the payment of claims against the Haitian
Government;
and to secure funds for public works and improvements necessary to the
development
of the resources of the country. The
Department of State has upon three
occasions
endeavored to assist the Haitian Government to obtain this loan - without
success
- due upon the first two occasions to the abnormal situation in the financial
world
created
by the war, and upon the latter occasion, to the fact that banking interests in
this
country
were unwilling to take up such a loan unless they received assurances that the
present
Administration would not withdraw from the obligations assumed under the
Treaty
of 1915. The report for the first six
months of the current fiscal year of the Haitian
Government
shows a deficit of five hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars; that
available
cash balances are nearly exhausted, and that the revenues for the next two
months
will be insufficient to meet expenses.
It is, therefore of vital important to the
Haitian
Government that it be enabled to secure a loan immediately. Therefore, it is
recommended
that the Department of State use its good offices in order that some bank or
group
of banking interests may become interested in effecting the loan at the
earliest
moment
possible. From recent conversations had
with representatives of banks possibly
interested
in the Haitian loan, it is believed that any effort made at this time by the
United
States
to assist the Haitian Government in that
regard will meet with the same failure
hitherto
encountered and noted above, unless the Department of State will make a
definite
pronouncement
of a firm, continuous policy in Haiti.
What is required, however, in order
that
the finances of Haiti may be placed on a sound basis is not only the floatation
of the
desired
loan, but likewise the devising of a method for providing internal revenue, and
the
placing
in force of an adequate system of audit and control of the Haitian revenues in
general.
4.
Plans for the Economic Development and Prosperity of the Haitian
Republic and Its People.
One of the primary needs of the
Haitian people today is education. As
mentioned
above,
approximately 98 per cent of the Haitian population is illiterate. The present
system
of education is inefficient and the schools are far too few. After very thorough
investigation
of this subject, it is believed a proper system of education can be placed in
effect
in Haiti only if the general direction of Education is placed in the hands of a
competent
American Advisor, having under his jurisdiction a sufficient number of
American
inspectors. The appropriation allotted
in the Haitian budget to education is not
believed
to be inadequate, the difficulty being, however, that only a small portion of
this
appropriation
is actually devoted to education, the greater part of it going into the pockets
of
the Haitian officials. Under the terms
of the Treaty as it now stands, the Government
of
the United States has no power to supervise education, and it is believed that
nothing
can
be accomplished in this direction until an amendment is incorporated in the
Treaty
giving
the United States the necessary measure of control. This power should not consist
solely
in the supervision by an American Adviser of the Ministry of Public
Instruction,
but
should likewise grant the United States the right to assist the Haitian
Government in
inaugurating
a system of manual training schools and of agricultural experimental
stations.
The inability of the Haitian
Government to float the desired loan has rendered it
impossible
to carry out public improvements to any considerable extent. It is believed
that
once the loan is obtained, very material progress in this direction should be
made
within
a comparatively short time. For the
same reason only a beginning has been made
in
giving the Haitian Republic a modern system of sanitation. This can likewise be
accomplished
if the necessary loan is obtained.
In view of these considerations, the
following recommendations are made,
modifying
the present system of control exercised by this Government in Haiti, in order
that
the obligation assumed by this government may be effectively carried out and in
order
that the Haitian Government and people may be led to understand that the desire
of
this
Government is one of helpful cooperation, and not one of dictation.
I.
It is therefore recommended that an agreement be reached between the
Government
of the United States and the Government of Haiti for an increase, as soon as
practicable,
in the number of men enlisted in the native Gendarmerie. This enlargement
will
necessarily require an increase in the appropriation allotted to the
Gendarmerie in the
Haitian
budget. It is recommended, in
particular, also, that the Navy Department
nominate,
in the future, only officers, and not non-commissioned officers, from the
United
States Marine Corps, for appointment by the Haitian President as officers in
the
Haitian
Gendarmerie. The exigencies of the
service during the period of the war made it
necessary
for the Navy Department, upon numerous occasions, to select
non-commissioned
offices to act as officers in the Gendarmerie forces, and it is believed
that
it is due almost entirely to this fact that friction has developed in Haiti
between the
Haitians
and the Americans acting as Haitian officers in the Gendarmerie and also that
the
Gendarmerie forces are not better organized and disciplined today. Enlargement and
reorganization
of the Haitian Gendarmerie is highly desirable. If this can be
accomplished,
and the Navy Department believes that the continued presence of large
bodies
of American Marines is no longer necessary to insure peace and tranquillity in
the
republic,
it is recommended that the United States Marines be withdrawn after such
reorganization
in the native Gendarmerie has been effected, with the exception, however,
of
small bodies of Marines to be stationed at Port au Prince and Cape Haitian to
act as
Legation
and Consular guards.
II. It is recommended that an official of this
Government be sent immediately to
Haiti
to act as personal Representative of the President of the United States in a
capacity
similar
to that now held by General Crowder in Cuba.
It is further recommended that this
official be, in possible, an officer of General
rank
in the Marine Corps, detailed by the Navy Department for service under the
Department
of State; to receive his instruction from the latter Department in all matters;
to
be authorized to undertake immediate control and supervision of all the
functions
allotted
by the Treaty between the United States and Haiti to the Chief of the
Gendarmerie,
the Financial Advisor, the General Receiver of Customs, the Engineer of
Public
Works, and the Engineer of Sanitation; and to have likewise under his
supervision
and
direction public instruction as provided for in the suggested amendment to the
Treaty
mentioned
in recommendation No. III below. In the
future, therefore, the Chief of the
Gendarmerie,
the Financial Adviser, the Engineer of Public Works, the Engineer of
Sanitation,
and the Adviser upon educational matters (which office will be created by the
suggested
amendment to the Treaty), will be required to act in conformity with the
recommendations
made to them by the Representative of the President. The work which
they
carry on will be directly subject to his supervision and direction.
It is further recommended that under
this plan of concentration, the suggestion
contained
in the latter [sic] of March 24th, addressed by the President of Haiti to the
President
of the United States, that the functions of the Financial Adviser and the
Receiver
General of Customs be centered on one official, be adopted. It is recommended,
therefore,
that the Financial Adviser be granted all the fiscal powers provided for in the
Treaty
- this is to say, the power at present vested in the Financial Adviser and the
Receiver
General of Customs, and to have in addition, control of the collection and
disbursement
of internal revenues of the Haitian Republic, as indicated in the Treaty.
This
recommendation is not intended in imply, however, that the Financial Adviser
should
not be enabled, in his discretion, to arrange the work of his office in such a
way
that
one of his assistants shall have entire charge of the collection of customs,
he, himself,
merely
supervising such work.
III. It is recommended that a new Treaty official be appointed, to
have
supervision
and direction of educational matters.
The direction and supervision of
education
in Haiti should be placed under this American Treaty official, who, in turn,
should
be subordinate to the Representative of the President of the United States as
noted
in
a preceding paragraph. It is
recommended, therefore, that an amendment be
incorporated
in the Treaty of 1915, reading as follows:
"The
Republic of Haiti, being desirous of furthering the economic
development and progress of the
country and the education and advancement of
its citizens, agrees to undertake to
execute such measure as, in the opinion of the
High Contracting Parties, may be
necessary for the advancement of education in the
Republic under the supervision and
direction of an official to be appointed by
the President of Haiti upon nomination of the President of the United
States."
IV. When the reorganization and concentration of
the duties of the American
Treaty
officials in Haiti, as outlined in the preceding recommendation, has been
placed in
effect,
it is recommended that prior to final approval of the yearly budget of the
Haitian
Government,
the Financial Adviser submit the budget and his recommendation, thereon
to
the Representative of the President of the United States. This officer will then
determine,
in consultation with the Financial Adviser, upon the general form which the
expenditures
of the Haitian Government should take for the ensuing year. After a
dicision
[sic], in necessary in consultation with the Department of State, has been
arrived
at,
the budget will be submitted by the Financial Adviser to the Haitian Government
as
has
been done in the past, and in the event that the Haitian Government disagrees
with the
nature
or the amount of the appropriations provided in the budget, the budget will be
once
more
submitted by the Financial Adviser to the Representative of the President of
the
United
States in order that, if possible, an agreement may thereupon be reached with
the
Haitian
Government. In the event that an
agreement is even then found impossible, the
matter
in dispute will be referred to by the Representative of the President of the
United
States
to the Department of State for final adjustment in order that the decision of
the
Department
of State may be submitted to the Haitian Government through diplomatic
channels. The greater part of the friction which has
existed in the past between the
members
of the Haitian Government and the American Treaty officials in Haiti has been
due
to disputes over the provision of the budget. It is believed that the method outlined
above
will make possible an avoaidance [sic] of such conditions in the future. It is not
believed
expedient or just that there be continued the present system by which a single
official
appointed by the United States, the Financial Adviser, determines upon the
amount
of money which the Haitian Government shall expend during the fiscal year and
the
exact manner of its allocation.
The above recommendation are
submitted in the belief that their enactment will
make
it possible for the Government of the United States to discharge efficiently
and with
the
least possible friction its obligations to the people of Haiti as assumed under
the
provisions
of the Treaty of 1915. It is believed
that the Republics of Latin-America are,
in
general, fully cognizant of present conditions in Haiti and realize that the
Haitian
people
have not advanced sufficiently far in the point of civilization to govern
themselves
in
the light of modern standards. They
realize, moreover, that outside assistance is
inevitable. So far as I am aware, no criticism has been
directed in Latin-America against
the
action of the United States Government in intervening in Haitian affairs. Criticism
has,
however, been directed against the United States for its failure, during the
last six
years,
to accomplish anything towards advancing education, commerce, or national
prosperity
in the Haitian Republic. Charge indeed
has been made that the United States
is
keeping Haiti for what material gain it may itself acquire from such
occupation. An
efficient
administration of Haitian affairs, through the existing Haitian Government
would
not only permit this Government to discharge its positive obligations to the
Haitian
people,
but would likewise set at rest the charges made throughout Latin America, above
referred
to.265
Appendix
17:
The 1922-23 Haitian Loan Plan
PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE
REPUBLIC OF HAITI
Article I
In pursuance of the objects of the
Treaty concluded September 16, 1915, between
the
United States of America and the Republic of Haiti to establish the finances of
Haiti
on
a firm and solid basis, the government of the United States and the Government
of
Haiti
through duly authorized representatives agree upon this Protocol pr the purpose
of
carrying
out the objects of the aforesaid Treaty and of giving effect to Article 12
thereof.
It
is clearly understood that this Protocol does not in fact or by implication
extend the
provisions
of the Treaty of September 16, 1915, hereinbefore mentioned.
Article II
Since the settlement by arbitration
or otherwise of all pending pecuniary claims of
foreign
corporation, companies, citizens or subjects against Haiti, makes it necessary
to
assemble,
analyze and adjust such claims, the Government of Haiti agrees to constitute
forthwith
a Claims commission of three members, one member, to be nominated by the
Secretary
of State for Finance of Haiti; one member to be nominated by the secretary of
State
for the United States, and the third member who shall no be a citizen either of
Haiti
or
of the United States to be nominated by the Financial Advisor, the three
members so
nominated
to be appointed by the Government of Haiti.
In case a vacancy occurs in the
office of any member by reason of his disability or
for
any other cause, a new member shall be nominated and appointed in the same
manner
a
was the former incumbent.
Article III
The Claims commission shall have
jurisdiction to examine and pass upon all
pecuniary
claims against Haiti. It is understood,
however, that the Commission shall not
have
jurisdiction to consider or pass upon:
(1)
The indebtedness represented by the three bond issues of 1875, 1896, and
1910,
now outstanding;
(2)
That to the Banque Nationale de la Républic d'Haiti, as of December 31,
1916,
as acknowledged by the Haytian [sic] Government on the 12th of April, 1919;
(3)
The sum due as interest as this sum will have been verified and admitted
by
the
Financial Advisor, upon the bonds of the Compaigne Nationale des Chemins de Fer
d'Haiti,
duly authorized and bearing the guarantee of the Haytian Government, to the
amount
of $3,544,548.74; and
(4)
So much of the sum due to the Compaigne des Chemins de Fer de la Plaine
du
Cul-de-Sac on account of the interest guarantee upon its bonds as has as not
hitherto
been
in dispute between the railroad and the Haytian Government, the Government
having
recognized its obligation to pay to the Compaigne des Chemins de Fer de la
Plaine
du
Cul-de-Sac a sum equal to $41,280 per annum, less the net profits of the
railroad.
