Analysis Of Joint Doctrine: Should It Remain Directive? SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy CSC 95 ANALYSIS OF JOINT DOCTRINE: Should it Remain Directive? by Mark A. Alred CG-12 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Marine Corps Command and Staff College in fulfillment of the requirement for a Military Issues Paper April 1995 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii ANALYSIS OF JOINT DOCTRINE: 1 SHOULD IT REMAIN DIRECTIVE? 1 DEFINING DOCTRINE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 2 THE CURRENT STATUS O DOCTRINE 4 FUTURE OF DOCTRINE 6 DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT DOCTRINE 7 FROM RELEARNING LESSONS TO WRITTEN GUIDANCE 10 EARLY EXPERIENCES WITH JOINT OPERATIONS 10 DEVELOPMENT OF JOINTNESS 12 COLD WAR EFFECTS ON JOINT DOCTRINE 13 POST COLD WAR PRIORITIES 13 EXPERIENCING JOINT DOCTRINE 15 JOINT DOCTRINE'S EFFECT ON WAR SCENARIOS 16 JOINT DOCTRINE IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 17 DIRECTIVE JOINT DOCTRINE: USE IT WITH JUDGMENT 23 BIBLIOGRAPHY 26 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, made joint doctrine directive in the summer of 1994. This may not seem to be a radical decision, but the ramifications are far- reaching. Does directive joint doctrine improve the efficiency of joint operations? By looking at several instances of military employment, this paper examines the effect joint doctrine played in the success or failure of the following operations; Operation Desert Storm (Iraq), Operation Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq), Operation Restore Hope (Somalia), Operation Restore Democracy (Haiti), and Operation Proud Shield (Somalia II). It may be too early to determine if directive joint doctrine is beneficial, but the effect is unequivocal on the outcomes of these Operations. ANALYSIS OF JOINT DOCTRINE: SHOULD IT REMAIN DIRECTIVE? Employment of United States military force is taking on new dimensions in today's global environment. Many potential situations do not fit traditional roles of the military and will result in joint operations. General Dwight D. Eisenhower said, "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare are gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all Services, as a single concentrated effort."1 What degree of doctrinal direction is required for the United States military to operate as a single concentrated force? Today, Eisenhower's "efforts" typically lead to establishment of a Joint Force Commander who acquires operational control of forces from multiple Services. What is available to the Joint Force Commander to enable not just the effective, but efficient employment of these forces? The answer lies in joint doctrine, but how does the United States military ensure joint doctrine guides these efforts? Does making joint doctrine directive improve the efficiency of joint force employment? This paper will attempt to prove that making joint doctrine directive improves the efficiency of joint operations. DEFINING DOCTRINE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE Doctrine is the fundamental set of principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.2 In layperson's terms doctrine is the publication of lessons learned in an effort to prevent duplication of mistakes and enhance the successes of previous operations.3 Doctrine encompasses all areas of the military and provides guidance to help streamline routine as well as special situations. Historical Perspective Keeping in mind the philosophical nature of doctrine as a guiding force to employment of forces, a review of history shows the basics of doctrinal thought as early as the 17th century. King Louis XIV initiated the organization and discipline that could be viewed as the beginnings of doctrinal philosophy.4 Vauban, one of Louis XIV's military architects has been credited with the doctrinal overlay of 17th century siege combat. Although this fact is disputed by some researchers, substantial evidence exists showing doctrinal guidance for the conduct of warfare during this period.5 This time frame also coincides with the beginnings of civilian administration of the military. Documentation of military activity may have improved civilian understanding of the tasks associated with military operations. Moving into the Napoleonic era, major advancements in military success came from an understanding of previously written accounts of employment options. Napoleon used written accounts of previous battles to enhance French capability in battles at Ulm and Austerlitz.6 His success in combat was a result of careful study of the art and science of warfare that allowed him to adjust combat maneuvers and exploit weak areas in enemy defenses. His written accounts of battles were essential doctrinal publications. In the 1860s, Prussia was believed to be one of the most powerful forces on the European continent.7 This was possible even though the Prussians had not participated in combat for nearly two generations. Organization, training, and doctrinal study of previous wars' successes and failures made this possible. This perspective was provided by the experiences