French And American Involvement In Indochina SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues CSC 1995 MILITARY ISSUES PAPER CONTRASTING FRENCH AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN INDOCHINA Commander Dahi S. Al Nehari, Royal Saudi Navy USMC Command and Staff College TABLE OF C0NTENTS Page Executive Summary 1 Background and Conception 2 Colonization and Exploitation 4 Insurrection and Rebellion 5 Global War and Declaration of Independence 7 French Reclamation of Sovereignty over Vietnam 8 Deadly Rivalry Between North and South Leadership 9 Transition to American Involvement 12 Gradual Buildup of Support 14 Massive American Offensive 17 TET, 1968 - The Turning Point 21 Phased Withdrawal 24 The Fall of Saigon 26 Aftermath 28 Conclusions 29 Notes 34 CONTRASTING FRENCH AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN INDOCHINA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This paper examines conditions of war in Vietnam to compare and contrast the involvement of France and the United States. A chronological review of the developments is appropriate since the Vietnamese Communists, in particular, began the conflict with almost no resources except for their heritage and a vision of reestablishing their national identity, and progressively learned from their own mistakes and those of their adversaries to achieve their goal of reunification. The sections of this paper trace the evolution of conflict from the conditions prior to World War II that led to the revolution, the decade of fighting against France, American assistance to the fledgling government in Saigon following the 1954 Geneva Accords division of Vietnam, a decade of extensive combat mostly between Americans and Communists of first South and then North Vietnam, and the subsequent decade of fighting in Cambodia after the departure of the United States from Indochina. Much has been written about the tactics and techniques employed in combat, particularly from the American perspective. However, the strategy formulated by the Vietnamese Communists was vastly different from that previously encountered by either the French or the Americans. Because of this strategy and the nature of the country and its terrain, the Vietnamese Communists were able to withstand a phenomenal onslaught and uitimately emerge victorious on the battlefield. Their victory proved to be less beneficial than they imagined when the United States initiated an embargo against them, and their former allies proceeded to attack them when reverting to age old animosities. Social, economic, and other forces in the World exerted substantial influence on the military decisions and even the form of warfare in Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. It is this combination of factors that the Vietnamese Communist leaders recognized from the beginning and used to their advantage. The lessons to be learned from the three Indochina wars are many and varied. While America seemed to win every battle throughout the Second Indochina War, defeat of the enemy remained an elusive goal just as the Vietnamese later discovered in Cambodia against determined Khmer nationals who used the same tactics and strategy against them that they had employed against France and the United States. France's loss was really a matter of time. Many of the factors that led to the defeat of the United States are described throughout this paper. Without the support and backing of China and the Soviet Union, the task of the Vietnamese Communists would have been far more difficult, but perhaps not impossible. Even if the United States could have avoided the many difficulties that plagued its efforts to assist South Vietnam, the eventual result may well have been inevitable. No one problem determined the outcome of the war, but the combination of many difficulties severly undremined America's efforts. Use of massive firepower and high technology as part of a limited warfare policy against guerrilla insurgents fighting a protracted total war in an agrarian, jungle, and mountain environment is no guarantee for success. In the final section of this paper, conclusions are presented for each of the preceding sections. BACKGROUND AND C0NCEPTI0N The results of French and American involvement in Indochina seem too similar: both great powers were forced out of Vietnam after expanding enormous amounts of money and manpower. Why did France or America lose the struggle? After the reunification of Vietnam, relationships still have not improved significantly. Most accounts of the conflict fail to consider all viewpoints, particulariy that of the South Vietnamese. Part of the Vietnam tragedy stems from each side analyzing things from their own perspective without sufficient knowledge or understanding or even concern for the viewpoint of the others. Americans should have learned from Vietnamese history and French mistakes in Indochina. Instead, they seem to have repeated many of the same counterproductive practices that characterized the French effort. They also seem neither to have studied nor cared about Vietnamese history. The longest and most costly war fought by the United States continued a legacy begun by France more than a century before. Classic conditions created by French colonization of Indochina ensured that conflict would be inevitable. The Americans wanted Independence for the Vietnamese people, at least that half that seemed to favor Western ideas. Self-determination, freedom, morality, and the rule of law rather than the rule of force: these were treasured American ideals. With radically different motives for their involvement, France and America should have had different experiences. Three successive Indochina Wars with the Vietnamese Communists at the center have occurred since the end of the Pacific war with Japan. These were complex affairs where external World affairs exerted influence on the direction, if not the outcome, of the conflicts. The concept in warfare in the form of the revolution in Vietnam was unlike either the French or American Revolutions of the eighteenth century that relied mostly on conventional military practices. The principles date back to earlier centuries when the Vietnamese successfully opposed their Chinese imperial colonizers. These principles for Vietnam derive from conditions leading to war. Natural resources and production capability made the Southeast Asia region an attractive target for exploitation. Repeated invasions by the Chinese, Mongol, and Manchu have given the Vietnamese people a special regard for their northern neighbors. Vietnamese express great pride in their defeat of successive invasion attempts by Mongol armies through skill and ingenuity. They have resisted stronger, larger forces through tactics and strategies that have proven successful many times in their long history of conflict. The Vietnamese copied much of the Chinese culture and tradition. The doctrines of Confucius, Tao, and Buddha became more established among the Vietnamese than within China. Formal education was limited to study of the Chinese classics in preparation for positions in the Mandarinate. In practice, only the sons of the very wealthy could ascend to become rulers. Commoners could only hope to maintain their current status. Villagers expected to follow in their ancestors footsteps in this very feudal society. Role relationships dictated by traditional concepts maintain substantial influence on the thinking and actions of Vietnamese regardless of external Western appearances. For centuries, the Vietnamese people have viewed themselves as innovative and courageous defenders fighting against larger enemies. Lack of understanding of local culture played a phenomenal part in the relationship of Vietnamese individually and as a society with the French, Americans, and also the Chinese from whom the Vietnamese learned much of their culture. Flawed assumptions by all parties resulted from a lack of recognition of basic concerns.1 COLONIZATION AND EXPLOITATION Missionary zeal of early European adventurers combined with commercial interests. Indonesian and Malayan areas rich in spices fell under the domination of an expanding Islamic movement. To counter the Viennese city-state trade monopoly with Middle-East caravans, explorers sought alternative routes to the East Indies. French missionaries were among the early explorers. Conversion of the Vietnamese written language to the Roman alphabet (from Chinese ideographs) by a French missionary in 1627 increased the influence of missionaries, Vietnamese priests, and France. The ability to communicate ideas to the populace undermined the Confucian system of authority based on narrow scholarship. Accompanying the bishop of Adran to Paris, the young son of a deposed imperial claimant of southern Vietnam charmed the court of Louis XVI. That event established a drive to convert Vietnam to the glory and civilization of France. Raw materials and outlets for their industries encouraged wholesale migration and national competition for territory. Gold and silver, precious stones, coal, tin, exotic woods, silk, spices, rice, and other commodities drew thousands of Frenchmen to Vietnam. Domestic, economic, and social problems slowed official French support for their Asian Empire building for more than a century. By 1843, the French government had deployed a permanent fleet to protect its interests in the South China Sea. Naval officers eagerly and sometimes ruthlessly used the opportunity to enhance their own status. French forces overwhelmed the relatively less militarily developed locals on several fronts. All provinces of Vietnam fell to French control and the Indochinese Union was formed in 1887. French businessmen and government officials relied upon the Mandarin structure to accomplish most of the organization and labor that provided profit. The French controlled law enforcement and military. Graft and corruption had long