It is further understood that the
claims heretofore presented to the Claims
Commission
appointed by the decree of November four nineteen sixteen need not be
presented
de novo to the new claims commission who will review the findings of the
Commission
appointed by the decree of November four nineteen sixteen in respect to
these
claims, may require the production of
further evidence where they deem this
necessary
and shall make such final awards as seem to them just and equitable.
Article IV
The Claims Commission shall proceed,
as soon as constituted, t hold meetings at
Port-au-Prince,
or elsewhere in the republic of Haiti, to formulate rules of procedure for
the
filing and adjudication of claims.
The Claims Commission may fix the
date after which claims may not be filed, but
such
date shall not be less tan six months after the date of the first public
announcement
by
the commission of its readiness to receive claims. The commission shall be bound to
examine
and decide upon every claim within two years from the day of its first
meeting.
a
majority vote of the Commissioners shall constitute a binding decision upon any
claim.
Article V
The Claims Commission shall
determine the proportion of each award which is to
be
paid in ash and the proportion to be paid in bonds of Haiti; and it shall state
these
amounts
respectively in its certificate of award which is to be issued to each creditor
in
whose
favor an award is made, and which is to be surrendered by him to the Secretary
of
State
for finance upon payment of the award.
Article VI
In order to make possible the
settlement of the awards rendered by the Claims
Commission
and the refunding of those obligation specifically mentioned in Numbers 1,
2,
3 and 4 in Article III above, and otherwise to establish the finances of Haiti
on a firm
and
solid basis, the republic of Haiti agrees to issue, upon the terms and at a
time to be
fixed
in accord with the Financial Advisor, but not later than two years after the
date of
the
signature of this Protocol a national loan of 40,000,000 dollars gold
($40,000,000),
payable
in thirty years by annual drawings at par, or by purchase below par in the open
market. It is agreed that the Government of Haiti
shall have the right to pay off the entire
loan
at any time upon reasonable previous notice after fifteen years from the date
of issue.
Article VII
It is further agreed that this loan,
to the issuance of which the President of the
United
States consents,, will be used to pay or otherwise provide for the obligations
specifically
mentioned and numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Article III hereof, and also the
awards
rendered by the Claims Commission provided for herein. Provision shall be made
for
the exchange of the bonds for this loan for the bonds of the issues of 1875,
1896, and
1910,
such exchange to take place with due regard for the interest rates of the
respective
bonds
and to be carried on between the Secretary of State for Finance of the Republic
of
Haiti,
in accord with the Financial Advisor, and such agency as may represent the
holders
of
said bonds. After two years from the
date of the official announcement of the
beginning
of the conversion the bonds of this loan not used for the purpose of this
conversion
shall be returned to the Secretary of State for Finance of Haiti at
Port-au-Prince
for the use of the government. The
holders of any said old bonds which
shall
not have been presented for exchange within this period of two years shall
apply for
redemption
of the same to the Secretary of State for Finance of Haiti. Any surplus
remaining
after the foreign and domestic indebtedness has been paid or otherwise
provided
for shall be applied by the republic of Haiti, in accord with the Financial
Advisor,
to the construction of necessary public works or to the service o the loan
hereinabove
authorized.
Article VIII
It is agreed that the payment of
interest and the amortization of this loan will
constitute
a first charge on al the internal revenues of Haiti, and a second charge upon
the
customs
revenue of Haiti next in order, until the expiration of the Treaty of September
16,
1915,
after payment of salaries, allowances and expenses of the General Receiver and
the
Financial
Adviser and their assistants; and it is further agreed that the control by an
officer
or officers duly appointed by the President for Haiti, upon nomination by the
President
of the United States, of the collection and allocation of the hypothecate
revenues,
will be provided for during the life of the loan after the expiration of the
aforesaid
Treaty so as to make certain that adequate provision be made for the
amortization
and interest of the loan.
Article IX
Each member of the Claims Commission
will receive $8,000 gold per annum as
salary,
and $2,000 gold per annum as expenses; and the Commission is authorized, after
the
approval of the Secretary of State for Finance in accord with the financial
Adviser, to
retain
the services of such assistants and experts and otherwise to incur such actual
and
necessary
expenses as may required for the proper discharge of its duties; and it is
agreed
that
upon proper certification by Secretary of State for Finance, such salaries,
allowances
and
expenses thus authorized will be paid from the General Treasury of the
Republic.
Article X
The government of Haiti agrees to
empower the commission by appropriate
legislation
or otherwise to compel the attendance at its session in Haiti of witnesses
whose
testimony is desired in connection with any claim pending before the
commission,
and
to require the production of papers which the commission may deem necessary for
it
to
consider. The government of Haiti
further agrees to enact such legislation as may be
necessary
to give effect to the provision of this Protocol.
Article XI
This Protocol will take effect
immediately upon signature by the Minister of the
United
States to Haiti representing the Government of the Untied States, and by the
Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs of Haiti representing the Government of Haiti.
In witness whereof this agreement
has been signed and sealed by Mr. Arthur
Bailly-Blanchard
, envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States
of
America on behalf of the United States, and by Mr. Constantin Benoit, Secretary
of
State
for Foreign Affairs of Haiti on the behalf of the Républic of Haiti.
Done in duplicate in the English and
French languages at the City of
Port-au-Prince
on the third day of October, one thousand nine hundred and nineteen.
A. Bailly-Blanchard [SEAL]
C. Benoit [SEAL]265
LOUIS BORNO, President of the
Republic,
Under article 55 of the
Constitution;
Under the treaty of September 16,
1915, concluded between Haiti and the United
States
of America, and the additional act of March 28, 1917;
Considering; that in order to
fulfill the purposes of the treaty concluded between
Haiti
and the United States on September 16, 1915, a protocol was concluded between
the
two
governments on October 3, 1919.;
Considering; that in an exchange of
notes between the two governments, certain
modifications
of the protocol were accepted and confirmed in the notes of 1st and 3rd of
June,
1922;
Considering, that it is urgent that
proper measures be taken to establish the
finances
upon a solid basis; that it is important to profit by the present rate of
exchange,
in
order to redeem the external debt; that it is just and equitable to ameliorate
promptly
the
situation of the bondholders of the internal debt, to determine the amount of
the
floating
debt and of the various claims and to provide for their settlement, either by
redeeming
the debt, or by guaranteeing the service of redemption and interest;
Considering, that in order to arrive
at a revision of the customs tariff and to
diminish
the taxes actually borne by the mass of the people, it is necessary to release
the
public
revenues from the pledges now existing;
Considering, furthermore, that it is
absolutely necessary to assure by intelligence
measures
the augmentation of national production, and consequently to execute all
projects
for work on public roads and or irrigation of the plains necessary to attain
that
end;
also that it is necessary to organize a proper surveillance of rural districts
and the
education
and instruction of the rural population, and to provide for the construction of
schoolhouses;
On the reports of the Secretaries of
State for Foreign Affairs, Finance and
Commerce,
Public Works, Public Instruction, and Agriculture,
And on the advise of the Council of
the Secretaries of State,
Has Proposed
And the council of State has voted,
the following law:
Article I. The government of the Republic is authorized to contract, to the
best
interests
of the country, a loan of $40,000,000 American gold.
The said loan shall be issued in
series; the first shall be for about sixteen millions
($16,000,000),
and the others shall be issued as may be necessary for the needs of the
public
service.
The terms, amounts, rates of
interest, sinking funds, and redemption of the bonds
shall
be fixed by the Haitian Government in accord with the Financial Adviser.
Conforming to article 29 of the
Constitution and in the interest of the contracting
parties,
the loan contract, once concluded and signed, shall be submitted to the council
of
State
for legislative sanction.
Article II. The stipulations of the protocol of October
3, 1919, signed between the
Haitian
Government and the Government of the United States of America, are and remain
sanctioned,
with the following modifications:
(a)
The delay of 2 years provided for in article 6 is and remains prorogued,
provided,
however, that the loan be contracted with a reasonable period.
(b)
Paragraph 4 of article 3 of the protocol is suppressed, the sum due
having
already
been paid.
(c) The already liquidated and consolidated
interior debt represented by the bonds issued
in
1912, 1913, and 1914--A, B, and C--shall not be submitted to the claims
commission;
the
Haitian Government reserves to itself the right of continuing the service or of
redeeming
the bonds.
(d)
The proceeds for the bonds as well as of the bonds themselves may be
used
for
the payment of the obligations mentioned in articles 3 and 7 of the protocol of
October
3, 1919; the reservation of bonds for the 2-year period, for the conversion
referred
to in the said article 7, is applicable only to such of the bonds not destined
to the
other
uses indicated in the above-mentioned protocol.
The dispositions of the said
protocol do not amplify, either in fact or implicitly,
the
provisions of the treaty of September 16, 1915, hereinabove mentioned.
Article III. The present law shall be executed by the
diligence of the Secretaries
of
State for foreign Affairs, finance and commerce, Public works and the Interior,
Public
Instruction,
and Agriculture, each in that which concerns him.
Given in the Legislative Palace at
Port au Prince, June 26, 1922, in the 119th year
of
Independence.
The President,
J. M. Grandoit
The
Secretaries
Delabarre Pierre-Louis
Charles Fombrun267
Appendix
18: The 1925 Gendarmerie Agreement.
The undesigned, duly authorized by
their respective governments, have this day
agreed
that Article I and XII of the Haitian Gendarmerie Agreement, made by and
between
the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Haiti,
on
the 24th of August 1916, and amended on the 23rd of March 1920, shall be and
they
are
hereby amended so as to read as follows:
Article I
That the constabulary contemplated
by Article X of the Treaty between the United
States
of America and the Republic of Haiti, signed at Port-au-Prince on September 16,
1915,
shall he known as the Haitian Gendarmerie; that its strength and amounts to be
expended
for pay, rations, hospital and medical supplies, and expenses of maintenance
and
operations, et cetera, shall be as set forth in the following table:
Per Month Per
Annum
Personnel Gourdes
Gourdes
1
General of Division, commandant . 1250.00 15,000.00
1
General of Brigade
1000.00 12,000.00
3
Colonels, Director . 1000.00 36,000.00
1
Colonel, Quartermaster-Paymaster Director 1000.00
12,000.00
1
Colonel Medical Director
1000.00 12,000.00
7
Majors, Inspectors 750.00
63,000.00
2
Majors, Assistant Quartermasters, Inspectors
750.00 18,000.00
3
Majors, Surgeon Inspector
750.00 27,000.00
20
Captains 750.00 180,000.00
1
Captain, Surgeon 750.00 9,000.00
49
First Lieutenants 500.00 294,000.00
3
First Lieutenants (Hospital Corps) 500.00 18,000.00
49
Second Lieutenants
300.00 176,000.00
6
Second Lieutenants, (Hospital Corps) 300.00
21,600.00
19
First Sergeants 125.00
28,500.00
112
Sergeants 100.00 134,000.00
262
Corporals
75.00 235,000.00
40
Field Musicians 50.00
24,000.00
2100
Privates 50.00 1,260,000.00
Total
Pay personnel Gdes. 2,576,700.00
Rations
Expenses
of procuring and preparing rations for
2533 enlisted men at 75 centimes per
diem 693,337.50
Medical
Service
Medical
supplies, equipment and maintenance of
hospitals 75,000.00
Maintenance and Operation
Civil
clerical force; uniforms; ammunition and target
practice; forage and remounts; transportation
of supplies and troops; maps;
stationary and
office supplies; intelligence
service; rent;
repairs to barracks; equipage;
gasoline; kerosene;
lights; tools and miscellaneous
expenditures
for maintenance and operation of the
Gendarmerie 1,142,975.00
Coast Guard
Per Month Per
Annum
Personnel
Gourdes Gourdes
1
Inspector 750.00 9,000.00
3
First Lieutenants 500.00 18,000.00
4
engineers 100.00 4,800.00
4
Quartermasters
75.00 3,600.00
30
Seamen 50.00 18,000.00
Rations
for 38 men at Gdes.