of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Scharnhorst. As warfare continued to evolve, so to did the capture of successes and failures into written publications. This process continued into the development of modern doctrine branches by each Service. These doctrine publishing divisions still exist in all Services. Although doctrine is derived from the same basic tenets, each Service views doctrine in substantially different ways. The Current Status of Doctrine The difference in each Service's definition of doctrine demonstrates how varied the opinions are on the subject of doctrine, its purpose, and its value. Each Service adheres to the belief that doctrine provides the guidance with which to employ forces. Doctrine provides the commander with a baseline from which to operate. It philosophically frames operations and allows understanding among a larger base of individuals.8 Doctrine does not limit operations and should not be thought of as a prescribed means of accomplishing a stated objective. With that in mind, how does each Service reflect its doctrine? Service doctrine varies widely from Service to Service. Much of this difference may be attributable to the level at which it is employed and the degree with which tactics, techniques, and procedures are interspersed in doctrinal publications. The Marine Corps, with its mission of opposed amphibious assault, has very detailed doctrine. This doctrine is divided into parcels covering every conceivable unit and function both on the battlefield and in the rear area. The Marine Corps has incorporated tactics, techniques, and procedures into many of the documents it considers doctrine.9 This provides philosophical understanding and the knowledge of employment techniques that allows objective accomplishment. The Army describes doctrine as the condensed expression of the fundamental approach to fighting.10 Field Manual (FM) 100-5 does an excellent job of describing the area, personnel, and psychology of modern warfare. It describes concepts of employment while staying clear of tactics discussions. The remaining 100 series publications are more detailed than 100-5 and are used to clarify intended means of accomplishing stated objectives. Air Force doctrine closely mirrors the philosophy of Army doctrine with a discussion of laws of war, followed by a brief explanation of the need for aerospace forces and the missions accomplished by those forces.11 To completely understand Air Force doctrine, missions, and capabilities one should also read Major Command Manual (MCM) 3-1.12 The combination of these publications allows a better understanding of how air assets are employed to accomplish the Commander in Chiefs objectives. The Navy has recently published its first volume of doctrine and is surging to catch up with the abundance of doctrine being published by all Services. Navy Doctrinal Publication 1 is an esoteric document expounding the virtues of the laws of war, but says very little about expectations of Navy capability.13 Each Service's doctrine is slanted toward justifying its roles and missions. All Services duplicate effort on the esoteric portion of doctrine preceding the description of Service specific capabilities. Each volume of doctrine has served a vital purpose in the past, but analysis of future employment opportunities has provided the catalyst for development of joint doctrine. Future of Doctrine "Rare is the contingency plan that calls for a military Service to operate completely independent of another service. Most situations require interaction between two or more Services."14 General Horner, Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) during Desert Storm, added to this thought during a visit to Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He discussed the need for military forces to join beyond Service lines to resolve future problems involving National Security Objectives. His historic perspective of Desert Storm has ingrained a positive viewpoint of joint operations. In that conflict a knowledge of all Services and their capabilities was required in order be successful as the JFACC.15 DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT DOCTRINE Joint doctrine is the fundamental set of principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in coordination with the Combatant Commands, Services, and Joint Staff.16 How do Unified Commanders ensure joint doctrine is used during joint force operations? The CJCS, General Shalikashvili, has taken the lead in this area by making joint doctrine directive.17 Does making joint doctrine directive provide the best solution to the unorthodox situations today's military finds itself in? Or does authoritative doctrine with room for manipulation by critical thinking commanders make the most sense? Although manning, equipping, and training is a Service responsibility, Title 10 of United States Code establishes the Joint Chief of Staff as the primary office of responsibility for the development of joint doctrine.18 Currently, responsibility for joint doctrine resides in the Joint Doctrine Division, Joint Plans and Interoperability, J-7, Joint Staff at the