Soviet Amphibious Operations In The Black Sea, 1941-1943 SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy CSC 1995 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Soviet Amphibious Operations in the Black Sea, 1941- 1943 Author: Charles B. Atwater, Jr. Thesis: The Soviet experience in amphibious warfare in World War II contributed to the development of Soviet operational art in combined arms operations. Background: Four operations in the Black Sea, two in the early months of the war and two after the Soviets had gained the initiative against the Germans, are examined to illustrate Soviet amphibious warfare experience. As Soviet prewar writings show, some concepts of amphibious warfare were developed, but a lack of landing craft made successful landings difficult to achieve in the operations examined. A strong trait of adaptability and improvisation highlight the Soviet experience. The writings of Soviet historians and past military leaders constitute the majority of the source material. Recommendations: None. SOVIET AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA, 1941-1943 INTRODUCTION The Soviet Armed Forces conducted numerous amphibious assaults in each of their four fleets during their Great Patriotic War and demonstrated a capability for landings that the German defenders had not anticipated. While a majority of the assaults were small raids of a tactical nature, several were large enough to be considered at the operational level. One purpose of this paper is to examine the performance of the Soviet Navy, the Red Army, and the marine units that made the landings in the Black Sea. Four operations will be used as examples, the landings at Odessa and at Kerch and Feodosia in 1941, and the landings at Novorossiisk and at Kerch and Eltigen in 1943. Three of these were among the largest amphibious operations the Soviets launched throughout the war, so these landings are of particular interest for a study of the Soviet military art of amphibious warfare, a topic often neglected in the west. One of the landings, the Kerch-Eltigen operation, conducted at the end of 1943 when the Soviet forces had gained the initiative after the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, will be examined in detail. The second purpose of this paper is to illustrate how the Soviets developed amphibious warfare into another element of their operational art. A striking, though hardly surprising, feature of the operations in the Black Sea is that an army general always was in overall command of the landings. The role of the Soviet Navy was relegated to support the maritime flank of the Red Army, to open up or secure a different avenue of approach so that the ground forces could attack, defend, reinforce, or withdraw. Soviet historians and former military leaders, whose works are the primary sources for this paper, generally concede that although their amphibious landings were successful, there were significant shortcomings, especially in the lack of landing craft. A few non-Soviet writers have objectively given credit to the sailors who launched the landings and to the marines and soldiers who assaulted the beaches for their genuine accomplishments under harsh conditions. THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRIMEA The ability to gain access to and maintain control of major sources of crude oil was a paramount feature of Hitler's war plans. The Crimea became a pivotal point in those plans, especially to protect the oil for the Wehrmacht. Russian bombers, staging from the Crimea, would be capable of duplicating their one-time strike in early July 1941 on the Romanian oil fields at Ploesti. On the Eastern end of the Black Sea, the capture of the Russian oil in the Caucasus near Grozny and Baku would become, in Hitler's view, a major strategic prize. Without sufficient naval power in the Black Sea, the Wehrmacht was forced to depend on the ground and air forces of Army Group South to sieze those fields. From Stalin's perspective, Admiral Gorshkov described the military-political significance of the Crimea as "... relating to the possible entry of Turkey (who was then biding her time) on the side of Hitler Germany. Seizing and holding the Crimea as early as possible in the war thus would assist Germany in gaining this strategic objective. The headquarters of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol had to be taken first, to neutralize the Soviet naval dominance. Afterwards, the German army would secure the Black Sea ports to the east, especially Kerch, Novorossiisk, and Tuapse, on its seaward march to the Caucasus, adding to the pressure by another offensive farther north, past Rostov-na-Donu. Kerch and Novorossiisk were easily taken in 1942; Sevastopol would become another matter. In the grandiose pre-war plans of Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg, the Ninister of Eastern Occupied Territory, once 1 S.G. Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea, translated by T.A. Neely (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1974), p. 91. the Crimea became firmly established under German control, it would become administratively merged with the Ukraine. The Crimea would be renamed either Taurida, the ancient Greek name for the area, or Gutenland, because it was claimed that the Goths had settled the Crimea in the 16th Century.2 SOVIET PRE-WAR CONCEPTS AND GENERAL APPLICATIONS The official U.S. definition of an amphibious operation is "... an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked on ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore."3 A recent authoritative Soviet definition is "An amphibious operation is an action coordinated and connected by a unified concept and plan for landing the amphibious forces on a hostile shore and for fulfilling their combat mission there."4 This definition, by excluding the phrase "an attack from the sea," implictly includes riverine operations and therefore differs from U.S. terminology. The riverine operations along the Danube in 1944 and 1945 are considered by the Soviets as amphibious. The concepts of Admiral Ivan Isakov, written in 1931 2 Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941-1945 (Boulder: Westview, 1981), pp. 253-254. 3 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office), 1 December 1989, p. 27. 