characterized Vietnamese rulers. This continued with the French who exploited every opportunity to advance themselves. Life-styles of the French colonials were grand. Salaries of the lowliest French colons were higher than the most superior Vietnamese. Climate and other factors reduced production. Demands on the local population helped to make up any losses. Literacy of the Vietnamese people increased. Limited schooling for all classes of society began to provide interest and awareness in Western ideas as well as traditional Vietnamese culture. New ideas and old traditions were published in books, magazines, and newspapers. A heritage of oral communication of historical and current events through poetry, song, theater, and storytelling enlightened the peasants and laborers throughout the country. Even humble villagers were usually well aware of the heros of antiquity and modern times as well as the activities of invaders. The majority of the population were well informed. INSURRECTION AND REBELLION Peasants retained close-knit relationships within their village organizations. They knew very little other than their village life except when corvee labor requirements took them away. People in the cities lived in close association with the French colons and daily witnessed their disregard for Vietnamese citizens. Higher education of young Vietnamese men brought them together to discuss their learning of ideas written about by French revolutionaries. Dissatisfaction with the worsening economic and social conditions produced widespread criticisms of the French Imperialists. Large self-governing clans of Chinese nationals maintained close-knit monopolies on virtually all commerce, transportation, and other areas of the economy, particularly in the south. Chinese influence eliminated development of any strong middle class of Vietnamese. Some locals collaborated with imperialists to improve their lifestyle. That class established closer ties to Western ideas and institutions. Others rejected all aspects of the bureaucracy while they took advantage of French educational opportunities. Many student and other activists were arrested and sent to prisons with brutally harsh such as Paolo Condore; most prisoners who survived emerged as Communists. Improvements in infrastructure brought about by the industrial revolution and capitalism were introduced by the French for their own purposes. As under Chinese occupation, locals selectively adopted features of the culture of their colonizers. Those who could acquired modern dress styles and other signs of Western progress. However, the vast majority of working poor within the cities, and people in the countryside, remained close to the levels of poverty that they had known for centuries. Harsh conditions of exploitation and natural calamities created severe hardship. French bureaucrats, businessmen, and landowners imposed greater burdens. In five years as governor-general of Indochina, future president of the French Republic Paul Doumer converted a drain on France's treasury to a profitable colonial enterprise. He accomplished this through increased requirements on local inhabitants. Insatiable demand for corvee labor to support grandiose public works programs resulted in death or disability of innumerable Vietnamese. Crushing taxes, forced labor, and oppressive law enforcement combined with a succession of crop failures to drive villagers to panic. Large groups of peasants went on rampages. Brutal suppression resulted in numerous deaths and injuries. There was no unified opposition. The incomparable Ho Chi Minh made an unsuccessful effort to have the condition of the Vietnamese people recognized by the supposed advocate of freedom and democracy, Woodrow Wilson, at the League of Nations conference in Paris. He received unfavorable treatment by French socialists as well. Subsequently, he underwent further indoctrination in Communist ideology in France, in Russia, and later in China to become the leading figure in Vietnamese opposition to all outside forces. Activities of intellectuals opposing the French regime within Vietnam brought them to the attention of authorities who proceeded to arrest and imprison or execute increasingly large numbers of dissidents. Future leaders of the independence movement escaped to China, Japan, or elsewhere or were imprisoned by in places like Hong Kong and Singapore. The stage was set for radical transformation. GLOBAL WAR AND DECLARATION 0F INDEPENDENCE Japan desperately needed the raw materials and the productivity that Vietnam represented. The French military forces stranded in Indochina could not readily oppose the Japanese without logistic support. Just months prior to the surrender of Japan, the Japanese Army imprisoned French colonists and military personnel. Many Vietnamese admired the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" concept and collaborated with the Japanese. During the Pacific war, various dissidents sought to connect with like-minded individuals who would oppose all outside powers. Religious differences as well as political feelings separated many individuals who wanted independence. During the war against Japan, China provided a sanctuary for many with differing ideologies. Most worked together to overcome outside influence on Vietnam, but Communist members produced the best collection of partisans to oppose tyranny by external forces. American OSS (Office of Strategic Services) agents perceived that Communist activists were superior in thwarting Japanese militarists. These agents provided training and aid to fledgling revolutionaries. Trained Viet Minh contingents disbursed throughout the country to prepare for eventual takeover. The Vietnamese themselves had already pacified the country following the Japanese surrender. Vo Nguyen Giap's army had marched into Hanoi on August 28th, 1945, unopposed by the thirty thousand Japanese troops there. On September, 2nd, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam before an ecstatic crowd of hundreds of thousand of Hanoi's residents and people from the countryside. Ho had lived in the United Slates for a year and his declaration was patterned after the American Declaration of Independence. His proclamation aroused nationalist sympathies among all Vietnamese people. Agreement at the great powers' Potsdam Conference provided that provinces of Vietnam north of the 16th Parallel would achieve independence quickly, but prosperous Cochinchina in the south would revert to colonial status at first and eventually be granted independence. More than 150,000 Nationalist Chinese troops were dispatched, without any of their own provisions, to occupy northern Vietnam above the 16th parallel following the end of hostilities. Their reliance on obtaining food locally created even more severe shortages. Over two million Vietnamese starved to death as a result of the Japanese redirection of rice farming to industrial crops. "Britsh" colonial troops including Gurkhas were used in the south adding further insult to injury. Their commanding general turned over civil and military control to the French within weeks. Supreme Commander Mountbatten's orders had expressly prohibited re-establishing French sovereignty. FRENCH RECLAMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER VIETNAM Opposition brought swift and devastating retaliation by embittered French military personnel who had been prisoners of war. Vanity and pride of the French could not allow defeat. Upon released from imprisonment, the French subsequently rearmed Japanese troops and along with German and other mercenaries proceeded to retake the entire Indochina area. French naval forces responded to opposition in the north by bombardment of the port city of Haiphong where tens of thousands of innocent citizens perished. French commanders within Indochina felt the urgent need to demonstrate significant progress to receive support from the French government. Competition for scarce resources during the reconstruction phase followed the war in Europe. Without support, the ability to continue control of the colonies through military activity was jeopardized. The French forces had to demonstrate sufficient control to maintain the colony as a viable component of the French Union. The basis for providing American support stemmed from the perceived need to reestablish France as a vital component in a strengthened Western Europe to oppose the buildup of the Eastern European Block of Communist states. Viet Minh units developed by the Communists who allied with other groups including the Catholics provided the most potent force to oppose the imperialists. Viet Minh ranks swelled as French forces reoccupied fortified outposts throughout the country. They had to learn the art of warfare on-the-job and acquire weapons wherever and however they could. The man most responsible for developing these units was Vo Nguyen Giap. He was a high school history teacher with a law degree from the French University of Hanoi and he studied ancient and modern military strategies.2 DEADLY RIVALRY BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH LEADERSHIP Opinion and philosophy differed as opposition to imperialist forces of France and Japan roused individuals and groups to action. Although the French had oppressed the people of Vietnam severely, they also provided a transition from a pre-industrial society into one that had the capacity to develop further in the modern age. Not all Vietnamese intellectuals thought that elimination of the French from their territory was an absolute requirement for obtaining autonomy. Financial and technological assistance could be inestimable. However, thinkers such as Ho Chi Minh who adopted Communist ideology refused to accept any concept other than total elimination of the French from Vietnamese homeland. French use of collaborators made those individuals contemptible to their adversaries; they were considered