Battlefield Mobility And The Soldier's Load Major William L. Ezell, USMC CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title. BATTLEFIELD MOBILITY AND THE SOLDIER'S LOAD Thesis. To ensure that our forces possess the speed and agility necessary to successfully concentrate and win on tomorrow's battlefields, the Marine Corps must educate its leaders on the concept of "load tailoring" in order to eliminate the dangerous overloading of our infantryman. Issue. The problem of overloading the individual fighting man has been with us since the beginning of time and continues unsolved into the period of modern warfare. Numerous examples of soldier overloading litter the pages of history. For over two centuries, military leaders and researchers have sought the answer to the elusive optimum load. Despite countless studies and numerous wars, neither researcher nor commander have been able to agree on a solution which will satisfy the requirements of the average infantryman. The inability to resolve this issue continues to threaten the mobility of individual Marines and their units on future battlefields. Conclusion. Overloading of the individual infantryman is a problem caused by leaders, and can be fixed by leaders. The solution will not require a single piece of new gear, nor will it require an increase to our manpower. It will require a commitment by leaders at all levels to educate themselves and their men on the problems of overloading and their many solutions. BATTLEFIELD MOBILITY AND THE SOLDIER'S LOAD OUTLINE Thesis Statement. To ensure that our forces possess the speed and agility necessary to successfully concentrate and win on tomorrow's battlefields, the Marine Corps must educate its leaders on the concept of "load tailoring" in order to eliminate the dangerous overloading of our infantryman. I. Soldier's Load A. Historical Perspective B. Roots of the Problem C. Technology's Impact II. Load Planning A. The Human Factor B. Optimum Load Concepts C. Load Tailoring III. Training and Education BATTLEFIELD MOBILITY AND THE SOLDIER'S LOAD The problem of overloading the individual fighting man has been with the us since the beginning of time and continues unsolved into today's warfare. This problem has been the subject of a great deal of research and writing. The age old question of what to carry into battle, and what to leave behind, remains a perplexing dilemma to commanders and soldiers alike. History has demonstrated that some military leaders understood and took steps to deal with the problems associated with overloading the individual soldier. Napoleon was one of the first commanders to publish guidance to his soldiers on a fighting load appropriate for engaging the enemy. Although his load often varied, he normally required "...forearm and ammunition, entrenching tool, knapsack and four days' rations." (5:219) In America, Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson provided the military establishment with its first lesson in load planning and its influence on tactics. Jackson's magnificent "foot cavalry" of the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1862 marched and fought 670 miles in 48 days without any appreciable loss in effectiveness. Descriptions of Jackson's hard-fighting divisions portray units who discarded all but the essential equipment to fight and win on the battlefield: The coatee issued in the early days of the war had already given place to a short-waisted and single- breasted jacket. Overcoats were soon discarded. ... Nor did the knapsack long survive. ... But the men still clung to their blankets and waterproof sheets, worn in a roll over their their left shoulder. (4:168) Unfortunately, history is replete with examples of commanders who turned their men into beasts of burden, and consequently lost the ability to move their men and individual equipment to the decisive place on the battlefield. Hardy Roman Legionnaires on the march carried 80-pound loads on the long spiked stakes slung across their shoulders. Byzantine infantrymen found themselves with similar loads. Their ration carts and pack horses did little to relieve their individual loads. During the American Revolution, British soldiers "fought their loads" in addition to the American colonists. (10: 25) During the First World War, the French "poilu's" load weighed 85 pounds. On campaign in North Africa, the French Foreign Legion marched 25 miles a day with 100-pound packs. In the equally inhospitable terrain of Burma during World War Two, British infantrymen in Wingate's Chindits carried 70- to 90-pound loads. American soldiers in Vietnam carried packs whose weight made them disinclined to crawl when under fire. (6:120) "They walked," wrote F.J. West in Small Unit Action in Vietnam, "because they were tired and it was easier to move than to stand. The weight and bulk of their equipment contributed greatly to this fatigue...." In October 1983, the United States invaded the island of Grenada. Although the island was small and enemy capability considered to be minimal, the soldiers in the assault carried enormous loads. When Army Rangers jumped onto the