Pentagon. This evolution began with the Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act in September 1986. This Act placed authority for development of joint employment doctrine for the armed services in the CJCS. In April 1987, DoD Directive 5100.1, in conjunction with Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 2, directed the CJCS to accept responsibility for joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. It also required coordination with all Services, Unified and Specified commands, and the Joint Staff.19 (see Figure 1.1) This ensured all warfighting elements were brought into the developmental stage of doctrine development. Click here to view image What is more, these directives required Service doctrine to be consistent with joint doctrine established by the CJCS.21 This was a significant change and to date has not been fully complied with by any Service.22 A large portion of the hesitation by the Services is the length of time required to bring a joint publication to fruition. Due to the review and coordination requirements, joint publications take four to six years to travel from thought to written guidance.23 Joint doctrine has made tremendous strides in the past five years. From the belief the CJCS should provide written guidance for the employment of joint forces, joint doctrine expanded to include 54 volumes of doctrine and 42 volumes of tactics, techniques, and procedures. There is also a Joint Electronic Library which encompasses all current and proposed joint doctrinal publications.24 Does this mean joint doctrine is being used to guide the unique situations America's military finds itself called upon to execute? Does the CJCS's requirement for directive joint doctrine have anything to do with effective employment of joint forces? Looking at the development of doctrine will lead to better understanding of the CJCS's position on making joint doctrine directive. FROM RELEARNING LESSONS TO WRITTEN GUIDANCE "Joint military operations involve the use of significant elements, assigned or attached, of the Army, the Navy or Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under the single commander authorized to exercise operational control."25 Throughout history land armies have fought by pitting forces against each other in often brutal, face-to-face confrontation. These armies advanced toward one another, weapons raging in a torrent of carnage until one army could no longer stand the force of the other.26 Weapons development has widened the distance between warriors, but has not eliminated this phenomenon Even with the advent of Naval forces, the competing navies would line up and do battle until one ship sunk or was driven away. Early Experiences with Joint Operations One of the earliest recorded instances of joint Navy and Army operations occurred during the Battle at Hampton Roads.27 This battle culminated with the Merrimac and the Monitor exchanging blows in an effort to support the respective Armys' campaign at Yorktown. The Battle at Hampton Roads began a revolution in warfare, bringing the Navy to the forefront as a viable means of disseminating combat power ashore. Three dimensional thought was brought to warfare early in World War I, when Baron von Reichtofen's flying circus was used to propagate the essence of aerial warfare.28 What began as aerial observation soon turned to combat employment to exploit the advantage of the third dimension. Many years passed as the Services learned how to work together during combat. Early in Vietnam, few operations required the employment of joint forces. Ground units were generally segregated by Service and mission.29 Even air operations, which are easily integrated, were divided by firm boundaries separating areas of employment into Navy, Air Force, and Marine activity.30 This led to many instances of aircraft being jeopardized by surface to air missile sites located in another Service's area of responsibility. It also prevented one Service from attacking targets within another Service's area of responsibility.81 The rules of engagement for Operation Rolling Thunder, March 1965-October 1968, were directed by the Joint Chief of Staff and added to at virtually every level below until they reached the pilots flying the aircraft. These rules established sanctuaries in North Vietnam which were soon used to employ and protect North Vietnamese military assets. Other portions of these rules prevented the closure of Haiphong harbor, and required US aircraft to attack in daylight, during clear weather until very accurate bombing systems, like laser guided bombs, could be fielded.32 Development of Jointness As the war progressed, President Nixon's objectives led planners toward joint employment of forces. The scope and complexity of missions like Rolling Thunder and Linebacker led some military leaders to consider written guidance for joint employment of forces.33 Increased firepower and survivability convinced individual Service members that fighting as a joint force was a better way to continue operations. Development of doctrine has come a long way since the end of Vietnam, but it is a slow process. There is a natural resistance