Marine Reserve Readiness CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Manpower EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Marine Reserve Readiness Author: Major, D.T. Jackson, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The role of the Marine Reserves has increased significantly, so we must ensure that the training structure facilitates achieving their full capabilities. Background: Operation Desert Storm proved that the Marine Corps can, and should, count on its Reserve forces in making its warfighting plans. The Marine Corps was reintroduced to the importance and necessity of the Total Force Policy. The Reserves received praise from their active duty counterparts for their performance and eagerness to serve. This paper specifically addresses the Reserve artillery battalion and the training structure that must be designed to develop our Marines with the focus on warfighting. The countless demands placed on the Reservists during the annual training cycle often detract from their ability to maximize combat readiness. Training must take priority, and artillery battalions must be allowed to train as artillery battalions, complete with the command and control functions exercised over their firing batteries. Geographical dispersion is often viewed as a "show stopper" within the Reserve component, but creative alternatives are possible. The proposed reorganization of the Reserve artillery will actually benefit the artillery community by specifying one common weapon system, the M198 howitzer, and by creating the opportunity for the Reserve battalions to be directly affiliated with an active duty artillery regiment. Recommendation: The Reserve artillery battalion headquarters cannot train autonomously and then be expected to integrate readily into an operational force in combat, therefore, every opportunity must be made available for the battalions to command and control their own firing batteries in a field training environment. Marine Reserve Readiness Outline Thesis statement: The role of the Marine Reserves has increased significantly, so we must ensure that the training structure facilitates achieving their full capabilities. I. Evaluation of mission II. General background A. Personnel B. SMCR drill requirements C. Desert Storm impact III. Drawbacks to present structure A. Geographic isolation B. Training limitations C. Logistical requirements D. Table of Equipment disparities IV. Proposed structure A. Advantages/disadvantages B. Impact on readiness MARINE RESERVE READINESS by Major D.T. Jackson The Marine Corps Total Force Policy was one of the great success stories in Southwest Asia. Years of hard work paid off as reservists and regulars integrated smoothly and efficiently. The Corps deserves great credit for the trust and confidence it showed in the Reserve component. Despite the overwhelming success demonstrated by regulars and reserves alike in the Gulf War, the system is not perfect. This conflict demonstrated that smaller units, predominately company and battery level units, could be activated and integrated with active duty battalions. But what about the activation of entire reserve battalions integrating within active duty regiments? My experience within the reserve community is as an Inspector-Instructor with the artillery battalion and that is where my comments will be focused. The role of the Marine Reserves has increased significantly, so we must ensure that the training structure facilitates achieving their full capabilities. The fact is, the current training structure does not prepare the Reserve artillery battalion staffs to effectively employ their units in a combat environment. This bold statement is based on the present inability of the battalion headquarters to effectively establish tactical command and control of its firing batteries. The mission of the artillery in the Marine division is to furnish close and continuous fire support by neutralizing or destroying targets which threaten the success of the supported unit. To accomplish its mission, artillery conducts three tasks: 1. Provides timely, close, accurate, and continuous fire support. 2. Provides depth to combat by attacking hostile reserves, restricting movement, providing long-range support for reconnaissance elements, and disrupting command and control systems and logistical installations. 3. Delivers counterfire within the range of the weapons systems to ensure the freedom of action of the ground forces. Within the mission, a critical aspect for the battalion headquarters is the ability to command and control. This basic command and control of the artillery battalion is provided within the command post (CP). The CP contains personnel from the intelligence, operations, communications, and logistical sections that assist the commander in planning, coordinating, and executing the field artillery portions of the fire support plan for the supported maneuver unit. Responsibilities within these sections include target planning, tactical fire direction, monitoring current operations, planning future artillery operations, and logistical operations in support of the field artillery. This is but a representative group of tasks that the artillery battalion must conduct in tactical