runway at Salinas airfield, the average load carried by each man was 167 pounds. (7: 61) What was the difference between those armies that carried the appropriate load for the task at hand, and those that did not? The answer is that experienced combat leaders and their staffs knew what had to be carried by the individual and what should be transported for him. In other words, they knew what was important and what was not. Having dissected the problem of overloading and its impact on the ability of our infantrymen to fight on the modern battlefield, we must now solve the problem. Thankfully, the solution will not require a single piece of new gear, nor will it require an increase to our manpower. Instead, it will require a commitment by leaders at all levels to educate themselves and their men on the problems of overloading. Acknowledgment of the problem is one part of the remedy. To ensure that our forces possess the speed and agility necessary to concentrate and win on tomorrow's battlefields, the Marine Corps must educate its leaders on the concept of "load tailoring" in order to eliminate the dangerous overloading of our infantryman. From the stone age to the industrial age, the individual soldier has been forced to bear the same burdens as his ancestors. Despite computer-age solutions to many perplexing military problems, few technological advances have been made to lessen the total weight carried by today's infantrymen. Although analysts and technicians continue to research and test lighter equipment and clothing, technology continues to demonstrate that it will never provide more than a partial solution to the problem. For example, when the Army replaced the 7.62mm M14 rifle with the 5.56mm M16 rifle, it achieved a weight reduction of some four pounds. But because the 5.56mm round of ammunition weighed less than the 7.62mm round, infantry leaders insisted that their soldiers carry more rounds. (1:9) As a result, little progress was made in the effort to reduce the net weight carried by the individual rifleman. As we have seen, history's "great captains" recognized that tactical mobility is one of the great principles of war and that the ability to gain this advantage is often paramount to victory. Warfare throughout the ages has demonstrated that technology will only serve as a partial solution to the problem. Although no load is the ideal load for fighting efficiency and every pound an infantryman carries cuts down his mobility and the tactical mobility of his unit, the solution of the load carrying problem will be a compromise between what the individual must carry to do his job and the ideal. The soldier must carry the minimum essential load and in a way that causes the least adverse effect on his operating efficiency. (2: 7) Today's commanders must give serious consideration to the problem of overloading and its effects on battlefield mobility. The solution will not be found in a simple set of prescriptive rules; risk acceptance and sound judgement will continue to be the foundation upon which any viable answer must rest. We must continue to guard against the tendency to let technology solve our problems. As FMFM l warns, "...technology cannot and should not-attempt to eliminate man from the process of waging war." LOAD PLANNING The purpose of load planning is twofold. First, it allows the commander to make an intelligent decision based on the information available. He does this by analyzing and evaluating the courses of action that have been presented by his S-3 and by considering the estimates of supportability presented by his staff. Second, it recognizes the potential impact of the soldier-load problem and emphasizes the need to carry only what is necessary. An important consideration in determining the proper load for the individual is a thorough understanding of the physiological capabilities of the person carrying the load. Finally, the impact of psychological and emotional factors upon a unit and its men must be considered. THE HUMAN FACTOR Analyzing the soldier's load physiologically raises the question of what is the physical load-carrying capacity of the average fighting man in battle. It is clear that any attempt to maximize a Marine's load-carrying capabilities can only be relevant if all sides of the problem are uncovered. As far back as 1870, European scientists initiated scientific investigations to measure the physiological cost to the soldiers of carrying various loads under various degrees of temperature. These and other studies in Europe and the United States led to a determination of energy expenditures by the human body in terms of calories per hour for various forms of physical activity (e.g., marching) and weight of loads carried. These studies concluded that a soldier could sustain indefinitely a maximum energy expenditure of 5000 to 6000 calories for 24 hours. Since the normal body operating functions and minimum living activity requirements amount to an expenditure of about 3200 calories per 24 hours in a temperate climate, we see that approximately 1800 to 2800 calories are available for the additional physical activities of