1.00 per man per diem
13,870.00
Maintenance
and Operation
of Coast Guard 92,970.00 160,240.00
Total for Land forces and Coast Guard 4,648,252.50
It is further provided that of the
condition of the Haitian Government's finances
shall
so warrant, the following additional
number of officers or part of this number may
be
appointed, and the following additional number of men of part of this number
and the
following
number of nurses or part of this number may be enlisted upon the
recommendation
for the commandant and upon the consent, in writing, of the Financial
Advisor.
The pay, rations, hospital and
medical supplies, and expenses of maintenance and
operation,
et cetera, shall be as set forth in the following table:
Per Month Per Annum
Personnel Gourdes
Gourdes
1
Colonel . 1000.00 12,000.00
1
Major, Assistant Quartermaster Inspector
750.00 9,000.00
1
Major, Surgeon . 750.00 9,000.00
2
Captains
750.00 18,000.00
1
Captain, Assistant Quartermaster 750.00 9,000.00
2
Captains, Surgeon
750.00 18,000.00
10
First Lieutenants
500.00 60,000.00
1
First Lieutenant
500.00
6,000.00
10
Second Lieutenants 300.00
36,000.00
4
Warrant Officers 300.00
14,400.00
22
Aspirant Officers
250.00 66,000.00
7
Sergeants Major 150.00 12,600.00
11
First Sergeants 125.00
16,500.00
23
Staff Sergeants
125.00 34,500.00
38
Sergeants
100.00 45,600.00
38
Corporals
75.00
34,200.00
10
Field Musicians 50.00 6,000.00
240
Privates
50.00 144,000.00
Medical
Services
4
First Sergeants
125.00 6,000.00
20
Sergeants
100.00 24,000.00
40
Corpsmen, 1 Class 75.00 36,000.00
30
Corpsmen, 2nd Class 60.00 21,600.00
6
Nurses
100.00 7,200.00
Palace
Band
1
Band Leader, 1st Lieutenant 500.00
6,000.00
1
Assistant Leader 250.00
3,000.00
10
Musicians, 1st Class 125.00 15,000.00
15
Musicians, 2nd Class 100.00 18,000.00
25
Musicians, 3rd Class 75.00 22,500.00
Rations
for 461 enlisted men, 50 bandsmen, and six
nurses at 75 centimes per person per
diem 141,528.75
Medical
supplies, equipment, and maintenance of
hospitals for 517 persons at Gdes.
2.25 per
month per person
13,959.00
Maintenance
and operation for 461 enlisted men, 50
bandsmen, a 6 nurses at Gdes. 17.75
per month
per person 110,121.00
Article XII
The sum of Gdes 4,648,252.50, Haitian Currency, shall be placed in the
Budget
annually
for the pay and allowances, rations, hospital and medical supplies, maintenance
and
operation, and other current expenses of the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard. This
appropriation
shall be made available in monthly allotments for the various needs of the
Gendarmerie
and Coast Guard, and any surplus not expended shall be available for the
use
for the Gendarmerie.
In case of the increase provided for
in Article I, the amounts necessary to carry it
into
effect shall be appropriated.
In witness whereof the undersigned
have hereunto signed their names and affixed
their
seals.
Done in duplicate, at
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, this twenty eighth day of February,
nineteen
hundred and twenty five.
George R. Merrell Jr. [SEAL]
Leon Déjean [SEAL]268
Appendix
19: Haitianization and Withdrawal
Agreements
Legation
of the
United States of America,
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, August 5,
1931
The undersigned plenipotentiaries
duly authorized by their respective
governments
have agreed upon the following Accord:
Article I
The services of the Engineers
provided for by Article XIII of the Treaty of
September
16, 1915, for the sanitation and public improvement of the Republic, and by
the
Accord of July 17, 1`923, regarding the Service Technique d'Agriculture, as
well as
their
foreign aids and employees, shall definitely cease on September 30, 1931,
except as
provided
below in Articles III and IV.
Article II
Accordingly, on October 1, 1931,
then Government of Haiti will assume
rightfully
and definitely the administration and control of the Direction Generale des
Traveauz
Publics, of the Service d'Hygiene, and of the Service Technique d'Agriculture,
and
the President of the Republic will deliver, in conformity with the Constitution
and the
laws,
commission to the Haitian engineers, physicians, and employees deemed necessary
for
the functions of the above mentioned services.
Article III
In that which concerns the Service
National d'Hygiene, it is understood that in
conformity
with the laws in force it will have, under the direction of the Secretary of
State
for the Interior, throughout the republic, the administration, inspection, and
supervision
of all of the public services of hygiene, sanitation, and quarantine of the
hospitals,
rural dispensaries, poor relief, insane asylums, and sanitary garages, of the
Medical
School, and Health Center, the laboratories, etc.
Nevertheless, in the cities of
Port-au-Prince and Cape Haitian, and their
immediate
environs (that is within a radius of two miles of the cities proper but
including
also
Petionville) where, pending other arrangements and until the conclusion of a
protocol
for their evacuation, American troops are stationed, an American scientific
mission
shall be especially charged in accord with the laws and regulations now in
force
with
the control of sanitation and the chlorination of water.
The Service Nationale d'Hygiene will
be entitled, if it so requests, to receive the
advice
and recommendations of the above mentioned scientific mission within the
restricted
field of sanitation.
The Government agrees to leave to
the Mission the sanitary garages at
Port-au-Prince
and Cape Haitian and the motor equipment strictly necessary for its
activities
but the Service Nationale d'Hygiene may always requisition the material thus
loaned
by agreement with the Mission if the need therefor should arise.
The government of Haiti agrees that
in case of epidemic or grace disorder
menacing
the public health within the above mentioned cities of Cape Haitian and
Port-au-Prince
the Mission will cooperate with the National Public Health Service to
combat
the danger and for this purpose shall be authorized to make all necessary
recommendations,
and to make use of all the facilities and all of the organizations of the
above
mentioned Service; and the Haitian Government, under such circumstances, will
take
the necessary measures and provide the necessary credits.
Article IV
The Mission provided for in the
preceding article will comprise three American
medical
officers nominated by the Government of the United States and appointed by the
President
of Haiti. Their status will be
assimilated so far as the salary that they receive
from
the public treasury is concerned to that of Public Health Officers first class
provided
for
by the law of August 8, 1926. The
Mission may also include, in addition, as a
maximum
of six hospital corpsmen of the United States Navy who will be paid in
conformity
with a budget approved by the Minister of Interior upon the basis of the law
of
December 5, 1924.
The Mission will have the right to
suitable offices at Cape Haitian and
Port-au-Prince.
The funds necessary for the payment
of the Haitian personnel and for the
functioning
of the sanitary services in the cities of Cape Haitian and Port-au-Prince will
be
provided for in a budget which shall be approved in advance by the Minister of
Interior.
Article V
The Accord of August 24, 1918,
regarding the communication of projects of
Haitian
laws to the legation of the United States of America at Port-au-Prince, is and
remains
abrogated from this date.
If, nevertheless, the Government of
the United States should deem a given law to
be
seriously inconsistent with any rights arising from provisions of agreements
still in
force,
it will present its views tot the Haitian Government through diplomatic
channels
for
all proper purposes.
Article VI
The Accord of December 3, 1918,
relating to the visa of the Financial Advisor on
orders
of payment issued by the Secretary of State for Finance, on the Reciever-General
of
Customs, or on the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti, is and remains
abrogated.
The
Minister of Finance shall reach an agreement with the Financial Advisor on the
procedure
governing the service of payments.
The abrogation of the visa implies
an obligation of the part of the Government of
Haiti
until the liquidation of the services of the Financial Advisor-General Receiver
to
make
its expenditures within the limits of laws and credits voted or decreed with
the
accord
of the Financial Advisor. The Haitian
Government will reach agreements with the
Financial
Adviser regarding the measures affecting sources of revenue pending the
liquidation
of the services of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver.
Article
VII
The land title registry office
(Bureau d'Enregistrement) shall be entirely detached
from
the Office of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver and will pass under the
complete
control of the Secretary of Finance upon the signature of this accord.
Article
VIII
In view of the difficulties which
have raised with regard to the Law of May 26,
1931,
it is understood that the traveling or representation allowance of the
Legislative
Body
as provided for in the above mentioned law, will be paid without delay,
starting
from
April 6, 1931, and up to September 30, 1931, from the general funds of the
Treasury. After September 30, 1931, these allowances
will be paid in accordance with a
balanced
budget.
Article
IX
Since the government of the United
States believes that the discharge of the
civilian
officials and employees in the Services mentioned above in Articles I and II of
the
present Accord, will be unduly precipitate and has requested an indemnity for
them,
the
Secretary of State for Finance in accord with the Financial Adviser is
authorized to
indemnify
them upon an equitable basis from the general funds of the Treasury.
Specialists in the Service Technique
who, upon the express request of the
Government
of Haiti, shall desire to remain in their former positions and sign the
necessary
contracts for this purpose with the Secretary of State for Agriculture shall
not
have
the right to an indemnity by virtue of the liquidation of the Treaty Services.
Article
X
The two Governments agree to
continue their discussion regarding the other
problems
arising from the Treaty.
Article
XI
While awaiting the settlement of the
question of the Garde, the two Governments
agree
to maintain the "status quo" established by existing laws and
agreements and to
respect
said laws and agreements.
Signed at Port-au-Prince in
duplicate in the English and French languages, this
fifth
day of August, 1931.
Dana G. Munro
A. N. Leger269
Section
I
Haitianization
of the Garde d'Haiti and Withdrawal of Military Forces from Haiti
The undersigned plenipotentiaries,
duly authorized by their respective
governments,
have agreed upon the following Accord:
Article
I
The American officers now serving
with the Garde d'Haiti will be replaced in
such
a manner that by October 1, 1934, the Garde shall be completely commanded by
Haitian
officers.
Article
II
On October 1, 1934, the Garde, under
complete command of Haitian offices, will
be
turned over to a Colonel on active service whom the President of the Republic
shall
designate
as commandant.
Article
III
The promotions to be effected until
the complete Haitianization of the Garde will
be
made after examination held in the presence of the representative of the
Government
of
Haiti in conformity with Article X of the Treaty of September 16, 1915.
Article
IV
To complete the instruction,
training and discipline of the Garde the President of
Haiti,
may, if he consider it desirable, request the President of the United States to
designate
a Military Mission of not more than seven members among the American
officers
who have served in Haiti. The powers to
be granted to this mission will be
determined
by a decree of the President of Haiti.
The services of this mission shall
terminate
at the request of either party to the agreement upon sixty days notice given by
either
party.
Article
V
The withdrawal of the Marine Brigade
of the United States and the American
scientific
Mission established by the Accord of August 5, 1931, shall commence on
October
1, 1934, and shall be completed within thirty days.
Article
VI
The government of Haiti, in order to
preserve public order, assumes the obligation
of
maintaining strict discipline in the Garde and of applying for this purpose the
present
regulations
of the Garde d'Haiti.
It will enact a statue which will
fix the conditions of appointment, promotion and
retirement
in the Garde. It will also take all
legislative measures recognized as necessary
to
guarantee public peace and security.
Section
II
Financial
Arrangement. Adjustment of financial
guarantees stipulated in the Protocol of
1919 and
the loan contract of 1922
Article
VII
Beginning January 1, 1934, the
services of the Financial Adviser-General
Receiver
and of the Deputy General Receiver shall be carried on, in fulfillment of the
obligations
and guarantees undertaken in order to obtain the loan issued in accord with
the
Protocol of October 3, 1919, by a Fiscal Representative and a Deputy Fiscal
Representative,
appointed by the President of the Republic upon nomination of the
President
of the United States, who shall exercise the powers hereinafter set forth.
Article
VIII
As the customs revenues constitute
the principle pledge to the holders of the
bonds
of the 1922 loan, the Fiscal Representative will have under his direction,
until the
complete
amortization or the prior refunding of the loan under reference, the Customs
Service
and the application of the laws relative thereto. In addition he shall inspect the
activities
of the Internal Revenue Service and make appropriate recommendations for its
proper
operation; he shall be in charge of the existing Service of Payments, reserve
being
made
of the provision of Article XII hereafter; he shall maintain adequate records
of
receipts
and disbursements which records shall be open to inspection and verification by
the
appropriate authorities; and he shall submit monthly reports of his activities
to the
Secretary
of State for Finance and the Secretary of State of the United States.
