Marine Corps C2 Systems Integration: Considerations For The Future CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA C4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Marine Corps C2 Systems Integration: Considerations For The Future Author: Major Robert A. Gearhart Jr., United States Marine Corps Thesis: The Marine Corps' ability to effectively integrate multiple C2 systems on future battlefields requires a Corps-wide C4I2 concept implementation, appreciation of C2 system complexities, knowledge of key organizational relationships, educational reform, alteration of traditional MOS progression paths, and efficient manpower utilization. Background: Success on the modern battlefield depends greatly upon the responsiveness of various C2 systems and their timely interpretation, presentation, and dissemination of critical information to operational commanders. The importance of this issue is magnified by the fact that the Marine Corps continues to develop and field a significant number of C2 systems which intersect all battlefield functional areas. C2 systems interoperability is critical within an integrated environment that shares information both horizontally and vertically. Significant corrective costs, as well as degraded operational capabilities result from poorly planned or incorrect C2 systems integration. Such results will be unacceptable in the constrained fiscal environments of the future. A basic C4I2 concept has been published in CMC White Letter 1-91. The Marine Corps organizational structure is currently struggling to implement this concept throughout the Fleet Marine Force, and the Supporting Establishment. The diversity of MAGTF employment options also raises concern for C2 systems integration within a joint or combined environment. Additionally, current professional military education, traditional MOS progression paths, and manpower utilization do not maximize C2 system integration efforts within the Marine Corps. Recommendations: The Marine Corps can streamline C2 systems integration by employing the C4I2 concept, improving professional military education, removing M0S progression path impediments, and using a more logical manpower to billet assignment process. MARINE CORPS C2 SYSTEMS INTEGRATION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OUTLINE Thesis Statement: The Marine Corps' ability to effectively integrate multiple C2 systems on future battlefields requires a Corps-wide C4I2 concept implementation, appreciation of C2 system complexities, knowledge of key organizational relationships, educational reform, altering traditional MOS progression paths, and efficient manpower utilization. I. Background A. State of Technology Today B. C4I2 Concept C. Marine Corps C4I2 Reorganization Issues II. MAGTF C2 Systems A. Tactical Versus Supporting Establishment C2 Systems B. Intelligence Systems 1. Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS) 2. Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS) 3. Intelligence Analysis System (IAS) C. Operations/Fire Support C2 Systems 1. Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) 2. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) D. Combat Service Support C2 Systems 1. Marine Integrated Logistics System (MILOGS) 2. MAGTF Il/Logistics Automated Information Systems (MAGTF II/LOG AIS) III. Organizations Impacting C2 Systems Integration A. Commandant of the Marine Corps (C4I2 Department) B. Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) C. Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) IV. Current Impediments To C2 Systems Integration A. Professional Military Education B. MOS Progression Paths C. Manpower Utilization MARINE CORPS C2 SYSTEMS INTEGRATION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE Given the complexity of current and emerging command and control (C2) systems, the sheer number and speed of technological advances applicable to warfighting are almost incomprehensible. Innocently enough, the intent of this movement is to simplify things in an increasingly complex combat environment. However, by making things easier, technology has also made things more difficult. Nowhere is this more evident than within the realm of C2 for operational forces. Indeed, success on the modern battlefield depends greatly upon the responsiveness of various C2 systems and their timely interpretation, presentation, and dissemination of critical information to decision makers. Within the past several years, literally hundreds of C2 systems supporting various combat functional areas such as intelligence, fire support, air operations, maneuver, logistics, and communications have been fielded. This literal flood of state-of-the-art information systems demonstrates the complexities which technology brings to the battlefield. To further complicate matters, Marine Corps C2 systems will be required to accept information from and provide information to a myriad of allied, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Department of Defense (DoD), Joint Staff, Army, Navy, and