Regaining Control Of The Modernization Process
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Logistics
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Regaining Control of the Modernization Process
Author: Major R.A. Arnold, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: A difference in perception of risk affects the ability
of commanders to make informed decisions about force modern-
ization. Dif ferences stem from institutional and entrenched
ideas about procurement and require change to restore
responsiveness and ensure the fleet is equipped for modern
warfare.
Background: A difference in perception prompted the writing
of this paper. My experience leaves me with a perception that
the risk attached to helicopter operations is reaching unac-
ceptable levels. A fundamental breakdown in communications
between decision-makers who establish policy and operators in
the field who execute policy, have inhibited the modernization
process. The mission tasks of the helicopter community are
expanding without commensurate investment in technology.
The examples of the AH-1W Night Targeting System and the
reorganization of Marine Aircraft Groups are presented to
illustrate the differences that exist in perception concerning
these programs. Three factors are discussed that influence
internal Marine Corps decision-making: a failure to recognize
the changing nature of the battlefield, a reliance on pilots
to fill the gap between technology shortfalls and expanding
mission requirements, and an institutional approach to systems
acquisition.
The current aviation plan is reviewed and defended as the
best short-term solution to the modernization plan, but only
if it can be executed. A change to the AVPLAN is presented
to increase its viability and provide the Marine Corps with
a mission capability not presently programmed. Decision-making
theory is briefly discussed to provide insight into the
acquisition process; aspects presented include: satisficing
behavior, incrementalism, and bureaucratic politics.
The institutional structure of the Department of the Navy
is presented as a major impediment to the modernization of the
helicopter fleet. It is suggested that broadening the process
to the DOD level and integrating Marine programs into DOD
programs could assist in resolving current impasses.
Recommendations: Acknowledge that the current acquisition
system is both unresponsive and inef ficent and advocate bold
and sweeping changes. Seek compromise on the MV-22 to accelerate
its production and institute changes to remove the bias towards
upgrade approaches to acquisition.
REGAINING CONTROL OF THE MODERNIZATION PROCESS
Thesis Statement. A difference in perception of risk affects
the ability of commanders to make informed decisions about
force modernization. Differences stem from institutional and
entrenched ideas about procurement and require change to restore
responsiveness and ensure the fleet is equipped for modern
warfare.
I. A DIFFERENCE IN PERCEPTION
A. Perspective and Perception
B. Risk Assessment
C. Unacceptable Risk in Helicopter Operations
D. The UH-1N as an Example
1. Cockpit preperation
2. Lack of Tactical Navigation Aids
3. Comparison with Fixed-wing Aircraft
4. Expanding Mission Requirements
5. The view of Decision-makers
II. WE ALL SHARE THE SAME GOAL
A. We are all Marines
B. My Intent
III. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE DIFFERENCE IN PERCEPTION
A. The AH-1W Night Targeting System
1. Requirements
2. Limitations of NTS
3. The Difference in Perception
IV. A SECOND ILLUSTRATION: REORGANIZATION
A. Compositing
1. East Coast Groups
2. West Coast Groups
B. Will Investment be made in Facilities
C. Southwest Asia worked well
V. INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
A. Nature of the Battlefield
B. Technology Shortfalls
C. Institutional Paranoia
VI. THE CURRENT AVIATION PLAN
A. We Live with Past Decisions
B. he Plan must be Executed
C. We must Correct the Process for the Future
VII. DECISION-MAKING
A. Satisficing Behavior
B. Incrementalism
C. Bureaucratic Politics
1. Budget Barginning
2. The MV-22 Fight: Congress v. SECDEF
VIII. IS THE NAVY OUR FRIEND
A. Navy Priorities
B. The Navy View of the Budget
IX. JOINT OPERATIONS
A. A DOD Problem
B. An Aging Fleet
C. A Credible Capability
X. BROADENING THE PERSPECTIVE
A. Broaden the Prespective to a DOD Perspective
B. Integration of Research and Development
C. Apply Proven Concepts
XI. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE AVIATION PLAN
A. A Replacment for the UH-1N
B. A Continuing Requirement
C. Being Realistic
D. Proposal for Acquisistion
E. Politics are Key
XII. THE MODERNIZATION OF MARINE HELICOPTERS
A. A Bridge between Constituencies
B. Sister Service Support
C. Funding Changes
REGAINING CONTROL OF THE MODERNIZATION PROCESS
by Major Roy A. Arnold
A DIFFERENCE IN PERCEPTION
An aspect often overlooked in the interpretation of high
level decisions is the influence that perspective and perception
have on decision-making. Differences of perspective are perhaps
easiest to understand. A squadron or battalion commander is
concerned with mission requirements today and tomorrow.
