The Weinberger Doctrine In The Post-Cold War Era AUTHOR Mayor Colin F. Mayo, USMC CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA National Security EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Weinberger Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era Thesis: Notwithstanding its origins as a response to security concerns in the bipolar world of the Cold War, Secretary Weinberger's set of tests remains a legitimate framework in which to deliberate the question of committing military forces to combat. Background: In 1990, as a result of revolutionary changes in the world security environment and domestic fiscal constraints, President Bush unveiled the need for a new national defense strategy. This was followed by the issuance of a post-Cold War national security strategy in August 1991 and a national military strategy in January 1992. Although the new strategies address the changed world security situation, a fundamental question remains: under what circumstances should military force be used to pursue the interests of the United States? In 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger introduced a set of tests, popularly referred to as the Weinberger Doctrine, to be used when weighing the use of U.S. combat forces. Discussion: This paper briefly describes the new national military strategy and examines the value of the Weinberger Doctrine's six tests in the strategy's context. The Weinberger Doctrine is found to be a valid framework for considering the commitment of U.S. forces to combat in the post-Cold War era. THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA OUTLINE Thesis Statement. Notwithstanding its origins as a response to security concerns in the bipolar world of the Cold War, Secretary Weinberger's set of tests remains a legitimate framework in which to deliberate the question of committing military forces to combat. I. National Military Strategy 1992 A. Post-Cold War National Security Strategy B. Realities of the National Military Strategy C. Foundations of the National Military Strategy D. Strategic Principles of the National Military Strategy II. The Weinberger Doctrine A. Background of Secretary Weinberger's tests B. Test One: Vital Interests C. Test Two: Wholehearted Commitment D. Test Three: Clear Political Objectives E. Test Four: Reassessment of Objectives and Forces F. Test Five: Support of American People and Congress G. Test Six: Military Force as a Last Resort INTRODUCTION United States defense policy is at a major crossroads in history. The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the end of a period which began with World War I. Although our major threat of over forty years has declined, the Cold War world was a more certain one. We now find ourselves in a world "in which peace and security, progress and hope, must live side by side with danger and turmoil, tyranny and war, and for the contingency no one ever predicted. "1 In this context, the United States now faces the dilemma of defining its leadership role as the world's only remaining superpower while simultaneously addressing multiple domestic issues. On August 2, 1990, ironically the same day that Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, President George Bush formally recognized the need for a new national security strategy designed to squarely confront the recent revolutionary changes in the world security environment while meeting domestic fiscal constraints. He described the revised strategy as one that . . . must provide the framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to guard our enduring interests - the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises, [and] to retain the capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed.2 With the deployment of U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf later that same month, the need to maintain responsive, capable forces was validated. Thus, the stage was set for the issuance by the President in August 1991 of a post-Cold War national security strategy and the development of its corresponding military strategy by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell.3 This newly developed military strategy, released in January 1992, recognizes the uncertainty of the post-Cold War era while acknowledging domestic fiscal realities. Nonetheless, a fundamental question remains: under what circumstances should military force be used to pursue the interests of the United States? On November 28, 1984, in a speech delivered to the National Press Club, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger presented a set of "six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad."4 Although the speech spawned a continuing debate concerning its relevance, the popularly termed "Weinberger Doctrine" was recognized by many as a valid model with which to consider the Clausewitzian relationship between war's political aims and its military means.5 Notwithstanding its origins as a response to security concerns in the bipolar world of the Cold War, Mr. Weinberger's set of tests remains a legitimate framework in which to deliberate the question of committing military forces to combat. Using our new national military strategy as a framework, this paper will show that these tests continue to be relevant. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY 1992 . . . a new world order - where diverse nations are drawn together in a common cause, to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law. Such is a world worthy of our struggle, and worthy of our children's future. President George Bush 6 Together with protecting our citizens and interests, the President's new national security strategy is aimed at supporting the creation of a new world order from within the ambiguity of the post-Cold War era, "a new world in which our fundamental values not only survive but flourish."7 The strategy ties the new era to the past by using a set of traditional values as its fundamental basis. These values are: The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure; A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad; Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations; and A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.8 By linking the post-Cold War era to the past, these fundamentals guided the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing a revised national military strategy designed to guarantee the nation's interests are served regardless of the uncertainty of the post-Soviet world. The military strategy builds on the President's fundamentals by identifying "certain realities and constants that we can use as stars to chart our course"9 into the 21st century. The first "reality" relates directly to the goal of creating and maintaining a new world order. It is the "reality" that the United States will retain its role as a world leader. Recognizing responsibilities to our allies throughout the world, this tenet provides the foundation for a regionally oriented approach to defense. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the existence of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and a huge military force in the Commonwealth of Independent States translates into a second "reality" - the requirement for continued deterrence focused at Eurasia. A third tenet, a domestic "reality," is the perceived need to refocus the nation's resources from defense to our needs at home. The acknowledgement of the uncertainty of the current security environment and all that the uncertain world suggests in terms of the nation's defense is the final "reality." Together, these factors imply that the we must maintain the forces necessary to prevent any potential enemy from thinking we are unable or unwilling to defend ourselves, our vital interests, or those of our allies, but must do so while meeting domestic fiscal constraints. Although this presents a dilemma, it is a dilemma which serves to focus our military strategy on balancing a necessary reduction In forces with the protection of the nation's interests. The new military strategy addresses this dilemma by translating the previously mentioned "realities" into a set of "foundations and strategic principles"10 with which to further define the role of military force in the uncertain world security environment. The foundations consist of: Strategic Deterrence and Defense - Maintaining a formidable, modern strategic deterrent against nuclear weapons along with the ability to protect the nation from limited strikes by ballistic missiles, whether Intentional or accidental. Forward Presence - Deploying U.S. forces throughout the world as a display of our commitment to regional stability and to provide the ability to respond to crises. Crisis Response - The ability of our forces, whether forward deployed or U.S. based, to respond to deter or fight against an adversary threatening our vital interests. Reconstitution - Preservation of the capability to form, train, and field new fighting units as well as maintaining the competitive edge over potential military competition through technology and quality of personnel. Each of these foundations is complemented by strategic principles which capitalize upon the strengths of our armed forces while exploiting the weaknesses of any nation who might not be deterred by our national resolve. These strategic principles are identified as: Readiness - The ability of our armed forces to respond quickly and be prepared to fight and win. Collective Security - The strengthening of response to crisis through multinational operations. Arms Control - Seeking to reduce military threats to security through reduction In arms, conventional as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological. Maritime and Aerospace Superiority - The ability of our armed forces to establish control of the air, sea, and land to enable employment of combat power. Strategic Agility - The rapid movement of forces to enable global employment. Power Projection - The strategic value of rapidly deployable forces. Technological Superiority - The deterrent use of the nation's qualitative technological edge over potential adversaries. Decisive Force - The ability to rapidly assemble forces capable of decisively overwhelming adversaries. Clearly, the foundations and principles are based on: (1) the role of the United States as a world leader willing to act unilaterally to preserve its interests and (2) the principle role of the armed forces - "to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe."11 The new strategy specifies that the forces required for implementation must be regionally focused and able to respond to crisis quickly. They must maintain the ability to respond across the spectrum of conflict with adaptive actions ranging from the employment of nuclear forces to the performance of day to day presence missions. These forces will regularly train overseas to maintain their agility while reinforcing our commitment to global alliances. They will participate in security assistance, protection of U.S. citizens abroad, humanitarian assistance, and combatting the trafficking of illegal drugs. Finally, the new strategy requires our forces to constantly plan and prepare for simultaneous regional conflicts capable of escalating to a global war. Equipped with its newly issued military strategy, the United States now faces the challenges of being the sole remaining superpower in the post-Soviet world. In this uncertain world, the U.S. will continue to encounter situations in which it will have to decide whether or not it must use military forces In pursuit of its interests. Secretary Weinberger's tests were developed to assist in such a decision. Using the tenets of our current national military strategy as a framework, let us now examine the continuing usefulness of the Weinberger tests. WEINBERGER'S TESTS IN THE POST COLD-WAR ERA Under what circumstances, and by what means, does a great democracy such as ours reach the painful decision that the use of military force is necessary to protect our interests or to carry out our national policy? Caspar Weinberger12 When Secretary Weinberger presented his set of considerations for use of military force, he attempted to codify the relationship between military force and the other elements of the Nation's power. Applying lessons learned from our experiences in Korea and Vietnam