enemies of the state that must be totally eliminated. A power vacuum existed where no groups other than the Communists had sufficient strength to achieve dominance. Others, who were equally nationalistic, rejected concepts of Communists. Millions of Vietnamese fled to avoid their control testifies that the narrow thinking of Communist ideology was not favored by the whole Vietnamese nation. Differences within families and among neighbors became as severe as those with complete strangers. Bitterness began among the competing forces as the French attempted to reclaimed their former territories. French influence was sufficiently strong to enlist large numbers of Vietnamese to join their governing bodies and also their military units. Several combat units quickly became competent fighting components of the French army. Dispersal of forces in small fortified infantry posts allowed systematic isolation and annihilation of units stationed there. A succession of French military commanders tried to reestablish control of the cities and the countryside. Classical tactics and strategy characterized the French approach to combatting the elusive dissidents. Numerous attempts were made to draw the Vietnamese revolutionaries into fixed piece battles. Large force confrontations were attempted on several occasions but resulted in dismal failure since terrain and other factors prevented effective use of maneuver warfare. Viet Minh practiced attrition warfare effectively against dispersed French outposts embarrassing and crippling the French. Conditions in Europe and the attitude of the French legislature brought increasing pressure on the commanders in Vietnam to demonstrate success. Problems resulted from the availability of logistic and technical support from the Communist Chinese following their defeat of Chiang Kai-sheck's Nationalists. French army thinking was consistent: success could best be demonstrated by winning a major set-piece battle against the Viet Minh. Additionally, Laos remained a component of the French Union of Indochina. Protection of Laos was problematic; the French government issued ambiguous instructions that hinted at maintaining protection of Laos. The French commander determined that he had sufficient justification to set up a major blocking action against the Viet Minh which should draw them into the desired set-piece battle that the French forces should win with superior logistics capability. Other conflicts continued throughout the country tying down large numbers of French forces. Thinking of the French planners in staging a battle at Dien Bien Phu was fatally flawed. Any commander might anticipate that the Vietnamese could not have the capacity to transport sufficient armament across such difficult terrain within the necessary time frame to be effective. Most commanders might reasonably think that the Vietnamese couldn't entrench their artillery so effectively. However, they resisted detection and annihilation by French artillery and air strikes. They resupplied undetected under conditions where the French had unrestricted observation. Chinese-supplied weapons were placed to maximum advantage and enormous amounts of ordinance were delivered. Resupply for French forces by road was not feasible. Logistic and combat support by air was at the maximum reach of their capacity. Only a small percentage of French forces were French nationals. The bulk of the soldiers were Foreign Legionnaires or from other French colonies in North Africa, and probably the weakest link in the combat units was the contingent of tribal Thai locals who were not ethnic Vietnamese. The result should have been inevitable. The rout of French forces could not have come at a worse possible time for them: the convention in Geneva provided the ideal platform for the Vietnamese to argue their case. The French population were sick and tired of the conflict. They would not condone further support. Worst of all, the French troops in Vietnam were weary of the fight. Throughout the First Indochina War, the United States provided ever increasing support for the French forces. America also provided supported Chinese Nationalist forces and later in Korea fought with the South Koreans against the Communist Chinese and North Korean armies. The aim of opposing Asian Communism came from the long-standing U.S. foreign policy of containing the spread of Soviet power. American analysts and decision makers were convinced that the U.S.S.R. controlled the Communist forces in other countries and dictated their aggression as the means to achieve World-wide dominance. Cold War issues affected the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. directly, and most other nations indirectly. However, the interplay of different regimes in the Communist sphere of influence demonstrated significant nationalistic trends that apparently made little impression on policy makers throughout the Cold War period.3 TRANSITION TO AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT President Roosevelt pressured the French during the Pacific war in an effort to force them to give up colonial control of Indochina. Roosevelt reflected the attitude of opinion molders who opposed imperialism yet supported "manifest destiny" for the United States. Idealists convinced of America's duty to preserve global order exhibited a zeal similar to that of earlier missionary adventurers. Rosevelt stressed nationalistic self-determination but concluded that postwar peace and stability after World War II would depend on America's global leadership. After his death, president Truman followed the lead of the European contingent in the department of state. America therefore provided substantial financial aid and moral support to the cause of reoccupation of Vietnam by the French as a means to stop godless Communism. As the First Indochina War progressed, aid from the United States continued to escalate until virtually all financial support came from America. The French came to be seen less as greedy imperialists and more as valiant opponents of the spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia. During the battle of Dien Bien Phu, American aircraft carriers were positioned in the South China Sea ready to assist the French. Bombers and fighters stationed in the Philippines were available. Atomic weapons were seriously considered as an option. Negotiation of the cease-fire in Korea allowed America (and China) to extract itself from prolonged combat there. American decision makers weighed the possibility of becoming involved in another quagmire in Vietnam in direct combat with Chinese forces. This might have occurred if America sent its bombers to the hoped-for rescue of the French forces at Dien Bien Phu. United States Congressional conditions for continued support of the contingency plan to bomb Viet Minh positions at Dien Bien Phu were: 1) United States intervention must be part of a coalition to include the other free nations of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and the British Commonwealth. 2) The French must agree to accelerate their independence program for the Indochina States so that the United States assistance would not appear as supporting colonialism. 3) The French must agree to stay in the war.4 There was no time for condition one to be met if it were possible at all. Condition three could not be met by the war-weary French. And condition two apparently did not interest the French in any case. The alternative contingency plan to rescue French forces with a beachhead evacuation was favorable to the French, but conditions deteriorated before it might have been effected. Also, the American commanders in the Pacific seemed to have even less understanding of the severity of actual conditions than their French counterparts. Conditions established during the Geneva Convention of 1954 partitioned Vietnam into two portions at the 17th Parallel at the location that separated the north and south centuries earlier during civil war of Trinh and Nguyen factions. The concept of combined armed and political struggle, dau tranh vu trang and dau tranh chinh tri, propelled the Viet Minh to utterly defeat the French forces in 1954. The same revolutionary concept prevailed following the accords signed at Geneva that establish two separate Vietnams. There was never any consideration by the Communists that anything short of reunification of the entire country under their leadership would be acceptable. They had agreed at Geneva only as a means of eliminating the French forces from their territory. American policy-makers perceived that the Vietnamese Communists would be relentless in their pursuit of their goals. As a result, the United States willingly undertook the burden of assisting the partisans south of the 17th Parallel to establish their own kind of nation. Whereas the Communists always placed political considerations ahead of military concerns, their opponents typically failed to integrate the two concepts and relied upon perceived military strengths to control the process of diplomatic initiatives. The French had focused on main force battles and their American successors likewise anticipated that the main thrust of the Communists would be invasion from the north.4 GRADUAL BUILDUP 0F SUPPORT President Eisenhower established a combined civillan and military advisory program to aid the new government set up in South Vietnam. The often stated rationale for support of South Vietnam was to oppose Communism. The choice by emperor Bao Dai of Ngo Dlnh Diem as first president of the new republic reflected Diem's ability to charm Western officials rather than a demonstrated background and ability to govern. He had spent half a decade in the United States prior to the Geneva Convention. His credentials as a nationalist and an anti-Communist were decisive. As a Northerner and a Catholic, Diem represented a distinct minority in South Vietnam. When he arrived in