Navy SEALs And The Battle For The SOF Budget CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA General EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Navy SEALs and the Battle for the SOF Budget Author: Lcdr Richard B. Landolt, United States Navy Thesis: Funding for our special operations forces must, at a minimum, be maintained at current levels. Background: The Navy's SEALs showed a marked improvement in personnel and equipment quality through the 1980's and continue to maintain that, quality. This quality was a result of an increase in military outlays across the board. It was not due to an increased emphasis on maintaining capable SOF forces in an increasingly multi-polar world that lends itself towards increased Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). With the fall of the Soviet bloc and a deemphasis on a European ground war threat, a review of defense priorities and force structure is in order and in this review SOFs must play an increasing role. Recommendation: The SOF budget must be maintained at current, if not increased, levels as threats to U.S. vital interests will be increasingly on the LIC level. NAVY SEALs AND THE BATTLE TO MAINTAIN THE SOF BUDGET OUTLINE Thesis Statement: Funding for our special operations forces must, at a minimum, be maintained at current levels. I. NAVY SEALs A. How SEALs Are Organized B. SEAL Equipment 1. Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDVs) 2. Dry Deck Shelters (DDSs) 3. SEAFOX II. Budget Background Overview A. The Reagan Administration and the Historical Emphasis on European Defense B. The Bush Administration and Increasing World Multi- Polarity III. The Evolving SOF Budget Debate A. The Four Requirements of the New U.S. Strategy B. How SOF Supports The Four Requirements C. Current High Level Prospectives On SOF Outlays NAVY SEALs AND THE BATTLE TO MAINTAIN THE SOF BUDGET We live in a world described by some as one of "violent peace." A world that is increasingly multi-polar leading to increased opportunities for low intensity conflict (LICs). Therefore, special operations forces (SOFs) have taken on increasing importance in providing an initial response to these potential threats to our vital interests. This rise in LICs will continue to require a force that can "go anywhere and do anything." A quick look at the most visible operations involving military intervention in the past decade show SOF's a key to our response. From the attempt at rescuing hostages in Iran in 1980, during the invasion of Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989 and most recently during Desert Storm, special forces have been at the cutting edge of our response. Therefore, we must maintain our budgetary and policy commitment to SOF capabilities despite efforts by some at enforcing fiscal austerity across our military spectrum. This report will discuss the capabilities and structure of Navy Sea-Air-Land special forces, otherwise known as SEALs, showing how this organization grew and benefitted by an across the board increase in military expenditures begun during the Reagan years. Explored further will be the changing attitudes that occurred during the Reagan and Bush administrations followed by an analysis on the direction in which the current debate is heading. In these more austere times, the defense budget will continue to affect special force readiness and capabilities. The need to maintain SOF budgets at no less than their current levels appears clear. Yet only recently has the Bush administration taken steps to educate and lead the debate in this direction. I. THE NAVY SEAL'S ORGANIZATION Special Operations Forces are considered America's elite warfighters. The elite of these elite are the Navy's SOF's, their Sea-Air-Land commando forces, more commonly known as SEALs. The Marine Corps has special operations capable Marine Expeditionary Units called MEU(SOCs) for short. These units are considered experts in guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare, and in counter-terrorism operations. (6:94) Their arduous training prepares them for missions in any terrain, in any location. They are normally deployed afloat naval vessels ready as a contingency force. The Navy's SEALS are direct descendants of the "frogmen" first established in World War II. They are simply organized. When a student graduates from Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL school at the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California, he is assigned to either a SEAL Team or Swimmer Delivery Vehicle Team (SDVT). A SEAL team consists of a number of operational platoons. A platoon is composed of two officers and twelve enlisted men. The team also will have a headquarters platoon of six enlisted men working for the team's commanding and executive officers. Naval Special Warfare SEAL Teams are now manned at 60 platoons, 30 per coast, 10 per team. Today there are nearly 2,000 SEALs divided among the six teams on each coast. (10) Each of these platoons is assigned directly to the Commander-in-Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). From there they are "chopped" to theater commanders when an operational need for them arises. (11:5) These