Counternarcotics In Peru: High Risk, Low Return CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Counternarcotics in Peru: High Risk, Low Return Author: Lieutenant Commander C.D. Bott, United States Navy Thesis: The current U.S. national strategy of using the military to fight narcotics trafficking in Peru risks undercutting Peruvi- an President Fujimori, with little chance of long-term success; our strategy should, instead, support Fujimori through assistance in counterinsurgency training. Background: The United States has sent military forces to Peru as part of President Bush's Andean Initiative to stem the flow of narcotics out of South America. This U.S. military strategy seems to run counter to the broader American strategy of support- ing and encouraging democratic nations, particularly those in this hemisphere. Indeed, President Fujimori contends the coun- ternarcotics effort is undermining his attempts at unifying the divided nation. The situation is further complicated by the brutal terrorist group known as Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path. The Sendero emerged in 1980 as a result of centuries long division between the classes of Peruvian society. Led by Abimael Guzman, this group uses vicious tactics against all sectors of Peruvian society to further their aim of the overthrow of the government. Worse yet, Shining Path has developed a symbiotic relationship with the coca growers of the Upper Huallaga Valley, affording the group a share of the profits on narcotics smuggled into the U.S. Finally, the Peruvian military is ill-equipped and poorly led to fight the insurgency. Additionally, the military has one of the world's worst records for human rights violations. Worse yet, the military appears to also be supporting narcotraf- fickers. Recommendation: The only U.S. military assistance to Peru that makes sense, both at the tactical and strategic levels, is within the realm of counterinsurgency. Aid should consist of training and arming of units, preferably outside of the army, and should be contingent on an improving record of respect for human rights. COUNTERNARCOTICS IN PERU: HIGH RISK, LOW RETURN Thesis statement: The current U.S. national strategy of using the military to fight narcotics trafficking in Peru risks under- cutting Peruvian President Fujimori with little chance of long- term success; our strategy should, instead, support Fujimori through assistance in counterinsurgency training. I. Current economic, political and human rights issues A. President Fujimori, a new face on the scene B. Fujimori's economic damage control C. Peruvian society cursed by a history conquest II. Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path A. One of the world's most brutal insurgencies B. In 12 years: 25,000 deaths and $20 billion in damages C. Sendero's critical vulnerabilities 1. Political and geographic isolation 2. Reliance of terrorism 3. Outgunned by the military 4. Reliance on a single leader III. The Peruvian military A. Designed around old, outdated threat B. Poorly equipped to fight the insurgency C. On the take? IV. U.S. aid A. Economic B. Military C. The risks V. A role for the U.S. military A. It should support the U.S. national strategy -- encour- age democracies throughout the world B. Train and equip counterinsurgency forces C. Encourage human rights reforms COUNTERNARCOTICS IN PERU: HIGH RISK, LOW RETURN by Lieutenant Commander Christopher D. Bott, United States Navy Against the swirling backdrop of the nation of Peru coming apart at the seams, the United States has sent military forces to that country in an attempt to stem the flow of cocaine en route to North America. This is the wrong way to use American military power. The use of the military in Peru as part of the Bush administration's Andean Initiative to combat the flow of narcot- ics out of South America, has not met with success. Additional- ly, the policy imperils Peruvian President Fujimori by isolating him from a large segment of the country's population. It runs contrary, in other words, to the widely held belief that the democratically elected Fujimori government needs and deserves continued U.S. assistance. Should the U.S. choose to continue supporting Peru, then, it should be in consonance with the de- sires of the Fujimori regime. Included in a broad package of assistance should be the provision for training by the U.S. military of forces fighting the vicious Peruvian insurgency known as Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path. (4) CURRENT ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES The inauguration of Alberto Keinya Fujimori as President of Peru on July 28, 1990, was something of a watershed for both Peru and the Americas. The son of Japanese immigrants, Fujimori is the first person of Japanese descent to lead an American repub- lic. An agricultural engineer by training, Fujimori later became a professor and rector at the Peruvian National Agrarian Univer- sity. His