4 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (Moscow: Military Publishing House), 1983, p. 458. when he was in the Operations Directorate of the Workers and Peasants Red Army, served as pre-war theories for conducting amphibious operations. The Bolsheviks had conducted several amphibious landings in the Civil War against the Whites during the Civil War, and Isakov drew upon those experiences as well as others during World War I. Isakov was the chief of the Soviet Navy Main Staff during World War II and was responsible for forming and coordinating all naval operations plans, including amphibious operations. Admiral Isakov's 1931 writings, while offering no definition of amphibious operations, specified and briefly expounded upon their types, scale, stages, and complexity.5 He listed three types: a strategic landing, a tactical landing, and a raiding party. A strategic landing, usually connected with political goals, involves the main front of the campaign or would open up a new front, and would be an independent operation. It would last from three weeks up to several months, conducted by a division at the very least, but more probably by a corps or higher. A major requirement of a strategic landing would be the secure lines of communication with the home country for sustainment of the operation. Isakov cited the Gallipoli operation in World 5 I.S. Isakov, Collected Works: Oceanography, Geography, and Military History, edited by N.D. Sergeev (Moscow: Military Publishing House), 1984, pp. 178-183. His article "Landing Operation" included in this collection was originally published in 1931 in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. War I as a prime example.6 A tactical landing has limited missions such as enveloping the flank of the enemy, but it is characterized as influencing the outcome of the battle on the theater's coastal sector. It is a supporting operation, usually lasting no more than a week, conducted usually by a battalion but possibly by a division. A raiding party is a small scale operation, a demonstration designed for very limited tasks such as creating panic in the enemy's rear or destroying a coastal artillery emplacement. The time of a raiding party is measured in hours and the inserted forces, often provided by a ship's company, require extraction.7 The stages of an amphibious operation, as delineated by Isakov, generally follow those of the PERMA sequence (Planning, Embarkation, Rehearsal, Movement, Assault) with two exceptions. Rehearsals are not a separate stage. The final stage involves fulfilling the mission ashore. The first stage, called preparation instead of planning, involves development of the plan, collecting intelligence on the enemy and the landing sites, and rehearsals for troops, naval and air forces and all equipment. The embarkation phase is next, followed by movement, and then to the assault onto the shore with naval gunfire and aviation support and consolidation of the landing ashore. The final phase is the 6 Ibid., p. 178. 7 Ibid., p. 179. development of activities to achieve the assigned missions ashore by the ground forces. Tasks for the navy in this last stage deal primarily for continued naval support, such as creating bases and keeping open the sea lines of communication. Isakov also emphasized planning for an evacuation in case the operation fails.8 Isakov briefly listed certain characteristics of an amphibious assault that make it the most difficult and complex form of military operations. These characteristics include the need for a unified plan for a combined arms force, the dependence upon a set of multiple external conditions on the land, on shore and at sea, and in the air, the weather, and even astronomical indicators such as the phases of the moon. The success of an amphibious operation hinges on the proper selection of landing sites, the timing of the landing, thorough preparation of all forces, and the need for secrecy in the preparation and execution of the landing. Finally, Isakov made only an oblique reference to the requirement for air superiority, not developing the idea at all.9 Isakov compiled this listing apparently for consideration by Soviet planners, more as a starting point for further development of a manual with more detailed procedures. Isakov cited command and control as one of the most 8 Ibid., p. 180. 9.Ibid., p. 179. critical elements in an amphibious operation. For a strategic operation, the overall control of the entire operation is entrusted to the ground forces commander. He has two subordinates who are the "direct executors" of the operation, the commander of the landing forces and the commander of the naval forces.10 He did not indicate what the command relationships would be for landings at a scale lower than strategic. Because the Soviets did not conduct a strategic-sized landing, it is unclear how well this key doctrinal concept was understood at the start of the war. Along with Isakov's ideas, the Naval Provisionary Regulations of 1937 provided a theoretical basis for Soviet amphibious warfare. An operational-sized assault was added to the types Isakov specified; its objective would be to deal a stronger strike than a tactical one or to create a new direction for entering the enemy's territory. For seizing a beachhead, the Regulations recommended that the units conducting the spearhead seize an area with a depth of 300-600 meters from the shore to keep enemy machinegun fire away from the follow-on forces. Soon after, the beachhead should be expanded to a depth large enough to prevent the enemy from bringing in observed artillery fire. The Regulations apparently did not refine information on command relationships between the naval and ground forces 10 Ibid., p. 182. commanders.11 Only in the Baltic Fleet had a unit formed by June 1941 which was intended especially for amphibious warfare, the 1st Special Marine Brigade organized in Leningrad in 1940. The deployment of this unit was not included in the mobilization plans drawn up in early 1941.12 Soon after the Germans kicked off Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet High Command recognized that similar units should be formed in all the fleets. Sailors were hastily enlisted from all types of ships and joined those recently released from hospitals and schools. Naval officers who had attended combined arms academies assumed many of the key command and staff billets. Two types of formations were created, each gaining a unit title which stemmed from its mission. A Marine Brigade, Regiment, or often a Battalion, would be assigned as its primary mission the spearhead in an amphibious assault. A Naval Rifle Brigade, of which 25 were eventually formed, were primarily intended for combat on the ground. Some of these units were employed in landings. Most of them came from Siberia and the Far East and initially fought in the defense of Moscow. 