Headquarters Marine Corps is by necessity, concerned with
mission requirements not only today, but ten years from today.
Headquarters is forced to assess competing requirements over
time, accepting risk when resources preclude covering both the
needs of today and the projected needs of tomorrow.
Risk assessment and acceptance are appropriate tools at
every level of command. Acceptance of risk is not ignoring
risk. It means the delibrate recognition of a problem beyond
the capability of the commander to resolve. When risk is
identified the commander must develop a plan to limit its
impact on mission accomplishment. The scope of assessment is
set by where you sit in the decision chain and therefore how
you perceive a particular risk. The commander for whom a risk
is a primary day-to-day concern will view it differently, and
assign' it more importance, than a superior for whom the risk
is only one of many that affect the various units under his
command.
A difference in perception prompted the writing of this
paper. My experience leaves me with a "perception" that the
risk attached to helicopter operations is reaching unacceptable
levels. Further, that this view is not shared by headquarters,
nor is the frustration of the fleet pilot even understood.
That a difference exists in perception between a pilot and
headquarters is by itself not a surprising fact; but the extent
of that difference is such that I find it disturbing. For
example, when General Gray visited Southwest Asia he was
surprised when told AH-1W's were not equipped for night
anti-mechanized missions; his "perception" was that night-
fighting systems had been in the fleet for some period of
time.1 This represents a fundamental breakdown in
communications between the decision-maker who establishes
policy and the operator in the field who must execute the
policy.
To illustrate the frustration within the helicopter com-
munity, let me present a typical example. A UH-1N crew preparing
for a mission requiring night vision goggles (NVG), walks to
the aircraft (that may be older than they are) carrying
cardboard, duct-tape, an assortment of paper maps, chemlights,
flashlights, and other paraphernalia. In the next few minutes
they will use the cardboard to extend the glareshield to reduce
the reflection of light from cockpit instruments, use the
duct-tape to cover light sources not suppressed by blue-light
kits, and strategically place maps and other mission essential
items where they will not interfere with control of the aircraft.
The UH-1N has no tactical navigation aids to assist in
mission completion. A map and stop watch will get the crew and
passengers to the objective, this requires one of the pilots
to concentrate solely on navigation and a scan largely inside
the aircraft. At terrain flight altitudes, a second set of
eyes outside the aircraft can mean the difference between life
and death; the crew and passengers assume a risk to offset a
lack of technology.
The need for a modern platform has been identified for
well over a decade without a replacement being programmed; the
explanation is always one of fiscal constraint.2 Yet while
taxing to the runway, the UH-1N crew will more then likely
pass night attack AV-8B's or F-18D's equipped with state of
the art navigation, nightvision, survivability, and targeting
systems. To the helicopter crew this makes it hard not to
feel that they and their passengers are "second-class citizens"
more expendable than their fixed-wing counterparts.
Even when the community gets a "new" aircraft, the disparity
in approach to modernization as compared to the fixed-wing
community is striking. The AH-1W is the community's newest
aircraft. I fly the AH-1W and find people amazed when I tell
them that this "new" aircraft can't autonomously fire its
primary weapons system, the HELLFIRE missile;3 that I have no
range finding capability other than my eyes and a map study;
and that the AH-1W is the only attack helicopter in the world
produced in the 1980's which has no fire control system for
gun or rocket delivery; when I pull the trigger it's based on
preflight study of ballistic tables, good old Kentucky windage
and experience.
The frustration is compounded when, without the benefit
of investment in technology, aircrew are tasked with expanded
mission tasking: maritime interdiction, gas and oil platform
operations, and military operations in urban terrain. All
represent new challenges to be conquered solely through reliance
on aircrew innovation. A recent statement that the fiscal
constraints of the 90 `s would require imagination and innovation
to meet coming challenges is not well received by a community
that has already been doing just that for the last decade.