to change that Robert Heilbroner referred to as the viscosity of history.34 This resistance may be viewed as a desire to continue doing things the way they have been done in the past. Military Services heighten this desire through parochialism and size. This creates a natural slowness with respect to the development of joint doctrine. The bipolar world after Vietnam also effected the resistance to joint doctrine development. Cold War Effects on Joint Doctrine The Cold War created an environment conducive to maintaining large forces. Defense of the United States was based on use of conventional forces combined with a heavy forward presence.35 These force levels made it cumbersome for individual Services to cross Service boundaries to operate as joint forces. With forces large enough to handle operations without joining across Service boundaries, there was little motivation to develop joint doctrine. This says nothing about the internal motivation to remain within a single Service due to Service parochialism. Post Cold War Priorities The end of the Cold War brought an end to an entire strategy of military employment. The status quo of employing military organizations in traditional manners ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The global security environment deteriorated from the known entity of forty years and American military leaders were left to determine the means with which the military would accomplish its mission. This post Cold War mission has been much less defined than the bipolar world before 1989. It is no surprise the Goldwaters-Nichols Act and Defense Reorganization Act roughly coincided with the fall of the Berlin Wall.36 Many guests to Marine Corps Command and Staff College have stated that future employment of forces would require crossing Service boundaries. Downsizing military organizations is part of the perceived peace dividend brought on by the end of the Cold War.37 It is a long term divestment of assets that spawns resistance as Services perceive their portion of the military budget dwindling. The early 1990s saw the largest decrease in American assets stationed in Europe since World War II.38 Record percentages of US military assets were returned to US soil. This leads to the question of whether the United States military has retained the power and capability to employ with little or no notice. The Service Chiefs clearly believe meeting the security needs of the National Command Authorities will require operations in a joint environment.39 This heightens the importance of joint doctrine as the guiding force to joint employment. EXPERIENCING JOINT DOCTRINE Knowledge of joint doctrine and understanding how to employ it has become increasingly important as the global environment continues to skew traditional roles and missions of the armed services. The cumulative effect of joint operations has been understood for many years. "The allied air campaign of the Pacific from 20 August to 15 November 1942 provided a shining example of what joint employment of air power from a joint airfield could do. It all centered around the men of Cactus Air Force defending Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. The Navy, Marine, and Air Force fliers set aside Service rivalry, adapted their Service doctrine, employed a single air component "commander", and overcame overwhelming odds to defeat the Japanese."40 Since 1989, the United States has found itself committed to a national emergency and numerous situations protecting national security interest or the rights of fellow nations. The Gulf War was the only one of these that followed traditional expectations of military operations. The remainder have required interpretation and manipulation of traditional roles in order to satisfy the National Command Authorities. How has joint doctrine affected the outcome of these situations? A brief look at Operation Desert Storm (Iraq), Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq), Restore Hope (Somalia), Restore Democracy (Haiti), and Proud Shield (Somalia II) may reflect some insight on joint doctrine's usefulness. Joint Doctrine's Effect on War Scenarios Much has been published concerning Operation Desert Storm. Most of these accounts have projected a positive light on military activity in the Gulf region. Some critical issues preceded the successes of Desert Storm; one of them will be explored here. A key component in the success of Desert Storm was military and political leadership with a memory of Vietnam. An explicit desire to avoid the mistakes of Vietnam reverberated through many decisions during the planning and execution of Desert Storm.41 This advanced the idea of keeping military decision making as close to the war as possible. But making decisions 8,000 miles from the Beltway42 required extreme confidence in the leaders making the decisions. An approved format for making these decisions made this long-distance confidence a little easier to nurture.43 This format was joint doctrine and where it was applicable to Desert Storm, it served a valid purpose. As early as August 1990, theater guidance messages referenced JCS publications as a source of