Air Force C2 systems when conducting ioint or combined operations. Without proper employment or understanding, these well-intentioned C2 systems will quickly overload the very operational commander they were designed to assist. Currently, the Marine Corps does not properly train or utilize officers to employ multiple C2 systems in an integrated environment. Over time, the lack of focus in these areas actually works against efforts to provide meaningful C2 systems integration within the Marine Corps. Such neglect could prove detrimental, if not fatal, in the increasingly complex battlefield environment facing Marine forces in the future. Additionally, degraded operational capabilities, as well as significant corrective costs, result from poorly planned or incorrect C2 systems integration. The Marine Corps' ability to effectively integrate multiple C2 systems on future battlefields requires a Corps-wide C4I2 concept implementation, appreciation of C2 system complexities, knowledge of key organizational relationships, educational reform, alteration of traditional Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) progression paths, and efficient manpower utilization. If the Marine Corps continues to ignore addressing these issues, the development and operation of multiple C2 systems in an integrated environment will be fragmented and degraded. In order to meaningfully integrate C2 systems throughout the Marine Corps, there must first exist a basic philosophy and understanding of the "C4I2 concept". General Gray described the essence of this concept in White Letter 1-91, and charged commanders to "...instill the C4I2 concept into your Marines until it becomes the only way of thinking with regard to the effective integration of all command and control assets to support the commander".(1) Although the Marine Corps is currently moving in the right direction, not everyone is fully on board yet. To be effective, C2 systems integration requires the understanding and efforts of all involved, or we will fall short of the goal - supporting the operational commander. Once fully accepted, this philosophy will permeate doctrine and subsequently provide a common roadmap for C2 systems integration within the realms of policy, requirements, acquisition, operations, and life cycle support. As both resources and personnel shrink in the coming budgets, the criticality of doing C2 systems integration right (the first time), should be clearly evident. The C4I2 concept presented in CMC White Letter 1-91 is relatively simple: - Positive command and control are critical to success in war - A commanders ability to receive, process, disseminate, and display all information required to support decision making and effective control of forces are keys to success on the modern battlefield - Command and control systems include personnel, equipment, facilities, communications, procedures and information. Together as a whole these assist the commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling operations of assigned forces. - Interoperability links the C4I2 concept - Command and control systems must support how we organize and fight as MAGTFs, either independently or in concert with joint and combined commands.(2) Recently, several reorganizations have taken place to support introduction of the C4I2 concept within the Marine Corps. At the Headquarters Marine Corps level, the C4I2 Department has combined the functions of communications, automated information processing, intelligence, and systems interoperability under a single policy sponsor. In the Fleet Marine Force, the Surveillance Reconnaissance Intelligence Groups support the operational commanders by communicating, fusing, and disseminating a myriad of information throughout the battlefield. Finally, the Communication Electronics Officer (CEO) and Information Systems Management Officer (ISMO) functions have been combined to form the G-6 at the general staff level.(3) However, as takes place during any reorganization that also implements a new operating philosophy, a certain degree of misunderstanding and resentment have occurred. At some levels, both personal opinions and political "ricebowl" issues still prevent a Corps-wide "sensor-to-shooter" C4I2 concept implementation. The crux of this problem lies in the fact that C2 systems can still be acquired without coordination by many organizations within the Marine Corps. While normally well- intentioned, C2 systems purchased from a local commanders discretionary funds, often add to, rather than solve the problem. Functional managers of Automated Information Systems (AIS's) within the Supporting Establishment (SE) often procure first and ask MAGTF interconnection questions second. Today, C2 systems integration crosses all functional areas. Tactical systems are required to interface with administrative systems on a daily basis to support commanders. Supporting Establishment (garrison) systems are taken to the field and plugged into tactical systems. There exists almost no