The Opposed Amphibious Assault Dilemma CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Opposed Amphibious Assault Dilemma Author: Major D. L. Brush, United States Marine Corps Thesis: This last is the situation that existed during Desert Storm and is the crux of the problem how to successfully eliminate continuing deficiencies to ensure the Marine Corps retains the ability to conduct an opposed amphibious assault. Background: The Marine Corps is charged to maintain the nation's ability to project forces across a hostile beach. During Desert Storm the opportunity presented itself to conduct the first truly opposed amphibious assault since WWII and Korea. When the amphibious assault did not take place, accolades were given to the operational planners for utilizing the Amphibious Task Force as a grand deception. In reality, though, the Navy/ Marine Corps team lacked the equipment, training and tactics needed to successfully assault the Kuwaiti coast without risking tremendous losses in men and equipment. If the Marine Corps is to regain the capability to conduct a forcible entry across a foreign beach, a dedicated effort must be made to develop and acquire equipment, train leaders and troops, and revise the tactics and doctrine. Recommendation: The Navy/Marine Corps team must reassess its equipment, training and tactics if it is going to be able to conduct amphibious assaults against defended beaches in the future. THE OPPOSED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DILEMMA Outline Thesis: This last is the situation that existed during Desert Storm and is t he crux of the problem; how to successfully eliminate continuing deficiencies to ensure the Marine Corps retains the capability to conduct an opposed amphibious assault. I. Desert Storm Background A. Defining the threat B. Use as a deception C. Reality strikes home II. Finding the Solution A. Who is at fault B. Allocation of resources 1. People 2. Funding III. Providing the answers A. Required equipment 1. Detection 2. Breaching 3 . Proofing 4 . Marking B Training the forces C. Developing tactics and doctrine THE OPPOSED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT DILEMMA The assault to liberate the nation of Kuwait is one during which new tactics and equipment played a critical role. The deceptions, the actual assault to breach through and the maneuver around the extensive multiple-obstacle barriers the Iraqi's emplaced across the Kuwaiti desert and into Iraq, are being canonized by instructors and tacticians at Army and Marine Corps schools. Indeed, the ease with which the breaching teams rapidly cleared paths through the estimated two million mines, thousand miles of barbed wire, and numerous oil -filled, anti-tank ditches was truly amazing. In fact, the speed at which the coalition forces entered into Kuwait eliminated the requirement for Marines to conduct an amphibious assault in support of the ground offensive, or did it? Just the threat of the amphibious task force steaming off the Kuwaiti coast was enough to hold several Iraqi divisions in place and keep them from reinforcing those defending along the barriers. This was the classic example of the use of a deception to support the main attack, or was it? The aftermath of Desert Storm has provided many accolades to those who planned the demonstration of Marine and Navy amphibious forces off the Kuwaiti coastline. This 'deception' plan occupied the attention of several Iraqi divisions during the initial stages of the ground offensive as the threat of a flank attack by amphibious means became one the Iraqi's could not ignore. In fact, the anticipated threat of a coalition amphibious assault caused the Iraqi military leaders to direct the construction of barrier systems along the entire Kuwaiti coast and to reinforce the already formidable Al Faw peninsula in Iraq. These barrier systems consisted of both land and water mines, barbed wire, and steel and concrete anti-vehicle/anti-landing craft obstacles. In light of these barriers it was decided that the amphibious assault could not have been accomplished without a significant loss of men and equipment. That estimated cost, in and of itself, was staggering enough to exclude this option from the CINC's inventory of capabilities. Lt. Gen. Walter Boomer, commander of U.S. Marine Corps forces during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, recently stated, "An amphibious assault was not undertaken because of the mines . . . . We need to solve this problem." (3: 12) While Navy spokesmen have made the following statement: The Navy admits its biggest weakness during Desert Storm was a lack of ships and aircraft to sweep mines from shallow waters, a lack that could have led to heavy Marine casualties in an amphibious assault . . . . A joint Navy-Marine Corps planning staff is being formed to look at other means of handling the threat that Navy mine clearance forces "were inadequate to counter," during the Persian Gulf war, according to the lessons learned report. (9: 7) Why has the proud heritage of the WWII island-hopping campaign in the Pacific been allowed to deteriorate to such a dismal state? The obvious answer to the Kuwaiti dilemma is to conduct the amphibious assault where the enemy is not. This is an unopposed landing and one which emerging tactics, "Over-the-Horizon" assaults and "Maneuver-from-the-Sea", and new items of equipment, such as the Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), address. The unopposed landing is the one which all commanders certainly strive for and one which our emerging technology may indeed allow to happen under most circumstances. (4: 36-40) Unfortunately, the tactical situation or simple geographics may dictate that one cannot move