In order properly to carry out his
duties, the Fiscal Representative shall have such
employees
and assistants as may appear necessary.
The number of American so
employed
shall not exceed eighteen. The
President of Haiti, upon the presentation which
will
be made to him by the Secretary of State for Finance, will commission as of
January
1,
1934, the employees occupying positions of authority and trust under the Fiscal
Representative
and recommended by the latter.
Thereafter, any position which may
become
vacant among the commission employees shall be filled by examination, the
form
and procedure of which shall be determined by an accord between the Secretary
of
State
for Finance and the Fiscal Representative.
The successful competitor in such
examination
shall be recommended for the vacancy and will be commissioned by the
President
of Haiti. such commissioned employees
may be suspended without pay by the
Fiscal
Representative, on charges filed with the Secretary of State for Finance and
such
employee
or assistant shall not b reinstated unless the charges have been disproved to
the
satisfaction
of the Secretary of State for Finance, and of the Fiscal Representative.
Pending
the hearing of the charges made, the Fiscal Representative, after a report to
the
Secretary
of State for Finance, may fill the vacancy provisionally, if necessary, until
the
charges
had been disproved or a new commission issued.
Article
IX
The salaries of the Fiscal
Representative and of the Deputy Fiscal Representative
shall
be made the subject of an accord between the two Governments. These salaries,
together
with the expenses of the activities of the Fiscal Representative, but excluding
the
expenses
of the Internal Revenue Inspection Service, may not exceed five per centum of
customs
receipts except by agreement between the two Governments.
Article
X
The Internal Revenue Service, the
personnel of which shall be exclusively
Haitian,
shall be placed in charge of a Haitian Director under the Secretary of State
for
Finance.
Nevertheless, if the Fiscal
Representative should notify the Secretary of State for
Finance
and the Director General of Internal Revenue in writing that there is reason to
suppose
any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue is inefficient, or that his
action
is
not correct, such officer or employee shall be suspended, and not reinstated
unless the
charges
shall have been disproved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State for
Finance.
The expenses of the Internal Revenue
Service shall be paid from the funds set
aside
for this purpose by the National Bank of the republic of Haiti in accordance
with
schedules
of payment agreed upon between the Secretary of State for Finance and the
Fiscal
Representative. These expenses shall
not exceed ten per centum of internal
revenue
receipts. Any sums not required by the
Internal Revenue Inspection Service
within
this allowance shall be made available to the Internal Revenue Service.
Article
XI
On and after January 1, 1934, all
monies received by or for the Haitian
Government
shall be deposited in the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti to the credit
of
the Haitian Government with the exception of the five per centum of customs
revenues
foreseen
in Article IX above and the amounts needed for payments connected with
execution
of the loan contracts, which amounts will be to the credit of the Fiscal
Representative. The National Bank of the Republic of Haiti
also shall set aside
preferentially
each month to the credit of the Fiscal Representative the amounts provided
in
Article X above for the expenses of the Internal Revenue Service and of the
Internal
Revenue
Inspection Service.
Article
XII
All payments of Government funds
shall continue to be made by checks prepared
by
the Service of Payments. The existing
arrangements, as agreed upon between the two
Governments
on August 5, 1931, shall continue to govern this service except that all
checks
henceforth will be signed by the Secretary of State for Finance, or his
delegate,
reserve
being made in the case of those checks against the funds deposited at the
National
Bank
of the republic of Haiti to the credit of the Fiscal Representative, which
checks shall
be
signed by the latter, or his delegate.
Article
XIII
Each year, by January 31st at the
latest, the Fiscal Representative shall present a
detailed
estimate of receipts for the following fiscal year. Except by special agreement,
the
budget of the republic shall not exceed the amount of probable ways and means
which
the
Secretary of State for Finance and the Fiscal Representative shall have agreed
upon.
Article
XIV
The Haitian Government may authorize
any appropriations whatsoever if
unobligated
funds are available, or derivable at an early date from the ordinary revenues,
to
cover such appropriation after setting such reserves as may appear to the
Secretary of
State
for Finance and the Fiscal Representative to be necessary.
Article
XV
In case of a probable budgetary
deficit, expenditures must be brought to the level
of
ways and means, either by reducing expenditures or by the creation of new
receipts. In
every
case, it will not be possible without the accord of the Fiscal Representative to
cover
a deficit by calling upon the reserve funds of the Government.
Article
XVI
There shall be included annually in
the budget of the Republic the amounts
necessary
for the regular service of the funded debt and other contractual obligations,
as
well
as two lump sums representing five per centum of customs and five per centum of
internal
revenues, respectively, for the payment of the expenses of the Fiscal
Representative,
and those of the Internal Revenue Inspection Service, and finally a lump
sum
representing ten per centum of internal revenue receipts for the payment of the
expenses
of the Internal Revenue Service. The
balance may be apportioned by the
Haitian
Government between the budgets of the various departments as it may see fit
. If
the
revenues received in any month shall be insufficient to meet the full debt
service and
expenses
of collection, the Government will make available the amount required to make
up
the difference.
Article
XVII
Without the accord of the Fiscal
Representative no new financial obligations will
be
assumed unless the ordinary revenues of the republic, after defraying the
expenses of
the
Government, shall be adequate to assure the final discharge of such obligation.
Article
XVIII
The Government will not dispose of
its investments except with the accord of the
Fiscal
Representative.
Article
XIX
The present finance law shall be the
organic act of the Republic so far as concerns
the
administration of government finances.
Article
XX
The Government of Haiti agrees not
to reduce the tariff nor to modify the taxes
and
internal revenues in such a manner as to reduce the total amount thereof
without the
accord
of the Fiscal Representative.
Article
XXI
The Custom House of the Republic
shall have an exclusively Haitian personnel
and
the title of Director shall be reestablished in lieu of that of collector. However,
inspectors
of the Customs service may be assigned, either temporarily or permanently, to
oversee
the operation and the strict application of the customs laws.
Article
XXII
In case of payment under protest of
customs duties or internal revenue taxes, and
where
restitution of such payment is requested, a written claim shall be presented to
the
competent
service within a time limit of thirty working days beginning with the date on
which
the duties to taxes were paid. If the
decision is not accepted, the matter shall be
presented
to a commission composed of a representative of the Secretary of State for
Finance
and a representative of the Fiscal Representative.
If there should still be failure to
reach an agreement, the claim for restitution shall
be
decided by legal proceedings, but the State may not be liable for any
compensatory or
punitive
damages.
Article
XXIII
In view of the fact that under
normal conditions the operation of the sinking fund
will
result in retirement of the outstanding series of the loan authorized by the
law of June
26,
1922, approximately by the year 1944, and inasmuch as any further issue of the
loan
would
necessarily extend the operation of this agreement, to a period beyond that
year,
which
extension is contrary to their desire, it is hereby agreed by both Governments
that
the
loan shall be considered closed and that no additional series shall be issued
thereunder.
Article
XXIV
In case there should appear to be
occasion for judicial proceedings against the
Fiscal
Representative or his American assistants, the two Governments, in order to
avoid
possible
misunderstandings, agree to examine each case impartially and to agree upon the
legal
action which might be appropriate.
Article
XXV
The Haitian Government, upon the
signature of the present agreement, will issue
irrevocable
instructions tot the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti in order that there
may
be full and complete execution of the clauses herein respecting the deposit and
disbursement
of the funds of the Government.
Article
XXVI
The Haitian Government reserves the
right to retire the bonds issued in accord
with
the Protocol of October 3, 1919, in advance of their due date; and the
Government of
the
United States will not invoke the provision of Article VI of the Protocol as an
obstacle
to such retirement before the expiration of the period of fifteen years fixed
therein,
provided that the Haitian Government is able to make an arrangement for this
purpose
satisfactory to the holders of the outstanding bonds.
In this case the provisions of its
accord shall automatically become null and void
and
of no effect upon the completion of the funding operation. The Haitian Government
in
order to hasten the retirement of the loan of 1922 may continue as rapidly as
ita
resources
will permit, to buy on the open market bonds of the several series of the said
loan.
Article
XXVII
Any controversy which may arise
between the two Governments on the subject of
the
clauses of the present accord shall be submitted to arbitration in case it
cannot be
settle
through diplomatic channels, in accordance with the Arbitration Treaty of
January
7,
1909 between the two countries.
Signed at Port-au-Prince in
duplicate in the English and French languages, this
seventh
day of August, 1933.
Norman Armour [SEAL]
A. Blanchet [SEAL]270
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
to the American Minister
[translation]
Mr.
Minister:
With reference to Your Excellency's
letter of October 21, 1933, I have the honor
to
inform you that I have been authorized by my Government to communicate the
following:
Subject to any legal measures which
may be required by the situation, the
Government
of Haiti agrees with the government of the United States on the following
points
concerning Guard officers assigned to the Military Staff of the President of
the
Republic:
1.
The commandant of the Guard shall, beginning in October 1933, be
authorized
to
assign up to nine commissioned Guard officers to serve on the Military Staff of
the
President
of the Republic. These officers shall
continue to be members of the Guard and
shall
retain their rank and pay therein; if they are second lieutenants, their
billeting
expenses
shall be set at one hundred gourdes per month.
2.
As long as an allowance is granted for the representation costs of the
Military
Staff,
this allowance, through the Quartermaster of the Haitian Guard, shall be used
monthly
for the special expenses of the officers belonging to the Military Staff.
Please accept, Mr. Minister, the
assurance of my high consideration.
Léon Laleau
His
Excellency
Norman Armour
E.
E. and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America,
Port-au-Prince
The American Minister to the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Port au Prince, October 27, 1933
No.
44
Excellency:
I have the honor to inform you that
I have been authorized by my government to
address
to Your Excellency the following communication:
With reservation of any legal
measures which may be required by the situation,
the
Government of the United States is in accord with the Government of the
Republic of
Haiti
on the following points concerning officers of the Garde forming part of the
Military
Household of the President of the Republic:
From October 1933, the Commandant of
the Garde shall assign up to nine
commissioned
Guard officers to positions in the Military Household of the President of
the
Republic. These officers shall remain
incorporated in the Garde and shall retain their
rank
and pay and if Second Lieutenants, their billeting expenses shall be set at
Gdes. 100
per
month.
As long as an appropriation for
representation expenses of the Military Household
shall
be made this appropriation, through the intermediary of the quartermaster of
the
Garde
d'Haiti, shall be set apart monthly for the extraordinary expenses of the
officers
belonging
thereto.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed
assurance of my highest consideration.
Norman
Armour
His
Excellency
M. Léon Laleau,
Secretary
of State for Foreign Relations,
Port au Prince.271
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI
Whereas the President of the United
States of America and the President of the
Republic
of Haiti, in the course of the conversation at Cape Haitian on July 5, 1934,
reached
the agreement, because of the rapid progress made by the Garde d'Haiti, to
terminate
completely the services of the American officers in that organization on August
1
of this year and
Whereas the President of the United
States of American and the President of the
republic
of Haiti, on the request of the Haitian Government, have furthermore agreed
that
the
Marine forces of the United States of America will be withdrawn a fortnight
later.
The undersigned plenipotentiaries,
duly authorized by the respective
Governments,
have agreed to the following arrangement:
Article I
On august 1, 1934, the service of
the American officers in the Garde d'Haiti shall
terminate. On the said date the Garde, under complete
command of Haitian Officers, will
be
turned over to a colonel in active service whom the President of Haiti shall
designate
as
Commandant.
Article II
The Marine Brigade of the United
States and the American Scientific Mission,
established
by the Accord of August 5, 1931, will be withdrawn a fortnight later.
Article III
The provisions of the present
arrangement modify the stipulation contained in
Articles
I, II and V of the accord of August 7, 1933.
Signed at Port-au-Prince in
duplicate in the English and French languages this
twenty-fourth
day of July, 1934.
Normal Armour [SEAL]
Léon Laleau [SEAL]271
1 Senate Select Committee on Haiti and
Santo Domingo, Inquiry into Occupation
and
Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Hearings, 67th Congress, First and
Second
Sessions, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1922), (hereafter cited as Hearings), p.
313.
2 Heinl, Robert Debs, Jr., and Heinl, Nancy
Gordon, Written in Blood, The Story of
the
Haitian People, 1492-1971, (Boston, Houghton Miffiin Company, 1978), pp.
