The Reunification Of Korea CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Reunification of Korea Author: Major R. W. Larsen, United States Marine Corps Thesis: A study of the potential reunification of Korea reveals political, military and economic issues of importance to the region and the world. Background: In the aftermath of German unification, there is a general expectation by defense analysts that the time for a single Korea is near at hand. It is, therefore, prudent to consider some of the troubling political, military and economic aspects of reunification. First, the internal politics of the two Koreans are irreconcilable. In the end the Northern elite will lose power and some authority from the South will rule. The issues of concern are how the power shift is to take place and the way in which the Korean people will be governed. Second, there will be no changing the geopolitics of the Peninsula. It has been a battle ground for two millennia and the national political interests of the surrounding giants are, and will remain, dissimilar. Third, the military issue of significance to the region is not so much the mobilization of the huge armies as it is the demobilization of the existing military manpower. Finally, while the economic potential of a united Korea is imposing, the question of paying for reunification is a sobering issue of world-wide relevance. In sum, the broad concern for the Korean situation is that the inevitable transition does not get out of control. The risk and unpredictability of the reunification of Korea warrants the attention of all nations associated with this part of the world. THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA OUTLINE Thesis Statement. A study of the potential reunification of Korea reveals political, military and economic issues of importance to the region and the world. I. History and Geopolitics II. Present Situation III. Political Issues A. Inside Korea 1. Concepts of Reunification 2. Leadership Accommodation B. Inter-Regional Concerns 1. Post-Revolution Russia 2. Japan 3. China 4. United States IV. Military Issues A. Aggregation of Two Koreas B. Demobilization of Forces V. Economic Issues A. Two Dissimilar Systems B. Aggregation of Two Systems C. Cost of Reunification THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA The continuing armed confrontation on the Korean Peninsula does not set well in the New World Order. The forty-year-old military stand-off along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) lingers as an awkward leftover from World War II and an uncomfortable reminder of the Cold War. As the cleft between the North and South deepens and impedes the commercial and diplomatic evolution of the region, the Korean people and the cast of nation players become more anxious for a solution. Considerable thought and speculation has taken place recently regarding the inevitability of a unified Korea, particularly in the aftermath of German reunification. Some analysts believe that the strong cultural identity of the people will soon overshadow the distrust and enmity that have characterized North-South relations since 1950. Others suggest that the economic burden of the costly military confrontation will force more amicable political policies between the two antagonists. Time, fading memories, and the expectations of the post-war generation are also expected to contribute to a Seoul-Pyongyang rapprochement. As these factors intertwine in regional politics and economics, the expectation, and perhaps the reality, of a single Korea becomes more pervasive. The Korean situation is of global interest. Regardless of the feasibility of near-term reunification, an analysis of relevant questions and problems helps to define the broader condition and is prudent in view of the plausible outcomes. A study of the potential reunification of Korea reveals political, military and economic issues of importance to the region and the world. BACKGROUND The small Korean peninsula has been of interest to its powerful neighbors for over 2,000 years. It has been the battleground of the Mongols, Chinese, Japanese, Russians, and Americans. In the first half of the last century the peninsula was dominated by the military force and political power of Japan. Since the end of World War II, the area generally north of the 38th parallel has been a communist state and the area south has developed along the Western, democratic model. The two regions have been in a condition of civil war since the invasion by the North on June 25, 1950. A truce signed in 1953 ended large scale warfare, but the two huge armies have remained in a stalemate and have kept the attention of the world powers for the past forty years. Only in the last few months has there been an inkling of progress toward political moderation. The Korean peninsula is the geopolitical hub of Northeast Asia. China and the former Soviet Union directly border the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.), and the Korean Straits separate the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) from the Japanese mainland by less than 200 miles. Diplomatic relations are characterized by a fervent, nationalistic pride and an overt absence of a common regional identity. Area economics are, however, becoming increasingly interwoven by aggressive East Asian and global