guidance. These ranged from OPSEC awareness guidance to policy and planning guidance for theater construction. Even where joint publications did not exist, references to joint messages and joint directives were incorporated into Desert Storm directives.44 The activities supporting war scenarios are immense. World War II required full mobilization of US industry and the economy.45 Desert Storm required a substantial mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces as well as substantial mobilization of the transportation industry.46 These mobilization activities do not just happen by accident. Well-documented joint doctrine as well as joint tactics, techniques, and procedures defined the road to success for mobilization of Desert Storm forces.47 Would making joint doctrine directive enhance its use by Desert Storm commanders? The military leaders of Desert Storm possessed an obvious appreciation of the value of joint activities that would take place in the ensuing months. To obtain the level of success that is generally bestowed upon Desert Storm, joint doctrine and a working knowledge of joint operations must be credited with helping to achieve that success. Joint Doctrine in Operations Other Than War Many Operations Other Than War (OOTW) have been placed upon the military since the termination of Desert Storm. Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) was initiated at the conclusion of Desert Storm in an effort to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq. OPC was both a peacekeeping and pseudo-nation building mission managed out of headquarters in Turkey.48 The nature of these operations resulted in the development of non-specific objectives by the Unified Commander responsible for these activities. The time relationship to Desert Storm also influenced the manner in which operations were established. Little emphasis was placed on joint doctrine as the guiding principle for establishing tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations.49 This resulted in incongruous activities every time units were replaced on their normal rotation schedule. Often, the entire concept of operations was re-invented with each rotation of units supporting OPC. The Marine Corps elected not to use joint doctrine, "Because of our familiarity with [Marine Corps] rapid response planning and confirmation brief." All Marine Corps plans were briefed using Marine doctrinal format.50 Joint doctrine could have clearly helped by adding a stabilizing effect to the continued operations in northern Iraq. The most sobering incident during OPC was the mistaken shoot down of two US Army helicopters by two US Air Force F-15Cs. Better understanding of the procedures established in joint publications could have led to better control of the assets available and might have prevented this horrible incident.51 To make matters worse, a similar situation occurred four months earlier, but was diffused before the situation turned to catastrophe.52 If joint doctrine had been directive, planners would have been persuaded to research joint procedures and terminate the helicopter sequence of events before it began. This has not been the only example where joint doctrine could have been used to improve a given situation. The situation in Somalia turned sour in January 1991. Lack of stability resulted in an enormous shortage of food which led to fighting between rogue factions, further reducing the stability of Somalia. The US embassy requested immediate evacuation and the actions that followed began Operation Provide Relief and led to Operation Restore Hope.53 Provide Relief was fraught with problems from the very beginning. Forces were employed out of Mombassa, Kenya to fly food into the southern half of Somalia. The instability between warring factions within Somalia prevented safe passage of the relief flights. The inability to establish relief facilities in Somalia forced the President to initiate Operation Restore Hope. A Unified Task Force consisting of coalition members from 21 nations embarked on a plan to secure sea and aerial port facilities. These would allow the import of humanitarian relief supplies so that starving Somalis could begin the process of stabilizing their country. Due in part to the lack of formalized direction, this operation was filled with honor stories about lack of guidance toward the troops trying to accomplish the mission.54 Failure to use joint doctrine, or some formalized guidance, resulted in numerous problems. Extreme amounts of time where used to set up the relief effort, relief supplies did not get to the people needing it, and US Marines and Soldiers were put at peril trying to feed a starving nation. The Humanitarian Assistance Newsletter published an article about command and control during Operation Restore Hope. The newsletter claimed individuals brought together on the joint staff for Operation Restore Hope could not understand the unique relationships between members of this staff.55 This is an example where use of joint doctrine and joint definitions would have eliminated problems. The only question remaining is how to get tasked forces to use and understand joint doctrine. This is a special problem when dealing with coalition forces in humanitarian relief situations. Since coalition forces do not fall into the US chain of command, it is difficult trying to prescribe joint doctrine. Early in 1995, the United Nations (UN) forces commanding operations in Somalia asked for assistance in leaving Somalia. Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, USMC, was assigned as the Commander of the Combined Task Force (CCTF) and began preparations for the orderly withdrawal of UN forces from Mogadishu. The Combined Task Force consisted of forces from a variety of nations that were brought into the planning cycle and introduced to joint doctrine.56 Joint doctrine was the cornerstone for the successful extraction of UN forces from Mogadishu. It is important to note General Zinni has been involved in five operations of this type over the last three years. His unique experience level could be the determining factor in the success of Proud Shield. Not all of these situations occur half way around the world. In 1994, the President committed US troops to duty in Haiti. Operation Restore Democracy has presented yet another interesting scenario for US forces. Re-inserting Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the President of Haiti hardly sounds like a mission for US military forces. However, in the fall of 1994, that is exactly where the 10th Mountain Division found themselves. This mission, nation assistance, is defined in joint doctrine.57 This operation presented several unique situations worthy of discussion. The tempo of operations throughout the military has stretched deployable units to their limit trying to satisiy the directives of the National Command Authorities. This was a contributing factor in the selection of an Army unit to board naval vessels and proceed toward Haiti. The coordination required to make this operation a possibility was immense. There were also numerous problems that had to be resolved through the cooperative efforts of Army and Navy forces. Did joint doctrine specifically play a major role in this success? The push for joint understanding spawned by the development of joint doctrine made this operation possible. Joint doctrine provided the basis for being able to plan and execute in an environment unfamiliar to the participants. Understanding joint doctrine put all elements into a pool of common understanding and played a part in being able to do something as unprecedented as putting Army helicopters onboard Navy vessels. DIRECTIVE JOINT DOCTRINE: USE IT WITH JUDGMENT Joint doctrine is not the perfect solution to all situations. The success of non-traditional employment of forces will vary with the level of critical thinking skills and the ability to adjust to the situation.58 There has been and will continue to be a remarkable change in the role of military forces as we approach the 21st century.59 Traditional warfare is transcending a revolution that may skew our view of what the military is all about. Alvin and Heidi Toffler raise pertinent questions as to the applicability of guns and bullets forces when future wars may be waged on the techno-battlefield. As the United States progresses through the revolution in warfare, great minds may take precedence over great strength. The ability to think critically about the situation and determine the best avenue of approach will play an ever stronger role in situations experienced by US forces. This ability to select the best approach does not happen without direction and purpose. Critical thinking skills may be nurtured and improved, but until everyone thinks on the same plane, written guidance will have to be available to increase the level of understanding among all participants. Joint doctrine, in conjunction with Service doctrine, plays a critical role in leveling the playing field. When joint doctrine was virtually ignored during Operation Provide Comfort, additional work was required to establish procedures with each rotation of assigned personnel. The lack of purpose and direction could have been solved by viewing the previously learned lessons that exist in joint doctrine. This was restated clearly by General Shalikashvili when he said the military should be compelled to prepare to fight as a joint force. Improving interoperability will "prevent tragedies inherent in hasty planning and lack of preparation."60 Relearning those lessons at a cost of two aircraft and 26 lives is not a viable option in today's environment. Public opinion, which is directly tied to funding dollars, must not be allowed to wane in the face of poor decisions. Desert Storm is a great model for study, not because so much was done so well, but because so much was done. The leadership involved in the Gulf War realized very early the importance of not learning by bad experiences. They turned quickly to joint doctrine to deter the opportunities for failure and built a model of success by viewing the past as having value in the future. Although joint doctrine was not directive during Desert Storm, the commanders were smart enough to use available help, in the form of joint doctrine, to ease the stresses