From the perspective of the cockpit it seems decision-makers
are not aware of the degree of risk crews have come to accept
as a daily matter of course, nor the growing feeling that the
envelope has expanded as far as possible with aircraft
essentially designed for the permissive environment (by todays
standards) of Vietnam.
The view of decision-makers is quite different. The 1990's
are viewed as a period when the helicopter community will
undergo unprecedented modernization. The modernization plan
revolves around the acquisition of the MV-22 as a replacement
for the CH-46. The remainder of the plan continues the goal
of reducing the types of aircraft operated by the Marine Corps,
upgrading remaining aircraft to better operate at night and
in adverse weather, and reorganizing Marine Aircraft Groups
for combat.4 These seem admirable goals that should be supported
by the fleet, but the truth is that the plan is viewed with
some reservation. Why?
WE ALL SHARE THE SAME GOAL
Before answering that question I need to point out that
fleet pilot and decision-maker are first and foremost, Marines.
We share the common goal of sustaining the Marine Corps rep-
utation as the nations primer fighting force. Nothing in my
remarks should be taken as an indication that I believe
individual Marines have forsaken that commitment. My exposure
to those involved in force modernization leaves me convinced
that the system is doing its best to meet the needs of the
fleet. Having said that, however, doesn't change the fact
that the aircraft we fly today and for the projected future
are not what they should be. I hope to reconcile the disparity
between the intent of the acquisition system and the reality
of the state of the fleet.
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE DIFFERENCE IN PERSPECTIVE
This is a complex problem and it is difficult to know where
to begin; let me start by sketching an example of how a program
can be viewed quite differently according to where you sit.
The AH-1W, as mentioned earlier, is without a nightf ighting
capability to autonomously fire either the TOW or HELLFIRE
missile at night.5 The fleet stated an operational requirement
for systems to solve this problem: a Helicopter Night Vision
system to assist in flying the aircraft and acquiring targets,
and a laser designator for HELLFIRE engagements. The fleet
saw the main requirement as a FLIR with repeater scopes in
both cockpits to allow for navigation and terrain avoidance
during tactical maneuvering, as well as the ability to acquire
and identify targets.
The Night Targeting System (NTS) currently funded in the
AVPLAN limits the FLIR picture to the gunners telescopic sight
unit (TSU) and because of the small dimensions of the sight,
to a one inch by one inch picture. The NTS can only be used
when the gunner places his face in the TSU, the pilot has no
ability to use the NTS for navigation, terrain avoidance, or
target identification. Additionally, the small screen limits
resolution, making target identification problematic. The
feeling is that the aircraft would have to close to ranges
that place it in a high probability kill zone before we could
break-out targets from background clutter and positively
identify a hostile; not to mention the fact that the pilot in
command cannot confirm that the gunner is engaging the right
target. 6
This sets the stage for the difference in perception. The
decision-maker believes the fleets needs are met by NTS and
is committed to fielding the system. Criticism that might
endanger the systems funding is discouraged. The fleet on the
other hand is faced with a dilemma; while NTS is deficient in
nightfighting capability, it does provide the laser designator
and range finder desperately needed. The fleet pilot is
concerned that if NTS is cancel led he gets no enhanced capa-
bility, but also concerned that if NTS is fielded he will never
see the true nightf ighting system that was the original cause
for the program. This is probably an overly pessimistic
perception, but it is important that decision-makers know it
exists and that the expectations of the fleet, realistic or
not, are not being met.
A SECOND ILLUSTRATION: REORGANIZATION
Reorganization of Marine Aircraft Groups to enhance combat
readiness is another aspect of the AVPLAN that can be viewed
differently according to where you sit. At face value, com-
positing helicopter groups to provide the full range of assault
support would seem a great idea; and if this were a perfect
world with unlimited resources, it would make great sense.
Indeed, on the east coast, MAG-26 and MAG-29 have enjoyed this
organizational concept for years. However, east coast groups
reside on the same airfield and therefore share much of the
infrastructure (simulators, test-cells, warehouses, air
traffic control, etc..) necessary to sustain operations. The
west coast groups due to their size, require separate facilities
and are unable to benefit from the consolidation of infra-
structure. The cost of duplicate facilities would represent
a significant investment.