57-122.
3 Maclean, Frances, "`We will Confound
the Calumniators of Our Race..."'
Smithsonian,
(vol. 18, no. 7, October 1987), p. 165.
4 Schmidt, Hans, The United States
Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, (New
Brunswick,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), pp. 19, 21-22.
5 1bid, p. 20.
6 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood,
Ibid., p. 321. The quote is by Rodolphe
Charmant,
son of Acius Channant, a political figure of the late 19th Century, and a
confederate
of Hyppolite. An electric street lighting system for the town of Jacmel,
which
functioned for about a year after its installation, was described by a resident
as "It
was
nothing but a fine pretext for official pillage."
7 A German warship demanding indemnities
totaling 3,000 pounds Sterling arrived
in
Port au Prince as early as 1872. In March 1902, two French and one Italian
cruisers, in
separate
visits, collected $105,000 in claims. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid.,
pp.
256, 326.
8 Ibid., p. 326, 333-334.
9 Ibid., p. 404.
10 Plummer, Brenda Gayle, Haill and the Great
Powers, 1902-1915, (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana
State University Press, 1988), pp. 44, 46-51.
11 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p. 352.
12 Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, Ibid,
pp. 141-143.
13 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p. 259.
14 National City Bank has an unsavory
reputation in Haitian financial affairs
(although
they appear no more venal than any other bank of the period that the Haitians
dealt
with) at least in part because of Smedley Butler and several Senators'
accusation that
the
United States invaded Haiti as bill collectors for National City Bank of New
York.
Schmidt,
United States Occupation, p. 17.
15 Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, Ibid,
pp. 147-155.
16 Ibid, p. 156.
17 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p. 359.
18 Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, Ibid,
pp. 36-37. Cacos "took their name
from
a native red-plummed bird-of-prey, which emits a cy something like `Kaaa-Koo'
and
lives
by preying on weaker birds." Snyder, H. W., "Butler at Fort
Riviere," Marine Corps
Gazette,
(vol. 64, no. 11, November 1980), p. 84.
19 Hearings, Ibid, p. 609. From General
Waller's testimony:
Gen. Waller. Well, they (the Cacos] were
the king makers of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. Do you mean that under the
conditions which prevailed at that time
the
h
Haitian Government existed during the
pleasure of these Caco leaders?
Gen. Waller. That had been the case
before we landed. What I mean is that an
aspirant
for political power, a man who wanted to be President, would go to the north
and
make
an agreement with these Caco leaders, and for a certain sum to be paid from the
Haitian
treasury after he was successful; also the privilege of looting some of the
towns
on
the way down [to Port au Prince from the north]. They would descend from the
mountains
and put the President in power.
20 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid.,
pp. 359-361.
21 Ibid, pp. 364-365. Leconte wasn't in
office a year when Philander C. Knox,
United
States Secretary of State and the first of his position since the Lincoln
administration
to actually visit Haiti, paid a visit in April 1912, aboard the armored
cruiser
USS Washington (CA-II), and delivered the message that now that the Panama
Canal
was completed, it was time for the countries of the Caribbean (this message was
also
carried to Costa Rica, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama,
and Venezuela) to straighten up: "A community liable to be torn by
internal
dissension
or checked in its progress by the consequences of nonfulfillment of
international
obligations is not in a good position to deserve and reap the benefits...
such
as are certain to come with the opening of the canal."
22 Ibid,pp. 369-370.
23 Hearings, Ibid, pp. 285-295.
24 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 394-400.
Hearings, Ibid, pp. 307- 308.
25 Webster's Biographical Dictionary,
(Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam
Company,
1980), p. 207.
26 Hearings, Ibid, pp. 308-313.
Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, pp.
406, 408-409.
Untitled Memorandum for President
Harding, State Department, July 19, 1921,
Butler
Papers, Box 7, Folder 3.
27 Hearings, Ibid, p. 312.
28 Ibid,p. 316.
29 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p. 417.
30 Hearings, Ibid, p. 315.
31 Ibid, pp. 315-321, 333.
August 18, 1915
From:
Commander cruiser squadron.
To: Secretary of the Navy, via wire.
If American charge' d'Affaires
extends to President elect of Haiti the
formal
recognition of the United States Government, as directed in department's
radiogram
02014, unless otherwise directed, I will fire national salute of 21 guns with
Haitian
flag at the main if this salute can be returned by the Haitian authorities.
22318.
Caperton
32 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 417-418.
33 Ibid, pp. 425-426.
34 Ibid, p. 436.
35 Hearings, Ibid., pp. 333, 336.
36 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid.,
p. 421.
37 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid.,
p. 74.
38 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 422-425.
39 Ibid, p. 437.
40 Ibid.
41 Butler Papers, Box l, Folder
"1916":
COUP D'ETAT
Extract from Admiral Caperton's
report of operations for April 6, 1916"
"The Senate did not
meet on this day. On coming to the Senate
building,
it found the doors locked. The permanent committee met in the house of a
member
and decided to request the keys from the secretary of the Interior. The Chamber
of
Deputies did not meet."
Extract from report of operations
by Admiral Caperton for April 7, 1916:
"On April 6, 1916, the
president of Haiti directed a lieutenant of
Gendarmerie to lock the doors of the Senate
building. The keys for the building were
taken to the President who directed the
Lieutenant of Gendarmerie to give them to the
Minister of the Interior. Upon arrival at
the buildings[,] the Senate body found them
locked. This measure being considered
irregular by that body, it decided to meet on 7
April at 10:00 a.m., at a private dwelling.
What action is contemplated by it is not yet
known. I am taking no action in this matter
other than preserving peace and order."
Inclosure to above report of
Admiral Caperton:
"From: The Expeditionary
Commander. 7 April 1916.
To:
The commander Cruiser Squadron.
Subject: Report re locking of doors of
Haitien [sic] Senate.
1. On April 6, 1916, the
President of Haiti directed Lieutenant A. August
Daumec,
Gendarmerie d'Haiti, to lock the doors of the Senate building. This at about
9:00
a.m. The building was locked by the said Daumec at about 9:45 a.m., and the
keys
were
then taken to the President, who then directed Lieutenant Daumec to give them
to
the
Minister of Interior, who was present. This Daumec did at about 10:30 a.m.
Littleton W. T.
Waller."
Inclosure to report of operations
of Admiral Caperton covering the date of
April
7,1916:
"From: President Permanent
Committee. 6 April,
1916.
To: Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller,
Commander of the U.S. Expeditionary
Forces.
Mr. Colonel:
The members of the Legislative
Body on arriving, this morning at the
place
of their meetings have found that the building was hermetically [sic] closed
up.
Viewing this proceeding as an
attempt upon the National Sovereignty, the
Members
of the Legislative Body have decided to meet tomorrow, at 10:00 a.m., in a
private
dwelling in the Rue Magloire Ambroise No. 56, close to the former place of the
Exposition
- under the reserves of all rights.
The Senate's Permanent Committee
has been authorized to give you this
information,
Mr. Colonel, in order to prevent all commentaries of the object of said
meeting.
Pray accept, Mr. Colonel, the
assurances of our high consideration.
/s/ P.
LARAQUE
President
Permanent Committee.
Extract from report of operations
of Admiral Caperton for April 14, 1916:
"By order of the President
of Haiti the gates to the grounds of the
Legislative
Building were locked."
Extract from report of operations
of Admiral Caperton for May 3, 1916:
``For the purpose of holding a
meeting, a number of the Senators attempted
this
afternoon to enter the house which they have rented. They were dispersed by
Gendarmed
[sic], there being no disorder. Instructions have been given the Provost
Marshal
to prevent any further meetings. Otherwise the Haitian situation remained
unchanged."
42 Hearings, Ibid, p. 623.
Mr. Howe. Let me ask you this question,
sir. Did that desire to prorogue the
legislature
originate with the President of Haiti or was it inspired by the United
States,(?]
Gen. Waller. It originated with the
Haitian Government, the President and his
secretaries.
Mr. Howe. As far as you know.
Gen. Waller. As far as I know,
Mr. Howe. As far as you know, was the
prorogation of this legislature desired by
our
government?
Gen. Waller. Only to carry out the
request of the President.
Mr. Howe. Of Haiti?
Gen. Waller. Personally, I was bitterly
opposed to it.
Mr. Howe. To the prorogation?
Gen. Waller. Absolutely; and I worked
over it even after the prorogation with the
greatest
efforts to get thein together again, but I was always confronted-
Mr. Howe. Upon whom did you bend your
efforts?
Gen. Waller. On the Haitian Government.
Mr. Howe. The President of Haiti?
Gen. Waller. The President of Haiti and
his secretaries, but was bitterly opposed
all
the time.
43 Ibid., pp. 624-625.
44 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid.,
p. 438.
45 Ibid., pp. 437-442.
Schmidt, United States Occupation, pp.
97-99.
Weisberger, Bernard A., "Ragtime
Diplomacy," American Heritage, (vol. 45, no.
3),
pp. 24-26.
46 Untitled Memorandum for President
Harding, State Department, July 19, 1921,
Butler
Papers, Box 7, Folder 3.
47 Hearings, Ibid, pp. 521-522.
48 Butler Papers, Box 7, Folder
"Photographs".
49 Hearings, Ibid, p. 627.
50 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 450-451.
51 Hearings, Ibid, pp. 649-659.
52 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 451-452.
53 Hearings, p. 432.
54 Lejeune, John A., The Reminiscences of a
Marine, (Philadelphia: Dorrance and
Company,
1930; republished Quantico, VA: The Marine Corps Association, 1990), pp.
465-467.
"We [Lejeune and Butler] not only questioned hundreds of officers and men,
but
conferred with many Haitians concerning the treatment they had received at the
hands
of
Marines. French priests and American and foreign civilians were also
interrogated, but
no
real evidence of the mistreatment of the Haitians by Marines was obtained
except a
few
individual cases in which court martial proceedings had been instituted and
appropriate
penalties awarded." (p.467) That said, one senses, seventy-odd years away
and
very much reading between the lines, a regret on Lejeune's part that some
Marines
had
their charges dropped as a consequence of the findings of the Mayo Naval court
of
inquiry.
(Annex C, Appendix 13)
55 Chapin, John C., The Marines' Role in the
U s. Occupation of Haiti 1915-1922,
(Washington:
Columbia College of Art and Sciences of George Washington University,
unpublished,
1967), pp. 94.
Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 467-473.
56 United States Senate, Inquiry into
Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the
Dominican
Republic, Report No. 794, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1922) (Hereafter cited
as
Report 794) p. 21. More specific findings were:
During the five and one-half
years of the occupation, 8,000 individuals
have
served in an average force of 2,000 marines maintained in Haiti since the
occupation.
It is true that some few of these individuals have committed crimes affecting
the
Haitians, the offenses depending in no way on the military character of the
guilty
parties.
The very small number of such individual crimes reflects credit on the
discipline
of
the Marine Corps. Proper diligence has been exercised by our military
authorities in
prosecuting
and punishing the criminals. (p.12)
...certain instances of
unauthorized executions of captives at the hands of
Marines
or at their command are beyond much doubt established. The number is small.
In
fact, after full inquiry and best invitation to complainants to come forward as
witnesses
or with affidavits, the committee is to this day reasonably satisfied of the
fact
of
10 such cases, of which two have been established in the course of judicial
inquires...
Of
the three Americans who, as officers, would be directly responsible, if the
facts were
judicially
established, one (1) was insane, one (2) is dead, and the other (3),
commissioned
in the gendarmerie from the enlisted personnel of the marines, has been
discharged
from the service. (p.17)
Accusations have been made of
tortures and cruel beatings. Many of these
accusations
have been completely refuted; others bear a resemblance to types of cruelty
well
known in Haiti for many years but foreign to anything known in America. (p.19)
57 Ibid., p. 23: "In concluding this
portion of the report the committee expresses its
chagrin
at the improper or criminal conduct of some few members of the Marines Corps
and
at the same time feels it to be its duty to condemn the process by which biased
or
interested
individuals and committees and propagandists have seized on isolated
instances,
or have adopted as true any rumor however vile or baseless in an effort to
bring
into
general disrepute the whole American naval force in Haiti. This committee
wishes to
express
its admiration for the manner in which our men accomplished their dangerous
and
delicate task."