involved in designing a military campaign. In Somalia and Haiti, planners have used joint doctrine to pursue opportunities that may have been missed otherwise. These non-military uses of armed forces create the greatest potential for disaster, particularly when the media is involved. Many of these unorthodox situations are addressed in joint doctrine, and although specific details may not be found, broad guidance exists in these documents. The United States cannot afford to disregard prior experiences in a world so fraught with uncertainty. In the past five years, the US military has enjoyed an ever increasing knowledge and understanding of joint doctrine. The success of missions based on joint understanding cannot be denied. But, until all US military personnel acquire an understanding of joint doctrine and how it should be employed, it should remain directive from the CJCS. This emphasis builds the knowledge base and allows greater opportunities for the military when it finds itself in a unique situation somewhere around the globe. Bibliography Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Volume 1. Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force. March 1992. Ambrose, Stephen E. 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Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Prentice Hall Macmillan, 1994. Kolb, Tim, Major, USMC. Interviewed by author, 7 March 1995. McKinley, W. "Decreasing Organizational Size: To Untangle or Not to Untangle?" Academy of Management Review, 17(1). McPherson, James M. The Atlas of the Civil War. New York: Prentice Hall Macmillan. 1994. Moore, George M., Captain, USN. "Joint Space Doctrine: Catapulting into the Future." Joint Forces Quarterly. Summer 1994. Navy Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1. Naval Doctrine. Washington DC: Department of the Navy, march 1994. Paret, Peter. Makers of Modern Strategy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1986. Probasco, Micheal T., Colonel, USAF. "Joint Force Air Component Commander or Coordinator?" Maxwell AFB: Air University Library. 1994. Shalikashvili, John M., General, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Strategy at the Heart of the Budget." Defense 94, issue 3. Washington DC: US Government Printing Press. 1994. Shalikashvili, John M., General, USA, Chairmen of the Joint Chief of Staff. "A Word from the Chairman." Joint Forces Quarterly. Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies. Summer 1994. Sowell, Lewis C., Jr. "Base Development and the Rapid Deployment Force: A Window to the Future." National Security Affairs Monograph Series 82-5. Washington DC: National Defense University Press. 1982. Sullivan, Gordon R., General, USA, Chief of Staff of the Army. "America's Army: Strategic Force for Today and Tomorrow." Defense 95, issue 1. Washington DC: US Government Printing Press. 1995. Title 10, United States Code, as Amended by the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War And Anti-War. Boston: Little Brown. 1993. Turner, Steven L., Colonel, USAF, Vice Wing Commander, Operation Provide Comfort, Incerlik AB, Turkey. Interviewed by author 9 January 1995. Zinni, Anthony, General, USMC, Commander Combined Task Force, Operation Proud Shield. Lecture given to Marine Corps Command and Staff College, QuantLco, VA. 3 April 1995. NOTES 1 Armed Forces Staff College PUB 1, x. This statement and many like it have been repeated by numerous guests at Marine Corps Command and Staff College 1994-95, to include General Horner, Air Component Commander of Desert Storm, and General Zinni, Joint Force Commander, Somalia. 2 Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, 121. 3 Captain George M. Moore, USN, Colonel Vic Budura, USAF, & Joan Johnson- Freese. "Joint Space Doctrine: Catapulting into the Future." Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 5 (Summer 1994): 71.76. 4 Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 64-66. 5 Paret, 82-86. 6 Paret, 128-142. 7 Paret, 281-290. 8 General George H. Decker, USA, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1960-62. Taken from the inside front cover of "Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 94. 9 LTC Crookston, USMC, Commander, School for Advanced Warfighting, interviewed by author, 22 March 1995. 10 Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1993) 11 Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Volume 1, (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, March 1992) 12 MCM 3-1 is a series of tactical employment documents that provide guidance for the employment of fighter aircraft. Volumes cover general employment concepts and aircraft integration, threat analysis, and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the employment of specific aircraft types. 13 Navy Doctrine Pub (NDP) 1, Naval Doctrine (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, March 1994). More volumes of NDP are planned, but not available at the publication of this paper. 