corporate entities with no clear-cut national allegiances. The borders of the region are bristling with military forces and relations are fraught with suspicion and deep cultural bias. In view of the size and character of the area population, and the political, military and economic power surrounding Korea, the importance of the peninsula becomes apparent. Though the North and South remain locked in a military impasse along the 300-mile "trench line", there appears to be genuine opportunity for a political termination of the war and potential reunification. To escape the overwhelming cost of its massive armed force, North Korea has been increasingly conciliatory in its relations with South Korea, the United States, and Japan. (4: 618) In the South, a population weary of heavy-handed government and economic sacrifice is exercising a new found political voice and forcing the fledgling democracy into action. Several significant indicators of improvement in relations between the two Koreas have recently appeared. In December 1991, high level delegates agreed to the first non- aggression accord in 45 years. (2: A1) Two weeks later, in Panmunjom, a "de-nuclearization" declaration was signed banning nuclear weapons from the peninsula. (10: A1) Though experts on both sides are cautious and agree that the achievements have been largely conceptual, there is now activity where there was previously none. The international community, generally more concerned with stability (and nuclear non-proliferation) than Korean reunification, has also provided various lubricants to the deadlock. Both Koreas have been accepted as members of the United Nations. Improved trade relations between China and South Korea, the post-Soviet Russia and South Korea, and Japan and North Korea, all point to more normalized affiliations. For its part, the United States has verified the absence of nuclear weapons in South Korea, urged the South to take a larger portion of the burden for of their national defense, and has conducted "the highest-level meeting between (North Korea and the United States) since the Korean War." (15: A18) Again, substantive changes are limited, but the aggregate effect of political, military and economic policy modifications is positive in terms of regional stability and possible Korean unity. KOREAN POLITICS Since the departure of the Soviets from the North in 1950, there has been a nearly universal desire for national reunification by the people of both North and South Korea. To unify or not to unify has never been the question. The issue is government. Despite the fears over monolithic world communism," the Korean War was, after all, nationalistic and largely an attempt to unify the Peninsula by force. Today the North is interested in new options to what is becoming an increasingly untenable political position. They are committed to pursuing broad negotiations centering on arms limitation and the removal of foreign forces. Pyongyang's articulated formula for a reunified Korea is through a North-South confederation based on the principle of "one state, one nation, two systems, two governments." (6: 492) This confederation would give equal representation to both regions without regard to 43 million-to-22 million, South-to-North population disparity. Until recently, the North's political solution amounted to a confederation of the two regions with an indefinite co- existence of the two political systems. However, their position has become increasingly conciliatory. They have relaxed the notion of a clear-cut confederation allowing that full unification would come with the gradual shift of; diplomatic and defense authority to the combined national government. In his 1991 New Year's address, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung declared, "We are ready to discuss vesting the autonomous regional governments of the confederal republic with more rights on a tentative basis and then increasing the functions of the central government in the future." (4: 617) South Korea rejects the notion of co-equal influence and regards it as an opportunity for the D.P.R.K. to continue its subversive efforts by disarming the South, removing American troops from the Peninsula, and opening up the R.O.K. to North Korean influence. The South Koreans advocate a unification model based on free elections, with their numerically larger population expectantly assuring political domination. President Roh Tae Woo articulated the South's reunification policy in 1989 with his "Korean Commonwealth" plan. (4:616) The plan envisions a Joint Secretariat and a governing body of an upper and lower house. The upper house would provide equal representation of the two states while representation in the lower house would be based on population. The South is being very deliberate with the ongoing negations. President Roh recognizes that the reunification issue could become a dangerous weapon in the hands of his political opposition. He has combined a series of cautious diplomatic gestures toward the North with a somewhat heavy- handed effort to keep North-South contacts under the strict control of the government. Pyongyang has accused Seoul of dragging its feet during negotiations as a means of stabilizing the status quo that would keep defense spending high and force the North into economic collapse. While the North is making