rise from political obscurity in thelate 1980s was helped by the national recognition he received as the host of a public affairs television talk show. In succeeding Alan Garcia Perez, Fujimori inherited an economy on the verge of collapse. Peru's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had fallen by twenty-eight percent and real wages by sixty percent in the previous two years. Government expenditures outpaced revenues three times. The annual inflation rate was at thirty-five hundred percent. The foreign debt was at nearly $24 billion, while nearly $2 billion in International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans had been defaulted on by Peru. (16: 61, 62) Twelve days after his inauguration Fujimori imposed a pro- gram of strict economic austerity measures. Known as a "paquetzo", or violent package, the new program eliminated long-standing price subsidies on food and gasoline, while charging much higher prices for government services such as electricity. Fujimori's aim was to balance expenditures with revenues. Inflation ini- tially soared with the rate for the month of August at nearly four hundred percent. (3: 117) But by 1991 the annual inflation rate had been reduced to two hundred percent. There are other signs that the Peruvian economy has stabi- lized somewhat in the last eighteen months: loan payments have resumed to the IMF; treasury reserves are now back in the black by $1.3 billion; and foreign investment is up. (11: A51) The key question is whether Fujimori will be able to pull the economy out of its deep recession. The election of President Fujimori in 1990 marked a decade of democratically elected governments in Peru. During the twelve years prior to 1980 the country was run by the military. Still, Peruvians do not equally share the fruits of a democratic society in the same way as the citizens of the northern republics. Power, wealth and race are inseparable in Peruvian society. The rich, white descendants of the Spanish conquistadors retain most of the power in Peruvian society. Unlike the poor, the rich do not live in fear of the police. The government bureaucracy, including the courts, will work on behalf of the elite. While the poor are victimized by their government, the rich live above the law. Peruvian society is cursed by a history, not of European colonization, but of Spanish conquest. Led by Francisco Pizarro, the Spaniards' mission was to extract as much of the wealth of the Incas as they could, as rapidly as they could. The wealthy Indians were enslaved in order to extract the mineral and agri- cultural wealth of the land. This society of patron and serf became the basis for the Peru of today: governmental corruption, feudal economic patterns, apartheid-like class differences, and the widespread use of violence by the government against the underclass. (13: 79, 80) As a result, while Fujimori presides over a democratically elected government, the notion of Peruvian citizenship is still elusive throughout most of society. Social reform and human rights are a case in point. It is ironic, for example, that during the years of military rule from 1968 to 1975, the govern- ment was committed to redistributive social and economic reforms, most notably during the reign of General Juan Velasco Alvarado from 1968 to 1975. Ultimately, Velasco and later Bermudez would fail in their attempts to reform society, primarily due to the problems associated with the economic decline. But unlike the other more repressive regimes of South America, and, more impor- tantly, the subsequent democratically elected governments of Peru, the human rights records during military rule were compara- tively good. (1: 533) A tangible consequence of the perceived dislocation by a large portion of the population was the rise of leftist insurgen- cies. Again another irony: the insurgencies arose and increased in intensity soon after the transition to democratic elections. As the insurgents intensified their campaigns in the early 1980s, counterinsurgency operations intensified; with this came the sharp increase in human rights violations by the government. In December 1982, the government declared a state of emer- gency in the Ayacucho department, essentially placing four prov- inces and their civilian governments under military rule. As the military stepped up counterinsurgency operations in the depart- ment, allegations of systematic use of torture, disappearances, and executions increased. The Peruvian attorney general acknowl- edged that between 1982 and August 1989 over 3,200 cases of enforced disappearances were reported. (1: 540) Out of the 1980s, then, came an increase in government brutality; this in response to the brutality of one of the world's most violent leftist guerrilla groups: Sendero Luminoso -- the Shining Path. SHINING PATH On October 23, 1991, a brown-eyed nine-year-old named Jorge Mayta Suxo edged into a minefield at the base of a high voltage tower near Lima. A guerrilla from