distinction between the two anymore in this age of information transportation. Both sides still remain separated, albeit moving begrudgingly toward some sort of eventual agreement. However, in the present environment of rapid technological developments, the movement is not fast enough. The key players cannot even agree upon who should establish standards for the Marine Corps. This particular issue has prevented updating the Marine Corps C2 Systems Interoperability Order (MCO 3093.1C) for over two years. Publishing the new version would be a major step in the right direction. Such action would provide clear policy guidance throughout the Marine Corps concerning "total" C2 systems integration in consonance with the spirit and intent of the C4I2 concept. This should be a top priority, and provide a working cornerstone, thus allowing everyone within the Marine Corps involved with C2 systems integration to work from the same sheet of music. Existent within the Marine Corps today are literally hundreds of C2 systems, some of which were developed and fielded over two decades ago. The challenge facing the Marine Corps is one of integrating these C2 systems developed in an age of "functional stovepiping" with modern C2 systems employing a "horizontal vice vertical" philosophy to exchanging information. Indeed, Marines have painfully come to realize that it is more efficient and accurate for functional area C2 systems to share information rather than to operate in an independent environment. This approach, while preferred, is extremely difficult for acquisition program managers to implement and coordinate. The various C2 systems with which their product must integrate are at various life cycle stages. Some may have been fielded for years, and now require retrofit, while others in development may require expensive changes or upgrades. One can quickly surmise that without some overall coordination mechanism, things could quickly fall apart. The Marine Corps as an entity needs to understand and appreciate the challenges of fielding MAGTF/SE systems compatible with existing USMC/Joint C2 systems. Additionally, within the parameters of increased fiscal constraints, these systems must be capable of expanding to meet future required operational capabilities. This is no small task considering the multiple aspects involved such as: joint fielding schedules, initial operational capability deadlines, data communications protocols, data elements, software languages, message formats, waveforms, frequency hopping parameters, baud rates, etc., which require detailed coordination and addressal. The following section is included to provide a synopsis of the scope and variety of C2 systems currently under development within various MAGTF functional areas. It should in no way be construed as even closely approximating all the C2 systems currently being addressed throughout the Marine Corps. The intelligence community currently has multiple C2 systems in various phases of development and fielding. The Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS) is being procured to provide MAGTF commanders with near real-time tactical intelligence. The ATARS suite will be employed on the F/A-18D and Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) platforms. A data link communications capability will allow ATARS to feed raw imagery into intelligence systems, which in turn will provide targeting and other information to multiple MAGTF C2 systems.(4) The Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS), scheduled for FY-93 procurement, will be the ground-processing facility capable of receiving soft copy data link images from systems such as ATARS, as well as both national and theater sources. Information provided by JSIPS will then feed other MAGTF C2 systems. Thus, JSIPS will allow the Marine Corps to exploit near- real-time soft copy digital imagery provided by various organic, theater, and national systems.(5) Several systems are combined to form the Intelligence Analysis System (IAS). This fusion center will process all-source information on the enemy, weather, and terrain provided via communication links with other systems such as: JSIPS, the Technical Control and Analysis Center (TCAC), and the Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES).( 6) The Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) system continues to evolve as the centerpiece of MAGTF C2. This automated system will receive, display, fuse, and disseminate input provided from C2 systems in other MAGTF functional areas via Local and Wide Area Networks (LANs/WANs). TCO capabilities include, display of current enemy and friendly tactical situations, automated message handling, and dissemination of operation orders/overlays. TCO is being acquired for use within the MAGTF command element and at all levels in the GCE, ACE, and CSSE.