limited concessions, they are not prepared to accept the loss-of- face implicit with the South's reunification plan along the lines of the German model. Recently, Kim Yong Nam, Vice Prime Minister, was interviewed and ruled out "unification of the political systems of North and South Korea," adding, "if either side tries to dominate the other side, it will lead to conflict." (6: 492) In addition to the dissimilarity of internal political systems and unification models, leadership accommodation is an issue critical to the idea of reunification. The D.P.R.K. has been headed by Kim Il Sung since its creation in 1948. As president and leader of the Korean Worker's Party, the 79 year old Kim Il Sung is larger-than-life, revered, and respected. The "Great Leader" has replaced Marxism-Leninism with his own ideology of self-reliance, juche, and has successfully managed to keep his country intact since World War II. It would be difficult to alter the politics of North Korea without appearing to question the basic ideology of autarchic self-reliance constructed about the personality Kim Il Sung. It would be equally difficult to envision a mutually agreeable, peaceful reunification as long as he remains alive. However, while there is no power struggle in Pyongyang, there appears to be a policy struggle under way. The economic realities are increasingly at odds with juche isolationism. The elder Kim hopes to hand over political power to his son, Kim Jong Il. In recent months the junior Kim has been named supreme commander of the North Korean armed forces and has assumed direction of his country's foreign policy. Kim Jong Il does not enjoy the high regard of his people, has been characterized as irrational, and has long been associated with North Korean terrorism. Further, there are concerns about the "dynastic succession" and there are intimations that the military will likely play a more assertive political role with the death of the elder Kim. Personalities aside, the political power in the North rests in the hands of a leadership elite who have perpetuated their status based on who they know rather than merit. They will not be eager to forsake their positions and lifestyles on the behalf of pan-Korean nationalism. (13) A segment of the Northern leadership elite that bears observation is the younger, second echelon military officers. Many of these leaders were trained abroad and have seen the world outside North Korea. The grisly demise of Ceaucescu and the theory of "perestrika' have presumably not been lost on these men. A Western diplomat recently remarked, "In the not too distant future we will have a North Korean military leadership to deal with that will be a lot easier than dealing with Kim." (5: 41) In the South, the first free presidential elections were held in December 1987. Roh was elected president with 30 percent of the vote as the opposition was split three ways. President Roh's term is finished in 1992 and his efforts to alter the constitution, which prevent him from serving a second term, will probably fail as a result of the recent unexpected defeat of his party in national elections. Roh shares his political power with hawkish elements tied closely to defense industries. Defense contractors and a bloated military elite live with the same fear as their opposite numbers in the North. Jobs, influence and lifestyles would be lost in the event of a demilitarized reunification. This group opposes dramatic changes advanced by reunification-minded politicians. The opposition to President Roh is a liberal coalition of politicians sensitive to public pressure for a shift in resource allocations from military to social welfare. They are generally pro-unification and pro-labor, and embrace the general demand for broader democratization. A growing anti- Americanism is also developing from a blend of injured pride and national resentment. As evidenced by recent elections, this element may be the emerging power and the political policies of all involved nations may need adjustment. Despite subtle shifts in respective approaches, the basic reunification policies of the North and South are at conceptual and procedural loggerheads. Seoul does not perceive the advantages of a neutralized and bi-systemic all-Korean confederation and Pyongyang opposes South Korea's proposal for incremental unification due to the difference in population size and the wide economic gap between the two countries. Further, neither of the reigning power elites have a great deal to gain and recognize that reunification risks loss of influence. In both the D.P.R.K. and the R.O.K. , however, are peripheral groups which could facilitate and, more importantly, accommodate the change necessary for the transition to a single Korea. INTER-REGIONAL POLITICS The politics of Northeast Asia are subject to the influence of several powerful players: the post-revolution Russia, Japan, China, and the United States. While regional stability is the common goal of all the nation players, a single Korea does not necessarily support the security of the same interested states. Further, the reunification process itself may serve to de-stabilize affairs in Northeast Asia. The political goal of Russia has traditionally been, and presumably remains, that the Peninsula not be allowed to become a hostile base to threaten western Russian. The objective