the group known as Sendero Luminoso wanted to verify the existence of government- planted mines around the tower. The guerrilla sent Jorge, the son of a local peasant, to find out. Jorge found a mine. He died of his wounds the following day. Since 1980, over 1,000 Peruvi- an children have died in the political violence of the Peruvian insurgency. (13: 40) There are several insurgency movements in Peru. By far the largest and most vicious is Sendero Luminoso. The Senderos are a Maoist terrorist group made up of as many as ten thousand fight- ers led by Abimael Guzman, a former professor of philosophy. Although formed in 1970, the group didn't surface as a political force until May 17, 1980, when it conducted a series of attacks on polling places during Peru's first democratic election follow- ing the dozen years of military rule. (9: 4) Sendero Luminoso is a movement which melds Maoist teachings and Andean mysticism with the dark messianic vision of Guzman. Its ultimate objectives include not only the overthrow of the government in Lima, but a return to socialism based on the pre- Columbian peasant society. Guzman claims to envision a greater Andean nation, brought about by armed struggle, that includes the Quechua-speaking peoples of Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Argenti- na, and Chile. The dozen years of Sendero's insurgency have resulted in over twenty-five thousand deaths and $20 billion in damages. (12: 82 and 11: A51) Such is the nature of Guzman's vision for over- throw of the state: violence is both the desired vehicle for change and source of purification for the movement. Sendero's radicalism is demonstrated not only by its brutal- ity toward Peruvians, peasants included, but by its contempt for other radical movements throughout the world. Like the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, the movement derides Cuba's Fidel Castro, Nicaragua's Sandinistas and Columbia' s M-19 as mere middle-class reformists. South American scholar Henry Dietz noted the com- parison between Sendero and the Khmer Rouge and states, ". . . If one is to take (Sendero Luminoso's) writings seriously, Peru would suffer the same scale of destruction as did Cambodia under Pol Pot were it ever to achieve power." (2: 132) Guzman appears to have shifted Sendero strategy in recent months. Instead of controlling shantytowns in the countryside through execution and terror, the insurgents are attempting to convert the populous through propaganda. (11: A51) Exploitation of the deepening economic crisis is lucrative as the nation's poor grow in number. The old tactics of simply murdering any who oppose the insurgency may be seen as less efficacious. Instead, it is now only the leaders of the government-sponsored self- defense militias who are singled out for execution; the rest are targets for conversion And conversion may be a viable alternative to the peasants who reside in the countryside or in the shantytowns that surround Lima. In the Upper Huallaga Valley, for example, the Senderos are able to offer protection to the peasant coca growers who have, in the past, fallen victim to unscrupulous drug dealers, as well as army and police officials on the take. In other areas Fujimori has granted military officials emergency powers to combat the insurgency. The resulting abuse by the military has resulted in an alienation which can only make the Senderos appear to be a lesser evil. For the average rural Peruvian family, life is hard. In the Ayacucho Department, for example, one in a hundred families has electricity. Illiteracy is at nearly fifty percent for adults -- including city dwellers. Life expectancy is twenty years shorter for Ayacucho residents than Peruvians living in Lima -- in part due to the paucity of doctors and health clinics. (13: 83) Sendero Luminoso's call for the destruction of the state might make sense to the poor who feel victimized by the government. Most observers of Peru argue that a successful overthrow of the government by Sendero is remote. Still, the insurgency has continued to grow despite increased efforts by Fujimori to strengthen the police and military. Ultimately, the best solu- tion to the insurgency problem is strengthening the economy and addressing Peru's social ills. But in the near term there appear to be vulnerabilities within the insurgency that may be exploit- ed. RAND analyst Gordon McCormick has identified several possi- ble critical vulnerabilities that may be exploited by counterin- surgency forces. (9: 17-20) First, the Senderos remain isolated by choice from other movements either inside or outside of Peru. As a result, no united front has formed within Peru against the government and little outside aid in the form of money or weapons currently flows to Sendero. The only exception is the alliance with the coca producers which probably nets the Senderos ten percent of the exporters' profits. A second critical vulnerability may be Guzman's reliance on terrorism as