to where the enemy is not. This, then, is the contingency that must be planned for. The corollary to an unopposed landing is an opposed landing. A landing may be opposed by a dedicated force, obstacles placed in the water approaches to the beach, obstacles placed on the beach itself or any combination of the three. This last is the situation that existed during Desert Storm and is the crux of the problem; how to successfully eliminate continuing deficiencies to ensure the Marine Corps retains the ability to conduct an opposed amphibious assault. The lack of an effective opposed amphibious capability lies on the shoulders of the Navy and the Marine Corps, both of whom are tasked to provide both forward-deployed and CONUS based forces that are capable of conducting both quick and deliberate amphibious operations. These forces, of course must have the doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment to be successful. One of the primary responsibilities assigned the to Marine Corps in the United States Codes Title 10 is: The Marine Corps shall develop, in conjunction with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, techniques, and equipment used by amphibious forces. (2: 3-6) From DOD Directive 5100.1 comes guidance for both the Navy and Marine Corps concerning amphibious warfare: Develop, in coordination with the other military services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment of naval forces for amphibious operations, and the doctrines, and procedures for joint amphibious operations. (2: 3-7 ) The solution to the countermine/counterobstacle warfare deficiency is simply people and resources. The allocation of sufficient people wil include those to conduct the research and development that leads to new equipment and tactics and to the development of training exercises that encompasses countermine/counterobstacle operations in conjunction with an amphibious assault. The allocation of resources would have to include the fencing, or identifying and isolating, tens of millions of dollars exclusively for research and development, procurement and the new training exercises in this area. Of course, money does not remain fenced long unless there is a high enough priority placed on the effort by both services and that priority is transmitted up the chain-of-command to the comptrollers and requirements personnel at the DOD level. The following questions were asked at a 31 January 1991 SASC hearing concerning the lack of countermine equipment in the Marine Corps' final fiscal year 92 budget submission. The responses were provided by the Program Manager, Engineer Systems of the Marine Corps Research, Acquisition and Development Command, now the Marine Corps Systems Command.(8: 4) Question: Does the Marine Corps have all the breaching equipment it needs? Answer: The answer is NO. Question: Why hasn' t more money been spent on such programs? Answer: Recent budget limitations (particularly the POM '92 program) have limited the application of development and procurement resources in a number of key Marine Corps areas, countermine/counterobstacle being one. A number of countermine system initiatives did not make the final cut in an extremely competitive and fiscally limited POM process. The creation of a joint Navy and Marine office to address the countermine/counterobstacle deficiency is the first step toward a realistic solution. This office is to be located under the Navy's operations department to allow it the capability to force the issues of purchasing of minesweeping ships, altering the use of and missions for SEALs, changing joint training exercises, providing the focus of the research, development and procurement process and recommending revisions to blue-water and green-water tactics and doctrine. The Marine Corps is providing existing land countermine/counterobstacle systems, for possible exploitation as surf zone clearance systems, as well as a fresh look at the tactics and doctrine of an amphibious landing from the 'green' side. The protection of funding is key to any new look this problem is going to receive. An example of funding cuts affecting programs is the one just experienced by two detection programs. Until last year, both the Navy and the Marine Corps were developing systems utilizing laser technology to detect objects under the water. The Marine Corps program, AMDAS, was performing fairly in the surf zone, 10 feet and shallower, under very turbid conditions. It showed promise in both turbid fresh water and for surface laid mines on the beach. The Navy system, Magic Lantern, was showing promise in the deeper waters, 40 feet and deeper. The Navy decided to bring both programs under joint management so as to benefit from the best of both programs. Congress felt that two laser detection systems for water were one too many and directed one be terminated. Ultimately, a new program was established under the new name of MDLT that is havi ng trouble in the turbid waters of the surf zone. (5:2-43) Both the Navy and the Marine Corps have to support this office with sufficient funding, and defend that funding, to complete the testing of existing programs. Hopefully, the joint office will be able to readdress the above example and reinstate the original programs that showed promise in two distinct environments. The ability to detect mines and other obstacles is the key for landing across a beach with a minimum of obstacles. The intent of the equipment being developed in existing programs, AMDAS/MAGIC LANTERN/MDLT, is to be able to recognize land and water mines both on and beneath the surface from a stand-off measured in hundreds of meters to miles. It is anticipated these systems will be mounted on jet aircraft and will provide