has been the elimination of foreign forces from mainland Asia. Before the ensuing Russian revolution, the Soviet's were divided in a policy struggle regarding a Korean unification. The traditional military hard-line Soviets rejected the notion of a German solution in Korea. They insisted on a policy of a close relationship with the North to include generous amounts of military aid and assistance. In their view the West was irrevocably hostile and that any concessions necessary to facilitate reunification would weaken the condition of world socialism. The reformers looked at North Korea as an obstacle to an emerging Soviet policy for closer ties with the R.O.K. and their dynamic economy. North Korea was a dead end unless they could be pressured to abandon their isolation and negotiate with the South. One Russian analyst predicted that if Kim Chung Il comes to power he would be overthrown in a matter of weeks by a combination of the army and the people. (1: 8) Even as it might detract from world socialism, they perceived a democratically united, neutral Korea as a net plus because of the implication of a general withdrawal of American forces. They also believed that a strong, stable Korea would serve as a desirable balance to the regional strength of Japan and China. There are no direct indications of a post-revolution Russian political policy regarding Eastern Asia. It seems apparent, however, that hard-liners are out and "Pyongyang has lost its friends in court." (1: 21) There is good reason to expect that the reformers' views probably are a good representation of future formal policy regarding Korean reunification. There are historical hostilities and growing economic frictions between Japan and Korea which are the basis of Japanese attitudes on the prospects of Korean unification. For the first fifty years of the century Japan occupied and exploited the Korean Peninsula leaving strong negative cultural biases and attitudes in the region. From the Japanese perspective, the Korean Peninsula has been, and remains, a significant source of regional instability. Today, concerns over the possible succession struggle in the North, nuclear proliferation, and the political reliability of the South are seen as major threats to the vulnerable, largely economic, power of Japan. The Japanese believe that the combination of the North and South would produce a political and economic total greater than the sum of the two parts. The union of the resource rich D.P.R.K. and the successfully capitalist R.O.K. would clearly be less subject to Japanese influence and could be a formidable rival to Japanese power. Further, Japan is strongly agreeable to the presence of American forces in Korea for security reasons and would therefore be unlikely to support reunification almost necessarily linked to the withdrawal of American forces. China is somewhat ambiguous about a Korean reunification as political and economic realities are forcing cautious shifts in Bejing's foreign policy. While she has had historically close ties with North Korea and is formally the North's only remaining ally, China has deliberately pursued improved relations with South Korea. Last year trade with the South approached $4 billion, which exceeded by several times the amount of trade with the North. Further, China chose not to stand in the way of United Nations' recognition of the R.O.K. Presently, China is focused on internal control -- Tiananmen Square. However, she does have a great deal of political influence over North Korea and is certainly interested in any shift of power which might unsettle Northeast Asia. It seems reasonable that China would, or perhaps already has, advised the North against nuclear or conventional saber rattling and encouraged the D.P.R.K. to get on with controlled reform in the Chinese fashion. China is a key player in the outcome of Korean unification. For, like Korea, China is also in a delicate period of transition. She needs to reform her political system and stake claim to a portion of the success of the international market economy of the region. However, the intolerance of the old Sino-centralism is strong. If China progresses with cautious reform the prognosis for a peaceful unification of Korea is good. However, the extent to which reunification can occur will depend to a degree on who is in power in Beijing. By any measure, the United States is a regional power in Northeast Asia. Without American military power, neither Japan nor South Korea could defend themselves or their economic interests. The official American East Asia policy is that regional stability is the primary security objective and a requirement for the satisfaction of national interests. This seems well founded since the United States trades more with Northeast Asia than it does with Europe. The presence of forward deployed forces in the R.O.K. are viewed by the Americans, and the South Koreans, as essential for deterrence. However, the South Koreans also perceive that the United States interferes with the R.O.K. 