operations. Overall, significant progress has been made within 4th Marine Division during the past five years. This enhancement centers around a philosophy that training takes first precedent. The focus is on being ready if and when mobilized. This emphasis on training has helped all units, particularly those at the battery and company levels. These individual units are virtually autonomous in preparing and executing their field training. However, battalion and higher headquarters are still left to operate as "staff cells," only able to apply operational responsibilities on a limited and infrequent basis. Time is the most precious commodity within the Reserve component. Marine Corps Order P1001R.1, which is the Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual (MCRAMM), states: "Members of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) are required to attend, and participate satisfactorily in, at least 48 scheduled inactive duty training (IDT) periods during each year and serve on annual training for not less than 14 days, exclusive of travel, during each year." (4: 35) This equates to one weekend drill per month for a total of ten for the year and the two-week summer training period. This, of course, is minimal time for Marine warriors to hone their skills. But this is designed by law and unlikely to change, so it requires, all the more, that the emphasis be placed on productive military occupational (MOS) training. In addition to the limited time factor, there is a misperception that the reserve structured annual plan does not address the same requirements as those of the active duty force. The fact is, 4th Marine Division is guided by the Commanding General's Campaign Plan, which is published annually. The reserves are responsible for the same training requirements, i.e., basic skills/essential subjects training, physical fitness test, rifle/pistol requalification, as the regulars. Furthermore, reservists are evaluated on the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) every two years and are responsible for most of the inspection cycles, such as the Field Supply Management Analysis Office (FSMAO) and the various Limited Technical Inspections. The most critical inspection that takes place in the reserve establishment is the Mobilization Operational Readiness Deployment Test (MORDT), which is always given in conjunction with a Commanding General's Inspection (CGI). The MORDT employs the same processing and embarkation procedures that were actually utilized by the activated units of 4th Marine Division during Desert Storm. Realistically, it must be obvious, with the time limitations involved in drill periods it would be impossible for reservists to conduct field training and effectively prepare for these many inspections. Inspection preparations are normally left up to the active duty Inspector-Instructor Staff during non-drill periods. This is often unfortunate because reserve personnel are left out of the hands-on learning cycle dealing with their equipment and maintenance. This type of knowledge can prove beneficial for mobilization and for sustainment in an operational environment. There is another element that is unique to 4th Marine Division and that applies to its immense geographical boundaries. There are active reserve units in all fifty states that fall under the control of the 4th Division. This vast geography often impacts negatively on commands and their subordinate units. To illustrate this point, I refer to 1st Battalion, 14th Marines: Headquarters Battery is located at Treasure Island, California; Battery A is in Spokane, Washington; Battery B is in Pico Riveria, California; and Battery C is located in Jackson, Mississippi. With the emphasis in training on command and control by the battalion staff, the difficulties in this scenario can be visualized. Although not all battalions are separated by such great distances, this situation is fairly prevalent. Under the current training structure, the battalion in its entirety, will train together only once a year at the two-week annual training period. But in the past few years, inevitably, one firing battery within the battalion will be required to fill another commitment elsewhere during this time. Another area of distinction between the active and reserve forces is the actual equipment held on-hand. Both forces utilize Table of Equipment (T/E) documents which depict exactly what a particular military unit rates in regards to equipment. (5: 1) It's safe to say that an artillery firing battery on active duty has the same equipment requirements that an artillery firing battery in the reserves. This holds true as well to the artillery headquarters batteries at both battalion and regimental levels. However, this may not be the case: there are disparities not between the actual T/E's but what is allowed for the reserves to have on hand. The reserves have their T/E document but along with that have a Mechanized Allowance List (MAL) which specifically addresses the items on the T/E that they are allowed to have on-hand. So in theory the equipment is the same, but in reality because of funding and availability of equipment the reserves lack some of their required equipment. The reserves are given the equipment that