Grenada: Hindsight CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA History TITLE: GRENADA: HINDSIGHT On the morning of 25 October 1983, United States armed forces invaded the small Caribbean island of Grenada. This account of Operation Urgent Fury is to provide a historical analysis of the high-level political and military decision-making process that directed the conduct of the operation. Almost ten years later, much of the data about the invasion of Grenada continues to be controversial. While many Americans now have some idea of the operation, tight security and the media restriction clouded much information on the military side of the Grenada mission. Critics challenge whether Operation Urgent Fury should have been performed at all. This paper does not purport to tell the "whole" story. Rather, the objective has been to make an attempt to answer questions and settle some of the controversy. The political decision to launch Operation Urgent Fury was proven by events to be a sound one. The Grenada campaign reflects the operational level of war, in which the results of individual tactical actions by the military were combined to fulfill the needs of national strategy. If the primacy of the political over the military is beyond question, the application of the relationship in the real world poses problems of terrible complexity. Political motives and the military methods and procedures to realize them are seldom clear-cut and in balance at any given moment. They are anything but easy to synchronize. The United States forces did achieve victory but no military operation ever has been, or ever will be, flawless. The dearth of intelligence, which resulted in units going into the island blind; serious planning errors; an absence of strategic or tactical surprise; the failure to achieve concentration at decisive points; continuous communication snarl-ups; and the lack of interservice coordination or overall ground commander all helped to fuel protests heard around the world. American armed forces were unprepared to respond to a crisis as a coherent joint force with all the inherent complexities. An ad hoc joint headquarters was required to plan and coordinate the operation. Inevitably constraints led to a task force composed of units and staffs that did not know each other, had never trained together, often did not understand each other's procedures, and were forced to plan in isolation and ignorance of what others were doing. We must fight bureaucracy's perception that the only way secrecy can be maintained is to exclude from the decision-making process all those who are theoretically charged with carrying out the decision. The lackluster success of Operation Urgent Fury points to the necessity for a blending of military capabilities into a joint force. GRENADA: HINDSIGHT OUTLINE THESIS: An analysis of Operation Urgent Fury can provide valuable lessons learned that can prevent future operational planning pitfalls and contribute to overall combat readiness of the Marine Corps. I. Background II. Situation A. The People's Revolutionary Government B. Caribbean Reaction C. United States Interests III. Response A. Intelligence Shortcomings B. Operational Planning Pitfalls C. Task Force Selection IV. Evaluation A. High-level Military Decisions B. Information Flow\Operational Security C. Joint Warfighting GRENADA: HINDSIGHT Why did the United States invade the sovereign state of Grenada in October 1983, risking world condemnation and the possible escalation of violence outside the borders of the tiny Caribbean island? Throughout the twentieth century, U.S. policy toward the Caribbean has been the sum of the answers to a set of recurring questions, how to (1) ensure stability, (2) discourage foreign penetration, (3) promote economic development, human rights, and democracy, (4) gain respect for U.S. investment, the American flag, and U.S. citizens, (5) maintain good relations. (5:15) Alfred T. Mahan educated the political leaders of his and succeeding generations about the strategic implications of the Caribbean for U.S. interests. The United States has been motivated not so much to control the region but to keep things from veering out of control where they could be exploited by others. (5:16) Thus a direct and active concern with the Caribbean basin is a demonstrable facet of U.S. foreign policy and has given rise to a corresponding image of the region in the consciousness of U.S. decision-makers. SITUATION In 1973 the new JEWEL Movement (NJM) was formed after the merger of the Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (JEWEL) and the Movement for the Assemblies of the People (MAP) led by two young lawyers, Maurice Bishop and Kendrick Radix. (7:7) On 13 March 1979, under the leadership of Bishop and immensely successful and widely welcomed coup seized power. After the coup the NJM formed the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) , with Maurice Bishop as the Prime Minister. The new government suspended the 1974 constitution; however, Grenada remained a monarchy, with the British Queen as head of state represented in Grenada by the Governor General Sir Paul Scoon. During its almost five-year rule, the PRG substantially fulfilled the promise made or 13 March 1979. The social economic, and political life of Grenada was transformed (10:34) Cuba and Grenada established diplomatic relations. Cuba also became the first country which Bishop visited after the revolution, and Cuba remained Grenada's principal ally until the American invasion. Grenada also established close relations with Nicaragua after the Sandinistas seized power on 23 June 1979. Grenada signed three agreements for free military assistance from the Soviet Union covering the supply of infantry weapons and equipment. (8:21) Cuban aid to the Grenadian government covered a wide range of activities. Assistance included the construction of a new international airport at Point