(7) Providing automated fire support coordination and tactical fire direction functions within the MAGTF, the Multi-service Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (MAFATDS) will enhance the employment and coordination of surface and air delivered fires. Additionally, MAFATDS system interfaces include the Position Location Reporting System (PLRS), and the Army's Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).(8) Within the Combat Service Support arena, the Marine Integrated Logistics System (MILOGS) is designed to provide the MAGTF commander with near-real-time, automated logistics data. MILOGS serves to enhance the visibility of logistics assets and interfaces with TCO and the MAGTF II/Logistics Automated Information Systems (MAGTF II/LOG AIS). Eight mutually supporting automated systems form the basis of MAGTF II/LOG AIS. Component systems include the following: MAGTF II War Planning Model, the Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movements System, a Computer-Aided Embarkation Management System, (CAEMS), a Computer Aided Load Manifesting (CALM) system, a Terminal Operations Management System/Cargo Management Subsystem, the Landing Force Asset Distribution system, MAGTF Deployment Supporting System II, and a MAGTF Data Library. Together, these logistics systems support both deliberate and time-sensitive planning, and operations from initiation of mobilization/deployment through employment in an assigned area of responsibility.(9) Within the functional area of aviation, the Advanced Tactical Air Command Central (ATACC), scheduled for FY-93 procurement, incorporates state-of-the-art technology to command and coordinate tactical air operations, conduct automated mission planning, and provide Air Tasking Order (ATO) generation and processing. The ATACC will provide the MAGTF commander with the capability to direct and coordinate organic aviation assets, as well as aviation assets from other services and/or nations. Current ATACC interfaces include the TCO system, and the Improved Direct Air Support Center (IDASC).(10) All the previously mentioned C2 systems are being interconnected under a concept named the Marine Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS). Thus, the myriad of component systems comprising MTACCS are being integrated to provide the MAGTF commander an ability to receive, process, filter, and display data in a usable format for tactical decision making. A comprehensive automated tactical system, MTACCS combines disparate battlefield functional areas by employing common hardware, standard operating systems, and software developed to common standards. Connectivity via a digital communications "backbone" links MTACCS throughout the MAGTF.(11) This relatively short review of emerging MAGTF C2 systems merely scratches the surface at best, and does not even address C2 systems present within the garrison (supporting establishment) environment. Literally hundreds of other existing systems are in place throughout the Marine Corps. The complexity of developing, acquiring, fielding, maintaining, and integrating modern C2 systems cannot be overemphasized. If properly understood, planned, and coordinated, the integration of multiple C2 systems can provide the MAGTF commander with a formidable combat multiplier. Conversely, a less than total approach to C2 systems integration merely invites disaster. Present organizational relationships within the Marine Corps, if exercised correctly, are properly structured to support C2 systems integration. The Marine Corps Interoperability Program has been instituted to ensure continuity and coordination of the C2 system integration effort. This interoperability program, which supports a "cradle-to-grave" C2 system integration approach, derives its mission from several Department of Defense (DoD) and Joint Staff policy memorandums. Specifically, DoD Directive 4630.5 requires all DoD C3I systems to be compatible and interoperable. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Memorandum of Policy (MOP) - 160 tasks services and agencies to possess the compatibility and interoperability necessary to ensure success in Joint and Combined operations, and to regularly test/verify the interoperability of C2 system interfaces. Internal to the Marine Corps, MCO 3O93.1C establishes the policy and management procedures that govern interoperability parameters of C2 systems integration. Within the Marine Corps, several organizations are responsible for ensuring successful C2 systems integration. Every step of the process including policy, requirement identification, research, development, acquisition, fielding, operation, and post deployment support is being monitored by a responsible office. Principle "players" include the Assistant Chief of Staff for Command, Control, Communication and Computer, Intelligence and Interoperability (CMC-C4I2); the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC); and the Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM). A quick review of the responsibilities of principle organizations impacting C2 systems integration in the Marine Corps is vital to understand and appreciate this complex process. CMC (C4I2) establishes overall