11 P. Yakhimov and V. Petrov, "Combat Use of Marines in Landings,' Journal of Military History, No 11 (November) 1974, pp. 27-28. 12 V. Bagrov, "Marine and Naval Rifle Units in the Summer- Fall Campaigns of 1941," Journal of Military History, No. 7 (July), 1973, p. 97. Tactical and demonstration landings comprised the bulk of the over 100 landings done throughout the war by all the fleets. While Soviet accounts differ as to the number, there were at least three or four landings at the level of war.13 Three of these operational-sized landings were made by the Black Sea Fleet with the Azov Flotilla, two of which were the largest of all done by the Soviets, the Kerch- Feodosia and Kerch-Eltigen operations. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, a previous Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy and a participant in many of the amphibious operations in the Black Sea, noted that a majority of the landings had to be planned in an extremely short period of time, mostly less than two days, some in a matter of hours.14 He does not differentiate among the type or scale of operations. For the operational-sized assaults conducted by the Black Sea Fleet, there was a minimum of nearly three weeks for planning and staging rehearsals, still not a long period of time. Because of the short stretches of sea that had to be traversed and especially because of the lack of landing craft, the Black Sea Fleet embarked and landed troops in one 13 V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Art in the Great Patriotic War (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1973), p. 113. This work specifically notes only three, but the description of the Novorossiisk operation, excluded in this tally, suggests it too was operational-sized. 14 S.G. Gorshkov, "The Development of Naval Art," Journal of Military History, No. 7 (July), 1982, p. 14. or more echelons in improvised craft, of widely varying sizes and seldom of the same type for any operation. The craft would return to the embarkation area, often with wounded, load up again, and return to the beachhead. This ferrying of troops compounded logistical tasks, which are seldom easy during the assault phase, even across short stretches of water. Combat loading, the planned storage of equipment and supplies at the embarkation points for rapid and sequential unloading at the beachhead throughout the operation, could be done only with the greatest of difficulty. In the Odessa landing, the assault forces embarked on one ship and then at sea transferred to smaller landing craft to make the assault. At the Kerch-Feodosia operation, there was a combination of ship-to-shore and shore-to shore movement, but all conducted a relatively short distance from the landing sites. At Novorossiisk and Kerch-Eltigen, the landings were shore-to-shore, a more expedient process because of the shorter sea passage. To gain surprise, it was recognized that movement should begin during darkness, with the assault also made during darkness or at dawn. Mistakes early in the war in the designation of the overall commander and the unclear delineation of the responsibilities of his subordinate commanders had to be corrected. By the end of 1943, this problem was solved so that the Kerch-Eltigen operation was launched with reasonable success. The senior overall commander was an army general. This assignment made sense because of the short passage across the Kerch Straits from the neighboring ports in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov that served as the points of embarkation. Much of the planning effort revolved around the combat ashore, and the embarkation onto the landing craft originated from shore, not from naval vessels. By the end of 1943, with the experience of previous landings, the planners for the operations refined earlier areas of weaknesses in procedures for aviation support, communications and logistics, and especially in coastal artilley and rocket fire support. They were forced to realize the absolute necessity for local air superiority. However, the Soviets never solved the problem of a serious lack of suitable landing craft. This caused immense difficulties, such as limiting the selection of landing sites. Operations in all the fleets, except for the brief operations in the Pacific in 1945, suffered as a consequence. Most Soviet accounts acknowledge this shortage. It is explained that the shortage was overcome with the expedient use of any craft available, including commandeered fishing boats, sailboats, rowboats, and even canoes. The resulting loss of life of many marines, soldiers, and sailors is usually omitted in the explanation. ODESSA The first sizable amphibious assault in the Black Sea occurred on 22 September 1941, in an attempt to relieve a sector of the Odessa Defense Area that two Romanian divisions had sealed off from the land approaches. Prior to the German invasion, Soviet commanders in charge of the defense of Odessa stressed repulsing an enemy attack from the seal the possibility of attacks from the land or the rear were basically ignored.15 The purpose of the assault was to land forces to eliminate artillery positions threatening Odessa. A tactical landing in the early morning hours of darkness inserted 1920 men of the newly organized 3d Marine Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet onto the shores near the town of Grigorevka, 25 kilometers east of Odessa. On 21 September the regiment embarked on two cruisers at Sevastopol and disembarked shortly after 0100 onto 19 motor craft and 10 barges used as landing craft. and were all ashore in three and a half hours.16 A nine minute naval gunfire barrage preceded the assault, which came ashore in two waves. The first wave consisted of two of the regiment's three battalions, one of which was led by a junior lieutenant, a sign the unit was hastily formed. The 15 John Erickson, The Soviet High Command (Boulder: Westview, 1984), p. 582. 