58 Ibid, p. 25.
59 Welles, Sumner, Naboth's Vineyard, The
Dominican Republic 1844-1924, (New
York:
Payson & Clarke Ltds., 1928), titlepage.
60 Untitled Memorandum for President Harding,
State Department, July 19, 1921,
Butler
Papers, Box 7, Folder 3.
61 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p. 473.
Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922 (hereafter
cited
as Foreign Relations of the US with the appropriate year), (Washington: USGPO,
1938),
vol. II, pp. 461-467.
62 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 475-476.
Foreign Relations of the US, 1922, Ibid,
vol. II, pp. 468-471.
63 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid,
p. 147.
64 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p. 476.
65 Millspaugh, Arthur C., Haiti Under
American Control, 1915-1930, (Boston:
World
Peace Foundation, 1931, reprinted Westport, CT: Negro Universities Press,
1970),
pp. 119-122.
66 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 476-480.
67 Untitled Memorandum for President Harding,
State Department, July 19, 1921,
Butler
Papers, Box 7, Folder 3.
68 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p. 480, 490.
69 Ibid., p. 492-493.
70 Ibid, pp. 417, 502-505.
71 Ibid., pp. 490-497.
Foreign Relations of the US, 1929, vol.
III, pp. 204-217.
72 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 497-502.
Schmidt, United States Occupation,
Ibid., pp. 216-217.
73 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid.,
pp. 505-507.
74 Foreign Relations of the US 1931, Ibid,
vol II, pp. 403-510.
75 Bevans, Charles I., compl.,
"Withdrawal of Military Forces," Treaties and Other
International
Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949, (Washington:
USGPO
(Department of State), 1971). pp. 703-709, 712-713.
76 "Final Ceremonies in Haiti," The
Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1934), pp.
20-21.
77 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid.,
pp. 515-516.
78 Calixte, D. P., Haiti, The Calvary of a
Soldier, (New York: Wendell Malliet and
Company,
1939; republished, New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969) pp. 25-32.
Calixte
wrote this small book in exile, having resisted the politicization of the Garde
to
the
point that he was accused in an assassination plot against President Vincent--which
he
denies--and
had to flee the country. After the book was written, Calixte ended up in the
Dominican
Republic, as a soldier working for that country's dictator Trujillo, but later
returned
to Haiti as an unsuccessful Presidential candidate in 1946.
79 Ibid, pp. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.
80 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid,
pp. 233, 234.
81 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 550-564.
82 "Haiti: Au Revoir, Magloire,"
Time, (vol. LXVIII, no. 26, 24 December 1956), p.
25.
83 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 575-584.
84 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid,
pp. 4-18. "The belief that Haitians
were
inherently inferior, coupled with the dictates of State Department diplomacy in
the
Caribbean,
led to grotesque perversion of the declared missionary ideal of spreading
liberal
democracy." (p. 10) "The perversion of professed American liberal
democratic
intentions
was, of course, the function of a whole constellation of unfavorable
circumstances,
as well as of the racial and cultural prejudices of the invaders." (p.12)
Abbott, Elizabeth, Haiti: The Duvaliers
and Their Legacy, (New York:
McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1988) pp. 37-43.
85 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid,
p. 11.
86 Russell, John H., "The Development of
Haiti During the Last Fiscal Year," The
Marine
Corps Gazette, (vol. XV, no. 2, June 1930) pp. 92-93.
87 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid,
p. 221.
88 Russell, "Development of Haiti",
Ibid, p. 88.
89 Laguerre, Michel S., The Military and
Society in Haiti, (Knoxville, TN: The
University
of Tennessee Press, 1993), pp. 30, 43-61.
90 McCrocklin, James H., Garde d'Haiti,
Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval
Institute,
1956), p. 234. This work, "compiled" by a reserve Marine officer
stationed at
Quantico,
amounts to an official Marine Corps history of the Gendarmerie/Garde.
Written
in 1955, it, of course, just misses the Duvalier years, and is generally
favorable
not
only of the history of the Gendarmerie/Garde, but of L'Armee d'Haiti which it
became.
91 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p. 477, pp. 406-514 passim, pp. 513,
545-550.
Or for example, the observation of the French minister on Page 14.
Abbott, Haiti, Ibid, p. 43. Despite her
generally disapproving tone over the
Occupation
and the Gendarmerie/Garde as an instrument of the Occupation, Abbott does
quote
"one old black peasant ..[who] saw the occupation differently: 'Ten years
ago this
country
was full of cacos (bandits) and there were no roads. The cacos often robbed and
murdered
us. Our own government tax-gatherers often robbed and starved us, then gave
us
nothing in return. It was hardly worth while to plant. It took four days on a
donkey to
go
down to the city. And if we weren't killed by cacos or drowned fording streams,
when
we
did reach the city we were conscripted to fight for the government, or on one
side or
the
other of some new revolution which was going to make things better and never
did.
Now
the bandits are all gone, there is no more revolution, I live in peace, I plant
all I can,
I
pay a reasonable tax, I go to the city in the motor bus in four hours, and I am
not
conscripted,
and while I am away, my wife, my children, my ears of corn, and my little
goats
are safe as if they were all in the arms of Jesus..."'
Laguerre, Military and Society, Ibid,
pp. 63-83 passim, sees the Gendarmerie/
Garde
more as an instrument of oppression rather than rural security: "The
oppressive
control
of the Gendarmerie became clear as they were called on to suppress and rout the
Kakos
[sic] in order to maintain peace and order and control the traffic of arms.
Their
alliance
with American forces (evidently against Haitian nationalists), which they
viewed
as
a necessary evil, was part of that duty. Castor [Castor S., La ocupacion
nortearmericana
de Haiti y sus consecuencias (1915-1934) (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno
editores,
1971) p. 56.] is probably right in seeing the Gendarmerie as having an
essentially
repressive mission" (p. 70)
92 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 433-435.
93 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid,
p. 235.
Laguerre, Military and Society, Ibid,
pp. 84-190,passim.
94 Russell, "Development of
Haiti", Ibid, pp. 90-92.
95 Ibid, p. 97.
96 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid., pp. 520, 552-553.
97 Russell, "Development of
Haiti", Ibid., pp. 113-114.
98 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid,
pp. 97, 99-100.
99 Hearings, Ibid, p. 1351.
100 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p. 509.
101 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid,
pp. 92-96.
102 Ibid., pp. 110-112.
103 Ibid., pp. 162-164.
104 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid.,
p. 519.
105 Laguerre, Military and Society, Ibid, pp.
66-67.
106 Schmidt, Hans, Maverick Marine: General
Smedley D. Butler and the
Contradictions
of American Military History, (Lexington, KY: The University Press of
Kentucky,
1987), p. 95. Schmidt, whose US Occupation (1972) indicts the United States
as
conducting a racist imperialist occupation, mellows a bit in Maverick Marine.
But not
a
lot.
107 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid, p.
410fn.
Schmidt, Maverick Marine, Ibid., p. 84.
"Waller, Littleton Waller
Tazewell" Who Was Who in American History-The
Military
Schott, Joseph L., The Ordeal of Samar,
(New York: The Bobbs-Merill
Company,
Inc., 1964), p. 67.
108 Schott, Ordeal of Samar, Ibid, pp.
175-276.
109 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid,
pp. 6, 103.
Schmidt, Maverick Marine, Ibid, p. 84.
110 Abbott, Haiti, Ibid, p. 38.
111 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid,
pp. 78-81.
Schmidt, Maverick Marine, Ibid.
112 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid,
p. 79. Quotes a letter from Waller to
Butler
in July 1916.
113 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid, pp. 442-443, 489.
114 Schmidt, United States Occupation, Ibid,
p. 141.
115 Schmidt, Maverick Marine, Ibid, p. 95.
116 Abbott, Haiti, Ibid, p. 39.
117 Hearings, Ibid, p. 517.
118 A. A. Vandergrift, as told to Robert B.
Asprey, Once a Marine, (New York:
Ballantine
Books, 1964; republished Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1982),
pp.
49, 52, 56-57. "Haiti was not a poor country but corruption made it so...
"The situation made Tammany Hall
politics seem like a Sunday-school
picnic.
local politicos, I soon learned, had been paying teachers dead for twenty and
thirty
years. some living teachers scarcely merited the title: one high school
`teacher of
English'
could not read, write, or speak the language--I fired him and returned his pay
to
the
Haitian government Like most honest reforms, our work proved popular with the
bulk
of the people but created enemies among local vested interests.......
"Our intended reforms
encountered enemies other than Cacos. An honest
administration
deprived some important Haitians of large sums of money heretofore
stolen
from the customshouses."
119 Wise, Frederick May, as told to Meigs O.
Frost, A Marine Tells It to You, (New
York:
J. H. Sears & Company, 1929; republished, Quantico, VA: Marine corps
Association,
1981) pp. 135, 307-308. "There are Haitians who are very rich. There are
Haitians
incredibly poor, who live in the same jungle life their ancestors lived in
Africa
more
than a century ago. You can meet a Haitian who has been educated at great world
capitals,
who speaks four modern languages fluently, and has a really French appreciation
of
music and art and literature. You can meet a Haitian living in a shack in the
jungle,
half
naked, supported by his group of wives, each one of whom works a small clearing
with
primitive implements...
"The gentry are a proud,
formal race. Some of the best blood of France is
in
their veins. They are descended from generations of rich plantation owners.
Their
sons
got their degrees from European universities. Their daughters were educated in
the
convents
of France and England. They were at home in the drawing-rooms of any capital
in
the world. They looked upon France as their mother country, and when money was
plentiful
visited it yearly."
120 Wirkus, Faustin, and Dudley, Taney, The
White King of La Gonave, (Garden City,
NY:
Garden city Publishing company, Inc., 193l),passim.
121 Schmidt, U S. Occupation, Ibid, pp.
146-147. "The Negroes of mixed type, who
constitute
the majority of educated people and politicians, have the general
characteristics
of
such people the world over-vain, loving praise, excitable, changeable, beyond
belief
illogical,
and double faced. Many of them are highly educated and polished, but their
sincerity
must always be doubted." (Cole, c. 1917) "[Our] sympathies lie
entirely,
however,
with the huge uneducated mass of Haitians who have by the despicable action
of
inappreciable few of their countrymen been kept for years in a bondage that is
akin to
slavery."
(Russell, c. 1921)
122 Schmidt, U.S. Occupation, Ibid, pp.
146-147.
123 Balch, Emily, Greene, ed., Occupied Haiti,
(New York: The Writers Publishing
Company,
Inc., 1927, republished, New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 118.
Ms.
Balch's book is presented as a "report of a committee of Six disinterested
Americans
representing
organizations exclusively American", and was written under the
sponsorship
of the International Executive Committee of the Women's International
League
for Peace and Freedom. It is often quoted by works critical of the Occupation
(viz.,
Laguerre, Military and Society, pp. 74, 80; Abbott, Haiti, p. 43).
124 Balch, Occupied Haiti, Ibid., pp. 175-180.
This comes from an unsigned letter in
an
appendix to Balch, which "reveals in some degree how things may look from
the
Haitian
[elite] side. Among other things, it bears on the remark one so commonly hears
from
Americans in Haiti that Haitians have no sense of patriotism.
"The very beautiful French style of
the letter, with its poetic turns of phrase, has
necessitated
a rather free translation, in which the original inevitably suffers." This
remarkable
piece of self-denial and revisionist cultural propaganda is reproduced here in
its
entirety:
"Your letter gave me at the same
time much pleasure and some pain. It seemed to
me
as if I were hearing you speak--that was the pleasure; and it seemed to me that
we
were
misunderstanding one another--that was the regret. I had the impression that
you
were
a little tried with me for not understanding your country and I on my side
still feel
that
your country has not even begun to realize what Haiti is, not even distantly.
"What is needed is not an
intellectual operation, however subtle, but an intimate
touch,
an act of love making it possible to understand others, to make them part of
oneself;
that is, to get so close to them that we love them like ourselves--more than
ourselves.
This human thrill, this practical sympathy, I have found-to be frank without
being
unjust--in a few exceptional persons only, in Doctor Gruening, who love Haiti
like
a
good Haitian, as a clear-sighted son would love his mother, and in some of the
large-hearted
women of this last mission to Haiti whom I had the opportunity of meeting.