's full exercise of sovereignty, thereby diminishing its dignity. This growing anti-Americanism merges too conveniently with the North's demand for the withdrawal of all foreign forces as a requisite to normalization and the confederation brand of Korean reunification. The United States would probably be eager to remove the costly forward deployed units and facilities, even at the expense of broader strategic concerns, if evidence is sufficiently strong to show that the threat of military force by the North has disappeared. At present the North Korean forces facing the R.O.K. and American forces across the DMZ are still formidable and threatening. Additionally, economic interests and commitments, as well as a lingering moral guilt regarding the abandonment of previous East Asian allies, are sufficiently strong to ensure a continued American resolve in Korea. Relations between most countries on the Pacific rim are becoming increasingly relaxed. Tension and insecurity are being eroded by improved relations among the greater powers: Russian-American, Chinese-Russian, and Russian-Japanese. With this backdrop the diplomacy of the larger powers should be expected to increasingly be able to focus on the Korean situation and their shared interest in a stable Peninsula. Regardless of policies toward reunification, China, Russia, Japan, and America should be expected to encourage confidence in Pyongyang about the benefits of change and in joining the Asia-Pacific community. MILITARY The Korean peninsula is one of the most militarized areas in the world. Both Koreas have been governed by military or military-backed regimes since their inception. Concern over the military aspect of Korean reunification is a dominant feature of the entire issue. Recent estimates place the active duty strength of Pyongyang's Korean Peoples' Army (KPA) at 1.1 million with an additional 200,000 troops under the Ministry of Public Security (North Korea's KGB equivalent) . (3: C3) They are essentially a land army and place only secondary emphasis on sea and air power. They have large numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, rockets, and a formidable chemical capability. They are forward deployed, committed, and in a high state of readiness. In the South there are an estimated 750,000 active duty troops who are well armed, well led, and proficient in the applications of combined arms. An arithmetic unification of the two forces yields the world's third or fourth largest army. Only China and presumably post-revolution Russia are larger, and the numerical strength of America's forces are roughly equivalent. (3: C3) Though a scenario in which the forces of the two Koreas might combine is difficult to conceive, the calculation does underscore the scope and strategic significance of the condition. The reunification proposals of both parties envision dramatic reductions in the number of military personnel. The North sees an immediate cutback as elemental to the transition process. They claim to have already demobilized 150,000 for road building, canal digging, and other civilian infrastructure projects. (8: 16) For years the D.P.R.K. has manned its armed forces at the expense of domestic needs and supported it with a mammoth proportion of their gross nation product. They are reported to have a significant civilian manpower shortage, particularly in large scale mining, capable of absorbing legions of deactivated soldiers. The South Koreans are far less anxious to rapidly reduce the size of their army for several reasons. First, even with the presence of 36,000 American military personnel, the South does not approach quantitative parity with the KPA positioned along the DMZ. Secondly, any withdrawal of American troops further diminishes the force ratios and places greater stress on the R.O.K.'s manpower and military spending. Third, a great deal of political power is currently in the hands of individuals with ties to South Korean defense industries and demobilization is not profitable. Finally, there is no manpower shortage in the South. Increasing the already high unemployment rates with deactivated soldiers and displaced defense workers would not sell well at the polls. The military demobilization problem is clearly a far greater challenge to the Koreans in the South than to their cousins in the North. Though both states are highly industrialized, the North is believed to be more manpower intensive in the fields of mining, chemicals, and steel production, while the South relies somewhat more on technology. It is also logical that a peaceful, unified market-oriented Korea would want less metal from the huge Korean steelworks and more consumer goods and services. This would further strain the system as labor is forced to transition from industry to manufacturing and services. While the creation of an overwhelming, unified Korean army is not likely, the demobilization issue is distressing. The scope of the problem is similar to the challenge faced by the United States and Great Britain after World War II. Only America succeeded in putting her army back to work by extending credit and fostering education. Great Britain lacked the where-with-all to effect full demobilization and never recovered. A unified Korea must find a sector or a means to efficiently absorb working men by the hundreds of thousands or the entire enterprise may be doomed to failure. ECONOMICS The most difficult and tangible concerns over reunification are found in the economic dimension of the issue. While there is much to be optimistic about regarding the potential of a united Peninsula, there are dramatic economic conversions required and massive "costs of