Case Study In Failure: The Iraqi Air Campaign, 1991 CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA History EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Case Study in Failure: The Iraqi Air Campaign, 1991 Author: Robert L. Knight, GS-13, Central Intelligence Agency Thesis: Using the methodology developed by Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch in their book Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, an analysis of the Iraqi air campaign in the Persian Gulf War reveals that Baghdad suffered a catastrophic failure consisting of three elements: a failure to learn, a failure to anticipate, and a failure to adapt. Background: Cohen and Gooch identify five types of failure that a military force can suffer in a campaign. The three types of "simple failure" include a failure to learn, a failure to anticipate, and a failure to adapt. The two "complex failures are l) an aggregate failure, which involves a combination of two simple failures, and 2) a catastrophic failure, which consists of all three types of simple failures occurring at the same time or sequentially. In the case of the Iraqi Air Force, they failed to learn from their own experiences in the Iran-Iraq War and from the experiences of others, including the U.S. in Vietnam. Baghdad failed to anticipate the level of violence and complexity that they would have to face in the Allied air campaign. Finally, Iraq was not able to successfully adapt to the situation presented them, with the result that much of their combat air power was either destroyed on the ground or else was forced to flee to Iran. Recommendation: The methodology proposed by Cohen and Gooch should be studied and employed by military historians and officer students to better understand the components of military disaster and to identify weaknesses in our own planning and training for combat. CASE STUDY IN FAILURE: THE IRAQI AIR CAMPAIGN, 1991 OUTLINE THESIS: Using the methodology developed by Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch in their book Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, an analysis of the Iraqi air campaign in the Persian Gulf War reveals that Baghdad suffered a catastrophic failure consisting of three elements: a failure to learn, a failure to anticipate, and a failure to adapt. I. The Air War A. Iraqi air in the Iran-Iraq war l. Initial strength 2. Opening weeks of war 3. Iranian superiority, Iraqi weaknesses 4. Iraq resurgent, Western aid 5. Command and control problems 6. Air defense B. Iraqi air in the Persian Gulf War l. Initial strength 2. Layers of air defense 3. Allied attack, Iraqi air defense collapse 4. Iraqi/Allied losses II. Analysis of Iraqi Failures A. Failure to learn B. Failure to anticipate C. Failure to adapt INTRODUCTION: FAILURE IN WAR, A METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSIS "Why do competent military organizations fail?"(1) This is the question Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch -- visiting faculty members of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island in 1985 -- asked themselves as they attempted to develop an understanding of operational failure in war. Assuming that one side in a campaign is not totally outmatched in size or material by the other or does not suffer from grossly incompetent leadership, what factors might result in its suffering a humiliating defeat. Why do "misfortunes" occur in battle and who, or what, is to blame? Cohen and Gooch were not satisfied with the time-honored expedient of automatically blaming the commander when his army met with defeat. The breadth of the modern battlefield combined with the complexity of current warfighting technologies has subordinated the influence of any one man -- even the commander -- to that of the organization which has been developed to actually oversee the day-to-day conduct of war. (2 )Furthermore, the organization, or bureaucracy, that has grown up to conduct war reacts in its own unique way to the setbacks and potential disasters encountered on the battlefield.(3) Cohen and Gooch argue that by studying how selected military organizations have unsuccessfully prepared for, and reacted to, the stresses and surprises of modern combat, the student/soldier can identify potential weaknesses in his own military and, hopefully, avoid future "misfortunes." After an in-depth review of twentieth century warfare, Cohen and Gooch -- in their book Military Misfortune: the Anatomy of Failure in War -- have identified three simple, and two complex types of military failure: failure to learn, failure to anticipate, failure to adapt, aggregate failure (a combination of two simple failures), and catastrophic failure (a combination of all three simple failures).