But
you came and went like birds of passage; what you saw of this was necessarily
their
surface,
a bird's-eye view. You would have needed to experience for a year, or six
months
at least, what we are suffering, to have felt the same revolt of conscience at
legalized
lying and triumphant injustice, to have had a sight of what lay under the
cards,
and
of the reverse side of the medal.
"Then only, then perhaps, you might
begin to understand. you would have to read
many
books--and to forget them again, see many people, talk with old men and women,
and
get them to tell you about the Haiti of the old days and compare and explain
the past.
You
would have to go ever further back in our history and listen to the dead, you
would
have
to try to fathom the quiet of our starry nights and listen for the voices of
our
sleeping
centuries. Ours is a land of beauty, but also a land of suffering, a people of
tormentors
and tormented.
"Nevertheless a special form of
civilization was created here, a social experiment
was
being worked out. The Negroes of old Haiti and the sons of the `philosophe'
colonialists
of the XVIII century were developing a social order and shaping customs and
ways
inherited from the most civilized people of the world--those of old
France--with the
modifications
inevitably brought about by the differences of climate and race.
"Think of the unique drama that was
being unfolded here. The first cause of our
financial
and economic bankruptcy was the long-continued rancor of France and the
immense
indemnity demanded from Haiti. Like a poor debt-burdened student beginning
the
world wholly without credit, Haiti had to live the life of a small and poor
people in
the
midst of the hostility and sneers of stronger nations, without help or support.
I affirm,
and
no one can contradict me, that what we have accomplished under such conditions
is
very
fine.
"There is nothing in the history of
Haiti that calls for shame or concealment. It is
the
story of painful gropings, of the uncertain youthful steps of a little country,
the
difficult
adolescence of a young nation.
"I know they throw the history of
Haiti in our face--its long tissue of revolutions
and
massacres. Yet the American war with the Cacos killed more people than 10 or 20
revolutions
put together; it devastated whole regions and ruined the cattle for Haiti, as
veterinary
experts can testify of they are honest. Revolutions were fomented by
foreigners-English,
French, American, Dutch traders--who risked nothing, and always
profited.
Loans which dealt rather in human lives than in merchandise were made at rates
of
1,000 per cent, and those who thus enriched themselves overthrew any government
that
was not subservient to them.
"And the diplomatic claims made
upon Haiti! They were a regular industry.
What
documents the chancelleries could offer to the sociologist and historian if
they
could!
If it were they who were under indictment, many who are now accuses would
have
to lower their heads in shame and blush redder than are their hands, still
stained with
the
blood of innocent men who were quite unaware of how they were being used.
"I know--and I do not excuse--the
Haitian accomplices in all this, ambitious men,
bloody
men. Ambition blinded them, as it still blinds many others, survivals of a
disastrous
past who are still with us, or our misfortune. These men were the agents of the
invasion.
Bad shepherds of a heedless flock, drunken pilots of a ship in distress, they
consciously
or unconsciously prepared the capitalist and militarist subjugation that we are
now
enduring.
"For the honor of the Haitian name,
for the pride of our elite have cherished, be it
said
that a succession of men of heat and capacity have continuously struggled and
suffered
for a civilized, a truly civilized, Haiti. The heroes who achieved independence
had
their successors. This is not sufficiently known, or rather it is persistently
ignored.
"Balthazar Inginac, finance
minister under Petion and Boyer, Boyer himself, a
great
president and a great statesman, who although beset by the greed of France,
Spain,
England,
and (already) the United States, yet ruled Haiti for 25 years and brought to
pass
the
voluntary union of the whole island under one government; Edmond Paul, the
great
tribune
and apostle of a liberal Haiti; Armand Thoby; Alcibiade Pommayrac, Justin
Devot,
Leon Audain, Georges Sylvain, Auguste Albert, (perhaps I forget others)--any
country
would be honored to count such men as these among its sons. They are
representative
men' such as Carlyle would put in his gallery, men who lived for their
ideals
and were ready to die for them. These are the witnesses of Haiti, our country,
of
our
humiliated elite. Even when, like Antenot Firmin, they sought to realize their
ends by
violence,
the are excusable, for they meant well.
"Efforts to help the masses have
been made again and again and in many ways,
but
the poverty of our budgets and the instability due to the causes mentioned made
progress
difficult and slow. Nevertheless a Haitian civilization was in progress of
development.
This is what the men of your country do not understand. They came and
interrupted
it. They act like barbarians, for they have established nothing but a course
materialism,
the religion of money, the worship of force and success. I do not hate them,
because
it is not my turn of mind nor the way my feelings have been trained. I cannot
any
longer hate, but I despise them. That does not trouble them, I know; but I
despise
them
for their sterile lack of understanding, for their vanity, men who are
parvenues in
matters
of intellect and feeling.
"Although foreign domination is
never a good thing, medicine teaches us that
painful
operations sometimes effect a cure. The American invasion might have been a
good
thing if, although unjust and even infringing for a time upon our independence,
it
had
been temporary and had led ultimately to the reign of justice and liberty. But
such is
not
the case. The Americans have not even this excuse. They have made themselves
the
allies
of the evil past of oppression and tyranny; they have abolished liberty,
justice,
independence;
they are bad administrators of the public funds; they offer a peace of
degradation
and subjection, shame and dishonor. They push forward like the rising tide;
they
attack our traditions, our soul. Is it not claimed that they want to change our
culture,
our
religion?
"Even the good that they do turns
to our hurt, for instead of teaching us, they do it
to
prove that we are incapable. They are exploiters. How can they teach us when
they
have
so much to learn themselves? I am not bitter as I may appear. If when you were
here
I seemed less emphatic than I do now, it is because I was not well informed
then.
Every
day I learn more, and things that I had felt and suspected prove to be true. It
is not
that
I have been disillusioned unless you understand that to mean that I formerly
hoped
for
a change peacefully brought about by mutual consent; in that sense--yes. I do
not
aspire
to propose any plan. I do not desire to be given any government lace. My social
position
and relations would put fortune and honor within my reach, but I should feel
myself
an accomplice. I have long accepted poverty and obscurity. Poverty is painful
only
when you see those that you love suffering.
"The present regime, an American
occupation with a false facade of Haitian
government,
is a pretense and a lie.
"It is a pathetic sight, a country
that is being slowly killed. I am not an agitator.
Like
you I am opposed to useless gestures. I want to be a man of action to remain
sincere
and
honest.
"I should have liked to visit and
know your country, for there must be sympathetic
Americans
capable of understanding all that I am trying to put before you. I should like
to
give the proofs of what I have been saying, and to show the facts that explain
what I
feel.
It would have been an opportunity to fulfill my desire to make the real
situation
known
and to try to scatter the clouds of misunderstanding, which separate our two
countries,
in the interest of both our peoples, so that the sun of truth may
triumph."
125 Abbott, Haiti, Ibid, p. 39.
126 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p. 484.
127 Schmidt, U. S. Occupation, Ibid, p. 141.
Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood,
Ibid, pp. 293, 311, 315, 327, 337.
128 Balch, Occupied Haiti, Ibid, pp. 118-119.
Schmidt, U. S. Occupation, Ibid, pp.
148-149; Schmidt declines to pass on the
prostitution
charge.
Abbott, Haiti, Ibid, p. 40.
129 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid.,
pp. 486-487.
130 Franck, Harry A., Roaming Through the West
Indies, (New York: Grosset &
Dunlap,
1920), p. 118. "By chance or design the great majority of our officers in
Haiti
are
southerners, and they naturally shun any but the most unavoidable intercourse
with
the
natives... The Southerner is famed for his ability to keep the `nigger' down,
but he
less
successful in lifting him up, and that is the task we have taken upon ourselves
in
Haiti."
131 Schmidt, U. S. Occupation, Ibid, p. 119.
"How American marines, largely made
up
of and officered by Southerners, opened fire with machine guns from airplanes
upon
defenseless
Haitian villages, killing men, women, and children in the open market places;
132 Balch, Occupied Haiti, Ibid, p. 133.
"It seems to be a marvel that these young
marines,
recruited as they are, with very commonly the extreme Southern attitude toward
Negroes,
trained as they are, isolated in black villages, do as well as they do, but
this does
not
mean that it is a proper system!"
133 Leyburn, James G., The Haitian People, (New
Haven: Yale University Press,
1941,
1966), p. 103fn. "The United States government in the early days had sent
Marines
from
the Southern States to Haiti, on the theory that they would, from long
acquaintance
with
Negroes, know how to `handle' them. This stupid blunder was shortly
rectified."
134 Rodman, Selden, Haiti: The Black Republic,
The Complete Story and Guide,
(New
York: The Devlin-Adair company, 1954, 1961), p. 25. "In the early days of
the
Occupation
the Americans had sent Marines from Southern states to Haiti on the fantastic
theory
that they would `know how to handle' Negroes."
135 "Bon Papa," Time, (vol. LXIII,
no. 8, February 22, 1954) p. 42. "Officers from
the
U. S. South (`they know how to handle the blacks, you know') humiliated
highbred
Haitians."
136 Schmidt, Maverick Marine, Ibid, p. 84.
Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p. 489.
137 Hurst, Ann, Southerners to Handle the
Haitians? (Wellesley, MA: Wellesley
College,
1964, 1995), p. 8.
138 Ibid, passim.
Heinl and Heinl, Witten in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 487-490.
Schmidt, US Occupation, Ibid, pp.
144-145.
139 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 501-502.
140 Hearings, Ibid, pp. 289, 290. Admiral
Caperton's testimony; comment by
Senator
Medill McCormick (chairman) presiding.
141 "Haiti: The Nightmare Next
Door," The Economist, (vol. 332, no. 7882, 24
September
1994), p. 2l.
142 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p. 513. "By the end of 1932, doctors of
the
newly Haitianized Service d'Hygiene were already diverting so many government
drugs
and medical supplies into private hands that pharmacists complained they might
be
run
out of business."
143 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 485-486.
144 Wirkus, White King, Ibid, passim.
145 Wise, A Marine Tells You, Ibid, p. 308.
146 Kurlansky, Mark, "Haitian Soil",
Audubon, (vol. 197, no. 1, Jan-Feb 95), pp.
50-57.
"Haiti: Structural Hindrances to
Development", Geographic and Global Issues
Quarterly,
United States Department of State, (vol. 3, no. 3, Autumn 1993) pp. 3-4.
147 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 394-400.
Hearings, Ibid, pp. 307-308.
148 Utley, H. H., "The Landing and
Occupation of Seaports," The Marine Corps
Gazette,
(vol. 19, no. 1, February 1935), p. 54.
149 Report of the Major General Commandant to
the Secretary of the Navy, 1915,
(Washington:
USGPO, 1915), p. 11. Hereafter cited as CMC with the appropriate year.
150 Hearings, Ibid, p. 308.
CMC, 1915, Ibid.
151 Lejeune, Reminiscences, pp. 221-223.
Hearings, Ibid, p. 313.
152 Ibid., p. 670-672.
153 Ibid, p. 322.
154 CMC, 1915, Ibid
McCrocklin, James H., Garde d'Haiti,
(Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval
Institute,
1956), p. 252.
First Regiment, First Brigade, U.S.M.C.,
Regimental Orders No. 34 (17 August
1915)
and 35 (August 19 1915), Smedley D. Butler Papers, US Marine Corps Research
Center,
Archive Branch, (hereafter cited as Butler Papers), Box 1, Folder
"1915".
155 "Proclamation to the People of Port
au Prince, Haiti," 3 September 1915, Butler
Papers,
Ibid.
156 Field Orders No. 1(21 August 1915), 2 (22
August), 3 (24 August), 4 (25
August),
5 (26 August), and 6 (27 August), Headquarters, First Regiment, First Brigade,
United
States Marine Corps, Cape Haitien, Haiti; Regimental Orders Nos. 45 and 46,
Headquarters,
First Regiment, First Brigade, United States Marine Corps, Cape Haitien,
Haiti,
24 August 1915; and Order No. l, Office of the Military Governor, Cape Haitien,
Haiti,
1 September 1915, Butler Papers, Ibid, Elaborate instructions were established
for
the
defense of Cap Haitien by First Battalion, which had been put in charge of the
defense
of
the city (Regimental Order No. 51, Headquarters, First Regiment, 3 September
1915),
re:
Letter of Instruction, First Battalion, First Regiment, First Brigade, U.S.