The concern is that reorganization will be instituted
without necessary facilities being in place, thereby requiring
fleet units to operate in austere conditions, at greater cost,
and with no guarantee that out-years will see resources made
available to bring facilities up to standard. There is ample
historical precedent to make the concern a real one, this
wouldn't be the first time the Marine Corps absorbed the cost
of reorganization internally.
Additionally, one has to ask the basic question, why?
MAG-16 and MAG-26 were both task organized for Southwest Asia
( a concept I thought was a Marine Corps selling point stressing
our flexibility ) and did exceptionally well.7 At a time of
dwindling resources, should we divert assets to address a
marginal gain in an area where we are already successful? I
feel we should look on this area as one where we can economize
and husband our resources for more pressing problems.
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
This leads us back to the question of why this situation
exists. I believe that problems with helicopter modernization
stem from three causes:
A failure to recognize the changing nature of the
battlefield.
A reliance on pilots to fill the gap between technology
shortfalls and expanding mission requirements.
An institutional approach to systems acquisition.
NATURE OF THE BATTLEFIELD
Marines may recognize that the battlefield is changing,
but they have not made the connection to its impact on mission
requirements. The tempo of Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
operations results in short term focus on known missions,
primarily battalion level tactics supported from amphibious
shipping. Prior to Desert Storm, operations above the division
level held.little relevance for most Marines. Marine Expe-
ditionary Force (MEF) operations translate to increased time,
space, and sustainment issues that differ from battalion
operations and must be addressed in both our concept of the
battlefield and in the systems we procure. The Marine sector
of the battlefield in Operation Desert Storm extended from
assembly areas south of the Kuwaiti border to the northern
suburbs of Kuwait City, from the shores of the Persian Gulf
to Kuwait's far western border: an area of 10,000 square miles.
Deficiencies in helicopter survivability, navigation, range,
and night-fighting capabilities constrained commanders in the
employment of helicopters on the battlefield.
TECHNOLOGY SHORTFALLS
Second, Marines are famous for making due with less and
never saying a mission is beyond their capability. In the
helicopter community, this meant that while mission require-
ments changed drastically in the 1980's, the equipment to
support the changes was not forthcoming; commanders dealt with
the shortfalls by asking pilots to press the envelope and
accept greater risks. Pilots did press the envelope and
completed their assigned missions, but the fleet also sustained
losses in airframes, passengers and crews which I believe in
part could have been saved with appropriate investment in
technology.
I realize this is a strong statement, but it is one that
I feel is justified. A review of accident statistics shows
that pi lot error continues as a leading cause of helicopter
accidents. To the layman, a finding of pilot error would seem
to be definitive, the pilot made a mistake causing the aircraft
to crash. The problem is the pilot not the aircraft. To a
safety officer, a finding of pilot error is only a starting
point for further investigation, pilot error only describes
the endstate, it doesn't explain why the "error" was made.
When you place pilots in a low altitude, high threat environment,
require that they navigate by map, do it at night on NVG's,
operate at maximum range, and do it with aircraft designed for
Vietnam, you have to ask yourself why more "errors" aren't
made. There is a point where human capability is exceeded and
no amount of training will substitute for providing the pilot
with technology to bring the mission back to an acceptable
risk level.
INSTITUTIONAL PARANOIA
Last, and related to our desire to do more with less, and
a very real paranoia that if we ask for too much we won't get
anything, is the Marine Corps approach to system acquisition.
Institutional in its reflection of the points made above,
weapon systems are bought with known deficiencies with the
hope that upgrades will be funded in the future. This worked
in the past but represents a gamble that the "balloon" won't
go up before problems are fixed with block upgrades. The AH-1W
is a perfect example: bought without a night targeting system
or laser designator, it was recognized as deficient when
purchased; block upgrades (NTS) are planned, but the balloon
did go up in August 1990 and Marines went to war tactically
constrained.
THE CURRENT AVIATION PLAN
The news is not all bad. The current AVPLAN has the
potential to meet the majority of the fleets needs if executed
as planned. My initial perception of a large disconnect between
the fleet and headquarters was not entirely justified. It has
to be recognized that we are living with decisions and concepts
of procurement which predate the individuals involved in today' s
decision-making. I think all would have preferred a modern-