teams are also components to Navy Special Warfare Groups of which there are two, one on each coast. Navy Special Warfare Group One (NAVSPECWARGRU-ONE) is located on the Naval Amphibious Base (NAB) in Coronado, California. It is composed of the following: SEAL Teams 1,3 and 5 Swimmer Delivery Vehicle Team One Special Boat Squadron One, composed of Special Boat Unit 11 (NRF) Special Boat Unit 12 Special Boat Unit 13 (NRF) Navy Special Warfare Unit One, Subic Bay, Philippines (Note 1) Helicopter Attack Squadron, Light-Five, the Blue Hawks NAVSPECWARGRU-TWO is located on NAB, Little Creek, Virginia. It has the following forces and support units assigned: SEAL Teams 2, 4 and 8 SEAL Team 6 (administratively -- See Note 2) Swimmer Delivery Vehicle Team Two Special Boat Squadron Two, composed of Special Boat Unit 20 Special Boat Unit 22 (NRF) Special Boat Unit 24 (NRF) Navy Special Warfare Unit Two, Machrihanish, United Kingdom Navy Special Warfare Unit Three, Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico Helicopter Attack Squadron, Light-Four, the Redwolves Note 1: To be relocated on Guam upon closure of Subic Bay. Note 2: SEAL Team 6 is under Opcon of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (5:346-347) SEAL training specializes in beach, coastal, and riverine reconnaissance; the clearing of beaches and harbors of obstacles; the destruction of enemy harbor facilities, communication nodes and facilities; the disruption of enemy shipping; and the clandestine infiltration of enemy territory for direct pre-landing support. The existence of SEAL Team 6, which is under the operational control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when ordered into action by the President or Secretary of Defense, is rarely acknowledged. This team specializes in counterterrorism activities. (6:90) The three special warfare units, located in Subic Bay, Philippines, Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, and Machrihanish, Scotland, are seventeen man teams specializing in clandestine activities that in event of war would incite confusion and disruption behind enemy lines. (6:90) II. Navy/SEAL Equipment SEALs possess specially designed equipment that aid in achieving their adventures in stealth. Routine in a Seal's inventory of equipment would be scuba equipment designed to contain its own bubbles; rubber raiding craft designed for speed and quiet; hand-held sonar gear; two-man swimmer-portable sounding equipment that allows them to conduct pre-assault beach surveys, special communications equipment; and an array of handheld and waterborne equipment that are collectively known as the Battle Area Surveillance System (BASS). (6:91) Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDV) and Dry Deck Shelters (DDS) have received great financial support in the last decade. SDVs are small, submersible craft designed to propel SEALs further and faster through the water. Additionally, underwater time is extended to a SEAL through use of breathing facilities available on board SDVs thus relieving a SEAL of the need for his own oxygen breathing apparatus while on board. There are SDV's designed to carry either two, four, or six men. (5:284-292) SDVs can be launched from any surface or sub-surface platform, proceed onto their targeted designation and, once completing an assigned mission, return undetected if called for. They can carry a wide variety of ordnance and/or material that may be required for the job as well. They are occasionally described and used as underwater "pack horses." (5:285) To get SEALs in-theater, the Navy has specially configured submarines possessing dry deck shelters or DDSs. A DDS is a pod shaped cylinder attached to a submarine that allows them to leave and return to a submerged submarine. A DDS is also capable of carrying an SDV. Navy plans are to have atleast three submarines configured with DDS on each coast. (5:295) For surface operations, SEALs employ a quiet and stealthy looking patrol boat vessel known as a Seafox. It is thirty-six feet long, can carry up to ten SEALs at speeds up to thirty knots and is a vessel ideally suited for surveillance, SEAL insertion and extraction, and interdiction. (6:91) III. Budgetary Overview Despite these austere times, the budget for the SEALs and remaining special operation forces will probably not be affected drastically due to the rising nature of low intensity conflicts. In fact, SOF's have found themselves expanding their missions. Particularly with regard to efforts in stemming the flow of drugs into the country. For example, SEALs are training Peruvian and other South American troops in riverine warfare to cut off the shipment of chemicals necessary for cocaine production. (10) Fortunately, an increased emphasis on readiness continues towards low intensity conflicts and special operations by both Congress and the Executive Branch. However, this emphasis was slow in coming. Operation "Just Cause" in Panama showed that troops trained to fight the Soviets in Europe were not adequate for smaller scale conflicts. High civilian casualty rates and collateral damage were caused by use of armored units and an occasional use of excessive firepower. (7:62) Using