reunification" (3: C3) anticipated. It is from this perspective that the often cited analogy of the Germany reunification and the Korean situation becomes less similar. The ever-widening gap between the North and South in terms of national wealth, business productivity, and personal lifestyles presents questions and concerns which overshadow the concept of a single Korea. The DMZ is a demarkation of economics as well as political ideology. In the isolated, tightly controlled North, the D.P.R.K. is a fiscal wreck. The sustaining technology, oil shipments, and assistance from China and the former Soviet Union have been severely cut, (8: 16) and the population faces food and energy shortages. The R.O.K. however, is an open, relatively free market society, with good national credit, trade surpluses and a significant international economic presence. Though not yet an affluent society, the standard of living is well above the Asian pattern and conspicuously improving. While these realities are readily acknowledged by the South, they are seen with understandable apprehension by the high-living leadership elite in the North. South Korea's "economic miracle" of the last twenty years has transformed the nation from a dependant of the United States to a nation with a multi-billion dollar trade surplus over its military benefactor. This budding, industrialized near-democracy, has a gross national product exceeding many West European nations and has one of the most powerful economies in the Pacific Littoral. It is an economy in transition, maturing from labor intensive consumer industries to high tech electronics and heavy industry, and is eager to access the raw materials, labor resources, and markets of a unified Korea. The North Korean economy has never been considered healthy, but with the demise of the Soviet Union and the loss of its trade and aid, the situation is becoming progressively worse. (11: 75) While China has been a longtime ally and economic partner, they are becoming less willing to bolster the North's deteriorating financial health and are in fact rapidly broadening trading agreements with the South. The D.P.R.K. is suffering debt problems, burdened with a heavy defence expenses, and struggling with declining industrial output. Starved for foreign currency necessary for oil and technology, the North is turning to the international sale of arms and drugs. The North is being forced to look for new alternatives to what is becoming an untenable economic isolation. A firmly controlled confederation with some vague notion of gradual transition to a more market-oriented economy (with less military spending) is one of their proposals. However, the leadership must fear that, "Once the North Korean people have their eyes opened to the outer world, they are likely to feel strong disillusion and resistance to the regime. (4: 619) This concern is reason enough to assume that a comprehensive and bloodless German-style reunification may not be forthcoming. The potential international economic impact of a unified Korea is impressive. While a combined Korean population of 65 million does not compare with China's 1.1 billion, it would make Korea one of the most populous countries. Korea would be larger than any European country except the unified Germany and larger than any African country except Nigeria. (3: C3) Such a labor pool and consumer market would certainly have a global economic presence. Crude estimates for the total economic output of the Korean peninsula when compared to other countries would rank a combined Korea as twelfth in the world. (3: C3) While these estimates are crude and fraught with assumptions, the magnitude is apparent. In terms of international trade, where the lingua franca is generally hard, convertible American dollars, South Korea is already an establish giant, ranking as the tenth largest importer and the eleventh largest exporter. (3: C3) While North Korean trade participation is marginal, the resource and manpower availability could add appreciably to the international trade promise of a unified Korea. The lessons learned from the German reunification, however, point to some major obstacles which may not bode well in the Korean scenario. German gross domestic product fell sharply and unemployment spiked upward. Korea lacks the internal economic infrastructure to accommodate the dramatic changes associated with a rapid reunification along the German model. Given time and unavoidable growing pains, the shock could be managed. However, those comfortable in the South, who are already impatient with the speed at which the government is developing the domestic economy, may not tolerate an extended depreciation of their lifestyle to the benefit of their Northern cousins. The matter of paying for the renovation of the North is onerous. Estimates of the "cost of reunification" in Germany exceed $1 trillion. Using similar estimates to the Korean case suggest staggering amounts of from $250 to $500 billion for the South to assimilate the North. (3: C3) These costs are grossly beyond the means of a combined Korea. Without substantial economic help from sources outside the Peninsula, the thought of a short-term economic reunification program is out of the question. Making presumptions about who might be willing and able to help with the bill takes us back to the relationships