the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) commander with a real-time picture of the proposed landing sites. Other programs include new hand-held sonars and delivery vehicles for SEAL teams, a new class of mine countermeasures ship and a sacrificial , air-cushioned vehicle that would carry magnetic and acoustic signature duplicators to fool the mines. The United States would do well to follow the lead of recent British experiment using an air - cushioned craft as a primary mine countermeasures vehicle. The British recognized the hovercraft's agility, speed and ability to outrun and survive the waterplume caused by a mine detonating in as shallow as 30 feet of water. (7: 107-113) As one answer to the breaching problem, a new look should be given to the decades-old, M58/M59 linear demolition charge that has proven exponentially more effective in the water than on land. Testing accomplished in the late 1970's, against inert mines and pressure gauges, demonstrated successfully the line charge's ability against simple pressure fuzed landmines. (10) Recent testing against modern blast-resistent fuzed landmines, accomplished during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, also proved successful. To date the line charge has not been tested against seamines. Additional testing needs to be planned and carried out to validate the exact capabilities of line charge against modern land and water mines. In a recent exploitation of a foreign countermine system, it was found that the exploited system, though very similar to the M58/M59 series line charge, was substantially more effective against modern mines. This increased effectiveness was attributed, in part, to the composition of the explosive fill of the system. While the M58/M59 is a C-4 plastic explosive derivative, the foreign system had a plastic explosive base with other chemicals mixed in. The chemical composition of the foreign system is not new, in fact has been known for decades, but was never applied to the U. S. system. Continued testing should validate this explosive for use in the M58/M59 and may provide the short to mid-term solution that will fill the gap until newer technology is proven and procured. Proofing the paths breached through the minefield/obstacle is, perhaps, the hardest and yet most critical task. Proofing must be accomplished immediately following the breach and must include some method of marking the path. On land the most successful proofing systems are those that physically remove any remaining mines from the breached path. This procedure may prove to have application on the beach, or very shallow surf zone, by a vehicle similar to an amphibious assault vehicle that has both the ability to swim to the beach and yet the weight to be an effective earthmover. A current program for the AAVP7A1 utilizes a full-width rake, mounted to the front of the P7, that is capable of sifting through 6 to 8 inches of sand once the P7's tracks touch down, generally in about 3 feet of water. Systems that are being tested for the area from 3 feet and deeper include rake-like devices towed by air-cushioned craft and the air-cushioned craft previously mentioned that will trick mines fuzed with magnetic or acoustic sensors. (5: 2-45 ) Whichever system, or systems is selected, it must be capable of rapidly performing its mission during the assault. Maintaining the momentum of the attack is extremely important in establishing overwhelming combat power ashore as quickly as possible. This could be accomplished by both the application of a device that would trick mines into detonating, towed by a small air - cushioned craft, as well as the use of a rake-like device mounted on the front of the USMC amphibious assault vehicle. Marking the proofed path is a task that has yet to be addressed adequately on land. Water presents a more dynamic and fluid environment in which to mark a specific path. Research programs are investigating the use of buoys as visual indicators and beacons to mark the centerline of the path that the newer position- locating devices may home in on. Sufficient quantities of these countermine devices will have to be procured, in spite of shrinking budget dollars, to provide the redundancy required for equipment used in countermine operations. That is, the equipment must be realized to be the sacrificial items required to protect the main force. Countermine equipment cannot be bought under the same auspices as a truck, it will not last 20 years in a realistic training environment. Additionally, a continuous effort must be made to acquire numbers of the existing, and evolving, threat mines, both land and water. These threat in should be used extensively in the research and development validation process and, when inerted intraining scenarios. Training countermine/counterobstacle operations must begin with the individual sailor and marine, during their initial specialty training, and should culminate in annual, Navy/Marine fleet exercises. Individual training begins with recognition, characteristics and handling of individual mines, using some of the threat mines procured for the research and development, and builds to employment of the emerging detection, learn and proofing systems. As the training approaches system employment , training are.as must be made available that will allow fluid training exercises to be conducted. Currently, the only training area that allows the detonation of linear demolition charges from the water is on San Clemente Island, off the California coast. Training areas must be developed that will provide the opportunity to conduct the detection, breaching and proofing phases of the amphibious assault on a continuing basis. Included in these training exercises should