while satisfying the containment policy of the Cold War, the tests were predicated on the need to "make more intelligent use of our various instruments of power on behalf of our interests - to avoid the necessity of direct military conflict."13 Not intended for use as a checklist, the tenets were provided as a guide to use when addressing the Clausewitzian dilemma between "our democracy's inherent reluctance about asking our troops to die for their country"14 and the use of military force to secure our national interests and objectives. Although formulated to help resolve this issue in the bipolar world of the Cold War, Secretary Weinberger's theory remains an enduring guide today. To demonstrate this, we will now examine the tests within the framework of our post-Cold War national military strategy. Test One: The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. With its fundamental values, the President's new national security strategy clearly attempts to provide the basis for identifying the Nation's vital interests despite the uncertainty of the world security environment. Its focus on the survival of the United States, growth of its economy, strong relations with our allies, and maintenance of a stable, secure world point the way toward defining our vital interests. The "realities" upon which the national military strategy is founded also acknowledge uncertainty. However, the post-Soviet security environment's ambiguity may cloud our ability to determine how these fundamentals apply in specific situations. Even though "the spread of democracy should provide a net plus in terms of management of both regional conflicts and conflict within individual states . . . what is unclear is at what point developments raise 'vital' interests to the West."15 Domestic issues, another reality recognized by the military strategy, further confuse this situation by shifting our direction inward. In his first test, Mr. Weinberger recognized that the world security environment is often times ambiguous. He reinforced this when he stated: American interests are nowhere etched in stone. . . . Judgments about vital interests will sometimes depend on the circumstances of the specific case and trends, as well as intrinsic values. Our vital interests can only be determine by ourselves and our definition of the threat.16 Because satisfying the first condition ensures that the United States does not commit forces without vital interests being at stake, this test is even more important today in the world of uncertainty than it was in the past. The observation that "our new strategy is, in many ways, more complex than the containment strategy of the Cold War era"17 leads to the conclusion that it is the ambiguity itself which validates Secretary Weinberger's first test. Secretary Weinberger was prophetic when he said, "The most likely challenges to the peace - the gray area conflicts - are precisely the most difficult challenges to which a democracy must respond."18 By requiring vital interests to be at stake before committing forces, this test causes us to be absolutely sure that military force is critical; a condition especially necessary in a world where determination of what constitutes a vital interest may now be more difficult. The increased challenge of applying the Nation's fundamental values in a precise manner amplifies the need to be certain that vital interests are at stake before committing U.S. forces to combat abroad. Even if "threats are ill-defined, we must be capable of quickly determining that the threats and conflicts either do or do not affect the vital interests of the United states and our allies."19 Test Two: If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. Building on his first test, Secretary Weinberger firmly believed that once it was determined that vital interests were at stake and the Nation must fight, ". . . then we had to commit, as a last resort, not just token forces to provide an American presence, but enough forces to win and win overwhelmingly."20 Mr. Weinberger's belief in the principle of strategic mass was largely based upon his experiences as Secretary of Defense along with the failings of the policy of gradualism during the Vietnam War. The second test evolved from this belief and was designed to ensure that we only commit troops in a manner which will guarantee a high probability of victory at the lowest possible cost while advancing the possibility of deterring a conflict by displaying a willingness to use maximum force. The new national military strategy is also clearly founded on the principle of strategic mass. The strategy's foundations of forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution were distinctly formulated with this end in mind. In Its basic principles, the strategy stresses the use of decisive force to rapidly overwhelm an adversary. The strategy also supports the necessity to commit troops and resources wholeheartedly through its recognition of the importance of readiness, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power projection, and technological superiority. U.S. security policy during the Persian Gulf War definitively demonstrated the validity of Secretary Weinberger's second tenet in today's world.21 Not only did the deployment of a large military force result in an overwhelming victory, but it also gave added impetus to diplomatic attempts to end the crisis peacefully. Our actions in the Gulf War reinforced the currency of Secretary Weinberger's conviction that "If a war is not serious enough for us to have to win it, it is not serious enough to enter it."22 Test Three: If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. In the third test, Secretary Weinberger reaffirmed Clausewitz' axiom that no one should start a war "without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it."23 This test probably originitated from the remembrance of the 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut; an incident which occurred during Mr. Weinberger's tenure as Secretary of Defense, Although some critics discount the applicability of the third test because the determination of clear political objectives is often difficult,24 this test attempts