a primary tool in advancing the movement. While effective in demonstrating government weakness and in forcing the government to overreact, the violence has been even more severe against Sendero's own constituency. This may lead to a further isolation of the insurgency from the rest of Peruvian society and make recruitment more difficult. Third, Sendero remains outgunned by the military. This is both a reflection of the group's geographic and ideological isolation, and of the lack of expertise in modern weapons except small arms and dynamite. This gap may close over time, however, as Sendero's drug alliance revenues increase. Indeed, narcotraf- fickers are becoming as sophisticated as modern law enforcement agencies in weapons, communications equipment, and doctrine. Finally, the insurgency is classically organized along highly compartmentalized cellular lines with Abimael Guzman retaining ultimate authority in the group's operations and ideol- ogy. As a result, the group is both difficult to control due to its geographic dispersion and vulnerable to Guzman's eventual death. Sendero Luminoso will not be easily defeated by the Peruvi- ans, with or without U.S. assistance. But there are inherent weaknesses in the group that, if attacked, could lead to the its eventual demise. Of concern is how to encourage the Peruvian military and police to conduct the counterinsurgency according to standards of common human decency. THE PERUVIAN MILITARY The traditional focus for the military has been on the rugged regions along the borders with Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile. These borders have often been the subject of disputes between Peru and her neighbors. As a result the military has been equipped and trained for conventional border security roles, rather than for counterinsurgency or counternarcotics operations. At 75,000 the Peruvian Army is the second largest in South America, second only to Brazil. The army is divided into five military regions. The Peruvian terrain which includes dense jungle, mountains and rivers argues for an emphasis on light infantry. But, like many Third World nations, Peru purchased heavier, more prestigious weapons, including enough Soviet T-54/T-55 battle tanks and French AMX-13 light tanks to equip two armored brigades. Like the army, the Peruvian Air Force is probably larger and better equipped than is warranted by any potential threat to the nation's sovereignty. For example, the Peruvians field nine fighter squadrons, including a squadron of French-built Mirage 2000 fighters. Purchases from a wide variety of countries such as France, the Soviet Union and the U.S. have given Peru a fairly capable air force by 1970s' standards. But with the demise of the Soviet Union and budgetary constraints at home, the Peruvian Air Force is aging with little prospect for follow-on airframes or evenreplacement parts. The focus of the Peruvian Navy is coastal and resources defense, with an overemphasis on submarine/antisubmarine warfare. The Peruvian Navy owns eleven conventionally-powered submarines, including six Casma Class boats, originally built by West Germany under the Type 209 design. Within the Navy organization are a Naval Air Wing and a single brigade of Marines. Like his predecessors in the early 1980s, Fujimori has given increased authority to the military in the conduct of counterin- surgency operations against Sendero Luminoso. Many Peruvians now live in one of the country's "emergency zones" where the military retains civil authority. And in 1991, the president issued a decree which strengthened military control of civil liberties, private property, and the overall strategy in fighting the insur- gency. (11: A58) Without strong civilian oversight this strategy has been largely to kill as many insurgents as possible, regard- less of the toll on civilians. To make matters worse, some in the Peruvian military appear to be actively engaged in protecting coca growers and traffick- ers. A "Newsweek" reporter recently visited a tiny outpost along the Huallaga River known as Uchiza. (5: 41) There Brook Larmer found a village virtually cut off from the rest of Peru, capable of cultivating nearly 62,000 acres of former jungle, and immune to both Peruvian counternarcotics forces (the police assisted by U.S. DEA agents) and Sendero Luminoso. This is due to the pro- tection afforded by the presence of the Peruvian Army. (The resignation of Fujimori's chief advisor on the counternarcotics, Hernando de Soto, in January 1992, as a protest against wide- spread corruption in the counternarcotics forces of the army and police, seems to corroborate Larmer's findings.) UNITED STATES AID The bulk of U.S. aid to Peru is in the form of economic assistance. (Today nearly one in six Peruvians is fed by the United States.) But economic assistance comes from another source: the fund associated with the Andean Strategy. Andean strategy, narcotics-related funding is divided into economic, military, law