Salines, health care, culture, housing, sports facilities, advisors on planning, agricultural industries and development of the island's electricity network. (l2:38) The majority of the Cubans were alleged to be engaged in constructing the new airport. They were housed in barracks near the airport. All Cuban conscripts undergo military training and these "construction workers" did have small arms (rifles and machine guns) with about 300 rounds per weapon for self defense. (12:66) According to an official Cuban communique, 784 Cubans were on Grenada on October 25. (12:38) The Cubans had been instructed by Fidel Castro to "fight to death." The Cuban's helped organize the militia and the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA). The Peoples Revolutionary Army (PRA) was approaching 600 soldiers supplemented by the People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM) estimated at between 2,500 and 2,800 members. (5:163) Although its forces already dwarfed those of its neighbors, Grenada was planning to field an 18-battalion force consisting of between 7,000 and 10,000 men and women under arms. (7:20) For weapons the PRA had a wide variety of small arms. The weapons of significance were six ZU-23-2 (range 2500 meters) Soviet-made anti-aircraft guns, which were distributed between the two airports at Point Salines and Pearls, and the capital, St. George's. The PRA also had twelve 12.7mm guns, six BTR 50 P Wheeled APCs, two BDRM Scout Cars, six 85mm guns, and twenty-four 8lmm mortars. (7:22) In proportion to population, this would have given Grenada one of the largest military forces of any country in the world. Grenada's relations with other countries in the Caribbean were not as close as those with Cuba; however, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Guyana did recognize the PRG. (12:39) The smaller island states of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) were disturbed by the NJM's reformist surge and were uniformly antagonistic to the Grenadian revolution. The OECS gave the PRG neither support nor recognition. On 19 October 1983, Bishop was executed by a hardliner Leninist faction in the NJM led by Bernard Coard and General Hudson Austin. On 23 October the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) decided to cancel trade agreements with Grenada and to expel it from the community. (12:55) The OECS feared democracy would eventually be at risk throughout the region and had already decided some sort of military action was necessary. Exploratory talks with the British, Canadian, and U.S. ambassadors were held. U.S. policymakers were already aware of the gravity of the request for assistance and the criticism the administration was likely to face if they obliged. (2:101) The choice made shows the interest and influence of outside groups on policy and decisions. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) specifically had authority in this matter in accordance with its charter and had requested the assistance of the United States. Additionally, the Grenadian Governor-General, Sir-Paul Scoon requested assistance which provided a "nice legal justification" for American action. (6:64) "Vital" security and economic interests provided a tangible basis for distinctive United States' policies within the region. Ever since the U.S. became a global power at the close of the Second World War, the persistent purpose of the U.S. has been to maintain global preeminence. Several transformations have occurred as various administrations have reacted with higher or lower policy profiles toward the region according to the nature of the "threat" perceived. The Reagan administration' s stark Cold War view of the world as a battle between the forces of "good" (the United States) and "evil" (the Soviet Union) set the stage. The administration felt that the principal problems in the Caribbean basin had stemmed from an erosion of order, which had been subverted by Soviet/Cuban expansion in the area and resulted in the decline of U.S. power in the region. The solution follows the diagnosis: re-establish that order at whatever cost is required. (10:54) U.S. confrontations, whether protracted or brief, covert or overt, by proxy or otherwise, have been impelled and guided by the doctrine of Containment. (12:5) The Soviet Union and its governing ideology, Communism, is no longer the chief threat to the global preeminence of the United States. If the national policy of Containment had been outdated in 1983, would the U.S. have invaded Grenada? According to a draft National Security Decision Directive, the American operation would seek to ensure the safety of American citizens. However, the invasion of Grenada was as much to "roll back" the allegedly Marxist regime and in the process to give signals of our resolve to Cuba, the USSR, and others as it was to "rescue" the American students. (12:62) The U.S. was anxious to prevent a repeat of the Iran experience with hostages taken and the U.S. publicly held helpless by a group of fanatics. (2:103) The Caribbean leaders told Ambassador Francis J. McNeil the Americans on Grenada appeared genuinely vulnerable, especially the medical students. Moreover, they submitted, resistance on the island was growing and a bloody civil war seemed likely. (2:101) Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, seven of his colleagues, and scores or Grenadian citizens had already been brutally murdered. The American Government could not assure the safety of foreign residents due to the chaotic internal situation on the island. U.S. citizens, most of whom were medical students, were subjected to round-the-clock, shoot-on-sight curfew imposed by Revolutionary Military Council. This faction had decided that they would use force if necessary to impose their will. Moreover, the RMC seemed to view the American citizens on the island as pawns. By itself, concern for the safety of U.S. citizens on