Marine Corps C2 systems integration policy, publishes and maintains the Interoperability Management Plan (IMP), and chairs the Interoperability Policy Board (IPB). The IMP provides the Marine Corps with detailed C2 systems interoperability program guidance, to include Joint/Combined interface efforts. The IPB serves as a resolution forum that addresses various interoperability issues within the Marine Corps. Additionally, CMC (C4I2) reviews and certifies that C2 system interoperability requirements have been met at each program decision milestone. MCCDC is responsible for validating Marine Corps C2 system operational interoperability requirements and standards. The C3I Proponency section publishes and maintains the MAGTF Interoperability Requirements Concepts (MIRC) document which is a compendium of interoperability requirements, based on doctrine, that contains information exchange requirements for Marine Corps, Joint, Agency, and National C2 facilities. Additionally, MCCDC assures that new C2 system interface requirements are evaluated for integration with fielded C2 systems. Finally, MCCDC is the "keeper" of C2 systems integration doctrine. It should be noted that MCCDC is the proponent for only the FMF, and not the supporting establishment. MARCORSYSCOM, specifies technical standards which drive the interoperability of C2 systems. MARCORSYSCOM program managers oversee the research, development and acquisition of Marine Corps C2 systems identified as requirements by MCCDC. Espousing a "cradle-to-grave" philosophy, MARCORSYSCOM is also responsible for continuing to support systems after fielding. In reality this effort is delegated to Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Barstow/Albany or the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA). To aid the C2 systems integration effort, MARCORSYSCOM maintains the Marine Tactical Systems Technical Interface Design Plan (MTS-TIDP), which serves as a repository of approved Marine Corps data element, message, and communications protocol standards. Additionally, MARCORSYSCOM produces the Marine Corps Tactical Communications Architecture (MCTCA) which is an architectural baseline that integrates interoperability requirements, standards, and C2 systems. Finally, MARCORSYSCOM coordinates required annual Joint and Combined interoperability testing of Marine Corps C2 systems. Organizational support for C2 systems integration within the Marine Corps is both complex and comprehensive. Along the "cradle- to-grave" path many things must be accomplished by many different offices and people to ensure success. The basic management hierarchy is in place for C2 systems integration to work. Strict adherence to the C4I2 concept, in accordance with MCO 3O93.IC, is required to force local commanders, the SE, and MARCORSYSCOM to properly coordinate C2 system integration throughout the Marine Corps. However, properly educated and qualified Marines are still required within key billets of these various organizations to make it happen. A deficiency exists today concerning C2 systems integration, concepts, and capabilities within the framework of the current Marine Corps educational system. Presently, most basic Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)-producing schools, intermediate-level schools, and top-level schools only pay "lip service" toward increasing awareness of the complexities surrounding C2 systems integration. To impart an appreciation of the importance of interacting with C2 systems to all Marine officers, regardless of MOS, the educational system must actively address C2 system integration within each respective curriculum. Such an approach would create a healthy basic awareness among C2 system "users" in the Marine Corps officer community, ultimately making the job of those performing C2 systems integration that much easier. The requirement for this cross-training should be identified to the Marine Air Ground Training and Education Command (MAGTEC) so that current programs of instruction could be modified. Current Marine Corps manpower policies regarding progression paths within the communications, data systems, and air command and control MOS's hinder rather than help the effort to provide officers capable of performing C2 systems integration. These progression paths routinely switch officers between MOS-related assignments (both within the Fleet Marine Force and the Supporting Establishment) and assignments outside a particular MOS, such as recruiting duty or other "B-billets". The goal of this policy is to produce a "well-rounded" officer. However, this policy produces an atrophy of skills in technical MOS's, and takes officers "out of circulation" for significant amounts of time. Given the rapid pace of technological development today, this "out of the saddle" syndrome negates the considerable costs and time invested by the Marine Corps in training these officers. The irony concerning this situation is particularly unsettling: if these officers were allowed to remain in their respective