in many cases is the minimal amount to train and execute their mission. Unfortunately, some of this equipment is communications gear which can enhance the unit's ability to set-up expeditiously and operate more reliably. Despite the fact that much of this gear may become available upon activation and attachment to the regular forces, it is equipment that reservists have not had an opportunity to train with and become proficient on. This does not mean that our reserves cannot adjust quickly, but they must be prepared to modify communication plans and procedures to meet those of the active force. As indicated earlier, the most precious commodity within the 4th Marine Division is the element of time. The authorized number of drill periods allowed a Marine in a given year is mandated by law and unlikely to change, particularly with the present budget cuts. And although some restructuring in regards to geography of units is being studied, it is unlikely to change in the near future. What all this means to the Marine Corps is, despite the limitations placed upon them, the reserves must find a way to train smarter in order to produce effective warfighting battalions. There is no single solution in regards to upgrading the readiness of the reserve battalion staffs. The philosophy that training takes first precedent must exist without reservation. A combination of training priorities must be focused upon. The most critical emphasis is that the reserves must continue to have the opportunity to train with their active duty counterparts whenever possible. Presently, this happens at best once a year during the two-week annual training period during the summer. During this period, the reserve battalion headquarters (staffs) must concentrate on effectively establishing tactical command and control of their firing batteries. Active and reserve artillery battalion staffs should work with one another under a common "standing operating procedure" (SOP) guide. This is a great opportunity for staff members from the intelligence, operations, communications, and logistical sections to realize their responsibilities and actually assist the commander in planning, coordinating, and executing the field artillery portions of the fire support plan for the supported maneuver unit. Furthermore, during well planned exercise scenarios, these staffs will become intimately familiar with their responsibilities of target planning, tactical fire direction, and the other numerous tasks required in artillery tactical operations. Another training evolution that should be pursued, at least on a semi-annual basis, is the battalion fire direction center (FDC) training with those of the firing batteries. This should take place in conjunction with one of the batteries scheduled firing exercises. The "host" battery would take its entire battery to the field as in a normal operation. This battery should be prepared to man six howitzers during the exercise. The battalion FDC, along with the FDC cells from the other two firing batteries, could fly/drive in on the drill weekend of the host battery's scheduled drill. Each FDC would have two howitzers that will in essence act as the gun line, as well as a forward observer to initiate calls for fire. This live-fire scenario allows for realism and gives the battalion FDC the responsibility to integrate with the battery FDC's. The battalion would now have the training opportunity to work on weaknesses and the flexibility to mass fires. The only limitation in this evolution is the creativity in the planning. At least quarterly, headquarters battery should conduct a Command Post Exercise (CPX) utilizing all staff sections. The planning period should be initiated several drills earlier with the culmination being the operation order, and the plan should be mailed to respective section heads prior to the CPX drill. Traditionally, CPX's stress participation from only a few sections, but the goal must be to exercise all sections to a degree that they could realistically be faced with in an actual crisis. Thus, the CPX must take place in a field environment. Command interest in these exercises is paramount, since it often determines their effectiveness. The Marine Corps has utilized Mobile Training Teams (MTT) for use by the reserves; however, the areas of expertise are often limiting and the scheduling difficult. The reserves require the use of MTT's, but they need to be more responsive to their needs. The development of the "battalion staff MTT" would be of great assistance. There should be representatives from the intelligence, operations (to include fire support), communications, and logistical sections. This training would prove beneficial and should focus on the intricacies of the artillery battalion in an operational environment. The preceding discussion on training enhancement is based on alternatives to deal with the limiting factors present within the reserve structure. The key to success within the reserve force is realistic training. In order to fully develop the skills associated with being on the battalion staff, there is no substitute to the actual field experience. While this integrated training may not occur as often as desired, we must take all steps to ensure our training priorities are established with warfighting as the focus. We in the military face uncertainty in our future due to the remarkable events of the last two years. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the conclusion of the 1990 CFE treaty on conventional forces in Europe, the end of the Warsaw Pact as an operational body, the unification of Germany, the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait by an alliance acting with authorization of the United Nations, and, finally, the break-up of the Soviet Union have changed the political landscape irreversibly. These dramatic events will result in monumental changes in structure to our military. The Gulf War signifies the success of coalition warfare, and many have responded that responsibilities should be shared, lifting the burden that has been almost solely on the United States. Out of all this, the cries for defense reductions are now a reality. All military services are attempting to balance these cuts with their required missions. By 1995, the Marine Corps is to be reduced from 196,000 to 159,100. General Mundy recently warned Congress, "the cuts the Hill is requiring are going to cut into the muscle of the Corps." (6: 1) Initially, when cuts were discussed we believed reductions in the active force would result in a build- up of the reserve force. This is untrue, as evident in the projected reduction of the reserve force from 43,000 to 35,000 in 1995. It was General Charles C. Krulak, the Marine Corps' director of procurement, who was assigned to head the force structure planning group assembled last summer by the Commandant. In a recent Navy Times article, "The Smaller Corps," General Krulak discussed non-Fleet Marine Force (FMF) cuts. He maintained that the Marines still need enough active-duty people - 4,000 - to train reservists who played a key role in Operation Desert Storm. And with a smaller active-duty force, reservists will be more critical than ever. General Krulak went on to say that the Reserves, which will be cut to 35,000, will retain their augmentation, reinforcing and reconstitution missions, but the idea of the 4th division/air wing/force service support group "deploying and fighting as an organization is gone." (2: 13) As for reductions within the artillery community, CMC Message R 272012Z JAN 92 discusses the reorganization of Marine Corps artillery units. (1: 3) Although reorganization actions were being reviewed prior to the Gulf War, they were placed on hold when operations in Southwest Asia (SWA) commenced. After operations in SWA, plans were reviewed by participants at an artillery conference and by the force structure planning group. This review confirmed the desirability to reorganize artillery battalions with four batteries of six guns each and validated an initiative to stand-up one Marine Corps Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Battalion. It was determined that artillery reorganization could be completed by 1995. The FY-95 time line was established in anticipation of Congressional funding approval specifically for the MLRS in FY-92. With the unexpected loss of funding for the MLRS, a review determined that without MLRS there would be insufficient artillery flexibility to provide general support for I and II MEF. So without MLRS, a four-battalion base for 10th and 11th Marines is considered essential to ensure a satisfactory Division general support capability. The artillery reorganization also mandates/indicates that all battalions be standardized into M198 battalions in the active and reserve forces. Although this reorganization results in net loss of artillery structure, commensurate with other force reduction decisions, it will retain artillery capabilities to meet higher battlefield operational tempos. This improvement is derived primarily from the new flexibility of each artillery battalion to provide either direct or general support. Consequently, there will be no longer a distinction between direct and general support battalions. The impact on the Reserve artillery regiment is that the SMCR will reorganize to four battalions. Three battalions will consist of four batteries each with six howitzers per battery. This means that the artillery firing batteries will be reduced from eight howitzer sections to six, from eleven howitzer crew members per M198 to nine, and be reorganized from two firing platoons to one. A firing battery's T/O has now gone from 11 officers and 176 enlisted to 8 officers and 131 enlisted. Reorganization of headquarters battery of the artillery battalion reduces the size of naval gunfire spot teams. The T/O goes from 18 officers and 172 enlisted to 18 officers and 167 enlisted. Plans for 14th Marines, the reserve artillery regiment, is to reorganize from five battalions to four. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalion will have four batteries of six guns each. In addition, one battalion headquarters (previously 4th battalion) will be deactivated and 5th battalion will be reorganized into six batteries of six guns - - when M198's become available. The most dramatic issue to surface from the recent CMC message is that upon mobilization, 14th Marines will augment/reinforce the active forces to allow each active artillery regiment to organize with five artillery battalions each. The message went on to further recommend that 14th Marines establish an affiliation of a 14th Marine battalion to each of the other regiments, 10th, 11th, and 12th Marines in order to facilitate the augmentation/reinforcement of those active force artillery regiments. (1: 10) With this direct affiliation, an implied, if not directed, responsibility for combined training must occur. This in itself fosters the greatest advantage of the proposed restructuring plan. It also specifies that in all likelihood reserve artillery battalions will in fact be activated/mobilized as battalions and that those many items discussed in regards to battalion staff responsibilities will come to the forefront. The Reserve artillery regiment has more cause for optimism with the proposed restructure than the active force. By deactivating a battalion headquarters and reorganizing one battalion into six batteries, the reserves really come out of the cuts virtually unscathed. Thus, advantages outweigh the negatives. The entire Marine Corps now comes on line with one artillery weapon system (the M101 will also be retained by MEU/SOC units) the M198, 155mm howitzer. This simplifies training for the Artillery Cannoneer Schools at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and the resident courses set up at each artillery regiment. A common T/O and T/E will now be maintained Corps- wide. The decreased T/O actually helps most reserve units, because they had problems maintaining the required manning levels of the previous T/O. In activating for Desert Storm this was identified as a problem and attaching Marines from one battery to another to "round-out" a mobilized unit was not uncommon. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage, and hopefully it will only be temporary, is the obtaining of additional T/E requirements for an M198 battery over a self-propelled battery. The most prominent of the equipment is obviously the M198 howitzers themselves and the additional M935 5-ton trucks. Apparently, acquisition of additional howitzers will be assisted by the Army. The proposed affiliation with the active regiments described earlier is necessary and at least with 10th and 11th Marines should be geographically linked. This aspect of mobilizing reserve artillery batteries from one coast for service with the division on the opposite coast was a topic for discussion in the 11th Marines, "Marine Corps Lessons Learned Summary" for Operation Desert Storm. (3: 13) Four Reserve Marine artillery batteries were mobilized through Camp Lejeune for service in Southwest Asia. Two of these, H 3/14 from Richmond, Virginia, and I 3/14 from Reading, Pennsylvania, were joined to 11th Marines. Problems were encountered because the two batteries intended for service with 11th Marines were mobilized from the eastern United States through their mobilization site at Camp Lejeune. The active duty battalion they were to join, 1/11, was in Camp Pendleton, thus creating liaison and coordination problems. Additionally, those batteries' T/E and general supply shortages were ordered through 2nd Marine Division upon reaching their mobilization site at Camp Lejeune. The complicated process involved in redirecting these items resulted in the non-delivery of a significant amount. Because the equipment was shipped to Southwest Asia with 2nd Marine Division equipment, several critical items, such as artillery section boxes with howitzer pantels, became mixed with 10th Marines' equipment and never returned. The obvious solution was that artillery units mobilized for service with 11th Marines should come from reserve artillery battalions in the western United States, the Camp Pendleton or MCAGCC, Twentynine Palms, mobilization sites. The mobilization of the Reserve for the Gulf War was the first such mobilization for the Marine Corps since 1950. It was a demanding test of existing policies, structures and procedures; however the achievements of Reserve Marine forces were impressive. As a matter of fact, Reservists served in all elements of I MEF and eventually comprised 15 percent of Marines in theater. The Marine Corps' approach to the Total Force policy must continue in this same vein. Although we are in a new era of military structure and decreased funding, we must seize the opportunity to ensure the Reserve unit training parallels the regulars. The annual requirements are the same and many of the exercises are the same: Combined Arms Exercises, amphibious exercises, and joint exercises such as Team-work, Team Spirit, and Solid Shield. The bottom line is that there must not be two different sets of military experiences, one Regular and the other Reserve. There should only be one: a Marine experience. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. CMC Message R 212002Z Jan 92. Reorganization of Marine Corps Artillery Units. January 1992. 2. Longo, James. "The Smaller Corps." Navy Times, February 17, 1992. 3. Marine Corps Lessons Learned Summary (11th Marines). "Operation Desert Storm." May 1991. 4. Marine Corps Reserve Administration Management Manual. MCO P1001R.1 1982. 5. Marine Corps Table of Equipment, ID N2208. January 1991. 6. Washington Post. Editorial. February 17, 1992.