to provide clarity of purpose to otherwise ambiguous situations. Clarity is especially important in the context of requiring our military strategy to support the maintenance of world order. Difficulties will arise when defining objectives in the international context, where differences between allies may develop as a result of differing perceptions of the existing international order. Historical examples abound in which unclear objectives have resulted in failure. Included in these is our recent experience in Lebanon which ended In a pullout of U.S. forces in 1984. Even during the Persian Gulf War, U.S. military and political objectives changed through the course of the crisis.25 These instances illustrate the danger of shifting political objectives and underscore the current relevance of Secretary Weinberger's statement that "policies formed without a clear understanding of what we hope to achieve will never work."26 The newly implemented military strategy specifically recognizes the third test's requirement to maintain and send forces necessary to accomplish the Nation's political objectives through its foundations and principles. Test Four: The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed - their size, composition and disposition - must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. The fourth test is Secretary Weinberger's affirmation of Clausewitz' belief that war, even in Its simplest form, will be chaotic and fluid, possibly causing its political objectives to be dynamic.27 This test's origins are also closely tied to the experience of the ill-fated U.S. peacekeeping mission in Lebanon where the objectives were changed but the forces required to accomplish the objectives were not. Mr. Weinberger described his fourth test in a simple manner by saying, "Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must our combat requirements."28 This advice was followed by President Bush during the Persian Gulf War. When it became clear that economic sanctions and the defensive posture of our forces in Saudi Arabia would not induce Iraq to meet the conditions of the United Nations resolutions, the Commander-in-Chief adjusted the forces accordingly. The foundations and principles of the national military strategy provide the flexibility to react to changing conditions as we did in the Gulf and are enabling in this regard. Further contemporary value of the fourth test is related to our new military strategy's recognition of the need to meet domestic fiscal constraints. This "reality" requires us to make a careful assessment of our ability to field a large military force in times of economic limitations. The President's security strategy recognizes this issue with the statement: We must balance our commitments with our means and, above all, we must wisely choose now which elements of our strength will best serve our needs in the future. This is the challenge of our strategy.29 Another facet of the fourth test gives it additional contemporary usefulness. Determination of clear objectives will often be difficult in the uncertain post-Soviet world. Since meeting this test requires close and persistent scrutiny of our objectives to detect changes, test four works in conjunction with the third test by amplifying the need for clear objectives prior to using force. The constant reassessment required to ensure that committed forces are commensurate with objectives will further clarify our goals over time, thus countering the ambiguity of the current world security environment. Test Five: Before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. Although debate ensues concerning the practicality of the fifth tenet,30 the fundamental basis of our democracy demands that it be followed. Requiring the approval of the American people before committing combat forces to war has roots that trace through Hamilton's "common defense" to Clausewitz' "remarkable trinity."31 The United States' democratic system makes this requirement as necessary today as it was when Secretary Weinberger first stated it. He recognized the necessary interaction of the "remarkable trinity" when he characterized our government as one which . . . is founded on the proposition that the informed judgement of the people will be a wiser guide than the view of the President alone, or the President and his advisors, or of any self- appointed elite.32 Our current security and military strategies also explicitly acknowledge the requirement of the will of the people before committing troops. The security strategy recognizes the shared responsibility between the President and Congress, while the military strategy's domestic reality relates directly to the trinitarian relationship. Regardless of the debate over the practicality of obtaining public consent prior to committing U.S. forces, this condition is just as necessary today in preserving our democratic system as it was when first articulated. Test Six: Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort. The final element of Secretary Weinberger's set of tests is the manifestation of his strong conviction that "military forces are but one of the multiple currencies of power" and as such we "must rely even more heavily on these other instruments of power in protecting our values and promoting our interests."33 With the note of caution sounded in this last test, Mr. Weinberger underscored the primacy of deterrence by arguing that it is through combining . . . sufficient military strength with such a clear determination to resist aggression that we discourage challenges. By preventing the attack that would make necessary an American commitment of forces in response, we achieve our objectives without war.34 Applying the sixth test ensures that the Clausewitzian precept of "not taking the first step without considering the last"35 is followed. Accomplishing President Bush's goal of creating and maintaining a new world order relates directly to Secretary Weinberger's final test and therefore confirms the latter's continued relevance. The military strategy recognizes the need to provide the global leadership necessary to fulfill the President's vision and asserts that "deterrence remains the primary and