(4) The case studies that the authors use to demonstrate their methodology are convincing,(5) but the true test of a methodology is it applicability to new situations. This paper will focus on the Iraqi air campaigns in the Iran-Iraq War and the recent Persian Gulf War to see if the Iraqi defeat in 1991 can be categorized using the Cohen and Gooch system. First, however, some caveats are in order. Cohen and Gooch developed their methodology by studying well-researched campaigns for which information was readily available from both sides of the action. In the case of the Iran-Iraq War, most information on the actual fighting came from the official propaganda organs of the two belligerents, neither known for its adherence to Western standards of truthful reporting. In the case of the Persian Gulf War, the same situation held true for the Iraqi side, i.e., we have little objective information on the Iraqi high command's (the Revolutionary Command Council -- RCC) thought processes during the war. We know they failed miserably but we do not know their concept for how the campaign was supposed to go. Second, Cohen and Gooch developed their methodology to explain why, given evenly-matched and competent opponents, one side or the other fails in a big way. This explains their use of the term "misfortune. "(6) Were the Iraqis and the Allied forces evenly matched? Were the Iraqis competent? Certainly before the war many commentators and military experts viewed the Iraqi military as a capable and worthy opponent. Now, with the aid of perfect hindsight, many argue that the result was a foregone conclusion Even if the Iraqis were doomed from the beginning, can the methodology still be applied to give us insight into what factors brought this situation into being? Finally, Cohen and Gooch argue that the seeds of misfortune and failure in modern warfare are planted in the organization, not in the individual commander.(7) But does this apply in the case of a dictatorship such as Iraq. Can Iraq's defeat be squarely laid at the feet of Saddam Hussein? While the argument can be made that this is the case at the strategic level of national policy, at the operational level the military machine that Saddam built must be judged on its own shortcomings. With these considerations in mind, analysis reveals that the Iraqi Air Force learned -- or, more precisely, mislearned -- lessons from their marginally-successful conduct of the Iran-Iraq War that almost certainly guaranteed their subsequent defeat during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Specifically, they misread the value of strategic and tactical airpower and their effect on the conduct of highly mobile, combined-arms warfare. Furthermore, they failed to anticipate the results of the military renaissance the U.S. had undergone in the aftermath of Vietnam with the development of the air- land battle doctrine and its integration with new military technologies. Finally, Baghdad's attempts to adapt to the challenge of the Allied air campaign proved completely ineffective with the result that much of the Iraqi Air Force fled across the border into the hands of their enemy, Iran, or else were destroyed inside their concrete shelters. This failure to learn, anticipate, and adapt set Iraq up to experience a catastrophic failure as defined by Cohen and Gooch. THE AIR WAR IRAQI AIR IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR The lessons Iraq learned in its eight-year war with Iran concerning the employment of aircraft and the conduct of an air campaign did not prepare it for what it would face on the night of January 17, 1991. Baghdad began the Iran-Iraq war with approximately 372 aircraft, mostly of Soviet manufacture.(8) The quality and training of Iraqi pilots was low principally because, as with all Iraqi military officers, their selection and chances for promotion were based not on demonstrated technical proficiency and aggressive spirit, but rather on their loyalty to Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party.(9) In the weeks prior to the start of the war, Baghdad dispersed its aircraft to other countries on the Arabian Peninsula to prevent their loss to a surprise, Iranian attack, an early indication that Iraq was more afraid of losing aircraft than in employing them to best advantage.(10) Iraq did begin the war with a surprise attack on Iranian airfields, a 1a the Israeli preemptive strike against Arab air forces in the 1967 war. But because of poor intelligence preparation and reconnaissance, little damage was done. Iraq's failure to devote enough sorties to this strategic opening gambit, and failure to follow up with restrikes until the job was done, was characteristic of her conduct of rest of the air campaign.(11) In the initial stage of the war, from September 1980 to March 1981, Iraq and Iran engaged in heavy air-to-air combat. The Iranian Air Force, in much better condition following Khomeini's revolution than Iraqi intelligence had been led to believe, slowly gained air superiority. Rather than risk further losses, the Iraqis avoided contact and waited for the arms embargo that had been instituted against Tehran by its traditional Western suppliers to take effect.(12) During this early period -- in particular the first 45 days of the war -- Iraqi pilots flew a large number of interdiction missions, mostly within the battlefield area. Again, the nonexistent Iraqi reconnaissance capability resulted in strikes against fixed targets, such as bridges and railroads, as opposed to Iranian troop reinforcements moving to the front.(13) This effort quickly wound down as Baghdad grew concerned with losses. Doctrinally, close air support (CAS), was not a high priority for the Iraqi Air Force primarily because of the lessons learned from the Israeli experience in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which surface-to-air missiles had exacted a heavy toll among CAS aircraft. Additionally, poor air-ground communications resulted in early losses to Iraqi antiaircraft gunners.