Amphibious Forces: The Gulf War (A Study In Quick Response And The Versatility Of Amphibious Forces)
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Amphibious Forces: The Gulf War (A Study in Quick
Response and the Versatility of Amphibious Forces)
Author: Major Charles M. Herndon, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: Although ground forces were the key to our success
in Southwest Asia, Amphibious Forces were activated,
deployed, and provided a variety of options to the CINC
including quick response to contingencies that require the
flexibility only Amphibious Forces can give.
Background: Since the cessation of hostilities in Southwest
Asia, many articles have been written lauding the
performance of U.S. ground forces during Operation Desert
Shield/Storm. To date there has been no mention of the
contribution of amphibious forces deployed to Southwest Asia
in support of operations in the Persian Gulf. This account,
as seen by one who participated with these forces, is an
endeavor to tell their story, highlight their contributions,
and validate the use of Brigade size amphibious forces in
future contingency operations where the respective combatant
CINC's require capability and flexibility of force to turn
the tide in any given situation.
Recommendation: Marine Corps planners consider the
deployment of Brigade size forces, as the only MAGTF potent
enough, to provide a viable deterrent option to the CINC's
in future regional conflicts.
AMPHIBIOUS FORCES: THE GULF WAR
(A STUDY IN QUICK RESPONSE AND
THE VERSATILITY OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES)
OUTLINE
Thesis: Although ground forces were the key to our
success in Southwest Asia, Amphibious Forces were activated,
deployed, and provided a variety of options to the CINC
including quick response to contingencies that required the
flexibility only Amphibious Forces can give.
I. Activation and Embarkation
A. The Lack of Mission
B. Problems of Task Organization
C. The Lack of Amphibious Lift
II. Transit to the North Arabian Sea
A. Development of Transit Groups
B. Communications
C. Logistics
D. Intelligence Requirements
III. On Station Masirah: The Challenges
A. Helicopter Utilization
B. Force Sustainment
C. Command Relationships
D. Employment Options
E. Integration of the 13th MEU
IV. Reconfiguration of MSC Vessels
A. Port Selection/Utilization
B. Alternative Shipping
C. MPS Utilization
D. The Port Operations Group
V. War Preparation
A. Rehearsals and Landings
B. Integration of 13th MEU and 5th MEB
C. Maritime Interdiction Force Operations
VI. Operation Eastern Exit
A. Warning Order
B. Assignment of CATF/CLF
C. Aviation Operations
D. Successful NEO
VII. The Gulf War
A. ATF Participation
B. Amphibious Firsts
C. Operation Sea Angel
Although ground forces were the key to our success in
Southwest Asia (5:22), Amphibious Forces were activated,
deployed, and provided a variety of options to the CINC
including a quick response to contingencies that required
the flexibility only Amphibious Forces can give. There have
been many articles written in the aftermath of the Gulf War
relative to ground operations. The following account
details how amphibious forces were tasked, organized,
deployed, and employed to carry out the CINC's campaign
plan.
During July and August of 1990, the 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade prepared for a major deployment and
training exercise in Norway and Denmark known as
Teamwork/Bold Guard 9O. The Brigade's plans pointed to the
upcoming exercise in northern Europe. These plans would
eventually prove to be of utmost importance when the Brigade
would get the word to "move out" in support of operations in
Southwest Asia.
Even with the ongoing planning for the NATO operation,
the Brigade G-2 kept close tabs on the rapidly deteriorating
situation in Liberia which might require the Brigade's
participation in an evacuation of Americans from Monrovia.
This situation coupled with the outbreak of hostilities in
Kuwait kept the Brigade's intelligence personnel up to their
"ears in alligators." Of the two ongoing problem areas, the
Brigade was leaning towards possible involvement in Liberia
by virtue to its close proximity to LANTFLT forces. They
were soon to find out that their focus would change
drastically and their efforts would be redirected,
accordingly.
On 9 August, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic
Command, directed the Brigade, in concert with Amphibious
Group Two, to deploy to the Gulf region as soon as feasible
in support on the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM).(4:2) With the haste to assign combat power to
the Gulf region, the CATF/CLF were assigned but not with the
amphibious lift required to get the forces there.