Saigon, he was a virtual unknown. American policy-makers failed to recognize that Diem and other Vietnamese leaders in the south were not necessarily anti-Communist, just non-Communist. Diem conducted a referendum and deposed Boa Dai. He set up his government and military organization based on personal and class relationships rather than competence. With classical Mandarin attitudes based on entrenched Confucian ethics, obedience to authority was a mandatory requirement. The nature of the village structure in Vietnamese culture provided that a locally selected headman conduct relations with outside entities. One of the first steps that Diem took was to replace the headmen and all other officials throughout the south with people of his own choosing. A key American in the establishment of South Vietnam was the successful nation-builder, Edward Lansdale. He had elevated Ramon Magsaysay to hero status in the Philippines through skillful public relations. After the Pacific War, McArthur's selection for leader of the Philippines was collaborator Manual Roxas who was closely associated with the most exploitative occupation policies revived a guerrilla uprising by the Communist-led forces. After conditions became intolerable, Magsaysay took control and crushed the insurgent guerrillas with the help of Lansdale using psychological warfare techniques. Lansdale taught counterinsurgency training courses with simplistic solutions to the problem. After being sent to Vietnam, he set up the Saigon Military Mission with specialists to perform "dirty tricks" and other clandestine activities for the CIA. Conditions in Vietnam in 1954 were only slightly similar to post-war Philippine conditions. Considerable adverse development within the Diem regime can be traced to Lansdale's operation. Civilian employees with groups such as the U.S. Agency for international Development initially established patterns of work and life-styles for themselves not unlike the French colonial administrators before them. They seldom went into the countryside to view their projects, and when they did they typically supervised in a leisurely fashion. Minimal public relations masked the fact that projects were funded and sponsored by the United States. Local nationals might easily be deceived that the new Westerners were little different from the colons. Communist propaganda also played on the lack of knowledge of farmers and fishermen to the detriment of American officials who tried to establish beneficial projects. Graft and corruption continued to be rampant as in earlier periods. Vast amounts of resources, whether financial or material, failed to go to their designated recipients. Diem's cronies took advantage of every opportunity to enrich themselves at the expense of their countrymen and American benefactors. Repression initiated by Diem's regime guaranteed support for political struggle activities of their Communist adversaries. Police brutality, insensitivity by army personnel to local residents, excessive taxation and control by officials, and myriad other practices of a despotic ruler characterized Diem. His younger brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and sister-in-law, Madam Nhu, established day-to-day control of the workings of government and became hated by the populace. Diem practiced autocratic control over the Vietnamese military forces to the extent that field commanders would do little without Diem's personal direction. Few Americans realized it at the time, but steps taken by their administration to bolster the support of Diem and distance themselves from his corrupt rule were bringing them ever closer to an impossible dilemma. With the practices of the government and commercial communities in the south, a war was being waged successfully by Communists controlled from Hanoi. For the North Vietnamese, it was a foregone conclusion. Their policy of protracted warfare convinced them of their ultimate success. Things that American forces did and things that the South Vietnamese did helped to virtually guarantee the eventual outcome. Understanding the essence of the Vietnam War requires acceptance of the concept of protracted, unconventional warfare that was employed against the southem forces by Hanoi. The three-tiered organization of the Communists consisted of main force troops, local army troops, and guerrilla militia troops operating out of the villages. Village-based guerrillas were the foundation of their strategic offensive. President John F. Kennedy was assassination in Dallas only days after the assassination of president Diem. Another major change in the course of the war occurred. Kennedy had said on numerous occasions that United States support of the Indochina War was unwise. He had intended to initiate a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam following his reelection. George Ball, as under secretary of state, was the sole advisor to caution against escalation of the war effort. Two days after Kennedy's assassination, president Johnson signed a National Security Action Memorandum that cancelled withdrawal and changed the objective of assisting South Vietnam to "win" against the Communists rather than just sustain the government of South Vietnam. It also authorized plans to expand the war into North Vietnam plus extend coverage to all of Southeast Asia, and ordered government officials not to contest or criticize the changes. A succession of men in Saigon tried to form effective governments, but none could exert sufficient influence until army general Nguyen Van Thieu finally brought relative stability four years later. Thieu was to retain the presidency until days before the final capitulation of South Vietnam. His manner of controlling the government and the armed forces differed little from Diem with respect to the graft, corruption, and patronage. His removal from the presidency became a major rationale for North Vietnamese negotiators who demanded a more compliant head of state prior to their acceptance of other terms. Johnson, as a seasoned politician, constantly sought compromise between the pro-war and pro-peace advocates thereby failing to develop a consistent policy aimed at achieving realistic goals and objectives. The leaders in Hanoi also sought consensus, but their goals were always clear.5 MASSIVE AMERICAN OFFENSIVE Logistics planning and execution enabled Vo Nguyen Giap to defeat the French under austere conditions. Giap and millions of North Vietnamese continued to improve the efficiency of relatively primitive transport of war materiel mostly by means of the notorious Ho Chi Minh Trail. In contrast, the logistic support of U.S. forces utilized modern, sophisticated transport mechanisms to provide all of the comforts of home for the American fighting men. Northern personnel who frequently went for days without food observed that American combat personnel who had water for showers flown in to remote camps couldn't possibly develop the motivation to match their own. A deliberate policy of minimizing discomfort created a network of outlets to pursue almost any form of recreation available back home. The influx of necessities, comfort items, and luxuries flooded the American base camps. Salaries of the American troops and civilian personnel vastly exceeded that of their Vietnamese counterparts. Large portions of the materials destined for the camps made their way into a thriving black-market system ripe to exploit the goods. The local Vietnamese economy necessarily rose out of control with the availability of so much affluence. Personnel in the service industry quickly came to acquire money and status that contradicted the former relationships of the community under Confucian ethics. The fabric of society changed drastically in less than a single generation. Contrasts in lifestyle brought even more turmoil for the displaced villagers who flooded into the cities. The volume of munitions provided little incentive for selective targeting. Particularly in outlying districts declared under Communist control, policy allowing free fire at anything that moved resulted in unlimited slaughter of innocent men, women, children, and animals. Carpet bombing of all forms of targets devastated the countryside with little to show for the effort. In places such as Dien Bien Phu located on the return leg of bombing missions to the concentrated areas of North Vietnam, pilots dropped any unexpended bombs on any available structure regardless of military value. Indiscriminate firing on villages where suspected enemy activity occurred brought destruction of the livelihood of villagers and frequently their deaths as well. A contradictory problem that caused extreme frustration and many deaths and injuries of American forces was the deliberate decision to furnish incompatible ammunition for the M-16 rifles issued to the combat personnel. The failure rate due to jamming became widely known by the guerrillas who would capture all other materiel whenever possible except for the M-16s. Pentagon procurement officials ordered ammunition specifically rejected by the manufacturer of the rifle.6 The buildup of forces within Vietnam itself and supporting areas such as Thailand, Guam, and the Philippines without a general mobilization caused several problems. Since neither the reserve nor National Guard units were activated, all services had to draw upon American personnel and units throughout the global structure of the armed forces. Units within Europe became particularly vulnerable to shortages of men and materiel. The designated tour of duty for in-country personnel restricted to one year meant that draftees serving two-year terms couldn't be effectively used in other assignments with so little time remaining on their enlistments. Most middle-class men could obtain deferments from the draft through continued college enrollment. Poorer lower-class men who had to work part time to pay their tuition couldn't