marching, running, digging, load carrying and the like. (11:3-4) One study of particular interest was conducted by the Institute William Frederick in Germany in: the last few years of the 19th century. The institute was particularly interested in measuring the effect on infantrymen who were carrying different loads under varying conditions of temperature. The research demonstrated that a load of 48 pounds could be carried by a well-conditioned soldier in cool weather with little difficulty. However, in warm weather the same load produced an impairment in physical strength, and the soldiers did not return to a normal state until some time during the following day. Other German experiments focused on the effects produced by increasingly heavier loads. The results demonstrated that soldiers continued to show physical distress regardless of the degree of physical conditioning. The study, therefore, concluded that it is impossible to condition the average soldier to march with a load once it reaches 69 pounds no matter how much training he is given. (8:48-49) This conclusion is in direct conflict with many infantry and specialized unit training philosophies today. Energy expenditure is another part of the puzzle which is essential to the infantryman's sustainability on the battlefield and merits further discussion. First, it is important to determine what causes energy expenditure by an individual soldier. Next, we will review potential methods which will reduce the amount of energy expended on the battlefield. The energy (energy cost) to perform a given task is dependent on a number of variables. The primary variables include the total weight of the load, rate of movement, grade or slope of the terrain, the firmness of the ground, and the physical condition, size, and fitness of the soldier. (14:LES) It is worthy of note that these factors deal almost exclusively with the physical aspects of war while neglecting in large part those all-important moral aspects of war and their expected impact on the battlefield. In order to gain a multidimensional approach to the problem we must look beyond those physical aspects common to warfare. The psychological and emotional factors which impact on the individual Marine in combat are paramount to any analysis of energy loss. In battle, stresses caused by fear, hunger, shock, panic, and mental fatigue are interdependent. As described by one veteran of Omaha Beach in World War II: We were all surprised to find that we had suddenly gone weak, and we were surprised to discover how much fire men can move through without getting hit. Under fire we learned what we had never been told--that fear and fatigue are about the same in their effect on an advance. (8:44) The second and perhaps more difficult of the issues is how to reduce the amount of energy expended due to psychological stress. Recognizing that symptoms of fear and fatigue are similar in both appearance and in cure gives us our first hint to the solution. The following passage provides a superb historical example: During the Korean conflict, the remnants of the Army's 7th Division which the 1st Marine Division brought out over the ice of the Chosin in a heroic exploit, had been enveloped by the enemy for the greater part of one week. The cold, privation, and the suffering at the hands of the Chinese Communist Forces had been extremely harsh throughout. In the case of these men, Major General Oliver Smith felt that at least 48 hours of total rest was essential. At the end of that time, he concluded by personal inspection that the ones who had escaped wounds and frostbite could march out with the column from Hagaru-ri and do normal duty. (8:viii) At the heart of the solution is the leader. For it is the leader, and he alone, who will make the critical decisions as to the cause and solution for the unit's degradation of fighting power. General Smith recognized the problem and prescribed sleep in order to bring his Marines back to fighting capability. In each combat situation, the circumstances change but the fact remains that the average individual will continue to lose energy from psychological stress as well as physical exertion. So what can commanders do to adequately prepare their units for the rigors of combat before the first shots are fired? Research indicates that infantrymen must be conditioned for more than just running to prepare for combat. In fact, most infantrymen in combat will do little sustained running, but must be able to perform high levels of anaerobic activity such as sprinting, jumping, climbing, and low crawling once they come in contact with the enemy. Training should also include exposure to realistic training exercises in which the sights, sounds and violence of the battlefield are simulated to the best of the commander's ability. Although the incredible hardships, violence and destruction of war can never be totally recreated, efforts to inject realism into training should be made a priority. This approach to training will greatly aid individuals and leaders in their search for the optimum load that their men should carry in order to be most effective