with the major regional nations discussed earlier. The economic potential for a unified Korea is lucrative, perhaps irresistible, to the South Koreans. When joined with the inevitable awakening of the economically deprived population of the North and the latent nationalistic desire of all Koreans for a single state, the prescription for rapprochement may be written. However, in a scenario of near-term reunification, the risks to the leadership of the North may be too great and the costs to the South too severe. CONCLUSION Most analysts seem to agree that, despite the problems and seemingly unresolvable issues, Korean unification is more a question of "when" than of "whether." The nature of the will and the cultural character of the Koreans, as exhibited in the South over the past 40 years, support this expectation. The world, after Berlin, appears anxious for more of the same in East Asia. However, even a cursory review of the situation reveals concerns that beg for attention at both the regional and global level. Presently the politics of the North and South are irreconcilable. Regardless of how reunification transpires, in the end the Northern elite will lose power and some authority from within the South will rule. The manner in which power is wrested from the communists cannot be predicted. Equally critical will be the way the South assimilates its cousins after years of hostility and bitterness. These issues are different from the German model. Korea is a society where "accommodation is not a cultural imperative." (13) Regardless of the path, a united Korea will remain "the runt of the neighborhood." (3: C3) There is a common, near- term desire for stability in the region. However, there is no changing the geographic arrangement of China, Japan, and post-revolution Russia around the Peninsula, or that the United States will remain a Pacific power for years to come. The lobe of Eastern Asia has been coveted by others for two millennia and human behavior is difficult to alter. The point being that external political relationships are critical to reunification and, beyond regional stability, the interests of the surrounding giants are likely to be dissimilar. The significant military aspect of reunification is strangely peaceful. While mighty generals and powerful armed forces do not just disappear, the forces of the Koreas are peculiar to the stalemate. They are not viewed by military analysts as adventuristic nor are they seen as a threat to neighboring nations. The expectation is that a reunified Korea would not maintain an armed force nearly as large as the aggregate of the two states. The issue of significance here is the reduction in the number of these forces. The demobilization of two million troops may be more than the infrastructure of a united Korea could absorb. The success of the entire unification project could be threatened by an unmanageable demobilization which could disrupt both the regional and international trade networks. Economics are probably the greatest area of international and Korean concern regarding reunification. To the non- Korean world the prospects of a nation with the world trade base and growing industrial might of the R.O.K. combining with the labor pool, market and resources of the D.P.R.K. are striking. From another perspective, the question of paying for the renovation of the North Korea, estimated at perhaps $500 billion (3: C3) is more than significant to the South Koreans. President Roh has voiced his understanding of the issue in a recent declaration that, "Our people do not want accelerated unification." (4: 621) The size of "the bill" and the associated risk of internal economic collapse should interest all trading partners, particularly Japan and the United States who have a sizeable stake in a healthy, prosperous Korea. The Koreans have a descriptive term which characterizes their cultural philosophy, "Hon." The word translates as "the bitter acceptance of the future." (9) The idea of "hon" captures how many in the South knowingly view reunification. It will come. It will not be easy and there will probably more to give than there will be to get. The broad concern for the Korean situation is that the inevitable transition does not get out of control. The issues mentioned in this paper depict a situation in Northeast Asia that is more risky and less predictable than the recent joining of the two Germanies. The risk and unpredictability of the reunification of Korea warrants the attention of all nations associated with this part of the world. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Blank, Stephen J., "Moscow, Seoul, and Soviet Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region," 23 November 1991, Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 2. Blumstein, Paul, "Two Koreas Pledge to End Aggression," Washington Post, 13 December 1991, p. A1. 3. Eberstadt, Nicholas, and Banister, Judith, "If Korea Tears Down Its 'Wall' . . .," Washington Post, 5 January 1992, p. C3. 4. Harrison, Selig S., "A Chance for Detente in Korea, World Policy Journal, Fall 1991, pp. 599-630. 5. Impoco, Jim, "If the Walls Come Tumbling Down," U.S. News & World Report, 20 August 1990, p. 41. 6. "JDW Interview," Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 September 1991, p. 492. 7. 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