(14) Therefore, Iraqi helicopters took on the bulk of CAS missions until late in the war, saving the valuable fixed- wing aircraft for strategic strike missions. By mid-1985, Iraq had gained air superiority as a result of Iran's failure to obtain aircraft and spare parts. Iraq, on the other hand was receiving French Super Etendard attack aircraft -- complete with Exocet missiles -- and Mirage F-l fighters. Even with Western aircraft; advanced aerial munitions such as the Super R-550 Magic air-to-air missile, fuel-air explosives, and TV-guided air-to-ground bombs; and French-supplied training, the Iraqi pilots showed only marginal improvement.(15) Iraq began to focus its efforts on strangling the Iranian economy by attacks on Tehran's oil production and transshipment facilities -- particularly Kharg Island -- as well as on tankers carrying Iranian crude. Here again, though the Iraqis were occasionally able to interrupt the flow of oil from Kharg, poor reconnaissance, tactics, and battle damage assessment resulted in an inordinate amount of effort to achieve limited results. Many Iraqi strikes on high- value targets were conducted by single aircraft or sections of two aircraft operating at high altitude to avoid antiaircraft fire.(16) From 1987 on, Iraq was able to conduct a credible strategic bombing campaign against Iranian cities and economic targets using aircraft and missiles. Iraq, however, seemed ever eager to accept cease fires whenever the Iranians responded by launching SCUD missiles of their own at Baghdad.(17) In 1988, with Iranian military and civilian morale crumbling because of economic hardship and fear of Iraqi chemical warfare, Baghdad was able to mount a series of successful counterattacks on the ground, regaining territory lost to Iran in 1982. During this campaign, the Iraqi Air Force made its presence felt in the CAS role. But, once again, results were not impressive. Since the Iranian Army was predominately infantry, their well-developed positions offered few lucrative targets. The RCC saw little value in risking expensive aircraft in attacks on troops and trucks.(18) Early in the war, the RCC had taken the helicopters away from the Air Force and had created the Army Air Corps in order to improve CAS coordination with the ground forces. Starting with Soviet Mi-24s, the Iraqis added Western-built Super Frelons, Gazelles, and MBB BO-l05s to their inventory. Helicopters proved consistently more responsive to Iraqi ground commanders than their fixed-wing comrades.(19) Throughout the war, Iraqi command and control proved overly centralized and inflexible. Political considerations often dictated the level of effort put forth in the air campaign. Iraqi concerns about the loyalty of its pilots, the loss of expensive aircraft, and the need to keep the war within bounds detracted from their ability to utilize the air component to its fullest capability.(20) Furthermore, the separation of command between the air and ground forces inhibited effective combined arms operations. By 1987-88, improvements were being made to the command and control structure, but Iraq was still far behind the West in fielding a truly integrated doctrine for the conduct of modern mobile warfare. Finally, with regard to air defense, a component that would play a major role in the Persian Gulf War, Iraq began the war with a mix of Soviet surface-to-air missile systems -- predominately SA-2 and SA-3 high-altitude, and SA-6 medium- altitude SAMs. Once the war began, they imported French-built Crotale and Roland missile systems. Fortunately for Baghdad, the Iranians posed little threat at the high and medium altitudes after the opening days of the war, since the Iraqis appear to have had difficulty in making the systems work. There was little integration between the launcher sites and the early-warning system and the Iraqis suffered from poor training and maintenance standards.(22) The bright spot in the air defense arena were the large numbers of antiaircraft artillery (AAA) which the Iraqis used with success against low-flying fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft as well as against troop formations. By the end of the war, Iraq had about 4,000 AAA pieces, most of the optically-guided variety. (23) IRAQI AIR IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR The saga of Iraqi airpower in the Persian Gulf War is a much shorter story since it ceased to be of any importance after the first week of the Allied air campaign. Iraq began the war with approximately 591 combat aircraft, including 116 Mirage F-ls, 48 MIG-29s, and 20 MIG-25s.(24) In the five months of Desert Shield, Iraqi aircraft had reacted to Allied aircraft probes toward the Kuwaiti border by staying well within their own airspace. This cautious response gave the Allies ample opportunity to map out the locations of Iraqi early warning and fire control radars using sophisticated electronic reconnaissance means. By 1991, the Iraqis had established a nominal integrated air defense system (IADS) in which fighter aircraft, SAMs, and AAA were centrally controlled from national-level command centers. Soviet-built Tall King early-warning radars fed data on incoming aircraft to the national command centers which then alerted missile batteries to turn on their target- acquisition and fire-control radars. Fighters were vectored to intercept the enemy aircraft using a Soviet-developed system known as ground-controlled intercept (GCI). Beneath this national layer were two additional air defense systems: a system of short-range missiles controlled by the Republican Guards emplaced around strategic national targets, and an army air defense system consisting of AAA and short-range, shoulder-fired missi1es.