14 Lewis C. Sowell Jr., (1982), "Base Development and the Rapid Deployment Force: A Window to the Future.", National Security Affairs Monograph Series 82-5, p. 21. National Defense University Press, Washington, DC 15General Charales Horner, "Air Operations During Operation Desert Storm," lecture presented to Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 6 December 1994. General Horner was candid about the need for all Services to understand not only their own doctrine, but the need to understand the historical perspective of each Service's doctrine, You got to know where they come from." 16 Joint Pub 1-02, 201. 17 General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, "Strategy at the Heart of the Budget" Defense 94, issue 3. 18 Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, 52. 19 Title 10, 52. 20 Reprinted from Joint Publication 1-01.1, 2. 21 Title 10, 52. 22 LTC Daly, Joint Doctrine Division, Joint Plans and Interoperability, J-7, Joint Staff, interviewed by author, November 1994. 23 Joint Publication (JP) 1-01.1, Compendium of Joint Doctrine Publications Abstracts (Washington DC, Joint Doctrine Division, J-7, Joint Staff, January 1994), 6. 24 Joint Pub 1-01.1, i 25 Joint Pub 1-02, 203. 26 Paret, 11-120 27 James M. McPherson, The Atlas of the Civil War (New York: Prentice Hall Macmillan, 1994), 60-65. 28 Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority (Washington DC: Center for Air Force History, 1991), 1.60. 29 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York, Viking Press, 1983), 349.380. Geographic boundaries were established in Korea and Vietnam. The same thought was proposed by the Navy during Operation Desert Storm planning. This idea was terminated by General Norman Swartzkopf, USA, CENTCOM Commander. 30 Karnow, 388-412. 31 Cooling, 505-519. 32 Cooling, 514-516. 33 Karnow, 500-580. 34 David Jablonsky, "US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs", Parameters, volume XXIV, (Autumn 1994): 18-36. 35 General Gordon R. Sullivan, "America's Army: Strategic Force for Today and Tomorrow" Defense 95, issue 1, 7-15. 36 Lieutenant Colonel Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols", Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1993, 71-81 Many factors were involved in the development of Goldwater-Nichols. The need for Defense Department reorganization goes back to World War II. The failings in Korea, Vietnam, Desert I, and even the success in Grenada were driving factors in developing the Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986. 37 W. McKinley, "Decreasing Organizational Size: To Untangle or not to Untangle?", Academy of Mangement Review, 17(1), 112-123. 38 General Charles Horner, 6 December 1994. 39 Defense 95, Issue 1. 40 Colonel Micheal T. Probasco, Joint Force Air Component Commander or Coordinator?, Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, AL, (1994), 1. 41 General Charles Horner, 6 December 1994. 42 Beltway is a term used in the Washington DC area to encompass the decisions and activities of Congress, the Senate, the White House, and the myriad of special interest groups that effect policy decisions. 43 Author served as the 4th Wing, Provisional, primary Desert Storm planner and advisor to the Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) Staff. 44 Operation Desert Shield/Storm inter-theater directive messages, compiled by Marine Corps University Research Center, Southwest Asia section. 45 Stephen E. Ambrose, D.Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 22-26. 46 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: An Interim Report to Congress, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, July 1991), 21-1. 47 Joint Pub 1-01.1, ii-v. and Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 15.1. 48 Colonel Steve Turner, Deputy Wing Commander, Incerlik AB, Turkey for a three month rotation during Operation Provide Comfort, interviewed by author 9 January 1995. 49 Major Robert Harvey, USAF and Major Jim Drew, USAF, interviewed by author 2 February 1995. 50 Operation Provide Comfort, BLT 2/8 Narrative Summary, 19 April 1991. 51 Joint Pub (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington DC, Joint Doctrine Division, J-7, Joint Staff; 9 September 1993). Also see General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, A Word from the Chairman, Joint Forces Quarterly, (Washington DC, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Summer 1994), 4-5. 52 Harvey, 2 February 1995. 53 JP 3-0, v14-v16. 54 Major Tim Kolb, USMC, interviewed by author, 7 March 1995. 55 Center for Army Lessons Learned, US Army Combined Arms Command, Humanitarian Assistance Newsletter, No. 92-x, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1992). DALIS, the Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System has stated that use of joint doctrine would have expedited the employment of humanitarian relief in Somalia. 56 Admiral Gage, Commander Amphibious Task Force-Proud Shield, lecture presented to Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 3 April 1995. 57 JP 3-0, v-10. 58 Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, "Proud Shield," lecture presented to Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 3 April 1995. 59 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 11, 64-79. 60 General John M. Shalikashvili, 5.