16 Kh.Kh. Kamalov, The Marines in the Battle for the Motherland, (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1966), pp. 136-137. second wave brought in the third battalion. There is no evidence that the landing was opposed, so the night landing achieved surprise. A simultaneous air drop of 25 parachutists five kilometers behind the beach resulted in the destruction of a Romanian command post and created confusion in the Romanian ranks. There was little time for planning the assault, no time for rehearsal. Sergei Gorshkov, then a Rear Admiral and soon to become commander of the Azov Flotilla, was in charge of the landing forces. He assumed command on 21 September after the original commander was wounded when his ship was severely damaged by German torpedos.17 The overall command of the Odessa area had just been given to the commander of the Odessa Naval Base. Arguments among generals and admirals in Moscow over the selection of the Odessa Defensive Area commander generated confusing and conflicting telegrams and orders in the early days of the defense.18 Overlapping responsibilities in the chain of command came to Stalin's attention in August, but the issue was not resolved for several weeks. In such confusion, the Black Sea Fleet had no easy task in coordinating the landing plans with the ground forces and the Odessa Naval Base which was to provide the landing craft. 17 K.F. Fakeev, "Landing at Grigorevka," Naval Digest, No. 9 (September) 1971, pp. 56-57. 18 N.G. Kuznetsov, On the Road to Victory (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1976), pp. 101-102. The marines' mission was to land and seize an area in the enemy's rear and flank, and to destroy artillery pieces that were threatening the city and port of Odessa. No follow-on forces landed after the 3d Regiment. After a stiff battle, the marines secured a few areas behind the landing site, neutralized the Romanian artillery, and joined up with another marine unit attached to an army division defending Odessa. Air strikes by bombers hit Romanian artillery, troop positions, and airfields while naval gunfire shifted fire from the beaches to the depth of the Romanian defenses.19 The assault, though modest in proportion, had specific and attainable objectives, surprised the Romanians, and gained time for the beseiged city. It was the first successful joint army, navy, and air force attempt at a landing in the war.20 The seaward flank was the only available avenue of approach into Odessa, and the Soviet's judicious use of it during a period of nearly utter confusion demonstrated their adaptability. Three weeks later, the Soviet High Command ordered the troops to evacuate Odessa to reinforce Sevastopol, which was coming under increasing attack and was considered more important. Gorshkov's ships took the Odessa defenders there in what one 19 Fakeev, op. cit., p. 57. 20 Soviet Military Encyclopedia (Moscow: Military Publishing House), Vol. 3, 1977, p. 51. notable historian calls a small Dunkirk.21 KERCH-FEODOSIA For many days into December 1941, Krupp siege guns had been battering Sevastopol, the pivotal point in the southern area, and the only area at the time in which Hitler, after the resounding Soviet counterstrokes near the gates of Moscow, allowed offensive operations to continue. Large scale relief for the Soviet defenders would be unable to advance head-on into the port or even in its immediate vicinity; a sizable force would have to land in the rear of Erich von Manstein's 11th Army occupying the Crimea. The Soviet High Command approved an ambitious plan for an operational-sized assault not just to repulse the Germans from Sevastopol, but also to initiate actions to liberate the entire Crimea.22 The Commanding General of the North Caucasus Front was put in charge of the overall operation. The command relationships of the subordinate naval and ground forces is not noted in Soviet sources. The original plan was drawn up at the end of November, but it was not finally approved by the High Command and disseminated to the 21 John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad (New York: Macmillan, 1976), p. 21. 22 N.G. Kuznetsov, op. cit., p. 167. forces involved until 16 December.23 This procrastination gave fits to the head of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, and the Navy Main Staff, not allowing them what they considered a reasonable amount of time to prepare.24 Any landing forces should have, at a rough minimum, a manpower ratio of three-to-one over the defenders ashore. Anything less could be courting disaster. In late December 1941 the commander of the North Caucasus Front mustered a total of nearly 42,000 men to land on two areas over 100 kilometers apart defended by the Soviet estimate of 25,000 Germans and Romanians of Manstein's 11th Army.25 The operation was delayed a week to allow three cruisers to rush reinforcements from Novorossiisk to Sevastopol. The cruisers "Krasnyi Kavkaz" and "Krasnyi Krym" returned on 25 December to Novorossiisk and immediately began to load up men of the 44th Army, including a detachment of 300 marines designated as a shock group that would transfer onto two minesweepers and 12 cutters.26 Surprise had been a deciding factor in the success of the Odessa landing. Surprise was lost for the Kerch- Feodosia operation before the forces had embarked. 23 I. Eliseev, "The Kerch-Feodosia Landing Operation," Naval Digest, No. 11 (November), 1971, pp. 66-67. 24 N.G. Kuznetsov, op. cit., p. 161. 25 Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, 1977, p. 146. 26 I. Eliseev, op. cit., p. 69. According to a former chief of the Soviet Naval Academy, the volume of radio traffic emitting from the Novorossiisk communications center during the early December preparations alerted Manstein to the impending landings.27 The Germans most likely did not know in advance the exact landing sites. But the other impediments to an amphibious assault, namely choppy seas, tumbling surf, and cold, rainy weather, were waiting along the entire Crimean coast. The operation was the largest and most complex amphibious assault conducted by the Soviets in the entire war.28 The main assault by elements of a division of the 44th Army landed on the port of Feodosia, which is tucked near the extreme eastern edge of the Crimean mountain chain hugging the Black Sea coast. A combination of the lack of surprise, gale force winds, and German air superiority enabled the defenders to put up a bitter defense against the landing at Feodosia. The cruisers and auxiliary craft of the Black Sea Fleet of this main assault departed Novorossiisk at midnight of 28 December. The landings commenced at 0350 under cover of darkness. It took over seven hours to land over 5400 men in the first echelon, a dismal rate of 12 men a minute according to one Soviet 27 V. Sysoev, "Command and Control Organization by the Branches of the Fleet," Journal of Military History, No. 7 (July), 1981, p. 37. 