specialties and become proficient at conducting C2 systems integration, they would be considered unpromotable. Therefore, the Marine Corps promotion system must recognize and make necessary adjustments for officers in specialties performing C2 systems integration. These adjustments must include provisions allowing designated communication, data system, and aviation C2 officers to remain in assignments or billets that positively affect increased MAGTF C2 systems integration, without adversely impacting their promotion opportunities. This approach will serve to stabilize the C2 systems integration efforts within the Marine Corps, prevent atrophy of technical skills, and allow Marine Corps C2 systems to keep pace with current state-of-the-art technological developments. To further complicate matters, certain Table of Organization (T/O) billets exist within the communication, data systems, and aviation C2 specialties which require the ability to conduct C2 systems integration. Neither these billets nor the officers possessing C2 systems integration expertise are flagged in any manner by the current manpower system. Therefore, no mechanism exists to ensure that officers capable of performing C2 systems integration are properly placed by the manpower system in billets requiring such a skill. The situation in this area requires teamwork and cooperation between the communications, data system, aviation C2 specialties and the Marine Corps Manpower system. First, the military occupational specialty fields must identify T/O billets throughout the FMF and Supporting Establishment structure which require C2 systems integration experience and knowledge. Next, the Manpower system must identify officers, who either have formal or on-the-job C2 systems integration training. This could be done via an additional MOS designation or other discriminator. Once accomplished, monitors could then assign qualified personnel to billets which actually require C2 systems integration experience. The benefits are immediately obvious. By matching known abilities to specific billets, this approach offers a high probability of allowing the Marine Corps to unlock and best utilize the combat multiplier potential of effective C2 systems integration. Indeed, the effectiveness of warfighters is degraded by C2 systems that are not interoperable, or flexible, or do not provide appropriate information to commanders in a timely manner. Degraded operational capabilities, as well as significant corrective costs, result from incorrect C2 systems integration. Integration of C2 systems within the Marine Corps and across Joint/Combined interfaces is not an easy task. However, the solutions could be enacted with relatively minimal turbulence given a cooperative approach by Marines from the respective educational, manpower, and occupational field communities. Thus, through improved understanding, education, relaxing of MOS progression path impediments, and more logical manpower to billet utilization, the Marine Corps can drastically improve C2 systems integration efforts. Without properly qualified officers to occupy key billets within Marine Corps command structures that affect policy, requirements, doctrine, acquisition, and post-deployment software support of C2 systems, the inability to effectively perform C2 systems integration will continue to haunt the Marine Corps. ENDNOTES 1. Commandant of the Marine Corps, White Letter No. 01-91, 26 Jun 1991. 2. CMC White Letter, No. 01-91. 3. CMC White Letter, No. 01-91. 4. United States Marine Corps, Concepts and Issues, Ninth Edition, 1991, p.3-13. 5. USMC, Concepts and Issues, p.3-23. 6. USMC, Concepts and Issues, p.3-19. 7. USMC, Concepts and Issues, p.3-18. 8. USMC, Concepts and Issues, p.3-18. 9. USMC, Concepts and Issues, p.3-19. 10. USMC, Concepts and Issues, pg.3-22. 11. USMC, Concepts and Issues, p.3-18. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Boros, LtCol. Louis L., "Automated Command and Control for the MAGTF: Can It Be Done?", Marine Corps Gazette, Vol 74, No.12, Dec 90. 2. Burkett, LtCol. Jack, "Command and Control: The Key To Winning", Military Review, Vol.7O, No.7, Jul 90. 3. Coates, Maj Robert A., "Automated Support for Command and Control", Marine Corps Gazette, Vol 74, No.12, Dec 90. 4. Commandant of the Marine Corps, "C4I2 Concept", White Letter, No. 01-91, Jun 91. 5. Gray, Gen. Alfred M., "Marines Streamline C3I, Merge Interoperability", Signal, Vol 44, Nov 89. 6. Marine Corps Order 3093.1C, "Intraoperability and Interoperability of Marine Corps Tactical C4I Systems", Jun 89. 7. Parker, Jay P., "C2 for the Cutting Edge", United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol 114/10/1028, Oct 88. 8. Tuttle, VADM Jerry O, "Command is the Name of the Game", Signal, Vol 43, Jun 89. 9. United States Marine Corps, Concepts and Issues, Ninth Edition, 1991. 10. Van Crevald, Martin, Command In War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985. 11. Wickham, Gen. John A. Jr., "C3I as a Force Multiplier", Signal, Vol 42, Apr 88.