Nonetheless, planning between the two staffs led to the
embarkation and deployment of 10,500 Marines and sailors
with their associated equipment and supplies within 12 days
of notification. Such a feat had not been accomplished;
since the dark days of Korea in the summer of 1950.(4:3)
Even with the quick "get-out-of town" plan, the Brigade
deployed without a mission. The open-ended guidance--be
prepared to conduct amphibious landings and sustained
operations ashore--was as close to an Initiating Directive
the Brigade ever received. This guidance forced the staff
to review any and all possible missions, enemy capabilities,
terrain and weather, troops, time, space and logistics
(METT-T-SL) that might impact the Brigade. Major General
Harry W. Jenkins, Jr. as the Commander Landing Force and
Admiral Laplante as the Commander Amphibious Task Force
(1:46) set their staffs to work with direction from CLF
deciding what the Brigade should be tailored to meet.
Priorities of anti-armor weapons, water production
capability, fuel storage capabilities, water and fuel
line-haul, engineer equipment, mobility and counter-mobility
assets, medical, air command and control, anti-air
capabilities, aviation assets, communications, and NBC
clothing and equipment comprised the "shopping list."
While these items were being sourced, II MEF and its
MSC's were assembling the force to go along with the
equipment. Every moment was now critical as the Brigade had
been directed to sail from Norfolk, Virginia, no later than
19 August. The task organization took shape as follows:
GCE, 2d Marines commanded by Col. T.A. Hobbs. ACE, Marine
Aircraft Group-40 commanded by Col. G.F. Burgess. CSSE,
BSSG-4 commanded by Col. J.J. Doyle. To this MAGTF was
added the additional combat power of a company of tanks, two
companies of LAV's, a battalion of artillery, a 20-plane
squadron of AV-8B Harriers, and a squadron of Cobra attack
helicopters. (4:5)
One of the many evolutions ongoing at this time was the
CATF/CLF staff's working feverishly to obtain enough
amphibious lift to move the Brigade. A Brigade of this size
has a lift footprint of 20-23 amphibious ships: the Brigade
was working with only the nine that were authorized to
support Teamwork/Bold Guard 90. After much "arm wrestling"
over ships' maintenance schedules, ships' conditions, and
recent deployments, the CATF/CLF staffs managed to negotiate
four more amphibious ships in support of the ATF. The
number, nine or thirteen, vacillated for four days as the
planning continued. Finally, with considerable efforts by
all concerned, the 13 ship mix was authorized and assigned
to the ATF.
Even with the assignment of the four additional ships,
the Brigade's lift footprint was still significantly larger
than the ships assigned. Work with the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) was at maximum speed to ensure the required
lift could be obtained. On 16 August, the issue culminated
in the assignment of the first MSC vessel in support of the
Brigade. The MV CAPE DOMINGO was the first of five MSC
vessels assigned to support the lift requirement. This
selection would become more and more significant as the
deployment progressed. (4:6)
All of this planning to move the ATF was not done in a
vacuum however. Due to the size of the ATF, the loading at
Norfolk and Morehead City, North Carolina, (MHC) had to be
staggered so as not to overcrowd the ports by the numbers of
personnel and equipment to be loaded. This plan worked well
with the first five "grey-bottom" gators departing MHC on 17
August; the second transit group departing on the 20th; and
the third transit group departing on the 21st. The five MSC
vessels assigned in support of the Brigade were loaded from
two weeks to one month after the Brigade's departure. This
schedule made knowing exactly what was loaded and how it was
loaded nearly impossible, even with the excellent assistance
provided by the Strategic Mobility section from Fleet Marine
Force, Atlantic. Even though a portion of the Brigade's
Assault Echelon (AE) and its Assault Follow-On Echelon
(AFOE) were loaded on "black-bottoms" and the ATF ships were
not optimally loaded, the ATF sailed with a full capability
to conduct an assault in accordance with its mission
guidance. (4:9) This evolution prompted the CLF to spend
much of his first three months at sea, devoting much of his
concern to how the Brigade was deployed, and forcing him to
dedicate as much as 75 percent of his time to logistics
issues. (4:11)
Development of the transit groups presented problems in
itself. With the physical separation of the three groups
and the CLF from his commanders, the CG decided to split the
Command Element into an "Alpha" and "Bravo" group so that
planning could continue with the maximum effectiveness.