for the situation and mission at hand. OPTIMUM LOAD CONCEPTS Numerous examples of overloading soldiers litter the pages of history. Fortunately, so do the lessons learned. In the continued search for the elusive optimum load, researchers have conducted experiments and studied numerous historical examples of the soldier's load. A brief discussion of the more significant studies will serve as an important reference point in the continued search to provide a framework for a solution to the optimum load. About 1900, the French, British, and Germans began experimenting with the weight and placement of the individual soldier loads. Working separately, all three countries reached the same conclusion: the maximum load which soldiers carry should not exceed one-third of their own body weight. (3:17) In 1920, a British study discovered that armies traditionally carried between 55 and 60 pound loads. The commission finally reached the following conclusion: ... not in excess of forty to forty-five pounds was a tolerable load for an average-sized man on a road march. More specifically, ... on the march, training purposes, the optimum load, including clothing and personal belongings, is one-third of body weight. (7:60) At the conclusion of World War Two, S.L.A. Marshall concluded in The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation that the average American soldier's optimum load for marching during a training period is slightly more than 51 pounds. Marshall further believed that the maximum combat load for the individual should never be more than four-fifths of optimal training load of 51 pounds. (8:70-71) This figure accounted for the effects of fear combined with the fatigue actually experienced in battle. A 1954 Marine Corps Development center study concluded that the maximum load for a rifleman should be lowered to 55 pounds for march conditions and 40 pounds for combat. This study further revealed that the average load for a Marine Rifle Squad was an unacceptable 71 pounds per Marine. (13: 42) In 1971, the Marine Advanced Recognition, Combat and Exploitation Study (MARCES) was initiated to develop a systems concept for a post-1980 infantry platoon and to apply advanced technology to that concept. The study identified minimum and maximum weights that can be carried most economically by combat-committed Marines, while still retaining some degree of combat effectiveness. These weights were 30% and 40% of the individual's body weight, respectively. (2:9) Recognizing the ongoing nature of the problem of overloading the"' individual infantryman, the Marine Corps and Army have been jointly working on a project referred to as the "Integrated Individual Fighting System." The program includes field testing of commercial items, as well as equipment already in the system. In addition, the program attempts to take a systematic approach in analyzing how much gear is being carried and in what manner it is being carried. (7:62) Results of this research indicated that the ideal soldier's load was 30 percent of individual body weight, or 48 pounds, and the maximum load a soldier could carry should not exceed 45 percent of his body weight, or 72 pounds. Research further indicated that training can only improve load-carrying capability by 10 to 20 percent at best. The joint study was successful in eliminating nonessential items of equipment in order to increase the mobility and speed of the individual infantryman. Improvements in the load-bearing equipment presently under consideration for the Marine Corps is a direct result of initiatives created from this project. Undoubtedly, the purchases of newer, lightweight equipment will continue to make small inroads towards solving the problem. Studies are helpful, but, it is critical that commanders at all levels fight smarter by deciding the optimum load for their units with the understanding of what impact the assigned load will have on their mission and their Marines. Victory on today's battlefield will depend directly on the abi1ity of units to create momentum by using a combination of speed and concentration. The commander who is able to concentrate forces at the decisive time and place against his adversary's center of gravity will exponentially increase his chances for success. LOAD TAILORING Overloading is a problem which is more easily resolved using "brain power" rather than "back power." And it is with this premise that leaders must start to attack this widespread problem. As stated in FMFM 1, Warfighting, ".... an officer's principal weapon is his mind." Leaders must collectively recognize the problems of overloading and resolve themselves to reach a viable solution for the Marines under their command. Ultimately the leader is the key, for he can negate all the planning, and studies on the spot. During this process, the commander's staff will play a critical role by preparing an accurate estimate of the situation for the operation to be conducted. Armed with this information, the commander can use his judgement to assess the situation and publish a well-thought-out load plan. Although the estimate-of-the-situation