(25) Using a combination of F-117 stealth attack aircraft, Apache helicopter gunships, and standard suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) tactics, the Allies were able to put the national-level command centers out of action within the first two hours of the air war. Intensive jamming of Iraqi radar- guided AAA forced the gunners to fall back on optical guidance; but, because the first attack took place on a moonless night, this too proved ineffective. With the national-level command and control centers wiped out, Iraqi fighters were essentially useless. Allied aircraft were then free to operate over Iraq at high and medium altitudes using SEAD tactics to attack targets defended by the low-altitude missiles and AAA. After the first night, the Iraqis were never able to reconstitute their national-level system, either because they did not have sufficient spare equipment sets or else because they did not have the technical expertise to develop work-arounds.(26) Moscow had been the major supplier of equipment and technical assistance to Baghdad. But, by agreeing to abide by the United Nations embargo on arms to Iraq, the Soviets left their clients out on a limb. During the air war, Allied aircraft shot down at least 36 Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft and seven helicopters.(27) Allied losses due to enemy action were approximately 40 aircraft of all types, most lost to AAA and short-range SAMs.(28) No Allied aircraft were lost in air-to-air combat with the Iraqis. As it became clear that the air war was lost, Iraqi aircraft began fleeing to Iran. By the end of the war, approximately 150 aircraft, including many front-line fighters, had made the dash to safety.(29), It is still uncertain whether this mass exodus was planned by Baghdad in order to get the aircraft to a place of safety for possible use later in the war, or rather was an attempt by Iraqi pilots to save themselves. In any case, once in Iran, the aircraft were no longer a factor. Many aircraft that remained behind in Iraq were destroyed inside their reinforced concrete shelters. The Iraqis faced the unenviable choice of "use and lose" or "don't use and still lose." Meanwhile, the Allies enjoyed the benefit of free skies in which to operate. They got to do all the missions that modern air forces are supposed to do once air superiority is won: CAS, battlefield air interdiction, strategic bombing, aerial resupply, and reconnaissance. ANALYSIS OF IRAQI FAILURES According to the Cohen and Gooch methodology, any one simple failure can lead to defeat. However, simple failures also can be overcome if the organization conducting the campaign recognizes what has gone wrong and moves quickly to correct the deficiency in its operation. An aggregate failure, on the other hand, typically requires more heroic efforts to rectify. This type of failure usually combines a failure to learn with a failure to anticipate. If, however, the organization involved can successfully adapt to the situation at hand, and still retains sufficient resources and morale to carry on, this failure too can be overcome. Catastrophic failure -- where all three types of simple failures occur simultaneously or sequentially -- is almost impossible to survive. This failure usually results in complete defeat for the afflicted party unless outside aid is forthcoming.(30) No such aid materialized for the Iraqis in the Persian Gulf War. The following is a discussion of each type of failure as experienced by the Iraqi Air Force. FAILURE TO LEARN The concrete lessons Baghdad failed to learn with respect to the proper utilization of airpower in its eight long years of war with Iran are legion. They include -- but certainly are not limited to -- the following: --The most expensive and complex aircraft and missiles are only as good as the training and skill of the men who employ them. Party loyalists in positions of command insure a loyal military, not an efficient military. --Strike planning, whether for strategic or tactical targets, requires proper reconnaissance beforehand and honest battle damage assessment afterward. Some targets require a maximum effort, sometimes several maximum efforts. --Commanders must be willing to accept reasonable losses if they expect results. Combat aircraft too valuable to lose in combat belong in museums. There were other lessons the Iraqis should have been considering once it became obvious that their invasion of Kuwait would not go uncontested. On a strategic and operational level, these were the most important failures: --Baghdad misread the lessons of Vietnam. The United States may have been forced out of that war, but not before devastating North Vietnam with two major air campaigns -- Rolling Thunder and Linebacker II. --U.S. air doctrine was designed specifically to defeat the type of Soviet-style integrated air defense system that Iraq had installed. More importantly, it was designed to defeat a system manned by people who knew what they were doing. --Third World countries cut off from their major sources of military equipment and technical assistance tend to lose. Iraq had seen the truth of that statement firsthand in its war with Iran. FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE The failure to anticipate is closely tied to the failure to learn. In the case of Iraq, by focusing on the wrong lessons of the U.S. experience in Vietnam as well as overestimating their own performance in the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad failed to anticipate the level of violence that it would suffer at the hands of a rejuvenated, confident U.S. military. Could Iraq have anticipated the sheer intensity of the aerial operations that would be directed at her, let alone their degree of complexity and technical skill? In the early days of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi Air Force averaged 65 sorties per day. By 1984 they were up to 150 sorties, and by the end of the war had achieved an average of 250 plus sorties per day. In eight years of war, Iraq flew approximately 400,000 sorties of all types. (31) From January 17 through 6 March, 1991, the Allied air forces flew 114,000 sorties of all types -- 28 percent of the Iraqi total in less than two months.