This separation turned out to be a blessing in disguise as
radio communications became almost non-existent and message
traffic routed through the Naval Communications Area Master
Station (NAVCAMS) became so back logged with messages that
NAVCAMS Mediterranean was 20,000 messages in arrears by 2
September. The breakdown in the communications network and
the lack of face-to-face communication between commanders
caused by the two to three-day steaming separation between
the transit groups forced the Brigade CommO to some drastic
actions.
The communication problem was addressed in two ways.
The first was the use of the World-Wide Military Command and
Control System (WWMCCS) terminal installed on the USS NASSAU
to provide communications to CONUS and to the theater of
operation. The second was to establish a command
communication channel over which the CG could communicate
with his commanders. When this channel was established,
communications between elements of the MAGTF could be
conducted in the evening hours with the other transit
groups.
Although this effort to communicate helped, it by no
means eliminated the problem. The two areas hardest hit by
the lack of continuous communication were the personnel and
logistics sections of the Brigade. Accurate personnel
counts from the separated units became more and more
difficult to sort. The G-1 could not provide accurate
accountability, either by unit or ship, nor could he
transmit with any regularity notifications of deaths, births
or emergency as they were received. This problem was not
solved until the Brigade rendezvoused in the North Arabian
Sea.
The problem of logistics was far greater than that of
personnel. The MAGTF was embarked, but the requisite data
required to evaluate its full capabilities was being lost in
the communication system. The logisticians understood at
the time of embarkation that the Brigade would be capable of
a full-scale amphibious assault upon arrival in the AO based
on the loads aboard and the information available at the
time of embarkation. However, they also understood that as
the transit groups pushed east additional missions were
being developed and that the ATF would most likely have to
be reconfigured to support them once the ATF reached their
destination in the North Arabian Sea. The "kicker" was that
the logisticians also understood the importance of the five
MSC vessels sailing with the remainder of the AE and the
AFOE. Information obtained from Embarked Personnel and
Material Reports (EPMR) gleaned from WWMCCS indicated that
the vessels assigned were not self-sustaining ships. This
inability to download ATF equipment in-stream would hamper
the flexibility inherent to amphibious forces. A
reconfiguration would have to be planned and conducted soon
after arrival on station. This evolution would not take
place until several weeks after the ATF arrived in the North
Arabia Sea on 16 September 1990.
With all going so negatively, a bright spot
existed. The normally small cadre of G-2 personnel assigned
to the Brigade had been augmented by a contingent from the
newly established 2d Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and
Intelligence Group (SRIG) from Camp Lejeune.(4:14) Composed
of The MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center(MAFC) detachment,
imagery interpreters, interrogator-translator and
topographic detachments, this unit manned the Joint
Intelligence Center with the Navy, providing both CATF/CLF
staffs with an intelligence production center for the ATF.
Conducting all-source fusion of collections efforts and
target intelligence, this combination would mark the first
time that a MAFC had been deployed afloat in support of
contingency operations. (4:14-15)
With this as a start, the Brigade Marines had
thoroughly settled into ship-board life and even through the
daily training evolutions, they were beginning to see places
and parts of the world many of them never thought they would
see: the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal with its vast
Sinai peninsula and abandoned Israeli watch towers; the Red
Sea and movement through the Bab El Mandeb that separates
Yemen and Djibouti.(4:15) Finally, on 16 September after
the transit of the Gulf of Aden, the ATF took up its
position off the tiny Masirah Island in the North Arabian
Sea, a place that would become home to the ATF for the next
eight-and-one-half months.
At last, the transit groups could come together as a
complete ATF once off the island of Masirah. In modified
locations (MODLOC), the ATF reported opcon to COMUSNAVCENT
for operations. The time had come for detailed planning and
the major challenges of force sustainment, component
relationships, employment options, intelligence support, and
the biggest challenge of all: helicopter utilization.
As had been the concern of the ATF throughout the
transit, logistics and sustainment of the force became of
paramount concern. Masirah Island, the site of past small
scale training evolutions, had an airhead that could serve
as the through-put hub for the ATF. Military Airlift
Command (MSC) established the pipeline and COMUSNAVCENT
worked out the details of airhead utilization with the Royal
Air Force of Oman. The problem was the lack of the Navy
Combat Logistic Force (CLF) ships and their organic
helicopter support to work the airhead. With force
sustainment the top priority, Marine helicopters took on the
mission of providing repair parts, mail, cargo, and fresh
fruit and vegetables to the ATF. MAG-40 and Navy aviation
planners (TACRON-22) came to a deadlock on the utilization
and employment of the helicopter assets. The navy planners
committed helicopters without regard to their efficient
utilization and the combat training requirements
yet to be met. Eventually, the planners agreed to the use
of a consolidated air tasking order (ATO).(4:17) This effort
allowed for the support of the ATF and provided centralized
control of the helicopter assets so as to maximize training
of air crews and pilots.