afford the time to take sufficient classes to rate an exemption. Departure from American jurisdiction of huge numbers of protesters of the draft almost created a national crisis. Rapid turnover of personnel disrupted the team-building necessary to form cohesive fighting units. The average age of combat personnel became the lowest in the history of America. The vast majority of volunteer and drafted personnel came from lower-income, working-class backgrounds. Few of them had any prior association even with other ethnic groups within America let alone Asians such as the Vietnamese. The resulting culture shock affected both groups profoundly. Additionally, McNamara's Project 100,000 brought into the military ranks individuals whose status had previously been as rejects due to their inadequate mental abilities. The social engineering experiment proved to be a dismal failure as experienced commanders anticipated it would be. Hundreds of thousands required greater supervision and only a handful of these special cases made sufficient progress to warrant their selection. Insufficient numbers of qualified commissioned and non-commissioned officers were available much of the time. Because of the high level of logistic and staff support, the majority of personnel dispatched to Vietnam did not perform in combat roles. Racial tension developed into many confrontations. The relative youth, immaturity, and lack of intercultural skills of the troops generated uncounted incidents of improper behavior. Despite these shortcomings, the fighting skill of American forces was praised by many of their adversaries. The same cannot be said for most of the South Vietnamese forces. Their leadership suffered from graft, ineptness, inadequate or inappropriate training, mismanagement, and other conditions. Many American advisors either became exasperated or took over the actual command roles. Part of the problem resulted from the fact that few men in the south had prior combat experience when called upon to fight for their government. Those who had been trained by the French frequently reverted to the same inappropriate strategies and tactics that had lost the First Indochina War. Nearly all senior officers during the Diem regime deliberately avoided aggressive combat to minimize their casualties and thereby satisfy edict of their ruler. As a result, the majority of American commanders relegated the Vietnamese troops to minor assignments and used the American or third country troops to conduct the main fighting. South Korean personnel were notorious for aggressive combat. Communist guerrillas from the south were primarily volunteers in the early years of the conflict who exhibited tremendous commitment to their cause of liberation. Some surrendered after years of living under extreme conditions. The vast majority who lived through the fighting remained loyal to the cause of liberation to the end: Those recruited or drafted in the later years of the conflict received less training and more closely paralleled their government counterparts in outlook and disposition. Following reunification, southern Communist troops discovered that their outlook, goals, customs, and other factors were significantly different from their northern countrymen after all. Many felt betrayed following reunification. A combination of factors exists in any insurgency environment where anyone, young or old, male or female, can be a deadly adversary. The contempt shown for the villagers in the countryside was not exclusive to the American or other Western troops. Vietnamese and other Asian troops committed atrocities periodically. Some of the South Vietnamese forces routinely brutalized people in the countryside. Assassination of select village and other officials by Viet Cong had been widely practiced from the beginning. Occasionally they slaughtered large groups of people, but mostly, the Viet Cong attempted to maintain favorable relations with local people. That was an integral and extensive part of their training. The code of conduct training for U.S. forces personnel typically consisted of a minimal lecture and a pamphlet that few ever bothered to read. Many veterans of the Second Indochina War in which the Americans fought exhibit what has been termed post-traumatic stress disorder. Many complain that they cannot erase the gruesome scenes that they participated in or witnessed. Others refuse to talk about their experiences. Few were properly prepared to encounter combat before they were rushed into battle. One of the most controversial aspects of the buildup of forces relates to media coverage of the war. During the French involvement and early American involvement, coverage was limited essentially to newspaper, magazine, and book descriptions of events. The general public in America was little aware even of the existence of Vietnam, much less that it constituted a serious national security issue. As the television industry developed, a substantial increase in interest brought news teams and free-lance reporters into the arena. Reporters went into the field with troops to document first-hand encounters with combat units and villagers alike. News reporters had unprecedented freedom of access and ability to relay their stories without censorship. Action scenes of fire-fights were more attractive than civic action. Commanders and decision-makers often found out about what was happening in their areas of responsibility far faster from the news media than from regular channels. The American public became subjected to an almost continuous barrage of gory devastation each evening at dinnertime that even the majority of military personnel serving in Vietnam never personally witnessed. Much of what they saw seemed to contradict any official version of events promulgated by government spokesmen. The propaganda value for turning attitudes against the war effort could not have been better planned by the leaders in Hanoi. The "free press" typically painted a one-sided picture principally because that was the way that they were able to obtain their coverage. Vietnamese nationals in the urban areas of the south likewise had a continuous portrayal of the carnage. Their countrymen in the north had access only to views and information provided by their leadership. The Communist propaganda program was amazingly effective within Vietnam and elsewhere. Questions are asked today by Northerners, as well as Southerners who lived in Communist controlled areas during the Second Indochina War, that reveal their total orientation to the image of the United States as an invader rather than an invited participant helping the legitimate government of South Vietnam. They ask why America destroyed their ancient Imperial City of Hue without acknowledging that the Communists initiated the campaign against that city during the violation of the sacred holiday period of Tet in 1968. Propaganda was then and continues to be a crucial element of the Communist program. Without access to impartial, objective information, any captive audience can be expected to accept much of what they are told, particularly if it is plausible.7 TET, 1968-THE TURNING POINT The single most meaningful occasion in Vietnamese culture during any period of any year is celebration of the new year's festival of Tet. Throughout recorded history, Vietnamese have been honoring their ancestors with great ceremony for up to several weeks during this all-important sacred festival. Although intelligence indicated that significant activity was expected by the Communists at about the time of Tet in January of 1968, commanders in nearly all areas expressed surprise at the timing, scale, and intensity of the assaults on almost all of the cities in the south and all major U.S. military bases. The buildup of main- force troops around Khe Sahn seemed to signal the beginning of another Dien Bien Phu type of fixed-piece challenge that, with victory, would gain immense political benefit for the Hanoi regime. Overall conditions for Khe Sahn and Dien Bien Phu were similar, but the outcome was victory for the southern forces. South Vietnamese forces who participated in the Khe Sahn siege demonstrated their capacity to fight. Likewise, many South Vietnamese units proved their worth in the fighting during Tet. The military defeat of Communist forces was overwhelming. However, the impact on morale of the American public, and the World, forced a serious look at objectives and commitments American leaders claimed. An overwhelming backlash effect roused millions of solid citizens including many who had previously supported the president. Johnson's loss of faith in McNamara brought Clark Clifford in as defense secretary along with a fundamental increase of anti-war thinking. That change forced a serious look at American objectives in Vietnam. The theater commander had strategic and operational objectives, and the Pentagon and Pacific military commanders had objectives to drive their national and regional military strategy, but there had been no grand strategy and overarching national goals and objectives articulated by the political leadership. Three alternatives were proposed to fill this vacuum. Strategic offensive was rejected as an overall policy in view of the political climate. In direct opposition to the desires of the military advisors, political decision-makers determined that there would be no taking of war directly to the adversaries. Strategic defensive provided the only apparent concept for acceptable alternatives. Previous policy focused on tactical offensive under strategic defensive with search and destroy missions. A second alternative proposed withdrawal to the "demographic frontier" to protect the urban population centers. The third alternative, which was adopted, proposed a two-fold policy of providing maximum assistance for strengthening the South Vietnamese forces while intensifying pacification of the countryside. This policy, known