28 N.G. Kuznetsov, op. cit., p. 164. historian.29 According to a German historian, the defenders at Feodosia were spread thinly and lacked mobile motorized reserves.30 The commander of the forces at Kerch, General Count Sponeck, disobeyed Manstein's orders to hold fast and moved his men in the bitter cold to reinforce those at Feodosia. Hitler later ordered Sponeck's execution, a verdict the historian calls "barbaric" and fulfilled in 1944.31 The secondary assault by the Soviet 51st Army onto the steep escarpments north of Kerch on the Sea of Azov succeeded. The assault waves of three battalions of the 83d Marine Brigade, nearly 5000 men, had landed on 26 December. The marines were transported by the Azov Flotilla in a shore-to-shore movement from the port of Temryuk, approximately 60 kilometers from the landing sites. This landing began at 0630 when the temperature had dropped well below freezing. Several of the narrow beaches were blocked by ice, forcing the marines to jump out of their rowboats and wade through neck deep water to the shore.32 Although hit hard by German aircraft, the follow-on forces of the 51st Army were able to expand the beachead and tied in with 29 G. Ammon, The Tempo in Amphibious Assaults," Journal of Military History, No. 3 (March), 1982, p. 25. 30 Paul Carell, Hitler Moves East (Boston: Little Brown, 1963), pp. 297-301. 31 Ibid., p. 301. 32 Kh. Kh. Kamalov, op. cit., p. 144. the beleaguered 44th Army that was struggling against Manstein's reinforcements from Sevastopol. The two armies of the North Caucasus Front, then, accomplished their initial mission, drawing away Germans from Sevastopol; by 2 January the Kerch peninsula briefly returned to Soviet control. It is important to note that the two-pronged amphibious assault was entirely successful. Subsequent actions were not so. By April Manstein launched a large counterattack against the North Caucasus Front, wiping it out and taking a large number of prisoners. At least one non-Soviet historian cites the Soviet failure to make any more than piecemeal attacks on the Crimea, leading to defeat.33 What might be overlooked in that evaluation was the Soviet ability to establish a beachhead with forces less than the "required" minimum. The future failure to provide enough forces for operations beyond the beachhead should not detract from the Soviet accomplishment for making a successful amphibious assault at the operational level. A regular feature of Stalin's centralized command and control was the practice of dispatching a representative of the Moscow High Command to the local battle area to ensure that the High Command's orders were being followed. In the early spring of 1942, Stalin sent a political henchman, the dreaded Lev Mehklis who led much of the purges against the 33 Alan Clark, Barbarossa (New York: Signet, 1966), p. 227. military in the late 1930's, to coordinate the Crimean offensive. This move proved disastrous, resulting in many Soviets being captured. Overall coordination of future operations would require major overhaul. NOVOROSSIISK Following the victory at Stalingrad in early 1943 and the retreat westward of elements of German Army Group "A" from the Caucasus, the Soviet High Command turned its attention once again to the German forces around the Black Sea. A tactical landing on the western side of the port of Novorossiisk in February 1943 was supposed to begin operations to liberate the Taman peninsula. This landing, known and celebrated as "The Little Land" and the topic of a book by Leonid Brezhnev who participated as a political officer, created a small beachhead, but follow-on reinforcements were effectively sealed off by German defenders. Even though destroyers of the Black Sea Fleet were positioned in the Novorossiisk harbor, they failed to provide gunfire support.34 A battalion of the 255th Marine Brigade remained holed up for six months on the Taman Peninsula, isolated from the reconstituted North Caucasus Front. The sequencing of the operation could be characterized 34 Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1968), p. 52. by the acronym PREMA, because the rehearsals preceded the embarkation. Preparations began two months before the operation, stressing rehearsals by all branches of service assembled for the combined arms assault. The landing forces, both marine and army, practiced night-time embarkation and landings, with special attention to loading and unloading equipment.35 On 18 August Stalin sent Admiral Kuznetsov from Moscow to the area to review personnally the plans and preparations for the operation with the commander of the Front, General- Colonel I.E. Petrov. They drove in Petrov's lend-lease Studebaker to the Front's field command post in Gelendzhik, on the coast only a short distance east of Novorossiisk. The High Command had decided that Petrov, a veteran of operations in the area, would be the overall commander. He was to have two deputies, the 18th Army Commanding General for ground forces, and the Black Sea Fleet Commander for naval forces. The landing itself would be led by the commander of the Novorossiisk Naval Base. It is unclear what arrangements were made, if any, on the transfer of command once the forces ashore could control the battle. Kuznetsov noted that the Navy Main Staff in Moscow would be following closely the naval portion of the operation. As Stalin's representative (it is noteworthy that only a naval representative was dispatched to ensure that the operation 35 I. Eliseev, op. cit., p. 55. followed the High Command's directives), Kuznetsov helped refine the plans, arguing successfully with Petrov on at least one naval matter, the proper embarkation points for the landings.36 After a two day delay because of strong winds, the attack on the Taman Peninsula finally began in the early morning hours of 10 September. The attacks came from the north and west on the ground, and from the south from the sea. It was a three-pronged assault by elements of four combined arms armies, supported by the 4th Air Army and the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet. The most important phase of the offensive was the joint ground and amphibious assault on Novorossiisk. In all, Soviet forces had only a 1.5 numerical superiority over the defending German and Romanian forces.37 The main strike was to be directed on Novorossiisk by the 18th Army. For the amphibious assault, 140 ships were divided into two echelons carrying 6500 men, 4000 in the first echelon. The initial waves consisted of 3000 men of the 255th Marine Brigade, an experienced unit that had the mission of securing the western side of the port, near where their fellow marines were still holding out on the "Little Land." Other waves, which had to maneuver past piers that considerably narrowed the width of the entrance to the port, 36 N.G. Kuznetsov, op. cit., p. 302. 