enforcement and DEA support. (14: 143) In 1991, the U.S. budgeted $94 million in economic and military aid. Approximately $10 million was to go to the army, in part to train the three Peruvian army counterinsurgency bat- talions. Included would be training by U.S. soldiers. The U.S. Congress canceled the $10 million portion of the package last fall, however, because of continued concerns about human rights abuses by the Peruvian Army. Counternarcotics operations by the army will continue to receive U.S. support (approximately $24 million), and the United States has reportedly sent Green Berets to assist in targeting cocaine production as part of the aid package. (12: 84 and 6: 29) The Green Berets are symbolic of the larger role played by the U.S. Department of Defense which has been assigned as the lead agency in detecting and tracking narcotraffickers. Forces such as U.S. Army Green Berets and Marines have been assigned missions in Latin America of counternarcotics training, intelli- gence collection and analysis, and interdiction. The press has focused on Operation Support Justice which is reportedly part of the Andean Initiative. (7: 18, 19) Targeted in Peru are the regions of the Upper Huallaga Valley where Coca leaves are grown. Military forces under U.S. Southern Command control, working with U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency personnel, may be providing Peruvian counternarcotics and riverine training, while participating in interdiction operations. In addition, air tracking radars and intelligence analysts in and around Peru have reportedly attempted to detect and track the northbound movement of coca by air. The U.S. counternarcotics effort in Peru is not without risks. On January 12, 1992, a U.S. helicopter on a counternar- cotics mission crashed in the Upper Huallaga Valley near Madre Mia, killing three Americans civilians and a Peruvian police officer. Although details on the crash are incomplete, the heli- copter was probably downed by Sendero Luminoso guerrillas operat- ing in the region. The Huey helicopter was flying out of the heavily fortified, U.S.-built base at Santa Lucia. (10: A12) The United States was a direct target later in the year when a bomb was placed outside the U.S. embassy compound in Lima on February 12, 1992. Sendero Luminoso claimed responsibility for the bombing which killed several Peruvian security personnel. The U.S.-aided campaign against Peruvian coca producers will have a far-reaching impact on much of Peruvian society. Prior to 1980, farmers in the Upper Huallaga Valley produced several crops for local consumption, including corn, rice cocoa, coffee, and coca. Contact with the outside world, let alone rest of Peru, was limited, due to the region's isolation on the eastern slopes of the Andes. After 1980, however, the old way of life in the Upper Hual- laga was forever changed. That was when the U.S. market for cocaine took off and outsiders became interested in the coca leaves of the Huallaga. Today nearly three percent of the Peru- vian population is directly support by coca. (8:35) (Interest- ingly, less than three percent of the U.S. population is involved in agriculture.) The farmers in the Upper Huallaga are today completely dependent on the production and sale of coca leaves, cocaine paste and cocaine hydrochloride to outside narcotraffick- ers, mostly in Colombia. This is the region's sole source of foreign exchange. A ROLE FOR THE U.S. MILITARY One of the objectives of the U.S. national strategy is to foster and encourage democracies throughout the world. While far from ideal, the government of Peru is a fledgling democracy. The greatest threat to Peru is not from the growth of coca. It is, rather, from the long neglected internal contradictions of Peru- vian society which have resulted in the birth of the Senderos. While this insurgency movement will not likely succeed in its stated goal of overthrowing the government, it has wrought great death and destruction on the people of Peru. And with this weakening of the social fabric comes the very real possibility of a return to military rule of the country. Not surprisingly, the insurgency has capitalized on the U.S. involvement in counternar- cotics operations in Peru as yet another example of the govern- ment's abuse of the Peruvian underclass. The U.S. military counternarcotics mission is a high risk, potentially open-ended operation. Success will be difficult to gauge, but will be closely evaluated over time by critics of the military. To date, U.S. military involvement in the nation's counternarcotics effort has not led to a discernible decline on the availability of cocaine on the streets at home. (7: 18) Regardless of Sendero propaganda, the U.S. risks alienating itself from Peruvians by siding with the extremely unpopular military in eradication of a crop that in many regions of Peru is the sole source of subsistence. President Fujimori stated as much during a recent visit to San Antonio