as Vietnamization, was formulated but Vietnamese leadership was not consulted about the basic concept and received little information about the implementation details. Worse than that, the theater commander was never told of this policy change. Timing of the announcement of Westmoreland's promotion to chief of staff of the U.S. Army shortly after Tet prompted the news media to draw the wrong conclusions and portray the transfer as relieving Westmoreland of his combat duties rather than recognizing his superior contribution to the war effort. Funding of the war effort seriously detracted from the Great Society program that Johnson had initiated. Expectations of the underclass who were supposed to benefit from the program remained unfulfilled. Middle-class taxpayers felt alienated by the demands of their support. Johnson's response to the adverse reaction of the populace, and particulariy to senior counselors, ultimately caused him to publicly announce his withdrawal from candidacy for a second term as president. Afterward, he gave many subtle hints that he really would like to be reelected. His public position was that he must devote his energies to bringing this war to an acceptable conclusion. Johnson hoped to convince Hanoi that he was sincere about efforts to negotiate a settlement. He believed that through renunciation of nomination for an additional term as president, the Vietnamese would see that there could be no political motivation for his actions. His lack of understanding of the Vietnamese way of thinking was fatally flawed. The effect of Hanoi's efforts in staging the Tet offensive was not what they expected, but the North Vietnamese leaders, particularly General Giap, recognized that the political repercussions were to their advantage even if it might take years to compensate for their substantial military losses. They had no intention of negotiating from a position of weakness. Disaffection of Americans as well as South Vietnamese continued to increase. During the period following TET of 1968, ready availability of narcotic substances increased use by American forces dramatically. In some units, most or all of the personnel began using heroin or marijuana laced with cocaine. Drug problems and other counterproductive activity increased from the time of TET 1968 until U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Numerous American personnel within Vietnam deserted their units. Others sought to solve their problems with despised superiors by terminating them with fragmentation grenades which left no trace of their initiator. Operation Phoenix, phung hoang, was created as a cooperative enterprise to suppress the local Viet Cong political structure. Military, police, and civil officials involved with intelligence services were finally centralized into an organized structure. These personnel penetrated the local population to gather information and arrest or kill Viet Cong. American anti-war activists challenged the operation as a mass murder campaign, but it had a tremendous impact on Communists in the south. Many captured suspects bribed their way to freedom reducing the program effectiveness. Undoubtedly, numerous other citizens who were either innocent or only loosely connected to Communists also were brutally tortured or killed. Meanwhile, the ever patient Communists continued to conserve their resources and prepare for the inevitable campaigns that would drive the invaders from their precious soil and allow them to deal with the collaborators of the Imperialists. Their patience and endurance was indeed legendary.8 PHASED WITHDRAWAL Defeat of the Democrats in the 1968 elections brought Richard Nixon to the presidency. Like Johnson, Nixon also had a vision of his role in World history. Nixon got into the spotlight by opposing Communists during his early Congressional years. His terms as vice president under Eisenhower increased his appetite for international politics. His choice of Henry Kissinger as national security advisor and William Rogers as secretary of state allowed him to exercise more intimate control of foreign policy. Nixon proceeded to initiate secret contacts with North Vietnam as well as the U.S.S.R. and China. Through these contacts, he and Kissinger attempted to bring pressure to bear for agreements that would allow withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam under "honorable" conditions. Diplomacy backed by military force was the approach used in contrast to the Johnson administration. Nixon recalled Eisenhower's use of the nuclear threat against China as a means to terminate the Korean conflict. His use of massive bombing in Cambodia was kept secret from the American public plus the secretary of the Air Force and Air Force Chief of Staff. This was done with the concurrence of Norodom Sihanouk, ruler of Cambodia, on the condition that no Cambodian nationals would be affected. However, planners of the bombing program realized that the areas were populated and civilian casualties were inevitable. Despite substantial coverage of the bombing and subsequent ground infiltration into Cambodia, it had little apparent effect on North Vietnam's attitude and effectiveness. Nixon hesitated to reinitiate bombing in North Vietnam until later. The final massive bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong had limited physical damage effect since potential target functions, personnel, and contents had been dispersed throughout the countryside. However, the psychological effect brought Hanoi's policy-makers face-to-face with the devastation. This was the type of strategic air warfare that Admiral Sharp had been advocating from the beginning of America's bulldup.0 Resumption of talks to terminate the conflict with the U.S. for a "standstill ceasefire" followed a week later. The agreement was formally signed within three more weeks. The prisoners-of-war and missing-in-action issue was a major sticking point throughout negotiations and remains contentious to this day.10 Prior to the agreement, significant numbers of American forces were gradually withdrawn from South Vietnam as use of air power increased. More activities were turned over to president Thieu's South Vietnamese forces along with large quantities of materiel. By the end of direct U.S. involvement in South Vietnam, they had achieved the fourth largest air force in the World. Maintaining sophisticated weapons systems requires spare parts, trained personnel, and energy resources. Unfortunately for the South Vietnamese, rising oil prices on the World market occurred when they faced reduced funding from America. Departure of United States forces from South Vietnam was something that most looked forward to, except the South Vietnamese leadership. Large numbers of enemy combatants remaining in the south meant that there would continue to be fighting regardless of the provisions of the Peace Accords signed in Paris by North Vietnamese and American representatives. THE FALL OF SAIGON The inevitable consequence of a country engaged in a long-standing civil war played itself out in Vietnam regardless of statements made by each of the belligerents at the Paris negotiations. Domestic conditions within the United States eliminated any possibility of significant response in the event of continued aggression by North Vietnam against South Vietnam. The government and armed forces of South Vietnam demonstrated that they could not effect sufficient change to combat the persistent Northerners without massive help from the United States. During the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam, several major engagements tested the competence of the government forces in the south. Most of the main force battles drove the North Vietnamese back primarily through massive aerial bombardment and active involvement of American advisors. The Cambodian assault in 1970 and the Laos strike into 1971 are instructive. The enemy withdrew almost completely within Cambodia leaving the South Vietnamese government forces the opportunity to devastate their supply caches unopposed. Any sense of South Vietnamese victory reflected only their ability to maneuver in relatively open terrain against a phantom army. The U.S. assisted in the background. The case was the opposite in Laos. That situation required decisive, continuous, and well coordinated action under extremely challenging conditions. The actions of the South Vietnamese commanders guaranteed the failure of the mission. Professional military advice and appropriately coordinated American airpower probably would have changed the course of events. America's Vietnamization program dictated that the southern forces would have learn to stand on their own. Changes necessary to allow that possibility might have taken decades. The campaign launched by Hanoi in 1975 was originally designed to prepare for an all-out offensive scheduled for the following year. The rapid success of their forces and the catastrophic collapse of the southern forces astonished nearly everyone. Conflicting and irrational orders given by president Thieu generated a panic in the Central Highlands. Rather than a general uprising consistent with Communist assumptions, the population anticipated a bloodbath at the hands of the North Vietnamese forces. No city dwellers wanted to be left to what they believed would be the brutality that would inevitably come. Thousands died in flight; more thousands were slaughtered by the pursuing North Vietnamese troops; and more still were killed by South Vietnamese troops in their attempt to escape ahead of the civilians. The thoroughly documented chaos that resulted vividly reflected a totally demoralized society. Once the Communists achieved control of all of Vietnam, the expected reprisals dld not materialize. Few were actually killed. Collaborators at all levels were forced to undergo "reeducation" in concentration camps. Ultimately, the Communists recognized that their