Marine
Corps,
Cape Haitien, Haiti, 4 September 1915; Butler Papers, Ibid.
157 Headquarters United States Forces on Shore
in Gonaives, Haiti, subj: Report of
Operations,
September 20th to September 26th, inclusive, dtd. 26 September 1915, Butler
Papers,
Box l. This version of the "battle" with Rameau is in contradiction
to the
account
in Butler's memoirs (ghosted by Lowell Thomas): "We were sitting down to a
well
earned supper when one of the outposts telephoned on that Rameau's rebels were
burning
the railroad. I rushed downstairs and called out to the men, `Who wants a
fight?'
"The Marines were in their
underclothes, trying to capture a stray evening breeze.
Without
stopping to dress they snatched up their rifles and belts. We flew up the
street,
streaked
along the railroad track and plunged headlong into the rebels. We didn't think
they
were so close. They fired first. And then the scrap started.
"It was the funniest fight I ever
saw. Those damn Marines were baying like
bloodhounds
all through the bushes." Thomas, Lowell, Old Gimlet Eye, The Adventures
of
Smedley D. Butler, (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1933; republished,
Quantico,
VA:
The Marine Corps Association, 1981), pp. 183-184.
158 Headquarters, First Regiment, Cape Haitien,
subj: Occupation of Grande Riviere,
15
October 1915; Headquarters, First Regiment, First Brigade, U. S. Marine Corps,
Cape
Haitien,
Haiti, subj: Orders, 15 October 1915; Headquarters, First Regiment, Cape
Haitien,
Haiti, subj: Disorders beyond Grande Riviere, 15 October 1915; District
Commander,
Fort Liberte and Ouanaminthe, Haiti, subj: Report of Operations, October
9th,
1915, to November 27th, 1915, inclusive, 7 December 1915; Butler Papers, Box 1,
Folder
"1915".
159 "Memo for Col. Cole,"
Ouanaminthe, Haiti, 13 October 1915, Butler Papers, Ibid.
Hearings, Thid, pp. 610-611.
160 District Commander, Fort Liberte and Ouanaminthe,
Haiti, subj: report of
Operations,
October 9th, 1915, to November 27th, 1915, inclusive, dtd 7 December 1915,
Butler
Papers, Box 1, File "1915".
161 MacCloskey, Monro, "A Medal for Lt
Ostermann," Marine corps Gazette, (vol
48,
no. 11, November 1964) pp. 46-47.
162 Thrasher, Thomas E., "The Taking of
Fort Riviere," The Marine Corps Gazette,
(vol
XV, no. 4, February 1931), pp. 31-33, 64.
163 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
p.430.
164 Hill, Walter N., "A Haitian
Reconnaissance", The Marine Corps Gazette, (vol. II,
no.
1, March 1917), pp. 31-36.
165 CMC, 1915, Ibid, pp. 9-10.
166 CMC, 1917, p. 12.
167 Johnstone, John H., A Brief History of the
1st Marines, (Washington, DC: HQs,
US
Marine Corps, 1962, revised 1968), pp. 10-12.
Kane, Robert J., A Brief History of the
2d Marines, (Washington, DC: HQs, US
Marine
Corps, 1961, revised 1962, revised 1969, 1970), pp. 5-14.
168 Coyle, Randolph, "Service in
Haiti," The Marine Corps Gazette, (vol. I, No. 4,
December,
1916), pp. 343-348. This assessment is based on the assumption that
instructions
to those looking forward to service in Haiti, advising them about the servant
problem,
schools, recreation, and motor cars, is describing normal garrison life rather
than
combat.
169 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 449-463.
"March of Events," The Marine
Corps Gazette, (vol. VII, no. l, March 1922), pp.
94-99.
170 Brady, John D., "Haiti", The
Marine Corps Gazette, (vol. IX, no. 2, June 1924),
pp.
149-156. Conclusions are based on the same reasons as in footnote 43.
171 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid.,
pp. 493-497.
172 "Final Ceremonies in Haiti", The
Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1934), pp.
20-21.
"After Nineteen Years" Ibid.,
p. 21.
173 Kane, 2nd Marines, Ibid., p. 14.
174 Marine companies were not organized as
permanent organizations until 1911.
They
were numbered consecutively throughout the Marine Corps, apparently to avoid
the
confusion
of having more than one "1st" or "A" companies in a
battalion or regiment
organized
for expeditionary purposes. The first four standing regiments of Marines were
organized
in 1913; Fifth and Sixth regiments were raised for duty in France in 1917.
Regiments
of Marines were redesignated Marine Regiments (as in "4th Marines")
in
1933;
at the same time, companies were permanently assigned to regiments and were
given
letter designations.
Johnstone, 1st Marines, Ibid..
Kane, 2nd Marines, Ibid,. pp. 5-14.
Santelli, James S., A Brief History of the
8th Marines, (Washington, DC: HQs,
US
Marine Corps, 1976), pp. 3-10.
Buckner, David N., A Brief History of
the 10th Marines, (Washington, DC: HQs,
US
Marine Corps, 1981), pp. 5-10.
Jenkins, James C., "The Second
Marines," The Marine Corps Gazette, (vol. 27,
no.
3, July, 1943), pp. 33-37.
Turner, Thomas C., "Aviation
Notes," The Marine Corps Gazette, (vol. VI, no. 3,
September,
1921), p. 292.
Brady, "Haiti", Ibid., p. 150.
"After Nineteen Years" Ibid,
p. 21.
Field Order No. 9, HQs, 1st Regiment,
1st Brigade, US Marine Corps, Cape
Haitien,
Haiti, 29 October 1915, Butler Papers, Box 1, Folder "1915".
Regimental Order No: 32, HQs, 1st
Regiment, 1st Brigade, USMC, USS
TENNESSEE--Enroute
from Philadelphia to Haiti, 11 August 1915, Butler Papers, Box
1,
Folder "1915".
Mersky, Peter B., U S. Marine Corps
Aviation 1912 to the Present, (Annapolis,
MD:
The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983), p. 15.
Chapin, John C., The Marines' Role in
the US Occupation of Haiti: 1915 - 1922,
(Washington,
DC: Columbia College of Arts and Sciences of George Washington
University,
1967 (unpublished)) p. 67
CMC, 1911, p. 4
CMC, 1915, pp. l0-15.
CMC, 1916, pp. 9-14.
CMC, 1917, p. 6.
CMC, 1919, p. 6.
McCrocklin, Garde, Ibid, p. 253.
Hearings, Ibid, pp. 1680-1721.
175 McCrocklin, Garde, Ibid, pp. 250-253.
176 Silverstone, Paul H., U S. Warships of
World War I; (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday
& Company, Inc., 1970) pp. 38, 72, 153-158, 169, 212, 256.
Hearings, Ibid, pp.
177 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood Ibid, pp.
358, 387, 417
178 Draft Gendarmerie Agreement, Butler Papers,
Box 1, Folder "1915".
179 HQs, US Expeditionary Force Operating in
Haiti, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, December
14,
1915, subj: Gendarmerie, The Butler Papers, Box 1, Folder "1916".
180 Hearings, Ibid, pp. 1738. Submarine Chasers
(SC) 214, 223, and 253.
181 Hearings, Ibid, pp. 512-514.
182 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid,
pp. 451-454.
183 Gray, John A., "Boucan Carre,"
The Marine corps Gazette, (vol. XVI, no. 3,
November
1931), pp. 28-32.
Gray, John A., "Cul de Sac,"
The Marine corps Gazette, (vol. XVI, no. 4,
February
1932) pp. 41-44.
184 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, Ibid, p.
451.
185 Wise, A Marine Tells You, Ibid, p. 309.
186 Ibid, pp. 309-310.
187 Amendment to the 1916 Haitian-American
Gendarmerie Agreement, 23 March
1920,
Butler Papers, Box "1920-23", folder "1920." Refer to HQs,
US Expeditionary
Forces
Operating in Haiti, Port au Prince, 14 Feb 1916, subj: Commission of Haitien
Gendarmerie
d'Haiti in Annex C, Appendix 7; this shows at least the official intention of
commissioning
Haitians in the Gendarmerie at the start of the organization. According to
Heinl
and Heinl, initial efforts to recruit members of the elite into the Gendarmerie
failed
because
military service was beneath their social position. Heinl and Heinl, Written in
Blood,
Ibid, p. 479.
188 "March of Events," The Marine
Corps Gazette, (vo1. VII, no. 1, March 1922), pp.
96.
189 Heinl and Heinl, History of Blood, Ibid,
p. 489fn.
190 Russell, "Development of Haiti,"
Ibid, p. 88.
191 Ibid, pp. 91-92.
192' McCrocklin, Garde, Ibid, p. 248.
193 Hearings, Ibid, pp. 1223-1238.
194 Ibid., pp. 1343-1355.
195 Ibid., pp. 1228-1229.
196 Ibid., pp. 1230-1231.
197 Ibid., pp. 1292-1293.
198 Ibid., pp. 1347-1351.
199 Ibid., pp. 285-286.
200 Ibid., p. 286.
201 Ibid., p.301.
202 Ibid., pp.304-305.
203 Ibid., p.305.
204 Ibid
205 Ibid., p. 305-306.
206 Ibid., p. 307.
207 Ibid., p.308.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid., p. 309.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid., p. 311.
212 Ibid., p.313.
213 Ibid., p.329.
214 Ibid., p.330.
215 Ibid., p.349.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid., p.351.
218 Ibid., pp. 333-334.
219 Ibid., p. 336.
220 Ibid., pp. 339-340.
221 Ibid., p. 340.
222 Ibid., p. 341.
223 Ibid., pp. 341-343.
224 Ibid., p. 344.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid., p.345.
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid., p. 346.
229 Ibid., pp. 346-347.
230 Ibid., p. 347.
231 Ibid., pp. 349-350.
232 Ibid., p. 352.
233 Butler Papers, Box 1, Folder
"1915".
234 Ibid.
235 Hearings, Ibid, p. 351.
236 Hearings, Ibid, p. 352
237 Ibid.
238 McCrocklin, Garde d'Haiti, Ibid, pp.
238-242.
239 Bevans, Charles I., compiler, Treaties and
Other International Agreements of the
United
States of America, 1776-1949, Volume 8, Germany-Iran, US Department of State,
(Washington,
DC: USGPO, 1971), pp. 675-676.
240 The Butler Papers, Box 1, Folder
"1916".
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid.
245 Hearings, Ibid, p. 417.
246 Ibid., p. 418.
247 The Butler Papers, Box, Folder
"1922"
248 Hanneken, Herman H., "Haiti",
Marine Corps Gazette, (vol. 49, no. 11,
November
1965), p. 39.
249 Hearings, Ibid., p. 427.
250 Ibid., pp. 428-430.
251 Ibid, p. 460.
252 Ibid., pp. 654-655.
253 Ibid., pp. 1753-1754.
254 The Butler Papers, Box 5, File
"Undated".
255 Hearings, Ibid., p. 1587.
256 Ibid., pp. 434-435.
257 Ibid., pp. 1727-1728. According to Hans
Schmidt, Major McClellan was wrong.
He
states in US Occupation that Marine Corps records hold monthly talleys that
show
3,071
Cacos killed from March 1919 to November 1920. Schmidt, US Ocupation, Ibid.,
p.
103fn.
258 Ibid., pp. 731-741.
259 Ibid., p. 1785.
260 The Butler Papers, Box 7, Folder
"1920".
261 Ibid.
262 The Butler Papers, Box 7, Folder 3.
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
266 Bevans, Treaties and Other International
Agreements, Ibid., pp. 678-682.
267 Foreign relations of the US, 1922, Ibid,
pp. 500-502.
268 Bevans, Treaties and Other International
Agreements, Ibid., pp. 693-695.
269 Ibid., pp. 699-702.
270 Ibid., pp. 703-709.
271 Ibid., pp. 710-711.
272 Ibid., pp. 712-713.
Ship pennant numbers (and the revelation
that the USS Tennessee was an armored
cruiser
rather than a battleship) from: Silverstone, Paul H., US. Warships of World War
I,
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1970) pp. 52-156, passim.
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3.
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for
the freedom of access they allowed me in my research and the great amount of
help they gave
me
during it.
The
Smedley D. Butler Papers.
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