(32) During the initial stage of the war, the Allies averaged nearly 2,000 sorties per day, many of which were highly-sophisticated airborne command and control-, airborne radar reconnaissance-, and electronic jamming missions for which the Iraqis had neither counterparts nor countermeasures. (33) Iraq's air defense system was never really targeted during the Iran-Iraq War, yet it is hard to understand why Baghdad had not anticipated the need for redundancy within its command and control system. Perhaps this can be blamed on their assumption that the Soviet advisors would always be there to make the system work. In the first phase of the Allied air campaign, Iraqi command, control, communications, and intelligence systems were successfully neutralized. The precise targeting of these vital facilities should not have come as a shock to Baghdad; the U.S. had demonstrated its capability to conduct this type of precision attack in 1986 against Libya. Furthermore, Baghdad reportedly had received assistance from U.S. national strategic reconnaissance means during its war with Iran.(34) It could logically have assumed that almost every site of any importance within its own borders had been thoroughly analyzed and targeted. Finally, on a basic human level, Iraq's decision to publicly display the dazed and battered Allied pilots shot down during the first days of the war was a monumental failure to correctly anticipate U.S. public reaction. Far from weakening U.S. resolve to carry on with the campaign, this callous display galvanized world support for President Bush and confirmed the depiction of Saddam's regime as an outlaw gang for whom no pity was necessary. FAILURE TO ADAPT Once a belligerent has ignored the lessons from its own, and others' experience; after it has built- its erroneous assumptions about the course the war will take, either because of poor reasoning or intelligence on its part or excellent deception on the part of its enemy, or a combination of all three; it must be able to adapt quickly and successfully to the true state of affairs or else it will lose decisively. Iraq lost decisively. The Iraqi national-level air defense system went down on the first night of the war. It never came back up. Without the GCI system to direct them, the Iraqi fighters that did launch were, with few exceptions, always the hunted, never the hunters. Iraqi SAM and AAA sites could only react to Allied aircraft when they came within range of the local target- acquisition radars; there was no early warning or coordination within air defense sectors. In short, the skies over Iraq belonged to the Allied air forces. The adaptations the Iraqis did make were almost totally negative. Twenty-five percent of Iraq's combat aircraft were flown to Iran. A large number of auxiliary aircraft also fled. Whether this was planned by the RCC, or simple suicide prevention on the part of the pilots, those aircraft ceased to play a role in the war. The most valuable aircraft that remained behind were hidden in steel-reinforced concrete shelters. The less valuable aircraft huddled within open revetments. Neither were safe. The two primary reasons any aircraft survived at all were 1) that the Allies knew that the Iraqis were not going to come up and give battle, and 2) that the Allies were running short of precision-guided munitions with which to wreck the shelters. The Iraqis were not even able to save aircraft from being captured by Allied ground forces operating in southern Iraq. The only sure adaptation that the Iraqis were able to come up with was the deployment of aircraft within civilian housing areas and around archeological sites. CONCLUSION: THE COHEN GOOCH METHODOLOGY CONFIRMED The Iraqi Air Force was thoroughly victimized in the Persian Gulf War. The genesis of their defeat lay in their failure to learn the right lessons from their own air campaign against Iran, as well as from the experiences of other air campaigns, in particular, the American effort in Vietnam and the that of the Israelis' in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The political nature of the Iraqi high command further insured that the remedial steps needed to improve the performance of the air component would not be taken unless they conformed to the wider goals of the Baath Party. Overly optimistic assessments of their own capabilities, coupled with a contempt for American military might and national will based on the Vietnam experience, prevented the Iraqis from logically anticipating the type of campaign they would have to face. It Is impossible to tell whether this wishful thinking permeated the entire Iraqi military or was centered at the top political levels. In any case, it