opponents would not change their views; most were eventually released. Scores of Vietnamese today are trying to make up for the many years of their lives that were lost in non-productive confinement. A substantial number of these latter-day prisoners-of- war eventually came to America or elsewhere to begin anew. That is another part of the legacy of the Second Indochina War. Even after the Second Indochina War between America and the Vietnamese Communists, Americans continue to assume "that the normal political evolution is toward the American pattern of government. Henry Kissinger observed that nations are shaped by their culture, their history, even their folk tales, that therefore their margin of chabnge is finite, is not a view readily accepted by most Americans, even their leaders."11 AFTERMATH Relations with neighbors to the southwest in Cambodia had been strained for centuries. Viet (and Thai) encroachment into Khmer territory made the Cambodians suspicious of Vietnamese intentions. The entire southern portion of Vietnam south of Saigon had been claimed by the Viets in the last century. Territory west was taken a century earlier, and that surrounding Saigon and to the east three centuries ago. Phu Quoc island west of the mutual border in the Gulf of Slam also is claimed by Vietnam, but with counterclaims by Cambodia and also by China. Throughout the First and Second Indochina Wars, Khmer and Viet nationals lived and worked on both sides of the border. Animosity continued to build among the Khmer forces throughout the first two Indochina wars despite the apparent cooperation between the North Vietnamese and the Communists of Cambodia (renamed Kampuchea following the takeover by Pol Pot). Pol Pot's paranoia resulted in slaughter of perhaps two million Khmer nationals during his reign of terror. Shortly after reunification of North and South Vietnam, Khmer forces began a program of ethnic cleansing to rid their territory of Viet nationals. The level of atrocities against peaceful villagers increased within Cambodia and several kilometers into Vietnam. Publicity of the Khmer activities was suppressed by the Vietnamese until well after they launched a successful campaign that drove the Khmer Rouge out of the capital of Phnom Phen into the mountains. The Third Indochina War began with that quick rout of Khmer Rouge forces and then continued for a decade. Vietnam experienced a reversal of roles with the Khmer Rouge using guerrilla tactics against Vietnamese main force units. China felt a significant threat to their national security from a powerfully equipped and continuously aggressive Vietnam on their southern border. Vietnamese acted against Chinese nationals living in Vietnam, predominantly in the Cholon district south of Saigon. Most Chinese merchants had become relatively affluent through their longstanding business dealings, which was an excuse for the Vietnamese to accuse them of deception and conspicuous graft. After confiscating their assets, Chinese residents were forced to leave Vietnam under adverse conditions. This action and the incursion into Cambodia caused China to launch a punitive assault across the northern border of Vietnam while their principal armies were engaged against the Khmers. After a preset period of massive destruction, Chinese forces left, but not without having suffered higher casualty rates than Vietnamese civilian and military personnel. Evidently, the Vietnamese did not learn the lesson that the Chinese attempted to teach. The historic rivalry continues with the northern area rebuilt and reinforced. With China supporting the Khmer Rouge forces in their fight against the Vietnamese, the Soviet Union responded favorably to Vietnamese officials' requests for aid, making membership in the East European economic community, COMECOM, a requirement. Vietnamese officials also sought to receive aid from the United States. Foreign policy initiatives by different administration factions frustrated the Vietnamese effort to normalize relations with America. President Carter's national security advisor Brzezinski's focus on Russia as the power to oppose resulted in Carter taking his advice to normalize relations with China while excluding Vietnam. Rather than viewing Vietnam as a client state of Russia, department of state personnel lost out to Brzezinski in their bid to have Carter recognize Vietnam as well as China. Chinese officiais encouraged the Soviet Union to continue supporting Vietnam and thereby drain Vietnamese and Soviet resources in fighting the Khmer Rouge.12 CONCLUSIONS In contrasting French and American involvement in Indochina, a number of questions need to be resolved. The following conclusions derive from these questions: What is the background of French and of American involvement in Vietnam? French involvement resulted from continued efforts to maintain a colonial empire. United States efforts in Indochina were directed against the Chinese and Soviets from the beginning to balance World power between the Western Free World and the Eastern Communist block. Vietnam was viewed as a client state under the direct influence of both Communist giants. How did the French colonization and exploitation of Vietnam affect their involvement? Potential loss of a profitable colony impelled France to take drastic messures to regain their territory following their humilliating defeat during World War II. As with their other colonies, they had sown the seeds of revolution through their cruel exploitation of the local peoples. Ruthless suppression of prior insurrections created the resolve in their opponents to eradicate them whatever the cost. What caused the insurrection and rebellion within Vietnam? Progressive demands for unpaid or underpaid labor, loss of land by the peasants, severe food shortages, conspicuous treatment of local nationals as second class citizens in their own country, brutal suppression of opposition, and continued withdrawal of the countries' resources impelled nationals to organize and challenge the French through armed combat. How did global war and the Vietnamese declaration of independence affect French and American involvement in Vietnam? The great powers allied during World War II maneuvered to obtain maximum influence for their own national interests at the conclusion of that war. The declaration by Ho Chi Minh of independence following surrender of Japanese forces to his partisans was irrelevant to the great powers concerned with larger issues. Occupation by forces designated by the great powers exacerbated severe existing conditions. Deliberate disobedience of orders by the British occupational commander allowed the French forces within Indochina to begin recolonization efforts. To support French involvement in the protection of Europe against the Soviet threat, the United States began a program of massive aid to France that eventually comprised almost the entire funding of the First Indochina War. How did the deadly rivalry between North and South leadership of Vietnam contribute to French and American involvement? Conservative elements in the north contrasted sharply with progressive elements in the south. Additionally, religious differences drew the Catholics toward support of the French in opposition to their Buddhist countrymen. Vietnamese with vested interests in maintaining the relative affluence provided by French oversight resisted aggression by Viet Minh forces setting the stage for a revolutionary civil war. What caused the transition from French to American involvement? American leaders felt compelled to continue support of the partisans who opposed the Communist forces following the disastrous defeat of the French. The Geneva Convention in 1954 partitioned Vietnam into opposing halves although substantial numbers of proponents existed within each portion of the country. Opposing Communist forces in Korea established a precedent for supporting nations on the periphery of China. The perception existed that the North Vietnamese under the direction of the Chinese and Soviets would continue to attempt subversion of the south and eventually invade the territory to capture the entire country. With partial success in thwarting Communist efforts in Korea and suppression of Communist insurrection in the Philippines, American involvement was viewed as both necessary and likely to succeed. How effective was the massive American offensive? After years of corruption and repression by the Diem regime, the military of South Vietnam was incapable of opposing the strategic offensive of the Communists using the then-current practices. Guerrilla warfare by the insurgents in the south proceeded at their initiative. The need was seen to protect American support bases that were being harassed by the Communists that South Vietnamese troops failed to prevent. Establishing massive search and destroy operations forced the Communist leaders in Hanoi to upgrade the approach that they wanted to avoid until conditions in the north improved. Was the 1968 TET offensive by the North the turning point of the war that caused American withdrawal? The strategy employed by the combined forced of the northern and southern Communist forces for the 1968 TET offensive violated many of the principles of effective warfare. Southern forces were in the forefront and were devastated. Because of the outrageous nature of the offensive, both South Vietnamese and Americans were appalled at the success of the Communists in penetrating into the urban areas previously thought to be safe havens. Obvious contradictions in the statements of political and military leaders and the apparent potential of the Communist forces caused serious reconsideration. Loss of confidence of American citizens and leaders was a major Communist victory. Morale and discipline of the American forces began a rapid decline. How did the fall of Saigon affect American relations with Vietnam? The fall of Saigon and the