process is a part of the solution, it is a lengthy topic beyond the scope and length of this paper. The basic assumption which underlies the solution is the fact that sufficient numbers of Marines will not be available to carry all of the ammunition and equipment required by the multidimensional battlefield in mid-to-high-intensity conflicts. The problem is exacerbated by the tendency to plan for the worst case contingency and plan the load accordingly. The commander must resist this temptation. Or worse yet, pressed by time, many staffs will merely duplicate the mistakes of their predecessors by copying "last year's order." A technique available to the commander for addressing the problem of overloading is the concept of task tailoring organizations, equipment, and weapons. Similar to the MAGTF, the organization and equipment can be structured from the ground up, to meet the mission's requirements. The ability to task organize is an important concept which makes each MAGTF a unique organization. Task organizing is the forming of an organization to carry out a specific task. (12:A-29) It provides flexibility and focus to the organization of a unit based upon the estimate of the situation and the commander's judgement. These concepts can also be used at lower levels to help solve our problem. Task organization at the tactical level can provide a means by which the individual load can be lessened. An example of how this might be done is by combining all 60mm mortar sections in the battalion into one platoon to accomplish a specific mission. This would allow massing of fires for a specific purpose and for a greater centralization of transportation requirements to provide the required ammunition for the entire unit. This situation would in many cases reduce the number of mortar rounds spread among an already overburdened company of infantryman. Although the example has drawbacks, it is intended to demonstrate the type of innovative thinking which must be explored. Many factors, including the unwillingness of commanders to give up their Marines to other units, are among the most commonly recognized obstacles remaining at the lowest levels. An essential component in solving the problem of overloading is the concept of "load tailoring." Load tailoring is essentially divided into two parts: task-equipping and task-arming. Both these concepts are new to Marine units. With each of these concepts, the primary stumbling block is a tendency to bring what we think we will need--and then a whole lot more just in case! Effective task-equipping requires commanders and their staffs to take risks based on detailed estimates. The requirements of a certain task may allow for the stripping down of a unit's gear to a bare minimum for a particular mission. An example of this would be elimination of the gas mask and MOPP suit when engaging an enemy unit which does not possess an NBC capability. Even though the unit SOP may require that those items be carried, the commander should take exception in favor of sound tactical judgement. Task-arming is a concept which is a bat more foreign to Marine Corps units. Task-arming requires the commander to tailor his ordnance and weapons load based on his estimate of the situation. For instance, certain missions and terrain will severely limit the use of the SMAW or Dragon weapons system. If this is the case, those weapon systems should be left in the rear for transportation forward at a later phase in the battle. The Marines from those units may be required to perform other non-standard infantry tasks during the interim period. The amount of ammunition carried by the individual or crew must be analyzed to insure that units are not needlessly loaded down with excessive weight. Historically, military units have gone into battle with an intense fear of running out of ammunition. In World War II, Vietnam, and Grenada, soldiers and Marines have labored with ammunition loads completely out of proportion to the mission at hand. Yet history does not lend support to the perceived need to carry extraordinary loads of ammunition. During the Korean War, U.S. rifleman learned to carry only 94 to 120 rounds of ball ammunition, after their experiences of moving up and down the rugged Korean terrain. (9:42) Despite these reductions, few historical examples from the Korean or other wars reflect a unit being destroyed because of an ammunition shortage. In fact, running low on ammunition has a perverse sort of advantage. When the individual believes he may run out of ammunition he becomes much more efficient and effective with each round. Task-arming has much to offer towards reducing the unit's load requirements. Resistance to this concept stems from a lack of confidence in our Marines' abilities to alternate between weapons, weapons accountability, and a desire to keep all assets in one spot for the unexpected contingency. The resistance to these new concepts is not insurmountable and can be overcome through training and education. TRAINING AND EDUCATION Who then should be the focus for this educational process--the private, the corporal, the SNCOs or perhaps the