Grenada would probably have been sufficient to prompt a limited rescue operation by the United States. It is far easier to prevent a hostage situation than to deal with one . The make-or-bread factor to mobilize the American people -- to invoke the national will -- was the student. (9:174) The Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) " government of terrorists" repeatedly assured the American government about the safety of the Americans on the island, and allowed those who wished to 1eave to do so without hindrance. (12: 63) The school authorities were convinced, in spite of urging from the State Department to the contrary, there was no danger and said so publicly. Moreover, 500 parents of the students and the school authorities sent a telegram to the U.S. State Department imploring it not to take any precipitous or provocative action. "(3:76) Clausewitz said, "War is simply the continuation of policy by other means. "(4:605) Although in the course of deliberations over the scope of contemplated American action, policy opponents urged the use of the political element of power; the decision to use the military element of power best served America's national interests. The United States' aim was to achieve our will by defeating their fighting forces to a degree consistent with our national objectives. RESPONSE The United States had invaded a foreign country; it was likened to the Soviet's attack on Afghanistan -- international law had been degraded. Nonetheless, the political decision to launch Operation Urgent Fury was proven by event to be a sound one. The Grenada campaign reflects the operational level of war, in which the results of individual tactical actions by the military were combined to fulfill the needs of national strategy. In line with the Weinberger Doctrine which stated the U.S. will not commit armed forces unless the U.S. intends to win, Urgent Fury was over in a few days. The U.S. forces did achieve victory but no military operation ever has been, or ever will be, flawless. Campaigns are planned and battles are fought by people, and people err. After Urgent Fury, the U.S. military became sensitive to criticism, some ill informed, about how the operation had been conducted. However, the uninformed allegations had gone uncomfortable near the mark. Although the campaign succeeded, the dearth of intelligence, which resulted in units going into the island blind; serious planning errors; an absence of strategic or tactical surprise; the failure to achieve concentration at decisive points; continuous communication snarl-ups; and the lack of interservice coordination or overall ground commander all helped to fuel protests heard around the world. American armed forces were unprepared to respond to a crisis as a coherent joint force with all the inherent complexities. Very little was known about Grenada. After all the fuss about the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG), the National Security Council's Special Situations Group was shocked to hear that there was no Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent on the island, that nothing was known about the military situation and that no aerial photographs has been taken of Point Salines for more than five months.(1:118) Strenuous efforts needed to be made to rectify these omissions; however, Vice President George Bush endorsed an overriding necessity for secrecy. For the most part, the reluctance to inform even the participants was due to the need to maintain security. (1:122) The effort to prevent leaks was understandable but in reality ineffective. The movement of ships, aircraft, and Caribbean troops had been seen and reported. Within the Caribbean, Urgent Fury had been expected and achieved no strategic surprise. (1:122) The planners had one need above all others -- information! Intelligence of the Cuban presence on the island, the Cuban's and Soviets' likely reactions to attack, the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) strengths, armaments, deployment, intentions, and morale were essential elements to be considered. Defenses at the airfields and the locations of the PRA headquarters, communications centers, supply depots, and antiaircraft positions were also necessary details. Because a main objective was the safety of foreign citizens, there was a need to know where such persons were living, whether the people were guarded, whether the people were at one location or several, and how many were at each. Facts on the geography of Grenada: the suitability of beaches for landing, the type of terrain, the road system, the hills, the layout of St. George's, and the details of approaches to selected targets were all critical knowledge for tactical planning. U.S. planners had started to focus on Grenada on October 13, almost two weeks before Urgent Fury took place. On October 14 Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) at Norfolk, Virginia, had been alerted to start planning for possible noncombatant evacuation operations. As far back as October 18, the military crisis action team at Norfolk started putting together various courses of action. (2:94) Nevertheless, the killing of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop six days before the intervention lit the fuse making military involvement inevitable. The Joint Chiefs of staff (JCS) provided Langhorne Motley, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, with a list of the military resources immediately available. A warning order was sent to CINCLANT confirming that evacuation plans were required at once. There was a contingency plan gathering dust in the Pentagon, number 2360, which was supposed to provide for a Grenada intervention. (1:131) This document specified that the overall command of such an operation would be given to the commander of U.S. Forces Caribbean at Key West, Florida, with the on-scene commander being the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps. An