South Vietnamese government symbolized a defeat of America that has been extraordinarily hard to accept or understand. Decades later, individuals and groups continue to struggle with the lessons to be learned from the entire war effort. Many see opposing lessons from different perspectives. What has been the aftermath of American involvement with Vietnam? American officials and the general public continue to perceive that Vietnamese officials have not been straightforward in their admission of prisoner-of-war and missing-in-action information. That issue was a cornerstone in Kissinger's negotiation of the cease-fire in 1973. The fact that approximately three hundred thousand Vietnamese remain missing- in-action lends credibility to the claim by Vietnamese officials that all persons that can be reasonably accounted for have been. The Vietnamese stress that president Nixon promised $3.5 billion in aid. As the victors, they reasoned that they should receive war reparations similar to that provided by vanquished nations throughout history. The fact that they did not uphold their end of the agreement reached in Paris in 1973 does not seem to be of concern to the Hanoi leadership. From the earliest days of planning, the Communist organizers never considered that any condition other than a reunified Vietnam was their ultimate goal. They achieved reunification at an awesome price and remain one of the poorest countries in the World. The invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam aggravated existing displeasure for Americans and Chinese as well. This Third Indochina War was a further drain on the economies of Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. who continued to support them. By implementing a policy of doi moi or free market economy, the Hanoi regime has attempted to use Capitalism to overcome the difficulties they experienced wlth their Socialist practices. Efforts continue for the Vietnamese to achieve normalization wlth the United States as the key to developing their economy through foreign investment and tourism.13 What additional conclusions should be drawn from French and American involvement in Indochina? Recognition of the differing world-views and conflicting interests has been crucial throughout history in avoiding or winning wars. The French had developed an intimate knowledge of Vietnamese culture, behavior, and customs throughout their colonial control. Paul Mus's Sociologie d'une Guerre published in 1952 provided that kind of information, but it was never translated into English. Nor was there any substantial language or cultural research in America during the early years of the Second Indochina War. The ideas that the Vietnamese had of America were likewise inadequate and inappropriate to provide for meaningful relationships.14 Ho Chi Minh was one of the few individuals of influence in the north or the south who probably understood both the French and the Americans having lived in both countries. Conventional warfare tactics cannot be applied suocessfully against a resourceful enemy that refuses to be found, fixed, and destroyed. Throughout the first and second Indochina Wars both France and the United States continuously employed methods that attempted to find, fix, and destroy their adversaries. Both failed. The supposed battlefield victories against the main force units of the NLF and PAVN were more cases of controlled withdrawal by the Communists when it suited their purposes. The fact that they lost so many lives in the process does not, in itseif, warrant a determination of victory over them. Their concept of attrition was based on protracting the time of combat to achieve ultimate success. Analysis of the factors that lead to victory and failure in Indochina continues to provide a source for developing current and future strategy. The lessons to be learned become more imperative as insurgency becomes a predominant mode of warfare around the globe.15 Notes 1. References that provide comprehensive coverage of the entire Vietnam experience include: Doyle & Lipsom, The Vietnam Experience: Setting the Stage. (Boston Publishing: Boston, 1981); Kamow, Stanley, VIETNAM: A History. (Penguin Books: New York, 1984); and Jamison, Neil L., Understanding Vietnam. (University of California Press: Berkley, 1993). 2. Discussion of the most significant military leader and planner of Communist Vietnam and the forces he directed is found in several works but thorough coverage is provided in Macdonald, Peter, GIAP: The Victor in Vietnam. (W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 1993); Pike, Douglas, PAVN: People's Army of VietNam. (Da Capo Press: New York, 1986); Doyle, Lipsom, & Maitland, The Vietnam Experience: The North, (Boston Publishing: Boston, 1986); and Lanning, Michael Lee and Cragg, Dan, Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnam's Armed Forces. (Ivy Books: New York, 1992). 3. Material on the French involvement is included briefly in many sources but extensively in Gardner, Lloyd C., Approaching Vietnam - From World War II through Dienbienphu. (W.W. Norton: New York, 1988); Young, Marilyn B., The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990,(Harper Perennial: New York, 1991); Morelock, Colonel J.D., "The First Indo-China War, 1946-1954, The Battle of Dien Bien Phu," in The Army Times Book Of Great Land Battles. (Barkley Books: New York, 1994); and Fall, Bernard B., Street Without Joy (Stackpole Books: Mechanicsburg, 1994). 4. Fall, Bernard B., The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. (Da Capo Press: New York, 1966), pg.301. 5. Coverage of the American involvement in Vietnam is extensive and portrayed in the following: Kolko, Gabriel, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Experience. (The New Press: New York, 1994); Morrison, Wilber H., The Elephant & the Tiger: The Full Story of the Vietnam War. (Hippocrene Books: New York, 1990); Davidson, Phillip B., Vietnam At War: The History 1946-1975. (Oxford University Press: New York, 1988); Sheehan, Neil, A Bright Shining Lie-John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. (Vintage Books: New York, 1988); Palmer, General Bruce, Jr., The 25 Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. (Da Capo Press: New York, 1984); Esper, George, The Eyewitness History of the Vietnam War 1961-1975. (Ballantine Books: New York, 1983). Development of American policy leading to involvement in Indochina is presented in: Weigley, Russell F., "American Strategy from its Beginnings through the First World War", in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1986) pp.408-443; and Keenan, George F., American Diplomacy 1900 - 1950. (The New American Library: New York, 1952). 6. Problems with the M-16 deployment are detailed in: Spector, Richard H., AFTER TET. The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam. (Vintage Books: New York, 1993), pp.52-54; and Hallohan, William H., MISFIRE: The History of How America's Small Arms Have Failed Our Military. (Charles Schribner's Sons: New York, 1994), pp.508-521. 7. In addition to the comprehensive references on American involvement, several works focus on the impact of the massive American buildup of forces within Vietnam and particularly the effects on by people on other people including: Hess, Martha, Then The Americans Came: Voices From Vietnam. (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick. 1993); Doyle & Weiss, The Vietnam Experience: A Collision of Cultures. (Boston Publishing: Boston, 1984); Appy, Christian G., Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam. (The University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1993); Wintle, Justin, Romancing Vietnam - inside the Boat Country. (Pantheon Books: New York, 1991); and Mangold, Tom and Penycate, John, The Tunneis of Cu Chi. (Berkley Books: New York, 1986). 8. The major turning point of the Second Indochina War is reviewed in detail in most references but special coverage is presented in: VIETNAM. TET SPECIAL ISSUE!, (February 1993). Herring, George C. ed The Pentagon Papers. Abridged Edition, (McGraw-Hill: New York, 1993) provides an encapsulated version of the decision-making that led up to the 1968 TET Offensive drastic change in attitudes and perceptions of president Johnson and his senior advisors. 9. Sharp, Admiral U.S.G., Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Perspective. (Presidio Press: Novato, 1978). 10. Gruner, Elliott, Prisoners of Culture: Representing the Vietnam POW. (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, 1993); and Franklin, H. Bruce, M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America. (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, 1993). 11. Harries, Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing The Sword: The Demilitarisation of Japan, (Hamish Hamilton: London, 1987), pg.10. 12. Chanda, Nayan, Brother Enemy: The War After The War: A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon. (Collier Books: New York, 1986). 13. Graetz, Rick, VIETNAM: Opening Doors To The World. (American Geographic Publishing: Helena, 1988); Sheehan, Neil, After the War Was Over: Hanoi and Saigon. (Random House: New York, 1991); Downes, Frederick, No Longer Enemies, Not Yet Friends. (Pocket Books: New York, 1991); Yogerst, Joseph R., Land of Nine Dragons: Vietnam Today, (Abbeville Press: New York, 1992). 14. Diem, Bui, "Reflections on the Vietnam War: The Views of a Vietnamese on Vietnamese-American Misconceptions," in Head, William and Grinter, Lawrence E., eds., Looking Back on the Vietnam War: A 1990s Perspective on the Decisions, Combat and Legacies (Praeger: Westport, 1993), pp.241-248. 15. Levy, David W:, The Debate Over Vietnam. (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1991); Dunnigan, James F. and Macedonia, Raymond M., Getting It Right: American Military Reforms After Viyetnam to the Gulf War and Beyond (William Morrow: New York, 1993).