captains and majors? If we ask the average fire team member the same question, he would probably answer that anyone who had the power to establish a load plan should be the target audience. The battalion commander would probably cast his vote for anyone that can take positive steps toward improving the problems associated with overloading. In this both are correct. No one rank has a corner on the market of new ideas. Directives, orders, and SOPs will never solve the problem of overloading the individual rifleman; not only have they been unable to provide a solution but they often have been part of the problem. As a first step, false perceptions must be dispelled. Foremost among these misconceptions is the idea that Marines must be loaded to meet every possible contingency. Second, Marines must assume that the supply system will be effective, and load plans should be made accordingly. Marines have long held to the idea that supply will fail when they need it most. No class or lecture will change perceptions rooted in bad experiences or passed down through rumors. But what will work is the integration of all elements of the MAGTF at the "grass root" level. Marines who get familiar with the duties of combat service support Marines during routine educational and training exercises will gain confidence in them. Cross-training has numerous positive effects when conducted between infantry and a supporting unit's personnel Other types of training exercises may require a small unit leader to practice load planning based upon his estimate of the situation and his higher commander's intent. As part of the evolution, he must justify his decisions, clearly state which risks he is willing to take, and define the prescribed load. The final step in the process is to experiment with a variety of load plans and configurations, and determine which load is appropriate, given the situation. This type of training mentality will help build a data base of information and will help leaders make decisions based on "recognitional" experience. Finally, the concept of standardization of combat loads must be taught and practiced. Leaders should make every effort to minimize the "parade mentality" which many associate with the standardization of gear and equipment. advantages gained from standardization of certain parts of the fighting and existence loads should be highlighted as they apply to a variety of situations. Current Marine Corps basic enlisted and officer training courses do not use the load-planning concepts discussed here in training our future warfighters. Significantly, only now, under the leadership of BGen P.K. Van Riper, is the 2D Marine Division embarking on a plan to educate and train Marines and Sailors in these concepts. Once the focus is clear, training should be institutionalized throughout Marine schools and FMF units. If the concepts are completely understood, sound techniques and procedures will be a natural offshoot. The theory of training and education discussed here is an attempt to eradicate the age-old problem of overloading the individual fighting man. This educational approach requires leaders to teach concepts until they are completely understood and accepted. Once the concepts of load tailoring are clear, the focus should shift to the application of modern techniques. What worked well last time may not work this time. Above all, training should foster self-reliance, initiative, and confidence on the part of all Marines. The end result will be a Corps of Marines who will be able to "fight smarter and lighter" and win on tomorrow's battlefields. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Curtis, LTC George; Maj Richard J. Vogel, Maj James E. Wright. "Soldier Load, When Technology Fails" Infantry March-April 87. 2. Evaluation of MARCES Platoon Load Distribution Report, CMC Project 30-70-06, Development Center, MCDEC, January 1971. 3. Galvin, Maj. John R. "the historical aspect: Fighting Weight of the Foot Soldier," Infantry, unknown. 4. Henderson, Col. G.F.R. Stonewall Jackson, New York: Longmans, Green, 1949. 5. HeroId, J. Christopher. The Mind of Napoleon, New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. 6. Holmes, Richard. Acts of War, The Behavior of Men in Battle. The Free Press, New York, New York, 1985. 7. Inghram, Maj. Daniel C. "Lightening the Combat Load," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1987. 8. Marshall, Colonel S.L.A. The Soldier's Load and The Mobility of a Nation, Marine Corps Association, Quantico, Virgina, 1950. 9. Marshall, S.L.A. Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea. The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Maryland, October 1951. 10. Mayville, Capt. William C. "A Soldier's Load." Infantry, January-February 1987. 11. Nottage, LtCol. Paul E. "The Overburdened Infantryman," Infantry Jan-Feb. 1964. 12. OH 6-1 Ground combat Operations, Quantico, Virginia, January 1988. 13. Spence, Capt. Thomas R. "Lighten the "Marine's Load," Proceedings, January 1990. 14. Warren, Dr. Philip. "Load Expert System," U.S. Army Natick RD&E Center, Natick, Mass. November 1990: computer program.