37 Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 5, 1978, p. 621. also had marines as leading elements. Follow-on forces came from two regiments of the 18th Army.38 An important feature of this landing was the coordinated fire support it received, a vast improvement over previous landings. The 18th Army artillery commander controlled 225 rocket launchers and 390 mortars of his army as well as the 44 coastal artillery pieces of the Black Sea Fleet, which somehow were moved into position for the assault. The rocket and artillery fire pounded the German defensive positions for 15 minutes as the assault craft sailed into the harbor. The wave commanders signaled cease- fire either by radio or by flare as they neared the landing sites. The 4th Air Army detached 60 aircraft and the Black Sea Fleet provided 88 aircraft. Both air and artillery support continued throughout the battle ashore, so the Soviets learned their previous lessons well, recognizing the need to ensure air superiority. Another feature of the landing was the use of hydrographic-geodesic teams that landed early on to set up fire control points on the piers for accurate positioning and more precise targetting data.39 By 16 September, the port was secure after heavy fighting. The Germans and Romanians quickly broke through 38 Kh. Kh. Kamalov, op. cit., p. 156. 39 M. Karyagin, "On the Black Sea," Naval Digest, No. 11, 1974, p. 56. in retreat to the west and managed to escape virtually unscathed across the Kerch Straits and to dig defensive positions on the commanding heights of the port of Kerch. Allowing these forces to escape proved to be a costly oversight for the North Caucasus Front. In less than two months another bloody battle would ensue. KERCH-ELTIGEN The landing at Odessa in 1941 was attempted as a time- gaining measure to relieve the burdened forces, enabling them to evacuate to Sevastopol. The ambitious assault on Kerch and Feodosia two months later was essentially a desperate rear-guard action, imaginative in concept and conducted with skill in the face of terrible weather conditions, a lack of experience, and unsuitable landing craft. At Novorossiisk in 1943, with the initiative on the Red Army's side, the amphibious assault was only a part of the overall plan, albeit a significant part, executed by applying lessons learned from previous mistakes. The next operational-sized assault, launched on 31 October 1943, once again across the Kerch Straits, would test the Soviet's adaptive skills to the fullest. Two beachheads on heavily defended areas would have to be established and then expanded to allow a rapid build-up of forces being ferried from across the straits. Rain and cold again were to impede the assault. And this time the meagre forces of the German 3d Minesweeping Flotilla became an unexpected and dangerous foe to the Soviet Naval forces, still equipped with makeshift landing craft. According to Admiral Doenitz, the Germans evacuated over 200,000 men across the Kerch Straits in September 1943 in the wake of the Soviet offensive on the Taman Peninsula.40 The 3d Minesweeping Flotilla assisted in this task with minimum opposition from Soviet air and naval assets, whose primary concern centered on mopping-up actions in the immediate vicinity of Novorossiisk. The story of the 3d Flotilla can rate only brief mention here. Its assorted craft, mainly minesweepers and a few barges, had moved in 1942 from the Baltic across the autobahn on giant 64-wheel carriers, down the Danube and into the Black Sea.41 The forces the Flotilla carried across the Kerch Straits throughout September were needed to defend the Crimea that Hitler still deemed strategically essential as the hub of all activity in the south, especially since the consequences of the defeat in August at Kursk had become apparent. The prize of the Caucasus oil was never realized; the defense of the Ploesti oil still depended on denying the Crimean airfields to the Soviets. The Germans, on the retreat, had ground, air, and naval 40 Karl Doenitz, Memoirs, Ten Years and Twenty Days, translated by R.H. Stevens (Cleveland: World, 1959), p. 389. 41 C.D. Bekker, Swaztika at Sea (London: William Kimber, 1954), p. 116. assets to frustrate any amphibious assault onto the Crimea. Chief among the naval assets were the fast-landing barges especially fashioned for navigating shallow waters and armed with rocket launchers and machine guns. The 3d Flotilla had laid over 2000 mines in the approaches and throughout the straits. In the air, the Germans would be unable to counter the Red Army's air superiority. The ground forces that remained to defend against the inevitable assault across the Kerch Straits consisted of one German infantry division and one division each of Romanian cavalry and mountain troops, in all about 85,00 defenders, per Soviet accounts. Mortar and artillery totalling 56 pieces along with 23 anti-air artillery guns were emplaced along the 40 kilometer stretch of coast at the most likely landing sites.42 The most heavily fortified area was around the port of Kerch where the straits are narrowest, only five kilometers across. These forces had adequate time to string barbed wire and to dig ditches to impede any landing attempt. The Soviets mustered four rifle divisions, one from the 18th Army and three from the 56th Army, to assault the German positions at two areas twenty kilometers apart. Each assault was spearheaded by a battalion of experienced marines. The ships of the Azov Flotilla under Admiral Gorshkov were to land the main assault in and around the port of Kerch. The Black Sea Fleet was to land the 42 Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, p. 147. secondary assault onto the beaches of Eltigen, the area closer to the Black Sea and across the wider portion of the mine-infested straits. Admiral Kuznetsov complained that a change of plans by the High Command forced the Navy Main Staff to coordinate the details of the operation