an army that was institutionally focused on large scale ground war made these results predictable. Some argue that special forces can be used for "surgical" strikes, but despite those that will argue that 'surgical strikes' are never precise, the aftermath of events in "Just Caused" proved there is a need for forces to carry out post- conflict requirements such as pacification missions and restoration of civil affairs. These "nation building" missions are ideally suited for special forces with their low visibility and small logistics string. Coming into the 1980's, defense planners gave short shrift to contingencies other than those which might happen in Europe. This mind set lead to little thought given to defense requirements for special contingencies. The disaster of 'Desert One", the attempted rescue of our Iranian hostages, brought this issue home by then candidate Ronald Reagan. After his election, the Reagan administration allocated significantly greater resources to military programs whose utility was greater outside of possible European conflicts. The most prominent examples of these programs would have to be the attempted attainment of a 600 ship Navy, and an increase in funds spent on special operations forces. By the time the Bush administration arrived in office, it was becoming clear Europe was no longer a number one warfighting priority. Additionally, U.S. forces were being deployed increasingly elsewhere in the world and there was the emergence of drug interdiction as a major national security concern. By late 1990, with world events occurring faster than any country's policies could adjust to, the U.S. defense budget for that year was nothing more than a holding operation. By late 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union and discussion of our own fiscal problems amplified by election year politics forced a review of U.S. defense posture. The drug war did receive greater emphasis in the 1990/91 defense budgets. SEAL force levels increased with the creation of ten new SEAL platoons and a new special forces group, however overall SOF budget totals declined. But in 1990, no defense strategy reviews of significance had occurred, the defense budget was being reduced, and a pattern had emerged whereby budget cuts were performed without formulating any strategies that might defend these cuts. From 1990 to 1991 SOF budget totals declined, from $3.2 billion to $2.75 billion, again reflecting the Bush administration's inconsistent approach to determining requirements. (7:69) IV. A NEW BUDGET DEBATE Lately, there has been growing debate over the direction the structure of the military and its base force should go. In the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress for 1992, a more clearly thought out attempt is made to account for the collapse of the Soviet empire and the no longer attendant need for focusing on a global war starting in Europe. Under this new strategy, the Secretary of Defense lists four basic requirements supporting the foundation of U.S. strategy. First, that an effective strategic deterrent be maintained. Second, that a forward presence be maintained, albeit in diminished numbers, to respond to crisis and threats to our security interests. Third, and probably most important with respect to SOF budgets, that, "U.S. based contingency forces are needed to ensure we can respond rapidly to crisis that affect our security." (3:vii) Lastly, to diminish our base force but only if we are prepared to reconstitute a necessary force structure to meet global threats that may emerge. In a more detailed section on SOFs in the report, the Secretary gives particulars on how SOF is inherently designed to support the four tenets of this newly emerging strategy. On Strategic Deterrence, he cites SOF, "special reconnaissance and direct action capabilities that can help to locate and destroy storage facilities, control nodes and other strategic assets" that house or support a country's weapons of mass destruction. (3:100) Additionally, "SOF can also support compliance with arms control measures in situations where intrusive verification measures become necessary." (3:100) He further declares SOF as, "one of the few instruments available to precisely apply measured force to deal with an adversary's nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons capabilities." (3:100) With regard to the strategy's second pillar, that of maintaining a forward presence, he repeats the deterrent, stabilizing, and initial response capability of forward deployed forces. He also recognizes SOF contributions, "in achieving greater regional stability through a wide range of humanitarian and nation assistance and Foreign Internal Defense activities, which contribute a de facto forward presence." (3:100) A reference to efforts, like counter-narcotics operations and "nation building" operations performed in-country. On "Crisis Response," SOFs offer their strongest suit. Secretary Cheney adds: Designed to be a quick-reaction, high-leverage force, SOF have repeatedly demonstrated their utility both in leading and supporting roles in recent crisis, including Operations DESERT HIELD/STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, JUST