air assault or airborne division from this corps, with one additional brigade on call, a carrier battle group, and a marine amphibious unit (MAU), were earmarked as the forces available. Likely objectives noted in this plan were Pearls and Salines airports, St. George's harbor, the supposed naval facility under development at Calivigny, and the radio transmitting station at Beausejour, north of St. George's. To the surprise of many, this plan was not activated; indeed, it was not discussed at the CINCLANT planning conference. (l.132) At very short notice, CINCLANT, rather than the U.S. Forces Caribbean Command, became responsible for planning what was mainly a ground forces operation. The operation would involve techniques and tactics bearing no resemblance to maneuvering naval battle groups, convoy protection, or antisubmarine warfare, the normal day-to-day activities of the staff at CINCLANT.(1:126) On October 22, the JCS issued their Execute Order for Urgent Fury to Admiral W. L. McDonald, CINCLANTCOM. He was to "conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadian forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS/friendly government participants assist in the restoration of a democratic government on Grenada. "(1:126) Once invasion became an option, the JCS had to put together an operation involving the Navy and Air Force--at the very least for transportation and logistic support--with Marines, and possibly the Army, for ground combat. Because the operation demanded speed and surprise, with the possibility of hostages being seized or the need to rescue U.S. citizens, there was a role for Special Operations Forces as well. (1:131) CINCLANT had the major planning responsibility; nevertheless, It also had to accept any constraints imposed by the Pentagon. CINCLANT had to accept the decision that it was not going to be a Navy-Marine Corps operation but that all services and Special Forces had to have part of the action.(1:131) The planning was further complicated by the requirement to include small units from Caribbean countries in a peacekeeping role. Additionally the final plan had to incorporate the involvement of both State Department and CIA. Urgent Fury would increase the prestige or the armed force, so none of them could afford to miss out. Urgent Fury was unusually complex. Inevitably constraints led to a task force composed of units and staffs that did not know each other, had never trained together, often did not properly understand each other's procedures, and were forced to plan in isolation and ignorance of what others were doing. In fact there was no combined U.S./Caribbean planning, and the role of the Caribbean contingents was not clear to commanders. On October 25, when Caribbean troops started landing at Salines, at least one Ranger battalion commander knew nothing of their participation in the operation; for a brief moment, he thought the peacekeeping Caribbean troops were the troublesome PRA.(l:131) CINCLANT could not cope unassisted. The headquarters at Norfolk lacked the intelligence and communications capability to handle the situation. Neither did the staff have the planning expertise for a large-scale ground operation. To assist CINCLANT, the commanders of Readiness Command (REDCOM-Army), Military Airlift Command (MAC-Air Force), and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC-Army) were designated as supporting commands. (1:127) An ad hoc joint headquarters was required to plan and coordinate the operation. An on-scene commander was needed. The operation would require a Joint Task Force (JTF) , under a task force commander. For Urgent Fury the task force was designated JTF 120, with its commander being Vice-Admiral J. Metcalf III. (11:5) To supplement Metcalf's naval team, a seventeen-man joint "fly away" staff was assembled. This group would fly out with the commander of JTF 120 to establish an operational headquarters on the U.S.S. Guam, the amphibious assault ship (LPH) leading ARG 1-84. It was all very rushed, with most officers never having worked together before. (1:127) The short time frame also limited the Army and Air Force representation on Metcalf's staff. Lack of a staff who understood how to plan and coordinate joint fire support programs for ground forces on the island, by aircraft or naval gunfire, was an omission later much regretted. At the initial main CINCLANT joint planning conference on October 22, the MAC representative did not make the meeting, hindering the airborne planning because MAC was to provide all the transport aircraft to get everyone, except the amphibious task force, to Grenada. Similarly there was no senior Marine Corps participant as the amphibious task force was at sea; the Special Forces representation was only a lieutenant colonel and three junior officers. Effective cooperation was to prove virtually impossible to achieve below the rank of general. The Navy dominated proceedings. Logistical problems were never considered at all. This exclusion was made in the name of security. (1:132) The decision made to divert toward Grenada the amphibious task force (ARG 1-84) that had sailed for Lebanon on October 18, resembled the original contingency plan. On board was the 22d MAU with some 1,900 marines comprised of Battalion Landing Team 2/8, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 (REIN), and MAU Service Support Group 22. (11:2) No reason was given when the task force received the orders to divert . If further word had not arrived by midnight of October 23 the amphibious task force could resume the transit to Lebanon. The force immediately assumed an emissions control (EMCON condition under which messages could be received but not sent (radar and other electronics equipment did not transmit under EMCON) . Colonel J. P. Faulkner (MAUCO) and his staff believed that if the MAU were committed to Grenada its mission would be to evacuate