in a hurried fashion. The High Command, or most likely Stalin himself, had the opportunity by mid-September to decide on the Kerch Straits as the primary area of action for initiating the liberation of the Crimea. Not until 12 October did the North Caucasus Front, to which to 18th and 56th armies were subordinate, receive the directive to conduct the amphibious assault.43 That left less than three weeks to prepare for the operation. As in the Novorossiisk operation, Stalin sent Kuznetsov from Moscow to the Taman area to supervise the naval preparations and rehearsals and to confer with Marshal Timoshenko, the High Command's representative there for ground forces. Two concerns stood out for Kuznetsov. The probability of worsening weather increased as winter approached, and the waters of the straits could ice up even in early November, evoking memories of the Kerch-Feodosia landing nearly two years before. The lack of landing craft might hinder the success of the passage across the straits and coupled with the extensive German mine-laying threat, 43 N.G. Kuznetsov, "The Kerch-Eltigen Landing Operation," Journal of Military History, No. 8 (August), 1974, pp. 73-74. the assault echelons might have difficulty in getting to the beach, let alone securing a beachhead. Kuznetsov heard the familiar reports of the shortage of landing craft and tanks when he met with all the principal commanders. General-Colonel Petrov, still the commanding general of the North Caucasus Front which was then headquartered just to the north of Novorossiisk, was in charge of the operation. Petrov's deputy for naval units was Vice Admiral Vladimirskii, commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Rear Admiral Gorshkov was in charge of bringing in the landing forces of the main assault, the 56th Army. The commander of the Novorossiisk Naval Base, Rear Admiral Kholostyakov, was in charge of bringing in the landing forces of the 18th Army, the secondary assault.44 In this arrangement, there was no exact equivalent to the U.S. title of Commander, Landing Forces. General Petrov commanded all forces, ground and naval, throughout the operation. The assignment of Admiral Vladimirskii as deputy for naval units roughly corresponded to the U.S. title of Commander, Amphibious Task Force. This chain of command fit Soviet procedures perfectly, demonstrating the primacy of the ground forces, through General Petrov's overall command, and the supporting role of the navy for the maritime flanks of the Red Army. Besides, 44 N.G. Kuznetsov, "The Kerch-Eltigen Landing Operation", p. 75. Stalin's demanding eye retained strict and centralized control over the strategic direction of the entire area. Admiral Kuznetsov's presence as the High Command's naval representative, at least during the preparations, ensured obedience to that control. Marshal Timoshenko stayed in the area throughout the assault phase of the operation.45 During the three weeks of preparation, the ports and airfields on the Taman Peninsula were readied with munitions and other logistical requirements. The army commanders moved more than 600 artillery guns and rocket launchers into position, some onto the Chushka Spit in the Kerch Straits only five kilometers from the port of Kerch.46 Naval units conducted reconnaissance by fire to flush out enemy artillery and machine gun positions just prior to the assault, scheduled for 28 October. The best detailed account of the Kerch-Eltigen operation is contained in the memoirs of General V.F. Gladkov, then a colonel who had assumed command of the 318th Rifle Division less than two weeks before the start of the operation and was assigned to lead the ground forces of the secondary assault at Eltigen. Many of his men were recruits, others had seen little combat, but one of his three regiments had participated in the amphibious assault 45 N.G. Kuznetsov, "The Kerch-Eltigen Landing Operation," p. 73. 46 Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, p. 146. on Novorossiisk the month before. Gladkov used that regiment along with marines assigned to him to instruct the newcomers. They constructed mock-ups of the Eltigen beaches and conducted several day and night wet-run rehearsals.47 Gladkov notes in his memoirs that the Germans were aware of his unit's activity; the only elements of surprise in his favor were the areas and timing af the assault.48 Admiral Kuznetsov, however, admitted that only a few beaches were suitable for landing, no others could be chosen, so surprise was negated.49 D-Day was postponed to 31 October because of foul weather. Embarkation from at least five locations on the Taman Peninsula began at 1800 on 119 cutters, 159 auxiliary craft, and assorted other boats, including rafts, sailboats, and rowboats.50 Logistics officers had their hands full in loading these non-standard craft to ensure timely delivery of ammunition, food, and medical supplies. Combat loading as defined in U.S. doctrine was non-existent. Before the troops embarked, Leonid Brezhnev instilled the fear of Lenin and Stalin in their hearts. Colonel Gladkov formed three operations groups for 47 V.F. Gladkov, The Landing on Eltigen (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1972), p. 13. 48 Ibid., p. 14. 49 N.G. Kuznetsov, "The Kerch-Eltigen Landing Operation," p. 75. 50 Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, p. 148. command and control of his division. His chief of staff loaded up with the lead regiment that, along with 575 men of the 386th Independent Marine Battalion, constituted the assault echelon of over 3000 men. Gladkov and his deputy commander would accompany each of the other two regiments which comprised the two follow-on echelons.51 Events during the movement phase and the assault precluded this judicious separation of the division's command element. All the flat bottomed boats that could be scraped up, many just commandeered from nearby fishing villages, were fitted with 45mm machine guns for the assault echelon. Under cover of darkness this motley armada of the Black Sea Fleet set out from port. The shortage of landing craft is shown by their putting aboard 60 men on motorboats that had a normal capacity for only 45. The choppy seas and freezing temperatures delayed the departure of some of the boats and required leaving behind small caliber artillery pieces. No tanks could fit aboard the already small craft, the last of which finally departed at 0300 on 1 November. Boats bumped into each other and many became