with other Latin Ameri- can leaders discussing ways to interdict the flow of drugs. (4) The U.S. military is trained and equipped to fight enemy combatants, not civilians. It would be inconceivable for a U.S. soldier to engage in a long-term counternarcotics campaign against American citizens on U.S. soil. Fighting such a war violates the basic tenets of armed conflict. Therefore, U.S. soldiers engaged in a counternarcotics campaign against South Americans does not make good military sense either. There are good reasons for the U.S. to stay engaged with Peru -- providing tacit support to a fragile democracy for one. The consequences of our not attempting to help Peru are dire for Peruvians as well as the other nations of North and South Ameri- ca. And this is where a role for the U.S. military may lie: in helping to stabilize Peru in the near term, so that long-term reform may begin. The U.S. military should focus on training and equipping Peru's counterinsurgency forces. Preferably, these forces would be police rather than the military which remains ill-equipped for the task Fujimori himself states that Sendero is an internal problem. Internal problems are best solved by police, rather than military forces. As discussed earlier, one of the insurgency's vulnerabili- ties appears to be a shortage of firearms. That will probably change as revenues increase from the drug trade. Accordingly, foreign military sales or grants should focus on weaponry best suited for counterinsurgency operations -- not high priced, high status items such as A-37 jets. It has even been proposed that some funds be used to offer cash to Peru's citizenry for guns, thus making it more difficult for the Senderos to obtain them. (12: 85) Finally, the U.S. military should act as a role model to the Peruvian military and police. With counterinsurgency training should also come basic training in the notions of citizenship and human rights. CONCLUSION President Fujimori believes the best way to stem the produc- tion of coca in his country is by offering the 250,000 coca gro- wers an economically viable alternative crop. His plan will be extremely difficult to devise, however, since a coca crop will generally earn a farmer ten times more than any other alternative crop. Still Fujimori sees himself as a man of the people, a unifying force. The primary obstacle in his path is Sendero Luminoso. The role of the U.S. military in Peru, then, clearly lies in the realm of counterinsurgency assistance against Sendero and not in counternarcotics. The United States must look inward for a solution to the country's demand for cocaine, rather than outward to the hills of the Upper Huallaga Valley. Indeed, on the day the U.S. kicks its cocaine habit, Peru's narcotics prob- lem will largely be solved and its government free to focus on the internal problems that destabilize that fledgling democracy. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Cornell, Angela and Kenneth Roberts. "Democracy, Counter- insurgency, and Human Rights: The Case of Peru." Human Rights Quarterly. 12 (November 1990) , 529-553. 2. Dietz, Henry. "Peru's Shining Path as a Revolutionary Movement," Journal of Political and Military Sociology. 18 (Summer 1990) , 123-150. 3. Guillermoprieto, Alma. "Letter From Lima." The New Yorker, October 29, 1990, pp. 116-129. 4. Krauss, Charles. Interview with President Alberto Fujimori. MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour. Public Broadcasting System, WETA, Washington D.C., February 27, 1992. 5. Larmer, Brook. "The Gateway to Heaven, A Trip Inside Peru's Perilous Cocaine Valley." Newsweek. Jan, 20, 1992, p. 41. 6. Lane, Charles, Brook Larmer and Clara Bingham. "Peru: Into the Cross-fire, Can Green Berets Stop Shining-Path?" News- week. August 19, 1991, pp. 29-30. 7. Lane, Charles, Douglas Waller, Brook Larmer and Peter Kate. "The Newest War." Newsweek. January 6, 1992, pp. 18-23. 8. Mabry, Donald J. "Andean Drug Trafficking and the Military Option." Military Review. LXX (March 1990), 29-40. 9. McCormick, Gordon H. "The Shining Path and Peruvian Terror- ism." RAND Document P7297. 1987. 10. Robinson, Eugene. "U.S. Cuts Drug War in Peru." The Wash- ington Post. January 25, 1991, p. A12. 11. Robinson, Eugene. "Peru's Guerrillas Pose New Threat." The Washington Post. February 16, 1992, pp. A51+. 12. Rosenau, William and Linda Head Flanagan. "Blood of the Condor; The Genocidal Talons of Peru's Shining Path." Policy Review. 59 (Winter 1992), 82-85. 13. Rosenberg, Tina. "Beyond Elections." Foreign Policy. 84 (Fall 1991) , 72-91. 14. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Andean Initiative. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., June 1990. 15. U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. "Shining Path Reportedly Kills Two Officials." PA2510162591 Mexico City NOTIMEX, 2059 GMT October 24, 1991, 40. 16. Werlich, David P. "Fujimori and the 'Disaster' in Peru." Current History . 90 (February 1991) , 61-64.