seems hard to believe that had Iraq anticipated the completeness of its impending defeat, it could not have found a face-saving way out of the situation. Finally, once the war began, Baghdad failed to adapt in any meaningful way. Fight or flight were equally poor reactions to the violence and complexity of the Allied air campaign. Had the war gone on much longer, and had the Allies had a larger inventory of precision-guided munitions, the only aircraft the Iraqis would have retained would have been those serving as roadblocks inside civilian neighborhoods. Until more thorough information is available on the decision-making process within the Iraqi high command and on the role of Saddam Hussein in the day-to-day preparations for the Persian Gulf War, it will be impossible to answer the question of how much blame should accrue to the leader. As to whether or not this case represents evenly-matched opponents, the answer is no, although 591 jet aircraft and thousands of missiles and AAA pieces in the hands of some countries could indeed have been a daunting challenge. In any case, definite elements of the three types of simple failures are evident and they combined in the end to produce an overwhelming catastrophe for the Iraqi Air Force. The methodology that Cohen and Gooch developed is a viable tool for analyzing past defeats and for guarding against future misfortunes ENDNOTES 1. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. vii. 2. Ibid., p. 3. 3. Ibid., p. 22. 4. Ibid., pp. 25-26. 5. Cohen and Gooch use the U.S. Navy's unsuccessful antisubmarine campaign of 1942 to demonstrate a failure to learn. The near disaster Israeli forces suffered in the opening days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War exemplifies a failure to anticipate. The ill-fated Suvla Bay landing during Britain's 1915 Gallipoli campaign is used to demonstrate a failure to adapt. The case study used for an aggregate failure is the 1950 defeat of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea. In this case the simple failures encountered were a failure to learn and a failure to anticipate. Finally, catastrophic failure is exemplified by the collapse of the French Army in 1940. 6. Ibid., p. 3. 7. Ibid., p. 34. 8. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, vol. 2: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 465. 9. Maj. Ronald E. Bergquist, The Role of Airpower in the Iran-Iraq War (Maxwell AFB, ALA.: Air University Press, 1988), p. 22. 10. Samar al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Inside Story of Saddam's Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), pp. 279-80. 11. Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis (London:1155 Adelphi Paper No. 220, 1987), p. 36. 12. Cordesman and Wagner, p. 465. 13. Bergquist, p. 61. 14. Ibid., p. 60. 15. See Cordesman and Wagner, pp. 456,474 and Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security 1984-37 (London: Jane's, 1987), p. 75. 16. Karsh, p. 37. 17. See Ibid., p. 38, and Cordesman and Wagner, pp. 486-89. 18. Cordesman and Wagner, p. 482. 19. Ibid., pp. 492-93. 20. Bergquist, p. 64. 21. Cordesman and Wagner, pp. 494-95. 22. Ibid., pp. 459-60. 23. Ibid., p. 463. 24. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 308. 25. Ibid., pp. 148-51. 26. Ibid., p. 152. 27. Ibid., pp. 357-59. 28. Ibid., pp. 353-56. 29. Ibid., p. 162. 30. Cohen and Gooch, p. 26. 31. Cordesman and Wagner, p. 478. 32. Friedman, p. 402. 33. James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), p. 129. 34. Gary Sick, "Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War." The Middle East Journal 43:2 (Spring 1989):239. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bergquist, Maj. Ronald E. The Role of Airpower in the Iran- Iraq War. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988. 2. Blackwell, James. Thunder in the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War. New York: Bantam Books, 991. 3. Bulloch, John and Harvey Morris. The Gulf War: It's Origins, History and Consequences. London: Methune London Ltd, 1989. 4. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: The Free Press, 1990. 5. Cordesman, Anthony H. The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security 1984-87: Strategic Implications and Policy Options. London: Jane's, 1987. 6. Cordesman, Anthony H. and Abraham R. Wagner. The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. II, The Iran-Iraq War. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1990. 7. FMFRP 3-203 Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War Vol I. U.S. Marine Corps: Washington, D.C., 1990. 8. Friedman, Norman. Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 9. Hiro, Dilip. The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. London: Grafton, 1989. 10. Karsh, Efraim. The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis. London: IISS Adelphi Paper No. 220, 1987. 11. Khalil, Samar al-. Republic of Fear: The Inside Story of Saddam's Iraq. New York: Pantheon Books, 1989. 12. Miller, Judith and Laurie Mylroie. Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf. New York: Times Books, 1990. 13. Segal, David. "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis." Foreign Affairs Summer 1988. 14. Sick, Gary. "Trial By Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War." The Middle East Journal Volume 43:2 Spring 1989. 15. Summers, Harry G. On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. New York: Dell Publishing, 1992.