disoriented. As the first boats approached the landing sites at around 0500, a few German search lights scanned the straits. Many of the boats carrying the marines and a few companies of the 318th Division landed on the wrong sector, but they initially faced only minor opposition at Eltigen. When the marines 51 V.F. Gladkov, op. cit., p. 19. charged the beach, several German defenders were caught literally with their pants down.52 The passage at sea for the following waves became a disaster. One kilometer off shore the boat carrying Colonel Gladkov foundered in the rough seas and had to be towed back to Taman. Many craft were hit by mines that had loosened from their anchors in the shallow waters. The original integrity of formation from which they departed soon disappeared in the frothy waters. No regimental commander landed with his troops; only a regimental chief of staff got ashore to lead the less than 1000 men who initially landed. Later that morning Colonel Gladkov urgently requested that he and the rest of his staff board one boat and risk the trip together. General-Colonel Petrov was reluctant to approve, so Marshal Timoshenko intervened and granted permission.53 During daylight and in weather just as treacherous, Gladkov and his deputy commander, chief of staff, chief political officer, a regimental commander, and chief of engineer troops crossed the straits, narrowly avoiding mines and strafing by German Junkers. The boat grounded on shoals, forcing the officers to wade the rest of the way through the frigid water onto the beaches the marines had secured earlier. To the north, the situation for the main assault was 52 Ibid., p. 45. 53 Ibid., p. 32. even worse. Admiral Gorshkov had to turn all the assault craft back. They were unable to launch again until 2 November when the weather slackened somewhat. Setting smokepots off in the straits as a screen for the assault forces of the 56th Army's 2d Guards Division, spearheaded by the 369th Independent Marine Battalion, the Azov Flotilla navigated the narrow straits and successfully landed onto the port of Kerch as well as onto the beaches on the northern side of the Peninsula. Enough of the German 98th Infantry Division had been drawn away to reinforce the defenders at Eltigen, allowing the 369th Battalion to form several beachheads for the areas of the main assault. Three days later the reinforcements arrived.54 Meanwhile, the Soviet forces at Eltigen had become isolated. The German 3d Flotilla blockaded resupply boats in what has been characterized as a battle from the the days of pirates.55 Soviet and German sailors fought in the middle of the straits at pistol range and less, usually at night because daytime crossings for resupply and reinforcement were too risky. Over 1000 aircraft of the 4th Air Army and Black Sea Fleet performed extensive bombing and aerial- dropped supplies, flying over 4000 sorties.56 Flying at 54 N.K. Zakurenkov, The 32d Guards (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1970), p. 72. 55 C.D. Bekker, op. cit., p. 118. 56 Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, p. 148. night and guided by lights held by men of the 318th Division who became dangerously short of ammunition, women pilots of the famed 46th Light Bomber Regiment would mask their approach to the division by cutting off their engines and drop their supplies.57 Despite these heroics, the Eltigen contingent had dwindled so by early December that they had to abandon their positions. They broke through to the north and came to the aid of the 56th Army units which by then had formed a beachhead several kilometers deep. Eventually Gorshkov's ships ferried 75,000 men onto the beaches around Kerch. Not until April of 1944 were the Soviet forces able to develop enough punch at Kerch and Eltigen to begin the offensive westward into the Crimea. Once again, as during the Kerch-Feodosia operation, the initial objectives of the amphibious assault were accomplished. This time, the further objectives of continued strikes against the German 17th Army were also successful, even though it took time to develop an offensive capability. The operation was not without its defects in planning and mistakes in execution. However, command and control had been streamlined, fire support improved, and enough forces were employed to overcome a stubborn defense. The lessons learned from this operation 57 V.F. Gladkov, op. cit., pp. 110-111. were to be studied for many years by the Navy Main Staff.58 CONCLUSION The experience gained in the Black Sea added greatly to the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting amphibious assaults by the post-war Soviet Navy. However, as one leading student of Soviet naval affairs has noted, Nothing beyond Army flank-support theory was added to Soviet naval theory directly from Soviet experience during the Great Patriotic War. This was due to the fact that the Navy served almost exclusively as the "faithful handmaiden" of the Army ground forces.59 What did become of value was an understanding of the naval portion of combined arms operations, especially regarding amphibious warfare as a component of operational art. Clearly, the final stage of an amphibious operation being accomplishment of the mission ashore, as initially set forth by Admiral Isakov in the 1930's and as demonstrated during the war, placed the emphasis on the land battle. In the Soviet art of war, the ground forces took precedence. After Admiral Gorshkov became Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy in the mid-1950's, he set out to improve the amphibious warfare capabilities in the fleets. Landing 58 N.G. Kuznetsov, "The Kerch-Eltigen Landing Operation," p. 71. 59 Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Theory and Policy: Gorshkov's Inheritance (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 156. craft was of prime concern. The development and production of the Ivan Rogov-class landing ship and a large component of air-cushion vehicles of varying classes served to fill previous gaps in both open ocean and littoral amphibious operations for power projection and defense of the homeland. Marine units received emphasis in naval and joint forces training beginning in the 1960's. Their small size would continue the tradition of being the spearhead in tactical and operational-sized operations. Their increased capabilities were a direct result of their experience during the war. 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