be the employment of training mines similar to the MILES system used by land forces. Finally, annual Navy/Marine fleet training exercises must include the ship-to-shore countermine evolution if the services are to become proficient in these operations. Realistic situations and the inabiIity to artificially bypass the mined area will provide a recognition of the difficulty of this phase of the amphibious assault and will lead to the refinement of the tactics and doctrine used. Presently, the tactics and doctrine used to support the ship- to - shore movement come directly from the successes of WW II . The doctrine establishing the requirements for cleared lanes to support a landing were developed utilizing slow and awkward landing craft. Modern landing craft employ state-of-the-art position-locating devices that are accurate to 10 meters and transit to the beach quickly, as compared to those used forty years ago. The modern landing craft will allow a reduction in the size of the lane that must be clear. This reduction will lead to less area that must be swept for mines, less area that must be breached and proofed and ultimately less equipment and explosives that would have to be procured and employed. Tactics and doctrine assigning responsibilities for the countermine operations must be reassessed. By present doctrine, SEALs must clear the entire path to the beach up to, and including, the high water mark. Recent talk has also included the landing zone for the air cushioned landing craft (LCAC) in the SEALs' area of responsibility. They are neither equipped nor manned to provide this service beyond the start of the surf zone, or 10 feet of water depth. Clearly, the responsibility to clear through the surf zone and across the beach must transition to the Marine Corps. This transition for the surf zone and beach areas must be done responsibly. New and innovative ideas are required, but they must also have reality injected into them. Tactics and doctrine being developed at the Marine Corps' Warfighting Center call for a heliborne lift of engineers to an area beyond the beach in the final hours of darkness before the local dawn. The engineers are accompanied by infantry for local security. Carried in by helicopter with the engineers are line charges and l ight bulldozers. In the three or so hours until dawn, the engineers must assemble the bulldozers, attach armor - plating to the outside of the bulldozer, breach a 50 yard wide path to the water, wide enough for an LCAC, and then begin launching line charges into the water. The clearance of the area required to offload an LCAC on the beach must occur after the surf zone is cleared. (11) This new tactic is said to support the second Department of the Navy Amphibious Lift Study (DON Lift 2) in which the Marine Corps signed up to assaulting the beach in LCAC' s. However, the study also gave the Marine Corps 90 minutes to build combat power ashore before being subject to a major counterassault . This does not quite match with what can only be light heliborne forces and an allowable time to breach to the water of three hours. Again, it seems, the studies are being used to justify a particular program rather than lending credence to ideas that are supportable by all key players. Without the capability to conduct amphibious landings across defended beaches the Marine Corps becomes just a hollow force tied to the maritime preposition program. The Corps will be able to project forces only into benign ports or beaches. If the long range planners can foresee a requirement, no matter how remote, to conduct a forcible entry into a country via the amphibious assault, then those planners must provide adequately for that eventuality. There are many parts to the opposed amphibious assault. each part is critical and builds on the next. Each service must be provided with the necessary equipment, training and doctrine required to accomplish this mission. It truly must evolve from the joint arena or it will continue to suffer from both a lack of exposure and a lack of funding, both of which are crucial to the ultimate solution of this deficiency that was brought out so well during Desert Storm. Secretary of Defense Cheney, when receiving Desert Storm after action reports, and prior to the compilation of the Title V report to Congress, reinforced the seriousness of the Southwest Asia mine problem by viewing it as one of the most critical deficiencies to surface during the war. (1) BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Brush, Maj. Danny L. "Countermine/ Counterobstacle Ops (Land) USMC." Brief for the Secretary of Defense. Washington, D.C. Department of Defense, 1991. 2. FMFM 1-2. The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense. Quantico, VA: Combat Development Center, 1991 3. Holitzer, Robert. "U.S. Navy Will Overhaul , Expand Efforts to Combat Mine Warfare." Defense News 2 December 1991: 12. 4. Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. 1985: 36-40. 5. Mines, Minelaying, and Countermine Requirements for the Mid-term Period. Final Draft Report. Quantico, VA: MAGTF Warfighting Center, 1992. 6. Mission Area Strategy- Amphibious Warfare. Quantico, VA: MAGTF Warfighting Center, 1990. 7. Moore, Captain John RN. Jane's Naval Review. 1986: 107113. 8. "PM Engineer Responses to 31 Jan 91 SACS Hearing at which MGEN Miller was a Witness." Quantico, VA: MCRDAC, 1991. 9. Steigman, David S. "Sweeping mines from shallow seas." Navy Times 30 March 1992: 7. 10. Underwater Explosive Performance of the M58A1 Linear Demolition Charge for Shallow Water Mine Clearance Panama City, FL: aval Costal Systems Center, 1978. 11. Wilks , LtCol Rick. "Counterobstacle Initiatives Update." Quantico, VA: Command and Staff College, 1992.