non-combatants. At this point, the task force had no information on the location or precise numbers of American citizens to be evacuated, but planning proceeded on the assumption that such information soon would be provided. EVALUATION In the future during deliberations over the scope of a contemplated American action, military advisors must provide sound insight to the national, leadership with regard to the selection of the best prepared task force composed of units and staffs that have trained together. Activation of the existing contingency plan would have allowed FORCARICOM to execute a plan prepared by that command minimizing the devastating effect imposed by the short time available for pre-invasion planning. The result achieved by using the plan was a task force composed of units and staffs that knew each other, had trained together, and properly understood each other's procedures. Moltke ("The Elder") said. "No plan survives contact with the enemy. "(13) But that does not mean that you disregard the plan beforehand. By activating the established plan much of the friction, which Clausewitz described as "the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult," would have been prevented. (4:119) To the amazement and consternation of all who wanted information, none was available. From a military point of view, the lack of accurate intelligence was to be the most serious failure of the operations. Perhaps the most serious handicap, aside from the conspicuous lack of good intelligence on all aspects of the operation, was that nobody had a map. (1:131) To plan a military operation without reference to a map is a sure way of making participants unclear and confused about their objectives. To prevent the undersupply of information in the future the CINC and his staff must anticipate the problems in information dissemination to the task force. A map planning package or a contingency plan request to the CINC -- critical to the operation -- should be transmitted prior to EMCON being set. If this request is not received, then the CINC must cue on that omission and transmit the necessary information out to subordinate units. We must fight the bureaucracy's perception that the only way secrecy can be maintained is to exclude from the decision-making process all those who are theoretically charged with carrying out the decision. (5:59) Through military competence and operational security we can dissolve the overriding concern for secrecy that hampers vital information flow. A better balance between operational security and disclosure of critical information necessary for planning can be achieved by revising emissions control (EMCON) procedures, updating communications equipment, and using a little common sense. Parallel and concurrent planning favors the assembly of commanders and staffs of corresponding echelons in the same locality. If such an arrangement is not practicable, the exchange of liaison officers qualified to perform essential planning is necessary. An exchange of liaison officers must be accomplished as early in the planning process as possible. The liaison officers are to ensure such things as link-up frequencies and call signs are distributed and joint fire support measures are in use. Intelligence staffs were caught badly off-balance. (1:129) The CIA should be tasked to provide a Joint Intelligence Liaison Element (JILE). The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) should be tasked to provide a National Military Intelligence Support Team (NMIST). JILE and NMIST can provide advanced communications capabilities and intelligence on an enemy's armaments, intentions, morale and other essential elements of information, to operational commanders in crisis situations. For U. S. military operations to succeed today and in the foreseeable future given the often divergent nature of service interests to succeed in war utilization of "joint" methods, structures, and relationships is required. Interoperabi1ity of communications equipment between all services ought to be pursued in the acquisition cycle and jointly coordinated by each service component. Intrenched and institutionalized interservice rivalries that afflict the defense establishment must be set aside for the common good. The lackluster success of Operation Urgent Fury points to the necessity for a blending of military capabilities into a joint force to achieve military objectives that will support our national objectives. Despite service-specific problems, joint warfighting concepts, processes, and doctrine must be adopted and taught to all operating forces to include all supporting agencies. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Adkin, Major Mark. Urgent Fury. Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1989. 2. Beck, Robert J. The "McNeil Mission" and the Decision to Invade Grenada. Newport: Naval War Review, Spring 1991. 3. Burrowes, Reynold A. Revolution and Rescue in Grenada. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988. 4. Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. 5. Dunn, Peter M. and Watson, Bruce W. American Intervention In Grenada. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985. 6. Gilmore, William C. The Grenada Intervention. New York: Facts on File, 1984. 7. Grenada: A Preliminary Report. Washington,D.C.: U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, December 1983. 8. Lessons of Grenada. Washington,D.C. : U.S. Department of State, February 1986. 9. McNeil, Frank. War and Peace in Central America:Reality and Illusion. New York: Scribner's,1988. 10. Payne, Anthony, Sutton, Paul and Thorndike, Tony. Grenada: Revolution and Invasion. New York: ST. Martin's Press, 1984. 11. Spector, Lieutenant Colonel Ronald H. U.S. Marines in Grenada 1983. Washington,D.C. : History and Museums Division Headquarters, USMC, 1987. 12. Tiwathia, Major Vijay. The Grenada War. New Delhi: Lancer International, 1987. 13. Attributed.