With the air tasking system in place, sustainment of
the force became an all consuming task. Navy and Marine
planners calculated the requirement for at least three CLF
ships to support the ATF. This requirement would allow for
movement of the ships on and off station to provide fuel,
passengers, mail and cargo (PMC) throughout the force. Only
two were provided, which put the "monkey" square on the back
of the ATF. To provide the needed support, the ATF would
have to provide at least one dedicated ship to work the
airhead in conjunction with the CLF ships assigned. With a
consolidation day, airhead operations day, and a
distribution day, the ATF dedicated six out of every seven
days to consolidating, receiving, and distributing
sustainment to the force. This effort was to severely
impact the rehearsal and exercise schedule of the landing
force, as almost always at least one ship had one or more
units missing during rehearsals.
While trying to sustain itself, the ATF was also
working on the command relationships that would be required
to function in the AO. The Brigade on arrival in the AO had
reported to CINCCENT who then passed the force to
COMUSNAVCENT, the naval component commander. The Brigade
was retained in this command relationship throughout its
time in Southwest Asia. At no time was the Brigade, Landing
Force, or the ATF under the OPCON of COMUSMARCENT, even;
though much of the contingency planning was done in support
of MARCENT requirements.(4:19)
MARCENT requirements drove the Brigade staff to look at
any and all possible missions that could be tasked in
support of ground operations. Their work produced the
following employment options:
OPTION 1: MEB level surface-heavy assault with
helicopterborne forces used to reinforce and expand the
beachhead. The 13th MEU (SOC) was now on station and was
integrated into the Brigade planning in order to maintain
their unique capabilities and training.
OPTION 2: MEB level combination surface and
helicopterborne assault with the same mix as Option 1. This
option would be used if the AAA/SAM threat was such as to
let the helo forces go deep inland to conduct a link-up.
OPTION 3: MEB level surface/helicopterborne assault
with 13th MEU as an advance force and then revert to the
landing force reserve.(4:20)
OPTION 4: MEB level heavy raid with two BLT's landing
by helo and surface means. The 13th MEU would be retained
separately for possible supporting mission. (4:20)
OPTION 5: MEB level raid with one BLT reinforced and
a GCE command group landing by helo.(4:21)
OPTION 6: MEB level raid with BLT reinforced with
mechanized assets (LAI and AAV) and a command group from the
GCE. The 13th MEU would be retained for an independent
mission. (4:21)
OPTION 7: MEU level raid reinforced with one
battalion. Landing by helicopter and surface means would be
controlled by the MEU.(4:21)
OPTION 8: MEB level artillery raids supported by both
MEB and MEU assets.(4:21)
OPTION 9: MEU level raids. This option encompassed
the standard 18 MEU (SOC) missions.(4:21)
OPTION 10: MEB level airfield take-down by helicopter
and surface means. MEU would be retained as a separate
entity for this option. (4:21)
These missions once forwarded to COMUSNAVCENT indicated
very clearly that the amphibious force was capable of either
tactical or strategic missions. This capability would not
have been possible without the integration of the 13th MEU
(SOC). The CLF's decision to integrate and not "composite"
the MEU added greatly to the capability of the force as a
whole and allowed for the prudent use of the MEU (SOC)
inherent with its training and capabilities.
While the development of employment options was being
considered, the logisticians were busy doing port surveys in
the area to ascertain their capabilities and limitations.
The five MSC vessels still had to be down loaded and
reconfigured to support the ATF. Additionally, an effort
had to be made to obtain self-sustaining ships that could be
utilized for in-stream down load should an amphibious
mission have to be executed. Both COMUSNAVCENT and Commander,
Military Sealift Command, Southwest Asia (COMSCSWA)
contributed greatly in helping to solve these two problems.
In early October, all five MSC vessels arrived in the North
Arabian Sea. COMSCSWA returned two MPF vessels, the MV
BONNEYMEN and MV BAUGH, from the common-user lift pool, and
designated them as withhold ships in support of the ATF. By
9 O