CAUSE, PROMOTE LIBERTY, and actions in the Philippines, Liberia, Latin America, and elsewhere. (3:100) Finally with regard to the tenet of "Reconstitution," the U.S. has traditionally drawn down forces after prolonged conflicts, without considering the consequences of such actions. The end of the Cold War represents such a conflict. Secretary Cheney asserts that the threat of a short notice global war is less likely than before but for DOD to reconstitute a significantly larger force if needed, SOF can serve as present force multipliers and buy time while mobilization is in effect. The SECDEF further states important reasons why SOF budgets should at least be maintained as is. He states: SOF are among the most difficult units to reconstitute because of the high demands on both individuals and units, especially the long lead-times required to develop mature operational experience, language skills, and regional orientation. (3:100) Clearly, this year's Annual Report to Congress showed a more mature and enlightened attitude and can help lead the way toward continued and sustained SOF support. Recognized by both Executive and Congressional leadership is that during these times of diminishing resources, SOF missions are increasing and some of these missions SOF can support are preventative in nature. For instance, efforts in the conducting of nation building and civil affairs programs can prevent potential destabilizing elements from introducing themselves and leading to larger conflicts. If even current budget levels can be maintained, as they have been, this shows an improved learning curve by both Congress and the Executive Branch and bodes well for the future of SOF. The SECDEF and many SOF warfare leaders and specialists are optimistic about maintaining budget levels as well. According to a recent interview held with Admiral George Worthington, head of the Navy's Special Warfare Command in NAB Coronado, he states, "I don't anticipate any (budget) cuts. I think the numbers will be about the same for the next decade." (10) This prediction comes after a decade of steady growth in the SOF community. Having the same "numbers" over the next decade does not worry officials either. According to a Heritage Foundation scholar, "Smallness of the force is one important ingredient." He further adds, ".. the problem with growth of special operations is it can only take a certain amount before you start diluting quality." (10) The type of personal attention that maintains a desired quality in a small, elite organization maybe jeopardized if growth were forced upon it too quickly due to the law of diminishing returns. In conclusion, it would appear self-evident that a need for a healthy SOF community will remain crucial to our defense for the foreseeable future. Ideally, we must strive for a cut in total force levels in a manner that provides the best hedge against near term uncertainties. If qualitative and quantitative force draw downs occur, America's ability to respond to unanticipated events affectively also will decrease. However, America must not make the mistake of drawing down forces such as which occurred after World War II. There is and will remain the temptation to demobilize however, it is far easier to demobilize a military than it is to rebuild one. We must prevent election year politics, to include the demagoguery which surrounds the inaccurate notion of savings with regard to the term "peace dividend," from leading us down a road of short sighted policy that may produce long term disaster. We must therefore continuously review our SOF needs and fully support them. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bosiljevac, T.L., SEALs:UDT/SEAL Operations in Viet Nam, New York, Ivy Books, 1990. 2. Cheney, Dick, Annual Report to the President and the Congress FY-92, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1991. 3. Cheney, Dick, Annual Report to the President and the Congress FY-93, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1992. 4. Collins, John M., Green Berets, SEALs, and Spetsnaz: U.S. and Soviet Special Military Operations, Washington, D.C., Pergamon-Brassey Books, 1986. 5. Dockery, Kevin, SEALs In Action, New York, Avon Books, 1991. 6. Goose, Stephen D., Low Intensity Warfare: The Warriors and Their Weapons," In Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism In The Eighties. Ed. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, New York, Pantheon Books, 1988, pp. 80-111. 7. Kruzel, Joseph, American Defense Annual 1990-1991, Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1990. 8. Locher, James R., "Low Intensity Conflict: Challenge Of The 1990's," Defense Magazine July/August 1991, pp 17-19. 9. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, FMFM 8-1, Special Operations, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1984. 10. Worthington, G.R., RADM, "SEALs To Slip By Navy Cutbacks Unscathed," The San Diego Union-Tribune, 13 Feb, 1992, cols. 1-4. 11. Worthington, G.R., RADM, Letter, Armed Forces Journal International, February 1992, pg. 5. 12. Young, Darryl, The Element of Surprise:Navy SEALs In Viet Nam, New York, Ballantine Books, 1990