central motivating purpose."36 In its quest for ensuring a stable world, the strategy seeks to place our military capability into the correct relationship with the other elements of power. Secretary Weinberger's final tenet clearly implies that national purposes can be met using non-military means; it offers a fitting context within which to place the President's prescription for a viable military strategy employing an effective, fiscally prudent military force structure. Through this concise, concluding condition which must be met before we should commit troops to combat, Mr. Weinberger offers support for the rationale inherent in the new strategy; that military strength must be kept in consonance with the other elements of national power, and must never become the sole focus of our thinking in the uncertain post- Cold War world. CONCLUSION The world has changed in dramatic ways since the Soviet Union dissolved. The post-Cold War security environment continues to be dynamic and full of uncertainty. The President and military leadership have attempted to safeguard the security of the Nat ion through the implementation of a new national military strategy which responds to global uncertainty and critical domestic issues. Founded on the primacy of deterrence, the strategy provides . . . our national leadership with the ways and means to achieve national security objectives and facilitates United States global leadership in a rapidly changing world - an unprecedented opportunity to influence peaceful change.37 Because the relationship between effective deterrence and the necessity to commit forces to combat may at times be unclear, we need a model to assist us in applying our strategy. Through its codification of historical precedent and political practice, the Weinberger Doctrine captures our democratic values and serves as that model. Though develop- ed in the era of containment, Secretary Weinberger's set of six tests continues to serve a vital function today. It remains a valuable framework in which to apply the military strategy, assisting the Nation in ensuring that the military means of war are consistent with the political purpose. When applied as a set, the tests "require national unity of purpose"38 and provide clarity to the ambiguous era in which the Nation finds itself. Above all, Secretary Weinberger's tests continue to assist us in attaining the proper balance between military force and the other elements of our Nation's power. FOOTNOTES 1. Colin L. Powell, remarks to the British-American Parliamentary Group, London, 4 December 1990. 2. George Bush, speech in Aspen, Co., 2 August 1990, as quoted in Lewis Libby, "Remarks on Shaping U.S. Defence Strategy: Persistent Challenges and Enduring Strengths," Adelphi Papers, 257 (Winter 1990/1991): 64. 3. National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991) and National Military Strategy (Washington: The Joint Staff, The Pentagon, 1992). 4. Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), p. 453. 5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 87. For assessments of Secretary Weinberger's six tests in the context of the teachings of Clausewitz, see John F. Otis, "Clausewitz: On Weinberger," Marine Corps Gazette 72 (February 1988): 16-17 and John L. Byron, "A Response to 'Clausewitz: On Weinberger,' " Marine Corps Gazette 73 (January 1989): 17-18. 6. George Bush, "The State of the Union," address to the 102d Congress, Washington, 29 January 1991. 7. National Security Strategy, p. V. 8. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 9. Colin L. Powell, "Base Force: Living With Success," Defense 92, (January/February 1992): 15-16. 10. National Military Strategy, pp. 6-10. 11. Ibid., p. 6. 12. Weinberger, Fighting, p. 446. 13. Caspar W. Weinberger, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1987 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 82. 14. Ibid., p. 81. 15. Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," Foreign Affairs, 71 (January 1992): 28-29. 16. Weinberger, Report of the Secretary, p. 79. 17. National Military Strategy, p. 6. 18. Weinberger, Fighting, p. 447. 19. Ibid., p. 451. 20. Ibid., pp. 159-160. 21. Secretary Weinberger's tests are used by Thomas R. DuBois to analyze national security decisions made during the Persian Gulf War in "The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait," Parameters, XXI (Winter 1991-92): 24-38. 22. Weinberger, Fighting, p. 181. 23. As quoted in Weinberger, Fighting, p. 453. 24. Byron, p. 17 and Freedman, pp. 27-30. 25. DuBois, pp. 29-31. 26. Weinberger, Fighting, p. 445. 27. Otis, p. 17. 28. Weinberger, Fighting, p. 454. 29. National Security Strategy, p. 34. 30. For discussions of the impracticality of the fifth test, see Byron, p. 17 and Alan N. Sabrosky, "Applying Military Force: The Future Significance of the Weinberger Doctrine," in The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, ed. Alan N. Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1988) pp. 147-148. Dubois (pp. 32-35) describes the application of the fifth test during the Persian Gulf War but does not address the argument that Iraq's lack of response to the U.S. buildup of forces was anomalous in allowing the time necessary for the President to build public consent. 31. Weinberger, Report of the Secretary, p. 79 and Otis, p. 17. 32. Weinberger, Report of the Secretary, p. 80. 33. Ibid., p. 81. 34. Ibid. 35. Otis, p. 17. 36. National Military Strategy, p. 6. 37. Ibid., p. 26. 38. Weinberger, Fighting, p. 456. BIBLIOGRAPHY Craig, Gordon A. and George, Alexander L. Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. National Military Strategy. Washington: The Joint Staff, The Pentagon, 1992. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington: Government Printing Office, August 1991. Sabrosky, Alan N. and Sloane, Robert L., eds. The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine. Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1988. Weinberger, Caspar W. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon. New York: Warner Books, 1990. ________ . Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1987. Washington: Government Printing Office, February 1986.
